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The Growth of the American Republic

by

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PREFACE

In writing this text-book, the authors have kept two principles in mind. The one is that the American college student should be addressed as a man rather than a boy: that the history of his country should be told to him with complete candor, without *suppressio veri* or *suggestio falsi*. The other, that history is simply a true story, a moving picture in prose of the past, to be told not only honestly and accurately, but with artistic skill. Of the joint authors, Professor Morison is a New England historian, trained in the severe school of Channing, Haskins, and Turner, yet inheriting the literary tradition of Parkman and Adams. Professor Commager is a Middle-Westerner with Southern affiliations, indoctrinated with the critical spirit of McLaughlin and Dodd. Each has brought his peculiar gifts to this work, and their collaboration has produced, we believe, the first short history of the American people to combine the scientific d catholic spirit of the modern university-trained historian, with literary charm of the classic writers of American history.

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
UNITED STATES
OF
AMERICA
1790
Miles
0 50 100 150 200 250
Area of Settlement in 1790.
BOSTON Towns thus, had a population of 8,000 or over in 1790
Natchez Towns thus, remained in British or Spanish possession until 1796 or 1798.
OSAGE Names of Indian Tribes.
Boundary of Indian country according to Act of 19 May 1796.
HUDSON'S BAY Co.
LOWER CANADA
UPPER CANADA
NEW BRUNSWICK
NOVA SCOTIA
MAINE (to Mass.)
NORTH WEST TERRITORY
MICHIGAN TERRITORY
ILLINOIS 1818
INDIANA 1815
OHIO 1802
KENTUCKY 1792
SOUTH WEST TERRITORY
TENNESSEE 1796
STATE OF FRANKLIN 1784-88
NEW YORK
PENNSYLVANIA
MASS.
CONN.
NEW JERSEY
DELAWARE
MARYLAND
VIRGINIA
NORTH CAROLINA
SOUTH CAROLINA
GEORGIA
WEST FLORIDA
EAST FLORIDA
SPANISH LOUISIANA
(Ceded to France 1800 to U.S. 1803)
Annexed to U.S. 1810
Annexed to U.S. 1813
LAKE SUPERIOR
LAKE MICHIGAN
LAKE HURON
LAKE ERIE
LAKE ONTARIO
LAKE OF THE WOODS
CHIPPEWA
DAKOTAH
WINNEBAGO
SAUX
FOX
OTTAWA
POTAWATOMI
KICKAPOO
WYANDOT
DELAWARE
WEA
PIANKASHAW
SHAWNEE
OSAGE
CHEROKEE
CHICKAMAUGA
CHICKASAW
CHOCTAW
UPPER CREEK
LOWER CREEK
BOSTON
NEW YORK
PHILADELPHIA
BALTIMORE
CHARLESTON
Natchez
Pensacola
New Orleans
Michilmackinac
Mason & Dixon's Line
W.T. Wright


CHICKASAW
ibigbee R.
Mississippi R.
Yazoo R.
Walnut Hills
(Vicksburg)
CHOCTAW
Natchez
Pearl R.
Alabama R.
Coosa R.
Turkey Town
Hillabees
Coosee Old Town
UPPER CREEK
LOWER CREEK
Chattahoochee R.
G
Flint R.
Annexed to U.S.
Annexed to U.S.
WEST FLORIDA
1810
1813
Perdido R.
Pensacola
New Orleans
Apalachicola R.
EAST
32
30
90
88
86
84

THE GROWTH
of the
AMERICAN REPUBLIC

I

LIBERTY AND EMPIRE

1. *The Imperial Problem*

THE roots of American history go deep down into the past of colonial and European experience, and into the more intangible realm of the spirit. We may trace the germ of American nationality to the Virginia Assembly of 1619 and the Mayflower Compact of 1620; but it was not until 1763 that the Thirteen Colonies began to strain at their imperial leash. The generation that came to maturity between the Peace of Paris and the inauguration of President Washington had to solve more serious and original political problems than any later generation of Americans. It was then that the great beacons of American principles, such as the Declaration of Independence, the Virginia Bill of Rights, and the Federal Constitution, were lighted; it was then that institutions of permanent and profound import in the history of America and of liberty were crystallized. The period was not only revolutionary and destructive, but creative and constructive; moreover the British connection was not the most important thing that was destroyed, nor was national independence the most important thing that was created. A new federal empire was erected on the ruins of the old empire, American ideals proclaimed, and the American character defined, if not created.

This period from 1763 to 1789 has a singular unity, from which the rush of events and the din of arms can easily distract our attention. We must not let the high-strung debates that preceded the American Revolution, or the vivid events of the War for Independence, hide from us the real meaning of these years. Just as the Greek tragedies of the Periclean Age are concerned not merely with the conflicts of gods and heroes, but with the depths of human nature; just as the stories of the Old Testament explore the mysterious relation between God and man, so we may discern, behind the noisy conflict of words and arms in the American Revolution, the stirring of a political problem older than recorded history: the balancing of liberty with order. That underlay all the tumult and the shouting. And this ancient question between liberty and order resolves itself into two: the horizontal or federal problem of distributing power between one central and many regional governments; and the vertical or democratic one of how far the masses of mankind shall be entrusted with control. These two problems are the warp and woof of American history; and the web that they wove between 1763 and 1789 set a pattern that even the complexities of the industrial and machine age have not yet obliterated.

We choose the date 1763 because it marks the end of the Seven Years' War, which like most wars, created more problems than it solved. The Seven Years' War, waged in the American wilderness, on the plains of Silesia, in the jungles of India, and on three oceans, was one of many conflicts between France and Britain for control of world trade and territory — the 'second Hundred Years' War' which closed only at Waterloo. The Peace of Paris of 1763 marked the culmination of this struggle for the American continent, and left France stripped of her proud empire and Great Britain perched on heights of victory so magnificent that few English subjects could look about them without becoming dizzy. 'The Romans were triflers to us,' boasted Horace Walpole, and urged his fellow countrymen to burn their Greek and Latin books, 'Histories of little peoples.'[1]

By the terms of this treaty, France ceded to Great Britain all her possessions east of the Mississippi, and the Iberville rivers, including Canada; and to Spain her territories in Louisiana west of the Mississippi, including New Orleans; retaining for herself only the sugar islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe and two fishing stations off the coast of Newfoundland. Spain at the same time surrendered the Floridas to the British. England and Spain alone remained in North America of the several naval powers that once contested for dominion; and the struggle between their two races did not end until another treaty of Paris, in 1898, expelled the proudest nation of the Old World from empire in the New.

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[1] A typical example of colonial enthusiasm is recorded in the journal of John Boyle of Boston for 1762. 'Sept. 16. Public Rejoicings on Acct. of the Reduction of Havannah, Sermon preach'd by Dr. Sewall, Cadets mustered, Bells rung, Batteries fired, Concert of Musick, the Town illuminated, Bonfires, etc. Many loyal Healths drank, a vast quantity of Liquor consumed, and General Winslow of Plymouth so intoxicated as to jump on the Table and break a great Number of Bowls, Glasses, etc.'

In excluding the French from continental North America, the British government took over more responsibility than it could handle. At one stroke the British possessions in North America were more than doubled in extent, and a race alien in language and religion was brought into the empire. Baffling questions of Indian relations, fur trade, land policy, and military and political administration were created. In short, Great Britain faced more urgently than ever before the great riddle of imperial organization, and the history of her relations with her older American colonies during the next twenty-five years can be related largely as an attempt to find a solution. Yet American independence was only a half-solution, for the independent States found themselves confronted with the same difficulties, and did not find a way out until they adopted the Federal Constitution of 1787.

From 1763 to 1775 Americans naturally asserted their rights, while Englishmen reminded them of their duties; yet the thinking men on both sides of the Atlantic were grappling with the same task: how to organize this vast empire so that the military, political, and economic interests of the whole would be furthered, the various parts nicely adjusted to each other, and a certain degree of local autonomy preserved. Men who were at best bewildered by the difficulties and at worst indifferent and ignorant, had to face or to evade these practical issues. Americans argued and until 4 July, 1776, fought, not for independence, but for a guaranteed free status within the empire. Englishmen until 1775 agreed, and until 1782 fought, not to reduce Americans to political 'slavery,' but to their 'proper place' in the empire: to a political status similar to that which Porto Rico and the Philippines enjoy in the American empire of today.

2. *Empire and Colonists*

Let us analyze the major elements of this problem of imperial order. For two centuries the British Empire had been a commercial one, dominated largely by merchants in profitable alliance with the landed gentry, and developing in accordance with the philosophy of mercantilism. Mercantilism meant the creation of an economically self-sufficient state which might compete on favorable terms with rival states. English mercantilism differed from the Continental in its emphasis upon trading overseas rather than developing home industries, but both types aimed at the same thing — the furtherance of the power and glory of the nation. It was mercantilism that planted Virginia, that fostered and developed colonial commerce and agriculture by the Navigation Act, bounties, and preferential tariffs, that defended the colonies against the French and Spanish, and extended their boundaries at the expense of all and sundry. This mercantilism looked to the establishment of a powerful and economically self-sufficient empire, with its center in England, its outposts flung over the whole earth. The mainland colonies of North America were the largest, but not the most valuable of these outposts. They were, however, an integral part of the imperial system. They were expected to furnish raw material for English manufacture, to consume part of the finished product and to aid in the development of the merchant marine and the navy; in return they obtained military and naval defense, and a protected or even exclusive market for their products in England. In this reciprocal arrangement the colonies had been allowed no voice, but with it they were on the whole well satisfied in 1763; and as long as the empire remained commercial rather than political in motive, there was little protest.

The mercantile policy of the old empire was of course dictated from its center, not from its periphery; and the interests that received primary consideration were those of the privileged ruling classes of England rather than the colonial masses. England in the eighteenth century was a land of privilege, a land, as Oliver Goldsmith saw it,

> . . . To hastening ills a prey
> Where wealth accumulates and men decay.

The ruling oligarchy, an alliance of the merchant with the tory squire, controlled the government, the church, the law, the wealth, and the society of the nation. This class composed a small minority of the population which controlled Parliament and much beside. The Church justified to God the ways of this class, the Universities formulated its philosophy, the Law was subservient to its interests; while all united to applaud Pope's dictum that

> In spite of pride, in erring reason's spite,
> One thing is sure, whatever is, is right.

The interests of this ruling class were primarily commercial, and it regarded the empire, quite properly, as a commercial empire, various parts of which were valuable only in so far as they contributed to the wealth of England, and more particularly of the privileged groups in England, whose representatives were never absent from the halls of Parliament. The mechanism of this commercial empire was the group of Acts of Trade and Navigation — a series of some hundred laws regulating the trade and commerce of the empire as a whole. These acts, much more liberal than those of any other continental empire of eighteenth-century Europe, were designed to bring the satellite colonies into their proper dependent relation to the English sun. When first imposed, after the Restoration of Charles II, they were resisted both in New England and Virginia, but by 1700 colonial interests had adjusted themselves to the system. By 1730 with few exceptions they were taken for granted, just as we take it for granted that we must ship goods from New York to San Francisco or Manila on an American ship, and that we must pay duties on imports from foreign countries. There was a certain amount of smuggling, just as there is today; and one or two unsound laws that hurt colonial interests were systematically evaded, just as the Volstead Act was generally evaded in the United States.

The immense acquisitions of the Seven Years' War produced a subtle transition from commercial to territorial imperialism, from the idea of governing colonies with a view to their trade, to governing colonies with a view to their revenue and man power. This meant, as Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts wrote, that 'there must be an abridgment of so-called English Liberties in America.' The new idea did not replace the old, but reinforced the mercantile idea, so that the Acts of Trade were tightened up and strengthened to an extent that began to work real hardships on important colonial interests. Just as today we are told we need a bigger navy because we have a wider commerce, and that we must have a larger merchant marine to support the bigger navy; so in the years after 1763 British statesmen felt that because they had a bigger empire to defend, they must have a bigger army and navy. That would cost money, and unless the British taxpayer supplied it all, the colonies must contribute; and revenue could be got out of the colonies only through a stronger central administration, at the expense of colonial self-government. The Thirteen Colonies tried to escape this vicious circle by squaring it, and finally broke through with independence. Then they found much the same problem of adjustment between parts and whole confronting their new nation. Federalism — a form of government which seemed just as absurd to eighteenth-century Englishmen as squaring the circle does to twentieth-century mathematicians — federalism provided America with a solution.

Whatever measures might be decided on for the colonies, English rulers had to reckon with the Americans, about two million of them scattered unevenly along the Atlantic coast, and on adjacent islands. These colonies had been planted in a variety of ways, and developed by different interested groups: trading companies, religious bodies, individual proprietors — but all owed their origin to private enterprise. While nominally the colonies owed allegiance to the king, and obedience to his government, actually most of them until 1660 were practically independent. Property and power had been granted recklessly to corporations and proprietors, with the result that the mother country found herself the nominal mistress of free centrifugal communities. In the seventeenth century England's domestic problems, rebellions, and revolutions combined with distance to produce that negative policy known as ' salutary neglect.' But under the impetus of competition from the France of Mazarin and Colbert, and in the shadow of the growing French Empire in America, this policy of neglect was gradually abandoned and replaced by a policy of centralization and royal control.

It began very early, under the Stuart kings, and was stimulated by the series of wars with France which began in 1688. Administrative efficiency, military effectiveness and commercial development made it desirable that the American colonies be brought under some more uniform and unified control. The short-lived Dominion of New England of 1685-89 was a foreshadowing of the eighteenth-century policy, and by the time of the outbreak of the French and Indian War, 1754, every British colony except four was a royal province with a fairly uniform government connected in sundry ways with the administrative machine at London, and in the two proprietary provinces, Pennsylvania and Maryland, the Crown had become more powerful than the proprietors.

This movement toward imperial centralization was neither superficial nor ineffective. In many ways the royal government made itself felt in the administration of the American colonies: royal governors, customs officials, admiralty judges, land officers and others were appointed by the Crown; a large number of the acts of Parliament were extended to the American colonies: the woolen act of 1699, the post-office act of 1710, the paper money act of 1751 and very many others.

All the acts of the colonial legislatures were subject to disallowance by the king in Council; and about five per cent of them were so disallowed.

This imperial regulation never accorded well with the colonial temper. Numerous controversies between the royal governors and the colonial assemblies over questions of revenue, land, trade, government, and military affairs, showed colonial restlessness. Commercial regulations were flouted, quit-rents often unpaid, the king's woods felled, and military aid frequently withheld in time of need. For there was developing in the American colonies a powerful spirit of independence and self-sufficiency that paralyzed the well-meant efforts of the mother to make them effective units under imperial control. One of the early governors of Virginia had announced, 'We hope to plant a nation where none before hath stood,' and that pious hope was within sight of fulfilment long before the Declaration of Independence gave formal recognition of the fact. By 1763 America contained a sturdy, self-reliant people with their own political and social institutions, with a distinct idea of their own economic interests, living their own life and impatient of any outside control or regulation.

And so there had grown up in the American colonies a large body of colonists accustomed to managing their own political, economic and religious affairs. Alongside these, men and women of a different race and background slowly ranged themselves. Scotch, Irish, Germans, Swiss, French and others had come to the New World; people alien to the English tradition, but falling easily into the American temper. Indeed the numerous Scotch-Irish and Germans who established themselves on the frontiers took very unkindly to control of any sort.

These then were the elements with which the imperial statesmen of eighteenth-century England had to contend: colonists trained to self-government and impatient of interference; self-reliant and enterprising merchants, politically conscious mechanics, planters proudly refractory to imperial discipline, sturdy yeomen of the uplands who lived their own lives, knowing little and caring less for the laws and regulations of the empire; Scotch-Irish who remembered Londonderry, Catholic Irish who had not forgotten Cromwell; Germans who loved their new homes but knew not Britain; colonial assemblies sensitive to any infringement on what they regarded as their constituents' rights. And it was ominous for the future that very few of the American colonists were capable of thinking imperially; that all but a small minority were aggressively determined to go their own ways and live their own lives here in the America they had converted from a wilderness to a home.

3. *The Albany Plan and the Seven Years' War*

Before the Seven Years' War an attempt was made to bring the imperial machinery up-to-date. On the instance of the Board of Trade, a congress of delegates elected by the assemblies of seven colonies met at Albany in June, 1754. After declaring a colonial union 'absolutely necessary for their preservation,' the Congress adopted a plan drafted by Benjamin Franklin. This Albany Plan of Union, though never adopted, was prophetic. With remarkable foresight it allotted matters of general concern to a central body, and left those of a local nature to the individual colonies: much as the Constitution of 1787 divided power among the Federal government and the states. There would have been a President-General appointed and supported by the Crown, and a Grand Council chosen triennially by the colonial assemblies; the number of representatives from each colony to be determined by the amount paid by that colony into the general treasury — a typical bit of Franklin foxiness. This government would have had power to make war and peace with the Indians, to regulate their trade, to purchase Indian lands, found and regulate new settlements, to raise military and naval forces, to levy taxes and customs duties 'such as may be collected with the least inconvenience to the people,' and to appoint a general treasurer and a particular treasurer in each colony to collect these moneys. Franklin always believed that the adoption of this system might have averted the Revolution. It was certainly a practical solution to the problem of imperial order, and served as a basis for the later attempts to solve the same problem within the United States. There is a definite continuity between the Albany Plan, the Articles of Confederation, and the Federal Constitution; and Franklin was the author of the one, principal architect of the second, and a very influential member of the body which adopted the third.

The Albany Plan failed, however, of adoption. 'The Assemblies . . . thought there was too much *prerogative* in it,' wrote Franklin, 'and in England it was judged to have too much of the *democratic*.' The colonial assemblies objected to granting to any 'foreign' body any taxing power; and it was not until they had experienced two great wars that in 1788 they finally made up their minds to do that. Hence the colonies weathered the war without any further union than came from the old imperial organization. Although that war began in Washington's conflict with the French in the Pennsylvania wilderness, although it was waged for American objectives: the fur trade, western land, the Ohio valley and the extension of the southern frontier; and although the colonies asked for and obtained sufficient aid from England to attain these objectives, their own part in it was secondary. Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New York alone contributed their full quota of soldiers to the common cause. Elsewhere there was a woeful lack of co-operation. Requisitions of men and money were flouted. Commercial regulations were evaded. Trade with the enemy flourished. This was not due to disloyalty, for the colonies were eager to win; but to lack of sufficient imperial control to override the petty bickerings and jealousies within each colony. Pennsylvania would not levy taxes unless her proprietor conceded what he considered his right of tax-exemption. Virginia, whose most unmilitary spirit was deplored by young Lieutenant-Colonel Washington, would have her levies controlled by a board of directors, until the Governor gave up his 'fee of a pistole.' The most pressing exigencies of defense were used by colonial assemblies, proprietors, and royal governors, to score points on one another, or to force some concession on internal matters. It was left to the regular army and navy, directed by the matchless strategy of Pitt, to gain the victories that won the war.

Naturally experience such as this taught all thoughtful men that the imperial fabric was defective, and that a thorough reformation was necessary before the next war came. And the fruits of victory placed a fresh strain on the fabric, which broke it asunder.

4. *The West*

The West was the fourth and most immediate element in the problem of imperial reorganization. There had been difficulties of adjustment between the old-settled, the newly-settled and the unsettled regions for at least a century before 1763, and there were such difficulties for more than a century after. This western problem may be likened to a rope of many strands, now twisted in a regular pattern, but more often tangled with each other, and with strands from other ropes, or tortured into Gordian knots which only war could sever. Of these strands we can distinguish as the most important, the international and military problem, the Indian problem, the fur trade, the problem of territorial administration and land policy, and the political problem, particularly with reference to the French Canadians.

The international aspect of it: whether the American West would be won by France, Spain or Great Britain, or partitioned among them, was only partially solved by the Seven Years' War. To the south and west of the new British possessions lay the vast empire of Spain, well organized, if sparsely populated. Though Spain had indeed fallen far from her high estate, she was still, in the eighteenth century, a power to be reckoned with, still the largest and the most powerful engine in the New World, extending in a vast crescent from West Florida to the Mississippi and northward until it was lost in the Great Plains. Under Charles III, the ablest monarch since Philip IV, Spain became aggressive and expanding for a brief space. Jealously she guarded Mexico; and in spite of her acquisition of a new bulwark in the shape of Louisiana, she was eager to recover the two Floridas which had gone to England, and the east bank of the Mississippi as well.

Although the Peace of 1763 finally disposed of the French danger to the English colonies, they were by no means sure of it; and events both in America and Europe have proved that France does not lightly renounce territory which she has relinquished by force. Indeed Napoleon's recovery of Louisiana in 1800 vindicated the fears of 1763. The French government continued mischievous intrigues with its former Indian allies, and kept its finger on the pulse of colonial discontent.

While the danger from French and Spanish ambition loomed always on the horizon, and served both as excuse and justification for military preparedness, the Indian danger was very real and present. Pontiac's conspiracy of 1763 was the most formidable Indian outbreak of the century. Goaded to desperation by the tactics of the English traders and trappers, affronted by the refusal of the English to continue the French practice of annual gifts, and foreseeing the occupation of their hunting grounds by English settlers, the Indians of the Ohio valley formed a grand confederacy under the leadership of the gifted Pontiac, chief of the Ottowa. Thousands of warriors were enlisted in this last great effort to drive the white men into the Atlantic. Every western fort except Detroit and Fort Pitt was captured by the savages, the frontier was ravaged from Niagara to Virginia, hundreds of pioneer families were murdered, and thousands sent scurrying back to safety. Virginia and Maryland struck back at the foe; but Pennsylvania, the worst sufferer, failed to provide adequate defense for her frontiersmen. The uprising was finally crushed not by Americans, but by British red coats. If the colonies could not even co-operate for their own defense against the Indians, could there be any doubt that stronger imperial control was needed?

Nor was the Indian question merely one of military offense; it was much more complicated than that. How were the Indians to be treated after they had been brought to terms? Should their hunting grounds be reserved for them in the interests of humanity and the fur trade, or, if not, by what means were they to be secured against speculators and land-hungry frontiersmen? In short it was imperative to work out some broad Indian policy; to provide not only for present emergency but for future developments. Such a task was preëminently one that required centralized control.

Closely connected with the Indian problem was the fur trade. From the time of the earliest settlements in North America, peltry had played a great part in American development. It had dominated the economic life of Canada, West Florida, and for a time New York, Carolina and Louisiana; it had drawn explorers and *coureurs de bois* into the far interior; and rivalry between traders and warfare between their governments came as a natural result. This fur trade was always a major stake in the winning of the West; it was a main factor in American foreign relations through the War of 1812, and again in the struggle for Oregon and the upper Missouri. It was not merely an international rivalry, but a ruthless competition among people of the same country, in a business which knew no ethics; and this competition became more intense when the Peace of Paris opened up a new field for colonial and English greed. Lord Shelburne declared in 1775, 'The peltry or skin trade, my lords, is a matter which I presume to affirm is of the last importance to the trade and commerce of the colonies and this country. The regulation of this business has cost his Majesty's ministers more time and trouble than any one matter that I know of.' As fast as the peltry of one region was exhausted, the trappers and traders moved farther west, where they competed with the Spaniards for an Indian clientele; or by too eager salesmanship they stirred up the nearer Indians, who retaliated on the nearest white family. So here was another ungrateful task for the harrassed officials at Whitehall: regulation of a group of unprincipled traders who could not be brought to see that contented Indians produced the most fur. And this aspect too of the Western problem was inherited by the United States government.

More perplexing and more permanent than any of these questions was the problem of territorial administration and land policy. This problem, again, was as old as the first English settlement in America and has remained to vex American politics until almost the present day. Should the extensive domain acquired from the French, Spaniards and Indians be conserved as an Indian and hunting reserve or opened in whole or part to white settlement? If the latter, should it be regarded as a source of revenue, and assessed with quit-rents, or should the quick settling of it be encouraged? And if so, how? By ceding it to land companies in large tracts, or in small farms to individual settlers? And for what price? Although the home government did not go very deeply into this question, it sincerely desired so to regulate settlement as to protect the settler and profit the empire.

All these questions of policy, baffling enough in themselves, were complicated by politics and by land speculation. The prize of millions of acres was a very alluring one, and excited the cupidity and rapaciousness of men everywhere in America and in England. Land companies with names such as the Loyal, Green Briar, Philadelphia, Mississippi, Illinois, and Ohio, had been formed, even before the conclusion of the war, with a view to securing large tracts of land in the contested region. These companies had their agents in Parliament, their spokesmen in the Cabinet even, and the Board of Trade was bombarded with petitions for immense grants of land in the new West.

While land speculators filled the political air with the noise of their demands, the claims of the American colonies, and of individual colonists could not be ignored. Almost every colony claimed land in the West. The rights of some, such as Virginia, were long-established and well-founded; the claims of others, such as New York, were doubtful and tenuous. It was clear that almost any policy which Great Britain adopted would step on someone's corns, arouse clamor, and engender hatred. But everyone will now admit that the land question was essentially imperial, and that a land policy ought to be administered by a central authority. At least the United States afterwards acted upon that assumption.

Finally, there was the political problem. If new settlements were to be established in the West,[1] what degree of self government should be permitted them, and what should be their relation to the older colonies and to the mother country? Moreover, the Treaty of 1763 had given England jurisdiction over some sixty thousand French Canadians, men alien in race and tongue and faith, and unaccustomed to English traditions of law and administration. Some general scheme of government had to be provided for these new additions to the empire and some method discovered to gain the friendship and support of the powerful Catholic Church which largely controlled the *habitans* of Canada.

The Western problem proved to be permanent. Before 1775 the diverse strands of defense, Indian relations, furs, land policy, and politics were English and colonial problems; after that time they entered into the web of American development, and all of them continued to occupy a prominent position in American politics far into the nineteenth century.

5. *British Politics*

Since Parliament initiated the new colonial policy to which the colonists objected, and passed the laws which finally precipitated the War of Independence, British politics were a factor in the American Revolution. In general, the British political system of that era has been too much simplified by historians. There was no clean-cut division between Pitt, Burke, and liberty-loving whigs on the one side, and a tyrannical king and sinister tories on the other. The old tory party no longer existed, the new tory party of Canning and Castlereagh had not yet arisen. In fact the English political situation in 1760–70 was not unlike that of the United States in the 'era of good feeling.' The whigs had successfully eliminated the tories by the stigma of Jacobitism and 1745, just as the Jeffersonian Republicans later eliminated the Federalists by the stigma of unpatriotism and 1814; in both instances, the dominant party broke up into factions. Even King George called himself a whig, and all the ministries with which the colonists had to deal were whig ministries. And to carry the parallel further, George III played the rôle of Andrew Jackson in reviving the two-party system, although, like our 'Old Hickory,' he thought party opposition highly unnecessary and somewhat treasonable.

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[1] For plans of settlement see C. A. Alvord, *Mississippi Valley in British Politics*, v. I.

For twenty years from 1760, British ministries were formed much as they are now formed in France: by making a *bloc*. The king asked someone to be premier, and he made a combination of leaders who controlled enough votes in the House of Commons to carry on the king's government, without much or any regard to political principles. Ministries fell because the *bloc* was weakened by some important person not getting the job he wanted for a relative or supporter, and so voting his gang against the government; or because the premier did not satisfy the king. The American question did not cause a single ministerial crisis until 1782. In fact American questions were of secondary importance in British politics until 1774. Almost every year there were rumors of war with France or Spain or both; there were many absorbing domestic questions such as what should be done about Jack Wilkes; and the game of politics took about all the time that ministers could spare from their sports, their gaming, and their dinners.

Of the different whig factions, the one which showed most sympathy for the Americans was the 'old whig,' so-called because it claimed to inherit the whig traditions of 1688. The 'old whigs' included the Duke of Richmond, General Conway, the Marquess of Rockingham and his sometime private secretary Edmund Burke; Charles James Fox joined them in 1774. And one may conveniently include with them William Pitt and his large personal following. He and the 'old whigs' were the most liberal group in British politics, and the most conservative; indeed they opposed the taxation of the colonies as much because it was new as because it was unfair. Although willing to make many concessions in practice to colonial demands, they believed strongly in the legislative supremacy of Parliament over the entire empire. Pitt, in his speech against the Stamp Act, declared, 'It is my opinion that this kingdom has no right to lay a tax upon the colonies. At the same time I assert the authority of this kingdom over the colonies to be sovereign and supreme.' If, however, the Americans ventured to attack the Acts of Trade, they would have no support from him. 'I would not permit them to manufacture a lock of wool or a horseshoe or a hobnail.' So it is not surprising that the colonists never did attack the

Acts of Trade before 1776; that would have lost them their chief support in British politics.

Pitt's following included the Duke of Grafton, who succeeded him as prime minister in 1767, and Lord Shelburne, who had a broader comprehension of colonial problems than any English statesman of his time, especially of the Western question. Brought up under almost barbarous conditions in Ireland by that tyrannical old ruffian the Earl of Kerry, Shelburne was afterwards sent to France for his education, and returned with a polish and politeness that made him an object of suspicion to the English — for this was the 'Goddamme Sir!' age in English manners. Highly intelligent, he tried to get what he wanted by indirect methods rather than go to the trouble to explain to ignorant colleagues, and so got the damning nickname 'The Jesuit of Berkeley Square' — the place of his stately town mansion.

Unfortunately the 'old whigs,' though rich in talents, were poor in leadership. Rockingham, a young man better known on the turf than in politics, was well-meaning but weak, and a halting speaker in the House. Pitt, a peerless leader in time of war, was inept in time of peace; and some strange malady thrust him out of the picture almost as soon as he became premier, in 1767.

Next, there were a number of small factions following such political free-lances as George Grenville and the Duke of Bedford, whose 'Bloomsbury gang' was notorious for being on hand when the plum-tree was shaken; and finally there was the king and his friends.

George III, only twenty-two years old at his accession in 1760, was brought up under the tutelage of his mother, a strong-minded German princess. His private life was as impeccable as that of his granddaughter Victoria. His simple tastes ran to farming and country sports. His strong sense of duty made him precise and methodical, and a glutton for work. 'George, be a *king!*' was his mother's frequent injunction, which he appears to have interpreted as 'George, be a politician!' The young man knew what he wanted, and got it, even though it cost him an empire. He wished to beat the whigs at their own game, and restore the power of the Crown, so diminished under his predecessors, by creating and eventually governing through a political party of his own. By this means he hoped to rescue England from the baneful effects of party politics, and govern the realm with an eye single to the public weal. His first ministry, under his personal friend Lord Bute, was a failure. He then induced George Grenville to construct a ministry, but got enough personal friends into it so that nothing could be done against his will. Grenville fell not because the colonists made a row about the Stamp Act, but because he endeavored to turn out Stuart Mackenzie, one of the king's numerous 'North Briton' friends; and the next ministry, Rockingham's, resigned rather than admit some of Mackenzie's henchmen to office. Finally, after the heterogeneous Pitt-Grafton ministry had crumbled, George III got exactly the government he wanted under his subservient friend and successful borough-monger, Lord North; and it was this ministry that drove the colonists into revolt, and lost the war.

For the first ten years of his reign, George III was conciliatory toward the colonists. He ordered his friends in Parliament to vote for the repeal of the Stamp Act. When Lord Hillsborough in 1769 proposed to punish Massachusetts for her Circular Letter of 1768 by altering the Massachusetts charter, the king refused to adopt what he called an 'odious measure' which would 'increase the unhappy feudes that subsist rather than to asswage them.' But the Boston tea-party, the first challenge to his personal rule, aroused his liveliest resentment. For the Coercive Acts of 1774, and for the inefficient conduct of the war, he was in great measure responsible, through his choice of ministers. If George III, for all his private virtues and well-meaning patriotism, is a pitiable figure in history, it is largely for the opportunities he lost. He might have been a patriot king indeed, by reaching out over the heads of the politicians to his people, both in England and the colonies, who were devotedly loyal, and attracted by his youth and personality. He did his best for the empire according to his lights; but his best was not good, and his lights were few and dim.

The British electoral system, with its rotten boroughs and family controls, was a strange mixture of mediaeval survival and eighteenth-century cynicism; but there is no reason to suppose that a more uniform or democratic system would have produced any different result, so far as the colonies were concerned. It was corrupt, in the opinion of Americans like Benjamin Franklin who viewed it from close quarters; seats in Parliament were openly bought and sold, and many members were kept faithful by pensions and positions, though very rarely with money. However, that sort of thing goes on in practically every representative government, democracy only creating a larger number of people to be bought or placated. The worst feature of the system, from the colonial point of view, was the lack of continuity, and the necessary preoccupation of ministers with local politics. No sooner did a really capable man like Halifax or Shelburne get to know the colonial ropes, than out he went. And a man like Burke, whose intelligent imagination enabled him to grasp exactly how to deal with the colonists, never received a responsible position. It is true that every ministry, even North's, meant well toward the Americans and wished to keep them quiet and happy, since their grievances made a talking-point for the opposition; but none save Grenville's made a real study of the colonial and imperial problem, or adopted anything but temporary expedients. And in 1774 the North ministry acted on emotion rather than knowledge. Seventy years later, when Canada rebelled, Parliament sent over a royal commission under a real statesman to find out what was the trouble and recommend a policy; and the report of that Durham commission was the beginning of the modern system of dominion home rule. But this statesmanlike way of meeting a situation occurred to nobody when the Thirteen Colonies were making trouble.

George III's ministers were no gang of unprincipled villains, subservient to a royal tyrant. Lord Dartmouth, for instance, who sponsored the Coercive Acts, was a kind and pious gentleman, patron of an American college and protector of the poet Cowper. But all save Grenville were incompetent. The situation of 1760–76 called for statesmanship of the highest order; and the political system which George III manipulated to his personal advantage put statesmanship at a discount, political following at a premium. In the end it was this unresponsiveness to crying needs and issues, rather than corruption or deliberate ill will, which convinced the Americans that their liberties were no longer safe within the British Empire.

II

THE IMPERIAL REORGANIZATION

1. *The Organization of the West*

THE most pressing task that confronted the Crown on the close of hostilities was the organization, administration, and defense of the new acquisitions. To this problem the ministry of George Grenville, who succeeded Bute in 1763, addressed itself. Various policies had been under consideration for some years, but the Western problems were at once so complex, so remote, and so unfamiliar as to be evaded rather than met, a disposition which the vicissitudes of English politics made almost inevitable. The series of measures adopted in 1763 and 1764 and inspired largely by Lords Shelburne and Halifax, must be looked upon, then, as largely provisional, as emergency measures to meet what was thought to be a temporary situation.

It was tentatively decided that settlers must be excluded from the trans-Alleghany country until the Indians were pacified, and a definite land policy worked out. This decision, dictated by sound reason, had been anticipated in 1761 when the colonial governors were instructed to prohibit future land purchases in the West. It was now given formal expression in the famous Royal Proclamation of 7 October 1763. By the terms of this Proclamation 'the extensive and valuable acquisitions secured to our Crown by the late Treaty' were erected into four new governments: Grenada, embracing several West Indian Islands, East Florida, West Florida, and Quebec. The Proclamation reserved all the western territory between the Alleghanies, the Floridas, the Mississippi, and Quebec, for the use of the Indians. 'We do strictly forbid, on pain of our displeasure, all our loving subjects from making any purchases or settlements whatever in that region.' Thus at one stroke the Crown swept away each and every western land claim of the Thirteen Colonies. Shelburne had originally planned to have the new boundary observe all vested rights, and weave in and out of western settle-



QUEBEC
TRONTENAC
FT. HENRY
FT. STANWIX
OSWEGO
NIAGARA
DETROIT
PRESQUISLE
LE BOEUF
VENANGO
ST. JOSEPH
SANDUSKY
MIAMI
PITTSBURGH
LEGONIER
BEDFORD
CUMBERLAND
VINCENNES
Ohio R
PT. PLEASANT
CANOKIA
KASKASKIA
CASWELL'S MINE
Cumberland R.
Tennessee R.
Boundary by Royal Order 1767
WEST FLORIDA
Boundary by Proclamation 1763
EAST FLORIDA
Proclamation Line of 1763.
Line of Treaty of Lochaber Oct. 18, 1770.
Line of Treaty of Augusta 1763.
Line of Treaty of Fort Stanwix.
SCALE
MILES
KILOMETERS
90
85
80
75
70
65
45
40
35
30
25

The West, 1763–1776

ments; but in the critical condition of Indian affairs, he made haste to draw a simple 'Proclamation line' along the crest of the Alleghanies.

In the following year an elaborate plan for the regulation of Indian affairs was advanced. As early as 1755 General Braddock had laid the foundations of an imperial Indian policy by appointing two highly capable colonists, Sir William Johnson and John Stuart, superintendents respectively of the Northern and Southern Indians. The 'Plan of 1764' recommended a well-organized Indian service under the control of these superintendents, licenses, regulations, and fixed tariffs for traders, and the repeal of all conflicting colonial laws — a program too ambitious for immediate fulfilment but looking in the right direction.

Before opening the country west of the Proclamation line to progressive settlement, it was necessary to purchase territory and establish an Indian boundary line west of the Alleghanies. Superintendents Stuart and Johnson, though seriously embarrassed by lack of funds, gave the problem immediate attention. In 1763 Stuart negotiated with the Cherokee nation the Treaty of Augusta, establishing the Indian boundary line west of Georgia and the Carolinas. The Treaty of Hard Labour of 24 October 1768, extended this boundary north to the Ohio at the confluence of that river with the Great Kanawha. This line called forth a storm of protest from Virginian land speculators and was subsequently adjusted to meet their views. In the same year, 1768, William Johnson established the line north of the Ohio by the Treaty of Fort Stanwix. By the terms of this Treaty the Iroquois ceded for some ten thousand pounds their rather dubious claims to a large part of central New York and Pennsylvania and all the territory south of the Ohio river.

Intimately associated with Indian affairs was the pressing question of defense. 'What military establishment will be sufficient? What new forts to be erected?' inquired the Secretary of State of the Board of Trade. Pontiac's rebellion made the issue acute, and the estimate of military needs was somewhat exaggerated. The Board of Trade proposed establishing a chain of garrisons from the St. Lawrence to Florida and from Niagara to Michilimackinac. They estimated that ten thousand soldiers would be required to garrison these forts and maintain the military establishment in America. This estimate was excessive, if protection of the frontier were the only object, and was double the number Lord Amherst, the Commander-in-Chief in America, asked for. Most of the troops retained in the colonies were quartered at New York, Halifax, and Quebec. But if the colonies could be persuaded to pay for ten thousand men, a number of deserving veterans of the Seven Years' War would be taken care of without expense to the people of Great Britain. The cost of maintaining this far-flung establishment soon proved to be prohibitive, but for the time being adequate defense had been provided, the frontiers garrisoned, the Indians pacified, the malpractices of Indian traders stopped, and an Indian demarcation line drawn. Large areas west of the Proclamation line were therefore available for settlement under propitious conditions.

Nevertheless the prohibition of settlement in the Proclamation of 1763 was never withdrawn. Shelburne, who alone of the British Ministers had some understanding of the Western problem and had caught a vision of America's future, was forced out of office, and his place taken by Lord Hillsborough. Confused by the claims of land speculators, the schemes of fur traders, and the perplexities of American politics, the new ministry abandoned the generous plans of Shelburne and Halifax for the development of the West and endeavored to make the region an Indian reservation for the use of the fur traders. 'Let the savages enjoy their deserts in quiet . . . were they drove from their forrests, the peltry trade would decrease,' wrote General Gage to the Board of Trade, and the ministry snapped up this bright thought as a reason for doing nothing further about the West. At the same time the Indian service suffered for want of funds, and the problem of defense was transferred to the colonial governments. Thus the Royal Proclamation of 1763, intended as a provisional measure antecedent to opening the West to colonization, became a permanent policy of exclusion. But American backwoodsmen were not to be stopped in their westward march by imperial proclamations, and the inevitable result was a knock-down, drag-out fight between Indians and frontiersmen.

In 1774 England made a last effort to solve the Western problem. A regular land system, providing for surveys, progressive settlement, and increased quit-rents was projected. Although not put into effect outside Canada, this plan of 1774 called forth Thomas Jefferson's bold *Summary View of the Rights of British America,* denying the Crown's right to dispose of this land at all. It furnished one more grievance for the Declaration of Independence, and in many details anticipated the American land ordinance of 1785.

At the same time Parliament passed the last and most important act dealing with the West — the Quebec Act of 22 June 1774. This law, dictated by an enlightened liberalism rare in that or any other age, was intended to correct certain mistakes in the Proclamation of 1763, and to secure the loyalty of the French Canadians. To these it granted complete religious liberty and the restitution of their peculiar legal and political institutions. But at the same time it annexed to the Province of Quebec all the territory north of the Ohio river, thus nullifying the western claims of the American colonies and thwarting the plans of the American land companies. With this the far-sighted plans of Shelburne and Halifax for the development of the American West came to an inglorious and ineffectual climax. The solution of the Western problem was left to Americans, and it was one of the most perplexing of all the issues that faced the new nation after 1776.

2. *Finances*

This organization of the West and erection of an extensive military establishment meant a heavy financial burden which the British government was ill prepared to assume. The attempt to assess a part of that burden upon the American colonies led in turn to a series of financial and constitutional controversies which ended only with the break-up of the empire. The national debt of Great Britain on the conclusion of the Seven Years' War had mounted to some £130,000,000, an increase of over £70,000,000 since 1756, while the extensive acquisitions in two hemispheres greatly increased administrative expenses. The annual cost of maintaining the civil and military establishments in America alone had risen from some £70,000 in 1748 to well over £350,000 in 1764. In the light of this situation, George Grenville, Chancellor of the Exchequer, felt that it was both necessary and just to increase the revenue from the American colonies. Parliament greeted this proposition with enthusiastic approval, and even the level-headed Franklin anticipated no trouble from America.

As early as 1763 Lord Egremont had inquired of the Board of Trade, 'In what mode least burthensome and most palatable to the colonies can they contribute towards the support of the additional expense which must attend their civil and military establishments?' Lord Shelburne wisely refrained from committing himself, but Grenville, who felt himself peculiarly qualified to solve just such problems, was not so cautious. A man of great and generally recognized abilities, of tireless devotion to duty as he understood it, George Grenville was an administrator rather than a statesman, a man more interested in the machinery of government than in its ends. His vision was circumscribed, his spirit uninspired and his pedantic mind bound by the traditions and precedents of the law, but he was neither unintelligent nor ungenerous, and he served his king and his country loyally according to his lights. Contemporaries considered him the ablest man of business in British politics and supported most of his well-meant measures. It was in April 1763 that he succeeded Bute in office, and at once he set about to reduce the American administrative and financial chaos to order. Early in the following year he introduced into the House of Commons a series of resolutions for securing a revenue from America, and upon these the Sugar Act and the Stamp Act were based.

The exact extent of colonial contributions to the upkeep of the empire is not easy to determine. English landowners, paying an income tax of twenty per cent, felt that the colonists could well afford to shoulder some of their burden. But the Americans insisted that they were already carrying their full share, and contributing, directly and indirectly, to the maintenance of the imperial government up to the limit of their capacities. The colonies had incurred a debt of over two and one-half million pounds for the prosecution of the war, and, notwithstanding the generosity of Parliament in assuming a part of that debt, a large portion of it remained. Massachusetts, for example, with a population of approximately 300,000, was raising no less than £37,500 annually for the payment of her war debt. Propertied members of that colony asserted, with considerable justice, that they were taxed as heavily as propertied Englishmen; but few inhabitants of other colonies could make the same claim. If little direct revenue was derived from the American customs or the royal lands, it must be remembered that the mercantilist system was not designed to levy tribute on colonies. The indirect contributions in the form of English export duties and the monopoly on colonial trade were considerable, and William Pitt estimated that the colonial commerce brought an annual profit of not less than £2,000,000 to British merchants. All of these factors must be taken into consideration in weighing the justice of the new revenue measures. Events proved their inexpediency quickly enough, whatever the right may have been.

The Revenue Act of 1764 — often known as the Sugar Act — was the first of these measures. This law had a double purpose: to provide revenue, and to tighten the mercantile system by strengthening the Acts of Trade and Navigation. The American customs service was notoriously inefficient; it was maintained at a cost of some £8000 annually though it brought in less than one-fourth of that sum. Of course this deficit might have been made good by economies in the civil service and by the elimination of unnecessary pensions at home, but it was no more to be expected that politics would be free of extravagance in eighteenth-century England than in twentieth-century America. The Act reduced from six to three pence the duty on foreign molasses, but levied additional duties on sugar and numerous luxuries such as wines, coffee, silks and linens, while drawbacks on European goods re-exported from England to the colonies were to cease. At the same time customs officers were ordered to repair to their posts in America, writs of assistance were authorized, and jurisdiction over revenue cases given to the admiralty courts.

It was not so much the duty of three pence per gallon on molasses as the prospect of its actual collection that caused consternation among New England merchants. For over a generation these had been accustomed to disregarding the provisions of the Molasses Act of 1733 and importing the larger part of their molasses from the French and Spanish West Indies. The Rhode Island distillers, for example, imported less than one-sixth of their molasses from the British Islands, a situation which gave profound concern to the British sugar planters, well represented in Parliament. This universal smuggling was made possible, of course, only by the connivance of the underpaid customs officers. 'The real cause of the illicit trade in the provinces,' wrote Governor Hutchinson of Massachusetts, 'has been the indulgence of the officers of the customs.'

The threat to New England distillers and business men was ominous. 'It is no secret,' asserted John Adams later, 'that rum was an essential ingredient in the American Revolution.' But the most serious aspect of a stringent enforcement of the new customs regulations was that it threatened to deprive the American merchant of the one customer with whom he had a favorable balance of trade, and cut off the one reasonably secure source of money at a time when increased duties and rising prices made the continuance of this income imperative.

So far as imperial reconstruction was concerned the most unfortunate part of the Revenue Act of 1764 was the preamble, for it gave the colonials an opportunity to rationalize their discontent on constitutional grounds. As yet few persons had cared to look into the constitutional relationship between colonies and mother country. It would have been better for imperial unity had none but humorists done so! The preamble to the Act states ' Whereas it is expedient that new provisions and regulations should be established for improving the revenue of this Kingdom . . . and whereas it is just and necessary that a revenue should be raised . . . for defraying the expenses of defending, protecting and securing the same. . . .' The power of Parliament to tax commodities for the regulation of imperial trade was universally acknowledged; the power of Parliament to tax commodities for revenue was debatable. This early constitutional issue became an entering wedge that finally split asunder the empire. 'One single act of Parliament,' said the fire-brand James Otis, ' has set people a-thinking in six months, more than they had done in their whole lives before.' Merchants, legislatures, town meetings, protested against the expediency of the law, but colonial lawyers such as Samuel Adams found in the preamble the first intimation of 'taxation without representation.' The opposition was as yet, however, unorganized, localized and sporadic. Grenville's next revenue measure was to crystallize and mobilize that opposition, to give it general support and driving force. This was the fateful Stamp Act of 22 March 1765.

3. *The Stamp Act*

The idea of a stamp tax was not original with Grenville. This means of indirect taxation had been long prevalent in England, and its extension to the American colonies had frequently been proposed by colonial governors with more zeal than perception. Easygoing Robert Walpole had earlier rejected such a proposition, and the far-sighted Pitt had ' refused to burn his fingers with an American Stamp Tax.' But Grenville was energetic and short-sighted. ' No tax,' he announced, ' appears so easy and equitable as a stamp duty,' and he decided to impose one. With well-intentioned but unfortunate fairness he announced his purpose a full year in advance, thus, as Burke sarcastically remarked, 'allowing time for all the discontents of that country to fester and come to a head, and for all the arrangements which factious men could make toward an opposition to the law.'

This opposition was not so apparent in 1764 as later. The colonial agents did, indeed, protest against the proposed law, but even they were unable to suggest any alternative method of raising a revenue except the customary one of requisitions which had so often been found wanting. Under these circumstances Grenville advanced confidently with his plan and early in 1765 introduced his bill to Parliament. It provided for revenue stamps costing (in specie) from a halfpenny to upward of twenty shillings sterling, to be affixed to all newspapers, broadsides, pamphlets, licenses, commercial bills, notes and bonds, advertisements, almanacs, leases, legal documents, and a number of similar papers. All the revenue was to be expended in the colonies under the direction of Parliament solely for the purpose of 'defending, protecting and securing the colonies.' Offenses against the law were to be tried in the Admiralty Courts. As a sugar-coating to the pill only Americans were to be appointed as agents, and a number of unsuspecting colonials such as Richard Henry Lee and Jared Ingersoll applied for such positions. The measure, if extended to the West Indies, was calculated to secure an annual revenue of over £60,000; the costs of collection, it was hoped, would be relatively small, and the burden of the tax so evenly and lightly distributed as to arouse little opposition.

The measure, indeed, appeared reasonable to the majority of Englishmen, and passed Parliament without any difficulty. The debate in the Commons which Burke described as 'languid' was enlivened only by a memorable passage at arms between Charles Townshend and the fiery young Colonel Isaac Barré, in which the latter endeared himself to Americans by referring to them as Sons of Liberty. Despite the Colonel's eloquence, the bill passed the Commons by a vote of 204 to 49, without debate or division.

The reception of the Stamp Act in the Thirteen Colonies was so violent that it astonished moderate men everywhere, and has puzzled not a few historians. It was the peculiar misfortune of the Act that it aroused the hostility of the most powerful and the most articulate groups in the colonies: merchants and businessmen, lawyers, journalists, and clergymen, and that it bore equally on all sections of the country, North, South, and West. Soon the merchants of New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, whose every bill of lading would be taxed, and who faced the prospect of a ruinous drain of specie money, organized for resistance and formed non-importation associations. Lawyers, bankers, land-dealers, and newspaper men were aroused to opposition and even the clergy joined in the din. Business came to a temporary standstill, the trade with the mother country fell off £600,000 in the summer of 1765; respectable men organized as 'Sons of Liberty' and political opposition soon descended into violence. Mobs, inflamed by the harangues of Samuel Adams or the sermons of Jonathan Mayhew, paraded the crooked streets of Boston and New York, gutted the home of Lieutenant Governor Hutchinson and threw his splendid library to the winds. 'Our presses have groaned, our pulpits have thundered, our legislatures have resolved, our towns have voted; the crown officers have everywhere trembled, and all their little tools and creatures been afraid to speak and ashamed to be seen,' wrote the exultant John Adams. From Massachusetts to South Carolina the Act was nullified, luckless agents forced to resign their offices, and the hated stamps destroyed.

The great significance of the Stamp Act, however, was not the mobbing and violence that it aroused. It crystallized the constitutional opposition to the program of imperial reorganization; and forced Americans to formulate a theory of empire that would accommodate itself to American conditions.

The first step in this direction was taken by the Virginia Assembly, dominated by proud planters of the Tidewater such as George Mason and Richard Bland, and impetuous leaders of the Piedmont such as Patrick Henry. 'Virginians,' the English traveller Burnaby observed, 'are haughty and jealous of their liberties, impatient of restraint, and can scarcely bear the thought of being controlled by any superior power. Many of them consider the colonies as independent states, not connected with Great Britain otherwise than by having a common king and being bound to her with natural affection.'

65/ On the 30th of May Patrick Henry, who had already achieved notoriety as an orator and popular leader in the famous Parsons' Cause, introduced a set of seven resolutions on the Stamp Act, and supported them with 'sublime torrents of eloquence' that later became grossly distorted by historians. Only the first five of the seven resolutions were actually passed by the closely divided legislature, but all seven of them were published in newspapers throughout the colonies. The gist of the resolutions was that taxation without representation was a dangerous and unprecedented innovation and a threat to colonial liberties. These Virginia resolutions were an 'alarum bell to the disaffected,' and pointed the way to common colonial action.

A few days after Henry had stirred up the Virginia Assembly, the Massachusetts House adopted a circular letter inviting all the colonies to appoint delegates to a Congress in New York to consider the Stamp Act menace. This Congress, which met in October 1765, was the first intercolonial meeting summoned by colonial initiative and may be regarded as the opening move in the Revolution. Delegates from nine colonies were present, among them James Otis of Massachusetts, John Dickinson of Pennsylvania and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina — bold and able men ready to seize on this opportunity to mobilize colonial opinion against Parliamentary interference in American affairs. The note was sounded by Gadsden. 'We should stand upon the broad common ground of natural rights. . . . There ought to be no New England man, no New-Yorker, known on the continent, but all of us Americans.' After considerable debate the Congress adopted a set of resolutions more moderate than those of Virginia, but asserting once more that 'no taxes ever have been, or can be constitutionally imposed on them, except by their respective legislatures,' and that the Stamp Act had a 'manifest tendency to subvert the rights and liberties of the colonists.'

The constitutional issue was thus drawn, and it centered on the question of representation. In the American colonies there had developed the custom that a representative must reside in the district which he represented. From the colonial point of view, therefore, it was impossible for the colonies to be represented in Parliament. The orthodox English viewpoint, on the contrary, was that of 'virtual representation' — representation by estate rather than by locality, and English Parliamentarians insisted that the American colonies were represented in the same way as the cities of Liverpool, Sheffield or Birmingham.

There were flaws in both the colonial and the English arguments, and these were fully revealed in the great debate in Parliament over the repeal of the Stamp Act. From the strictly legal point of view, the English contention was probably correct: virtual representation was the accepted practice of the British Constitution, and the power of Parliament to legislate for the colonies could scarcely be controverted on the grounds of law or precedent, unless you skipped the eighteenth century and went back to Stuart England for your arguments. Even the great Pitt, friend of America, insisted on the right of Parliament to exercise every power whatsoever. Yet ' virtual representation ' was one of those glib phrases that cover a multitude of flaws. As Hutchinson carefully pointed out, every English *interest* was represented in Parliament, even if most English individuals were not. ' But the colonies have an interest distinct from the interest of the nation; and shall the Parliament be at once party and judge? ' Daniel Dulany of Maryland, one of the ablest pamphleteers of the period, exposed the fallacy of the theory of virtual representation, and Pitt denounced it as ' the most contemptible ' idea ' that ever entered into the head of man. I rejoice,' he declared, ' that America has resisted. Three thousand people so dead to all feelings of liberty as voluntarily to submit to be slaves would be fit instruments to make slaves of the rest.' James Otis swept away the distinctions of lawyers with his impatient cry: ' To what purpose to ring everlasting changes to the colonists on the cases of Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield? If these now so considerable places are not represented, they ought to be.'

It is doubtful whether the eloquence of Pitt, the logic of Dulany, or the indignation of Otis, would have induced Parliament to repeal the Stamp Act had it not been for the pressure brought to bear by business men throughout the kingdom. These had no special tenderness for the American colonies, but they could not remain passive before the prospect of bankruptcy; and while merchants bombarded Parliament with memorials and petitions, the unemployed rioted outside the doors of the House. Under these circumstances the king and the new Rockingham ministry got the Stamp Act repealed by Parliament in March, 1766.

At the same time Parliament passed, without division, a Declaratory Act asserting in sweeping terms the power of King and Parliament to ' make laws and statutes of sufficient force and validity to bind the colonies in all cases whatsoever.' This flat assertion of Parliamentary sovereignty was couched in the very phraseology of the odious Irish Declaratory Act of 1719, and indicated therefore the intention of the government to assimilate the American colonies to the same subordinate position in the empire as was occupied by Ireland. Few Americans, however, stopped to inquire into the implications of this Act. They were too busy celebrating the repeal of the Stamp Act, and raising statues to the king and Pitt. Nor did certain changes in the Trade laws imposing a uniform duty on British and foreign molasses and thus transforming a law for the regulation of trade into one for raising revenue, receive any notice. On the contrary, a wave of loyalty and gratitude swept through the colonies. It would have been well for imperial relations had the English government capitalized that loyalty and refrained from further acts which might weaken it, or raise delicate constitutional questions. Instead, the accident of politics placed Charles Townshend in temporary leadership of the government, and that ill-starred politician ripped open the whole controversy over colonial liberty and imperial order.

4. *Imperial Muddling*

The history of the decade from the repeal of the Stamp Act to the Declaration of Independence is one of drifting and muddling. Had a wise and statesmanlike comprehension of the problem of imperial order obtained at Whitehall, the War of Independence might have been avoided and the break-up of the empire postponed to a future generation. But larger issues of imperial organization were lost sight of and when any American issue arose petty questions of right and prestige came to the fore; and as the king got more control over his government, the quality of ministers notably declined. Shelburne, for instance, was frozen out in 1768. Actual unity was sacrificed to theoretical unity. Few periods in history illustrate more convincingly the disastrous effects of applying doctrinaire principles to the larger problems of politics.

At least, that is how the broad issues appear to us. But a different view is reasonable, and has been held by many historians to this day. Admitted that the whole colonial system needed overhauling, which would cost money, and that the Thirteen Colonies had gained enormously in power and security from the conquest of Canada and the West, was it not fair that they should either pay some part of the cost, as Parliament directed, or propose some constructive alternative? Did not the experience of earlier wars prove that voluntary requisitions — the only alternative they proposed — were not constructive? And did not Parliament twice back down before colonial insistence, in 1766 and 1770, only to find the colonists preferring new claims and discovering new rights? Perhaps, say those who ask these awkward questions, if Parliament had been a little more unyielding in 1765 they would have prevented trouble in 1775. Or, putting it another way, if old whig politicians in England had not encouraged rebels in the colonies, these rebels would soon have acquiesced in Parliamentary regulation. To which one can only reply, with Sir Philip Francis, that the fates of empires are not to be judged by forms, and the principles of police administration cannot be extended to imperial administration. England has maintained her empire, or rather transformed it into a league of free Commonwealths under George V, by following a policy diametrically opposed to that of George III, a startling parallel to the system demanded by Jefferson and Adams as a price of colonial loyalty.

The Rockingham ministry repealed the Stamp Act; but for reasons of internal politics and royal pleasure the Rockingham ministry fell in 1766. King George then turned to the great Pitt as the one man of outstanding ability who commanded the confidence of Parliament and was not unalterably opposed to the royal pretensions. The great Commoner — now created Earl of Chatham — formed a ministry of talents, including three known friends to the American colonies, Shelburne, Conway, and Camden, and others like the Duke of Grafton and Charles Townshend, who were not so friendly. 'Indeed, a very curious show, but utterly unsafe to touch and unsafe to stand on,' as Burke remarked. Then at the critical juncture Chatham was laid low by a mysterious malady, and the government drifted. It was under these distressing circumstances, 'while the western horizon was still in a blaze with his descending glory, on the opposite quarter of the heavens arose another luminary, and, for his hour, became lord of the ascendant.' This was Charles Townshend, brilliant, ambitious, and unprincipled, 'Champagne Charley' of melancholy eminence in imperial history, whose startling career was cut short by death before the empire had reaped the results of his sowing.

Townshend, who was Chancellor of the Exchequer, saw in the temporary incapacity of his chief an opportunity for bridging the gap between the king's friends and the old whigs. With breathtaking audacity he proposed in the Commons to reduce the land tax from twenty to fifteen per cent, and meet the resulting deficit of some £400,000 partly by reducing the military establishment in the

American colonies, and partly by increasing the revenue from the colonies. This revenue was to be realized by import duties in the colonies on English paint, lead, paper, and tea. It was expected to yield not less than £40,000 annually. The colonial distinction between internal and external taxes Townshend held to be 'perfect nonsense,' but since the point seemed of such importance to Americans he affected to observe it by providing for these 'external' taxes only. For the more efficient collection of the duties the customs service was strengthened and reorganized, and a Board of Commissioners of Customs was established at Boston: an important administrative reform. New Vice-Admiralty courts were created, and writs of assistance, whose legality had been challenged by Otis, were specifically authorized. Most important of all, the moneys thus raised in the colonies, instead of going to support the garrisons, were to be used to create a colonial civil list and thus render the royal governors and judges independent of the colonial assemblies.

To meet this new threat a new formulation of the colonial argument was necessary. Townshend, with admirable cleverness, had but adopted the colonial distinction between internal and external duties, but this only made the pill more bitter for American merchants and politicians. John Dickinson, a Pennsylvania country gentleman who had read law in London and practised it in Philadelphia, filled the breach in his *Letters of a Pennsylvania Farmer,* where he discovered an essential difference between duties for the regulation of trade and duties for revenue. The latter were, according to the Farmer, clearly taxes, and as such beyond the power of Parliament to levy. Duties for the regulation of trade were, on the other hand, a necessary part of the administrative power of an imperial government. The distinction was a nice one, but led the more forthright Franklin to assert:

> The more I have thought and read on the subject the more I find myself confirmed in the opinion that no middle ground can well be maintained. I mean not clearly with intelligible arguments. Something might be made of either of the extremes: that Parliament has a power to make *all laws* for us, or that it has a power to make *no laws* for us; and I think the arguments for the latter more numerous and weighty than those for the former.

Aside from the question of duties, the declared purpose of the English government to create a civil list, and its high-handed dictation to several of the colonial assemblies at this time, brought to the fore the question of legislative independence. It had long been for Americans a matter of peculiar pride that through the control of the purse they were able to check the pretensions of royal officials in the colonies. Furthermore the English ministry had dissolved the New York Assembly in 1767 for its refusal to comply with all the provisions of the Quartering Act. In 1768 the General Court of Massachusetts was dissolved for refusing to rescind its circular letter to sister colonies protesting against the Townshend Acts, and the Virginia Assembly was dissolved for receiving it. Thus the question of legislative prestige and power was raised, as well as that of taxation.

The agitation that followed the Townshend duties was marked by less violence than that of the period of the Stamp Act, except in Boston. Merchants once again resorted to non-importation agreements, and although little enforced in some places, importations fell off by one-half in Boston, by two-thirds in Philadelphia, and by four-fifths in New York. Men dressed in homespun, women found substitutes for tea, students used colonial-made paper, and houses went unpainted. New colonial industries sprang up, and an agreement among planters to purchase no more slaves is estimated to have cost English slave traders £250,000. Yet, due to the opening up of new markets for English goods in Europe and the East, the colonial opposition of 1768–69 was less effective in British trading circles than the earlier non-importation agreements.

In New England alone, where the mercantile interests were most sensitive to any interference, were the new customs regulations attended with violence. When customs officials sought to collect duties from John Hancock's sloop *Liberty* they were set upon by the Boston populace and roughly handled. This led Governor Bernard to demand two regiments to protect the Commissioners, and these were duly sent out and quartered upon the town of Boston. The presence of the red-coats in the old Puritan town was a standing invitation for disorder, and the natural antagonism between citizens and soldiery flared up after eighteen months of resentment, in the so-called Boston Massacre of 5 March 1770. A harmless snowballing of the red-coats degenerated into something like a mob attack. Someone gave the order to fire, and four Bostonians lay dead in the snow. It is absurd to dignify the brawl with the name 'Massacre,' but radicals such as Adams and Warren seized upon it for purposes of propaganda. It is well to remember that Captain Preston and the British soldiers were defended by young John Adams and Josiah Quincy, and acquitted of the charge of murder brought against them. Governor Hutchinson was forced to remove the offending soldiery from the town to Castle William, however, and all the strategic advantage lay with the radicals.

On the day of the Boston Massacre, the North Ministry, concluding that colonial duties on English manufactures were preposterous, repealed all the Townshend duties except that on tea. A tax of three pence per pound was kept on this article primarily as an assertion of Parliamentary authority. 'A pepper-corn in acknowledgment of the right is of more value than millions without it,' George Grenville had said, and Lord North, well-disposed as he was, acquiesced in this glib fallacy.

Despite such untoward incidents as the Boston Massacre, the *Liberty* affair, the riot on Golden Hill in New York, and the burning of the British revenue-cutter *Gaspée,* two years later, the decade of the seventies opened auspiciously for imperial relations. Constitutional calm succeeded the agitation of the sixties. Yet Parliamentary taxation was an established fact, and the unrepealed duties, including the tax on tea, were being efficiently collected by the new American customs service. The income from customs duties rose to over £30,000 annually, while the cost of collection averaged only £13,000 — a sum which did not include, to be sure, the expense of maintaining the two regiments in Boston. In the ten years from 1767 out of £257,000 taken in at colonial customs houses, £83,000 was remitted to England, and £32,000 expended on colonial civil lists. This allocation had an important effect on the colonial governments, especially in Massachusetts, where the native-born Governor Hutchinson began to use a high hand with his Assembly. At the same time the penalties for violation of the customs laws rose from £473 in 1769 to £2395 in 1774, and smuggling well-nigh ceased.

Yet prosperity was increasing, and most colonial leaders were willing to let the future take care of itself. 'The people,' wrote Connecticut's agent in England, 'appear to be weary of their altercations with the mother country. A little discreet conduct on both sides would perfectly re-establish that warm affection and respect towards Great Britain for which this country was once remarkable.' And for three years the relations between colonies and mother country were unmarred by any serious crises. Inertia and neglect seemed to succeed where bolder policies had failed. The moderate element, everywhere predominant in the colonies, welcomed this peaceful interlude, and the amiable Franklin, ever a friend of peace, composed a ditty he was later to repudiate:

> ' Know too, ye bad neighbours, who aim to di'ide
> The sons from the mother, that still she's our pride,
> And if ye attack her, we're all on her side,
> Which nobody can deny, deny,
> Which nobody can deny.'

Only the left-wing radicals such as Sam Adams and Warren in Boston, Isaac Sears and John Lamb in New York, Henry in Virginia, and Gadsden in South Carolina, were disgruntled. In order to arouse his fellow country-men from their lethargy Adams organized committees of correspondence. Soon a network of these committees covered New England, and the system was quickly extended to the middle and southern colonies. Together with Warren, Adams drafted a statement of the ' Rights of the Colonies ' with a list of infringements which was circulated in pamphlet form throughout the colonies. ' It told them a hundred rights, of which they had never heard before,' remarked Solicitor-general Wedderburn, ' and a hundred grievances which they had never before felt.'

But it was the famous Boston tea party, 18 December 1773 that broke the long calm. The powerful East India Company, finding itself in critical financial straits, had appealed to the government for aid, and had been granted a monopoly on all tea exported to the colonies. The Company decided to sell its tea through its own agents, thus eliminating the independent merchants, and disposing of the tea at a price considerably under the customary one either in America or in England. It was this ill-considered step that aroused the colonial merchants and threw them into alliance with the radicals. It was not so much the loss of the tea trade alone, valuable as that was, but the principle of monopoly, that stung the merchant class to action. ' America,' wrote one of them, ' would be prostrate before a monster that may be able to destroy every branch of our commerce, drain us of all our property, and wantonly leave us to perish by the thousands.' These fears were, perhaps, groundless, but they were none the less powerful for that. Burke gaged well the American temper, in his speech on Conciliation. ' In other countries, the people, more simple and of a less mercurial cast, judge of an ill principle in government only by an actual grievance; here they anticipate the evil, and judge of the pressure of the grievance by the badness of the principle. They augur misgovernment at a distance, and snuff the approach of tyranny in every tainted breeze.'

The colonial reaction to the monopoly on tea took various forms. In Charleston the tea was landed, but was not offered for sale; at Philadelphia and New York the consignments were rejected and returned to England. It was in Boston alone — Boston, stronghold of the merchant class and of radicalism — that violence occurred. Here, on the night of 16 December, a band of men disguised in the paint of Mohawk Indians boarded the three tea ships and dumped the offending leaves into the water. ' Many persons ' wrote the exultant John Adams ' wish that as many dead carcasses were floating in the harbor as there are chests of tea.' The radicals had called the Ministerial bluff. They had refused even the pepper-corn in acknowledgement of right, and by confusing the legal and the economic issues, had succeeded in committing a large part of the merchant class to opposition.

The results of this momentous jettison were six-fold: it brought to a head the long-smouldering conflict over home rule; it committed the ' patriots ' to violent measures; it forced the more moderate merchant element into the hands of the radicals; it inflamed public opinion in England; it strengthened the ' die-hard ' element in Cabinet and Parliament; and it produced an unwise attempt at punishment and cure. This was the ' coercive Acts,' a series of bills indefinitely closing the port of Boston to commerce, radically changing the form of government of Massachusetts, providing for the transportation of certain offenders to England for trial, and quartering four regiments of soldiers on Boston. These ' intolerable ' acts threatened the very life of Boston, for the attempt to exclude her from the sea, the element that made her great, was a punishment comparable to the destruction of Carthage.

Instead of isolating Massachusetts, however, as had been supposed, these measures demonstrated a parliamentary power more dangerous to colonial liberty than mere taxing, and thus rallied twelve continental colonies to Massachusetts. On 27 May 1774 a rump assembly meeting in the historic Raleigh Tavern at Williamsburg, Virginia, sent out a call for a congress of all the American colonies. One by one the other colonies fell into line, and on 5 September the delegates of twelve of them assembled in Carpenter's Hall, Philadelphia, 'to consult upon the present unhappy State of the Colonies.'

'Clouds, indeed, and darkness,' said the great Burke, 'rest upon the future.'

* * * *

Thus after a decade of muddling with the imperial organization the English government indicated that it had no solution to the problem but coercion. No one of the events of these troubled years was of sufficient seriousness to account for the final split, but the cumulative force of dissension and bickering over a period of years was such that it drove men unwillingly, and often unwittingly, to extremes. Moderates everywhere, in England and in the colonies, were forced to take sides, and issues were raised which might well have been avoided had common-sense rather than legalism obtained. The larger question of imperial order was transformed by King and Parliament into one of sovereignty; the welfare of the empire sacrificed on the altar of authority.

Constitutionally the importance of this decade of controversy is in the evolution of two ideas central to the American politician system: the idea of a fixed constitution, and the idea of a federal system. In the course of their quarrel with Parliament Americans appealed from their charter rights to their rights as Englishmen under the British Constitution. Refusing to recognize the flexible and evolutionary nature of that Constitution, they insisted that it was 'fixed'; that it was, in the words of John Locke, 'a standing law to live by.' Not only was the Constitution unalterable, but it contained in it the immutable laws of Nature. Just what these laws were, was nowhere made clear, but that they included 'life, liberty, and property' was universally acknowledged. Finally, Parliament itself was bound by the Constitution, and by the laws of Nature. 'As the supreme legislative derives its authority from the constitution,' asserted the Massachusetts Circular Letter, 'it can not overleap the bounds of it without destroying its own foundations.' And if Parliament should, nevertheless, pass its constitutional limits, its acts would be null and void and of no force. Thus ran the American argument; the British held, of course, to the contrary theory that 'what Parliament does no power on earth can undo.'

It is bootless to debate the legal correctness or incorrectness of the American argument. Historically its importance is that Americans were setting up ideals of a fixed constitution, a constitution which embodied natural law, and a government that was limited in its powers, and insisting that acts contrary to fundamental law were void. All of these concepts were later embodied in American institutions.

When Americans came to set up their own governments they resorted to written constitutions, with precise limitations of powers, and they established courts with the power of passing on the constitutionality of laws. The origin of written constitutions in America can be traced back to early Massachusetts and Virginia, but it was the experience of Americans in the revolutionary period that made them inevitable. Having had unhappy experience with a constitution that was not ' fixed ' they determined that their own should be definite and rigid. The doctrine of judicial review, too, though its roots may be traced deep into the historic past, was a normal product of the colonial insistence that all authority is limited, that certain rights are not subject to the vagaries of absolution, executive or legislative. It is important to remember that the constitutional controversy of the revolutionary period was essentially constructive in nature.

Of equal importance was the emergence of the idea of federalism. Benjamin Franklin had outlined a federal empire as early as 1754, in the Albany Plan of Union, and he had not ceased to advocate it since that time. Forced to defend their contention that Parliament, although sovereign in the empire did not have control over the internal affairs of the colonies, Americans such as Franklin, Jefferson, Wilson, John and Samuel Adams, had discovered in the empire the essentials of a federal system — a distribution of powers between governments. When, in 1773, Governor Hutchinson asserted that ' no line can be drawn between the supreme authority of Parliament and the total independence of the colonies ' and, ' it is impossible that there should be more than two independent legislatures in one and the same state,' John Adams, on behalf of the lower House of Massachusetts, cut through this dialectic with the reply that the British Empire was not a centralized but a federal one. There actually were, Adams insisted, a number of independent legislatures in the empire, and furthermore ' if they interfere not with one another, what hinders but that, being united in one head and common sovereign, they may live happily in that connection and mutually support and protect each other.' Adams's argument may not have fitted the legal theory of the British Constitution in the eighteenth century, but it was remarkably close to the historical reality. Actually the British Empire of the eighteenth century was a federal empire with powers and authority distributed between governments, and prior to the imperial reorganization of 1763 there had been no anxiety to interfere with this arrangement. Had the structure of the empire of 1774 been petrified, it would have been obvious to all that it was federal. The unwillingness of British statesmen to abandon the legal fiction of centralization and sovereignty for the historical fact of federalism spelled the failure of imperial organization. But the federalism of the old empire became the basis for the American federal system.

III

SECTIONAL AND CLASS DIVISIONS

1. *Social Classes and Geographic Sections*

QUITE as important as the question of home rule in the empire was the question of who should rule in the colonies. The first was more the subject of talk than of thought before 1765; the second lay under the surface and was more thought about than discussed. Some colonies, such as North Carolina, were relatively democratic; and others, like New York, fully aristocratic in their social structure. In some, such as Massachusetts and New Hampshire, the franchise was fairly broad; in others, such as South Carolina, it was very narrowly restricted. But no one of the thirteen was really democratic in political or social structure, much less 'dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.' Class distinctions had been brought from England by the colonists, and since maintained; and class distinctions, in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, implied political privilege.

In all the colonies in 1760 the franchise was limited by property qualifications, which were much higher for office-holding; and the newly settled regions were under-represented in colonial legislatures, and in many other ways treated unfairly by colonial politicians and men of wealth. There was nothing new in this, but the majority were beginning to resent it, and the political controversy with the mother country enabled them to make this resentment felt. An internal quarrel, partly class and partly sectional, cut athwart the larger contest between colonies and mother country. There were really two American revolutions at the same time: the sectional revolt of thirteen colonies against imperial centralization; and a class upheaval against vested interests and local governing classes.

The upper colonial class consisted of merchants, landed gentry, clergy of the established churches, planters, and officials. These groups had rival economic interests, and were often inspired by opposite political views and religious affiliations; but they were agreed in general that the direction of local and colonial affairs should lie in their accustomed hands. They controlled the colonial assemblies, owned a large part of the land, sat on the county courts, maintained the established churches, directed the important economic activities, and set the social and cultural standards. Some lived simply and others with ostentation; but it was this class which built the beautiful colonial houses in the seaport towns from Portsmouth, N. H., to Charleston, S. C., lined the banks of the Hudson and the shores of Chesapeake Bay with stately mansions, and filled them with furniture, glass, and plate which (provided it be 'American') is now almost priceless. They employed servants or owned slaves, seldom appeared afoot out-doors unless in pursuit of game, sent their brighter boys to a colonial college or to Oxford or Cambridge, and filled the ranks of the professions. Except for a few Scots and Irish gentlemen, a few successful Germans in Pennsylvania, and the Dutch in New York, this upper class was English in race, intensely and consciously proud of their English heritage. They provided most of the principal leaders of the Revolution and the years that followed: men such as the Quincys and Trumbulls of New England, the Jays, Schuylers, Livingstons, Dickinsons, and Stocktons of the Middle Colonies; the Howards and Carrolls of Maryland, the Lees, Masons, and Washingtons of Virginia; Willie Jones of North Carolina and the Pinckneys and Izards of South Carolina.

Next in the social scale comes the middle class, which often shared political power with the gentry, but could not measure up to them on the economic and social scale. This class was the backbone of the colonies. It included the average farmer, city shopkeeper, and master workman of New England and the Middle Colonies; the lesser planters and county-seat merchants of the South. There were more of them in the region settled at least fifty years, and less as you approached the frontier. This middle class was educated at least to the point of reading newspapers and following politics, and it produced a few of the important leaders of the American Revolution, such as the 'brace of Adamses,' Ben Franklin, and Patrick Henry. In New England and Virginia the middle class had broken into local politics; in Pennsylvania and the Carolinas it had only a foot in the door. Less intelligent than the upper class, it was more quickly responsive to emotional movements. The gentry drank the tea, but the middle class dumped it, at Annapolis and Boston.

Next came what for want of a better word we must call the lower class: people who were often referred to as ‘the peasants’ or the ‘meaner sort,’ in eighteenth-century writings. The line between these and the middle class is hard to draw, and perhaps easier to describe historically. The lower class included, first, the many thousands of Germans and Scotch-Irish immigrants who had come to America in the course of the eighteenth century, mostly since 1730. Some halted in seaports where they entered the lower ranks of labor; but the great majority pushed toward the frontier, where land was cheap. Very many had come as indentured servants from the humbler ranks of society, accustomed to class distinctions in the Old World but hoping to rise in the New. Second, this class included many small farmers of English stock, who had been squeezed out of eastern sections by the growing dearness and scarcity of land, and the large families of the period. Frontier New England, for instance, was composed of such people. A third element in the lower class were the urban mechanics and laborers, the tenantry of New York, the coast fishermen and sailors, and the ‘poor white’ of the older-settled South. The lower class were little concerned with political theory or imperial organization, but tremendously interested in anything that affected their economic welfare, religious privileges, and political rights. They were better off than people of their class anywhere else in the world. But in no colony were they fairly represented in the legislature, and in few colonies did their interests and grievances receive much consideration. Many, probably most, of them had no vote; few even made the lower house of a colonial assembly; and in most colonies representation was so apportioned as to favor the older-settled regions. They were a simple people, unschooled and often unlettered. Those who were artisans worked long hours at their lasts or their looms, and looked forward to becoming independent farmers; the majority were on the way to become just that, by clearing the wilderness and tilling the soil with rude wooden implements. They were religious, but not ritualistic; intense and emotional Protestants who liked their gospel served hot off the griddle by a shouting preacher of their own kind, not lukewarm from a smooth Anglican, nor shredded and predigested by the trained mind of a Harvard, Yale or Princeton graduate. Free land and voluntary religion were their two great objects; and while neither of these were real driving forces of the American Revolution, they were the ‘boosters’ which got the patriot locomotive over many a stiff grade on its journey to independence.

√ Finally, there was a lowest class of indentured white laborers and negro slaves, which we may ignore in 1760, as it does not come into the political picture for fifty years. There were negro slaves in every one of the Thirteen Colonies, but in New England and Pennsylvania they had little economic significance, being used chiefly for domestic service. It is a good indication of how far democratic ideas and economic opportunity had already gone, that white domestic servants were difficult to obtain in 1760, except by indenture.

These class divisions were not rigid, not even as clear and distinct as we have to state them in so brief a space; nor were conditions the same from one generation to another. American society of the eighteenth century was dynamic, not static. In New England the community was generous in helping poor scholars into college, whence they could become ministers or lawyers: John Adams was just such a man; and shrewd Yankee boys were constantly working up from the ranks to become country storekeepers and then merchants, or shipmasters and shipowners.

In New York many an alliance of ambitious lawyers or rising merchants with proud patroon was consummated by marriage. The Quaker society of eastern Pennsylvania was sufficiently democratic to enable men like Benjamin Franklin to get ahead — but no aristocracy, however rigid, could have kept Ben Franklin down! Even in the more aristocratic South, alliances of 'first families' and middle-class families were not unusual: as with the parents of Thomas Jefferson and John Marshall.

The division in the colonies, however, was not so much one of classes as of sections. Sectionalism — the political, economic, and social response of people to their geographic environment — has played an important rôle in American history from the seventeenth century to the present time. In 1760 there were two main sections in the American colonies: the coastal region or Tidewater, as it was called in the South, and the interior, up-country, as it was called, or 'Old West,' as historians have come to call it today.

The coastal section has already been described in terms of its dominant class, the merchants and planters. The southern part of it, generally known as the Tidewater, extended in an uneven belt from Maryland to Georgia, and west to the 'fall line' — an imaginary line connecting the falls which mark the head of navigation of the rivers. Accessible to ocean-going ships by countless indentations of the sea, it was in close touch with the mother country. In Maryland, Virginia and South Carolina, the Tidewater was a section of large plantations, devoted to the cultivation of staple crops under the slave system. The planters ruled their colonies as by hereditary ability, controlled a large part of the land of the South, and maintained the Anglican Church. Like their social peers in the North, they were everywhere over-represented in the colonial assemblies.

The second great section, and the one most important to the history of American democratic institutions, was the 'Old West,' the frontier, together with the region settled since 1715 or 1730. This section included most of the sparsely settled region of Maine and New Hampshire, the New Hampshire grants (Vermont), the interior of Massachusetts and western Connecticut, the Mohawk valley of New York, central and western Pennsylvania, the Shenandoah valley and western Virginia, and in the Carolinas most of the Piedmont, between the fall line and the mountains as well. This great up-country section contained, on the eve of the Revolution, not far from a million inhabitants. It was a sturdy, self-sufficient, democratic community, the home of a primitive radicalism in politics, of emotional revivalism in religion. This was an expansionistic, imperialistic section, regarding the Indians as having no more right than wild beasts to the land, which belonged to white folks by natural right; a fierce, land-hungry people, the vanguard of those pioneers who followed the setting sun across the continent to the Pacific.

The Old West suffered under grievances and discriminations which became intolerable with the years. This section was under-represented in every colonial assembly, and the adminstrative and judicial organization was not designed to further its welfare or convenience. The frontiersmen naturally bore the full brunt of Indian warfare and defense, and this often without adequate support, military or financial, from the coastal regions. Like all frontiers, this one lacked roads and marketing facilities. Extensive areas of western lands were owned by the Crown, by proprietors and absentee landlords, and the conditions of purchase or rental were often onerous, though these conditions were widely disregarded by the settlers. The West was a debtor section, its leaders advocating stay laws and large issues of paper money to ease financial burdens. The religious Great Awakening of 1740 had electrified the frontier, where the large majority belonged to dissenting churches: Presbyterian, Baptist, and numerous German sects; yet in most colonies they were taxed to support churches not their own, like the dissenters of the Old World.

It was this Old West which seized upon and adopted as passionate convictions the more democratic ideas which were set floating in the American Revolution. Ethan Allen was a perfect representative of this region — except for his impiety; Patrick Henry well represented its windy and thoughtless eloquence; Jefferson, who had a bit of the Old West in him, succeeded in making a complete fusion of frontier prejudice and democratic dogma; but adaptable Ben Franklin was the favorite statesman of the frontier.

Now, having examined the colonial classes and the main vertical geographical divisions, let us look at the three main groups of the Thirteen Colonies: the South, the Middle Colonies, and New England.

2. *The South*

The Southern Colonies present the keenest edge in the sectional cleavage. In Virginia, most populous of the American colonies, the conflict between Tidewater and back-country was particularly sharp, and was even recognized by local nicknames for the people of the two sections: 'Tuckahoes' and 'Cohees.' At the same time, there were certain factors which made it possible to present a united front against the mother country.

Tidewater Virgina had not always been a land of great planters and of slavery. In the early seventeenth century it was a colony of yeomen, each tilling a moderate-sized plantation by his own family, with a few white indentured servants. After 1675, as tobacco exhausted the soil, the large plantations grew at the expense of the small, and indentured servants began to give way to negro slaves. At the opening of the eighteenth century there were perhaps 10,000 slaves in Virginia; by the time of the Revolution there were approximately 200,000. Extensive plantations, running into tens of thousands of acres, became more common, and the small farmers, unable to compete, retired into the Piedmont.

The large plantations of eighteenth-century Virginia were acquired in various legitimate ways, and also by fraud and corruption. The second William Byrd increased his holdings from twenty-six thousand acres to seven times that area. Governor Alexander Spotswood deeded himself sixty thousand acres of the best Virginia land. The great estates were seldom concentrated in one locality, but scattered in largish parcels throughout Tidewater and Piedmont. They furnished the foundation for the wealth and social consequence of the 'First Families of Virginia,' such as the Lees, Randolphs, Carters, Beverleys, Ludlows, Blairs, Masons, and Pages, whose estates were kept intact through the feudal institutions of primogeniture and entail. A relatively small group of inter-related planter families controlled Virginia. They sat in the Governor's Council, composed the majority of the Burgesses, and filled the county bench which controlled most local matters. By virtue of their power to lay out new counties and apportion representation, they were heavily over-represented in the legislature: thus Elizabeth City County in the Tidewater, with a white population of 1574, had the same representation as Berkeley County, in the Shenandoah valley, with a white population of 16,781.

Here, as elsewhere in the South, the Anglican Church was established, and all inhabitants were required to pay taxes to its support. Tidewater gentry might acknowledge that there were many roads to Heaven, but they were convinced that a gentleman could take only the Anglican way. Dissenting churches existed only by sufferance, and not infrequently a Baptist preacher or Presbyterian clergyman was refused a license to preach. The English Act of Toleration of 1689 was not definitely extended to Virginia until 1755. Yet by the middle of the century the communicants of the Established Church composed a decided minority of the population.

The Virginia back-country — Piedmont and Valley — contained over two-thirds of the white population of some 300,000, on the eve of the Revolution. While the Piedmont was settled by farmers and former servants from the coast, the Valley was almost entirely peopled by Germans and Scotch-Irish who followed the natural route from Pennsylvania, attracted by the excellent limestone soil, the climate, and the relative cheapness of land. The 'Cohees' or back-countrymen were simple and democratic, and between them and the Tidewater 'Tuckahoes' there was a religious and racial as well as a social gulf. An Anglican clergyman, Jarratt, tells us:

> "We were accustomed to look upon what were called gentle folks, as beings of a superior order. For my part I was quite shy of them, and kept off at a humble distance. A periwig in those days was a distinguishing badge of gentle folk, and when I saw a man riding the road near

our home, with a wig on, it would so alarm my fears and give me such a disagreeable feeling that I dare say I would run off as for my life. Such ideas of the difference between *gentle* and *simple* were, I believe, universal among all of my rank and age."

These up-country people nursed many grievances against the gentry. They objected to a system of representation whereby one-third the white population ruled the other two-thirds; they objected to the Established Church and religious intolerance; they regarded primogeniture and entail with suspicion, and looked upon quit-rents as unjust impositions; and negro slavery they hated, not because they regarded the black man as a brother, but because possession of him was a badge of privilege and the road to wealth. Their first spokesman was the eloquent Presbyterian preacher, Samuel Davies, leader of the Great Awakening, who had been instrumental in securing the extension of the Toleration Act to the colony. Davies, in turn, inspired one of the greatest and the most popular of frontier leaders, Patrick Henry.

Patrick Henry, tall, red-headed, and raw-boned, was a true child of the frontier. To low-country gentlemen he was a dangerous demagogue: to up-country democrats an inspired spokesman, a flaming genius around whom they might rally in their struggle against injustice. He had won widespread fame in the Parsons' Cause, where he skillfully turned a bad legal case into a stirring appeal for religious liberty and independence from royal control. Early in 1765 he was sent down to Williamsburg as burgess from Louisa County, and there struck an alliance with a young and discontented aristocrat named Richard Henry Lee. Together they uncovered a record of misuse of public moneys by Speaker Robinson and his Tidewater friends, shook the confidence of the colony in the ruling class, and became heroes of the democracy.

Yet despite this cleavage between Tidewater and back-country, the two sections were able to unite against the mother country. And despite the aristocratic nature of Tidewater society and the intimate connections of planters with the mother country, there were proportionately fewer tories in Virginia than in any other colony. This can be accounted for on three grounds: political liberalism, western lands, and debts.

The tradition of colonial autonomy was very strong in the 'Old Dominion.' That very name, and the motto on the colony arms *En dat Virginia quintum* under the leopards of England, the lilies of France, the lion rampant of Scotland, and the harp of Ireland, suggested that Virginia was a separate dominion of the Crown, not a part of the English realm.

For generations the planters had governed the colony with no serious interference from Crown representatives, and had developed a proud spirit which would suffer no challenge to their rights and traditions. Nurtured in the tradition of Hampden and Milton, familiar with the doctrines of Harrington and Sidney, they were political liberals without being democrats. Their type was a persistent one in our annals to 1865.

A second factor was western lands. The rapid exhaustion of tobacco soil, combined with the natural land hunger of Americans, fastened attention upon the vast rich virgin country beyond the mountains, which Virginia claimed under her ancient and long vacated charter. Even before the Seven Years' War, land companies had been organized by Virginians and others to obtain and exploit the Ohio valley. The war interrupted these plans, and the policy of the British government defeated them. By the Proclamation of 1763, and the Quebec Act of 1774, the Virginian claims to these lands were nullified. Many planters who had invested heavily in land projects viewed with dismay and anger the destruction of their speculative hopes. Jefferson wrote a notable pamphlet to disprove the right of the Crown to dispose of western lands. Washington, who controlled some 70,000 western acres, and who, more than most men of his generation, foresaw the boundless possibilities of the West, was deeply disturbed. Planters and frontiersmen were one in their greed for lands and in their hostility to the mother country. When the Revolution came, Virginia immediately reasserted her claims to the West, established land offices, formed land companies, and deeded away millions of acres.

Indebtedness also tended to alienate the planter class from the mother country. Like the present-day farmer who sells in a world market and buys in a protected one, the tobacco planters sold their crop at a price fixed in England, and made all their purchases at prices fixed by their agents. These debts, Jefferson wrote, 'had become hereditary from father to son for many generations, so that the planters were a species of property annexed to certain mercantile houses in London,' and he estimated that at the opening of the Revolution at least £2,000,000 was due from Virginians to British merchants. Planters of Maryland and the Carolinas were in a similar position, but the problem was most acute in Virginia. There was, indeed, no way out of the impasse except repudiation, for which war offered the best chance. Tom Moore's gibe:

Those vaunted demagogues, who nobly rose
From England's debtors to be England's foes
Who could their monarch in their purse forget
And break allegiance but to cancel debt —

was cruel, but not without justification.

If we turn to the Carolinas we find conditions differing in detail only from those we have noted in Virginia. In North Carolina, indeed, the antagonism between plain and Piedmont was present in exaggerated form, and this colony was the scene of the first serious violent sectional conflict. A small group of seaboard gentry, in close alliance with the royal governor and his hand-picked council, composed an inner ring that ruled the colony. Though a small minority of the population they controlled four-fifths of the representation: the coastal counties sending five members each to the legislature, while the inland counties had two apiece. The system of taxation also was unfair, and quit-rents were everywhere assessed, though not successfully collected. Although the great majority of the population belonged to the dissenting churches, as late as 1769 no marriage was legal unless celebrated by an Anglican clergyman, of whom there were only six in a colony of 230,000 souls. The administration and the judiciary were shot through and through with corruption, and a report of 1770 revealed at least one defaulting sheriff in every county.

The society of up-country North Carolina, beyond the unsettled pine barrens, was more democratic than elsewhere in the American colonies. This region had long been a refuge for the discontented of Virginia, and during the latter part of the eighteenth century it filled up rapidly with the Scotch-Irish and Germans streaming down through the great Valley. William Byrd, the second, described this section of Carolina as 'Lubberland' about 1730:

> 'Surely there is no place in the World where the Inhabitants live with less Labour than in N. Carolina. It approaches nearer to the Description of Lubberland than any other, by the great felicity of the Climate, the easiness of raising Provisions, and the Slothfulness of the People. Indian corn is of so great increase that a little Pains will subsist a very large Family with Bread, and then they may have meat without any Pains

> at all. . . . The Men, for their parts, just like the Indians, impose all the work upon the poor Women. They make their Wives rise out of their Beds early in the Morning, at the same time that they lye and Snore, till the Sun has run one third of his course, and disperst all the unwholesome Damps. Then, after Stretching and Yawning for half an Hour, they light their Pipes, and, under the Protection of a cloud of Smoak, venture out into the open Air; tho' if it happens to be never so little cold, they quickly return Shivering into the Chimney corner. When the weather is mild, they stand leaning with both their arms upon the corn-field fence, and gravely consider whether they had best go and take a Small Heat at the Hoe; but generally find reasons to put off till another time. Thus they loiter away their Lives, like Solomon's Sluggard, with their Arms across, and at the Winding up of the Year Scarcely have Bread to Eat. To speak the Truth, tis a thorough Aversion to Labour that makes People file off to N. Carolina, where Plenty and a Warm Sun confirm them in their Disposition to Laziness for their whole Lives.
>
> 'They are rarely guilty of Flattering or making any Court to their governours, but treat them with all the Excesses of Freedom and Familiarity. They are of Opinion their rulers woul'd be apt to grow insolent, if they grew Rich, and for that reason they take care to keep them poorer, and more dependent, if possible, than the Saints of New England used to do their Governours.'

Laziness and improvidence went hand in hand with democracy, according to this mordant Virginian, and his remarks were echoed by those of an English lady of quality who visited North Carolina just before the Revolution.

In the decade of the seventeen-sixties the grievances of the frontiersmen became intolerable; and repeated petitions to the government for redress proved futile. One from Anson County enumerated particular causes for discontent, including disproportionate taxes, venal lawyers and judges, lack of paper money, quit-rents, abuse of land laws, and religious intolerance, and, adopting the language of Tidewater politicians, asserted that 'notwithstanding our sacred privileges, we have too long yielded ourselves slaves to remorseless oppression.' The discontent culminated in the organization of so-called Regulator associations in 1768. Two years later violence broke out all along the frontier, and Governor Tryon called out the militia and marched into the back-country to suppress this radical threat to the established order. The result was the total defeat of the Regulators at the battle of Alamance in May 1771. Some of the leaders were hanged for rebellion; hundreds of the rank and file took an oath of allegiance to the government, and thousands fled across the mountains to the fertile lands along the Watauga and Holston rivers. The battle of Alamance was not the first battle of the Revolution, as it has often been called, but a chapter in the story of the internal sectional conflict: the civil war of East against West which has so often threatened to break out in America, but never materialized. For the alignment has always been broken up by a new arrangement of forces: in this instance, the War of Independence.

South Carolina, smaller than any of the Southern colonies except Georgia, was dominated by the planter-merchant aristocracy of Charleston. Here the Rutledges and Ravenels, Bees and Hugers, Pringles and Petigrus, formed the most exclusive and delightful society in the American colonies. A Charleston gentleman declared that he would rather be buried in St. Michael's, or St. Philip's churchyard than alive anywhere else. Wealthy rice and indigo planters such as the Pinckneys and Draytons allied with prosperous merchants such as the Manigaults and Izards to form a landed-commercial interest not unlike that which prevailed in New York. Like the planters of Virginia they were liberal and independent in imperial politics, but ultra-conservative in questions of domestic government. Qualifications for office-holding were the highest in America — five hundred acres of land and ten slaves or property to the value of £1000, for membership in the lower House, which was called the House of Commons. The Charleston gentry controlled the government, the administration, and the judiciary. They owned most of the desirable land along the coast and on the Santee, Pedee, Ashley and Cooper, Edisto, and Savannah rivers, and engrossed large tracts in the up-country. The Anglican Church was firmly established. And here, alone in the colonies, the slaves outnumbered the white population.

The South Carolina up-country was a cosmopolitan as well as democratic society: a melting pot of Germans, Swiss, Scotch-Irish, English, and Welsh, staunchly dissenting in religion, levelling in political principles. Their rôle in the government was purely passive. As in North Carolina, and for the same reasons, Regulator associations were organized in 1764. Hostilities were barely averted in 1769 when armed Regulators and militia met on the Saluda river. Peace was patched up, and some of the Western grievances were remedied. Sectionalism cropped up again during the War of Independence, and the Federalist era; but it never came to blows as in North Carolina.

Thus, for the Southern people the question of who was to rule at home was more immediate than the problem of home rule in the empire. We shall see how the War of Independence interrupted the growing sectional conflict, retarding it in some colonies, accelerating it in others, but everywhere giving it larger scope and new objectives.

3. *The Middle Colonies*

The sectional division in Pennsylvania and New York was, in a general way, similar to that in the South, but complicated by a larger urban population, and distinguished by the absence of religious issues. Pennsylvania was a proprietary colony, with all ungranted land owned by the Penn family, who also drew annual quit-rents from much of the land already granted. It was a Quaker province, still dominated by the merchant aristocracy of the Delaware valley; but it contained the largest proportion of non-English stock of any American colony; and Philadelphia was the largest and wealthiest town on the Atlantic seaboard.

Scarcely a century old, the colony of William Penn had developed more rapidly and prosperously than any other in America, and contained, on the eve of the Revolution, a population well over 250,000. The natural advantages of soil and climate, the complete religious toleration that obtained, and the once enlightened form of government, made Pennsylvania the Mecca of the poor and discontented in Europe. In the course of the eighteenth century tens of thousands of Germans from the Palatine, the upper Rhine, and Switzerland, and of Scotch-Irish from Ulster, poured into the back-country, squatting on the proprietors' lands, and disquieting the older Quaker group.

The Germans were a stolid, God-fearing people. They tilled the rich limestone soil of the Delaware, the Schuylkill, and the Lehigh valleys, clung tenaciously to their language and folkways, and formed a solid German community in the heart of the English colonies. Many had come over as indentured servants (redemptioners the Germans called them), and most were poor, but with thrift and industry they wrung wealth from the soil, became a powerful middle-class group, and commanded the respect of their neighbors. Benjamin Rush, the eminent Philadelphia physician, thus described these ' Pennsylvania Dutch ':

> 'A German farm may be distinguished from the farms of other citizens by the superior size of their barns, the plain but compact form of their houses, the height of their enclosures, the extent of their orchards, the fertility of their fields, the luxuriance of their meadows, and a general appearance of plenty and neatness in everything that belongs to them.'

By the time of the Revolution these numbered not far from 90,000, — one-third of the population of the province.

Another story was the Scotch-Irish immigration into Pennsylvania. Harried out of Scotland into northern Ireland in the seventeenth century, they were forced, in the eighteenth, to abandon oppressed Ulster for America, and throughout the century Pennsylvania attracted a larger proportion of them than any other colony. As early as 1729 Penn's secretary, James Logan, wrote:

> 'It looks as if Ireland is to send all its inhabitants hither, for last week not less than six ships arrived, and every day, two or three arrive also. The common fear is that if they continue to come, they will make themselves proprietors of the province. It is strange that they thus crowd in where they are not wanted.'

Finding the best lands in the east already occupied, the Scotch-Irish poured out along the frontier and squatted on the proprietors' lands without leave or license. The very year after Logan wrote, they seized 15,000 acres on Conestogoe manor, declaring that 'It was against the laws of God and Nature that so much land should remain idle while so many Christians wanted it to labor on.' Of the 670,000 acres occupied between 1732 and 1740, no less than 400,000 were taken by squatters, principally of this energetic, fighting people. Presbyterian to a man, land-hungry, individualistic, and living on the farthest frontier, the Scotch-Irish bore the full brunt of Indian warfare, and were partly responsible for the peculiar savagery of the border wars. By 1775, although many had re-emigrated across Maryland to the Shenandoah valley, they constituted one-third of the Pennsylvania population.

Between these two back-country groups and the Quakers of Philadelphia, Chester, and Bucks counties along the Delaware, there was a natural hostility, complicated by the proprietary form of government and by the presence in Philadelphia of a large body of unfranchised mechanics, tradespeople, and laborers.

Although William Penn himself had lived in the colony for some time, and took an enlightened interest in the welfare and development of his vast estate, his descendants came to look upon Pennsylvania as a private domain destined by God to support them in the upper circles of English society. Between the reigning proprietor and his personally selected governor, on the one hand, and the Quaker-controlled Assembly on the other, there was constant friction, sharpened by the unwillingness of the Penns to pay taxes on their wild lands. They claimed all the emoluments of government and ownership, without any of the expenses or responsibilities. Their attempts to collect quit-rents, the high price that they charged for land, and the inadequacy of defense against the Indians, aroused against the proprietors the hostility of the westerners.

The city of Philadelphia was dominated by a wealthy Quaker aristocracy, many of whom had intermarried with the more progressive German families. They controlled the business, the trade and shipping, the finances, and the politics of the province, and lived in a luxury that excited the envy of the less fortunate. The division between the classes was a deep one. 'A poor man,' wrote one Philadelphia democrat, 'has rarely the honor of speaking to a gentleman on any terms, and never with any familiarity but for a few weeks before the election.' Even the genius of Benjamin Franklin, first citizen of America, could not entirely bridge the social gap, and he was always *persona non grata* to the 'best people' of the City of Brotherly Love. The political situation mirrored the social one: the franchise was limited to those who possessed £50, which successfully disqualified nine out of ten men; and the entire city of Philadelphia had only two representatives in the Assembly, while the county of Philadelphia, much smaller in population, had eight. The discontent of the disfranchised element in the city threw them into alliance with the disgruntled Scotch-Irish in the west, and created a fighting combination that proved irresistible when the critical struggle came.

The causes of discontent in back-country Pennsylvania were similar to those in the Southern colonies. It was grossly underrepresented in the Assembly. The three Delaware river counties of Philadelphia, Chester, and Bucks returned eight representatives each; the five western counties had only eleven representatives altogether. If representation had been based either on population or on the number of taxables, the figures would have been reversed. Further, the western counties of York, Lancaster, Berks, and Northampton were so large that it was difficult for many of the residents to get to the county seat, and until 1770 the Quaker oligarchy resisted subdivision. At the same time, representation was increased. But at no time prior to 1776 was it possible for any combination to outvote the Quaker aristocracy of the east.

Of more importance, probably, were the economic grievances of the western counties. These involved land, roads and markets, taxation, and paper money. The Scotch-Irish, who had left Ireland to get rid of rent, insisted that the land belonged to those who cultivated it, and resisted the collection of quit-rents. The natural market of the Delaware watershed was Philadelphia; that of the Susquehanna, Baltimore. The best roads led to Baltimore, where the inhabitants of central and frontier Pennsylvania sold their crops and purchased their supplies. Naturally Philadelphia merchants resented this. The westerners also felt that they paid a disproportionate share of the taxes; they fiercely resented the excise tax of 1771 on whiskey; and yet the Assembly consistently refused to vote necessary taxes for the defense of the frontier.

Border warfare was the most serious western grievance. On the frontier fell the full burden of Indian depredations, and the chronicle of the border wars of eighteenth-century Pennsylvania is a dark and bloody one. The proprietors refused to provide for adequate defense, and the Assembly, taking refuge behind the anti-war doctrines of the Quaker church, refused to vote any military support or supplies. In fact both Governor and Assembly were inclined to lay the responsibility for the Indian wars at the door of the Scotch-Irish themselves — and they were probably right. As a result the west bore not only the danger, but the full military and fiscal burden of the defense of the whole province. It was this situation that led to the famous raid of the 'Paxton Boys' in 1764. Infuriated by Indian attacks — which they had provoked — a band of frontiersmen fell on a little settlement of peaceable Christian Indians, massacred them, and then marched on Philadelphia to demand the wherewithal to continue the campaign. Only Benjamin Franklin's diplomacy averted an open conflict between the Paxton Boys and the authorities, but the episode revealed a bitter sectional hatred. If the Crown had exploited this feeling, it might have won the western vote here, as in North Carolina; for the westerners contrasted the aid given them by British regulars in the Pontiac rebellion with the utter neglect of them by their own Assembly. It is true that the Scotch-Irish of the eighteenth century were even more bitterly anti-English than the Catholic Irish — for the strident loyalty of Ulster is a very recent phenomenon — but the Philadelphia Quakers were a little more English than the English themselves, and socially superior in a very offensive way. As Charles Biddle observed on the legislators from the two sections: 'Those from the westward look upon the people in any of the commercial towns as little better than swindlers, while those of the east consider the western members a pack of savages.'

From 1763 on there was a continuous struggle in the colony between the conservative Quakers of the east and the Scotch-Irish of the west in alliance with most of the Germans and disfranchised inhabitants of Philadelphia. The discontented groups were skilfully led, not to say exploited, by intelligent men such as Benjamin Franklin, Joseph Reed, Thomas McKean, and Judge George Bryan. Here, as elsewhere in the colonies, the liberal doctrines that were being hurled against England, proved boomerangs in the domestic scene. 'By liberty,' sniffed the aristocratic Alexander Graydon, 'the people meant anarchy, since hallowed by the phrases of Equality, and the Rights of Man.'

Just as two series of waves, approaching in opposite directions, form waves of greater destructiveness; so in Pennsylvania the rising tide of democracy met and coincided with the rising tide of home rule; and the result was independence. The War of Independence furnished an opportunity for the democratic and western element to get what they wanted — guaranteed, as they fondly hoped, by the most radical of revolutionary constitutions.

In the royal province of New York can be found the same elements, but the antagonism was neither so deep, nor so clean-cut as in Pennsylvania. New York was one of the smaller colonies, both in settled area and in population. Only on the islands at the mouth of the Hudson and in the comparatively narrow valleys of the Hudson and Mohawk rivers was there any considerable settlement, and the population in 1770 was less than that of either Connecticut, Maryland, or North Carolina. This was due partly to the powerful Iroquois confederacy which held all central New York, and partly to the illiberal land system inherited from New Netherlands.

The colony was dominated by a great land-owning aristocracy, whose princely estates surpassed those of Virginia planters in extent and value: the Van Rensselaers, Philipses, Livingstons, Van Cortlandts, De Lanceys, Morrises, Schuylers, and others — descendants of the Dutch patroons or of the Duke of York's favorites. Six manorial estates in Westchester embraced over half the area of the county; Rensselaerwyck in Albany County covered nearly 700,000 acres; and the estate of Sir William Johnson along the Mohawk was even larger, while speculators like Cruger and Duane held title to almost unlimited lands in the back-country. Governor Bellomont declared the 'whole province' already 'given away to thirty persons,' and Governor Colden wrote, in 1764, that three estates contained

> 'above a million acres each, several others above 200,000. . . . Although these grants contain a great part of the province, they are made in trifling acknowledgements. The far greater part of them still remain uncultivated, without any benefit to the community, and are likewise a discouragement to the settling and improving the lands in the neighborhood of them for from the uncertainty of their boundaries the patentees of these great tracts are daily enlarging their pretensions, and by tedious and most expensive law suits, distress and ruin poor families who have taken out grants near them.'

This, indeed, had been the fate of the German Palatines who had come over in 1713, and their unfortunate experience had deterred others from settling land in this province.

The great proprietors not only engrossed the land, but through their control of the Assembly evaded taxation, and even a careful scrutiny of their titles. And here, as in South Carolina, the landed gentry strengthened their position by marriages with the wealthy merchant and professional families of New York City, such as the Alsops, Beekmans, and Jays.

After a protracted struggle the New York Assembly, controlled by this upper-class combination, had gained ascendancy over the royal governor. The political differences that agitated the colony were largely of a factional nature, led by the De Lancey and the Livingston interests. The so-called Popular party was popular only in so far as it opposed royal control, but not at all in its constituency. The high suffrage qualifications successfully excluded the great majority of the adult males from politics, and the landlords could usually control the politics of those tenants who were able to meet the suffrage requirements. In only four counties was the Anglican Church established — New York, Westchester, Queens, and Richmond — but these counties contained half the population in 1700 and one-third of it in 1770. Land, trade, politics, law, the church, society, were controlled by the landlord-merchant aristocracy. Life on a great manorial estate along the Hudson, as described in the charming memoirs of Anne Grant, was probably more delightful than any that could be found north of the Potomac; but it contained no promise of the American life that was to be.

At the other end of the scale were the tenant farmers, small freehold farmers, and the mechanics and laborers of New York City and Albany. These, the large majority of the population, were out of the political picture altogether. Very few could qualify for the suffrage with a £40 freehold. They were an inarticulate and unorganized group, looking to the landlord for guidance and support — and often very happy in that relationship. A more democratic community was to be found in the Mohawk and Schoharie valleys, where numbers of Germans and Scotch-Irish had settled, and where frontier conditions made for equality and self-sufficiency.

In between the aristocracy and the unenfranchised was a middle class of £40 freeholders, small merchants, tradespeople, lawyers, and professional men. These constituted less than ten per cent of the population, and had little cohesion, but counted heavily politically, by holding the balance of power between the upper-class factions. Isaac Sears, John Lamb, and the brilliant young lawyer, John Morin Scott, led this middle-class group. Their names were as prominent as those of Patrick Henry and Sam Adams among the radical whigs of the continent.

Dissatisfaction with the feudal structure of New York politics and society was general by 1760, but unorganized and inarticulate. Here, as elsewhere, the controversy with the mother country brought it out into the open. Organized opposition to the Stamp Act afforded the opportunity for the discontented to strike out at authority, and in the winter and spring of 1766 New York was troubled everywhere by mobs and rioters. The tenants of Westchester and Dutchess counties refused to pay their rents and 'prescribed law to their landlords,' while five hundred men marched on New York City ripe for rioting and lawlessness. And the turmoil and rebellion of the Green Mountain Boys in the New Hampshire grants that went on during the ensuing decade was directed rather against the New

York Assembly and New York landlords than against England. New York was experiencing serious domestic difficulties when the controversy with the mother country substituted a common enemy for the sectional and class antagonisms, and obscured for a generation the domestic issues.

4. *New England*

The sectional and class cleavages in New England were less distinct, less organized, and less concentrated than elsewhere in the American colonies. They do not appear to have had much to do with bringing the section into the American Revolution. In New England, the War of Independence was not accompanied by any internal revolution in the structure of society or of government. Merchants, lawyers, and clergy led the revolutionary movement, and remained in control after the war, their position materially strengthened by the prestige of victory. The situation in New England was analogous to that of Virginia, where the Tidewater planters stayed in power by espousing a popular and successful cause.

The history of New England during the eighteenth century exhibits three notable processes: a general secularization of life, the growth of commerce, and expansion of population. Puritanism had been the main motive of settling the New England Colonies. In all but Rhode Island, the Puritan church was established by law and so remained until well into the nineteenth century. But though the power of the clergy was greater here than elsewhere in America, and although Samuel Adams cleverly turned the old Puritan fear of Episcopacy against England, by 1760 religious idealism had pretty well spent itself: the Puritan gave way to the Yankee. Eighteenth-century Boston and Salem were worlds removed from the Puritan towns that ran after Anne Hutchinson and hanged witches. Arminianism — which later became Unitarianism — was boring into the old Puritan Congregational churches. The Great Awakening had produced thousands of dissenters; and several dissenting denominations were tolerated, although they did not enjoy the legal privilege of the Congregational churches.

While the Puritan clergy still possessed enough authority to be most valuable political allies, their weight in the New England legislatures was much less than that of the merchant aristocracy. Nature was niggard to the Yankees in soil, climate, crops, and natural resources, but it gave a magnificent stand of timber, excellent harbors, and tempting off-shore fishing banks, which drew the people to shipbuilding, fishing, and carrying goods for more prosperous neighbors. New Englanders were the most inveterate fishermen in North America, and the most expert whalers in the world: it was the island of Nantucket that created that deep-sea whaling whose peculiar blend of enterprise, dare-deviltry and ruthlessness forms one of the most lively memories of America's past. Shipbuilding by native craftsmen and the operating of these vessels with native thrift and shrewdness, surpassed fishing in economic importance: distribution, not production, brought the large profits. From every harbor of the New England coast — from Falmouth (Portland, Maine), Portsmouth, N. H., and Newburyport; from Salem, Marblehead, and Boston; from Plymouth, New Bedford, Providence, Newport, New London, New Haven, and Bridgeport, hundreds of little schooners, sloops, and sketches put forth each year for coastwise traffic, and scores of brigs and ships for England, the Mediterranean, the Gold Coast, and the West Indies. During the War of Independence the West India Islands were often near starvation for want of the Yankee provision ships; and the loss of this principal market for New England farms, forests, and fisheries, produced agrarian unrest at home. In 1660, New England traded for a living; in 1760 New England lived for trade. The old clerical and magisterial families were supplanted by those whose wealth was drained from the sea: Langdon, Dalton, Cabot, Derby, Gerry, Hancock, Quincy, Delano, D'Wolf, Hillhouse — to take only one from each principal port. These formed a substantial upper-class society, as in New York, Philadelphia, and Charleston. With the aid of country storekeepers, who were often in debt to them, they controlled politics; without any competition from landed gentry they established the social standards; patronized painters such as Copley, silversmiths such as Paul Revere, and parsons too numerous to mention; and ran their communities like their ships, from the quarterdeck. Hence their interests and their pride were affected by the acts of the British government regulating West India and other trade, in 1764–67, just as the interests of the Virginia planters were affected by the new Western policy. This economic solidarity of the seaboard explains why four New England colonies came into the revolutionary movement as a unit, although two of them, Rhode Island and Connecticut, did not have the usual irritant of a royal governor and other crown-appointed officials. Rhode Island, in fact, was the center in North America for the evasion of the Acts of Trade and the rum distillery, both of which interests would have been ruined if the new parliamentary policy had taken effect.

If there was little democracy in these seaboard communities, there was on the other hand little discontent. By and large the mechanics, ship-carpenters and seamen were bound by ties of common interest to the merchants and shipowners. The lot of the fisher-folk of Gloucester and Marblehead was less happy: John Adams thought their condition 'as abject as that of slavery.' These submerged groups, eager like all Yankees to rise in the world, found their leader in Samuel Adams, and their medium in the town meeting. They suffered most sharply from the regulative or coercive measures of imperial reorganization, for their margin of living was very narrow; hence they furnished a rich field for the agitator, and were ready for mob violence when leaders who spoke their language gave the word.

Expansion is the third note in New England history during the eighteenth century. Land hunger was as strong among the hard-scrabble Yankee farmers as among the placid Dutch of Pennsylvania or the fierce Scotch-Irish of Virginia and the Carolinas. Connecticut had its counterpart to the great Virginia land companies: the Susquehanna and Delaware companies which, relying on Connecticut's ancient charter extending its western boundary to the Pacific, proposed to pre-empt a large slice of Pennsylvania which lay due west. These schemes were estopped by the Crown, causing much discontent. But the movement of population in New England was generally by compact communities northward rather than by large speculations and individuals westward. When a group of people desired to try their fortune in the interior, they would apply to the colonial legislature for a free township grant, and manage the allotments themselves. In the wilderness they did not abandon organized society, but took with them the *lares* and *penates* of their households, the New England institutions of church, school, and town meeting; and in spite of early privations never lost sight of the amenities of settled community life. These characteristics distinguished the expansion of New England in the later eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries — into up-state New York and the old Northwest. By 1760 practically all of southern New England had been taken up. On the conclusion of the Seven Years' War, the teeming population swarmed into northern New England. In the fifteen years prior to the Revolution one hundred towns were planted in New Hampshire, seventy-four in Vermont, and over twenty in Maine. The frontier was being pushed forward with unprecedented rapidity.

The political differences between this newly-settled interior of New England and the seacoast were not numerous; first among them was absentee ownership. Through a degeneration of the old method of township settlement, the newer townships were often granted to speculators, who gave away a certain number of hundred-acre lots to actual settlers, and held the rest for a rise. Until the township became populous enough to receive privileges of local government, it was governed, at their own expense to be sure, by these absentee proprietors. The proprietors' meeting which ran a frontier community of Maine or Vermont often met in a tavern of Boston or Hartford. Individuals like James Otis and Ezra Stiles, President of Yale College, had holdings in a dozen towns in the interior. The situation was parallel to that of the Penn estates, though temporary and on a smaller scale. But although the New England settlers frequently petitioned, as in Pennsylvania, for right to tax the proprietors' lands, that right was almost always granted, at least by the Massachusetts legislature; and there is little evidence that this frontier discontent fanned the flames of the American Revolution — the frontier grew out of it so quickly.

In the Maine district of Massachusetts there was ill feeling between settlers and groups of merchant proprietors in Boston, who had bought for a song ancient Crown grants; but that caused no serious trouble until after the war. New Hampshire was rather a special case in New England, with some points of resemblance to Pennsylvania and North Carolina. 'Before the Revolution,' says Jeremy Belknap, in his *History of New Hampshire* (1792), the people of the different parts of the state had 'little connection with each other.' They were divided into three sections: the old seaboard towns, including Portsmouth, the capital, which was largely Anglican in religion; the southern part of the interior, peopled largely from Massachusetts and northern Ireland; and the Connecticut valley and future State of Vermont, peopled largely from Connecticut. New Hampshire was run politically by a gifted native family, the Wentworths, who held the royal governorship and most of the appointive offices. In order to have all legal business done at the capital they prevented the formation of counties until 1771, and in order to keep uncouth democrats out of the small and easily controlled Assembly, they denied representation to interior towns. As late as 1773, of 147 towns only 46 were represented, and by 34 members. And this does not count all the 138 townships which the Wentworths laid out beyond the Connecticut river, in a region claimed by New York, whose claims they did nothing to quiet. So the New Hampshire frontiersmen welcomed the Revolution as a chance to be quits with the Portsmouth gang, which conveniently went tory. The Green Mountain Boys organized their section as the State of Vermont; the rest of the population got a new constitution, and soon transferred the state capital inland.

The same early historian, Belknap, has described the life of the New Hampshire frontiersmen, in terms which fit almost equally well their fellows as far south as the Valley of Virginia; and in the later trans-Appalachian settlements.

> ' Men who are concerned in travelling, hunting, cutting timber, making roads and other employments in the forest, are inured to hardships. They frequently lie out in the woods several days or weeks together in all seasons of the year. A hut composed of poles and bark, suffices them for shelter; and on the open side of it, a large fire secures them from the severity of the weather. Wrapt in a blanket with their feet next the fire, they pass the longest and coldest nights, and awake vigorous for labour the succeeding day. Their food, when thus employed, is salted pork or beef, with potatoes and bread of Indian corn; and their best drink is water mixed with ginger; though many of them are fond of distilled spirits, which, however, are less noxious in such a situation than at home. Those who begin a new settlement, live at first in a style not less simple. They erect a square building of poles,[1] notched at the ends to keep them fast together. The crevices are plaistered with clay or the stiffest earth which can be had, mixed with moss or straw. The roof is either bark or split boards. The chimney a pile of stones; within which a fire is made on the ground, and a hole is left in the roof for the smoke to pass out. Another hole is made in the side of the house for a window, which is occasionally closed with a wooden shutter. In winter, a constant fire is kept, by night as well as by day; and in summer it is necessary to have a continual smoke on account of the musquetos and other insects with which the woods abound. The same defence is used for the cattle; smokes of leaves and brush are made in the pastures where they feed by day, and in the pens where they are folded by night. Ovens are built at a small distance from the houses,

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[1] Log cabin.

of the best stones which can be found, cemented and plaistered with clay or stiff earth. Many of these first essays in housekeeping, are to be met with in the new plantations, which serve to lodge whole families, till their industry can furnish them with materials, for a more regular and comfortable house; and till their land is so well cleared as that a proper situation for it can be chosen. By these methods of living, the people are familiarised to hardships; their children are early used to coarse food and hard lodgings; and to be without shoes in all seasons of the year is scarcely accounted a want. By such hard fare, and the labour which accompanies it, many young men have raised up families, and in a few years have acquired property sufficient to render themselves independent freeholders; and they feel all the pride and importance which arise from a consciousness of having well earned their estates.'[2]

So, generally speaking, New England had a nascent or suspended, rather than an actual, frontier grievance. It broke out after the war in disturbances like Shays's Rebellion, and finally turned into Jeffersonian Republicanism.

More palpable were the causes of New England's early primacy, with Virginia, in the patriot cause. Parliamentary prohibition of the Land Bank of 1740 — a scheme whereby land was to be used as security for floating an issue of paper money — ruined many of the middle class, including the father of Sam Adams. It 'raised a greater ferment in this province than the Stamp Act did,' said his cousin John, and aroused a fierce antagonism against some of the Boston families like the Olivers and Hutchinsons, who welcomed British aid to the cause of sound money. Later, Parliament prohibited all paper money by the Currency Act of 1751, which merely aggravated the discontent. In Connecticut, a 'New London Society United for Trade and Commerce,' a wild-cat scheme, somewhat similar to the Massachusetts Land Bank, had an even shorter and more disastrous career. In that eastern section of Connecticut the religious radicalism engendered by the Great Awakening bit deeper than elsewhere, creating several religious societies with a grievance outside the established church. And a contemporary remarked that both the economic and the religious grievance combined to make that section the most radical part of Connecticut when the Stamp Act was announced.

Especially irritating to the backwoods enemies of 'conservation,' was the attempt of royal officials to keep settlers out of certain well-timbered lands, on the theory that the tall pines were reserved for masts in the royal navy. Apprehension lest the mother country establish Anglican bishops in the colonies was widespread throughout New England. That such a project was ever seriously considered by Parliament is doubtful; but the fear of it acted on politics like the fear of ' popery ' in a recent presidential campaign. For, as the Rev. Jonathan Mayhew pointed out, if Parliament had the power to establish the Anglican Church, they had the power to support it by tithes; and behind Episcopacy lay the Pope. When Parliament in 1774 very wisely granted special privileges to the Catholic Church in Canada, some of the patriot leaders in New England began to insinuate that George III, like James II, had gone ' papist.'

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[2] Jeremy Belknap, *The History of New-Hampshire,* vol. III., pp. 257–259.

In New England the lack of an acute class conflict, but the existence of a multitude of puritan, frontier, and maritime bristles, which were rubbed the wrong way by almost everything Parliament did, good or bad, on the American problem, explain why that section bore the first brunt of attempted coercion, and went in whole-heartedly for independence.

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Now, as we have been chronicling divisions and grievances to the neglect of unities and contentments, we have perhaps unwittingly given the impression that the people of the Thirteen Colonies were all ready to spring at one another's throats, or at England's, on the slightest provocation. That is not correct. Rare indeed is the community and golden the age where complaints and clashes cannot be found; but they are not always significant. It is only when some new element is added, or unusual issue arises, that latent grievances become patent, and passive causes, dynamic. So it was in the American Revolution. The taxation controversy, and the naked issue of power that arose with the Coercive Acts of 1774, set all the colonial bees a-buzzing and a-stinging; and it was many years before they settled down to making honey again, in a new federal hive.

IV

THE REVOLUTION PRECIPITATED

1. *Gathering Clouds*

THE Congress which assembled in Philadelphia in September, 1774, had been summoned by popular demand — not for independence but for liberty, as Americans understood that word. They expected Congress to take steps to ward off parliamentary wrath, vigorously to assert colonial rights, and so far as Americans could, to restore imperial relations to their former happy status. This Continental Congress was an extra-legal body chosen by provincial congresses, or popular conventions, and instructed by them. This meant that the patriots, who did not fear extra-legal action were in control of the situation, and that extreme conservatives who would have nothing to do with resistance to the laws were not represented. Otherwise the membership of Congress was a fair cross-section of American opinion. Here were extremists like John and Samuel Adams from Massachusetts, Stephen Hopkins from Rhode Island, Thomas Mifflin of Pennsylvania, Richard Henry Lee and Patrick Henry of Virginia, and Christopher Gadsden of South Carolina; moderates like Peyton Randolph and George Washington of Virginia, John Dickinson of Pennsylvania and the Rutledges of South Carolina; conservatives like James Duane and John Jay of New York, and Joseph Galloway of Pennsylvania. The varied interests of the colonies were well represented. Every colony save Georgia sent at least one delegate, and the total number was fifty-five — large enough for diversity of opinion, small enough for genuine debate and effective action.

Able as this Congress was, it faced a distressing dilemma: it must give an appearance of such firm unanimity as would persuade or frighten the British government into concessions; and at the same time avoid any show of radicalism or 'spirit of independency' that might alarm conservative Americans. To brandish the sword and proffer the olive branch simultaneously was a feat that required no little skill. At the same time Congress did not wish to encourage the spirit of lawlessness and levelling that was already abroad in the country.

Peyton Randolph was chosen President of the Congress, and the early keynote was caution; but the presentation of the Suffolk Resolves precipitated the convention into the hands. of the radicals. These famous resolves from Suffolk County, Massachusetts, declared that no obedience was due to the Coercive Acts, which should be resisted 'as the attempts of a wicked administration to enslave America.' They were presented in such a way that unless Congress endorsed them it would appear to have abandoned Massachusetts to her fate. It endorsed them, and by that endorsement the bolder and more reckless spirits won a victory that they exploited to the full. Hard upon this came the rejection of Joseph Galloway's Plan of Union. His plan proposed a union of all the American Colonies with a colonial continental legislature having co-equal control with the British Parliament over all colonial affairs. Although not so well worked out as Franklin's federal plan of 1754,[1] Galloway's was so plausible that it was lost only by a majority of one. The division of opinion, as stated by Galloway himself, is probably not exact but illuminating. Those who favored his plan, 'were men of loyal principles, and possessed the greatest fortunes in America; the others were congregational and presbyterian republicans, or men of bankrupt fortunes, overwhelmed in debt to the British merchants.' If the Galloway plan had been presented before the Suffolk Resolves, it would certainly have been adopted, and the next move would have been up to Great Britain.

Congress then proceeded to a series of retaliatory measures against the Coercive Acts. Mindful of the success of commercial boycott in 1765–70, it adopted new and stringent non-importation, non-exportation, and non-consumption agreements. John Adams, unsatisfied, confided to his *Diary,* 'When Demosthenes (God forgive the vanity of recollecting his example) went as ambassador from Athens to the other States of Greece. . . . he did not go to propose a non-Importation or non-Consumption Agreement.' But Lee of Virginia was certain that these measures would wring immediate concessions from Parliament, while Chase of Maryland believed that they would reduce England to bankruptcy.

Having agreed upon this counter-offensive, Congress passed a

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[1] See above, p. 8.

Declaration of Rights and Grievances, addresses to the people of Great Britain and the colonies, and, as a sop to the moderates, a petition to the king. These papers, taken together, led the great Chatham to admit that 'for solidity of reason, force of sagacity and wisdom of conclusion under a complication of difficult circumstances, no nation or body of men can stand in preference to the general Congress at Philadelphia.' The Declaration of Rights summed up anew the traditional arguments of American protest and anticipated in many particulars the grievances of the Declaration of Independence. It did, however, concede parliamentary regulation of external commerce and strictly imperial affairs: for Chatham had given America due warning that otherwise Americans could expect no sympathy from his party.

This concession, it must be admitted, was not pleasing to the radicals. Quite independently of one another, James Wilson, a close-reasoning Scot of Pennsylvania, Thomas Jefferson, and John Adams had reached the conclusion that Parliament had absolutely no jurisdiction over the colonies. 'All the different members of the British Empire are distinct States,' said Wilson, 'independent of each other, but connected together under the same sovereign in right of the same Crown.' Wilson's *Considerations on the Authority of Parliament,* Jefferson's *Summary View,* and Adams's *Novanglus* papers published this startling theory between August 1774 and February 1775. Historically they found no ground for Parliament's authority, although they admitted that the colonies had weakly accepted it; logically there was no need for it, since the colonial legislatures were competent. The colonists should love and honor the king, follow his lead in war, observe the treaties he concluded with other princes; but otherwise govern themselves. So these three Americans in 1774–75 demanded for their colonies the exact dominion status which Canada, South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and the Irish Free State now enjoy in the British Empire, and which is now the official basis of the British 'Commonwealth of Nations.' Here was the complete theory of federalism, already worked out before the War of Independence. But these doctrines had no remote chance of acceptance in England. Very few Englishmen except Lord Camden — who pointed out the analogy of the Channel Islands — could understand how a community could be in the empire, unless parliamentary authority over it were sovereign and complete. It is one of the ironies of history that the British Empire should finally have officially adopted the federal theory of these three American thinkers, which had been dismissed as insincere and fanatical ravings in 1775.

The most important work of the Congress was 'The Association.' This provided for a system of committees of inspection in every town or county, in order to supervise the non-importation, non-exportation, and non-consumption agreements. The Association was charged to inspect customs entries, to publish the names of merchants who violated the agreements and to confiscate their importations, and even to 'encourage frugality, economy, and industry . . . and discountenance every species of extravagance and dissipation, especially all horse-racing, and all kinds of gaming, cock-fighting, exhibitions of shews, plays, and other expensive diversions and entertainments.' This play for the religious vote was a master-stroke.

Thus a Congress called to protest against parliamentary usurpation of rights ended by creating a powerful and extra-legal machinery for supervising the daily life of Americans. The Association introduced an element of illegality and rebellion that caused moderates to draw back in alarm. For many the issue now became: submission to parliamentary authority, or to the petty tyranny of a self-constituted vigilance committee. 'If we must be enslaved,' wrote the loyalist Samuel Seabury, 'let it be by a King at least, and not by a parcel of upstart, lawless committeemen.'

The Association favored the spirit of lawlessness that was already abroad in the colonies. By placing power squarely in the hands of the radicals, and making nonconformity synonymous with toryism, it forced large numbers of moderates to go along with the current, and widened hopelessly the breach between patriots and loyalists.

Even now the Crown might have effected an alliance with the large body of conservative opinion in the colonies, and by timely concession have averted hostilities. For not willingly would the propertied men in the colonies ally themselves with levellers and democrats, mob leaders and snooping committees. But the king had no intention of making concessions; and what the king said went, in the North administration. In September 1774, George III, scoring a petition of Philadelphia Quakers asking concessions, wrote, 'the dye is now cast, the Colonies must either submit or triumph; I do not wish to come to severer measures but we must not retreat . . . there must always be one tax to keep up the right, and as such I approve of the Tea Duty.' And in November: 'the New

England Governments are now in a State of Rebellion, blows must decide whether they are subject to this Country or independant.' In February 1775, Lord North got through Parliament a resolution providing that if any colony would raise of its own authority the cost of its own government, with a proper quota (determined in England) for defence, Parliament would forbear to tax that colony, and would pay the regulatory customs duties collected therein into the colony treasury. The king liked this because it would, so he fondly thought, 'put an end to Congresses,' and North defended it because it gave up no British right, which was certainly true; but from the American point of view the North Conciliatory Resolve conceded nothing on taxation, and failed to meet the latest issue of closing a port and altering a government. And news of it arrived in America at a moment fatal to any reconciliation — just as the news of Lexington and Concord was being shouted through the length and breadth of the land.

2. *Hostilities Begin*

General Thomas Gage, an amiable gentleman with an American wife, was in command of the garrison at Boston. Dr. Joseph Warren, one of the leading radicals of that town, where political activity had wholly replaced trade, wrote to an English friend on 20 February 1775:

> 'It is not yet too late to accommodate the dispute amicably. But I am of the opinion that if once General Gage should lead his troops into the country with the design to enforce the late Acts of Parliament, Great Britain may take her leave, at least of the New England colonies, and, if I mistake not, of all America. If there is any wisdom in the nation, God grant it may be speedily called forth! Every day, every hour widens the breach. A Richmond, a Chatham, a Shelburne, a Camden, with their noble associates, may yet repair it; it is a work which none but the greatest of men can conduct.'

Unfortunately these gentlemen and their noble associates were in opposition, without a dog's chance of ousting the king's well-nursed majority; and General Gage's duty was to enforce the Coercive Acts. News that the Massachusetts patriots were collecting powder and military stores at Concord came to his ears. On the night of 18 April he sent a strong detail of his garrison to confiscate these munitions. But the signal was given: Paul Revere and Tom Dawes aroused the whole countryside. When Major Pitcairn, after a night of marching, led his column of light infantry into the village of Lexington, he saw through the mists of the early morning a grim band of minute men lined up across the Common. There was a moment of hesitation, cries and orders from both sides, and in the midst of the noise somebody fired. Then firing broke out along both lines and the Americans dispersed, leaving eight of their number dead on the green. The first blood of the War for American Independence had been shed. Who first fired, American or Englishman, is one of the unsolved riddles of history; but the patriots managed to circulate their own version, a brutal and wanton attack on peaceful villagers: a version which it is still considered unpatriotic, in some quarters, to doubt.

The British continued their march to Concord, where the 'embattled farmers' at the bridge 'fired the shot heard round the world.' Their purpose partially accomplished, the British regiments began their return march. All along the road, behind stone walls, hillocks, and houses, the militia arriving from 'every Middlesex village and farm' made targets of the bright red coats. When the weary column finally stumbled into Boston it had lost 247 in killed and wounded. And inside of a week Boston was a beleaguered city.

It was while the country was still resounding with the alarms and 'atrocities' of Lexington and Concord, that the Second Continental Congress assembled in Philadelphia (10 May 1775). The prophetic words of Patrick Henry were still ringing in the ears of the delegates: 'It is vain, sir, to extenuate the matter. Gentlemen may cry "peace, peace" but there is no peace. The war is actually begun! The next gale that sweeps from the north will bring to our ears the clash of resounding arms! Our brethren are already in the field! Why stand we here idle?' Why, indeed? Congress was in no conciliatory mood. War had already begun. Would it be accompanied by independence? Even as delegates were asking these questions, timidly or boldly, Ethan Allen and his Green Mountain Boys were crashing through the defences of Fort Ticonderoga and raising the standard of revolt in the North. Control of affairs was rapidly drifting out of the hands of hesitant and law-abiding men, and Congress had little to do but register, in one form or another, the accomplished facts.

This second Congress was as distinguished a group as ever assembled in America, and they have achieved historical immortality as 'the signers.' John Hancock, a wealthy Boston merchant, was chosen President. Young Thomas Jefferson was there, fresh from composing his *Summary View;* and the venerable Dr. Franklin, so discouraged by his vain search for conciliation in London as to be an exponent of independence. Yet the radicals did not push through their program of accepting war and declaring independency without a severe struggle. John Dickinson again raised his voice in favor of conciliation, and persuaded his reluctant colleagues to adopt another petition to the king.

The real temper of Congress was revealed by a stirring Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms, the joint product of Dickinson and Jefferson.

> 'Our cause is just. Our union is perfect. Our internal resources are great, and, if necessary, foreign assistance is undoubtedly attainable. . . . The arms we have been compelled by our enemies to assume, we will . . . employ for the preservation of our liberties, being with one mind resolved to die free men rather than live slaves.'

And then came the ominous if oblique threat,

> 'We mean not to dissolve that union which has so long and so happily subsisted between us. Necessity has not yet driven us into that desperate measure, or induced us to excite any other nation to war against them. We have not raised armies with ambitious designs of separating from Great Britain, and establishing independent States. . . .'

The inference was unmistakable, and even as the Declaration was being debated Congress took the militia besieging Boston into Continental service, and appointed Colonel George Washington commander-in-chief of the American forces. And on 23 June Washington rode off from Philadelphia to take charge of the army, only to be met by breathless couriers with the stirring story of Bunker Hill. And shortly after Congress authorized a project which the British could only consider as wantonly aggressive: an overland expedition to Quebec under Benedict Arnold,[2] to bring Canada into the Union as the fourteenth colony.

[2] See Chapter V.

3. *Independence*

Still, the idea of independence was repugnant to many members of Congress and to a large part of the American people. The ostensible purpose of the two Continental Congresses had been to get the Coercive Acts repealed, restore imperial relations as before 1763, and thus avert both war and independence. As late as the autumn of 1775 the legislatures of North Carolina, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, and Maryland went on record against independence. Public opinion was not yet ready for any drastic action. Yet the colonies could not forever remain half in, half out of the empire, professing allegiance while refusing obedience. Moderates persuaded themselves that they were not fighting the king or the mother country, but the 'unprincipled hirelings of a venal ministry.' They referred to the enemy as the 'ministerial,' not the British army; they hoped for a political crisis in England that would place their friends in power; as late as January 1776, the king's health was toasted nightly in the officers' mess presided over by General Washington. Radicals acquiesced in this policy because they expected that it would have the contrary effect, and make Britain more uncompromising; as it did.

As the months wore on, the difficulties of prosecuting a war while still a part of the empire, became more and more patent. Independence was desirable for military success; without it the colonies could scarcely expect that assistance from France upon which they based great hopes. Furthermore, it became clearer every day that the first Congress's policy of non-importation and non-exportation was a complete failure. Commercial pressure was not effective after fighting had aroused passion. It simply prevented the Americans from getting needed supplies, and hurt them more than it did the British. And after so many lives had been lost, at Bunker Hill and in the vain assault on Quebec (December 1775), there came a feeling that something of permanent value ought to be achieved.

No compromise came from England. King George, naturally regarding as insincere an 'olive-branch' petition from a body that was carrying on armed rebellion, refused to receive it, and instead issued a proclamation declaring the colonies to be in a state of rebellion (23 August 1775). And on 22 December 1775, all trade and intercourse with the Thirteen Colonies was interdicted by Parliament. The triumphant comment of John Adams reveals how this Act helped the American radicals:

> 'I know not whether you have seen the Act of Parliament called the Restraining Act or Prohibitory Act, or Piratical Act or Act of Independency — for by all these titles it is called. I think that the most apposite is the Act of Independency; the Kings, Lords and Commons have united in sundering this country from that, I think forever. It is a complete dismemberment of the British Empire. It throws thirteen colonies out of the royal protection, and makes us independent in spite of supplications and entreaties.'

In January 1776, Thomas Paine's pamphlet *Common Sense* was published. This book was to the American Revolution what *Uncle Tom's Cabin* was to the Civil War. Sweeping aside dialectic and sentiment, Paine stated the case for independence in a crisp, vigorous language, that appealed to the ordinary American. It presented in popular form the natural rights philosophy that was to be embodied in the Declaration of Independence. 'Society in every state is a blessing, but Government, even in its best state, is but a necessary evil; in its worst, an intolerable one. Government, like dress, is the badge of lost innocence; the palaces of kings are built upon the ruins of the bowers of Paradise.' With ruthless disregard for tradition and sentiment Paine attacked the monarchy, the British Constitution, and the empire. Monarchy itself, he argued, is an absurd form of government; one honest man worth 'all the crowned ruffians that ever lived'; and George III, 'the Royal Brute of Great Britain,' the worst of monarchs. Such words were sweet music to democratic ears. How absurd, too, that a continent should be governed by an island! Such an unnatural connection merely subjected the colonies to exploitation, and involved them in every European war. Separation would not only avert these evils, but bring positive benefits — such as a world market for American trade. Anticipating the idea of isolation, Paine announced it to be 'the true interest of America to steer clear of European contentions, which she can never do while, by her dependence on Great Britain, she is made the make-weight in the scale of British politics.'

Thus with persuasive simplicity Paine presented the alternatives: continued submission to a tyrannous king, an outworn government, and a vicious economic system; or liberty and happiness as a self-sufficient independent republic. The loyalists he lumped together and denounced as 'interested men who are not to be trusted, weak men who *cannot* see, prejudiced men who will not see, and a certain set of moderate men who think better of the European world than it deserves.' And he closed with the eloquent peroration:

> 'O! ye that love mankind! Ye that dare oppose not only the tyranny but the tyrant, stand forth! Every spot of the old world is overrun with oppression. Freedom hath been hunted round the Globe. Asia and Africa have long expelled her. Europe regards her as a stranger and England hath given her warning to depart. O! receive the fugitive and prepare in time an asylum for mankind.'

The influence of this amazing pamphlet cannot well be exaggerated. Within a few months it had been read by or to almost every American. It rallied the undecided and the wavering, and proved a trumpet call to the radicals. 'Every Post and every Day rolls in upon us Independence like a Torrent,' observed John Adams exultantly. Among the makers of the new nation few hold a higher place than Thomas Paine, sometime staymaker of Norfolk in old England.

In each colony now a keen struggle was going on between conservatives and radicals for control of the delegations in Congress. As yet only a few delegations were definitely instructed for independence: it was the task of the radicals to force every one into line. The struggle coincided with the class and sectional divisions which we have already described as present in most of the colonies. Everywhere the radicals were using the powerful lever of independence to oust the conservatives and put themselves in control, and, under cover of a popular war, push through their programs of democratic reform. The alternative that faced the conservatives in such colonies as New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and South Carolina, was not pleasant. If they tried to stem the popular tide, they would see themselves denounced as tories, hurled out of office, and old institutions exposed to the mercies of the radical democrats. They could maintain their accustomed position and influence, and save their property, only by acquiescing in a policy of war and separation. In Pennsylvania the struggle was particularly bitter, coinciding as it did with the ancient feud of Scotch-Irish frontiersmen and the city artisans against the Quaker oligarchy and the wealthier Germans. The success of the radicals here was achieved only by overthrowing the old government, establishing a new one with full representation of the frontier counties, and drawing up a new constitution. This new revolutionary government promptly instructed the Pennsylvania delegates for independence. The effect of this radical victory upon the Congress, sitting in Philadelphia, was tremendous.

Events now moved rapidly toward independence. In January 1776 came the burning of Norfolk by Lord Dunmore, and Virginia took the road to Revolution. The next month the embattled farmers of the South repulsed the royal troops and native loyalists at Moore's Creek Bridge. In March the legislature of North Carolina instructed its delegates to declare independence and form foreign alliances. Congress then threw the ports of America open to the commerce of the world, and sent an agent to France to obtain assistance. On 10 May Congress advised the states to establish independent governments, as several had done already. On 7 June, Richard Henry Lee, pursuant to instructions from his native state, rose in Congress and moved 'That these United Colonies are, and of right out to be, Free and Independent States.' After a terrific debate in which sturdy John Adams pled the cause of independence, Lee's motion was carried on 2 July. Meantime Congress had appointed a committee consisting of Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Roger Sherman, and Robert Livingston, to prepare a formal declaration 'setting forth the causes which impelled us to this mighty resolution.' This Declaration of Independence, written by Thomas Jefferson, was adopted 4 July 1776.

4. *The Great Declaration*

The Declaration of Independence not only announced the birth of a new nation; the philosophy which it set forth has been a dynamic force in the entire Western world throughout the nineteenth century. 'Out of a decent respect for the opinions of mankind,' Jefferson summed up, not only the reasons which impelled Americans to independence, but the broad political and social principles upon which the Revolution itself rested. The particular 'abuses and usurpations' which are charged against the king, and which fill a large part of the Declaration, are not advanced as the basis for revolution, but merely as proof that George III had 'in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these states.'

The Declaration rests, therefore, not upon particular grievances, but upon a broad basis which commanded general support not only in America but in Europe as well. The grievances are scarcely those which appeal to the student of that period as fundamental; examined in the candid light of history many seem distorted, others inconsequential, some unfair. One of the strongest, an indictment of the slave trade, was struck out at the insistence of Southern and New England delegates. But the historical accuracy of the grievances is not the yardstick by which they are to be measured. Jefferson was making history, not writing it.

Jefferson's indictment is drawn against George III, despite the fact that for twelve years the dispute between the colonies and Britain had centered on the question of parliamentary authority. The only reference to Parliament is in the clause, 'He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our constitution and unacknowledged by our laws, giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation.' Entire odium of parliamentary misdeeds is transferred to the hapless George III. The reason for this shift was not that the king's influence over politics was understood, but that Congress had finally accepted the position of Adams, Jefferson, and Wilson regarding Parliament as merely the legislative body of Great Britain, each colonial legislature being a co-equal and co-ordinate body, having exclusive power (with the king or his representative) over that particular colony.

The political philosophy of the Declaration is set forth clearly and succinctly in the second paragraph:

> 'We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed. That whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to institute new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.'

'These truths' were not the creatures of Jefferson's mind; they formed a political theory 'self-evident' to his generation. The obvious sources for this philosophy were Harrington and Sidney, John Locke's *Second Treatise on Government,* and the actual experience of Americans. It is unnecessary to seek further.

And what was the nature of this ideal government? It was one created by social compact. Originally, so Locke and Jefferson held, men lived equal in a state of nature. When necessity required some form of control, they got together and set up a government by popular consent. It is the function and purpose of government to protect men in their life, liberty, and property. Jefferson substituted for the term 'property' the word 'happiness': a characteristic and illuminating stroke on the part of this social philosopher who throughout his life placed human rights first. If government fail to perform these functions, 'it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it altogether, and to institute new government'—as the Americans were doing. To the troublesome charge that such popular power would lead to anarchy, Jefferson replied, 'all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer while evils are sufferable, than to right them by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed.'

It is futile and irrelevant to argue that this theory of the origin of government does not square with nineteenth-century experience and twentieth-century anthropological knowledge. Whatever the origin of government may have been in prehistoric times, in America it often arose just as Jefferson described. As in the Mayflower Compact of 1620, so in countless frontier settlements from the Watauga to the Willamette, men came together spontaneously and organized a government. Jefferson's political philosophy seemed to them merely the commonsense of the matter. And the ideas of the Declaration were dynamic throughout in the nineteenth century. Historical facts derive their significance not as they are judged correct or incorrect by some abstract criterion, but by the place they come to hold in the minds and imaginations of men. By a curious transfer of ideas Jefferson's doctrine that all men are *created* equal has gradually come to mean that all men *are* equal, or that if not they ought to be. Most of the great liberal reform movements of the nineteenth century—abolition, universal suffrage, labor laws, popular education; most of the nationalist movements—in Ireland, Finland, Italy, Germany in '48, Czecho-Slovakia—based their philosophy on the Declaration of Independence; and the American Union could not have been saved in 1861–65 without it. The timelessness of its doctrines and the haunting beauty of its phrasing insure immortality to the Great Declaration.

5. *The Loyalists*

The Declaration of Independence divided those who hoped to solve the problem of imperial order by evolution from those who preferred to solve it by revolution. By calling into existence a new nation it made loyalty to King George treason; and in most colonies patriot committees went about forcing everyone, on pain of imprisonment of person and confiscation of property, to take an oath of allegiance to the United States. Thus it strengthened the hands of the patriots or whigs, and gave to the loyalists or tories the unpleasant alternative of submission or flight.

This party was important in quantity and impressive in quality. There were loyalists in every colony and in every walk of life. In New York, New Jersey, and Georgia they probably composed a majority of the population, and they were very strong in Pennsylvania and the Carolinas, the regions where British arms were most successful. The loyalists were weakest in Virginia, Maryland, and Massachusetts: the oldest settled colonies with the proudest traditions. Although it is impossible to ascertain their number, the fact that over seventy thousand loyalists left the country during the Revolution, and that everyone admitted those to be a minority of the party, gives some index of their strength. The greater part of the loyalists took the required oaths and paid taxes, while praying for the defeat of the American cause, simply because they had no place to go. As late as 1830 there were old ladies in New York and Portsmouth, N. H., who celebrated the king's birthday, but drew all their curtains and closed their shutters on the Fourth of July!

Loyalism was strongest in the upper classes. The royal officials went tory as a matter of course; so too, most of the Anglican clergy, whose Book of Common Prayer prescribed loyalty to one's lawful sovereign as a Christian virtue. Outside Virginia and Maryland, most of the greatest landowners were loyal, although many remained passive during the war to save their property. The merchants in the North, except in Boston and the smaller New England seaports, were pretty evenly divided; and many lawyers remained faithful to the king. In general the older, conservative, established, well-to-do people — always excepting the Virginia planters and

New England merchants — were inclined to oppose revolution, actively or passively; but many families such as the Randolphs of Virginia, Morrises of New York, and Otises of Massachusetts, were divided; and most of the earliest and most prominent leaders of the Revolution were gentlemen. It is easy to understand that they could not carry their entire class into a revolution which involved not merely separation from the mother country, but the stability of American society. The question of home rule in the empire could not be divorced from the question of who was to rule in America. The country was much less united in 1775 than in 1765. When the conservatives realized that liberty could be won only by opening the floodgates to 'dirty democrats,' many drew back in alarm; others, like John Jay, held their noses and carried on, to be rewarded by capturing the government in 1789 — and being let down once more in 1801. Of these perhaps the most distinguished was John Dickinson, who opposed independence to the last but when it finally came acquiesced and fought under Washington. Even some of the radical patriots had their bad moments. John Adams, riding home from the Continental Congress, was accosted by a countryman who exclaimed, so he tells us:

> '"Oh, Mr. Adams, what great things have you and your colleagues done for us. We can never be grateful enough to you. There are no courts of justice now in this province, and I hope there never will be another." Is this the object for which I have been contending? said I to myself, for I rode along without any answer to this wretch. Are these the sentiments of such people, and how many of them are there in the country? . . . If the power of the country should get into such hands, and there is a great danger that it will, to what purpose have we sacrificed our time, health and everything else?'

To what purpose indeed! This question forced itself upon the consideration of every thoughtful man, until finally, when independence was achieved, it became the dominant question of American society.

It is hardly necessary to tell the present generation that the old popular view of the tories as perfidious traitors to the American cause, is false. Intellectually and morally the loyalists were good men, and their principles were respectable. The attitude of those Americans who fought to hold the empire together in 1776 was no different from that of Southern Unionists like General Thomas and Admiral Farragut in 1861; and the difference between success and failure, more than the difference of right and wrong, explains the different 'verdict of history' toward these two great civil wars. After a hundred and fifty years Americans as a whole have become essentially conservative, so loyal to their institutions and faithful to their traditions, that if another issue should arise like that of 1776, there is not the slightest doubt that the great mass of the nation would take the loyalist side.

V

THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE

1. *Factors and Conditions*

IF Americans had really been so united and determined as the ringing phrases of the Declaration of Independence suggest, they could have achieved independence within a year. For they already controlled ninety-nine per cent of the country, the English people were half-hearted in the war; and the difficulties of conquering a determined people three thousand miles overseas were insuperable. But Congress found it very difficult to keep an army together and to feed those who fought. Americans were willing to turn out as militia and repel an invasion of their own state; but comparatively few could be induced to stay in the regular army for longer than a year. Independence could not have been won without foreign aid and the leadership of Washington, one of the best and greatest men in recorded history.

Indeed the surprising thing about the War of Independence when you compare it with other wars of liberation in history, is not that the Americans won, but that they did not win more easily. The continent was theirs, in 1775, from Quebec to the borders of Florida, and from the sea to the mountains — except for the acreage occupied by a few thousand British troops at Boston; and all the Americans had to do to win independence was to hold what they had. The British, on the contrary, had to reconquer a vast territory in order to win. It was the military problem of 1861, on a vaster scale, and with the dice loaded in favor of the 'rebels.' For the British government, in order to get troops into action against the 'rebels' of 1775–81, had to send them by bulky, slow-moving sailing vessels which never took less than five weeks and often twelve to cross the Atlantic against the prevailing winds. Many men succumbed to ship fever, and the rest had to be conditioned after they landed, weak and groggy, in a strange land with a perplexing climate. Moreover, those who 'came three thousand miles and died, to keep a king upon his throne,' had to be armed, clothed, and even partly fed from England, which meant more shipping, more delays, more losses from American privateers and hazards of the sea, and such expense as had never been known in English history.

Several English military experts thought the reconquest of America hopeless from the start. The Adjutant-General of the army called it ' as wild an idea as ever controverted common sense,' and Lord Barrington, the veteran war secretary, agreed. He proposed to bring the rebels back to their bounden duty and service by withdrawing all land forces, and smothering the rebellion by a strict blockade. Not being a sailor, Barrington did not appreciate that you cannot maintain a blockade without bases; but if the British had concentrated on holding three or four seaports as fortified naval bases, and sent not a single company inland, they would have had a fair chance of saving something besides honor.

However, that was not to be. The Secretary at War was not in the Cabinet, and the conduct of the war came under the Colonial Secretary of the North ministry, Lord George Germain, who is always represented in the savage political cartoons of the day as wearing a white feather. He had been dismissed from the army after the Battle of Minden for something that looked like cowardice, yet had risen in politics through a combination of personal effrontery, family influence, and royal favor. The feelings of British officers and generals at having to take orders in war time from a man who had been declared by a court martial unfit to serve in any military capacity, may well be imagined. Lord George did not see eye to eye with Lord Barrington. He saw no essential difference between this war and any other. A British army was already in the country; honor and prestige demanded its reinforcement; then let it defeat or disperse the rebels, and ravage or occupy the country. It was all so simple, as you looked on a neatly colored map of North America, and ignored the ocean and the wilderness.

Congress could not afford to let a British army parade about the country unopposed. Many members of Congress inherited the traditional English aversion to standing armies, and believed the war could be fought by militia alone; but the wiser saw that a regular army was absolutely necessary if only as a stiffener to the rest; that it took time to train a soldier. They had to reckon, however, with American individualism, hostile to the necessary discipline of a regular army, and with a very slight spirit of sacrifice among the people


REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN THE NORTH
Quebec
Chaudière R.
DISTRICT OF MAINE
Montreal
Lake CHAMPLAIN
VT.
Falmouth
N.H.
Crown Point
Ticonderoga
Lake GEORGE
Portsmouth
FT. Edward
Connecticut R.
Saratoga
Bennington
Salem
Concord
Lexington
Boston
Oriskany
Mohawk R.
Albany
MASS.
Springfield
Providence
NEW YORK
R. I.
Wethersfield
Newport
Hudson R.
CONN.
New London
Delaware R.
West Point
New Haven
White Plains
Wyoming Valley
Morristown
New York
Brooklyn
N.J.
PENN.
Princeton
Monmouth C.H.
Trenton
Susquehanna R.
Valley Forge
Germantown
Philadelphia
Camden


Wilmington
N.J.
Potomac R.
Elkton
Baltimore
DEL.
Shenandoah R.
Charlottesville
VIRGINIA
James R.
Richmond
Bedford
Petersburg
Yorktown
Roanoke R.
Hillsboro
Guilford Court House
Ramsay's Mills
Tar R.
Neuse R.
Cowpens
Kings Mountain
NORTH CAROLINA
Cross Creek
Newbern
Pedee R.
Fear R.
Camden
SOUTH CAROLINA
Wilmington
Santee R.
Charleston
Fort Moultrie
Savannah

REVOLUTIONARY
WAR
IN THE SOUTH

at large. The Revolutionary War was fought under the peculiar condition of want of enthusiasm on each side. Nothing comparable to that of 1917, or even 1861. The king was obliged to hire German mercenaries, his own subjects were so reluctant to enlist; though no doubt this was as much due to the hard conditions of British army life, with severe discipline and low pay, as to indifference. Soldiers were not supposed to be patriots in those days, or even to know what the war was about; soldiering was simply a trade like any other. There were, however, very many instances of British officers who resigned their commissions rather than fight their overseas brethren; and the late Sir G. O. Trevelyan in his brilliant history of the American Revolution, which so well represents the 'old whig' point of view, gives instance after instance of the most open sympathy by prominent Englishmen with the American 'rebels,' whom they regarded as fighting for English freedom from arbitrary monarchy as much as for American independence. Fortescue, the historian of the British army, regards the 'treason' of those liberty-loving Englishmen as a principal factor in the American victory.

On the other side, the greatest disadvantage of the Americans was the small number who were willing to fight or to make any sacrifice for independence. Washington himself wrote, when trying to get the New England troops to re-enlist in the fall of 1775, 'Such a dearth of public spirit, and want of virtue, and stock-jobbing, a fertility in all the low arts to obtain advantages of one kind or another, I never saw before and pray God I may never be witness to again. . . . Could I have foreseen what I have, and am likely to experience, no consideration upon Earth should have induced me to accept this command.' He was to experience less virtue and more politics as the war went on; but his own steadfast patriotism never wavered for a moment, and he endured a degree of neglect, disobedience, and even disloyalty, which would have induced almost any other general in history to resign his sword and give up the cause.

Washington was more than a general: he was the embodiment of all that was noblest and best in the American people. With no illusions about his own grandeur, no thought of the future except an intense longing to return to his beloved Mount Vernon, he assumed every responsibility thrust upon him, and fulfilled it. He not only had to lead an army, but to write constant letters to Congress, state leaders, and state governments, begging them for the wherewithal to create and maintain an army. He had to compose quarrels among his officers, many of them volunteers from Europe, and placate cold, hungry, unshod troops. Intrigues against himself he always ignored, and always the intriguers came to grief. After France sent aid, he had quasi-diplomatic functions to fulfil. Although asking and receiving no salary, he sometimes from his own pocket bought clothing for his men, and sent aid to the destitute families of his companions in battle. Thus Washington brought something more to the cause than his military ability and statesmanship; he contributed the priceless gift of character.

The Declaration of Independence gave a brief fillip to patriotism, but for only a short period; and it was the comparative indifference of the vast majority that made the task of Washington and the handful of devoted and self-sacrificing men and women who sustained him, so difficult. For the Americans were not then — nor are they now — a military people. They were eager for a fight perhaps, but sustained warfare demands other qualities than those needed to fight Indians and wildcats. The sort of warfare they enjoyed was militia warfare: turning out under some popular local leader like John Stark or Francis Marion to repel an invasion or do a little bushwhacking, and then home to plant the corn or get in the hay. Steady service in an army so ill-fed, paid, clothed as Washington's was distasteful; and the average American, though he wished his side to win, saw no need of continuous fighting. When New England was cleared of the enemy, it was difficult to get Yankees to go to the aid of the Middle States or the South; after the first enthusiasm of 1775 it was equally difficult to get Southerners to serve in the North; and the people of the Middle States, where most of the fighting occurred, hung back even then. The total enlistments in the war, regulars and militia — i.e., the total number of men who counted as veterans and as ancestors for members of 'patriotic societies' — was several hundred thousand. But Washington's army reached its peak of strength with 16,000 in the summer of 1776. It fell to 5,000 by the end of the year, and seldom if ever went higher. His army that marched from the Hudson to Yorktown was only 2,000 strong. It is true that no provision was made for the families of men in service, and no pensions were paid to the dependents of those who fell, so enlistments were practically restricted to the very young, the adventurous, the floating population, and the superpatriotic. But with all these allowances the fact remains that a disgracefully small number of Americans were willing to do any sustained fighting for their country's cause.

The government of the country contributed to this slackness in the fight. All the state and local governments of the Thirteen Colonies, except the few places under British occupation, were in patriot hands; but the central government, which alone can successfully wage war, was very weak. Until the Articles of Confederation were ratified the Continental Congress had no legal authority. It was little more than an inter-allied conference. It passed resolutions, not laws; it issued requisitions, not orders, for men, money, and supplies. Although Congress had the good sense to give Washington supreme control of military operations, and to resist all intrigues to deprive him of it, it did not support him adequately—indeed it could not, dependent as it was on the good will of the states and the people for the wherewithal to carry on the war. Washington organized his army in line regiments, each one coming from a specific state; and the states were supposed to keep these filled. Congress made requisitions on states for so many recruits, for so many months' or years' service. The states generally passed on the responsibility to the counties or towns, and these local units advertised for recruits, paying bounties in money or kind, which steadily increased as the war continued. Near the end of the war Virginia was offering recruits a choice between £60 specie and 300 acres of land with 'a healthy, sound negro'; while Beverly, Mass., to fill her local quota, paid each man an amount of sugar, coffee, beef, corn, and cotton, to the value of £1600 in continental currency.

In the matter of arms and munitions, Congress, aided by generous supplies from France, captures by privateers, and local enterprise, did rather well; and no battle was lost for want of arms or powder. But in the matter of feeding and clothing the army it did very ill.

> 'The story of the sufferings of the Revolutionary army has usually been regarded as a glorious proof of endurance and patriotism, and this it is; but it is also proof of weakness and folly on the part of Congress and the Country. Undoubtedly, liberal allowance should be made in judging a young, ill-organized people, who were inexperienced in great affairs, and whose circumstances were peculiarly unfavorable to executive efficiency. Yet the fact remains that the army starved, not because the country could not furnish food, but because the people were unwilling to endure taxation, and because Congress themselves did not understand the importance of administrative centralization. Some of

the hardships that the army endured were, indeed, unavoidable; but the greater part of them were caused by incompetent or negligent officials, bad management, and an excess of paper money.'[1]

When, in the spring of 1778, Congress chose able men as quartermaster-general and commissary-general, with full powers, the army was well fed for a year and a half. Congress then became terrified at the depreciation of continental currency, and resorted to requisitions in kind on the states: so much beef, pork, and flour, so many blankets, coats, and stockings. Paper money also increased the difficulty of procuring transportation for supplies. Roads were few and bad, the sea was largely controlled by the enemy; and it took money as well as organization to keep teams and wagons moving. The whole matter of supplies was in a vicious circle of paper currency, decentralization, inefficiency, and popular hatred of taxation. Many patriots thought the war was being fought to get rid of taxation, and only two of the Thirteen States made any attempt to raise money by taxation in 1775 and 1776! Congress finally broke out of the circle by appointing Robert Morris, a wealthy Philadelphia merchant, Superintendent of Finance in 1781. By heroic methods he placed the government on a specie basis, fed the army by contract, and procured a proper supply of uniforms, so that during the last year of the war, after Yorktown, the army was better paid, clothed, and fed than in the 'times that tried men's souls.' Paper money is all very well when the people can get nothing else; but throughout the War of Independence continental and state paper had to meet the competition of golden sovereigns; and after 1780, of French *louis d'or* as well.

The existence of a loyalist minority was an important factor in prolonging the war. Those who fled to England whipped up British public opinion by their stories of persecution (unfortunately for the most part true); and they were forever telling anyone who would listen that if Lord George would only dispatch a few regiments to my section of the country, Sir, the countryside would rise as one man, Sir, and flock to the colors! This policy was occasionally tried, but the loyal rustics learned very early in the war that if they rallied to a British force, it presently marched away and left them at the mercy of patriot committees. There were never enough loyalists anywhere to control the country; even in the South, every county snapped back into patriot hands as soon as Cornwallis had passed by. There were enough, however, to do some very effective fighting for the king. Somewhat late in the war, the British discovered that Americans were the best people to fight Americans. Several tory regiments were then organized. New York furnished more soldiers to George III than to George Washington. Loyalist forces which were quartered in New York City, frequently harried the shores of Long Island by marauding expeditions, and did other dirty work with which the regulars would not soil their hands. It was Butler's Tory Rangers and St. Leger's Loyal Greens who with Mohawk Indians perpetrated the Wyoming massacre in central New York, the surpassing horror of the war. In the South, the large number of fighting loyalists made the warfare in that section more bitter and inhumane than elsewhere, for neighborhood feuds and personal grudges gave a sharper edge to the conflict. The Battle of Camden was really an American loyalist victory, won by Tarleton's Legion and Rawdon's Volunteers of Ireland. King's Mountain was the rebel revenge. Gallant Patrick Ferguson with 125 British regulars and 1000 American loyalists took his stand on the summit and challenged 'all the rebels outside of hell' to dislodge him; and he must have thought that most of them were there when the firing began from every rock and bush on the mountain side. Half the loyalists were killed, and all the rest but twenty-one surrendered.

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[1] L. C. Hatch, *The Administration of the American Revolutionary Army*, pp. 121–122.

How far was race a factor in the American Revolution? There has been much ill-tempered writing and declamation on this subject in recent years, owing to the 'inferiority complex' of race-conscious groups, and the 'superiority complex' of veterans' descendants. In a general way, it is probable that the racial heterogeneity of the colonies in comparison with England weakened the bond between the two; but George III was a German prince as well as an English king. Thomas Jefferson in his original draft of the Declaration of Independence spoke as one Englishman to another. His indignant reference to the king's sending over 'Scotch and foreign mercenaries to invade and destroy us' had to be deleted because James Wilson and John Witherspoon resented the 'Scotch'! Members of every non-English race then in America can be found on American army rolls; but so can they also be found on British army rolls and lists of loyalists. One of the best tory regiments was Rawdon's Volunteers of Ireland. The Pennsylvania Germans were notoriously slow to take fire in this cause, as in most things; although the

Mühlenbergs were leaders both in war and politics. Mrs. Ravenel, the historian of South Carolina, declares that the Huguenot element of that colony, grateful to England for many benefits, failed to turn out in large numbers until their hero Marion called them. The Scotch Highlanders of North Carolina, who had been fighting the local whig gang in the 'War of the Regulation,' generally remained loyal to the Crown. And thousands of backwoodsmen from Pennsylvania to Georgia emigrated beyond the mountains rather than pay war taxes and perform war service. Conversely, many English and Irish officers who were English or Irish born and bred, such as Gates, Charles Lee, St. Clair, Montgomery, and Conway, joined the American army; and Tom Paine wrote for it rather more effectively than they fought for it. So one might go on claiming and counterclaiming, and all to no purpose; for the truth is that Americans were not race-conscious in the eighteenth century, and race played no part in the choice of sides. All peoples then represented in America played an honorable part on the patriot side; and an equally honorable part on the loyalist side.

2. *Military and Naval Operations, 1775–1777*

Even before the Declaration of Independence there were military operations which had an important influence on the outcome of the war. The crushing of the North Carolina loyalists by patriot militia at Moore's Creek Bridge near Wilmington, N. C., on 27 February 1776, made it impossible for the British to erect a military base in that region. That was the object of a new expeditionary force from Ireland commanded by Lord Cornwallis, with a detachment of British regulars from Boston under Sir Henry Clinton. They were forced to try Charleston, S. C., instead. Charleston is a remarkably hard nut to crack, as Spaniards, British, and Yankees have discovered to their cost. Washington detached Charles Lee to take charge; but before he arrived, the local patriots had erected Fort Moultrie, which drove the attacking ships off when they endeavored to force a passage (28 June 1776). Clinton and Cornwallis, baffled, retired to join Howe in his attack on New York. So the British acquired no southern base in 1776, and the large number of Carolina loyalists had to fend for themselves.

About the time of the Moore's Creek fight, Washington, who had been besieging Boston for eight months with an army composed largely of New England militia, decided to finish up. Seizing and fortifying Dorchester Heights, which the British had neglected after their dearly-bought capture of Bunker Hill, Washington got his artillery in a position to bombard the enemy out of Boston. General Sir William Howe decided it was time to leave, and, happily for modern Boston, chose St. Patrick's Day, 1776, to evacuate his army.

After Ethan Allen had taken Ticonderoga and Crown Point on Lake Champlain early in 1775, Benedict Arnold, an enterprising Connecticut militia officer, persuaded Congress to authorize a march on Canada in two divisions. The French Canadians were expected to revolt on the appearance of an American force, and bring in Canada as the fourteenth member of the half-formed American Confederation. But England had gone far toward conciliating the French Canadians by the Quebec Act of 1774, which, in turn, had provoked such outbursts of intolerance in the northern colonies that the French *habitans* had no wish to change masters.

Richard Montgomery, with a little over a thousand men, taking the classic route of the Hudson and Lake Champlain, captured Montreal on 12 November 1775. About six hundred of Benedict Arnold's equal force got through the wilderness of Maine to Quebec, after incredible hardships. They poled, pushed, and dragged their way in flat-bottomed boats up the Kennebec river, across a twelve-mile carry, through a complicated chain of ponds and small streams, across a snow-covered mountain pass, and — those who had boats left — down the rapids of the Chaudière river, while the rest, cold and starving, stumbled along deer trails, until they met with assistance from the French Canadians. Rendezvous was made with Montgomery near Quebec. As many of the troops' term of enlistments expired on New Year's Day 1776, Montgomery and Arnold delivered a premature assault on Quebec, the strongest fortress in America, in a blinding snowstorm on the last night of 1775. Montgomery was killed, Arnold wounded; and although Congress sent reinforcements, the position of this expeditionary force so far from its base, proved untenable. Arnold was forced to retreat by Lake Champlain in the spring, and Canada remained British. Yet, taking a long view of it, the Arnold-Montgomery campaign had an important bearing on the war. It alarmed the British Government for the safety of Canada, induced Germain to divide the largest force of regulars yet despatched across the Atlantic, and send almost half to Quebec. The attempt of this section under Burgoyne to get to

New York in 1777 resulted in the most decisive American victory of the entire war.

Before that took place, the Americans had lost in succession New York and Philadelphia. Washington, rightly foretelling that New York would be the next British objective, marched thither from Boston in April 1776, with as much of his army as could be induced to stay under the colors. Had it not been for the presence of Washington's force in New York City that colony would certainly have stayed loyalist: as it was, the Provincial Congress did not vote for independence until 9 July 1776, and the patriot committees had the greatest difficulty in keeping the tories quiet by strong-arm methods. If the British expeditionary force had arrived in April or May, there would have been a different story to write. But Sir William Howe, after retreating from Boston on 17 March, had to wait at Halifax, N. S., until 7 June for reinforcements to arrive from England; and his transports and convoying fleet, commanded by his brother, Admiral Lord Howe, did not sail through the Narrows of New York Harbor until 2 July 1776.

The Howe brothers, whig in politics and friendly to America, brought an olive branch as well as a sword. All they had to offer (so Ben Franklin drew from them at a conference on Staten Island) was His Majesty's clemency to the rebels if they would only stop fighting; no guarantee of future liberty within the empire. Franklin, as instructed, refused to negotiate save on the basis of independence. It would have been well for both countries if the British had accepted this condition then, instead of six years later; but national honor forbade them to relinquish the Thirteen Colonies without a fight. And with thirty thousand men and a navy to oppose Washington's land force of eighteen thousand, it seemed as if the fight would soon be over.

Washington, on his side, felt that he could not honorably abandon New York City without a struggle. Commanded both by Brooklyn Heights and by ships already in the harbor, the metropolis was difficult to defend. Washington promptly fortified the Heights, and prepared to defend them; but Howe landed his army safely in the rear. In the ensuing Battle of Long Island (27 August 1776) Washington's plan was faulty, his generals did not execute their assignments, all the breaks went against him, and the British numbers were overwhelming. Brooklyn Heights became untenable, and Washington on 29 August executed a masterly retreat in small boats to the Manhattan shore. Providentially the wind held north, so the British warships could not come up the East River, and Sir William Howe apparently never knew what was going on. He lost his greatest chance to end the war by a single stroke: for if Washington's army had then been captured, it would have been impossible for the Congress to have raised another. Indeed the War of Independence was remarkably punctuated by 'ifs.'

After a delay for the futile conference on Staten Island, Howe easily seized New York City, forcing Washington to retire to Harlem Heights; and during the remainder of the war that city remained a British base and a tory refuge. Arnold, in the meantime, was stubbornly contesting every mile of the American retreat from Canada; and to such good purpose that Sir Guy Carleton, after fighting his way to Ticonderoga with heavy loss, withdrew to Montreal, and gave up for that year an attempt to form a junction with Howe. Thus Benedict Arnold a second time helped to save the cause he later betrayed.

Washington, his army weakened in morale as in men by the militia contingents going home, was unable to hold his position to the north of Manhattan Island. He retreated into New Jersey. General Charles Lee, the showy, loud-mouthed type of military man which impresses simple folk, was given by Congress what amounted to an independent command, and refused to co-operate with Washington, hoping to be made commander-in-chief. Congress retreated from Philadelphia to Baltimore on the approach of Howe, and General Washington retreated, since there was nothing else to do in face of a vastly superior force; he must save his army to save the cause. By the end of the year his army was hardly five thousand strong. The rest had simply dwindled away: deserted, gone absent without leave, or left when terms of enlistment were up. These were 'the times that tried men's souls,' wrote Tom Paine. And how few souls survived the ordeal!

Howe, in that dreary autumn, lost several chances to capture Washington's army; for Howe waged war in the dilatory manner of European campaigns. There seemed to be no hurry. Every month the American army grew weaker; Jersey loyalists were hospitable; gentlemen did not fight in winter. And so Washington got his entire army to the further bank of the Delaware before Howe's outposts reached it. Five days later Charles Lee, still in the Jersies, was captured. It was well for the American cause that he was, for his army now joined Washington's; unfortunate that he was later exchanged.

Desperately, as an animal at bay, Washington lashed back at the enemy, and after recrossing of the Delaware on a snowy Christmas eve, captured a thousand Hessians at Trenton. The cause at once looked up; men whose enlistments would expire New Year's Day re-enlisted — for six weeks. And in a rapid and brilliant manœuvre Washington evaded Cornwallis, who had been sent by Howe with eight thousand men to 'bag the old fox,' defeated a portion of his force within sight of the college at Princeton, and retired to a strong position in the highlands of New Jersey, about Morristown. The British returned to New York City, leaving the Jersey loyalists to their fate. Congress now invested Washington with power to appoint and replace all officers except the generals, who had to be apportioned more or less among the states for political reasons. And Congress recruited vigorously. But in March 1777, when the roads began to thaw, Washington had only four thousand men.

For the year 1777 Lord George Germain, in consultation with General Burgoyne and the king, worked out a plan of campaign which was perfectly sound from the point of view of persons sitting in London and playing military chess on maps of America. The idea was to reunite at New York the forces which had been divided in 1776, by reason of the American threat to Canada. Burgoyne was to bring eight thousand men south by the line of Lake Champlain and the Hudson to Albany, where they would be placed under Howe's command, while Howe, detaching a force to meet Burgoyne up-river, would himself capture Philadelphia, and perhaps proceed farther south. The danger to the American cause lay in concentrating at New York a force so overwhelming that it could conquer other American seaports piecemeal. The weakness of the plan lay partly in the difficulty of obtaining co-ordination at such a distance. Germain was in such a hurry to get away from London for a week-end that he forgot to send an important dispatch, and Howe did not learn that he was expected to help Burgoyne until 16 August, when the bulk of his force was in Chesapeake Bay. But the fatal mistake was ignoring the physical and human conditions of warfare in America. The several transfers between Lake Champlain, Lake George, and the Hudson meant an enormous apparatus of baggage and portable boats, many delays, and plenty of warning to the enemy. Lexington and Concord had showed on a small scale what would happen to a British force advancing into a hostile country. And European tactics were helpless against a countryside in arms: for the countryside in Europe never rose; warfare over there was a professional game.

In the early summer of 1777, while Washington waited at Morristown, knowing not what to expect, General Howe embarked the bulk of his army on transports, in order to attack Philadelphia from the sea. He chose the longest way, by Chesapeake Bay instead of the Delaware, which was so well fortified that the seamen had no stomach for covering the landing. Howe did not reach Elkton, Maryland, at the head of the Chesapeake, until 25 August; so Washington had plenty of time to bar the road thence to Philadelphia. All he could do against greatly superior forces was to retard Howe's advance, at the Brandywine Creek. Howe occupied Philadelphia on 27 September 1777, and Washington's gallant attack on his forces at Germantown (4 October) was a complete failure. The British settled down to a comfortable winter in the former seat of Congress, while Washington went into most uncomfortable winter quarters at Valley Forge, only a few miles away.

In the meantime, the greatest American victory of the war had been won, on the line of the Hudson. The army of Canada, some seven thousand strong, began its southward advance in good season and with bright prospects. On 6 July, Burgoyne took Fort Ticonderoga. By 29 July he had reached Fort Edward on the upper Hudson, and was forced to wait for more supplies from Canada. 'Gentleman Jack' Burgoyne would make no concessions to wilderness conditions; he must have his service of plate, his champagne, and thirty wagons for his personal baggage. Baron Riedesel, the commander of the Brunswick mercenaries, was accompanied by the Baroness, who has left us a most vivid account of the series of splendid picnics that marked her hero's advance. Burgoyne's ideas of American geography were not as hazy as those of Bernard Shaw, who in his delightful play, 'The Devil's Disciple,' places New Hampshire south of Boston; but he did seem to imagine that it would be an easy matter for a raiding force to march in two weeks across Vermont to Bellows Falls, down the Connecticut river to Brattleborough, and back 'by the great road to Albany,' collecting at least thirteen hundred cavalry horses, together with beef and draught cattle and wagons for the use of his army! For this exploit he chose three hundred and seventy-five dismounted German dragoons, the slowest marchers in his army, and about three hundred tories, Canadians, and Indians. They did not even get to the Vermont line. John Stark and his Green Mountain Boys marched out from Bennington, Vermont, to meet them; and very few of the Germans ever returned. In the meantime General Herkimer and the German-American settlers of the Mohawk valley held up the British general St. Leger, who was trying to join Burgoyne by that route; and on the approach of reinforcements under Benedict Arnold, St. Leger retreated to Canada.

In militia fighting, nothing succeeds like success. The Battle of Bennington brought a general turnout of the fighting population of northern New England, and Burgoyne's delay at Fort Edward enabled Washington to dispatch regulars from the lower Hudson. In early September Burgoyne finally got his unwieldy force in motion, and marched into a hornet's nest of Yankee militia, flushed with the success of their fellows, stiffened by regulars, and well commanded by an adequate general of the regular army, Horatio Gates. As the early frosts were turning the foliage of the upper Hudson to colors bright as the British soldiers' coats, the fighting began. At the battle of Stillwater, on Freeman's farm (19 September) Burgoyne reached his farthest south. Only a quick retreat could have saved him then; but he had little notion of what stout fellows were mustering behind the screen of woods; and Sir Henry Clinton appeared to be coming up the Hudson to his rescue. On 7 October Burgoyne lost another fight on Freeman's farm; and retreated to Saratoga. The autumn rains began, the Germans deserted in shoals. Americans were in front, rear and flank in overwhelming numbers: and on 17 October 1777 Burgoyne surrendered his entire army, still over five thousand strong, to General Gates. This was the decisive blow of the war, for it brought England's hereditary enemy to the American side.

3. *Enter France*

France had been watching and waiting for her *revanche* since 1763; and America was ready to gratify her. As early as November, 1775, Congress appointed a committee of foreign relations and sent Silas Deane (who later turned traitor) to France to buy munitions. After Independence had been declared, Franklin and Arthur Lee were sent to join him, with instructions to obtain aid, secret or open, and to offer a treaty of amity and commerce. John Adams then, and always, was against an 'entangling alliance.' But the American military situation became so desperate toward the close of 1776 that Congress authorized Franklin to conclude an offensive-defensive alliance if necessary to get France into the war.

Enthusiasm in France for the American cause ran high. The intellectual world, though far as yet from republicanism, was in revolt against feudalism and privilege. Voltaire had taught the French to admire the society of Pennsylvania, where men had showed it possible to live the good life on the basis of religious liberty, and thus had paved the way for a warm reception to Franklin. Condorcet was so charmed with what he read of simple, rustic Connecticut that he signed one of his tracts *Un Bourgeois de New-Haven;* Rousseau imagined the Indians to be genuine children of nature. The Declaration of Independence was greeted ecstatically; Washington seemed a new Cincinnatus; and ardent young men, of whom Lafayette was easily the first, hastened to place themselves under his command.[1] The Virginia Bill of Rights and the State Constitutions of 1776 were hailed as harbingers of a new era, subjecting the civil authorities to the popular will, bringing into practical statecraft those principles of liberty which had hitherto been mere speculations of philosophers.

If intellectual France was ready to fling up her cap for independence, the rulers of France had more solid and practical reasons for helping the United States. A shrewd, practical statesman, the Comte de Vergennes, directed the foreign affairs of the rather stupid young monarch, Louis XVI. England must be humbled and the balance of power redressed in favor of France, whose lowered prestige had lately been signalized by a partition of Poland without her consent or participation. 'Providence has marked this era,' Vergennes wrote to the Spanish government in 1778, 'for the humiliation of a proud and greedy power . . . glory and inestimable advantages will result for the two crowns.' And the French manufacturers were eager for a new market in America, closed to them by the British Acts of Trade. 'Always keep in mind,' wrote Vergennes to the Minister of Finance after the war was over, 'that

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[2] Other foreign officers who greatly helped the American cause were Baron Steuben, who introduced a modified Prussian drill and discipline in the Continental Army; Thaddeus Kosciuszko of Poland, an admirable artillery officer; Count Casimir Pulaski of Poland, mortally wounded at Savannah; the Baron de Kalb, who died of his eleven wounds at the Battle of Camden; and the Chevalier du Portail, an accomplished officer of engineers.

in separating the United States from Great Britain it was above all their commerce which we wanted.' And so for practical reasons of state, the French government from the first gave the United States unneutral aid in the shape of munitions (through a bogus company organized by the playwright Beaumarchais), and by welcoming Yankee privateers to French seaports. But Vergennes shrank from the expense of direct intervention and open war with England.

This policy lasted until after the news of Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga; and then changed, because Vergennes feared lest this disaster induce the English government to make such liberal concessions as would reunite the empire. He was not far wrong. Lord North was anxious to recognize American independence as soon as he heard of the defeat at Saratoga; but the king forbade it. North repeatedly offered to resign; Rockingham and his party were ready to take office and bear the ignominy of treating with rebels; but the king declared he would rather lose his crown than submit to the old whigs and abandon his own party. However, the king was ready to concede everything short of independence to keep the American states nominally under his sovereignty. A bill which North introduced in November 1777, but which owing to the long Christmas holidays of Parliament did not pass until February 1778, appointed a peace commission with authority to make the following offer: parliamentary taxation of the colonies to be renounced; no military forces to be kept in the colonies without their consent; the Coercive Acts of 1774 and all other acts of Parliament to which Congress objected—even the Acts of Trade—to be repealed, if America would but acknowledge the sovereignty of the king; and these concessions to be guaranteed by treaty. In other words, England was ready to place the Thirteen Colonies on the same dominion status as the Irish Free State to-day. If the peace commission had reached America in advance of the French alliance, its terms would in all probability have been accepted; for the British still held New York, Newport, and Philadelphia; and Washington was at Valley Forge. But, as usual, the British offer of conciliation came too late.

On 6 February 1778, eleven days before the conciliatory bills passed Parliament, Franklin signed with Vergennes treaties of commerce and of alliance. Each nation promised to make common cause with the other until American independence was recognized. It was a generous treaty, in which America obtained everything and promised nothing except to defend French possessions in the

West Indies. Vergennes had been brought to this point by Franklin's cleverly playing on his fears that otherwise the British offer would be accepted. Great Britain promptly declared war on France, and the War of Independence became world wide. Spain entered it as an ally of France in 1779, and proved very useful to the American cause by making New Orleans a base for privateers, and by keeping the British occupied in West Florida. The Netherlands, which had been reaping a fortune as the principal neutral sea power, were forced into the war by England in 1780; and Catherine II of Russia formed a League of Armed Neutrality which considerably cramped the operations of the British navy against neutral traders. United, the enemies of England would have been irresistible; but of them only France and America acted in concert, and that not until 1780.

So, by 1780, the shot at Concord bridge had literally been heard around the world. The only military operations were on the American continent and in India; but there were naval operations on the Atlantic Ocean, the Mediterranean, the Caribbean, the North Sea, the English Channel, even the Indian Ocean. And in far off Hindustan Warren Hastings was fighting native troops and princes to create a new empire for England in the Far East.

4. *The Naval War and Yorktown*

French sea power was the decisive factor in the War of Independence; but it was not until 1780 that the French navy, or any navy for that matter, was of much assistance. An American navy was improvised by Washington from some Marblehead fishing schooners during the siege of Boston, and before 1776 the New England states began to fit out privateers with letters of marque and reprisal authorizing them to capture British merchantmen wherever found; there were also a few state navies. These three American naval forces: continental, state, and private, engaged almost exclusively in commerce-destroying, for there was no money to provide capital ships, and naval warfare had to pay for itself.

The state navies accomplished very little. The story of the Continental navy is one of successful prize-taking and gallant naval combats by single ships or small squadrons, commanded by men such as Esek Hopkins (a Rhode Islander), Joshua Barney (a Marylander), John Barry (an Irishman), and John Paul Jones (a Scotchman). Captain Jones was sent across the Atlantic in the *Ranger* in

1777 to announce the capture of Burgoyne. Using Brest as a base, he raided English shipping in the narrow seas, and spiked the guns at Whitehaven near his old home in Scotland. With an old French ship renamed the *Bonhomme Richard,* he won a desperate fight against the *Serapis* off Flamborough Head on 23 September 1778. Paul Jones's exploits had slight military value, but he became the hero of countless ballads, chapbooks, and fireside tales. After the French entered the war, Congress gradually dismantled the Continental navy. There were thirty-four vessels in commission in 1777; only seven in 1782.

At least two thousand American privateers were commissioned during the war; about three-quarters of them from New England. Privateering was primarily a business: each man got a certain percentage of the prize money, according to his rank. Some privateers were built for speed, able to run down trading vessels and flee from the large slow-sailing men-of-war; others were armed merchantmen which made it their main business to trade with France, Spain, and the West Indies, and only took prizes as a side line. Yet in helping themselves the privateersmen served the cause, for they intercepted military supplies, made the British trade routes unsafe, forced up insurance to unheard-of figures, and obtained valuable goods for the army and the people. Enormous sums were made out of privateering during the war — especially by the merchants who handled the prize cargoes — but most of the gains were lost before the war ended.

The year 1778 was one of incompetence and failure on all sides, redeemed only by the indomitable patriotism of Washington. While Washington's troops went barefoot and hungry in the snow at Valley Forge, Sir William Howe was revelling on the fat of the land in Philadelphia. But Howe was recalled in the spring of 1778, and his successor, Sir Henry Clinton, was ordered to evacuate the city and concentrate on New York in preparation for a new campaign. Washington attacked Clinton's retiring army at Monmouth Court House, in New Jersey: a confused battle in which an American disaster was barely averted by Washington sending incompetent Charles Lee off the field, and saving the day himself. Clinton reached New York safely; and all that Washington could do was to encamp at White Plains, fortify West Point, and look on. The only successful American campaign of 1778 was that of George Rogers Clark in the West, acting under the State of Virginia. Floating down the Ohio from above Pittsburgh to the mouth of the

Cumberland, he marched his little force across the wilderness to take the British port of Kaskaskia in Illinois, and instead of settling down for the winter, made an overland march in February 1779 to Vincennes, and took that by surprise. By several historians Clark is credited with saving the West for his country; but if the peace negotiators were aware of his exploits in 1782, they did not allude to them in a single one of their numerous notes and dispatches.

Fortunately for America, the French navy had been reorganized since 1763, and was at a high point of morale and efficiency; while the British navy, under Lord Sandwich, the most corrupt and inefficient First Lord of the Admiralty in history, was full of dry rot and mismanagement. The loss of the *Royal George* 'with twice four hundred men,' mourned by William Cowper, was due to dockyard graft. And England at this time had in high command only one sea-dog worthy of her tradition, Admiral Rodney.

On 11 July 1778, the first direct French aid arrived off Sandy Hook, in the shape of a gallant fleet under a too cautious commander, the Admiral Comte d'Estaing. The British had prepared for him by fortifying the Narrows, and Estaing did not have the nerve to force a passage with his great men-of-war. He left New York to attack the other British base at Newport; but after landing a force to co-operate with the New England militia, hurriedly recalled them when the wind turned northeast. His fleet was blown out to sea by a gale, and put in at Boston to refit. Despite John Hancock's hospitality the feeling between the allies at Boston was very bad. There were duels between officers and murderous riots between men; the French alliance seemed a broken reed. In 1779 Estaing's squadron sailed away for the West Indies to pick up sugar islands for King Louis.

After France entered the war it was more difficult than ever to get Americans to enlist. Washington's army remained so small in 1779–80 that he could do nothing more than defend the Hudson from Clinton. In the meantime the British embarked on a new plan of campaign: to establish bases in the lower South, conquer the Carolinas, and roll up the tide of rebellion northward. A beginning was made by the capture of Savannah on 29 December 1778, but no more was accomplished for another year. In December 1779, as soon as Estaing's fleet was out of the way, Clinton sent from New York seven thousand men who besieged Charleston and captured the city together with an American army in May 1780. Then began a fierce bushwhacking war between Southern whigs and tories, aided by regulars of both sides, with an occasional pitched battle such as Camden, King's Mountain, the Cowpens, and Guilford Courthouse (15 March 1781). By that time the Carolinas were practically out of the war, and the British began to prepare a new military and naval base at Yorktown on the Chesapeake. Although they could never control the interior as a whole, there would have been a limit to American endurance if every seaport had become a British base.

The early months of 1781 were the darkest for the American cause. It seemed as if nothing could induce the country to give Washington a proper army. Continental currency became almost worthless. The states would not even honor requisitions in kind. The Pennsylvania line regiments mutinied, exasperated at broken promises for pay and clothing. But it was the darkness before the dawn.

Lafayette visited Versailles in the winter of 1779–80 and persuaded his government to make a real effort to bring the war to an end. Hitherto Louis XVI had kept his army at home, in case Frederick the Great made trouble. Now, with the European horizon clear, he sent over a splendid expeditionary force of six thousand men under General Rochambeau, which occupied Newport in the summer of 1780. For a year it did nothing except enrich the Rhode Island farmers and fascinate their daughters. As Washington said, nothing could be done against the British as long as they held the naval superiority off the American coast. Washington, far ahead of his time, grasped the implications of sea power. In a note to Rochambeau he declared, 'In any operation, and under all circumstances, a decisive naval superiority is to be considered as a fundamental principle, and the basis upon which every hope of success must ultimately depend.' Rochambeau's army was of no use without a French high-seas fleet.

In March 1781, Louis XVI sent to the West Indies a powerful fleet of frigates and line-of-battle ships under the command of a really first-rate seaman, the Admiral Comte de Grasse. He arrived at his destination in May, with orders to repair to that part of the coast of the United States where he could do the most good. Clinton with the main British army, and Admiral Graves with a large British fleet, were still in New York. Lord Cornwallis, after several victories in North Carolina, had marched north into Virginia, where he made junction with another British detachment under the traitor Benedict Arnold. In August 1781, Cornwallis settled down to fortify Yorktown.

Washington and Rochambeau had held a conference at Wethersfield, Connecticut, in May, and agreed that they would move jointly against New York City *or* Yorktown, according as De Grasse decided to attack the one or the other. Washington naturally would have preferred to dislodge the British from New York; but he wisely decided that the French navy 'must have the casting vote.' And thus De Grasse was informed.

There followed the naval and military campaign of Yorktown, beautifully co-ordinated when we consider the means of communication, and the distance between New York, the Chesapeake, and the West Indies. Everything went like clockwork. The story can best be told by time-tables:

18 June 1781. Rochambeau pulls up stakes at Newport, leaving his siege artillery and a French fleet under De Barras in the harbor, and marches across Connecticut to unite his forces with Washington's on the Hudson. Junction effected, 6 July.

26 July. French frigate *La Concorde* brings news of the decision of Washington and Rochambeau to De Grasse, at Hayti, and sails two days later, with news De Grasse is coming to the Chesapeake.

1 August. Cornwallis moves his entire force — 8,000 men — into Yorktown. Admiral Rodney sails for England from the West Indies, sending a small fleet to New York under Sir Samuel Hood. Rodney had got into trouble over the loot of the Dutch island of St. Eustatia, and had to consult his lawyers and doctors.

5 August. De Grasse's fleet sails from Hayti for the Chesapeake, with the Hayti garrison of 4,000 men, and ample money and supplies.

14 August. *La Concorde* (to whose swift sailing qualities success was largely due), brings news to Washington and Rochambeau that De Grasse is coming to the Chesapeake.

19 August. Washington breaks camp.

25 August. Washington's and Rochambeau's armies, respectively 2,000 and 4,000 strong, cross the Hudson and march South, leaving 4,000 Americans behind to guard the Hudson and mislead Clinton into believing that they intend to attack New York City from Staten Island. De Barras's fleet sails from Newport for the Chesapeake, with Rochambeau's siege artillery.

28 August. Fleet of Sir Samuel Hood makes junction with British fleet under Admiral Graves, at New York.

30 August. De Grasse's fleet anchors within the Capes of the Chesapeake. Washington and Rochambeau reach Philadelphia.

1 September. British at New York finally hear of enemy's destination; Graves' and Hood's fleets sail for the Chesapeake.

5 September. Washington and Rochambeau, at Chester, Delaware, hear of De Grasse's arrival. Washington throws up his hat and shouts for joy.

5 September. Naval battle off the Capes of the Chesapeake between the French and British fleets under De Grasse and Graves. Bad fighting tactics on part of Graves; Hood misunderstands signals; De Grasse batters their fleet badly, and wins command of the sea. Graves and Hood retire to New York.

11 September. De Grasse back within Capes of Chesapeake, and finds De Barras's fleet from Newport already there, and the armies of Washington and Rochambeau being ferried down Chesapeake Bay to take position before Yorktown.

30 September. The Siege of Yorktown begins, under the direction of French engineers.

14–15 October. Two British redoubts carried; the Americans led by Colonel Alexander Hamilton and the French by the Prince de Deux-Ponts.

16–17 October. Cornwallis vainly attempts to escape by crossing York River.

17 October 1781. Cornwallis surrenders Yorktown and his entire army, over 7,000 strong. General O'Hara delivers the commander's sword to General Lincoln, and as the British pass through the American and French lines to stack arms, their bands play 'The World Turned Upside Down.'

Lafayette joyfully writes the news to the Comte de Vergennes at Paris: 'The play is over, Monsieur le Comte: the fifth act has just come to an end.'

5. *The Peace of Paris*

Although everyone in England who could face the facts knew that the game was up with the surrender of Cornwallis, thirteen months elapsed before even a preliminary peace was concluded. The king, after he heard the news, declared he would never sanction 'getting a peace at the expense of a separation from America'; and when Lord North, who had been threatening to resign almost every month since Burgoyne's surrender (even thrice in one week) finally threw up the sponge, George III went so far as to draft a message of abdication. But he thought better of it, and called Rockingham — the same minister who had repealed the Stamp Act — to form a party government again, together with Shelburne, Charles James Fox, and others who were traditional friends of America. This was in March 1782. Shelburne at once sent Richard Oswald to Paris to sound Dr. Franklin, and Fox sent an emissary of his own. Both proved remarkably complacent when Franklin suggested not only independence and peace, but the cession of Canada to the United States to prevent future quarrels. It was perhaps lucky for British Canada that the negotiations were not pushed through at once, for at that time Shelburne was willing to concede almost anything to get home the thirty thousand troops who were doing nothing in America at enormous expense. But there were endless complications and delays.

As it was, Franklin had the negotiations well in hand before any of his colleagues arrived; and John Jay and John Adams were the only two who did arrive in time to affect the negotiations.[3] They complicated matters by a deep-rooted suspicion of 'Poor Richard' and of France. Adams was the original isolationist, hostile from the start to the French alliance; John Jay had become violently anti-Bourbon during his recent uninvited visit to the court of Madrid, and as a member of Congress he had witnessed the unauthorized intrigues of the French minister at Philadelphia to detach the West from the United States, in favor of Spain. Franklin was taken ill, and let his younger and more positive colleague have his way. He was suspicious too of Shelburne, the 'Jesuit of Berkeley Square,' who became premier on the death of Rockingham, 1 July 1782. So that when Oswald presented credentials that were rather unhappily phrased, and it looked as if the United States must negotiate as 'dependent states,' Jay insisted he must return to London and get a new commission. It was a mistake to have made so much of a phrase, for every month the British position improved, the American spirit became more apathetic, and the French treasury more empty. Admiral Rodney beat De Grasse badly in the West Indies on 12 April 1782, and Gibraltar held out against the joint siege by a French fleet and a Spanish army. Oswald did not get back to Paris with credentials satisfactory to Jay until 28 September, almost a year after Yorktown.

In the meantime, Jay believed that he had discovered evidence of

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[3] Except that Henry Laurens arrived in time for the last day negotiations.

Vergennes' attempting to double-cross America, by a scheme to partition the West between England and Spain. Vergennes was in a bad dilemma. France needed peace as much as anyone; but she had promised Gibraltar to Spain, and her best efforts failed to extract that English thorn from the Spaniard's leg. Hence Vergennes hoped the United States might relinquish a share of the West in order to buy Spain's consent to peace without Gibraltar. But when he found this proposition inacceptable to the Americans, he loyally dropped it, and did his best without. John Jay, overwhelmed by his suspicions, secretly proposed to the British government that if they made peace promptly, their army at New York would be set free for the conquest of Florida from Spain; and that if Florida became British rather than Spanish, the United States would accept latitude 32° 30′ as her southern boundary instead of 31°. Fortunately this left-handed offer did not appeal to Shelburne.

In early October 1782, John Adams arrived in Paris after negotiating a treaty at the Hague; and found Paris much more congenial than on the occasion of his former visit, when accompanied by Mrs. Adams. He and John Jay, overruling Franklin, determined to break their instructions from Congress, and negotiate a separate peace with Great Britain, apart from France. Negotiations then began in earnest, and the draft peace treaty was signed 30 November 1782. Franklin was then deputed by his colleagues to tell the news to the French foreign minister. Vergennes accepted their somewhat discourteous action quite cheerfully, and was promptly touched by Franklin for a fresh loan. Although the Americans had broken their instructions in negotiating separately, they did not break the treaty of alliance and make a separate peace, for the preliminary articles were not to take effect until France concluded peace with Great Britain. There was not even an Anglo-American armistice until 20 January 1783, the day that England and France ceased hostilities.

The comment of George III, in a letter to Shelburne, was characteristic:

> 'I cannot conclude without mentioning how sensibly I feel the dismemberment of America from this Empire, and that I should be miserable indeed if I did not feel that no blame on that Account can be laid at my door, and did I not also know that knavery seems to be so much the striking feature of its Inhabitants that it may not in the end be an evil that they become Aliens to this Kingdom.'

The definitive treaty of peace, signed 2 February 1783, gives the lie to the epigram that 'America never lost a war, or won a peace conference.' Considering that the British still held New York, Charleston, Savannah, and seven posts in the Northwest, that Washington's army was incapable of further effort, and the British navy commanded the sea, it is surprising what wide boundaries and favorable terms the United States obtained. The treaty, however, was very badly drafted, as treaties in English are apt to be. Almost every article except the one acknowledging the independence of the United States was subject to double construction, and occasioned long diplomatic controversy. The northeast boundary was laid down in a very sketchy manner, and not settled until 1842. The northern boundary along the line of the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes was fairly definite, except where it went among the islands, until it reached the Grand Portage on Lake Superior; and beyond the 'northwest corner of the Lake of the Woods' it was left completely in the air. Franklin had hoped to get the whole of Canada, and the Quebec fur interests expected that the Ohio river boundary of 1774 would be retained. Shelburne, always a friend to westward expansion, accepted the final boundary [4] with the statesmanlike intention that it would leave both countries free to expand along parallel lines; but, as we shall see, the Canadians did not give up hope of recovering the Ohio river until 1815.

As for the other articles, the Americans retained fishing privileges in the territorial waters of British North America, which they had enjoyed as British subjects. The problem of the loyalists caused the greatest difficulty. Shelburne dared not face Parliament without some provision that would take those unfortunate exiles off the books of the treasury, by giving them restitution or compensation. Franklin, contrary to his usual benevolence, cherished most ferocious sentiments against the tories, and even circulated false atrocity stories to prejudice European opinion against them. He refused to go beyond an innocuous agreement that Congress should 'earnestly recommend' to the several states to restore tory property, and a positive stipulation that no future confiscation should be made. Both parties knew that the earnest recommendation would amount to nothing, but Shelburne accepted it to save the ministry's face before

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[4] The Americans gave the British the choice of two. The rejected alternative, 45°, would have given us the Ontario peninsula, but cost four degrees of latitude in the West.

Parliament. The treaty, however, would never have been accepted by Parliament but for Article IV, that 'creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment' to the recovery of pre-war debts. As some millions in unpaid bills for goods furnished before the war to Americans were still in the strong-boxes of English merchants, this proved a strong plea for ratification; but it was an article which the United States Government found itself powerless to enforce for many years.

In the other treaties signed the same day between England and France and Spain, a clause of great interest to the United States provided for the retrocession of West and East Florida to Spain, as compensation for England's keeping Gibraltar. So North America was divided between Spain, the British Empire, and the United States; Spain retaining the lion's share: everything west of the Mississippi and south of the thirty-first parallel of latitude. This marked an important step in the history of the Western question, but the expansion of the United States in another generation wiped out the Florida and the Mississippi boundaries, and by 1848 flung back the Spanish-American frontier to the Rio Grande. France got nothing out of the war but a few West India islands, a bankrupt treasury, and the prospect of a new market and an ally in America: a prospect which failed to materialize.

Franklin hoped to follow up the peace by a triple entente between England, France, and the United States. He wrote to David Hartley, the English minister at Paris:

'What would you say to a proposition, if I should make it, of a family compact between England, France and America? America would be as happy as the Sabine girl if she could be the means of uniting in perpetual peace her father and her husband.'

Mr. Hartley said nothing. Over a century elapsed, and Mr. Kellogg embodied the dream of Dr. Franklin in an international treaty. *Esto perpetua!*

VI

FROM COLONY TO COMMONWEALTH

1. *The Formation of New Governments*

HAVING followed the external history of the American Revolution to the winning of independence, we must now turn back to take up the internal history: the transformation of colonies into commonwealths, the creation of new political institutions, the class and sectional conflict, and the readjustment of American society and business to the new conditions. The Revolution furnished Americans the opportunity to give legal form and expression to their political ideals as indicated in the Declaration of Independence; and to remedy some of their sectional and class grievances through the state constitutions, through legislation, and to some extent by a shift in the balance of political power. As James Madison wrote, 'Nothing has excited more admiration in the world than the manner in which free governments have been established in America; for it was the first instance, from the creation of the world . . . that free inhabitants have been seen deliberating on a form of government, and selecting such of their citizens as possessed their confidence, to determine upon and give effect to it.'

As early as 10 May 1776 Congress passed a resolution advising the colonies to form new governments 'such as shall best conduce to the happiness and safety of their constituents.' Some of them, such as New Hampshire and South Carolina, had already done so, and Massachussetts, ignoring the Coercive Acts, had established a provisional government as early as the fall of 1774. Within a year after the Declaration of Independence every state except Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island had drawn up a new constitution.[1] Massachusetts labored under her provisional government

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[1] The dates of the adoptions of new State Constitutions are as follows:

New Hampshire (1)	6	Jan.	1776	North Carolina	18	Dec.	1776
South Carolina (1)	26	Mar.	1776	Georgia	5	Feb.	1777
Virginia	29	June	1776	New York	20	April	1777
New Jersey	2	July	1776	Vermont	8	July	1777
Delaware	22	Aug.	1776	South Carolina (2)	19	Mar.	1778
Pennsylvania	28	Sept.	1776	Massachusetts	15	June	1780
Maryland	11	Nov.	1776	New Hampshire (2)	13	June	1784

until 1780, while the two others retained their colonial charters, with a slight change in the preamble, until well into the nineteenth century.

The Pennsylvania Constitution quaintly thanked God for 'permitting the people of this State, by common consent, and without violence, deliberately to form for themselves such just rules as they shall think best for governing their future society.' Here indeed was the Americans' opportunity to put into practice their favorite theories that government is of the people, rests upon the consent of the governed, and should be given form in a fixed constitution. Yet a method of giving effect to this 'compact' theory was not easily found. War, political disturbances, and the need of haste, caused the states to adopt new constitutions in a variety of ways. The South Carolina, Virginia, and New Jersey constitutions of 1776 were framed by legislative bodies without any specific authorization, and were promulgated by them without express popular consent. In New Hampshire, Georgia, Delaware, New York, and Vermont, the legislative bodies or provincial congresses which framed the constitutions did so by express authority, but failed to submit the finished products to popular approval. In Maryland, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina, constitutions framed by authorized legislatures were in some manner ratified by the people. Only Massachusetts (1780) and New Hampshire (1784) had constitutional conventions specifically elected for that purpose alone, with a popular referendum on the result, which has become the standard method of constitution making.

Massachusetts illustrates the most deliberate and effective transition from colony to commonwealth, as well as the first successful use of the constitutional conventions with popular referendum. The process took five years, and the delay was fortunate, for in Massachusetts the sort of people who made John Adams wince by shouting 'no courts, no taxation,' were very numerous. The hired men, tinkers, and village drunkards who had enjoyed tarring and feathering tories, ransacking the premises of suspected profiteers, and turning out with the militia for a few days or weeks, were a force to be reckoned with, and almost every rural township had a village Hampden with a gift for gab and a crack-brained scheme of government. But in addition there was much shrewd common sense in the New England population, which sustained the leaders in establishing a sound constitution.

The last General Court (legislature) of Massachusetts under the

Crown was dissolved by the last Royal Governor in September 1774. The lower house met alone, and resolved itself into a Provincial Congress. On 5 May 1775 the Provincial Congress deposed Governor Gage and ordered the election of a regular General Court, as though the royal charter were in force and the governor absent. This made such an awkward government that the General Court, in September 1776, requested the people to empower it to draw up a constitution. Permission was eventually given, but Concord town meeting seized the opportunity to lay down the principle that a specially elected convention was the only proper body to draft a constitution, and that the people should have a whack at it before it went in force. A legislature, they declared, was no fit body to form and establish fundamental law, since one of the objects of a constitution was to secure the people against legislative tyranny. Further, if a legislature established a constitution, it could by the same power amend it, which would be no security to the citizen. This Concord idea became so rapidly popular, that when the Massachusetts legislature compiled an average sort of state constitution, and submitted it to the people, they rejected it by a five-sixths majority. The chastened legislature then put into effect the new method. Early in 1779 it requested the people to decide in their town meetings whether or not they wanted a constitutional convention. They so voted. The legislature then ordered the towns to elect as many delegates to the convention as they were entitled to send representatives, and expressly provided that every resident freeman twenty-one years of age or over should vote. The convention duly met and chose a committee to draft a constitution, and on that committee John Adams did all the work. His amended draft was adopted 2 March 1780, when the convention asked the freemen to discuss the constitution in their town meetings, to point out objections and suggest improvements, to vote on it article by article, and to empower the convention to ratify and declare it in force if two-thirds of the men aged twenty-one and upward were in favor; or, if not, to alter it in accordance with the popular will as expressed in the returns, and ratify it as thus amended. This complicated procedure was followed. The town meetings that spring had a beautiful time picking the constitution to pieces, clause by clause, and their criticisms in the main were sensible. When the convention tabulated the returns, it found a two-thirds majority for every article,[2] and declared the entire constitution ratified and in force on 15 June 1780.

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[2] Actually there was only a bare majority for the article on religion and the

It would be difficult to devise a more deliberate method of securing a government by popular consent. In fact the process of ratification was over-elaborate. At every step the rights of the people were safeguarded, and their views consulted. By the constitutional convention, the written constitution, and popular ratification, Americans had discovered a way to legalize the revolutionary doctrine.

2. *The New State Constitutions*

The writing of the state constitutions was a splendid opportunity for the democratic elements to remedy their grievances and realize their ambitions. Most of the new constitutions showed the impact of democratic ideas, but none made any drastic break with the past. They were built by Americans on the solid foundation of colonial experience, with the timber of English law and practice. And there was a remarkable uniformity in the new governments. The reason was that the main work of drafting a constitution must always be done by a few men, and those few selected were men of education and experience, who saw eye to eye on the fundamentals of popular government. 'Government is a very simple, easy thing,' declared a local convention in Maine. 'Mysteries in politics are mere absurdities.' But when simple men tried to draft a constitution they found it not so easy.

The new constitutions were, for the most part, the work of able and talented men. John Jay, Robert Livingston, and Gouverneur Morris were the architects of the New York constitution, which was regarded as a model by contemporaries. The conservative 'Essex Junto' of Massachusetts: George Cabot, John Lowell, and Theophilus Parsons, worked hand in glove with John Adams. The South Carolina convention contained the names of Pinckney, Rutledge, Gadsden, Laurens, and Drayton; of the Pennsylvania and Virginia drafters we shall speak shortly.

Americans are so accustomed to living under written constitutions that they take them for granted; yet the written constitution is a distinctly American contribution, and these were the first in

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article on amendments, but the convention juggled the returns so that these appeared to be accepted as well. Although the constitution was voted on by manhood suffrage, there was a two-thirds majority for the clause adopting the traditional forty-shilling freehold qualification for voting for state officials.

history.[3] 'In all free states the constitution is final,' John Adams had written, and Americans everywhere had demanded 'a standing law to live by.' The written constitution was the natural, the inevitable result. Although solidly based on the colonial charters from which they had evolved, and on colonial experience, they contained much revolutionary theory. The doctrine of delegated powers was implied or expressed in most of the new constitutions. Virginia, for example, declared 'all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people; that magistrates are their trustees and servants, and at all times amenable to them.' It took time, as John Jay observed, to change subjects into citizens. The ancient fear of government, the belief that if not limited it would usurp the liberties of the people, led to an elaborate system of checks and balances in state and federal governments alike. The three departments were balanced against each other; the two branches of the legislature served as checks upon each other; annual elections were equivalent to the modern 'recall'; and elaborate bills of rights placed the fundamental civil rights beyond governmental usurpation. It took fully a hundred years before Americans came to look upon their governments as something to be used, instead of something to be feared and limited.

Most of the new constitutions followed the main outlines of the colonial governments. In general they consisted of three departments, executive, legislative, and judicial. The legislature was bicameral except in Pennsylvania and Georgia, which had had unicameral legislatures in the colonial period; and in Vermont, which copied Pennsylvania. All the constitutions paid allegiance to the theory of separation of powers — a theory already firmly established in colonial experience and reinforced by Montesquieu in his *Spirit of Laws*. The constitution of Massachusetts, for example, provided that 'In the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers or either of them; the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial powers or either of them; the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers or either of them — to the end that it may be a government of laws and not of men.' Yet the fact often deviated widely from the theory. The long struggle between royal governors and the colonial assemblies had created a natural antipathy to the executive power, and in every state but New York and Massachusetts that branch was conspicuously weak. Pennsylvania even did away with the office of governor altogether, substituting a president and council. In eight of the states the governor was elected by the legislature or council; nine states limited his term of office to one year; and Massachusetts alone granted him the veto power. The judiciary was almost equally subordinate to the legislative bodies. It was to be a full generation before either executive or judiciary obtained an actual equality with the legislative power.

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[3] In one sense, the Connecticut, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Massachusetts charters, and the frames of government promulgated by William Penn were constitutions; two of these served as such; but none were so fully developed or had so broad a popular basis as the later state constitutions.

Though the bases of the new state governments were democratic, every constitution but that of Vermont placed the control of the government in the hands of the propertied groups. The accepted idea was that the body politic consisted of those who had a 'stake in society.' Even the democratic Franklin declared that 'as to those who have no landed property . . . the allowing them to vote for legislators is an impropriety.' There were property qualifications for voting, and proportionately higher ones for office-holding. Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and Georgia gave the suffrage to all who paid taxes; Virginia, Delaware, and Rhode Island to freeholders; while the other states had various property qualifications. In little New Hampshire the governor had to own property to the value of £500; in Maryland to the value of £5,000; in aristocratic South Carolina to the value of £10,000. In most states too there were religious qualifications for office-holding, designed to keep Roman Catholics out. In general it may be said that the new state constitutions placed the government in the hands of orthodox Protestant property-holders.

Few of the early constitutions provided any special method of amendment, yet when necessity arose, amendment could be effected by a new convention. Despite the haste with which many of the constitutions were drafted, five lasted over half a century, and the deliberately formed constitution of Massachusetts is still in effect, although much amended. A number of mistakes and crudities were to be expected; but these amateur constitution makers fully proved themselves worthy of liberty and their states ripe for independence.

3. *Western State Making*

While the thirteen seaboard colonies were being metamorphosed into states and adjusting themselves to the conditions of independence, new commonwealths were being created in Vermont and in the trans-Appalachian country. Here, under primitive conditions, the processes of commonwealth-building and state-making were going on all simultaneously through the Revolutionary period, and here the democratic theories of that era were given a rude and effective application. Nothing more eloquently bespeaks the vitality and creative energy of Americans of this generation than the rapidity and vigor with which, during the years of war and reconstruction, they hewed new empires out of the wilderness and peopled them with a large and sturdy population.

The history of Vermont from 1770 to 1790 illustrates in a most illuminating fashion the complexities and cross-currents of the Revolution. The land between the Connecticut and the Hudson rivers, long in dispute between New Hampshire and New York, began to be settled about 1763. By the time of the war the population was thirty thousand or more — enough to furnish the Green Mountain Boys who harrassed Burgoyne's army. Yet, stout fighters as they were, the Vermonters and their leaders, Ethan, Ira, and Levi Allen, cared less for the independence of the United States than for the autonomy of Vermont, which was refused admission to the Confederation because New York and New Hampshire each claimed it as a part of their territory.

Ethan Allen was the leader of the Green Mountain Boys. A combination of patriot and speculator, adventurer and capitalist, he was typical of those frontier leaders who directed the expansive forces of the American people. Defying a pre-war decision of the Privy Council allotting the Green Mountain country to New York, defying also Congress and Governor Clinton and General Washington, who regarded this decision as valid, the Allens and their party created and defended an independent commonwealth. In June 1777, a revolutionary convention adopted the name Vermont and drafted a state constitution modelled upon that of Pennsylvania, and even more democratic. It provided for a unicameral legislature, a plural executive and septennial council of censors. No property qualifications were established for voting or office-holding, religious liberty was upheld, and slavery prohibited.

Although the Allen brothers used the vocabulary of patriotism, and spoke glibly of oppression, tyranny, and sacred liberties, they and their numerous followers were primarily interested in land. The Allen family controlled the Onion River Land Company which claimed title to over 300,000 acres in central Vermont, and Ethan himself thus stated their position: 'He and his family have large fortunes which they do not intend to lose, if there is a possibility of saving them. At all risks, he is determined that Congress shall not have the parcelling of his Lands to their avaricious Minions.' That this event should not come to pass they carried on intrigues with Governor Haldimand of Canada looking to a guarantee of independence in return for neutrality during the war, or even a return to the British Empire after the war. Like true Vermonters they acted with such silent shrewdness that only recently have the archives revealed their doings. In 1789 Levi Allen went to London to obtain a commercial treaty, and offered, 'to raise a regiment of Green Mountain boys for His Majesty's service.'

Meantime the body of people, who knew naught of these intrigues, had been loyal and active supporters of the American cause. Yet Congress was estopped from recognizing their claims to statehood by fear of antagonizing New York. After a checkered history the Green Mountain State succeeded in vindicating her independence and escaping foreign entanglements. In 1790 New York finally relinquished her claims, a convention at Bennington ratified the Federal Constitution, and on 18 February 1791 Congress admitted Vermont as the fourteenth state.

The creation of new commonwealths west of the Appalachians was attended with even greater difficulties than in Vermont. Lured by the finest hunting their race had found in a thousand years and the richest land yet spied out in America, the pioneers poured into the 'dark and bloody ground' of Kentucky and Tennessee. As early as 1769 settlers from western Virginia, defying the royal proclamation, established a small community on the upper waters of the Watauga, one of the tributaries to the Holston. In the following years James Robertson and John Sevier, the two great figures in the early history of Tennessee, led a body of eighty men from North Carolina to the Watauga settlements; and Jacob Brown established a small community on the Nollichucky. These far-flung outposts of settlement were shortly reinforced by the arrival of large numbers of Regulator refugees from the civil war in North

Carolina, and by 1775 there were several thousand settlers scattered along the banks of the Watauga, Holston, Clinch, Nollichucky, and French Broad rivers. These Watauga settlements were separated by mountain ranges and by hundreds of miles from the centers of political authority in the East. Uncertain whether they were within the jurisdiction of Virginia or of North Carolina, the rapid increase in population, together with the want of law, justice, and common defence against Indians, made some form of political organization imperative. As early as 1772 the Watauga inhabitants, being in a state of nature politically, drew up a written compact of government — the first of its kind in the region west of the Appalachians.

In the meantime Judge Richard Henderson, one of the greatest of American land speculators and commonwealth builders, had organized the Transylvania Company. It was he who employed the celebrated scout Daniel Boone to hew the Wilderness Road from the Holston settlements through the Cumberland Gap, and across the Kentucky to the Ohio. From the British Government Henderson could not obtain permission for the Transylvania Company to purchase land from the Indians, for the British policy, as we have seen, had definitely turned against westward expansion; but the Revolution gave Henderson his opportunity. On 17 March 1775 he negotiated with the Cherokee Indians the Treaty of Sycamore Shoals, acquiring for £10,000, all lands lying between the Ohio, Kentucky, and Cumberland rivers — an area comprising a good part of Kentucky and Tennessee. Hunters and pioneers had already found their way into the beautiful land of Kentucky, and there were tiny settlements at Harrodsburgh and Boonesborough, where on 23 May 1775 Henderson called a meeting to draft articles of government. In opening this primitive constitutional convention, he said:

> 'If any doubt remains amongst you with respect to the force and efficacy of whatever law you may now or hereafter make, be pleased to consider that all power is originally in the People,' and that all laws 'derive their force and efficacy from our mutual consent.'

This convention of seventeen backwoodsmen solemnly signed a compact of government erecting courts of justice, regulating the militia, protecting game, preserving the breed of horses, and guaranteeing religious liberty, for the 'State of Transylvania.' But the legislatures of Virginia and North Carolina were not yet ready to surrender their western lands to a proprietor. Henderson's Indian purchase was annulled, and the State of Transylvania disappeared.

The third center of settlement in the West was in central Tennessee. In 1779 James Robertson led a small band of pioneers two hundred miles into the heart of the wilderness to the bend of the Cumberland and established the town of Nashborough. The following year the tiny community received accessions from the Watauga and Holston settlements, one intrepid group going down the Tennessee river to the Ohio and back up the Cumberland river to Nashborough. On 13 May 1780 a body of men signed the Cumberland compact, providing a government on the basis of a Virginia county court. The community was to be administered by a court of twelve judges, chosen by vote of all men over twenty-one years of age, and subject to recall. It is eloquent of the dangers of pioneer life in this era that of the two hundred and fifty-six signers to the Cumberland compact, scarcely a dozen were alive a decade later, and but one died a natural death!

Despite their isolation from the main scene of the conflict, these Kentucky and Tennessee settlements suffered severely during the war. They were exposed to merciless Indian warfare, the attacks of tories, and the ravages of the desperadoes and cattle-thieves who always flock to the frontier. Yet these communities throve lustily, and the end of the war attracted a flood of emigration from the older states. Settlers from North Carolina and Virginia pressed through the Cumberland Gap into the fertile river bottoms of Kentucky, the hardwood forests between the Cumberland and the Tennessee or the rolling blue-grass prairies; while another stream of settlers from Maryland and Pennsylvania followed the Potomac or the Juniata to their headwaters, then crossed the Alleghanies to Wheeling or Pittsburgh and floated down the Ohio into the promised land.

The Trans-Appalachian population, but a few thousand on the outbreak of the war, numbered well over 120,000 by 1790.[4] In the year ending November 1788, 967 boats containing 18,370 men, women and children, floated down the Ohio, while almost equal numbers were spilling over the mountain barriers to the South.

The most striking features of this migration were its spontaneity and the intense individualism of its members. California was taken possession of by Spain, with methods derived no less from pagan than from Christian Rome; not so the ‘dark and bloody ground’ by the American pioneer. No government provided his means of transport, or protected him at his destination. His ideal and his practice were individual liberty, restrained only by spontaneous organization to secure defence, and to protect property from his more lawless fellows. His earlier settlements were in stockades, or ‘stations’ as he called them. Perhaps twenty or thirty families lived within a wooden palisade, with blockhouses at the corners, encircled by a swath cleared from the surrounding forest as a precaution against surprise. Thus, ten centuries before in England, countless ‘stokes’ looked out on unbroken fen and forest. But the American stockades were fortuitous and temporary. Some vague instinctive fear, perhaps, that village life would mean serfdom to him as to his Saxon ancestor, broke up the stations before it was safe to do so, and each pioneer made haste to satisfy his ambition for a wilderness farm with clearing and log cabin in the center.

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[4] The census of 1790 gave the population of Kentucky as 73,677, that of Tennessee as 35,691. The Tennessee census was very incomplete, with five districts missing. It is estimated that there were between four and five thousand inhabitants north of the Ohio.

‘Our own blood was spilt in acquiring land for our settlement, our fortunes expended in making these settlements effectual; for ourselves we fought, for ourselves we conquered; and for ourselves we have a right to hold.’ Here is the authentic voice of the men on the western waters: a petition or rather demand for separate statehood in 1784. Politically all these western settlements belonged to North Carolina. But few of their settlers retained much attachment to the states whence they came, and, economically, their connection with the seaboard states was unnatural. Separatism was rife throughout the West; problems of Indian defence, administration of justice, control of vacant lands, money and taxation, made independence highly desirable. The geographic bases for two of the new states were already indicated in the settlements along the headwaters of the Tennessee and on the Cumberland, and in the Kentucky country. A third region that seemed marked out by nature for independence was located along the headwaters of the Ohio — on the Monongahela, Cheat, Tygert, and Youghiogheny rivers. The inhabitants of this region petitioned in 1776 to be organized into the State of Westsylvania, claiming a flourishing population of 25,000 souls — an obvious exaggeration. Although this petition was rejected, it may be regarded as the beginning of the movement which bore fruit almost a century later in the State of West Virginia.

The most notable instance of Western state-making in this era was the establishment of the State of Franklin in the Watauga region. When in 1784 North Carolina deeded her western lands to Congress, the inhabitants of this region, feeling, as it were, thrown into a 'state of nature,' proceeded to organize. 'If we should be so happy,' the leaders said, 'as to have a separate government, vast numbers from different quarters with a little encouragement from the public, would fill up our frontier, which would strengthen us, improve agriculture, perfect manufactures, encourage literature and everything laudable.' In August 1784 a convention of the Watauga and Holston settlers met at Jonesboro, decided to organize a separate state, and elected John Sevier governor. This Virginia-born aristocrat, the outstanding military and civil figure in the West, had long been associated with the Tennessee settlements. In December a new convention met and drafted a constitution modelled closely on that of North Carolina, and named their new state Franklin. The State of Franklin was short-lived. Factional quarrels divided it into hostile camps, and North Carolina hastened to reassert her jurisdiction over the region. But as soon as North Carolina completed the cession of her western lands to the Federal Government, the demand for separate statehood arose again. Franklin was finally included in Tennessee which was admitted to the Union in 1796.

The movement to establish a state government in Kentucky ran a less troubled course, although the intrigues of James Wilkinson threatened at times to make this embryo commonwealth a Spanish dependency rather than an American one. Virginia was willing but not eager to release Kentucky, provided that satisfactory terms could be agreed upon. After a series of conventions, Virginia in 1790 relinquished her jurisdiction over the region, and on 1 June 1792, Kentucky was admitted to the Union as the fifteenth state.

4. *Political and Economic Reform*

In almost every state the writing of the new constitutions precipitated a struggle between the democratic and the conservative elements. In most states the latter were at a considerable disadvantage, for the initial decision in favor of independence had been a radical victory, and as the war progressed it became common to brand all those who would not go the whole gamut of revolution as tories. Yet the radicals by no means had things their own way. In states such as New York, Massachusetts, South Carolina, Maryland, and Virginia, where the conservative classes had taken the lead before 1775, they were in a position to direct the course of events and stem the democratic tide. 'However unexceptionable a democratic government may appear at first view,' said Governor Rutledge of South Carolina, 'its effects have been found arbitrary, severe, and destructive! Take notice, North Carolina!'

The constitutional history of three typical states, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina, illustrates the class struggle and the essential continuity of this period with the pre-war years.

In the Quaker commonwealth the struggle between east and west culminated early in 1776 in a complete reapportionment of representation, a smashing victory for the western counties. Triumph tasted sweet, and the radicals wanted more. They called a convention to adopt a new constitution and take over the government of the state. Delegates were chosen by popular vote, without property qualifications. The constitution that they produced was drastically democratic; the principal authors were George Bryan, an intense and idealistic Irishman, James Cannon, a Scotch professor of mathematics, and Benjamin Franklin. It did away with governor and upper chamber, and provided for a Council of Censors to examine the operation of the government every seven years. As one conservative bitterly lamented:

> 'We might at least have prevented ourselves from being ridiculous in the eyes of the world were it not for a few enthusiastic members who are totally unacquainted with the principles of government. It is not only that their notions are original, but they would go to the devil for popularity, and in order to acquire it, they have embraced leveling principles, which you know is a fine method of succeeding.'

There were no qualifications for voting or office-holding, except the payment of a state tax and the touching proviso that membership in the House should consist of 'persons most noted for wisdom and virtue.' Representation, proportioned to the number of taxables in each county, gave the more numerous Scotch-Irish and Germans of the interior the majority; and their natural allies, the working people of Philadelphia, obtained a larger share of power than they had ever known. These groups promptly swept away many of the unpopular features of proprietary and Quaker control, and much good with the bad: the Philadelphia College, for instance.

The constitution of Virginia was a compromise, weighted on the conservative side. As the Tidewater aristocracy took the lead in the revolutionary struggle, so they naturally retained it in drafting the constitution of 1776, which was done before the Declaration of Independence. Archibald Cary, Robert Carter Nicholas, James Madison, George Mason, and Patrick Henry were on the drafting committee; Jefferson and even John Adams exerted some influence from Philadelphia, where they were busy on more important matters. On the one hand, a conservative plan of Carter Braxton for a high-toned government with a senate elected for life, got no consideration. On the other hand, the property qualifications for voting and office-holding remained unchanged, and the eastern counties retained their control of the legislature through the device of giving each county exactly two members. As the western counties were large, populous, and growing fast, this disproportion became greater every year. In 1790 the five Valley counties with an average white population of 12,089 had two representatives each, and five Tidewater counties with an average white population of 1,471 had two representatives each. Also, the Valley Presbyterians were disappointed in not obtaining separation of church and state.

The Virginia constitution, like Virginia political life, was distinguished for liberal theory. Its outstanding feature was the noble Declaration or Bill of Rights, which served as a model for other states, and even for France. No frontier democrat drafted this declaration: it was the work of George Mason of Gunston Hall, an aristocratic liberal who used to refer to George Washington as 'that damned young surveyor.' The Declaration includes these ringing phrases:

> 'That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot by any compact deprive or divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
>
> 'That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people . . .
>
> 'That government is, or ought to be instituted for the common benefit, protection and security of the people . . .

'That the legislative and executive powers of the state should be separate and distinct from the judiciary . . .

'That the freedom of the press is one of the great bulwarks of liberty, and can never be restrained but by despotick governments.'

Although the Virginia gentry were unyielding in matters such as sectional representation which threatened their political supremacy, they went further in social reform legislation than the gentry of any other state. Their constitution, brief and flexible, allowed this; and within a few years, under the driving leadership of Jefferson, Madison, and Mason, quit-rents, primogeniture, and entails were abolished, church and state separated, the legal code revised, and the slave trade abolished.

This Virginia constitution of 1776 was radical in comparison with the second South Carolina constitution, of 1778, which perpetuated those class and sectional inequalities that made trouble in the colonial period. Suffrage was limited to those with a fifty-acre freehold, and property qualifications for office-holding were almost prohibitory. A senator had to hold an estate worth £2000, while the Governor, Lieutenant-Governor, and councillors must own property to the value of £10,000. There were special provisions for absentee voting and representation, making it possible for wealthy planters who resided in Charleston to be elected from communities where they owned property. The coastal region continued to be grossly over-represented in the House, with 144 members, and the up-country under-represented with 58. The Anglican Church was disestablished, but only Protestants were guaranteed civil rights. Quit-rents and entail had already been done away with; primogeniture lingered on until 1791. This triumph of the conservatives left that state under the control of low-country planters, and made it the stronghold of Southern conservatism for three-quarters of a century.

These typical states of Pennsylvania, Virginia, and South Carolina, give some indication of the general trend of political reorganization, but we must look elsewhere as well to appreciate what was done in the way of democratic reform that was so integral a part of the Revolution. The war did not give the 'people,' even in the limited eighteenth-century sense of the freemen, control of their governments, but it did widen their participation in government. With land selling at a few cents an acre, as it did in many states when confiscated property was thrown on the market, it was a sorry fellow who could not acquire fifty acres, or a forty-shilling freehold, which would entitle him to the vote. If property qualifications for office remained, they were seldom prohibitory, and thousands of poor men got a taste of power during these years. In the Northern states representation was generally reapportioned according to population, allowing the back-country for the first time its full weight. Relics of feudalism such as titles of nobility, quit-rents, entails, primogeniture, and tithes were swept away. The crown lands, the extensive domains of proprietors such as the Penns and Calverts, and the princely estates of loyalists such as Lord Fairfax of Virginia, Sir William Johnson of New York, James Wright of Georgia, Henry Harford of Maryland, Governor Wentworth of New Hampshire, and others, were confiscated by the states and in part redistributed to small farmers and war veterans. The estate of Roger Morris of New York, for example, went to two hundred and fifty persons, that of the De Lanceys to even more. Considerable progress was made in achieving complete religious freedom and separation of church and state, and a concerted attack upon slavery and the slave trade was made in every state. The democratic philosophy of the Revolution percolated through politics into the structure of American society, and the force of it was not spent for a century.

5. *Religion and Slavery*

When the War of Independence broke out, the Anglican Church was established in every colony from Maryland to Georgia and in part of New York, and the Congregational churches enjoyed a privileged position in Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Hampshire. Only in otherwise-minded Rhode Island, and in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware, was there a separation of church and state. The dissenting groups were discriminated against in various ways, and their discontent was part of the internal upheaval that accompanied the War of Independence. An important leader in the movement was the Presbyterian minister John Witherspoon, who came to America after fighting the established church in Scotland, became President of the College of New Jersey at Princeton, and a signer of the Declaration of Independence. He was forever preaching that mere toleration was not enough, for that implied superiority and condescension; the only proper principle for a republic was complete liberty to worship how one chose or not at all, and every church should be supported by its own members or funds without help from the taxing power of the state. Witherspoon's pupils, among whom James Madison was conspicuous, were always to be found on the side of religious liberty.

The issue was first joined in Virginia; but the struggle by Madison, Jefferson, and R. H. Lee, to get that principle expressed in concrete terms, was long and arduous. Dissenters were still forced to pay tithes, and none but the Episcopal clergy could perform the marriage ceremony. It took ten years of what Jefferson called 'the severest contest in which I have ever been engaged,' to do away with these privileges. Patrick Henry supported a counter-scheme to establish all the churches of whatever denomination, and support them all by taxation, as in New England; but complete religious liberty prevailed. 'There had been a time,' one dissenting clergyman observed of his brethren, 'when they would have been satisfied to have paid their tithes, if they could have had liberty of conscience; but now the crisis was such that nothing less than a total overthrow of all ecclesiastical distinctions would satisfy their sanguine hopes. Having started the decaying edifice, every dissenter put his shoulder to push it into irretrievable ruin.' In January 1786, after a State-wide campaign of education, the legislature passed the noble Statute of Religious Liberty which Jefferson had introduced seven years earlier, and which he accounted one of his three great contributions to his country.[5] It provided

> 'That no man shall be compelled to frequent or support any religious worship, place or ministry, whatsoever, nor shall be . . . burthened in his body or goods, nor shall otherwise suffer on account of his religious opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain their opinion in matters of religion and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities.'

In Maryland, where the Anglican Church was unpopular both with the Catholics of the coast and the Presbyterians of the interior, it was separated from the State in 1776. In North Carolina the feeble establishment completely disappeared, and the constitution of 1776 stated simply that 'there shall be no establishment of any one religious church or denomination in this State in preference to any other.' There was a struggle in South Carolina, where the Church was firmly intrenched in the affections of the ruling class;

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[5] The other two were the Declaration of Independence and the establishment of the University of Virginia.

but the constitution of 1778 provided that all Protestant churches should enjoy equal civil and religious liberties.

In the Middle Colonies where religious liberty already existed, the principle was embodied in the new constitutions as a matter of form; and it was incorporated into the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Only in New England did it fail of recognition. Here the Congregational clergy had been early and eloquent on the winning side; the Rev. Thomas Allen of Pittsfield even led his parishioners into action at Bennington. It was argued that the town church like the town meeting and town school had made New England, and should be equally respected. Rhode Island had always had religious liberty; Vermont adopted it at once; but the other three States adopted a sort of quasi-establishment, according to which everyone had to pay a religious tax to the Congregational church of the parish within which he lived, unless he belonged to a recognized dissenting church. In that case the dissenting pastor received the tax. The Episcopalians in Connecticut and the Baptists elsewhere attacked this system intermittently, but it lasted in New Hampshire until 1817, in Connecticut until 1818, and in Massachusetts until 1833.

The next issue was personal liberty. When the War of Independence broke out there were about half a million slaves in the American colonies.[6] The inconsistency of demanding life, liberty

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[6] It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of slaves in the American Colonies in 1776. The tables below give the approximate number in 1776 and the number according to the census of 1790.

	1776	1790
New Hampshire	700	157
Rhode Island	4000	958
Connecticut	6000	2648
Massachusetts	5249*	0
New York	20000	21193
New Jersey	10000	11423
Pennsylvania	6000	3707
Delaware	?	8837
Maryland	70000	103036
Virginia	200000	292627
North Carolina	70000	100783
South Carolina	100000	107094
Georgia	10000	29264
Kentucky	?	12440
Southwest Territory	?	3417
	501,949	699,374

* Including free negroes.

and happiness for themselves while denying those 'natural rights' to the negroes, was apparent to Americans even before unfriendly English criticism called it to their attention, and they proceeded to do what they could about it. Historians are fond of pointing out the yawning chasms between the theory that 'all men are created equal' and the fact that thousands were born into slavery. Be it said to the credit of the theorizers that they did everything in their power to bridge the gulf.

The first point of attack was the slave trade. Time and again the American Colonies had protested against the traffic, maintained chiefly for the benefit of the Royal African Company, but their protests had been in vain and their prohibitory laws had been disallowed by the Privy Council. As late as 1776 the pious Lord Dartmouth denounced the colonies for their attempts 'to check or discourage a traffic so beneficial to the nation.' One of the first acts of the Continental Congress was to conclude a non-importation agreement prohibiting the slave trade. Soon the states took separate action. Delaware prohibited the trade in 1776, Virginia under Jefferson's leadership in 1778, Pennsylvania in 1780, and Maryland in 1783, where Luther Martin argued pointedly that the traffic was 'inconsistent to the principles of the Revolution and dishonorable to the American character.' Even in South Carolina the trade was temporarily prohibited, while North Carolina placed a heavy tax on all slaves imported into that state. Within ten years after independence every state except Georgia had prohibited or severely restrained the traffic, and Georgia followed tardily in 1798 with an absolute prohibition. But a good many ships from New York and New England continued to bring slaves illegally from Africa, and sell them in the West Indies and the lower South.

The struggle for emancipation was more difficult, and marked by a more distinct sectional character. It was relatively easy for the Northern States, where slavery was unprofitable, except as a means of providing cooks and butlers for the wealthy. In the South the slaves were so numerous that to free them would not only shake the economic and social system to its foundation, but substitute a negro problem for a slavery problem. The dilemma of liberal southerners is well presented in a letter that Patrick Henry addressed to his friend Robert Pleasants:

> 'I take this Oppertunity to acknowledge the receit of Anthony Benezets Book against the Slave Trade. I thank you for it. . . . Is it

not amazing, that at a time when the rights of Humanity are defined and understood with precision in a Country above all others fond of Liberty: that in such an Age and such a Country, we find Men, professing a Religion the most humane, mild, meek, gentle and generous, adopting a Principle as repugnant to humanity, as it is inconsistent with the Bible and destructive to Liberty — . . . Would any one believe that I am Master of Slaves of my own purchase! I am drawn along by the general Inconvenience of living without them; I will not, I cannot justify it. However culpable my Conduct, I will so far pay my devoir to Virtue, as to own the excellence and rectitude of her Precepts and to lament my want of conformity to them. I believe a time will come when an oppertunity will be offered to abolish this lamentable Evil. — Everything we can do, is to improve it if it happens in our day, if not let us transmit to our descendants together with our Slaves a pity for their unhappy Lot, and an abhorrence for Slavery. . . .'

The progress of emancipation in the North was rapid. As early as 1774 Rhode Island provided that all slaves thereafter brought into that commonwealth were to be free, and the reason given is illuminating:

> .'Whereas,' it went 'the inhabitants of America are generally engaged in the preservation of their own rights and liberties, among which that of personal freedom must be considered as the greatest, and as those who are desirous of enjoying all the advantages of liberty themselves should be willing to extend personal liberty to others. . .'

The Constitution of Vermont abolished slavery outright. In Massachusetts, Quork Walker sued his master for freedom on the ground that the State Constitution declared 'All men are born free and equal.' He won his suit (1781), and slavery ended in that state. The New Hampshire courts, under a similar clause, freed only the *post nati*. Pennsylvania, stronghold of anti-slavery Quakers, provided for gradual emancipation in 1780; Connecticut and Rhode Island followed four years later. New York and New Jersey made similar provisions in 1799 and 1804. So the Revolution put slavery well on the way to extinction, north of the Mason and Dixon line.

The struggle for emancipation in the Southern States was led by such men as Jefferson, Madison, and Mason in Virginia, William Pinkney, and Luther Martin in Maryland. 'I tremble for my country,' Jefferson wrote, 'when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever.' Yet proposals for gradual emancipation were defeated in every Southern state, though several states encouraged manumission by the masters, and thousands of negroes secured their freedom by this means. Except in South Carolina and Georgia, almost every Southerner looked upon slavery as an evil, but a necessary one; in time it became so necessary that it ceased to be an evil. The anti-slavery forces, however, scored a signal victory in the provision of the Northwest Ordinance dedicating the territory north of the Ohio to liberty.

Revolutionary liberalism also found expression in other efforts of a humanitarian nature. A contemporary historian, David Ramsey, wrote in 1789:

> 'From the latter periods of the revolution till the present time, schools, colleges, societies and institutions for promoting literature, arts, manufactures, agriculture, and for extending human happiness, have been increased far beyond anything that ever took place before the declaration of independence. Every state in the union has done more or less in this way, but Pennsylvania has done the most. The following institutions have been very lately founded in that state, and most of them in the time of the war or since the peace. An university in the city of Philadelphia; a college of physicians in the same place; Dickinson college at Carlisle; Franklin college at Lancaster; the Protestant Episcopal academy in Philadelphia; academies at Yorktown, at Germantown, at Pittsburgh and Washington; and an academy in Philadelphia for young ladies; societies for promoting political enquiries; for the medical relief of the poor, under the title of the Philadelphia dispensary; for promoting the abolition of slavery, and the relief of free negroes unlawfully held in bondage; for propagating the gospel among the Indians, under the direction of the United Brethren; for the encouragement of manufactures and the useful arts; for alleviating the miseries of prisons. Such have been some of the beneficial effects which have resulted from that expansion of the human mind, which has been produced by the revolution. . .'

Few other states, as Ramsey correctly observes, could match Pennsylvania, but the legal and educational developments in the South were almost as far-reaching. Especially notable was the assumption of public responsibility for education, as in New England. Maryland, North Carolina, and Georgia founded state universities on paper; and although the net result was but one college in North Carolina, the intention was good. Virginia and Jefferson had to wait fifty years for a state university, but the College of William and Mary was revolutionized by turning the two chairs of theology into professorships of law. And in the Northwest Territory a liberal reserve was made by Congress for the support of public education.

Important as all these reforms were, it would be an exaggeration to describe the American Revolution as a social revolution, like those in France and Russia. No class as such was expropriated, slavery was not abolished, the structure of society was not altered. Our revolution was primarily political, like the English revolution of 1640–60. Even the confiscation of loyalist property affected the relations of persons rather than of classes: one set of proprietors was impoverished, and another enriched; and it was not long before the patriots who obtained tory farms and mansions were just as conservative as the former owners. Yet the Revolution was a powerful catalytic agent in American society. It released pent-up energies and gave them form and direction. It crystallized the American character and institutions. The established order of things was questioned if not replaced. Ideals heretofore nebulous were given concrete formulation; hopes and aspirations heretofore formless were realized. Jeffersonian democracy would have been impossible but for the fillip that war and independence gave to the democratic elements in American society.

VII

THE CONFEDERATION

1. *Articles of Confederation*

ONE of the three Resolutions introduced by Richard Henry Lee to Congress on the famous 7 June 1776, was a motion to appoint a committee to draw up articles of confederation among the several states. Congress acted at once upon the motion and chose a committee of one member from each state, among them John Dickinson, Samuel Adams, and Roger Sherman. On 12 July this committee presented a plan of Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union drafted by Dickinson, and based partly on a plan introduced the previous year by Franklin. The plan as reported was severely altered in Congress, and was not finally adopted until November 1777. Since ratification by all the states was necessary, the Articles did not go into effect until 1781. The delay was principally caused by Maryland's refusing to accede to any formal union until the Western lands had been disposed of to her satisfaction.

The Articles of Confederation represent the first American experiment in reconciling unity with localism — the old problem of imperial order. Independence had merely transferred the solution from London to Philadelphia and complicated it by the peculiar circumstances of war, unfavorable for the cool consideration of political problems. The states, having just won full powers over taxation and commerce from Parliament, were not ready to grant them out again; and Tom Paine's theory that all government at best was a necessary evil, something to be feared, limited and circumscribed, had bitten deep into the American brain. And although the problem was restricted in scope, its major elements were still the same: taxation, regulation of commerce, Western lands, Indian affairs, paper money, military co-operation in time of war.

What was the Confederation, a government or a treaty? In the preamble it is described as a 'perpetual Union'; in Article II 'Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom and independence'; and in

Article III the states 'enter into a firm league of friendship.' Each state had one vote in Congress, no matter how many delegates it sent. Unanimous consent was necessary for any amendment. The states retained complete control over taxation and regulation of commerce. The relations between the members were essentially international: each state gave full faith and credit to the records, acts, and judicial proceedings of all other states; citizens of one state were entitled to all the privileges and immunities of those of other states, and must extradite criminals.

On the other hand the powers of the central government were so broad as to cast doubt on the reality of state sovereignty. Congress was granted authority to make war and peace, send and receive ambassadors, make treaties and alliances, regulate coinage, weights, and measures, establish a post-office, manage Indian affairs, borrow money on the credit of the United States, raise an army and equip a navy, make requisitions upon the states for men and money, and decide disputes between states. The essence of federalism is the distribution of powers between governments, and the success of a federal system depends upon the accuracy with which powers of a general nature are allotted to the central government and those of a local nature reserved to the local governments. This distribution was not done well in the Articles of Confederation; but they did outline a federal system, and it represented a great improvement upon the constitution of any previous league in modern history.

The defects in the Articles: failure to give Congress control over taxation and trade, want of a federal executive or judiciary, and lack of any sanction for federal powers; these were inherent in the situation. The Thirteen States were not yet ready to give a federal legislature what they had refused to an Imperial Parliament, or to surrender the shadow of sovereignty for the substance of union. Even when the inadequacies of the Articles became glaringly apparent, unanimous consent for amendments was impossible to obtain. Rhode Island defeated one proposal to provide Congress with a five per cent customs duty; and when Rhode Island was later induced to part with this 'most precious jewel of sovereignty' the proposal was rejected by the legislature of New York.

Yet it was not so much powers that the Confederation wanted as power. Requisitions might have served in lieu of taxes had Congress possessed the authority to enforce them. As James Madison observed in a paper written in 1787:

> 'A sanction is essential to the idea of law, as coercion is to that of government. The federal system being destitute of both, wants the great vital principles of a political constitution. Under form of such a constitution, it is in fact nothing more than a treaty of amity of commerce and of alliance, between independent and Sovereign States.'

Noah Webster pointed out the same defect, and indicated the remedy that was eventually adopted:

> 'The general concerns of the continent may be reduced to a few heads; but in all the affairs that respect the whole, Congress must have the same power to enact laws and compel obedience throughout the continent, as the legislatures of the States have in their respective jurisdictions.'

But all this was apparent only to a few. It took time and bitter experience to convince men of the folly of particularism. Furthermore, the Confederation was launched under distressing economic circumstances. The years after Yorktown were years of profound economic depression and decline in property and security values. The ultimate breakdown of the Confederation, then, was due not so much to the defects of the Articles as to the psychological unreadiness of Americans to submit to any outside control, and to the 'hard times' which made any government an adventure.

2. *A New Colonial System*

And now the old Western question comes home to roost. All those pesky problems of land, Indians, fur trade, settlement, and government of dependencies, which had troubled Grenville and Shelburne and Chatham and North from the Peace of Paris to the Quebec Act, were now up to Congress to settle. In these Western matters it did well, formulating policies and inaugurating practices during the troubled years of the Confederation, which made a permanent mark on American history.

During the colonial period Virginia, the Carolinas, Georgia, New York, Massachusetts, and Connecticut had extensive and often overlapping claims to land beyond the Appalachians. The Quebec Act abrogated most of these titles by attaching the land north of the Ohio to the Canadian province of Quebec. Upon the outbreak of the war the states revived their claims, and Virginia sent a military expedition to recover her Western territory.[1]

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[1] See above, pp. 92–93.

The prospect of this rich territorial prize's falling to the few more fortunate states, was unpleasant to states without Western claims. Maryland made herself the spokesman for this group, and her representatives early introduced into Congress a resolution that the Western lands,

> 'If wrested from the common enemy by the blood and treasure of the thirteen States, should be considered as common property, subject to be parcelled out by Congress into free and independent governments. . . .'

The states which hoped to use their Western lands to finance the war and reward their soldiers, did not appreciate the idea of pooling them; and the resolution did not pass. Until they should feel more generous Maryland refused to ratify the Articles of Confederation, and thereby rendered a great service to the nation.

In 1780 New York led the way by ceding her claims to the United States. Congress immediately passed a resolution which contained in it the germ of American future colonial policy.

> 'The unappropriated lands that may be ceded or relinquished to the United States . . . shall be disposed of for the common benefit of the United States, and be settled and formed into distinct republican States, which shall become members of the Federal Union, and have the same rights of sovereignty, freedom and independence as the other States.'

Inspired by this guarantee, and by New York's example, Connecticut and Massachusetts followed suit.[2] Virginia, whose claims were the largest and the soundest, surrendered her lands north of the Ohio in 1781, Governor Jefferson writing:

> 'The lands . . . will remain to be occupied by Americans, and whether these be counted in the members of this or that of the United States will be thought a matter of little moment.'

By 1783, with the successful termination of the war, it was apparent that Congress would come into possession of all the lands north of the Ohio, and probably of all west of the Alleghanies. This common possession of millions of acres of lands was the most tangible evidence of nationality and unity that existed during these troubled years, and gave a certain substance to the idea of national sovereignty. Yet possession itself was fraught with difficulties. Ancient problems of land, Indian, and administrative policy pressed for a solution.

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[2] Wrathful over an adverse decision in the Susquehanna dispute, Connecticut withheld a strip of land extending westward from Pennsylvania 120 miles along the shore of Lake Erie — the Western Reserve. This was finally ceded in 1800.

Congress feebly attempted to regulate the fur trade. It obtained land cessions from the Iroquois and the Northwest Indians, who in alliance with Britain had waged a terrible and relentless war against the backwoods settlements; but most of these treaties it was unable to enforce. New forts were built on the Ohio, and in 1787 a detachment of the United States army moved down the right bank, burning the cabins of frontiersmen who had staked out claims there by 'tomahawk right'; but it was not strong enough to prevent repeated Indian forays into Kentucky and Virginia. In the transmontane region south of the Ohio, where *de facto* state governments had been set up by the pioneers, and where no land claims had been made over to the Confederation, the period 1785–88 was one of bitter race warfare. The westward movement had obtained such a start that even the stronger Federal Government of 1789 could do little more than give the Indians a breathing-space, pending their final removal or extinction.

With land disposal and the problem of government, Congress was highly successful. It appointed a committee to take each subject under consideration, and Jefferson was made chairman of both. In 1784 he brought in the draft of an ordinance for the political organization of the entire trans-Appalachian territory. This plan provided for a temporary government and ultimate self-government of the West, which was to be divided into sixteen states,[3] eventually to be admitted on a basis of absolute equality with the original Thirteen. Jefferson's original draft excluded slavery, but the Southern states got that deleted. This Ordinance of 1784 was adopted by Congress, but never put into effect.

The report of the committee on land was incorporated into the Land Ordinance of 1785. This Ordinance provided for a rectangular survey of lands and a division into townships of six miles square. Each township was to consist of thirty-six sections of 640 acres each, and the sections could be subdivided as necessity arose. Land officers were to be established at convenient points in the West and lands sold in orderly progress at a price of not less than one dollar an acre. Four sections of every township were to be set aside for the United States Government, and one section reserved for the maintenance of public schools. This land system was modelled in a general way on that of New England, with some features derived from the projected imperial land survey of 1774. It adopted the principle of using the national domain as a source of revenue rather than granting it free, or on easy terms, to settlers. And as not less than one section could be sold, and $640 was too much for a pioneer farmer to pay, the states and private land companies did most of the land-office business for many years. With numerous changes in detail, however, the Ordinance of 1785 remained at the basis of the American land policy until the Homestead Act of 1862.

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[3] Some of the names that Jefferson suggested for these States are: Sylvania, Polypotamia, Pelisipia, Cherronesus, and Michigania.

It was the activities of private land companies that forced Congress to make some provision for the political administration of its Western territory. The most important of these land companies were the Ohio and the Scioto, both organized in New England, largely by officers of the Revolutionary army, and similar to the land companies of the colonial period. In the spring of 1787 General Rufus Putnam and the Reverend Manasseh Cutler appeared before Congress requesting the sale of millions of acres of land north of the Ohio river on favorable terms. The prospect of an immediate revenue proved irresistible, especially when coupled with the promise of offices and perquisites, and the purchase was finally agreed upon at bargain prices. The Ohio Company of Associates obtained 1,500,000 acres of land along the banks of the Ohio and Muskingum rivers at an average price of less than nine cents an acre.[4] The Scioto Company negotiated for an even larger tract of land along the Scioto river, but it later became involved in financial difficulties and the sale was never consummated.

With this immediate prospect of settlement in the Ohio country, Congress had to make some immediate provision for government, and on 13 July 1787 passed the Northwest Ordinance, largely the work of Nathan Dane, Rufus King, and Manasseh Cutler. This famous Ordinance bridged the gap between wilderness and statehood by providing a system of limited self-government, the essence of which has been repeated for all the continental and most of the insular possessions of the United States. The Northwest Territory was organized as a single district and ruled by a governor and judges appointed by Congress. When this territory should contain five thousand free male inhabitants of voting age it could elect a territorial legislature, with the status of a subordinate colonial assembly, and send a non-voting delegate to Congress. No more than five nor less than three states were to be formed out of this territory, and whenever any one had 60,000 free inhabitants it was to be admitted as one of the United States 'on an equal footing with the original States in all respects whatever.' A series of Articles of Compact guaranteed to the inhabitants of the Northwest Territory the customary civil rights and liberties, and provided that 'Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged.' Further, 'There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said territory.'

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[4] One section in each township was reserved for educational and one for religious purposes. Two entire townships were set aside for a university.

Thus a new colonial policy based upon the principle of equality, was inaugurated. The time-honored doctrine that colonies existed for the benefit of the mother-country and were politically subordinate to and socially inferior to the mother-country, was definitely repudiated. In its stead was established the principle that colonies were but the extensions of the nation, and entitled, not as a privilege, but as a right, to all the benefits of equality. The Ordinance of 1787 is one of the great creative contributions of America, for it showed how to get rid of that friction which had always been a canker in the relations of colony to metropolis. The enlightened provisions of the Land Ordinance of 1785 and the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 laid the permanent foundations for the American territorial system and American colonial policy, and enabled the United States to expand westward to the Pacific, and from thirteen to forty-eight states, with relatively little difficulty.

3. *Liquidating the Treaty of Paris*

The Treaty of Paris was satisfactory neither to England nor to the United States, and its terms were fruitful of future quarrels. Boundary disputes, arising from the loose wording of the treaty, were fortunately postponed to a later generation, but there were immediate controversies over matters in which one or the other party failed to fulfil its obligations, such as debts, the treatment of loyalists, and the presence of British garrisons on United States soil. Congress on 14 January 1783 duly made the required 'earnest recommendation' to the states to restore confiscated loyalist estates and a few actually complied to some extent: Pennsylvania, for instance, paid the Penn family $650,000 in compensation for their proprietary rights — but most of them, being under no obligation, failed to act. The treaty requirement that loyalists should be free to reside twelve months in any part of the United States, in order to endeavor to recover their property, was not always respected. Many loyalists managed to recover their property, by assigning it to some patriot friend or kinsman, whose exertions and whose honor seldom failed them in this period of blasted hope; but tory rangers or partisans who returned to the districts they had ravaged were fortunate to get off with a term in jail. More often they were given a coat of tar and feathers and escorted out by a mob. A second requirement, 'that there shall be no future confiscations made,' nor fresh prosecutions commenced against loyalists, was generally obeyed. New York passed a Trespass Act, encouraging owners of property formerly within the British lines to recover damages against loyalist occupants through actions of trespass. But Alexander Hamilton successfully defended the first loyalist so prosecuted, in the case of Rutgers v. Waddington, and obtained a judgment from the Mayor's Court of New York, nullifying the statute on the ground of its conflict with the treaty. South Carolina authorized fresh confiscations in 1783, but rescinded them in 1786. Other states passed laws having reference to the disposition of property already confiscated during the war, taking the ground that the treaty had no retroactive effect; a construction vigorously maintained by the British Government in respect of a different article which forbade British commanders to deport negro slaves.

America often had law on her side in her treatment of loyalists; but few will contend that she had justice. In extenuation one may observe that American tories were less harshly treated than royalists in the French Revolution, or than bourgeois and unionists in more recent upheavals. It was too much to expect of human nature that the Americans should forgive a class of people who, with all their acknowledged merits, had contributed greatly both to the ferocity of the war and to its prolongation. And, after all, the sixty to eighty thousand loyalists who were driven from the United States during the war, and left it voluntarily afterwards, were but a minority of the loyalist party. After 1776 tories who paid their taxes, refrained from hostile action, and kept their mouths closed, were in most states permitted to continue the enjoyment of their property; and practically all of this class remained in the country. John Adams admitted that the tory vote helped to obtain the ratification of the Federal Constitution. Even in New York most of the tories remained, and many of the exiles drifted back — men such as Cadwallader Colden, who became mayor of the city, and commanded a regiment in the War of 1812, and Henry Cruger, elected to the New York senate while still a member of Parliament. If then, the bulk of the loyalists became good American citizens, the country might well have repatriated all who were willing to do so. A young republic could ill spare such men as Benjamin Thompson (Count Rumford), John Singleton Copley the artist, and Justice Howe of Nova Scotia, though American schoolboys were saved much future pain through the departure of that loyal grammarian Lindley Murray. However, America's loss was Britain's gain; without the United Empire Loyalists of Canada, and the equally loyal refugee families in the West Indies, it is unlikely that those dominions would still belong to the British Empire.

A second clear obligation placed on the Thirteen States by the peace treaty was to open their courts freely to British subjects seeking to recover their pre-war debts. There is no doubt that this article was violated both in letter and in spirit. Virginia, where the debts were heaviest, and the general attitude toward financial obligations was aristocratic and feudal, led the way in passing laws hampering the recovery of British debts. Both French and British armies left plenty of gold and silver in the country, but the Americans — like others in similar circumstances — spent it on luxuries instead of paying off their pre-war debts. Hard times followed, and domestic creditors suffered equally with the foreign. John Jay induced Congress to send a circular letter to the states, adverting strongly on their breach of public faith, and requesting the repeal of their illegal acts. Most of them had complied by 1789, when the Constitution superseded all state laws contrary to treaty obligations, and opened the new federal judiciary to British litigants. Thereafter, the recovery of British debts was a matter of judicial process, and no impediment was imposed save the law's delay. This, however, was so prolonged that the matter was finally adjudicated by Jay's Treaty, where the determination of uncollected debts was left to a mixed commission which failed to agree. Finally by a convention of 1802 the United

States paid a lump sum of £600,000 in complete satisfaction of the bona fide debts and interest.

Article VII of the treaty of peace required all British garrisons on American soil to be withdrawn 'with all convenient speed.' New York was completely evacuated by December 1783. Seven military and fur-trading posts[5] on the American side of the new Canadian boundary remained in British possession. The general in command refused, in August 1783, to discuss arrangements for turning over these posts with an emissary of Washington. On 8 April 1784, the day before George III ratified the treaty of peace, his Home Minister wrote the Governor of Canada that the posts would not be evacuated, 'at least until we are enabled to secure the fur traders in the Interior Country,' because the United States had not complied with even one article of the treaty. They were not evacuated until 1796, after a convenient delay of twelve years. Now that the archives have yielded up their secrets, it is clear that prior violations by the United States were a mere excuse. Unwillingness to abandon the fur trade and the Indians of the Northwest was responsible for retention of the posts.

It was partly in order to conserve the fur trade and control the redskins that the Province of Quebec had been extended from the Ottawa to the Ohio river in 1774. Scotch-Canadian fur merchants, Grants and McGills and Mackenzies and McTavishes, brought new capital and business acumen, which made an irresistible combination with French-Canadian personnel, technique, and Indian connections. During the next ten years they so developed this trade that peltry to the annual value of £200,000 passed through Montreal on its way to London. Then, in the peace treaty, Shelburne made a free gift to the United States of this immense imperial asset, the land between the Lakes and the Ohio river. At least, so the cession appeared on the Canadian side of the boundary. But we must remember that the Thirteen Colonies had prior claims to this region as against Canada. A glance at the map, and a forward reference to the annexation of Texas, suggests that sooner or later the American settler would have rushed across the Ohio, with another Anglo-American war as result. Lord Shelburne's statesmanship is indicated by the unarmed Canadian-American boundary, which enabled the two countries to expand along parallel lines.

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[5] From east to west these posts were Dutchman's Point and Pointe-au-Fer at the head of Lake Champlain, guarding the military and trading route between Montreal and Albany; Oswegatchie on the St. Lawrence river, near Ogdensburg, N. Y.; Oswego, N. Y., on Lake Ontario, guarding the portage route to the Mohawk; Niagara, on the American side of the falls; Detroit, on the river between Lakes Erie and Huron; and Michilimackinac, on an island in the strait between Lakes Huron and Michigan.

As soon as the news of the treaty terms reached Canada, petitions and remonstrances from the Montreal fur merchants began to pour in upon the Governor-General. American possession of the Northwest posts, they complained, would divert the fur trade to New York and Philadelphia, and alienate the loyal Western Indians who had been guaranteed the Ohio boundary in 1768. The Canadians only requested a reasonable delay to reorganize the trade before evacuating the posts. It was in answer to these petitions that the Home Office gave orders to retain the Northwest posts until further notice.

By this deliberate breach of treaty obligations the United States were excluded from territory, trade, and Indian control that were rightly theirs. Yet there were even more serious implications in the act, though the actors may have been unconscious of them. Detroit and Michilimackinac were sally-ports of empire, looking towards New Orleans. Twice the Thirteen Colonies had fought to keep French Canada from their back doors. Must the Thirteen States fight again to keep British Canada within her legal boundaries? Would the United States ever be secure until British power, like French power, was expelled from the North American continent?

4. *Foreign Affairs during the Confederation*

Isolation, free trade, and westward expansion were American aspirations as old as the Thirteen Colonies, but frustrated by the colonial status. Unless independence could achieve them, independence was a delusion. American foreign policy from the seventeenth century onward has been the median of vertical and horizontal forces: repulsion from European politics, attraction for European principles. Geography accentuates the one; cultural unity keeps the other alive. It was idle for European philosophers to warn the Americans that they could attain political isolation only by commercial isolation; that, like China, they must renounce foreign trade in order to preserve their virtue. What would become of the Southern States, without a market for their tobacco, naval stores, and rice; or of the Northern States, without a market for their corn, fish, and timber, or employment for their shipping? The Western settlements, if they could not secure an outlet for their peltry by the Mississippi or the St. Lawrence through the efforts of the Federal Government, were certain to turn to some other power. The United States might be independent politically of the British Empire; but for a generation to come they would encounter the ships and soldiers of that empire on the high seas, in the mouths of their harbors and at the gateways to the Great West.

America emerged from the War of Independence entangled by an alliance with France — the only treaty of alliance the United States has ever ratified. Isolation was not likely to be achieved until that alliance ended; and until the two gates that closed westward advance — Britain's along the Ohio, and Spain's along the Mississippi — swung open on their hinges at Montreal and New Orleans. Not until then could America pretend 'to dictate the terms of the connexion between the old and the new world,' as Hamilton predicted in *The Federalist*. Until then the United States must balance France against Britain in the old world, and Spain against Britain in the new.

Lord Shelburne, who alone of English statesmen of his generation had the wisdom to base British policy on what America might be rather than on what she was, proposed to heal the wounds of war and to consolidate Anglo-American friendship. The liberal terms of the Treaty of Paris, largely inspired by him, had been a step in this direction. Now, at his suggestion on 3 March 1783 young William Pitt introduced a bill restoring to the ships and products of the United States practically the same privileges they had formerly enjoyed within the British Empire. British shipowners vigorously attacked the bill, and the Commons amended it out of all conformity with Shelburne's wishes. Within a month his ministry was succeeded by the coalition that united Fox and North.

In the meantime Lord Sheffield had brought out his *Observations on the Commerce of the American States*. Sheffield argued that England could now absorb the commerce of America without the expense of governing her, and without concessions to the American interests.

> 'Our great national object is to raise as many sailors and as much shipping as possible. Parliament should endeavour to divert the whole Anglo-American trade to British bottoms. America cannot retaliate. It

> will not be an easy matter to bring the American States to act as a nation. They are not to be feared as such by us . . . We might as reasonably dread the effects of a combination among the German as among the American States.'

And he concluded with the tempting suggestion that the United States were breaking up; that New England, if made to feel the rod of British maritime power, might return to her old allegiance.

Sheffield's policy prevailed. Pitt's bill was lost; the commercial negotiation with the American diplomatists at Paris dragged along for a year, until the Foreign Office cut it short. By a series of Orders in Council of 1783 American vessels were excluded absolutely from Canada and the West Indies. In British ports they were placed on the same footing as the ships of any European country, in carrying the produce of other European countries. American tobacco, timber, and other raw materials, however, were admitted to British ports in American or British bottoms, practically on a colonial footing; provided they came directly from America.

This privilege was a great concession: no European country enjoyed as much from Great Britain. It was not, however, secured by a commercial treaty, but revocable at pleasure. And, for all its apparent liberality, the Order in Council of 1783 was carefully designed for ' strangling in the birth ' American shipping, as the loyalist author of it boasted. It might well have done so, if the American States had not formed an effective combination somewhat more promptly than those of Germany.

The immediate success of this policy established Sheffield's reputation, and discredited the free traders; although it was the free-trade element in it — the free admission of American materials — that made it successful. By 1789 the Board of Trade could boast that British exports to the United States had recovered pre-war dimensions; and that their excess over imports from America was even greater than in 1772. Anglo-American trade was so largely triangular that the exclusion of American vessels from the West Indies, and from all but a direct trade in American products with England, threw the traffic into British bottoms. The Confederation of 1781–89 had no jurisdiction over commerce, and all efforts of the states to retaliate separately were completely futile. If Massachusetts closed her ports to British ships, British goods came overland from

New Hampshire and Rhode Island; Connecticut and New Jersey similarly poached trade from New York City.

America had no right to expect colonial privileges after she had repudiated the colonial status; but the fact that other nations granted them made the British refusal seem invidious. France opened up her West Indian ports to American shipping and to most American products, and admitted American-built vessels to French registry. Havana and Santiago de Cuba were opened by the Spanish about the same time; and the Dutch were completely hospitable. Four Continental powers concluded commercial treaties with the American Confederation. If American friendship were worth winning and possible to win, it would be the part of wisdom for Great Britain to make some concessions of a similar nature.

From the point of view of Anglo-American friendship the Sheffield policy was shortsighted, almost disastrous. It gave the anti-British feeling in America a new lease, at the very moment when it was running out. But it did a great deal for the United States. Sheffield's taunts stung American pride. Exclusion from the West Indies sent American merchants in search of other markets; and the futile efforts of the states to retaliate separately showed that a stronger federal union was necessary. It is time that Lord Sheffield should be accorded his due as a prime mover of the Federal Constitution.

American relations with Spain were scarcely more satisfactory than those with Great Britain. There was, between the two nations, a natural conflict of interests, inherited from the ancient feud between Great Britain and Spain, and not ultimately resolved until 1848. During the War of Independence Spain had offered an alliance to the United States in return for the region south of the Ohio, between the Mississippi and the Appalachians, which she was pleased to call 'Eastern Louisiana.' Her object was not so much to acquire territory as to dam the flood of western migration at the mountains, lest it overrun the Mississippi to the plains of Texas and the valley of Mexico. Florida Blanca, the able premier of Charles III, foresaw and feared the expansive and propagandist tendencies of the United States, before the American Revolution was a year old.

Congress refused to cede the West, but Spain joined the war as an ally of France, though not of the United States, and obtained from Britain, as the price of peace, East and West Florida. It was too late to stop the gaps in the Appalachians; but not too late to make them an international boundary, with 'Eastern Louisiana' a Spanish protectorate. To accomplish this policy, Spain not only used Indians, and retained posts on United States territory, but choked the southern outlet of the West, and corrupted some of its leading men.

In 1784 the Creek, Choctaw, and Chickasaw Indians, who inhabited the territory of the United States south of the Tennessee river and west of Georgia, were persuaded to conclude treaties with His Catholic Majesty, who became virtually their protector. A loyalist refugee from Georgia organized the firm of Panton, Leslie & Company, which, with Spanish approval, established trading posts in Florida and sent its factors, with ammunition and other Indian truck, up the rivers towards the Tennessee frontier. Creek and Cherokee, now well furnished with weapons, began to harry American settlements on the Cumberland and upper Tennessee rivers, and in Georgia. The frontiersmen were not slow to retaliate on Indian villages, and they found the southern tribes better organized and less elusive than those along the Canadian frontier. During 1787–88 the border from Nashville to southern Georgia was the scene of hideous barbarities.

Natchez, on the left bank of the Mississippi well within the boundary of the United States as recognized by Great Britain, had been captured from British loyalists in 1779 by the Spaniards, who refused to surrender it to the United States, as not England's to grant. Natchez and New Orleans gave Spain the control of the lower Mississippi — a powerful means of pressure on the West. The people of Kentucky, Tennessee, western Virginia, and even western Pennsylvania, discovered that the long river journey south was their only practical way to market. Their cheap and bulky products could not stand the cost of being sweated over the Appalachian passes. But the Mississippi river led to natural markets in lower Louisiana, where the Creole planters preferred to concentrate on sugar cane, and purchase their live stock, horses, corn, and bacon. New Orleans was the natural post of trans-shipment for the New York and European markets.

As General James Wilkinson of Kentucky wrote in 1789, 'Spain ought to consider the navigation of the Mississippi as one of the most precious jewels of her crown. For, whatever power shall command that navigation, will control all the country which is watered by that river, and by those streams which fall into it.' Conversely, permission to navigate the lower Mississippi, and to enjoy a 'right of deposit' or free trans-shipment at New Orleans, was for the American West a question of life and growth, or strangulation.

Although formally denied to the United States as a right, both navigation and deposit were frequently accorded as a privilege, by the dispensing power of Governor Miró, in favor of such Westerners as would promise to serve Spanish policy — to detach their communities from the United States. Wilkinson, who accepted not only favors but bribes to make his state a 'bastion of Mexico,' was the most notorious of these Western conspirators. When John Jay, secretary of the Confederation for foreign affairs, proposed in 1786 to waive the right of deposit in return for privileges to Eastern shipping in Spanish ports, Spain's Western following increased. A surprising number of backwoods politicians accepted Spanish gold, and intrigued for secession, because they had lost hope of obtaining their outlet from the United States. What made matters worse was that many leading Easterners, disliking frontiersmen as political bedfellows, wished the West well out of the Union.

It was a strange diplomatic combination, that of polished don and rough-necked pioneer. One may well wonder that the latter showed less resentment against the nation who egged on the Cherokee and Creek, than against the power who supported the Shawnee and Miami. It was not merely that the Spaniard had more to offer. However fiercely your backwoodsman might hate the Canadian loyalist, he respected British power, whilst for Spaniards and their diplomacy he had a fundamental contempt. To the northward, moreover, he wanted nothing but his rights; to the southward his ambition knew no limit but Panama and the Pacific. As the Germans in the dark Teutowald yearned for the sunny, fertile plains of Italy, so the backwoodsman of Tennessee, as he tilled his patch of corn in the shade of girdled trees, while kinsmen watched with loaded rifle, dreamed of the day when he would go whooping down the great river of the West to loot the lazy Spaniard of his undeveloped land. And his dream, like the other, came true.

5. *The Day of the Debtor*

Most of the difficulties under which the United States labored during the first five years of peace were the necessary effects of a war that loosened the bonds of society, and cut the connection with a trading empire. But they were aggravated by the weakness of government, and the failure of co-operation on the part of the states. The radical weakness of the Confederation, as we have seen, was its complete dependence — like the old German Diet and the modern League of Nations — upon the goodwill of the sovereign states. Congress wanted power to fill the treasury, to enforce the laws of the Union, to regulate trade and commerce with foreign nations. The government languished upon the meagre results of requisitions which the state legislatures sometimes could not, but more often would not, honor. Only half a million dollars on the average was annually paid into the federal treasury by the states between 1781 and 1786: a sum hardly sufficient to meet the running expenses of government, let alone war costs and the interest on foreign loans.[6] Robert Morris, the able finance minister of the Confederation, was fortunate to prevent repudiation, and, by the grace of loans from Dutch bankers, to stave off bankruptcy. So hopeless had the financial situation become by 1783 that Morris resigned, in despair, confessing 'it can no longer be a doubt . . . that our public credit is gone.' Overdue interest on the debt accumulated, continental securities fell below 15, and demobilized army officers had to sell at a heavy loss the scrip they had received in lieu of pay. In the four years after the war the finances of state and central governments alike fell into hopeless confusion, and after emitting hundreds of millions of dollars of paper money, repudiation, partial or complete, was the order of the day.

Congress had exclusive charge of foreign and Indian relations, but for want of authority to regulate foreign commerce it could not deal as a sovereign power with Britain or with Spain. For want of authority to regulate domestic commerce, Congress could not prevent the states from indulging in petty tariff wars, or from hampering each other's vessels with a variety of niggling dues and regulations, which aggravated the economic and commercial depression of the middle eighties.

There were many who saw the defects of the Articles of Confederation and agreed as to the imperative necessity of a powerful central government; but the vast majority of Americans remained unconvinced. The principles, and still more the catchwords of a struggle waged for independence rather than union, for liberty rather than social order, were still current.

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[6] In 1783 the foreign debt of the United States stood at $7,885,085. By 1799 the principal of foreign debts had increased to $10,098,706, and the arrears of interest to $1,760,277. Approximately $350,000 of interest had been remitted by the French government.

> 'The people perceive . . . that a natural consequence of granting wider power to the government would be the regular collection of taxes, a severe administration of justice, a rigorous execution against debtors, and the preponderance of rich men and great landowners.'

So wrote a French observer, L. G. Otto, in 1786. In almost all the states, as we have seen, there was a distinct class division between merchants and farmers, or, in the South, planters and farmers, coinciding roughly with the physical division between coast and interior, town, and country. The loss of markets after the war increased the normal indebtedness of frontier and rural districts to merchant-bankers and market towns. A currency famine made matters worse. Debtors began to press state legislatures for relief in the form of 'tender acts' making land or produce, at fixed prices, a legal discharge; or 'stay laws' postponing the collection of debts; or laws providing cheap money. It was, indeed, this radical movement within the states threatening the property interests, that, according to James Madison 'contributed more to that uneasiness which produced the Constitution, and prepared the public mind for a general reform' than any political inadequacies of the Articles of Confederation.

The device of legal-tender paper currency had often been used in colonial days, when Parliament was not looking. The financial necessities of the war forced state and confederate governments to resort to this panacea, and altogether some $450,000,000 of paper money was emitted during the war years. The greater part of this depreciated to utter worthlessness, but, ethical considerations aside, this was perhaps as satisfactory a way to finance the war as any other that could have been found. It served as a substitute for taxation, and distributed the losses over a long period and over the entire population. 'This Currency,' observed the clear-sighted Franklin, 'as we manage it is a wonderful Machine. It performs its Office when we issue it; it pays and clothes Troops, and provides Victuals and Ammunition; and when we are obliged to issue a Quantity excessive, it pays itself off by Depreciation.'

But the financial difficulties of the states by no means ended with the Peace of Paris, and the expedient of resorting to paper money to overcome them proved irresistible. Seven states issued paper money in 1786, when the economic depression was at its worst. But confiscation seemed intolerable to many when the necessity of war was removed. 'They are determined,' wrote General Knox to Washington, 'to annihilate all debts, public and private, and have agrarian laws, which are easily effected by the means of unfunded paper money.' In order to overcome the opposition of the property-owning and creditor classes, the states were forced to resort to extreme measures. North Carolina purchased tobacco from the farmers at double the specie value. In Charleston young radicals formed the Hint Club, which made a practice of sending sections of rope to planters who would not receive state paper for their rice. Rhode Island, where the debtors put through their whole program, furnished an example of what the gentlemen might expect elsewhere. The state lent large sums of paper money to landowners, and forced it on others by heavy penalties.[7] If a creditor refused to accept state paper to the face value of his due, the debtor could discharge his obligation by depositing the currency with the nearest judge. Of course the merchants shut up shop and fled the state to escape purchasers, as did hundreds of harassed creditors, pursued by implacable debtors seeking to make the legal proffer of paper money. But before the New England farmers had time to learn this economic lesson, civil war broke out in Massachusetts.

In that state the case of the farmers was really deplorable, and they lacked the political power to obtain relief. Farm produce was a glut on the market, owing to the stoppage of West India trade, and taxes were heavier than elsewhere. The commercial interests, having rigged the state constitution, had succeeded in shifting the weight of taxation onto land and polls — the latter accounting for no less than 40 per cent of the entire taxes. Courts were clogged with suits for debt, the cost of justice was exorbitant, and lawyers were more grasping than usual. All through the summer of 1786 popular conventions and town meetings demanded reform in the state administration, the removal of the capital from Boston, and an issue of fiat money as in Rhode Island. One petition read: —

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[7] The attempt of the state to enforce its paper money laws by substituting summary trial by judges for a jury trial, led to the famous case of Trevett *v.* Weeden, 1786. In this case the Court boldly declared the state law unconstitutional, null and void.

> ' We beg leave to informe your Honours that unless something takes place more favourable to the people, in a little time att least, one half of our inhabitants in our oppinion will become banckerupt . . . Sutes att law are very numerous and the atturneys in our oppinion very extravigent and oppressive in their demands. And when we compute the taxes laid upon us the five preceding years: the state and county, town and class taxes, the amount is equil to what our farms will rent for. Sirs, in this situation what have we to live on — no money to be had; our estates dayly posted and sold, as above described. . . . Suerly your honours are not strangers to the distresses of the people but doe know that many of our good inhabitants are now confined in gole for det and for taxes; many have fled, others wishing to flee to the State of New York or some other State.'

No relief, however, was to be had from the legislature. That body, dominated by the conservative propertied and creditor interests of the state, was deaf to all petitions and complaints, and even Sam Adams, grown cautious with age, denounced the unhappy farmers as ' wicked and unprincipled men.' The process of distraining upon cattle and land for the debts and accumulated taxes of five lean years went rigorously on. That many of the yeomen, facing a debtor's prison and loss of ancestral farms, resorted to violence is not so surprising as the sense of law and order that prevented the majority of sufferers from following them.

In the autumn of 1786 mobs of farmers, under the somewhat unwilling lead of a former army captain, Daniel Shays, began forcibly to prevent the county courts from sitting. The object of the leaders appears to have been to prevent further judgments for debt, pending the next state election. They met with stout resistance from the state government. John Hancock, scenting trouble, had retired from the governorship; his successor, James Bowdoin, was a tough-minded merchant who kept the legislature firm. The mobs were ordered to disperse, the leaders declared outlaw, and a price placed upon their heads. Shays and his comrades then resolved to become rebels indeed. For a few days there was danger that the state government might be besieged in Boston by an infuriated yeomanry, as had happened to the last royal government in 1775. But the rebels lacked firearms, and their attempt to capture the federal arsenal at Springfield was repulsed with grape-shot. Loyal militia, financed by forced contributions of merchants, was set in motion from the eastern counties, and college boys formed a cavalry regiment to terrify the country folk. The rebel bands, armed for the most part with staves and pitchforks, were scattered into the barren hills of central Massachusetts, where they were hunted in the heavy snow like game. Many fled to the Western wilderness; cold and hunger forced the remnant to surrender. There was a threat of inflicting the death penalty on the leaders, but wiser counsels prevailed, and a general amnesty was finally granted to all those concerned in the rebellion. Only after the uprising had been crushed did the legislature consider the justice of the grievances which had caused it, and take steps to remedy them.

So ended Shays's rebellion. Its effects went deeper than any event since the Boston tea-party. Unlawful force was discredited, and a government based on rebellion showed that it could deal with rebellion. But how narrow had been the escape from civil war, if indeed it were an escape. 'There are combustibles in every State which a spark might set fire to,' wrote Washington. 'I feel infinitely more than I can express for the disorders which have arisen. Good God! Who besides a Tory could have foreseen, or a Briton have predicted them?'

Some conservatives turned in despair to monarchy. The President of Congress even sounded Prince Henry of Prussia whether he would accept an American throne. Others learned their lesson from the powerlessness of the Confederation even to protect its own property, much less to help a state in distress. Out of it all came an emotional surge — without which nothing great can be accomplished in America — towards a new Federal Constitution.

VIII

THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION

1. *The Federal Convention*

WHILE Shays's rebellion was at its height, the advocates of strong government managed to turn another movement into that channel. Owing to disputes over the navigation of the Potomac, Madison induced the Virginia legislature to propose an interstate convention, to adopt a uniform system of commercial regulation. This convention met at Annapolis, Maryland, in September 1786. Delegates from only five states were present, but among them were Washington, Madison, and Hamilton. The last-named induced his colleagues to report that commerce was too much bound up with other questions, and the situation too serious, to be dealt with by so unrepresentative a body as themselves. They recommended a general convention of all the states 'to take into consideration the situation of the United States, to devise such further provisions as shall appear to them necessary to render the constitution of the federal goverment adequate to the exigencies of the Union, and to report such an act as . . . will effectually provide for the same.' Thus prompted, the Congress of the Confederation, on 21 February 1787, invited the several states to send delegates to a convention at Philadelphia on 14 May, 'for the sole and express purpose of revising the Articles of Confederation.' So the Annapolis Convention, under the clever guidance of Hamilton and Madison, became a stalking horse for a Federal Constitutional Convention.

The story of the Federal Convention is the story of solving the problems of imperial order and of domestic disorder. Of these the first was fundamental, the second temporary. A confederacy of coequal, sovereign states had been tried and found wanting. Since 1777 the gruelling experiences of the war and the years after had persuaded many more people to allow a central government a larger share in the distribution of powers, and they were more ready to consider the problem candidly and without prejudice. It was not, however, a mere technical question of political science. As the great authority Dr. Andrew C. McLaughlin has written:

> ' Supposing that the cleverest adjustment of powers, the most accurate assignment of authority, was at last discovered, what security could there be that the states would regard the system, play their parts, and abide by their obligations? Could any method be found for making certain the observance of the Articles of Union, for making certain the power of the central authority to perform the duties bestowed upon it? Could this be done without destroying the states as political entities or reducing them to mere districts? That was a question that might well have confused the clearest brain of the time; no more delicate and intricate problem in practical politics and statecraft ever confronted a thinking people. If a system could be found which did not involve the destruction of the states, which preserved an equitable distribution of authority between the centre and the parts, the great problem of imperial organization had found a solution. If this could be done, America would make one of the greatest contributions ever made by a nation to the theory and practice of government." [1]

It was an assembly of notables that met in the State House at Philadelphia in May 1787 as the Federal Convention. The legislatures sent the best men of their respective states: leaders with ample experience in colonial and state governments, in Congress, on the bench and in the field. The delegation from Virginia was particularly brilliant. George Washington, although doubtful of changing the prevailing popular temper, consented to serve and was unanimously chosen president of the Convention. James Madison, who at the age of thirty-six had a ripe knowledge of political theory and practice, came prepared with a study of ancient and modern confederacies — a study fruitful in lessons of what to avoid. George Wythe, the law tutor of Jefferson and Marshall at William and Mary College and one of the greatest lawyers of his generation; George Mason, author of the Virginia Declaration of Rights; and Governor Edmund Randolph, were also of the delegation from the Old Dominion.

North Carolina sent ' respectable characters ' rather than ' brilliant luminaries,' but South Carolina shone with General Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, his young cousin Charles Pinckney, John Rutledge, and Pierce Butler, the one of ancient Irish family, the other Irish born. Massachusetts sent Rufus King and Elbridge Gerry, young men of ability and of experience, destined for high office. Yankee shrewdness was represented by Roger Sherman of Connecticut, shoemaker turned judge; Oliver Ellsworth, a future Chief Justice of the United States, and William Johnson, president of Columbia College and a former loyalist. From New York came Alexander Hamilton, just turned thirty, and already famous. The Pennsylvania delegation, led by the aged but still lively Franklin, vied in distinction with that of Virginia. James Wilson, born and educated in Scotland, was the most useful member of the Convention after Madison. Gouverneur Morris, the brilliant debater and keen observer of human weaknesses, and Robert Morris, the English-born financier of the Revolution, represented the same state. John Dickinson, the ' Pennsylvania Farmer ' of 1768 and reluctant revolutionist of 1776, was sent by Delaware. From New Jersey came William Paterson and from Maryland Luther Martin, two eminent lawyers who distinguished themselves as representatives of the interests of small states. Every state but Rhode Island was represented. The total number of delegates who attended was fifty-five, of whom three-quarters had served in Congress and nine were foreign-born. Their average age was forty-two, the youngest, Jonathan Dayton, being 27, and the oldest, Franklin, 81.

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[1] A. C. McLaughlin: *Confederation and Constitution:* 176–7. (Harper & Bros.)

Certain distinguished persons were conspicuously absent. Jefferson was in France; John Adams and Thomas Paine in England. John Hancock, Samuel Adams, and Christopher Gadsden failed to be chosen; Patrick Henry and Willie Jones, political bosses of Virginia and North Carolina, refused election. These were the more radical revolutionary leaders, and their absence helped to give the Constitution its conservative character.

2. *The Convention at Work*

The temper of the Convention, in marked contrast to that of the French Constituent Assembly of 1789, was realistic and objective, rather than idealistic and theoretical. ' Experience must be our only guide. Reason may mislead us,' was the keynote struck by Dickinson. Collectively, the members well represented the political intellect, statesmanship, and great property interests of the country. Luther Martin of Maryland was the only champion of the debtors and small farmers. Most of the members were public creditors, who stood to lose personally by a dissolution of the Union, and to gain by a restoration of public credit; but it would be unjust to attribute their work to property alone, as it is absurd to pronounce them superior to forces that move the best of men. All the members hoped to remedy the proved defects of the Articles of Confederation. A few of them saw that something more was at stake. As Madison said from the floor, 'They were now to decide the fate of republican government.' No fair-minded person can read their debates without wonder that a country of four million people could produce men of such intellect, common sense, and enlightened vision.

The Convention had been authorized merely to draft amendments to the Articles of Confederation. But events at the beginning gave nationalists like Madison and Wilson, who wished to scrap the Articles, a start over those who thought that tinkering would suffice. The nationalists, or large-state party as they came to be called, had quietly organized their forces even before the Convention opened, and on 29 May, Randolph presented the result of their joint efforts — the Virginia or large-state plan. This plan, foreshadowing the stronger government that was subsequently adopted, became the first basis of discussion. It provided a 'National Executive,' a 'National Judiciary,' and a 'National Legislature' of two branches, with members apportioned according to population, empowered 'to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent.' As for the basic question of how the states could be persuaded to abide by these Articles of Union, the Virginia plan offered three solutions: an oath of office, a negative on all state laws contravening the Constitution, and power to call forth the forces of the Union to coerce recalcitrant states. All this was not essentially different from the methods that prevailed under the British connection. A negative on state laws was no better than the practice of disallowance by the Privy Council, and the power to coerce a state was little improvement on the Coercive Acts of 1774. The Virginia plan did not begin to get at the root of the problem of maintaining a federal state.

For two weeks the Convention developed the Virginia plan in committee of the whole, when William Paterson presented a counter-project, the New Jersey or small-state plan, containing almost every feature of the Articles of Confederation that made for weakness and uncertainty. A single legislative body in which each state was equally represented, and whose acts were to be enforced by armed coercion of the states, was the central feature of this plan. Yet it did contain one clause of far-reaching importance, which in a modified form became the key clause of the Federal Constitution. 'All Acts of the United States in Congress made in pursuance of the powers hereby and by the articles of confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made and ratified under the authority of the United States shall be the supreme law of the respective States . . . and the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby in their decisions, anything in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding.' Here we see the germ of the doctrine that the Constitution is supreme law, that acts contrary to it are void, and that the courts are the proper agents to enforce it.

To this New Jersey plan the smaller states rallied. Some of their delegates preferred the Virginia plan, but thought it too 'high-mounted' for popular acceptance; others were influenced by the fact that their states enjoyed equality with the larger ones in the Congress of the Confederation, and did not propose to give up that privilege. This division between large and small states, which threatened time and again to wreck the work of the Convention, was most unfortunate because it rested upon prejudice rather than logic. There was no natural antagonism between the interests of large and of small states as such — between Pennsylvania and New Jersey, or Virginia and Maryland. The real divisions of interest in the country were sectional and economic in character: divisions between North and South or East and West, between the commercial and the agrarian interests, the creditor and the debtor. But as Hamilton remarked in the acrimonious debate that followed the introduction of the small-state plan, 'It is a contest for power, not for liberty.' Washington is said to have replied to the argument of expediency, 'If to please the people, we offer what we ourselves disapprove, how can we afterwards defend our work? Let us raise a standard to which the wise and the honest can repair. The event is in the hands of God.'

By using their superior voting power the large states were able to shelve the New Jersey plan, and make that of Virginia again the order of the day. But the small states' delegates were unappeased. July brought hot weather, bad temper, and deadlock. Even Franklin the sceptic could only suggest that the sessions be opened henceforth with prayer. Fortunately the large states met the small half way. After all it was not the best possible constitution that must be drafted, but the best that the people would be likely to accept. The same practical consideration ruled out Hamilton's plan for a centralized, unitary constitution that would leave the states mere subordinate corporations — a plan that revealed how completely Hamilton failed to grasp the value of federalism.

The deadlock was finally broken by the appointment of a grand committee of one member from each state to deal with the vexatious problem of representation. This committee finally brought in a report distinctly favorable to the small states — known as the Connecticut or Great Compromise. By the terms of this compromise every state was conceded an equal vote in the Senate irrespective of size, but representation in the House was to be on the basis of the 'federal ratio' — an enumeration of the free population plus three-fifths of the slaves. At the same time it was provided that all money bills should originate in the popularly elected House of Representatives.

The alignment of large against small states then dissolved; but almost every question raised new parties and was resolved only by a new compromise. State delegations were not even united within themselves. Certain members wished no branch of the federal government to be popularly elected, whilst others, like Wilson, thought that the 'federal pyramid' must be given as broad a basis as possible in order that it might be 'raised to a considerable altitude.' In the end the qualifications for voting for the House of Representatives had to be left to each state to decide for itself. Gouverneur Morris struggled by means not wholly fair to exclude the growing West from statehood, arguing that 'The busy haunts of men, not the remote wilderness, was the proper school of political talents. If the Western people get the power into their hands they will ruin the Atlantic interests.' Fortunately others like Wilson and Mason had a vision of future expansion, and eventually Congress was given full discretion in the matter. There was no serious difference of opinion on such economic questions as paper money and the security of property; but a split between the planting and the commercial interests was recorded in a compromise by which export taxes were forbidden, as an exception to the federal power to regulate commerce. The fear of the Southern States lest they be kept permanently in a minority, as they were by the estimated population in 1787, brought the requirement of a decennial census as a basis for reapportionment of the House. Southerners also feared lest a Northern majority, using the commerce-regulating power of

Congress, might pass a Navigation Act more galling than the old Acts of Trade; they consented to that power only when the Northern States agreed not to touch the slave trade for twenty years.

During sixteen weeks the Convention held sessions every weekday, except when it adjourned for committees to catch up; it was practically continuously at work. Finally the Constitution was entrusted to a Committee on Style, with the brilliant if reactionary Gouverneur Morris as chairman, and here a number of significant changes were made. At length, on 17 September 1787, the finished Constitution was engrossed and signed 'By unanimous consent of the States present.' As Washington arose from his armchair inscribed with a gilded half-sun the venerable Franklin observed:

> 'I have often and often in the course of this session, and the vicissitudes of my hopes and fears as to its issue, looked at that . . . without being able to tell whether it was rising or setting; but now at length I have the happiness to know that it is a rising and not a setting sun.'

The Constitutional Convention was over. The members 'adjourned to the City Tavern, dined together, and took a cordial leave of each other.' Yet the crucial part of the struggle for a more perfect union had not begun. For the document upon which the Federal Convention had expended so much thought and labor required the consent of popularly elected conventions in at least nine states, to become a constitution.

3. *The Federal Constitution*

The Federal Constitution it has always been called, and the organism that it created is still known as the Federal Government. This term was used advisedly, in order to spare current susceptibilities against a consolidated national government; but according to the accepted meaning of a *federal* government in 1787, a league resting upon the good faith of the parties, it was somewhat misleading. For the essence of the Constitution, and a secret of its success, was the complete and compulsive operation of the central government upon the individual citizen. It was carefully discussed whether the new government, like the old, should depend upon the sanction of state governments, and, in the last resort, upon the coercion of sovereign states by force of arms; or whether the federal government should create its own sanctions, enforce them by its own courts and officials, and, in the last resort, by the coercion of individuals. The latter system, which Ellsworth called the coercion of law, was finally adopted.

> Congress shall have power . . . to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the . . . powers vested for this Constitution in the Government of the United States.' (Art. I Sec. 8.)
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> This Constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. (Art. VI.)

But these state authorities are only auxiliary to the federal judiciary, which has jurisdiction over 'all cases, in law or equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made . . . under their authority.' Further, Congress has power 'to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union.' The President 'shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed,' and he is commander-in-chief of the army and navy; while all officials, federal and state, are required to take an oath to support the Constitution.

These are the central clauses of the Constitution. They went far to solve the more perplexing problems of the period since the war. They grew out of the cumulative experience of these years, and emerged in their present form from the debates in the Convention over the New Jersey plan. They provide the Federal government with means for a peaceful enforcement of its laws in normal times, and for coercion of organized law-breaking in abnormal times. The Congress of the Confederation, in contrast, had been powerless to enforce its law on the people of a recalcitrant state. That a great Civil War occurred in spite of these provisions is true; but it is no less certain that without them the Federal government would have been successfully defied by several states before the Constitution had been in effect a generation.

Yet the Constitution is not a national one, for the government it creates lacks complete sovereign power. It is a government supreme within its sphere, but that sphere is defined and limited. As the tenth amendment made clear in 1791, 'the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the

States, are reserved to the States respectively or to the people,' and the supremacy of federal laws is limited to such as 'shall be made in pursuance of the Constitution.' The states are co-equally supreme within their sphere; in no legal sense are they subordinate corporations. Both governments rest on the same broad bottom of popular sovereignty. And although the scope of federal power has been widely extended by amendment, by implication, and by judicial interpretation, so has that of the states so that even in the twentieth century, the American citizen comes more frequently in contact with his state than with his Federal government. To the states belong, not by virtue of the Federal Constitution but of their own sovereign power, the control of municipal and local government, factory and labor legislation, the chartering of corporations, the statutory development and judicial administration of civil and criminal law, the supervision of religious bodies, the control of education, and the general 'police power' over the health, safety, and welfare of the people. And the Federal Constitution cannot be amended without the consent of three-fourths of the states.

Article IV of the Constitution, copied almost word for word from the Articles of Confederation, has an international flavor. Each state shall give 'full faith and credit' to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of its sister states, shall extend to their citizens every privilege of their own, shall extradite criminals and return fugitive slaves. The United States guarantees to every state its territorial integrity, a republican form of government, and protection against invasion or domestic violence — another reflection of Shays's Rebellion. The Supreme Court is open to interstate boundary and other controversies and has appellate jurisdiction over disputes between citizens of different states. As the Supreme Court later held, 'For all national purposes embraced by the Federal Constitution, the States and the citizens thereof are one, united under the same sovereign authority, and governed by the same laws. In all other respects the States are necessarily foreign to and independent of each other.'

In conferring powers on the new government, the Convention included all those of the Confederation, such as the conduct of war and foreign and Indian relations, posts, coinage, fixing the standards of weights and measures, and administering the western territory. To these were added the taxing power within certain limits;

a general supervision over state militia; copyright, patent, naturalization, and bankruptcy laws; and the regulation of foreign and interstate commerce. The power to pass all necessary and proper laws for executing these defined powers rendered the Federal government sufficiently elastic to meet the needs of later generations, and of a greatly expanded body politic. Between the powers expressly or implicitly granted to the Federal government, and those reserved to the states, is a sphere of possible governmental action in which the lines between federal power, state power, and concurrent power have as yet been merely pricked out by decisions of the Supreme Court.

Madison thus concludes his analysis of the nature of the new Constitution:

> 'The proposed Constitution . . . is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal not national; and finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.'

Thus almost without knowing it, the framers of the Constitution had realized the principle that they believed to be implicit in the constitution of the British Empire, and that they had maintained so boldly in face of the counter-theory of parliamentary sovereignty and centralization. They proved that federalism and nationalism were not mutually exclusive terms; they gave a new meaning and value to the federal principle; they made the most successful reconciliation in modern history between liberty and empire.

4. *The Frame of Government*

'Let the government be as the materials be.' This wise advice of a pilgrim father was followed by the Convention, in erecting its frame of government. Colonial or state forms to which the people were habituated were used wherever possible. Instead of the parliamentary system, which the British Dominions have preferred, the Convention of 1787 adopted a system immediately derived from state constitutions, and ultimately from the colonial charters and joint-stock trading corporations of the sixteenth century: a legislature and executive elected at stated intervals, and responsible to the same authority, the freemen. Practically every feature of the Federal Constitution was ultimately of English origin, in the same sense that the British Constitution is of Norman and Germanic origin; but there is hardly a clause in it which cannot be traced to state constitutions or to colonial practice. Yet in its grand outlines, in the distribution of powers between central and local governments that is the essential characteristic of a federal system, the Constitution follows the unwritten constitution of the British Empire as it was prior to 1763. The same general powers that were exercised by Parliament in the empire were now granted to the central government; the same local jurisdiction that was allocated to the colonies, was now reserved to the states.

The principle of separation of powers, familiar in most of the colonial governments, had become explicit in the minds of Americans who read Montesquieu's *Spirit of Laws*. This doctrine had already found expression in all of the state constitutions; its incorporation into the Federal Constitution was but another indication of that profound fear of governmental tyranny that was so characteristic of Americans of that generation.

The two-year term of the House of Representatives was a compromise between the current American practice of annual elections and the four-year presidential term; the six-year term of the Senators, expiring biennially by thirds, was meant to be a brake on the will of the people. Compared with other legislative chambers, the Senate has a very small membership: 22 in 1789, gradually increasing to 96 in 1913. Until then the members were chosen by their state legislatures. As Madison said, 'the Senate is admirably organized to protect the minority of the opulent against the majority' and 'to secure the permanent interests of the country against innovation.' Dickinson hoped it would bear 'as strong a likeness to the British House of Lords as possible.' But the Senate has become a much more powerful chamber than the Lords, by virtue of its co-equal legislative power with the House, and its share in the President's powers of appointment and treaty-making. The two-thirds requirement for ratifying treaties, which caused such dismay in Europe not long since, was a relic of the Articles of Confederation, retained for fear lest the interests of one section of the country be sacrificed to those of another, as John Jay had recently done in his negotiation with Spain. Madison attempted to procure an exception in favor of treaties of peace, but was overruled.

Apart from the federal judiciary, the office of President was the boldest feature of the new Constitution; for there was a strong popular prejudice against one-man power. Most of the states had a mere figurehead of a governor, chosen by the legislature; but the example of Massachusetts, where a strong and popularly elected chief magistrate had put down rebellion, encouraged the Convention to clothe the President with ample powers. He is not only the responsible head of the executive and administrative branches, but supreme war chief and, by virtue of his suspensive veto over acts of Congress, a part of the legislative as well. He is not hampered by a council, although the Senate shares his appointing and treaty-making powers. He is responsible only to the people. It has often been said that the President of the United States is a republican monarch and a monarchical premier rolled into one; but the comparison is inexact. He is more independent of the legislative power than either, but Congress is independent of him. He cannot dissolve Congress and can adjourn it only in case of disagreement between House and Senate as to the time, which has never occurred. The state authorities issue writs of election for the House of Representatives every two years, and the Constitution requires Congress to assemble every December.

The executive department gave the Constitutional Convention more trouble than any other part of the Constitution. Questions of powers, qualifications, term of office, mode of election, relations with the other departments and the like, inspired prolonged debates, and were settled in most instances by compromise. The method of electing the President was particularly perplexing. It was finally provided that each state legislature should choose or cause to be chosen, quadrennially, a number of presidential electors equal to its whole representation in House and Senate. The presidential electors of every state form the electoral college, though each state group meets separately. It was expected that the presidential electors would nominate a number of 'favorite sons,' and that the election would consequently devolve upon the House 'nineteen times out of twenty'; but the two-party system has allowed this to happen but once, in 1825. Political parties have made the nominations since 1792, and the presidential electors merely register the will of the state pluralities. That they should do so is now an unwritten convention quite as strong as any provision of the written Constitution; and although some state legislatures appointed presidential electors as late as 1860, a popular vote has become the accepted and universal method. It is interesting to note that in this one department of the government where the Federal Convention was largely without experience to guide it, it created a clumsy system which had to be supplemented by the Twelfth Amendment and by the intervention of political parties.

Besides the powers taken from the states and granted exclusively to the Federal government, they are forbidden by Article I, section x, to exercise certain powers, such as the issue of paper money, or the passage of laws impairing the obligation of contracts, a prohibition which the Supreme Court under Marshall construed very strictly. By forbidding the states to levy import or export duties, the United States became a free-trade area, eventually the largest and most populous in the world.

The Convention decided to submit its work for ratification to popularly elected state conventions, rather than to state legislatures, in order to give the Constitution a broad bottom of popular consent. Further, the Federal Convention made a clean-cut, revolutionary breach with the Confederation by declaring that the Constitution would be in force when ratified by nine of the thirteen states.

5. *Ratification*

In September 1787, when the Convention adjourned, the prospect of ratification seemed dark indeed. Mason, Randolph, and Gerry refused to sign the finished Constitution, while Lansing and Yates of New York and Martin and Mercer of Maryland had already left the Convention and were urging their states to reject its handiwork. Popular governors like George Clinton, Patrick Henry, and Willie Jones were certain to whip up local patriotism against the loss of state power. Debtors and paper-money advocates were furious with the Convention. The Constitution flouted such catchwords as rotation in office, annual elections, and legislative supremacy, while the absence of a bill of rights caused profound misgivings among democrats everywhere. For many, it was enough to condemn the Constitution that it granted more power to President and Congress than King and Parliament had ever exercised over the

Thirteen Colonies. It was a generation that had been taught to view all government, and especially a centralized, distant, and powerful government, with fear and suspicion. The idea of state sovereignty was generally accepted and particularism was rampant. William Pierce of Georgia observed, ‘Some will oppose it from pride, some from self interest, some from ignorance, but the greater number will be of that class who will oppose it from a dread of its swallowing up the individuality of the States.’

The Federalists, as the protagonists of the Constitution tactfully called themselves, could count on the support of merchants and the seaport towns, public creditors, speculators in western lands, officers of the late army, the pulpit, and most of the press. It was an inestimable advantage that Washington consented to stand for the Presidency. *The Federalist* papers written by Hamilton, Madison, and Jay were first in permanent value of thousands of editorials, pamphlets, and handbills that were issued to persuade the doubtful, and enlighten the ignorant. The Federalists, too, could appeal to popular prejudice; the instinct for law and order so recently aroused against Shays's Rebellion, the fear of anarchy, and the latent spirit of American nationalism. Their most powerful argument was to contrast the impotence of the Confederation against British seapower and Spanish intrigue with the means for a vigorous foreign policy that the Constitution afforded. It is significant that both the French minister and the British consuls at New York and Philadelphia were unfriendly to the new Constitution, fearing lest it enable the United States to become the leading American power.

Unless the Federalists had been shrewd in manipulation as they were sound in theory, their arguments could not have prevailed. In Pennsylvania they rushed through the election of a state convention before the Anti-federalists had time to stir up their natural supporters, the German farmers and Scotch-Irish frontiersmen. Pennsylvania, accordingly, ratified on 18 December 1787. Several of the smaller states, grateful for an equal vote in the Senate, adhered shortly after. Massachusetts suffered the first sharp contest. There was an Anti-federalist majority in the state convention when it met at Boston. The spirit of Shays's Rebellion was still abroad in that state, and ‘Many of the insurgents are in the Convention, even some of Shays's officers,’ wrote General Lincoln to Washington. The note of opposition was struck by Amos Singletary:

> 'These lawyers, and men of learning and moneyed men, that talk so finely, and gloss over matters so smoothly, to make us poor illiterate people swallow down the pill, expect to get into Congress themselves; they expect to be managers of this Constitution, and get all the power and all the money into their own hands, and then they will swallow up all us little folks like the great *Leviathan;* yes, just as the whale swallowed up *Jonah!*'

In order to meet the popular objection to the lack of a bill of rights, the Massachusetts Federalists drafted one which their commonwealth, in ratifying the Constitution, might propose to her sister states for adoption by subsequent amendment. This clever device won many of the waverers here and helped the Federalist cause elsewhere. Governor Hancock, who was waiting to see which way the cat would jump, had the Vice-Presidency dangled before his expectant gaze. Doubtful members from the rural districts were plied with flattering hospitality and converted by persuasive eloquence. Finally the Massachusetts convention ratified the Constitution by a margin of 19 votes in 355. Maryland followed, despite the efforts of Samuel Chase and Luther Martin, and South Carolina fell into line. By the end of May 1788, eight states had ratified; but the key states of Virginia and New York were still to be heard from.

In no state was the event so doubtful, or the discussion so able as in Virginia. Here, alone in all the states, the Constitution received a thorough and searching analysis; here alone its merits were fully revealed, its defects candidly exposed. Here alone the opposition leaders were able to meet the Federalists on equal terms: Patrick Henry, George Mason, Benjamin Harrison, James Monroe, and Richard Henry Lee were fully able to hold their own against Madison, Marshall, Pendleton, and Wythe. Mason presented the state convention with a reasoned Anti-federalist view; Henry, the greatest American orator of the day, thundered against the Constitution as undemocratic, tuned its every clause with local or popular prejudice, and conjured up a horrid spectacle of the President sallying forth at the head of his army to 'make one bold push for the American throne.' Madison, John Marshall, and 'Light-horse Harry' Lee replied; but it is doubtful whether their arguments would have been convincing had they not previously made sure of Governor Randolph. That weak and vacillating member of an ancient family was the most popular Virginian after Henry. In the Federal Convention he split with Madison, and refused to sign the Constitution on the ground that it would lead to monarchy or aristocracy. Washington and Madison, however, won him back to Federalism before the state conventions met; and his skillful advocacy of the Constitution in that body carried weight. The sectional divisions of Virginia also counted heavily in the decision. The Piedmont, where Patrick Henry's influence was strong and the planters were heavily in debt, mustered very few votes for the Constitution; but the Tidewater on general conservative principles was for it, and the Shenandoah valley Presbyterians, though still in a frontier stage of culture, were so eager for free interstate trade, for more equable taxation, and for a prompt execution of the treaty of peace, that they cast a unanimous vote for ratification. Virginia, therefore, was an exception to the generalization that the Constitution was carried by upper class and seaboard against interior and West. In the Old Dominion it was an alliance of the two ends, 'Tuckahoe' and 'Cohee,' against the middle; and the Federalists had only ten votes to spare out of 168 when the Constitution was adopted, on 25 June 1788.

New Hampshire had come in a few days previously; Virginia made the tenth state, and the Constitution could now go into effect. Yet with New York out of the Union the new nation would be divided in the middle and hopelessly incomplete. In New York, wrote Washington, there was 'more wickedness than ignorance' in Anti-federalism. A determined opposition of the landed interest prolonged the contest another month. Hamilton led the Federalist forces with consummate skill, but it was only after a threat to detach New York City from the rest of the state that the convention finally ratified by a majority of 3 in a total vote of 57. North Carolina and Rhode Island alone remained outside the new Union, which could now well afford to await their pleasure.

The Congress of the Confederation arranged for the first presidential election, declared the new government would begin operations on 4 March 1789, and quietly expired.

On 10 July 1788 the New York *Public Advertiser,* under the heading 'Ship News — Extra' noted the entrance of the good ship *Federal Constitution,* Perpetual Union master, from Elysium. Her cargo included thirteen large parcels of Union, Peace, and Friendship; on her passenger list were Messrs. Flourishing Commerce, Public Faith, and National Energy. Below is noted the clearance of

Old Confederacy, Imbecility master, with a cargo of paper money, legal-tender acts, local prejudices, and seeds of discord; and the total loss with all hands of the sloop *Anarchy,* wrecked on the Rock of Union.

6. *The End of an Era*

The Federal Constitution was the outcome of a twenty-five year contest with the problem of imperial organization: parliamentary sovereignty, rejected by the colonists; dominion status, rejected by the North ministry only to be offered too late in 1778; Articles of Confederation, imperfect and too rigid; over the dead bones of all these solutions rejected or attempted, the Federal Convention worked out a new federal system, a successful distribution of powers between central and local governments, all resting upon popular sovereignty. The creation of this federal system is undoubtedly the greatest original contribution of America to the art and science of government. Republics there had been before, and democracies; but nothing to reconcile liberty and empire over vast areas and disparate interests.

Yet federalism was not the only political contribution of this generation. Vital for the extension of this federal system over wider areas and for adapting it to an expansive people, was the discovery of a new colonial system, in the Northwest Ordinance. Herein was first adopted the policy of treating colonies as equals of the mother country, a policy which enabled the United States to expand from thirteen to forty-eight commonwealths under the same government. And other Western problems were put in the way of solution by the land Ordinance of 1785. The compact theory of government, formulated in the Declaration of Independence, was given concrete shape by the device of a constitutional convention, which made it possible to abolish, alter, or create government by peaceful process.

These — federalism, a new colonial system, and the constitutional convention — were the positive contributions of the Revolutionary era, and mark that period as creative and constructive. Less palpable but no less significant, was the growth of democracy. That would have come without revolution, as in the British dominions and England itself; but the war and the diffusion of power from London to thirteen states, greatly accelerated the process. In 1789, however, the democratic movement was in abeyance. The democratic discontents of 1760–75 had only partially been placated, and, largely for want of effective leadership, had broken out into demands for paper money and other devices which threatened property values. Hence the Federal Constitution put a stopper on those levelling and confiscatory demands of democracy by making contracts sacred, by prohibiting paper money (just as Parliament had done), and by the system of checks and balances which made the satisfaction of an immediate popular will highly improbable.

If democracy found itself checked and hampered by the new government, every liberty compatible with good order was secured. America was very fortunate to achieve political independence without loss of liberty, even without loss of cultural values. There is something cramping to the human spirit in a dependent relation, and it is doubtful whether America could have produced such statesmen as Jefferson, Hamilton, and Madison, or such creative artists as Irving, Poe, Bryant, and Emerson, had it remained a series of colonies. Certain humanitarian reforms, such as the abolition of the slave trade, could now be realized; although independence was the means of giving slavery itself a longer life than in the British Empire. Full scope, too, was given by the Revolution to that business enterprise which has become the leading factor of the United States; the Acts of Trade and Navigation no longer existed for America, her ships were no longer confined to the Atlantic Ocean, and her workmen could never again be told that they might not 'manufacture a lock of wool or a horseshoe or a hobnail.' On the political thought of the western world, the Revolution exerted a tremendous influence. In the words of Lord Acton, 'It was from America that the plain ideas that men ought to mind their own business, and that the nation is responsible to Heaven for the acts of the State — ideas long locked in the breast of solitary thinkers, and hidden among Latin folios — burst like a conqueror upon the world they were destined to transform, under the title of the Rights of Man.'

IX

THE UNITED STATES IN 1790[1]

1. *Generalities*

ONLY twenty-five years since the Stamp Act; only fourteen years since the Thirteen Colonies declared ‘ to a candid world ’ that they were, ‘ and of right ought to be, free and independent States.’ It is already time to take stock, and see what sort of country it was when the Federal Constitution was newly established, and Washington had been President for less than a year.

Much had been said in the debates over the Constitution about the enhanced prestige that it would give to the United States. Official Europe was not impressed. Not that they perceived danger in American republicanism. With Washington's army disbanded, and the navy dismantled, the United States was hardly a feather in the balance of power. Merchants and traders, however, were not so indifferent to the new nation, if it could be called a nation. As a source of raw materials for Europe, the United States was not yet in a class with the West Indies; but for a country of such vast empty spaces, it was an important market. Even with the Mississippi as its western boundary, the United States was equal in area to the British Isles, France, Germany, Spain, and Italy. Less than half this territory had yet come under the effective jurisdiction of the United States or of any state; and the population of four millions, including seven hundred thousand negro slaves, was dispersed over an expanse of coastal plain and upland slightly more extensive than France. But if the trans-Appalachian country were ever settled, it would surely break off from the Thirteen States. So at least believed the few Europeans who gave the matter a thought.

Whatever the future might promise the United States in wealth and power seemed to be denied by political vagaries. America was attempting simultaneously three political experiments, which the accumulated wisdom of Europe deemed likely to fail: independence, republicanism, and federal union. While the British and the Spanish Empires touched the States on three sides, their independence could hardly be maintained without more of that European aid by which it had been won; and an independence so maintained would be only nominal. Republicanism promised instability; and federalism, dissolution. Since the Renaissance, the uniform tendency in Europe had been towards centralized monarchy; federal republics had maintained themselves only in small areas, such as the Netherlands and Switzerland. Most European observers believed that the history of the American Union would be short and stormy.

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[1] We have taken the year 1790, rather than 1789, as the central point of this description, because it was the year of the first federal census, with the first accurate statistics for the United States.

It was still too early to aver that the Americans had conquered the forest. Volney wrote that during his journey in 1796 through the length and breadth of the United States, he scarcely travelled for more than three miles together on open and cleared land. ' Compared with France, the entire country is one vast wood.' Only in southern New England, and the eastern portion of the Middle States, did the cultivated area exceed the woodland; and the clearings became less frequent as one approached the Appalachians.

The larger part of the American people then lived under isolated conditions, but in a land of such plenty that exertion had no attraction for the unambitious. The ocean and its shores yielded plenty of fish; the tidal rivers teemed with salmon, sturgeon, herring, and shad in due season, and the upland streams with trout; every kind of game was plentiful, from quail and raccoon to wild turkey and deer; and at times the flights of wild pigeon darkened the air. Cattle and swine throve on the woodland herbage and mast; Indian corn ripened quickly in the hot summer nights; even sugar could be obtained from the maple, or honey from wild bees. The American of the interior, glutted with nature's bounty and remote from a market, had no immediate incentive to produce much beyond his own actual needs; yet the knowledge that easier life could be had, often pressed him westward to more fertile lands, and a higher scale of living. Hence the note of personal independence that was, and in the main still is, dominant in American life. 'The means of subsistence being so easy in the country,' wrote an English traveller in 1796, ' and their dependence on each other consequently so trifling, that spirit of servility to those above them so prevalent in European manners, is wholly unknown to them; and they pass their lives without any regard to the smiles or the frowns of men in power.'

However independent of those above him the average American might be, he was dependent on those about him for help in harvest, in raising his house-frame, and in illness. In a new country you turn to your neighbors for many offices and functions that, in a riper community, are performed by government or by specialists. Hence the dual nature of the American: individualism and herd instinct, indifference and kindliness. Isolation in American foreign policy is an authentic outcome of community isolation, as are the recent American relief organizations of primitive interdependence.

In 1790 there were only six cities (Philadelphia, New York, Boston, Charleston, Baltimore, and Salem) in the United States with a population of eight thousand or over; and their combined numbers included only three per cent of the total population.[2] Their aspect was not unlike that of provincial towns in Great Britain, for a native American architectural style had not yet been invented. Brick houses in the Georgian style, often detached and surrounded with gardens and shrubbery; inns with capacious yards and stables; shops and stores with overhanging signs; places of worship with graceful spires after Sir Christopher Wren; market houses or city halls of the same style, often placed in the middle of a broad street or square, with arcades to serve as stalls or merchants' exchange; rather tumble-down unpainted wooden houses where the poorer people lived, but hardly one without a bit of garden or yard. Wealth was not a conspicuous feature of the United States in 1790. Almost a century had to elapse before a European could find there anything impressive in the way of shops, mansions, architecture, or high living. Nor was there anything to match the poverty of a European city; and even the slave population of the Carolina rice-fields was less wretched than the contemporary Irish peasant.

The vast mineral resources of the country were practically untouched. Primitive forges and foundries produced from bog-ore and surface deposits small quantities of pig-iron and crude articles of ironmongery; but Americans then imported most of their cutlery and hardware. Agriculture was the main occupation of nine-tenths of the people. Except along the Hudson, practically every farmer was a freeholder. Except among the Pennsylvania Germans and the more enlightened country gentry of the South, the methods of agriculture were incredibly wasteful and primitive, with little sign of the improved culture and implements that were then transforming rural England. Wheat bread was largely an upper-class luxury. Indian corn was the principal food crop, with rye a poor second. Brown ' rye and Injun ' bread, corn-pone or hoe-cake, and hasty-pudding or hominy, with salt pork or codfish, washed down by rum, cider, or whiskey, according to locality, formed the farmer's staple diet from Maine to Georgia. The Marquis of Chastellux, as early as 1780, noted the prevalence of hot biscuits, the bountiful breakfasts of the South, and ' the American custom of drinking coffee with meat, vegetables, or other food.' Frontier conditions still prevailed over the larger part of the ' Old West ' which had been settled within the last fifty years. The houses were commonly log cabins of one or two rooms and a cock-loft; the fields were full of stumps, and acres of dead trees strangled by girdling were a depressing sight to travellers.

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[2] The proportion of urban to rural population did not pass ten per cent until after 1840.

Bad roads were one of the penalties that Americans paid for their dispersed settlement and aversion from taxation. In 1790 the difficulties of communication were so great that a detour of several hundred miles by river and ocean was often preferable to an overland journey of fifty miles. It was almost as difficult to assemble the first Congress of the United States as to convene church councils in the middle ages. There was a main post-road from Wiscasset in Maine to Savannah in Georgia, over which passengers and mails were transported by light open stage-wagons, in approximately so many days as the railway now requires hours. It took twenty-nine days for the news of the Declaration of Independence to reach Charleston from Philadelphia. Bridges were few, even over the rivers and streams that were unfordable; the wooden pile structure across the Charles at Boston was considered an immense feat of engineering. Washington managed to visit almost every state in the Union in his own coach without serious mishap; but he had to choose a season when the roads were passable, and to undergo discomforts and even dangers. Most of the roads were merely wide tracks through the forest, full of rocks and stumps and enormous holes. Many that are marked on the early maps were mere bridle-paths or Indian trails, that would admit no wheeled vehicle. Northern farmers reserved their heavy hauling for winter, when snow made even the worst trace practicable for sledges; whilst upland Southerners got their tobacco to tidewater by pivoting a pair of shafts to a hogshead, and rolling it down on the bilge. Inns were to be found at frequent intervals along the main roads; but they commonly fulfilled the function of neighborhood pot-house better than resting-place for the weary traveller. The food was cheap and plentiful, but meals could be had only at stated hours — as in the largest American hotels within recent memory. A traveller was fortunate to secure a bed to himself, or to arrive on the evening after the sheets were changed. Lieutenant Anburey, late of Burgoyne's army, regretted that he could not safely horsewhip the landlord who overcharged him. He might have fought the landlord, however, with bare fists, and been thought a better man for it.

Now that America has become famous for its sanitation, and for hotels with as many thousand baths as bedrooms, it is worth noting that in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries America impressed European travellers as an uncommonly dirty country. From persons at that time accustomed to London or Paris, this meant a good deal. Even in the larger towns streets were seldom paved and never cleaned, offal was deposited in the docks; and, without wire screens, houses were defenseless against the swarms of flies and other winged pests that summer brought. As no one had yet heard of disease germs, there were intermittent outbreaks of typhoid and yellow fever in the seaports as far north as New Hampshire; and the frontiersmen were racked every summer by malarial fevers and agues, transmitted by mosquitoes. Flower gardens were rare; and the pioneer, regarding trees as enemies, neither spared them nor planted them for purposes of shade. Country farmhouses in the older-settled region were almost invariably of wood, usually unpainted, resembling dingy boxes surrounded by unseemly household litter. Stoutly and honestly built as they were, the colonial houses that have survived long enough to acquire white paint, green blinds, lawns, shrubs, and century-old shade trees, are seen to have both distinction and beauty. In the eighteenth century, however, no one found much to admire in America in the works of man; and few Americans had the taste or leisure to appreciate the rugged grandeur of their mountains and forests, and their majestic rivers, swift rapids, and mighty waterfalls.

The United States of 1790 were not a nation, by any modern standard. Materials of a nation were present, but cohesive force was wanting. An English origin for the bulk of the people made a certain cultural homogeneity; the Maine fisherman could understand the

Georgian planter much more readily than a Kentishman could understand a Yorkshireman, or an Alsatian a Breton. Political institutions, though decentralized, were fairly constant in form through the length and breadth of the land. But there was no tradition of union behind the War of Independence, and it was difficult to discover a common interest upon which union could be built. Most citizens of the United States in 1790, if asked their country or nation, would not have answered American, but Carolinian, Virginian, Pennsylvanian, Jerseyman, New Yorker, or New Englander. A political nexus had been found, but unless a national tradition were soon established, the United States would develop a particularism similar to the states of Germany and Italy. Already the problem was becoming complicated by the formation of settlements on the western waters, beyond the Appalachians. In the meantime, it would require the highest statesmanship to keep the thirteen commonwealths together, so widely did they differ in origin, tradition, religion, and economic interests. The Federal Constitution made it possible; but few observers in 1790 thought it probable.

2. *New England*

In New England, climate, soil, and religion had produced in a century and a half a strongly individualized type, the Yankee, perhaps the most persistent ingredient of the American mixture.

The Yankee was the American Scot; and New England was an eighteenth-century Scotland without the lairds. A severe climate, a grudging soil that had to be cleared of boulders as well as trees, and a stern puritan faith, dictated the four gospels of education, thrift, ingenuity, and righteousness. By necessity rather than choice, the New Englanders had acquired an aptitude for maritime enterprise and trading. They hailed with joy the new and wider opportunities for seafaring opened by freedom from the Acts of Trade. The seamen of Salem had already ventured to the East Indies with much success when Boston, in 1790, celebrated the return of her ship *Columbia,* laden with tea, silk, and porcelain, from a voyage around the world. On her next voyage the *Columbia* sailed up a great river that Vancouver had passed by, gave it her name, and to its banks her flag.

The five New England States were divided, politically, into townships, about thirty square miles on an average, containing from a hundred to several thousand people. Each was a unit for purposes of local government, conducting its own affairs by town meeting and selectmen, supporting common schools by local taxes, and electing annually to the state legislature a representative, whose votes and doings were keenly scrutinized by his constituents. The nucleus of every township was the meeting-house, part town hall, part place of worship, bordering on the village green. Outlying farms, by 1790, in most places outnumbered those with a village house-plot; and the common fields had been divided in severalty, and enclosed by uncemented stone walls. There was plenty of wood to supply the large open fireplaces. Families were large, but estates were seldom divided below a hundred acres; a Yankee farmer hoped to make a scholar or minister out of one son, to provide for a second with a tract of wilderness, and let the rest earn their living by working for hire, going to sea, or learning a trade. Until 1830 or thereabouts the American merchant marine was manned largely by New England lads who were seeking the wherewithal to purchase land and set up housekeeping.

Compact settlement and village life might well have produced in New England a second merry England, but for hardship and puritanism. This latter force had altered its quality without its pervasiveness. Puritanism was less grim than in the seventeenth, less petty than in the nineteenth century. 'Holy days' were still proscribed, and the puritan Sabbath was still observed; but there was plenty of dancing and drinking at rural barn-raisings, or corn-huskings; and on public occasions such as ship-launchings, ordinations, college commencements, and Thanksgiving Day — the puritan substitute for Christmas, which in course of time became an additional day of merry-making. On the whole, living was plain in New England; and the ample, generous tone of new countries was little in evidence. Even in the family of President Adams, we are told, the children were urged to a double portion of hasty-pudding, in order to spare the joint that was to follow. Idleness was the cardinal sin. If a Yankee had nothing else to do, he whittled barrel-bungs from a pine stick, or carved a model of his latest ship; and he usually had much else to do. New England housewives spun, wove, and tailored their woolen garments, and made cloth for sale. Small fulling mills and paper mills were established at the numerous waterfalls; and distilleries in the seaports turned West India molasses into that beverage of grateful memory, New England rum. Wooden ware was made by snow-bound farmers for export to the West Indies; or nails were cut and headed from imported iron rods, at fire-side forges; and in some parts there was a domestic industry of shoemaking. Connecticut, in particular, had attained a nice balance between farming, seafaring, and handicraft, which made the people of that state renowned for steady habits and mechanical ingenuity. Before the century was out, Eli Whitney of New Haven devised the cotton gin and interchangeable parts for firearms: inventions which, for weal or woe, have deeply affected the human race. New England was ripe for an abrupt transition from handicraft to the factory system; but the success of her seafarers, and the facility of emigration, postponed industrial revolution for another generation.

New England puritanism, in later generations, was to blossom into philosophy and belles-lettres; but in 1790 the New England intellect was mainly concerned with politics, and with getting on in the world. In Connecticut a group of 'Hartford wits' was producing Hudibrastic satire, and one dreary epic, Joel Barlow's 'Columbiad.' Noah Webster ventured to controvert the Johnsonian orthography in his American spelling-book of 1783, a prelude to the great dictionary; while at Boston Jedidiah Morse wrote an *American Geography* to supersede the inadequate English works, and in company with other patriotic elders, who wished to prove that the Muses could flourish in a new-world republic, founded the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and the Massachusetts Historical Society.

For a good inside view of New England by an outsider, we are indebted to the South American patriot Francisco de Miranda, who travelled through that region in the summer of 1784. An intelligent member of an old Spanish family, brought up in Carácas and familiar with Spain, Miranda found much in New England that was kindly, pleasant, and in good taste. At New Haven he is taken over Yale College by President Stiles, converses with a classically educated miller who had been a cavalry captain in the late war, and views the famous Blue Laws in the town archives. Proceeding to Wethersfield, he attends Sabbath meeting, and admires the manner in which the psalms and responses are sung by the congregation, trained by a music master. At Windsor, the men are ill-dressed and the women ill-favored, but he enjoys a lively literary conversation with John Trumbull, as well as with the innkeeper. This worthy is discovered reading Rollin's *Ancient History,* and discusses with Miranda the comparative merits of the ancients and the moderns, stoutly maintaining Ben Franklin to be a better man than Aristides. Thence to Middletown, and a boat excursion on the river with General Parsons and other good fellows, drinking copiously of punch 'in pure republican style,' which was probably very different from the present Republican style. Newport he thought justly called the paradise of New England, containing, besides hospitable natives, a large company of ladies and gentlemen from Charleston, S. C., who were already using Newport as a summer resort. The leading lights of Providence, on the other hand, were provincial and vulgar, Commodore Esek Hopkins even insisting that there was no such place as the City of Mexico.

Miranda entered Boston armed with letters of introduction to the 'best people,' whose ladies he found vain, luxurious, and too much given to the use of cosmetics. Boston society was so fast, in that year of post-war extravagance, that he predicted bankruptcy within twenty years. Samuel Adams, however, was still faithful to republican simplicity. After carefully inspecting Harvard College, Miranda reports it better suited to turn out clergymen than intelligent and educated citizens. He visits the studio of the self-taught painter, Edward Savage, and predicts that with a European education his talent will take him far. From Boston, Miranda takes the eastward road to Portsmouth, N. H., and is much impressed by the thrift and prosperity of the North Shore of Massachusetts. 'Liberty inspires such intelligence and industry in these towns . . . that the people out of their slender resources maintain their large families, pay heavy taxes, and live with comfort and taste, a thousand times happier than the proprietors of the rich mines and fertile lands of Mexico, Peru, Buenos Aires, Carácas, and the whole Spanish-American continent.'

The New Englanders were very well satisfied with themselves in 1790, and had reason to be; for they had struck root in a region where nature was not lavish, and produced a homogeneous, cohesive, and happy society. Disorderly as colonists when royal governors attempted to thwart their will, the Yankees quickly passed through the cruder phases of democracy. For another generation the leadership of their clergy, well-to-do merchants, and conservative lawyers would not be successfully challenged. Outside New England, where they were familiar as traders and pedlars, the Yankees were regarded much as Scotchmen then were by the English: often envied, sometimes respected, but generally disliked.

3. *The Middle States*

New York State was not homogeneous in 1790, and was never destined to attain homogeneity. The Dutch ‘Knickerbocker’ families shared a social ascendancy with the descendants of English and Huguenot merchants. There were many villages where Dutch was still spoken, and Albany was still thoroughly Dutch, ruled by mynheers who lived in substantial brick houses with stepped gables. But the Netherlandish element comprised only one-sixth of the three hundred thousand inhabitants of New York State. For the rest, there were Germans in the Mohawk valley and Ulster County; a few families of Sephardic Jews at New York City; an appreciable element of Scotch and Irishmen, and a strong majority of English, among whom the Yankee element was fast increasing.

New York was only the fifth state in population in 1790: a fourfold increase in thirty years made it first in 1820. It was the settlement of the interior that made the difference. In 1790 the inhabited area of New York followed the Hudson river from New York City to Albany, whence one branch of settlement continued up the Mohawk toward Lake Erie, and a thin line of clearings pushed up by Lake George and Lake Champlain, which Burgoyne had found a wilderness. There were also a few islands of settlement such as Cooperstown, where James Fenimore Cooper was cradled in the midst of the former hunting grounds of the Six Nations. Socially, New York was still the most aristocratic of the states, in spite of the extensive confiscation and subdividing of loyalists' estates; for most of the patroons managed to retain their vast properties. One out of every six New York families held slaves in 1790, and nine more years elapsed before gradual emancipation began. The qualifications for voting and for office were high. For a generation the story of New York politics was to be, in the main, a struggle for the prestige and profit of office between the great whig families, struggles waged by the means familiar to English politics of the time. These landlords were wont to improve their fortunes through alliances with mercantile families, with lawyer-statesmen like Hamilton and Rufus King, and by speculation in western land.

New York City owed its prosperity, and its thirty-three thousand inhabitants, to a unique position at the mouth of the Hudson river, the greatest tidal inlet between the St. Lawrence and the Plata. It was the natural gateway to the Iroquois country, which was settled between 1790 and 1820; and in 1825 the Erie Canal, following the lowest watershed between the Atlantic States and the Lakes, made New York City the principal gateway to the West, and the financial center of the Union. The merchants did not need to be so venturesome as those of New England and Baltimore, and they spent more on good living than on churches and schools. They too had a family college — Columbia (late King's); but while Boston was forming learned institutions, and Philadelphia supporting a literary journal and a Philosophical Society, New York was founding the Columbian Order, better known as Tammany Hall. Yet it was in the midst of this wealthy, gay, and somewhat cynical society that Alexander Hamilton reached manhood, and Washington Irving was born.

New Jersey, a farming state of less than 200,000 inhabitants, has been compared with a barrel tapped at both ends by New York and Philadelphia. Travellers along the road between these two cities admired the Jersey apple orchards, the well-cultivated farms, and, at the pleasant village of Princeton, the College of New Jersey whose Nassau Hall, one hundred and eighty feet long and four stories high, was reputed to be the largest building in the Thirteen States. At the falls of the Passaic river, near Newark, an incorporated company had just founded Paterson, the first factory village in America. South of this main road was a region of pine barrens and malarial marshes.

Pennsylvania, the second largest state in the Union, with a population of 435,000, had acquired a certain uniformity in diversity. Her racial heterogeneity, democratic polity, and social structure, ranging from wealthy and sophisticated merchants to the wildest frontiersmen, made Pennsylvania a microcosm of the America to be. Philadelphia, with its evenly spaced and numbered streets crossing at right angles, had been the principal port of immigration for a century previous to 1825; and the boat-shaped, conestoga wagons of the Pennsylvania Dutch needed but slight improvement to become the 'prairie schooner' of westward advance.

Pennsylvania was still in the throes of democratic experiments. Her radical state constitution, with a unicameral legislature and a plural executive, had become notoriously factious and incompetent. In 1791 a new constitution with a bi-cameral legislature was adopted, but manhood suffrage was retained; and this laid a firm foundation for subsequent democratization of Pennsylvania.

Philadelphia, admirably situated at the junction of the Delaware and Schuylkill rivers, and with a population of 45,000 in 1790, was easily the first city in the United States for commerce, architecture, and culture. During the next ten years it was the seat of the Federal government and of a more brilliant republican court than the city of Washington was to show for a century to come. Owing largely to Quaker influence, Philadelphia was well provided with penal, charitable, and educational institutions which European philosophers regarded as model; and they greatly prized membership in Franklin's foundation, the American Philosophical Society. It was here ' by Delaware's green banks ' that Tom Moore in 1804 found Dennie and Ingersoll and Brockden Brown, but for whom

Columbia's days were done,
Rank without ripeness, quickened without sun.

These ' sacred few ' were producing pallid imitations of the *Spectator,* dreary tragedies of medieval Europe, novels of mystery and horror; ignoring the rich color and wilderness flavor of youthful Pennsylvania.

A few miles from Philadelphia one reached the garden spot of eighteenth-century America, a belt of rich limestone soil that crossed the Susquehanna river, and extended into Maryland and the Valley of Virginia. The fortunate inhabitants of this region were reaping huge profits in 1790 by reason of the European crop failures of 1789; and were to prosper still more through the wars that flowed from the French Revolution. ' The whole country is well cultivated,' wrote a Dutch financier who passed through this region in 1794, ' and what forests the farmers keep are stocked with trees of the right kind — chestnut, locust, walnut, maple, white oak. It is a succession of hills, not too high, and the aspect of the country is very beautiful.' Lancaster, with four thousand inhabitants, was the largest inland town in the United States. Here and in the limestone belt, the bulk of the farmers and townspeople were German. They were by far the best husbandmen in America, using a proper rotation, with clover and root crops. Their houses were commonly of stone, and heated by stoves; their fences of stout posts and rails; but what most impressed travellers were the great barns, with huge gable-end doors, through which a loaded wagon could drive on to a wide threshing-floor, flanked by spacious hay-lofts, cattle and sheep pens, and horse stables. The Germans were divided into a number of sects, some of which, like the Amish Mennonites, have retained their quaint costumes and puritanism into the twentieth century. They supported six weekly newspapers in their own language, and were as keen household manufacturers as the Yankees; but Chastellux found them lacking in public spirit, compared with the English-speaking Americans, 'content . . . with being only the spectators of their own wealth,' and with the standards of a German peasant.

Lancaster was the parting point for two streams of westward emigration. One wagon road took a southwesterly direction, crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and entered the Shenandoah valley of Virginia, between the Blue Ridge and the Unakas. The Pittsburgh wagon road struck out northwesterly, crossed the Susquehanna by ford or ferry at Harrisburg (the future capital of Pennsylvania), and followed the beautiful wooded valley of the Juniata to its headwaters. This region was inhabited mainly by Ulstermen, although in the easternmost section they were rapidly being bought out by the more thrifty and land-hungry Germans. North of it, and west of the upper Susquehanna, Pennsylvania was still a mountainous virgin forest. After a long, painful pull up the rocky, rutty wagon road, to an elevation of some 2,500 feet, you attained the Alleghany front, an escarpment from which, by a rolling, densely wooded plateau, you descended westward to where the Alleghany and Monongahela rivers come together to form the Ohio. At this point you reached Pittsburgh, a thriving village in the midst of virgin coal and iron deposits, the most important of three inner gateways to the far West. Already fleets of covered wagons were bringing in settlers destined for Kentucky, and goods to be distributed down the mighty valley of the Ohio and Mississippi.

4. *The South*

Twenty-five miles south of Philadelphia the post-road crossed Mason and Dixon's line,[3] an internal boundary that bulks large in

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[3] Mason and Dixon's line is the parallel lattiude of 39° 43′ 26.3″ between the southwestern corner of Pennsylvania and the arc of a circle of twelve miles' radius drawn from Newcastle (Delaware) as a centre; and along that arc to the Delaware river. Most of it was run in 1763 by two English surveyors named Mason and Dixon, in consequence of Lord Hardwicke's decision, in 1750, of a long-standing controversy between the proprietors of Maryland and Pennsylvania. But there have been interstate controversies about parts of it even in the present century.

American history. Originally drawn to divide Pennsylvania from Delaware and Maryland, in 1790 it was already recognized as the boundary between the farming or commercial, and the plantation states. From 1804 to 1865 it divided the free and the slave states; and even yet it is the boundary of sentiment between North and South.

Delaware, formerly an autonomous portion of the Penn proprietary, was the least populous state of the Union; and apart from the flour-milling regions about Wilmington, a farming community, steadfastly conservative in politics. Maryland, with 320,000 souls, one-third of them slaves, was the northernmost state where slavery was an essential part of the economic system. The old Catholic families, although long since outnumbered by English Protestants, still retained some of the better plantations on both shores of Chesapeake Bay; the Carrolls, of Irish origin, provided the first Roman Catholic bishop in the United States. Maryland produced the best wheat flour in America, and a variety of tobacco chiefly appreciated by the French. The lowland planters were famous for hospitality, and for the various and delicious methods devised by their black cooks for preparing the oysters, soft-shell crabs, terrapin, shad, canvas-back ducks, and other delicacies afforded by Chesapeake Bay. Annapolis, the pleasant and hospitable state capital, had just acquired St. John's College. Later, the town was to be saved from decay by the United States Naval Academy.

Baltimore, a mere village before the War of Independence, was approaching Boston in population. Its deep harbor on Chesapeake Bay, water-driven flour mills, and proximity to wheat-growing regions, made it the metropolis for an important section of Pennsylvania, in preference to Philadelphia. Baltimore was also famous for its beautiful women, one of whom married a Bonaparte (but succeeded in retaining him no longer than the beautiful Creole kept Napoleon), and for its swift schooners, the Baltimore clippers that made excellent privateers and successful pirates. The Maryland Piedmont was much like the limestone belt of Pennsylvania: a rolling corn-land tilled by English and German farmers, with the aid of a few slaves. This region, in combination with Baltimore, neutralized the Tidewater aristocracy, and gradually drew Maryland into the social and economic orbit of the Northern States.

From Baltimore a road that long remained the despair of travellers traversed Maryland to Georgetown, just below the Great Falls of the Potomac. Here, at the head of navigation, the City of Washington was being planned. Crossing the river, one entered the Old Dominion, with a population of 748,000, of which forty per cent were slaves.[4]

Virginia is today but a fragment of the imperial domain that was granted to the Virginia Company in 1606; and less than half the size of the state in 1790. Kentucky was lopped off as a separate state of the Union in 1792, and West Virginia in 1863. But even without Kentucky, Virginia was the most populous, proud, and wealthy American commonwealth.

The Tidewater or coastal plain of Virginia, east of the fall line which passes through Washington, Richmond, and Petersburg, consists of a series of long narrow peninsulas separated by the navigable estuaries of the Potomac, Rappahannock, York, and James rivers. There were no towns excepting Norfolk; and scarcely even a village. County seats were merely a court house, church, and tavern at some convenient cross-roads. Tobacco warehouse-receipts, and bills of exchange on your London merchant, who did your shopping in the metropolis, served as currency. 'Even now,' wrote John Randolph in 1813, 'the old folks talk of "going home to England."'

By 1790 the Tidewater had seen its best days. The state capital had been transferred to Richmond, at the falls of the James; only William and Mary College kept Williamsburg alive. Norfolk was a poor-looking seaport of less than thirty-five hundred people. The forest was reconquering exhausted tobacco fields, the wiser planters were laying down their lands to wheat and grass, and the wisest were emigrating to Kentucky. One of the best plantations of the Virginia Tidewater, Davies Randolph's 'Presqu'ile' at Bermuda Hundred on the James, was described by the Duc de la Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, in 1795. It contained 750 acres, of which 400 were wood and marsh, and 350 were cultivated by eight negroes, two horses, and four oxen. This area was divided into forty-acre fields by the usual Virginia or worm fence, made of split rails, notched near the ends, and intersected in a zigzag pattern in order to dispense with posts. 'No sort of fencing is more expensive or wasteful of timber,' wrote Washington; but those improving farmers who attempted hedges were thwarted by the enterprise of American hogs and cattle. Mr. Randolph used manure on but one of his fields. His system of

[4] Not including the 74,000 in Kentucky (17 per cent slaves).

rotation was corn, oats, wheat, rye, fallow: an improvement over the customary one of corn, wheat, and pasturage, which John Taylor called a scheme of tillage founded in contempt of the earth and terminating in its murder. With a modest average yield of ten to twelve bushels per acre, Presqu'ile brought its owner from $1,800 to $3,500 annually; and he valued the plantation at $20,000. The proportion of labor to acreage was so low that the condition of the land compared 'very indifferently with the most ordinary husbandry of Europe.' Apart from the mansion houses, the appearance of Virginia plantations, with their ill-cultivated fields, straggling fences, and dilapidated negroes' cabins, was slovenly in the extreme. A traveller going south from Pennsylvania looked in vain for tidy agriculture until he reached the rice plantations of South Carolina.

By 1790 the Virginia Piedmont between the fall line and the Blue Ridge, for the most part a fruitful, rolling country, had become the seat of all that was healthy and vigorous in the plantation system. Most of the great Virginia statesmen of the revolutionary and republican eras were either born in this region, to adventurous younger sons of the Tidewater families, or, like Washington, grew to manhood in its wilder margins. The 'First Families of Virginia,' although in few instances related to the county families of England, held the corresponding place in the community. They reproduced the high sense of honor and public spirit of the English aristocracy, and preserved the amenities of English country life. They frequently combined planting with the practice of law, but left trade to their inferiors, commerce to the agents of British mercantile firms, and navigation to the Yankees. Well educated by private tutors, or at schools kept by Scotch clergymen, and sometimes at Princeton or William and Mary; trained to administration by managing their large estates, and to politics by representing their counties in the Virginia Assembly, the planters stepped naturally and gracefully into the leadership of the nation. It was no accident that Jefferson of Virginia drafted the Declaration of Independence, that Washington of Virginia led the army and became the first President, that Madison of Virginia fathered the Federal Constitution, that Marshall of Virginia became the greatest American jurist, and that he and Taylor of Virginia led the two opposing schools of American political thought.

If the proper object of society be to produce and maintain an aristocracy, Virginia had achieved it. If it be to maintain a high general level of comfort and intelligence, she had not. Below the ' first families,' but continually pushing into their level by marriage, was a class of lesser planters, to which Patrick Henry belonged: a class generous and hospitable, but uneducated, provincial, and rude. Below them was an unstable and uneasy class of yeomen, outnumbering the planters in the Piedmont. Descended largely from indentured servants and deported convicts, these peasants, as the gentry called them, were illiterate, ferocious, and quarrelsome. Self-contained plantations, with slave artisans and mechanics, created no demand for skilled white labor, and made small farms unprofitable. Hence the Virginia yeoman had but the alternative of migrating westward, or of becoming ' poor white trash ' despised even by the slaves. It was already doubtful in 1790 that any community could endure half slave and half free; presently it would be doubtful if the nation could thus endure.

In the lowlands the slaves outnumbered the whites; in the Piedmont they comprised about one-third of the total population. They supported the economic system, and contributed much to the quality of Virginia leadership. Jefferson's oft-quoted passage, that ' the whole commerce between master and slave is a perpetual exercise of the most boisterous passions,' can only have applied to new and inexperienced members of the planter class; for the successful management of negroes required tact, patience, forbearance, an even temper, and a sense of humor. Few denied that slavery was a moral evil and a menace to the country. Almost every educated Virginian hoped to make real the opening words of his Bill of Rights ' that all men are by nature free and independent.' But a state whose population was forty per cent black naturally quailed before such a social revolution. Jefferson counted on the young abolitionists that Chancellor Wythe was making in William and Mary College. But in a few years' time the cotton gin gave chattel slavery a new lease of life; and, shortly after Jefferson died, a young professor of William and Mary began to preach the doctrine that negro slavery was justified by history and ordained by God.

As one rode westward across the Virginia Piedmont, with the crest-line of the Blue Ridge looming in the distance, the forest became more dense, the large plantations less numerous, the farms of independent yeomen more frequent, and the cultivation of tobacco gave place to corn and grazing. Between the Blue Ridge and the higher folds of the Appalachians lies the Shenandoah valley peopled as we have seen by Scotch and Germans, and feeling itself a province apart from lowland and Piedmont until 1861. It was here, in Rockingham county, that Abraham Lincoln, grandfather of the President, lived until 1784; and at Staunton in Augusta county, Woodrow Wilson was born in 1856. Still less did the trans-Appalachian part of Virginia, a densely wooded plateau sloping to the upper Ohio, resemble the Virginia of the planters. In 1790 it was a frontier more primitive even than Kentucky. In 1861 it refused to follow the Old Dominion out of the Union, and became the State of West Virginia.

South from Petersburg in Virginia, through a level, sandy country of pine forest, a two days' journey took you to Halifax, one of several petty seaports of North Carolina. This 'tar-heel state' possessed a very different character from its neighbors on either side. Her population was the result of two distinct streams of secondary and fairly recent colonization: Virginia yeomen who settled in the coastal plain; outpourings from the Shenandoah valley into the Piedmont and the Great Smoky mountains. Along the Roanoke river there was an overflow of plantations from Virginia; but the greater part of the coastal plain, a hundred miles or more wide, consisted of pine barrens with soil too sandy for wheat or tobacco, and extensive marshes like the Dismal Swamp. The river mouths were landlocked against vessels drawing above ten feet by the barrier beaches that enclosed Pamlico and Albemarle Sounds. This region, therefore, was sparsely settled, and its chief exports were naval stores: tar, turpentine, and pine timber. President Washington, travelling through it in 1790, found it 'the most barren country he ever beheld,' without 'a single house of an elegant appearance.'

The Piedmont of North Carolina was a thriving region of upland farms, supporting a large population of Germans, Ulstermen, English, and Highland Scotch. There was little communication between coast and Piedmont through the pine barrens, and less sympathy. Petersburg (Virginia) and Charleston (South Carolina) were nearer markets for the upland farmers than the petty ports of their own state. Local particularism was so strong that the legislature abandoned Governor Tryon's 'palace' at Newbern, and became peripatetic. Only by creating a new state capital, at Raleigh on the falls of the Neuse river was it enabled to settle down.

The plantation system never obtained a strong foothold in North Carolina; the state remained a farming democracy, aided by rather than based upon chattel slavery. Among its white population of three hundred thousand in 1790, less than one-third owned slaves; and the proportion was even smaller in 1860.[5] For such a community a democratic polity was natural and inevitable; but without the leaven of popular education, a landlocked region was not apt to make much progress. Honest mediocrity was typical of North Carolina statesmanship from the eighteenth century to the twentieth, when the industrial revolution brought wealth, material progress, and a great enthusiasm for letters and learning.

There was no such dearth of great figures, as we have seen, in South Carolina. The coastal plain of that state has a sub-tropical climate. In Charleston, its only city, the ravages of war were quickly repaired and the gay old life was resumed; in 1790, with a population of sixteen thousand, it was the fourth city in America, and metropolis of the lower South.[6] The more opulent families continued after 1790 to send their sons to Eton, Westminster, and Oxford; or to read law at the Temple. The Rev. Jedidiah Morse in his *American Geography* (1789) wrote, ' In no part of America are the social blessings enjoyed more rationally and liberally than in Charleston. Unaffected hospitality, affability, ease in manners and address, and a disposition to make their guests welcome, easy and pleased with themselves, are characteristics of the respectable people of Charleston.' One can well imagine that stiff Boston Calvinist succumbing to the graceful attentions of a Charleston family, and absorbing Madeira on a spacious verandah overlooking a tropical garden.

The South Carolina planters went to their country houses in November, when the first frosts removed the danger of fever; and took their families back to Charleston for the gay season from January to March. Early spring, a most anxious period in rice culture, was passed in the plantation mansion — shaded by a classic portico, and surrounded by groves of live oaks, hung with Spanish moss. The hot months would be spent at a summer house in the pine hills, or at Newport.

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[5] With a total population of 400,000 in 1790 (one-quarter slave), North Carolina was the fourth state in the Union, just ahead of New York. But North Carolina's interior had already been settled, and New York's had not. New York reached the million mark in 1810; North Carolina only in 1870; in 1920 North Carolina had two and a half millions to New York's ten; and its largest city fell short of fifty thousand.

[6] In 1920 Charleston had only 68,000 inhabitants, but more distinction and flavor than any one of the hundred American cities that exceeded it in size.

Rice, the economic basis of the lower country, required intensive cultivation, along such parts of the tidal rivers as permitted artificial flooding with fresh water. These regions were so unhealthy for white people that black labor, immune from malaria, was a necessity; and in no part of the United States were slaves so numerous. Out of sixteen hundred heads of families in the rural part of the Charleston district, in 1790, thirteen hundred held slaves to the number of forty-three thousand. South Carolina not only prevented an unconstitutional abolition of the African slave trade in the Federal Constitution, but traffic was reopened by state law in 1803.

Indigo culture had been abandoned with the loss of the Parliamentary bounty; but the South Carolina planters, in 1790, were experimenting with the long staple sea-island cotton; and the next year Robert Owen spun into yarn the first two bags of it that were sent to England. The short staple upland cotton, which could be grown inland, was so difficult to separate from its seed as to be unmarketable until after the cotton gin was invented in 1793. One effect of this momentous discovery was to extend the plantation system into the Piedmont, the more populous section. In 1790 the upland people had just won their first victory by transferring the state capital up-country, to Columbia; but the Piedmont was still under-represented in the legislature, and poor men were denied office by high property qualifications. John C. Calhoun, who was destined to weld the South and divide the Union, was a boy of eight in the upper country, in 1790.

Across the Savannah river from South Carolina lay Georgia, which retained few traces of General Oglethorpe's pious experiment. The objects of his benevolence, poor debtors and Scotch highlanders, wedged between hostile Indians on one side and a plantation colony on the other, had led a miserable existence. As soon as the prohibition of rum, slaves, and large holdings was removed, Georgia developed, as had South Carolina, a slave-holding rice coast, a belt of infertile pine barrens, and a rolling, wooded Piedmont of hunters and frontier farmers, who were a mixture of the usual Southern upland stock with Oglethorpe's importations from English jails. Vigorous and lawless, hard drinkers, and dirty fighters, eager to despoil the Creek Indians of their fertile cornfields across the Oconee river, these Georgia 'crackers' gave constant trouble to the Federal government.

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Such, in their broader outlines, were the Thirteen States, and the people thereof, seven years after the war. They were singularly fortunate and happy. Of such a people, so circumstanced, the friends of liberty in Europe had high expectations.

> 'This people,' wrote Turgot in his famous letter of 1778 to Dr. Price, 'is the hope of the human race. It may become the model. It ought to show the world by facts, that men can be free and yet peaceful, and may dispense with the chains in which tyrants and knaves of every colour have presumed to bind them, under pretext of the public good. The Americans should be an example of political, religious, commercial and industrial liberty. The asylum they offer to the oppressed of every nation, the avenue of escape they open, will compel governments to be just and enlightened; and the rest of the world in due time will see through the empty illusions in which policy is conceived. But to obtain these ends for us, America must secure them to herself; and must not become, as so many of your ministerial writers have predicted, a mass of divided powers, contending for territory and trade, cementing the slavery of peoples by their own blood.'

Dr. Price printed Turgot's letter in 1785, together with some hundred pages of his own advice to the young republic. Slavery must be abolished. America must adopt a system of education that will 'teach *how* to think, rather than *what* to think, or to lead into the best way of searching for truth, rather than to instruct in truth itself.' The American States should foster an equal distribution of property; and to this end they must renounce foreign trade, as well as foreign alliances.

> 'The Atlantic must be crossed before they can be attacked. . . . Thus singularly happy, why should they seek connexions with Europe, and expose themselves to the danger of being involved in its quarrels? — What have they to do with its politics? — Is there anything very important to them which they can draw from thence — except *infection?* — indeed, I tremble when I think of that rage for trade which is likely to prevail among them.'

Here is the policy of isolation, laid down in terms that America found too Spartan; and something more than a suggestion of the political system later known as Jeffersonian Democracy. But there was one dominant force in American history that no one foresaw in 1785: the expansive force. With such a prize as the American continent at their back doors, the people of the United States would have been more than human had they been content with a 'state of nature' between the Atlantic and the Appalachians. For a century to come, the subduing of the temperate regions of their continent to the purposes of civilized life was to be the main business of America. In 1790 the boundaries of the United States included eight hundred thousand, in 1860 three million square miles. In 1790 the population was four million; in 1920 one hundred and five million. This folk movement, comparable only with the barbaric invasions of Europe, gives the history of the United States a different quality from that of modern Europe; different even from that of Canada and Australia, by reason of the complete absence of exterior control. The advancing frontier set the rhythm of their society, colored their politics, and rendered more difficult, both in Canada and the United States, the problem of union. Yet, as Turgot warned them, only union could secure the gain and fulfil the promise of the American Revolution.

Thomas Bland Hollis, another English radical who looked to the rising star in the West, wrote to the President of Harvard College in 1788: 'Our papers mention that there is an intention of having the Olympic games revived in America. All her friends wish it and say she is capable of it: having acted upon Greek principles you should have Greek exercises.' Her friends saw no reason why literature and the arts should not spring into new life in a new world, fostered by liberty. One of them, ten years later, recorded with his disappointment the popular excuse: 'We are but a young people — let us grow.' How often has that excuse been repeated, and how constantly has it been true! Grow they did; but not as Rome, neither as Greece. Their astounding expansion was a continuous adventure in pioneering, a constant renewal of the nation's youth through fresh contact with a receding frontier. The American of today, with all his wealth, pride, and power, is still unmistakably young, inexperienced, creative in energy but not in thought.

> 'Trite and rigid bits of morality and religion, with much seemly and antique political lore, remain axiomatic in him, as in the mind of a child . . . he is chiefly occupied with his immediate environment and

> . . . his reactions upon it are inwardly prompted, spontaneous, and full of vivacity and self-trust. His views are not yet lengthened; his will is not yet broken or transformed.'[7]

The frontier has vanished with the wild Indian, and America's youth is waning fast; but it is the story of a youthful people that we are to read; of a people constantly in movement, expanding and upheaving, blithely accepting new forces that were to strain their body politic, and seeking to assimilate them to the democratic principle.

[7] George Santayana, *Character and Opinion in the United States.*

X

ORGANIZING A GOVERNMENT

1789

1. *The Prospect*

WITH their new constitution the Americans challenged their own future. It remained to be seen whether federal and republican government was workable on such a scale, whether local interests would not choke national sentiment, whether the political fabric had the strength to withstand war, or the elasticity for social and territorial growth.

The prospect seemed fair enough, outwardly, on that bright morning of 30 April 1789, when Washington, a picture of splendid manhood, stepped out onto the balcony overlooking Wall Street, New York, and took the oath: 'I do solemnly swear that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.' A clean, new ship of state, under the old, tried master: what more could the patriot desire? Yet many of the commissioned officers were filled with anxious forebodings, and the master himself, on setting out from Mount Vernon to take command, wrote to his future Secretary of War:

> 'My movements to the chair of government will be accompanied by feelings not unlike those of a culprit, who is going to the place of his execution; so unwilling am I, in the evening of a life nearly consumed in public cares, to quit a peaceful abode for an ocean of difficulties, without that competency of political skill, abilities, and inclination, which are necessary to manage the helm. I am sensible that I am embarking the voice of the people, and a good name of my own, on this voyage; but what returns will be made for them, Heaven alone can foretell. Integrity and firmness are all I can promise. These, be the voyage long or short, shall never forsake me, although I may be deserted by all men.'

Let us consider the state of the country in 1789, and the nature of Washington's task. The new Constitution possessed neither tradition nor the backing of organized public opinion. The new government had to create its own machinery. Every revolutionary government of Europe has taken over a corps of functionaries, an administrative system, and a treasury: the American Confederation left nothing but a dozen clerks with their pay in arrears, an empty treasury and a burden of debt. There were no taxes or requisitions coming in, and no machinery for collecting taxes existed. The new Congress quickly imposed a customs tariff; but months elapsed before an administration could be created to collect it, in a loose-jointed country two thousand miles long. Until a federal judiciary could be established, there was no means of enforcing any law. The country itself was just beginning to experience the return of prosperity; but free capital was exceedingly scarce, and Washington, reputed the wealthiest of Americans, had to borrow six hundred pounds from a friend in order to meet the expense of his removal to New York.

Although the Confederation had established a decimal system based on the Spanish dollar, it had as yet coined nothing but copper cents; and its paper money had gone the way that the rouble and the mark have since followed. There were only three banks in the country, and their notes had merely a local circulation. The easiest way to send money from New York to Philadelphia was by bill of exchange on London! Congress might have the right to tax — but dared it attempt what Parliament had failed to achieve? How national credit could be established on a basis such as this, passed all understanding, save that of Alexander Hamilton.

Nor could it even be said that Washington was President of a united country. North Carolina had not ratified the Constitution, and Rhode Island declared she never would do so. Rhode Island, if you please, was the United States; the rest were illegal seceders! Vermont was actually treating at London for recognition as an independent state. England and Spain, as we have seen, controlled spheres of influence on United States territory. A secession movement in the West threatened to split the Union along the crest of the Appalachians. The American army consisted of 672 officers and men; the navy had ceased to exist.

Fortunately, there were saving elements in the situation. In 1789 economic conditions were vastly improved over the panic year of 1786; and by 1790 a time of easy money had returned. Virginia and the Carolinas had recovered their pre-war volume of exports in tobacco, naval stores, and rice. Poor crops in France gave a better market for the corn of the Middle States. The West India trade, mainstay of New England, was doing service once more by 1789. Jamaicans and Barbadians, hampered by the British regulations that lessened their supply of provisions from the Northern States, were helping Yankee shipmasters to smuggle. New markets had been discovered. Northern shipowners, with specie borrowed from English merchant-bankers, were driving a roaring trade in Calcutta and Canton, where the number of American entries, in 1789, was second only to those flying the British flag. All this had been effected by good fortune, enterprise, and individual energy, before the new government came into operation, but the Federalists were quick to claim credit for the tide on which their ship was launched.

The Federal government could count on a good press, and a favorably expectant public opinion. Not that there was any enthusiasm for the Constitution, even among its advocates. Washington, indeed, considered it a hopeful experiment, a 'standard to which the wise and honest might repair,' and Madison was pleased with what was chiefly his handiwork; but Hamilton, in his more cheerful moments, regarded it as a makeshift; and, in bad humor, as a 'frail and worthless fabric.' John Adams believed it would not outlast himself. Every Federalist, however, was determined to do his best for the Constitution, as the sole alternative to anarchy; and the same attitude, to their lasting credit, was taken by the Anti-federalists. Patrick Henry declared, when he recognized his defeat in the Virginia convention: 'I will be a peaceable citizen. My head, my hand, and my heart, shall be at liberty to retrieve the loss of liberty, and remove the defects of that system in a constitutional way.' His party throughout the union showed the same fine spirit of fair play. Consequently the new government had not to reckon with an irreconcilable party. No other fact so well attests the political maturity of the American people.

A federal bill of rights, promptly passed by Congress and ratified by the states, quieted some honest fears of tyranny; but the Anti-federalist type of mind persisted. The habit of considering a government dangerous in direct ratio to its effectiveness was too ingrained to disappear in a decade, or even in a century. Less than three years elapsed before many of the Anti-federalists were again found in opposition; but it was a constitutional opposition.

The Federal Constitution was so flexible and open to varied interpretation that the solution of those difficulties it had been created to overcome depended more upon the precedents created, the traditions inaugurated, and the policy followed during the ensuing years, than upon the actual words of the document. Gouverneur Morris wrote wisely when urging Washington to accept the Presidency:

> 'To continue a well poised political mechanism is the task of no common workman; but to set it in motion requires still greater qualities. When once agoing it will proceed a long time from the original impulse. . . . No constitution is the same on paper and in life. The exercise of authority depends on personal character. . . . Your cool, steady temper is *indispensably necessary* to give firm and manly tone to the new government.'

2. *Pater Patriae*

Washington accepted the Presidency with great reluctance. It had been his hope and wish to spend the remainder of his days at Mount Vernon — not as a simple Virginia gentleman, for Washington was more than that; but as a scientific farmer, improving American husbandry by experiment and example. Washington studied the best works on the subject, corresponded with English experts such as Arthur Young, imported improved implements, and applied new methods. Tobacco culture, which had exhausted the soil of Tidewater Virginia, was relinquished at Mount Vernon as early as 1765. Wheat, flax, and root crops were substituted for corn, pasturage was increased, a five-year rotation of crops adopted, and sheep folded on turnips or clover.

Yet, English in origin as these methods were, we must efface our conception of an English estate in order to envisage Washington at home. Mount Vernon was a self-contained principality, stretching ten miles along the broad Potomac, containing twenty-five hundred acres as Washington inherited it, and eight thousand at his death. The thirty-five hundred acres under cultivation were divided by tracts of woodland into separate farms, each with its own force of slaves and an overseer, who must report weekly how he had employed every hand. There were great wooden barns, with cow stables and spacious threshing-floors. The pastures, enclosed by worm fences, produced a thin, poor turf in that land of hot, dry summers. Brood-mares and blooded stallions occupied the best watered of them. Royal Gift, a fifteen-hand jackass presented by the King of Spain, had a special paddock and groom, as befitted the ancestor of the American army mule. The cattle were undersized and of low breed; the hogs ran at large through the woodlands, affording illicit sport for a pack of French boar-hounds, an unwelcome gift from Lafayette.

Mount Vernon was an industrial as well as an agricultural unit. There were slave blacksmiths, carpenters, and even bricklayers; a cider press and a still-house, where excellent corn and rye whiskey was made, and sold in barrels made by the plantation negroes from plantation oak. Herring and shad-fisheries in the Potomac provided food for the slaves; a grist-mill turned Washington's improved strain of wheat into the finest grade of flour, which was taken to market in his own schooner. There was a weaving-shed, where a dozen different textiles were produced from local wool and flax, and West India cotton. Picture Washington rising at sunrise, breakfasting at seven, and superintending from the saddle the work on his several farms, frequently dismounting and stripping his coat to demonstrate with his strong back and large, capable hands how things should be done. His good lady, in the meantime, would be directing the work of a large force of household slaves, and helping to cut and piece home-woven cloth for the negroes. Dinner at three ended the day's work in the field; but there were usually accounts and problems enough to occupy the master until supper.

For recreation there was fox-hunting with his own and his neighbors' packs; taking toll of the great flights of wild duck, goose, and pigeon; dancing assemblies at Alexandria. A constant stream of relations and friends flowed through the mansion house, few distinguished travellers came South unprovided with a letter to the great man, and no gentleman could be turned away from his door. The guests, in fact, ate up most of the increase not consumed by the slaves, whose children Washington was too humane to sell away from their parents.

This was the life that Washington loved, and in which he hoped to spend his declining years. No detail was too small for his attention, no slave too humble to attract his interest, no blight too devastating to command his patience. Even on his campaigns, and in the Presidency, he would write sixteen-page letters of instruction to his overseers; and one suspects that, like Sir Robert Walpole, he read their reports before he turned to the affairs of state. 'The more I am acquainted with agricultural affairs, the better I am pleased with them,' he wrote to Arthur Young in 1788. 'How much more delightful . . . is the task of making improvements in the earth than all the vain glory which can be acquired from ravaging it by the most uninterrupted career of conquests.'

The qualities that made Washington the first farmer and the first soldier in America also made him the first statesman. As landed proprietor no less than as commander-in-chief, he had shown executive ability, the power of planning for a distant end, and a capacity for taking infinite pains. Neither drought nor defeat, nor, as it proved, political abuse, could turn him from a course that he discerned to be proper and right. In describing himself as one who inherited 'inferior endowments from nature' Washington was too modest; but we shall underestimate the difficulties of his task if we forget that his superiority lay in character, not in talents. He had the power of inspiring respect and trust, but not the gift of popularity; directness but not adroitness; fortitude rather than flexibility; the power to think things through, not quick perception; a natural presence and dignity, but none of that brisk assertiveness that has often given inferior men greater political influence. The mask of dignity and reserve that concealed his inner life came from shyness, humility, and stern self-control. A warm heart was revealed in numerous kindly acts to his dependants and subordinates. And beneath the cool surface of him there glowed a fire that under provocation would burst forth in immoderate laughter, astounding oaths, or Olympian anger.

3. *The First Presidential Administration*

The Federal government was not only limited in scope, but hampered within its proper sphere by 'checks and balances.' Yet, however anxious the 'Fathers' might be to prevent bad legislation, their chief point in establishing a new constitution was to enable the nation to get things done. For this, not only ample federal powers, but leadership was necessary; and leadership in policy was expected to be one of the functions of the President. It was impossible to write this desire into the Constitution itself. An attempt to define the Presidency as Roosevelt and Wilson administered it would have been considered plain tyranny in 1788. The Presidency was left purposely vague in its relation to Congress, and with such executive departments as Congress might establish. Hence the personality of the first President would go far to determine the scope of his office.

It was here that Washington's character and prestige counted heavily. The heads of departments had to be appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. But Congress, according to colonial usage, might have made them responsible to itself, and removable by the Senate. Instead, it made the Secretaries of State and of War responsible to the President alone, and subject to his direction within their legal competence. Moreover, when the first question of dismissal from office came up, the Senate admitted that the President could remove officials without its consent. The effect of this precedent was to make the entire administrative force and diplomatic service responsible to the chief magistrate.

For heads of the State, War, and Treasury departments, there was not a large field of choice, as the Confederation had given small scope for civil administration. As Secretary of State someone with diplomatic experience was needed. The only available candidate was Thomas Jefferson, then minister to France. Robert Morris suggested Alexander Hamilton for the Treasury, which fell in perfectly with Washington's inclinations. Henry Knox, Washington's chief of artillery, was given the War Department, and Edmund Randolph, whose term as governor of Virginia had expired, was appointed Attorney-General.

The making of minor appointments turned out to be, as Washington feared, the 'most difficult and delicate part of his duty.' He deemed it necessary to reward war service, to conciliate factions, and to avoid any suspicion of personal or sectional partiality. Washington scrutinized applications most conscientiously, asking the advice of senators and representatives from the applicant's state, and sought out able men where none applied. The federal civil service began with principles of efficiency and honesty that were in sharp contrast to the jobbery and corruption in contemporary European governments, and in several of the state governments.

A Vice-President was created by the Federal Constitution in order to provide an acting chief magistrate in the event of the death or disability of the President, without the need of a special election. In order to give him some regular occupation, he was made President of the Senate, with a casting vote in case of tie. John Adams, the first Vice-President, regarded his office as 'the most insignificant . . . that ever the invention of man contrived, or his imagination conceived.' Adams suffered all his life from the notion that he was not properly appreciated. A sound political scientist, and a useful drafter of state constitutions, he had a foible for titles and ceremonies. But his efforts to introduce the elaborate ceremonial of the British Parliament met with no success. Senator Maclay of Pennsylvania was profoundly shocked at Adams's reference to the President's inaugural address as 'His Most Gracious Speech,' and reminded the Senate that the removal of royal trappings was an object of the Revolution. The Vice-President was deeply offended. Rising from his chair he declared 'that he was for a dignified and respectable government,' and that if he had suspected we should ever come to this, 'he never would have drawn his sword.' (The senators must have wondered when and where Mr. Adams ever drew a sword). Outbursts of this sort prevented more than one summons to a cabinet meeting being issued to John Adams.

Although most of the first senators were friends to the administration, their chamber early developed that *esprit de corps* which has been the bane of wilful presidents. 'Senatorial courtesy,' the practice of rejecting any nomination not approved by the senators from the nominee's own state, soon began. In the matter of treaties, however, the Senate's sense of its own dignity defeated its ambition. The Constitution grants the President power, 'by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two-thirds of the senators present concur.' On one memorable occasion Washington appeared before the Senate, like the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the House of Commons, to explain an Indian treaty and see it through. Hampered in freedom of debate by the august presence, the senators voted to refer the papers in question to a select committee. The President 'started up in a violent fret.' 'This defeats every purpose of my coming here,' he said. After that he dispensed with advice until a treaty was ready for ratification. This practice has generally been followed by his successors.

'Impressed with a conviction that the due administration of justice is the firmest pillar of good government,' wrote Washington in 1789, 'I have considered the first arrangement of the judicial department as essential to the happiness of our country and the stability of its political system.' The Constitution left this branch of government as inchoate as the others. The scope of federal judicial power was defined, the mode of appointing judges was determined, and their tenure fixed during good behavior. But it remained for Congress to create and organize the inferior federal courts, to determine their procedure, and to provide a bridge between state and federal jurisdiction. All this was done by the Judiciary Act of 24 September 1789, the better part of which is still in force. It provided for a Supreme Court consisting of the Chief Justice and five associates, for thirteen district courts, and three circuit courts. The great problem of getting cases that involved jurisdictional disputes out of the state courts and into federal courts, in order that the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States might indeed be 'the supreme law of the land,' was solved in the twenty-fifth section of this Act. A final judgment in the highest court of a state, in any case involving a conflict between federal and state powers, may be re-examined in the Supreme Court of the United States upon a writ of error. This section is quite as essential to the peaceful working of the federal system as the Constitution itself. Without it, every state judiciary could put its own construction on the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the Union. A case involving constitutional law may originate either in the state or the lower federal courts; but its final determination belongs to the Supreme Court of the United States.

John Jay was appointed Chief Justice by Washington; and on 2 February 1790 the Supreme Court began its first session, at New York. The judges assumed gowns of black and scarlet, but honored Jefferson's appeal to 'discard the monstrous wig which makes the English judges look like rats peeping through bunches of oakum.' Under Chief Justice Jay the federal judiciary assumed its place as the keystone to the federal arch. As early as 1791, in a case involving British debts, one of the circuit courts declared invalid a law of Connecticut which infringed Article VI of the treaty of peace. In 1792 a state law of Rhode Island was held unconstitutional, as impairing the obligation of contracts. The same year another circuit court, in the first Hayburn case, refused to execute an act of Congress requiring the federal courts to pass on pension claims, on the ground that this was a non-judicial function, beyond the constitutional power of Congress to impose, or of the courts to assert. Thus the power of judicial review over both state and federal legislation was asserted during Washington's first administration. Later, when party and sectional interests perceived the implications of it, judicial review was vehemently attacked behind the cover of state rights and democracy; but in the early years of the republic it went almost unchallenged.

Washington was unwilling to come to any vital decision without taking the advice of people in whom he had confidence. Hence the American cabinet, a body quite different in origin and in functions from the British cabinet. There had been much talk in the Federal Convention of providing the President with a privy council, but the project was not developed. The Senate was given a check on the appointing and treaty-making powers, but it was expected that the President would call upon such heads of departments as Congress might create, for informal consultation. That is exactly what he did. In 1793 we find some forty-six meetings of the three secretaries and the Attorney-General at the President's house. These officials were already known collectively as the President's cabinet; but not until 1907 was the cabinet officially recognized as such by law.

This lack of co-ordination between executive and legislature is one of the distinctive and less useful features of American government. Colonial in its origin, the practice received the sanction of theory from Montesquieu's brilliant misconception; it was also a reaction from George III's close relations with an unreformed House of Commons. The Federal Constitution guarded against executive control through ' placemen ' by disqualifying civil or military officials for membership in either house; and by forbidding the appointment of members during the term of their election to an office created, or increased salary, during that term. There was nothing, however, to prevent a cabinet official appearing in person before either house. The clause requiring the President to recommend measures to Congress reflected a desire that the executive should take the lead in legislation; that the President and his heads of departments should occupy a position similar to ' the government ' in England.

Washington had not the temperament to do this alone. He wanted some young and energetic man to give the impulse, and attend to his relations with the legislature. Fortunately the right man, Alexander Hamilton, was in the right office, the Treasury. For the primary problems of Washington's first administration were fiscal.

XI

HAMILTON AND JEFFERSON

1789–1792

1. *A Philosophy of Self-Interest*

IF the character of Washington fortified the new government, the genius of Hamilton enabled it to function successfully. As Henry Adams wrote, he ‘had at once the breadth of mind to grapple with the machine of government as a whole,’ the practical knowledge to find ways and means, and ‘the good fortune to enjoy power when government was still plastic and capable of receiving a new impulse.’

Alexander Hamilton was thirty-two years old in 1789 when Washington appointed him Secretary of the Treasury. No American equalled him in administrative genius; few surpassed him in maturity of judgement. As an undergraduate of seventeen he had brilliantly defended the rights of the colonists. At twenty he had earned a place on Washington’s staff. In his twenty-fifth year he indicated the fatal defects of the Confederation, wrote a remarkable treatise on public finance, and commanded the storming party at Yorktown. Admitted to the New York bar at the conclusion of peace, he quickly rose to eminence in the law. With Madison he dominated the convention at Annapolis; in the Federal Convention he played a spectacular though hardly a useful part. His contributions to *The Federalist* helped to obtain the ratification of a constitution in which he did not strongly believe. One of the greatest of Americans, he was the least American of his contemporaries: a statesman rather of the type of Colbert, whose innate love of order and system was strengthened by the lack of those qualities among his slack, turbulent, and suspicious fellow citizens. Disciplined himself, Hamilton was eager to discipline his countrymen. He had bold plans and definite policies where others had cautious notions and vague principles. When Congress was thinking of what the people would say, Hamilton told them and the people what they ought to do.

The Treasury Department was the creation of Congress, not of the Constitution; and the organic Act of 1789, still in force, was framed with the intent of making the Secretary responsible to the House. Fortunately the same members who feared executive power also disliked select committees. Hence all financial questions, even routine matters such as petitions, were referred to the Secretary of the Treasury. Hamilton, quick to perceive the opening, acquired a quasi-ministerial lead in legislation which might have developed into a parliamentary system, had he possessed more tact and patience. On his retirement in 1795, the House seized the opportunity to create a ways and means committee, which gradually assumed the initiative in questions of supply.

Hamilton's financial policy was determined by his conception of the governmental problem in 1789; and that, in turn, by his political philosophy. The key may be found in his speeches in the Federal Convention:

> 'Take mankind as they are, and what are they governed by? Their passions. . . . One great error is that we suppose mankind more honest than they are. Our prevailing passions are ambition and interest; and it will ever be the duty of a wise government to avail itself of those passions in order to make them subservient to the public good. . . . All communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well-born; the other the mass of the people . . . turbulent and changing, they seldom judge or determine right. Give therefore to the first class a distinct, permanent share in the Government.'

The Federal Constitution, he believed, could only be made an instrument for good and a guarantee of order by 'increasing the number of ligaments between the government and interests of individuals.' The old families, merchant-shipowners, public creditors, and financiers — in other words the Federalists who had procured the Constitution — must be welded into a loyal governing class, by a straightforward policy favoring their interests. That was the object of Hamilton's domestic and foreign policy. He proposed to use the Federal government to enrich a class, in order that this class might strengthen the Federal government. Instead of his political policy having an economic object, his economic policy had a political object. As Thomas Cromwell fortified the Tudor monarchy by distributing confiscated land, and as Bonaparte promoted his own fortune by the Concordat, so Hamilton would clothe the Constitution with the sword of sovereignty and the armor of loyalty, by giving definite individuals a distinct interest in its permanence.

In September 1789, ten days after he took office, the House of Representatives called upon Hamilton to prepare and report a plan for the 'adequate support of public credit.' The report was laid before the House at its next session, on 14 January 1790. Based on the tried expedients of English finance, it was worthy of an experienced minister of a long-established government.

Hamilton first laid down principles of public economy, and then adduced arguments in support of them. America must have credit for industrial development, and commercial activity, and the operations of government. Her future credit would depend on how she met her present obligations. The United States debt, foreign and domestic,

> 'was the price of liberty. The faith of America has been repeatedly pledged for it. . . . Among ourselves, the most enlightened friends of good government are those whose expectations [of prompt payment] are the highest. To justify and preserve their confidence; to promote the increasing respectability of the American name; to answer the calls of justice; to restore landed property to its due value; to furnish new resources, both to agriculture and commerce; to cement more closely the Union of the States; to add to their security against foreign attack; to establish public order on the basis of an upright and liberal policy; these are the great and invaluable ends to be secured by a proper and adequate provision, at the present period, for the support of public credit.'

Precise recommendations of ways and means ensued. The foreign debt and floating domestic debt, with arrears of interest, should be funded at par, and due provision should be made by import duties and excise taxes to provide interest and amortization. The war debts of the states should be assumed by the Federal government in order to bind their creditors to the national interest. A sinking fund should be created in order to stabilize the price of government securities and prepare for repayment of the principal. The want of banking facilities should be filled by a Bank of the United States, on the model of the Bank of England, but with the right to establish branches in different parts of the country.

This daring policy could not have been carried out by Hamilton alone. Every proposal was matured by the cool judgment of the President; and in House and Senate he found eager co-operation.

Congress passed a customs tariff, with tonnage duties discriminating in favor of American shipping — both essential parts of Hamilton's system — before Hamilton took office; and his other projects were altered and in some respects improved in the process of legislation. The foreign and domestic debt was funded at par; the former was entirely paid off by the end of 1795, the latter in 1835. Most of the debts of the states were assumed by Congress, after a bitter struggle not unmixed with intrigue. The Bank of the United States was chartered, and its capital subscribed in four hours after the books were open. By August 1791 United States six per cents were selling above par in London and Amsterdam; and a wave of development and speculation had begun.

All Hamilton's immediate plans were adopted. He turned dead paper into marketable securities, and provided for their redemption by taxes that the nation was well able to bear. He set standards of honesty and punctuality that were invaluable for a people of crude financial conceptions. His youthful country, so lately on the verge of bankruptcy, acquired a credit such as few of the nations of Europe enjoyed. Yet Hamilton failed to achieve his ultimate end of consolidating the Union. If he created an interested government party, his measures encountered a dangerous opposition. Instead of attaching new interests to the Federal government, he endowed with new privileges those who were already attached to it. His measure of financial corn tempted only those horses in the paddock that had tasted corn; when Jefferson turned them out to grass, they threatened to jump the fence into John Bull's cornfield.

2. *The Sectional Test*

To understand where and why Hamilton failed, we have only to glance at the effect of his measures on two commonwealths: Massachusetts and Virginia. From the earliest colonial times to 1865, these two illustrate the contrast of North and South. Massachusetts was the second state of the Union in population. Her premier interests were maritime; her upper class, composed of shipowning merchants, voted for the new Constitution in the hope of substantial benefits, which Hamilton and Congress accorded. Her fishing villages benefited by the new bounties on dried codfish; her foreign trade benefited by the low tariff, and her shipyards by the discriminating tonnage duties. Good business men themselves, the merchants knew the value of sound credit and honest finance. Their war-time gains from privateering and profiteering were largely invested in government paper, worthless but for the funding system. Massachusetts, with the largest war debt of any state, gained most from the assumption of state debts by the Federal government. Maritime prosperity, percolating from the market towns to the interior, raised the price of country produce, and healed the wounds of Shays's Rebellion. Washington's foreign policy completed the process; and Boston, once the home of radical mobs and loud-mouthed demagogues, became a pocket borough of the new Federalist party. The ' Essex junto ' of Massachusetts: Cabots, Higginsons, Lowells, and Jacksons, who had been to sea in their youth and viewed politics as from a quarter-deck, hailed Hamilton as their master, and kept his flag flying in the Bay State long after his death. With them, in general, were the solid men of Rhode Island and Connecticut, of New York City, and the seaports south of it. But the great mass of the American people was untouched, either in imagination or in pocket, by Hamilton's policy. It would have been otherwise had the public debt remained in the hands of its original possessors; but the phenomena incident to falling prices had appeared. Farmers, discharged soldiers, petty shopkeepers and the like who held government securities representing services rendered, goods supplied, or money advanced during the war, had been forced to part with them at a ruinous discount during the hard times that followed. By 1789 the bulk of the public debt was in the hands of the ' right people ' at Philadelphia, New York, Boston; and the nation was taxed to pay them at par, for what they had purchased at a tremendous discount.[1]

By the same economic test, a system that appeared sound and statesmanlike in Massachusetts seemed unwarranted and unconstitutional in Virginia. Although well provided with a long sea frontage, Virginia owned not a single topsail vessel; Yankees and foreigners carried her grain and tobacco to market. With feudal disdain, the planters allowed their profits to be absorbed by Scotch agents of mercantile houses in Glasgow, Bristol, and London, who advanced supplies and luxuries at exorbitant prices against future deliveries of leaf tobacco. The Virginia planter knew little of business, and less of finance. A gentleman inherited his debts with his plantation, why then should debt trouble the United States? Why not pay it off at market value, as a gentleman compounds with his creditors? Virginians had sold their government paper as low as 15; why should they be taxed to assume the debts of other states? For men such as these, in love with 'republican virtue' of the pristine Roman model and ignorant of affairs, Hamilton's system was incomprehensible, therefore suspect. It must portend colossal taxation as in England, jobbery and corruption as in England — perhaps monarchy as in England.

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[1] In 1795 the Federal government disbursed $309,500 in interest to citizens of Massachusetts, as against $62,300 to natives of Virginia; $367,000 to New York, as against $6,800 to Georgia.

Patrick Henry, who a quarter-century before wrote the Virginia resolves, drafted a remonstrance against the federal assumption of state debts which the Virginia Assembly adopted. Therein, on 23 December 1790, were expressed the misgivings of plain folk throughout the country, as well as those of the Virginia gentry.

> 'They discern a striking resemblance between this system and that which was introduced into England, at the Revolution,[2] a system which has perpetuated upon that nation an enormous debt, and has moreover insinuated into the hands of the executive an unbounded influence, which pervading every branch of the government, bears down all opposition, and daily threatens the destruction of everything that appertains to English liberty. The same causes produce the same effects! In an agricultural country like this, therefore to erect, and concentrate, and perpetuate a large monied interest, is a measure which your memorialists apprehend must in the course of human events produce one or other of two evils, the prostration of agriculture at the feet of commerce, or a change in the present form of federal government, fatal to the existence of American liberty. . . . Your memorialists can find no clause in the constitution authorizing Congress to assume the debts of the States!'

A vision of the Civil War flashed across Hamilton's brain as he read this remonstrance. 'This is the first symptom,' he wrote, 'of a spirit which must either be killed, or will kill the Constitution of the United States.'

Hamilton was making new enemies to the administration. But Virginia could hardly form an opposition party without aid from some of her citizens who were highly placed in the Federal government. Washington, national in his outlook, and convinced that Hamilton's policy was honest and right, signed every bill based on his recommendations. Richard Henry Lee, in 1788 elected to the Senate as an Anti-federalist, became a convert to Hamilton's views. Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of State, and James Madison, leader of the House, wavered — but found the Virginia candle stronger than the Hamiltonian star.

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[2] The Revolution of 1688.

The breach between Jefferson and Hamilton which we are about to describe, was not personal. The Republican and Federalist parties were in no sense the projections of rival personalities; and only in a limited sense were they a division between democracy and aristocracy, or between radicalism and conservatism. They were the political expressions of a deep-lying antagonism between two great American interests — the planting-slaveholding interest, typified by Virginia; and the mercantile-shipping-financial interest, typified by Massachusetts. These interests preceded Hamilton and Jefferson by a century. In the Federal government they found a stake worth fighting for; and in Hamilton and Jefferson they found natural leaders. American political history until 1865 is largely the story of these rival interests, capitalist and agrarian, Northern and Southern, contending for the control of the Federal government — using that government to help themselves and starve their rivals, undermining each other's vote, interfering with each other's labor, bidding for Western support, gambling with petty wars, and finally staking everything on civil war. Principle also divided the parties, particularly in their infancy; but principles were both changed and exchanged, while Massachusetts and Virginia remained the intellectual, after they ceased to be the economic, nuclei of the two systems.

3. *Thomas Jefferson*

When Thomas Jefferson returned to Virginia in November 1789, on leave of absence from his diplomatic post at Paris, he was surprised to learn of his nomination to the Department of State. Only Washington's urgent request persuaded him to accept. Ambition to found a political party was remote from Jefferson's mind. 'If I could not go to heaven but with a party, I would not go there at all,' he wrote that year. Yet his name and reputation are indissolubly bound up with the party that he was the first to lead.

Jefferson was fifteen years older than Hamilton, and much more experienced in administration. As the author of the Declaration of Independence and the *Notes on Virginia* he was famous in both continents. As representative of the United States in France, he became a sort of consulting attorney on revolution. While the National Assembly was in session at Versailles, the leaders met at his dinner-table, and were surprised at his moderate advice; for Jefferson, despite his reputation as an idealogue, had an inductive rather than a deductive mind. A democrat in a country with a democratic social basis, he was not even republican in France. Science, literature, and the fine arts attracted Jefferson as much as they had Franklin; and he was easily the first American architect of his generation. In England the Adam country houses and formal gardens interested him more than the British Constitution. His Virginia mansion of Monticello, designed by him and superbly situated on a hill-top facing the Blue Ridge, was as admirable for its architecture and landscape gardening, as Mount Vernon for efficient husbandry. The most beautiful and harmonious college quadrangle in America is his design. Jefferson wrote upon Neo-Platonism, the pronunciation of Greek, the Anglo-Saxon language, the future of steam-engines, American archaeology, and controversial theology. But there was one subject of which he was ignorant as any Virginian planter, yet self-confident in theory: and that was Hamilton's specialty, finance.

Hamilton's political theories had more validity for the future America than for the simple country with whose common mind and condition Jefferson's theories agreed. Yet if America outgrew Jefferson's principles, she is still indebted to them for whatever liberalism and idealism she has preserved in an industrial society. Hamilton wished to concentrate power; Jefferson to diffuse power. Hamilton feared anarchy and thought in terms of order; Jefferson feared tyranny and thought in terms of liberty. Hamilton believed republican government could only succeed if directed by a governing class; Jefferson that republicanism was hardly worth trying if not fused with democracy. Hamilton took a gloomy view of human nature; Jefferson, the hopeful view of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The people, according to him, were the safest and most virtuous, though not always the most wise, depository of power; and education would perfect their wisdom. Hamilton would diversify American economic life, encouraging shipping and creating manufactures by legislative enactment; Jefferson would have America remain a nation of farmers. All those differences in temper, theory, and policy were bracketed by two opposed conceptions of what America was and might be. Jefferson inherited the idealistic conception of the new world to which Price and Turgot paid homage — an agrarian republic of mild laws and equal opportunity, asylum to the oppressed and beacon-light of freedom, renouncing wealth and commerce to preserve simplicity and equality. To Hamilton all this was sentimental and mischievous nonsense. Having assimilated the traditions of the New York gentry into which he had married, Hamilton believed that the only choice for America lay between a stratified society on the English model and a squalid 'mobocracy.' Jefferson, who knew Europe, wished America to be as unlike it as possible; Hamilton, who had never left America, wished to make his country a new Europe.

Their appearance was as much of a contrast as their habits of mind. Hamilton's neat, lithe, dapper little figure, and general air of brisk energy, went with his tight, compact, disciplined brain, that could conceive a system, and carry it out relentlessly. Yet Hamilton's written style was heavy and often lifeless. Unlike Jefferson, he could not have composed a classic state paper such as the Declaration of Independence; yet Jefferson's mind in comparison was somewhat untidy, constantly gathering new facts and making fresh syntheses. 'His whole figure has a loose, shackling air,' wrote Senator Maclay in 1790. 'I looked for gravity, but a laxity of manner seemed shed about him.' His discourse 'was loose and rambling and yet he scattered information wherever he went, and some even brilliant sentiments sparkled from him.' His sandy complexion, hazel eyes, and ill-fitting, much-worn clothes, gave him the look of an indolent Scotch laird; while Hamilton had the fair complexion, light hair, and personal charm of his French mother.

Jefferson assumed his duties as Secretary of State in March 1790, when Hamilton's financial policy was well under way, and government circles were ringing with his praises. Their acquaintance was slight, apart from overlapping terms in the old Congress, and a friendly rivalry for the smiles of Angelica Church, the witty and beautiful sister of Mrs. Hamilton. Jealousy, however, was not one of Jefferson's many faults, and few statesmen were more generous to possible rivals. Considering his blood, his age, his experience, and his position as the premier officer of state, Jefferson must have regarded Hamilton as a bit of a thruster; yet a Virginian planter could not ride easy in the financial field.

Jefferson approved the payment of the domestic and foreign debt at par. He did not approve in principle the assumption of the state debts. But, as he wrote Monroe in June 1790, he saw ' the necessity of yielding to the cries of the creditors in certain parts of the Union for the sake of union; and to save us from the greatest of all calamities, the total extinction of our credit in Europe.' A few days after, according to Jefferson's own account, he arranged with Hamilton the famous bargain by which the federal capital was transferred from New York to Philadelphia for ten years, pending removal to the new federal city of Washington on the Potomac. Jefferson induced two Virginian congressmen to vote for assumption, and Hamilton rounded up Yankee votes for the Potomac.

If Jefferson later complained that in the assumption of state debts he had been duped into holding the bag for Hamilton, it was because later he imagined new implications in the matter. From the date of Hamilton's report recommending a national bank (13 December 1790), Jefferson's attitude towards him and his policy began to change. To George Mason of Virginia, on 7 February 1791, he mentioned a ' sect ' high in office who believed the British Constitution to be the goal of perfection; and intimated that Congress was under the control of ' stock-jobbers.'

Madison, principal architect of the Federal Constitution, and fellow author with Hamilton of *The Federalist,* opposed the bank bill in the House on the ground that the chartering of such an institution transcended the powers of Congress. (It has ever since been an American custom to denounce a bill one dislikes as ' unconstitutional.') The President called for opinions on that point from his cabinet. Jefferson, in a rather incoherent report that foreshadows the ' strict construction ' school of interpretation, declared flatly that the bill was unconstitutional. According to him the congressional power ' to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution ' its delegated powers of taxation and the like did not include laws merely convenient for such purposes. A national bank was not strictly necessary — the existing state bank at Philadelphia could be used for government funds. It was a clear case for the presidential veto.

Hamilton replied with a nationalistic, ' loose-construction,' interpretation of the Constitution.

' Every power vested in a government is in its nature sovereign, and includes by force of the term, a right to employ all the means requisite

> . . . to the attainment of the ends of such power. . . . If the end be clearly comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the measure have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any particular provision of the Constitution, it may safely be deemed to come within the compass of the national authority.'

Congress, he pointed out, had already acted upon that theory in providing lighthouses and buoys, necessary and proper to the regulation of commerce. A bank has a similar relation to the specified powers of collecting taxes, regulating trade, and paying the debt. This opinion satisfied Washington's scruples, so that he signed the bank bill; and it only needed the clarifying process of Chief Justice Marshall's brain to become the great opinion of 1819,[3] which read the doctrine of implied powers into the Constitution.

Jefferson was neither silenced nor convinced. The Federal Constitution, from his point of view and Madison's, was being perverted into a consolidated, national government. To what end? Before many months elapsed, the two Virginians thought they knew. Hamilton was simply juggling money out of the pockets of the poor into those of the rich, building up through financial favors a corrupt control of House and Senate; and 'the ultimate object of all this was to prepare the way for a change from the present republican form of government to that of monarchy, of which the English constitution is to be the model.'

That belief remained a fixed tenet of Jefferson for the rest of his life. Completely innocent as Hamilton was of any such intention, he had laid himself open to suspicion. For Hamilton, said Gouverneur Morris, 'was of all men the most indiscreet. He knew that a limited monarchy, even if established, could not preserve itself in this country . . . [yet] he never failed, on every occasion, to advocate the excellence of, and avow his attachment to, monarchical government.' Like sentiments were common in Federalist circles, especially in New York and Philadelphia society. Hamilton openly avowed his belief that corruption was a necessary engine of government. His financial projects were unnecessarily complicated — bewildering to Virginia planters; yet with the insolence of youth he declined to make necessary explanations. Jefferson had been sent about his business for inquiring into some of the operations of the sinking fund.

Virginian suspicions were deepened by the brisk speculation in lands, bank stock, and government funds that began in the year 1790. No sooner did Hamilton's financial reports come out, than Northern speculators began to comb the Southern countryside for depreciated paper. Several of Hamilton's friends and subordinates were implicated in larger transactions of a shady character. William Duer, his first assistant secretary, and Henry Knox, the Secretary of War, floated a colossal speculation in wild lands. Duer and Macomb, an associate of Hamilton's father-in-law, formed a blind pool to speculate in government bonds: an operation which landed Duer in jail, and produced a financial flurry in New York. Hamilton sincerely deprecated all this, and his own hands were clean — but the speculators were very close to him.

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[3] McCulloch *v.* Maryland, see below, Chapter xviii.

Jefferson's opposition then was based partly on his Virginian prejudices, reinforced by agrarian theory; partly on a complete misapprehension of Hamilton's aims. Yet a complete understanding would not have won him over. Hamilton's ideal of a disciplined, powerful nation, with bondholders as loyal supporters, was no less disgusting to Jefferson than the spectacle of royal George and rotten boroughs. Hamilton's fear of political dissolution and social levelling seemed as fantastic to him as his own fear of monarchy to Hamilton.

Jefferson, however, did not create an opposition; he joined and organized the elements of opposition. The antagonism of the Northern mercantile and creditor elements to Southern, agrarian, and debtor elements can be found in congressional debates before either Hamilton or Jefferson took office; a full year before the Virginia remonstrance we have quoted. Hamilton had six months to organize his natural supporters before Jefferson appeared on the scene. If Hamilton was taking the country to the dogs, must not Jefferson lead it back? If the Treasury had its party, why not the Department of State?

4. *The Virginia-New York Alliance*

Political parties were in bad odor at the end of the eighteenth century. No provision for party government had been made in the Constitution, although parties or factions existed in all the states as in all the colonies. Ought Jefferson to resign from the cabinet, leaving Hamilton in undisputed control? Was it proper for him openly to support opposition to a policy that Washington had accepted? The President, believing that every month and year the Constitution endured was so much gained in future stability, endeavored to keep the smouldering fire from bursting forth. To Jefferson he preached charity and to Hamilton forbearance. Both were entreated to remain in office, and both consented. But Jefferson, believing Hamilton's policy to be dangerous, used every means short of open opposition to check it; while Hamilton spared no effort to thwart Jefferson, when his management of foreign affairs appeared to be mischievous. The conduct of neither man, in view of the unprecedented circumstances and the uncertain position of the cabinet, can be called dishonorable.

Jefferson's first secret move towards ' showing up ' Hamilton was to induce Philip Freneau, a poet who had been at Princeton with Madison, to start an opposition newspaper at Philadelphia. Then, in the summer of 1791, Jefferson took Madison on what purported to be a botanizing excursion to the Hudson. It was *Clintonia borealis,* apparently, that they were in search of. New York politics were divided into two factions, of which one was led by Governor George Clinton. His lieutenant, a distinguished army officer named Aaron Burr, had discovered the political value of a benevolent society called the Sons of St. Tammany. Allied to him were the Livingstons; opposed was the old aristocratic party of De Lanceys, Van Rensselaers, and Schuylers, into which Alexander Hamilton had married.

George Clinton was a practical politician, but he had bet on the wrong horse in opposing the Federal Constitution. Hamilton had defeated him on this point, so Hamilton's friends naturally secured the federal patronage in New York. Hence Jefferson's sudden interest in the discontented Clintons and Livingstons. In the presidential election of 1792, Virginia, North Carolina, and New York gave their second electoral votes to George Clinton for vice-president, as against John Adams. From this ' botanizing excursion,' then, we may date the Virginia planters' first political alliance, a combination that set the pattern of the Jeffersonian Republican party, and of all its successors. For one hundred and thirty-five years the ' Solid South ' and Tammany Hall were the two constant, faithful factors in the Democratic party; and it is strange that, after one hundred and fifty years of religious liberty, religion should have divided them.

5. *Hamilton's Report on Manufactures*

On 5 December 1791, before the cabinet dissensions were generally known, Hamilton presented to Congress his famous Report on Manufactures. Alone of Hamilton's state papers, this report fell flat; yet it became an arsenal of protectionist polemics on both sides of the Atlantic. No single argument was original; many of them were implied in centuries of English protective legislation; but they were beautifully co-ordinated. Professing a fundamental belief in Adam Smith's philosophy of freedom, Hamilton used the Scotch economist to knock down the French physiocrats, with their doctrine that agriculture is the only productive branch of industry. He was addressing a country preponderantly rural, where manufacturers were still in the household or handicraft stage; where the domestic system, such as the English woollen manufacture had followed for centuries, was hardly known; where only a few experimental factories existed, and not a single steam-engine. Free trade, in view of the dearness of labor and the scarcity of capital, would mean few American manufactures; and, in view of the uncertain foreign market for American grain, a low purchasing power for foreign manufactures.

Notwithstanding these unfavorable conditions, a beginning had been made. Samuel Slater, a Yorkshire weaver and employee of Arkwright, had laid the foundations of the New England cotton industry that very year. There was a wool-card factory employing twelve hundred hands at Boston; felt and beaver hats were being manufactured in Danbury, Connecticut; and a patriotic graduate of Yale expressed himself ready and willing to supply the entire American continent with metal buttons if Congress would prohibit imports thereof. Hamilton wished the government to encourage these efforts, in order to increase the national wealth and diversify American labor. Artisans would be induced to immigrate, machinery would be invented, woman and child labor would be productively employed. Instead of a nation of inefficient jacks-of-all-trades, the cobbler could stick to his last, and the farmer produce efficiently for a home market. In other words, Hamilton would reorganize and regiment America's happy-go-lucky society on the basis of Adam Smith's pin factory.

Hamilton's ultimate aim, as with his funding system, was 'to increase the number of ligaments between the government and the interest of individuals.' Doubtless he perceived that the merchants and public creditors were too narrow a basis for a national governing class. He believed that manufacturers might prosper in the South as well as in the North. The report was a distinct bid for Southern support over the heads of Jefferson and Madison. The South, however, regarded protection as another tax for Northern interests. 'What! are they going to tax our cloth too?' was the reply of Virginia farmers to a federal agent collecting data on domestic manufactures. Hamilton's argument would have been sound, nevertheless, had not Eli Whitney's invention of the cotton gin, the following year, made the culture of upland cotton the most profitable employment for labor in the South.

Nor did the North show any enthusiasm for protection. Hamilton's favored class, the public creditors and merchant-shipowners, had too strong a stake in free trade. Congress took no action on the Report. Hamilton himself let it lie, when the European war gave a new vent for farm products that trebled the nation's purchasing power. Twenty-five years later the Report was resurrected by the new manufacturing interest built up during the war of 1812; and its arguments have never since been allowed to grow cold. They were imported into Germany by Friedrich List, and into England by Ashley and Chamberlain. Hamilton, far ahead of his time, grasped the nineteenth-century compromise between paternalism and *laissez-faire:* protection to property interests valuable to the state; free competition for labor.

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Washington, dismayed by the growing opposition to his administration, was eager to retire in 1793. Hamilton and Jefferson both urged him to accept another four-year term; the one for obvious reasons, the other because he trusted Washington to suppress any further 'monarchical tendencies,' and believed the opposition needed further nursing to become an effective party. The President was unanimously re-elected. He began his new term in March 1793, in the shadow of a European war which was soon destined to precipitate all floating elements of political dissension into two national parties, around the nuclei of Massachusetts shipping and Virginia planting — the Federalists, led by Hamilton and inclining towards England; and the Republicans, led by Jefferson and favoring the French Revolution. These parties held the national stage for the next generation; and the Republican and Democratic parties of today are respectively their descendants.

XII

THE FRENCH TOUCHSTONE

1789–1796

1. *The Two Poles*

WASHINGTON'S foreign policy may be summed up in three words: peace, union, and justice. Peace, to give the country time to recover from the material and moral wounds of the Revolutionary War, and to permit the slow work of national integration to continue. The less diplomacy, the more likelihood of peace; but justice could not be done, nor the Federal Union maintained, without a vigorous foreign policy.

It was certain that the Westerners would not long remain in the Union unless Washington could secure to them the navigation of the Mississippi; that the support of the trading classes would be lost if their commerce were not protected; and that there would be irresistible demand for war with Britain if the Northwest posts were not shortly surrendered. The Federal government would become as contemptible as the Confederation unless it could satisfy all parts of the country that their essential interests were being protected. To obtain these ends peaceably would require years of patient and skilful diplomacy. But Washington seemed to have absorbed in his person all the patience and serenity in America. War-clouds were hanging over Europe, and if they broke it would be difficult to prevent their deluging the new world with the old.

Jefferson and Hamilton agreed with Washington's objects, although by different processes of reasoning; and they also agreed that the first step towards securing them must be a good understanding with England. But they disagreed absolutely as to the means of obtaining that understanding. Jefferson had been minister to the court of Versailles before taking the Department of State. 'You will perceive,' he wrote from France in 1788, 'that my object is to strengthen the connection between this country and my own in all useful points. . . . This friendship we ought to cultivate closely, considering the present dispositions of England towards us.' Those dispositions Jefferson had tested two years previously, as joint commissioner with John Adams at London. He concluded: 'That nation hate us, their ministers hate us, and their King more than all other men.' Jefferson returned this hatred with interest, and for reasons more profound than foreign policy. English society, government, and manners were the sort of things that he wished his country to avoid. With Hamilton and his friends daily avowing their admiration for the British Constitution, British finance, and English society, Jefferson believed it to be their object to make the United States a mere transatlantic copy of the mother country. It was repulsion from them and their ideas, rather than attraction for France as such, that led Jefferson to regard the French alliance as his polar star. The French Revolution made him all the more eager to cling to that course, regardless of the rocks that Hamilton pointed out ahead.

Hamilton believed that the essential interests of Great Britain and the United States were complementary, not competitive. 'I cannot foresee any solid grounds of difference between us,' he told an Englishman in 1790. Jefferson would probably have agreed, with the reservation that Britain must undergo a revolution at least in commercial policy, before the point of view of her governing class could be friendly to the sort of country that he wished America to remain. When he saw signs of the desired transformation taking place, he was willing to contemplate 'fighting side by side with her in the same cause.'[1] Until then, he feared America would have to fight her way up to a place in the sun.

Although Hamilton never attempted to graft the British Constitution on the Federal one, he did believe that Americans had many political lessons to learn of their mother country. 'We think in English.' England, for him, had found the just balance between liberty and order. The influence of her friendship could only be wholesome for a young nation, sprung from her loins, and which needed above all things integration and stability. Hamilton really liked Frenchmen, who in turn found his personality more sympathetic than that of Jefferson. For, after all, Hamilton was one-quarter French in blood. But on the French Revolution Hamilton saw eye-to-eye with Burke. It was most disconcerting, just when there seemed some hope of America settling down, to have her favorite nation blow up and invite everyone else to follow her example!

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[1] In 1823, see Chapter XIX.

We have already seen how Hamilton's financial policy sent Virginia Federalists into opposition as early as December 1790. A question of foreign policy had really opened the rift more than a year earlier; and dissension on these two issues, domestic and foreign, steadily drove the wedge deeper until a chasm divided the body politic into two national parties, Federalist and Republican.

It was the tariff and tonnage bill of 1789 that brought the first ominous crack. The Federal Constitution gave Congress the exclusive power to levy customs and tonnage duties, and to regulate foreign and domestic commerce. It had been one of the leading arguments for the new Constitution that these powers would enable the country to strike back effectively at the British commercial regulations, and force England to negotiate a commercial treaty in self-defence. Accordingly the first federal tariff bill, as it passed the House, contained three classes of tonnage duties on vessels entering American ports: the lowest on American bottoms, higher on the ships of countries having commercial treaties with the United States, and highest on ships of nations having no such treaty. The bill was drafted by James Madison. 'The produce of this country,' he said, 'is more necessary to the rest of the world than that of other countries is to America. If we were disposed to hazard the experiment of interdicting the commerce between us and Powers not in alliance, we should have overtures of the most advantageous kind tendered by those nations.'

Here was a persistent Virginian error trembling on the edge of legislation. The notion, natural enough in a young and bumptious nation, that Europe needed American products more than America needed European markets, was inherited from colonial days. Hamilton had made the same argument in *The Federalist,* but had since learned better. He knew that Anglo-American commerce was valuable for England, but vital for America — and he knew that England knew it. If America was England's best customer, taking one-twelfth of her manufactures exported in 1788, three-quarters of America's entire commerce was with Great Britain. No less than ninety per cent of American imports came from Britain, and Hamilton planned to finance his new fiscal system with customs duties, the only considerable source of revenue then open to the Federal government. England could better afford to play the game of commercial retaliation than America; and retaliate she would if Congress began it. Commercial warfare, even if it did not lead to open warfare, would check the economic recovery of the United States so hopefully begun and would destroy every calculation on which Hamilton's funding scheme was based. Without credit, Hamilton could see the Federal government becoming as impotent as the Confederation. Not on sentimental anglophilism, but on this keen perception of the essential facts in their relation to his domestic policy, was Hamilton's foreign policy based.

The more discerning merchants of the Northern States knew very well that they were then enjoying larger privileges in English ports than they could expect to secure in a commercial treaty wrested by retaliatory legislation. The Senate, in whose closed sessions they were able to present their point of view, struck out of the House bill all tonnage or tariff discrimination between foreign nations. As finally passed, the tariff of 1789 levied higher duties on foreign than on American vessels, but placed English and French vessels in the same class. The effect was threefold. England perceived that Washington's administration was not unfriendly, and ' that a party is already formed in favour of a connexion with Great Britain, which, by moderation on our part, may perhaps be strengthened.'[2] American shipping recovered more than its fair share of the Anglo-American carrying trade; and thus convinced Pitt's committee on trade that America was no longer so helpless as Lord Sheffield had led them to suppose; that perhaps, after all, it would be wise to have a commercial treaty. France justly complained of being placed in the same category as Britain, in spite of her alliance and her repeated favors to American commerce. The French Minister at Philadelphia advised his government to press for the recovery of Louisiana from Spain, as the means of keeping America in hand. Within three years the French Republic acted upon this pregnant suggestion, and in 1800 Bonaparte put it through.

2. *Pressing for the Posts*

Before matters had progressed further with Great Britain, the Nootka Sound affair gave Washington's administration a serious question of high diplomacy. A dispute in an obscure bay of the

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[2] Report of Lords of Trade, 28 Jan. 1791, in *Collection of Interesting Reports published by Society of Shipowners* (1807), pp. 137–8.

Pacific Northwest suddenly flashed into European diplomacy, shook the balance of power, and reverberated on American politics.

Spain's renewed colonial activity under Charles III — one aspect of which, as we have seen, was the distribution of gold in the Kentucky backwoods — led to the effective occupation of the California coast. In 1769 a naval expedition was dispatched from Mexico, and two parties were sent overland to occupy Alta California. One of the ships took one hundred and ten days to reach San Diego and another was never heard from; but the overland party, under Gaspar de Portolá, pushed north along the coast as far as the site of Drake's landing; and then, turning south, came upon the magnificent Bay of San Francisco, which had strangely eluded earlier explorers. A chain of Indian missions, whose mellowed buildings still reflect the Californian sunshine, were founded by the Franciscan father Junípero Serra; and in 1775 General Anza conducted a band of colonists northwestward from Arizona, and founded the *presidio* of San Francisco. Little they dreamed that within a man's lifetime California would become a state of the American Union.

In order to keep interlopers from this new colony, the Spanish *guardacostas* patrolled the Pacific coast as far north as Alaska. There, Russian fur traders had founded another colony that eventually fell to Uncle Sam. New rivals soon appeared. As a result of Captain Cook's voyage, both American and English shipowners learned that fat profits could be made through buying furs from the Pacific Coast Indians and selling them in China. Nootka Sound on Vancouver Island was the centre of this traffic. In 1789 both the Spanish and the British governments planned to take effective and exclusive occupation. The more powerful Spanish ship seized the Englishmen and sent them prisoners to Mexico. Reparation and apology were demanded. A European war was threatened, and Jefferson had an opportunity to play *haute politique*.

The likelihood of war in Europe brought the unpleasant prospect of a British attack on New Orleans and the Floridas, with the probable result that a solid barrier of British territory, from the St. Croix to the St. Mary's, would contain the United States on front and flank. Jefferson hoped that through careful diplomacy the right to navigate the Mississippi could be extorted from the Bourbon powers, as the price of American neutrality. Otherwise, the United States had better make the best bargain she could with Britain, for the same price. Washington approving, the American chargés at

Madrid and Paris were instructed to press for the ' right of deposit '; and Gouverneur Morris, in London, was ordered to promise American neutrality in return for British evacuation of the Northwest posts.

In May 1790, at the crisis of the Nootka controversy, Gouverneur Morris found Mr. Pitt friendly, though non-committal. The Governor of Canada had just informed him that he could not defend the Northwest posts if attacked by the United States. By the time Jefferson's instructions reached Europe the danger of war had passed. France backed out; Spain was forced to ' eat crow,' as the American backwoodsmen put it; and the Foreign Office took no further interest in Mr. Gouverneur Morris. But Jefferson had reached the conviction that, in order to secure an outlet to the West, the whole west bank of the Mississippi must become American territory — a conviction upon which he acted when he became President.

Spain consented to negotiate with the United States over the navigation of the Mississippi and the Southwestern posts. But in the meantime she established two new posts on the American bank of the Mississippi. The negotiations dragged on at Madrid for two years, when the American commissioners concluded ' that a few ships of the line would have more weight in securing peaceably the territorial rights of the United States, and those with respect to the Mississippi than all the most unanswerable arguments or incontestable proofs that could be adduced in support thereof.'

It was not until his second term of office that Washington could gather the fruits of his patient diplomacy and forbearance. But the Federal Union was continually being strengthened by fresh accessions, no less than by Hamilton's financial policy. North Carolina ratified the Federal Constitution before the end of 1789, and ceded her western territory to the United States. Rhode Island joined in 1790, after Congress had threatened to exclude her from commercial intercourse. The admission of Vermont in 1791, as the fourteenth state, put an end to the separatist movement in that quarter. Kentucky was admitted in 1792; Tennessee in 1796; but the separatist movement continued in the West until the Mississippi outlet was secure.

The longer Britain retained the Northwest posts, and refused to conclude a treaty of commerce, the more difficult Hamilton found it to restrain Congress from retaliatory measures. One such movement was checked by the first friendly gesture from Whitehall since the peace — the appointment of a British minister to the United States. It was not a wise appointment. George Hammond had not yet attained years of discretion; he married the daughter of a Pennsylvania loyalist; and he liked to exercise his talents by sharp complaints on immaterial matters. But the mere fact of a minister being sent strengthened the hands of Hamilton. In return Washington appointed to the vacant London post Thomas Pinckney, an eminent South Carolinian, who had been educated in England and found old schoolmates in the Foreign Office. Yet Pinckney found London as coldly civil as did John Adams. Pitt's government was not seriously anxious for a settlement; Hammond's appointment marked no real change in policy. The ministry did not wish to risk the interruption of commercial relations with a country which had already become Britain's leading customer; but it was not yet convinced that any concessions were necessary. Hammond had no powers to conclude a commercial treaty, or to promise evacuation of the Northwest posts, even if the United States complied in full with the British construction of the treaty of 1783. Jefferson quickly inferred as much; and the fact that the new seat of government of Upper Canada was established at Fort Niagara, on the American side of the boundary, seemed to indicate that Britain liked the posts too well to move.

3. *Neutrality and Citizen Genet*

In the meantime events in Europe were making a peaceful solution of these difficulties highly improbable. Americans followed the French Revolution with the keenest interest and sympathy; few perceived the difficulties ahead. Lafayette, Tom Paine, and the Declaration of Rights, seemed to make that revolution a continuation of theirs. News from Paris, arriving in huge stale batches by infrequent vessels, was printed at large in the newspapers, discussed eagerly in mansions, taverns, and the log cabins of the frontier. In December 1792 arrived the news of the previous summer — the storming of the Tuileries, the declaration of the French Republic, and the Battle of Valmy. Hard on its heels came the decree of 19 November, the 'war of all peoples against all kings.' Enthusiasm then became hysterical, as is apt to be the case when American emotions are stirred. In puritanic Boston, where dramatic instincts found an outlet in political form, there was a civic feast in French style. A procession of 'citizens eight deep' escorted a roasted ox, labelled 'a Peace Offering to Liberty and Equality,' together with sixteen hundred loaves of bread and two hogsheads of punch, to a spot rechristened Liberty Square. As the punch fell lower in the hogsheads, the spirits of the citizens rose, and what was said and sung was not complimentary, we gather, to John Bull.

A series of westerly gales prevented any vessel arriving from Europe for three months. Then, in April 1793, came news that brought war to the edge of the three-mile limit, and made the French Revolution an issue in American politics. France had declared war on Great Britain and Spain; the king had been guillotined; the Girondin party was in power; and Citizen Genet was coming over as minister plenipotentiary of the French Republic.

America was still, formally, an ally of France. In the treaty of 1778 the United States had guaranteed French possession of her West India islands. As the royal navy was certain to attack them, it was difficult to see how America could honorably refuse to enter the war, if France demanded it. Most Americans wished to help France; and war would enable them to discharge both their debt of gratitude to her and their feeling of resentment against Britain.

On 18 April 1793 a Cabinet meeting was held at Philadelphia. Washington, though dismayed at the turn of events, still wished the French well, but thought of his own country first. Hamilton, loathing the French Revolution, wished to declare the treaty of 1778 in suspense now that the king was dead, declare American neutrality, and reject the French minister. Jefferson considered the cause of France 'the most sacred cause that ever man was engaged in,' but was equally anxious to keep America out of the war. To an immediate declaration of neutrality he was opposed; partly on constitutional grounds, but mainly because he regarded American neutrality, without some equivalent, as a free gift to England that she would receive only with contempt. To Washington such bargaining seemed unworthy of a self-respecting nation. Neutrality must be declared on its merits, not as part of a bargain. Accordingly, on 22 April 1793, the President issued his famous neutrality proclamation. It declared the 'disposition of the United States' to 'pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the belligerent powers,' and warned citizens that 'aiding or abetting hostilities,' or unneutral acts committed within the country, would render them liable to prosecution in the federal courts. The proclamation marks another stage towards creating the traditional American foreign policy. Whether it would prevent ardent and lawless Americans from forcing a conflict with Britain remained to be seen.

In the meantime Citizen Genet, quaintest of the many curious diplomatists sent by European governments to the United States, had landed at Charleston. A brother to Madame Campan, lady-in-waiting to Marie Antoinette, he had been appointed before the condemnation of Louis XVI, partly owing to the influence of Tom Paine, who was trying to have the king and queen sent to America instead of the guillotine. But before the monarchs were dead, Genet became an ardent republican of the Girondin party.

Fortunately the United States had no navy; otherwise the French Republic would have called for an immediate execution of the treaty guarantee. Without a navy America could be of more service neutral than belligerent. Genet's instructions called upon him to use the United States as a base for privateering; and before presenting his credentials to Jefferson he undertook to fit out privateers against British commerce. He was instructed to recruit forces for the conquest of Florida and Louisiana, 'et réunir peut-être à la constellation américaine la belle étoile du Canada.' Several fighting land speculators like George Rogers Clark, who had some dubious claims to Western land still held by Spain, showed great enthusiasm for war with that country. To them Genet distributed French military commissions, forming the *cadres* of an 'Armée du Mississippi' and an 'Armée des Florides.' In other words, France expected the same sort of aid from her sister republic that she herself had given in 1776; aid which was as certain to embroil the giver with Britain. Genet's progress to Philadelphia was a continuous ovation, after which the President's formal reception of him came as a cold shower. But the minister needed many more of the same sort to cool his Girondin ardor.

If Washington's failure to kiss Genet on both cheeks was the first rebuff, the second was Hamilton's refusal to provide him with funds, in the shape of advance instalments of the debt to France. So for want of pay and subsistence, Genet's warriors had to return empty-handed to their log cabins. Jefferson welcomed the arrival of Genet as a sort of refresher for the opposition party, then much discouraged because their recent investigation of the Treasury Department had only proved Hamilton's integrity. Yet Jefferson enforced Washington's neutrality policy with loyal and even-handed justice. He insisted on a strict construction of the French treaty privileges, and lectured Genet on the law of nations — a formula that the Citizen refused to admit. 'This Secretary of State,' he wrote his government, 'hunts up excuses in the dusty tomes of Vattel and Grotius.' With entire communities sympathetic to France, and little moral sanction anywhere for the duties of neutrality, the Federal government could no more prevent occasional violations of neutrality than the British government could enforce revenue laws in the Hebrides; but Lord Grenville agreed that the United States was honestly enforcing its declared policy.

Vain, scatter-brained, and indiscreet, Genet represented his party at its worst. The popular reception completely turned his head. 'Je vis au milieu de fêtes perpétuelles,' he wrote his government. 'Le vieux Washington . . . ne me pardonne point mes succés, et l'empressement avec lequel toute la ville s'est précipitée chez moi.' Many Americans regarded Genet as the symbol of embattled France, and some wished to use him against Washington and Hamilton; but for the most part he was a victim of the American humorous curiosity that loves to gape at distinguished foreigners, and to observe them make fools of themselves.

When Genet found he could do nothing with the government, he conceived the brilliant notion of turning it out. His official notes became inconceivably truculent. In Charleston he had presided at the birth of a local Jacobin club, whose legitimacy was recognized by the parent organization at Paris; and his progress through the states was marked by similar progeny of ill portent. After a few weeks of him, Jefferson concluded that Genet was likely to become the Jonah of the Jeffersonian party: 'He will sink the Republican interest, if they do not abandon him.' In August 1793 the Cabinet unanimously voted to request his recall. Robespierre gladly consented, and in return asked for the recall of Gouverneur Morris, whose intrigues at Paris had been quite as mischievous as Genet's in Philadelphia. Early in 1794 a new French minister arrived in the United States, with an order for his predecessor's arrest. Instead of returning to feed the guillotine, Genet married the daughter of Governor Clinton, and settled down to the life of a country gentleman on the Hudson.

4. *The French Revolution, Precipitant of Parties*

The year of the passing of Citizen Genet, 1794, saw the definite crystallization of all those unstable political elements that had been oscillating between the Massachusetts and Virginian poles, into two national parties. Although the division began in 1789 on domestic issues that were economic at bottom, nation-wide parties had not yet been formed. Hamilton had a group in Congress, and Madison, inspired by Jefferson, led a compact opposition against the 'corrupt Treasury squadron.' But most of the members were attached to neither. Candidates for Congress appealed to the voters largely on their personal merits or past services. Hamilton's partisans wished to maintain peace with England at almost any price; the opposition wished to draw closer to France; but until 1793 almost every one viewed the French Revolution with friendly sympathy. Jefferson informs us that he never saw Washington so depressed as on the day he heard of the flight to Varennes; and 'Light-horse Harry' Lee, Federalist father of the great Confederate general, offered his sword to France in 1792.

Edges were blurred, issues confused, but the political cauldron was seething. Men were asking whether the American experiment in self-government had passed its zenith. Could the republic be saved only by old-world expedients: national debt and accumulation of capital, army and navy and governing classes, perhaps even church and king? Must the Federal Constitution be merely the British Constitution writ large? Or, on the contrary, was the American Revolution just begun? Were the people of the United States destined to shake off every fetter that enslaves men's bodies and minds, and face the world, united indeed, but enlightened, free, and equal? In the tumultuous year 1793 Americans gazed on the French Révolution as into a crystal ball, for an answer to their hopes and fears. Presently they looked up, satisfied, with a hearty 'Yes!' or a thumping 'No!'

European issues reach America without shadings, all black and white. Thus the French Revolution seemed to some a clean-cut contest between monarchy and republicanism, oppression and liberty, autocracy and democracy; to others simply a new breaking-out of the eternal strife between anarchy and order, atheism and religion, poverty and prosperity. The former joined the Republican party;

the latter the Federalist. Sectional and economic groups were polar to the completed parties; but in the reverse order to general expectation. Sometime democratic New England and the seaports, young rivals to Liverpool and Bristol, became the headquarters of the pro-British Federalists; while the landed interest, particularly in slaveholding communities, was swept by gallomania.

The explanation is both social and economic. In New England the clergy had been worrying over the younger generation: undergraduates who preferred reading Voltaire and Gibbon to studying Jonathan Edwards and Rollin. Yet a naïve delight at the drubbing of ' papists ' kept the parsons faithful to the French cause up to a certain point. The execution of Louis XVI cast a shadow of doubt; doubt changed to horror when Tom Paine's *Age of Reason* appeared in 1794. In puritan New England as in middle-class England that scurrilous arraignment of the Bible sent liberal dissenters hot-foot to the standard of reaction, eager for anything to exclude ' French infidelity.' Paine himself, by a fierce attack on Washington the next year, completely identified Jeffersonianism with Jacobinism, in the mind of the average New Englander.

The planters of Virginia, freethinkers and deists for the most part, were immune from religious panic. But why did not the obvious result of ' liberty, equality, fraternity ' in Santo Domingo, the terrible negro insurrection, cut a chasm between Virginia and France? One can only answer that the slaveowners' hatred of British merchants made them invulnerable to this new suggestion. A British merchant appeared to the Virginia planter as a Twin City banker appears to the Dakota wheat grower of to-day: a heartless exploiter, selling him necessities at a swollen price against future deliveries of crops. For after the war the British tobacco factors returned, did business as usual, and under color of the treaty even had the insolence to demand their debts.[3] Not all the debts, however, had been collected, and in the Anglo-American crisis of 1794 a resolution for the suspension of the debt article of the treaty of peace was introduced by the two senators from Virginia. Historians of that commonwealth deny that the planters could have been biased against England by such sordid considerations; others may suspect that Virginian debtors were not lacking in human nature.

The basis of Virginia's opposition to Northern capital we have already examined. Her opposition to British capital and sea-power was of the same nature. The intellectual leader of the Republican party was Colonel John Taylor, a Virginian whose mansion in Caroline county, near the main post-road between Philadelphia and Richmond, was a rendezvous of travelling congressmen, and whose pamphlets propagated the doctrine that every dollar made by the carrying trade, the tobacco factors, and Hamilton's 'paper aristocracy' came out of farmers' pockets. It was Taylor of Caroline who pointed out that the Federalists were building up a new privileged class which, unless promptly checked, would become a bloated plutocracy, more powerful than the aristocracy of the old regime; and more difficult to deal with, as undistinguished by blood and legal privilege. It followed that England, through her flagrant disregard of sound economic principles, was a 'sinking nation,' and that trade with her, in adverse balance, was 'draining' America of her wealth. And it was Taylor, not Jefferson, who first defined the doctrine of state rights, in order to preserve the agrarian states from Federalist tyranny and corruption.

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[3] See above, p. 131.

British capital, to the merchant shipowners of New England, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Charleston, was an indispensable instrument of credit; and commerce with Britain the first condition of American prosperity. Their overseas trade was largely financed by London merchant-bankers; and after the French armies had sucked Amsterdam dry, credit could be obtained nowhere else than in London. Like Hamilton, they did not care to risk a quarrel with the power that could give or withhold. British spoliations on neutral trade might annoy American shipowners; but they soon discovered that British sea-power gave compensation, while French sea-power did not. Although the Acts of Trade and Navigation were technically in force in the West Indies, actually they were not enforced after 1792. During the entire period of the French war, as in 1914–17, there was no time when American shipowners could not make immense profits through submitting to British sea-power when they could not evade it; while French attacks on neutral commerce, as those of the German submarines, tended to destroy the only traffic that the British navy permitted.

Thus it came about that great Virginia planters of English race and tradition — men like John Randolph of Roanoke who would wear no boots but Hoby's of London, and read no Bible printed outside Oxford: men whose throats would have been the first cut and whose lands the first divided if Jácobinism infected America —

screamed for the Rights of Man and railed at Britain. Thus it came about that Boston Unitarians like William Ellery Channing and Harrison Gray Otis, whose creed was more subtly subversive of traditional Christianity than the crude outbursts of the Paris commune, beat the tomtom against French impiety and anarchy.

Around these two poles American opinion crystallized in 1793-95. You were either for the Republicans and France, or for the Federalists and Britain — there could be no compromise. Emotion for a principle, and for the kind of country you wanted America to be, joined interest and policy. It was not Britain and France corrupting American opinion, but American merchants and farmers stretching out to Europe for support. As a French observer wrote, ' Each party will use foreign influence as it needs, to dominate.'

A dangerous game indeed — rather like calling in the Goths to win the imperial purple. The emotional nexus with European nations grew progressively stronger, until the European war seemed to absorb American politics. It became a fixed idea of the Republicans that republicanism in America could not long survive the triumph of monarchy in Europe; while the Federalists as firmly believed that American union, social order, property, and religion, depended on England's standing fast against Jacobinism. On occasion, and with certain individuals, this foreign partisanship became so overpowering as to remind one of the city states of Greece, where democrats loved Athens more than their native city, and oligarchs, Sparta. Any foreign war that brings into conflict two principles that go to the heart of politics will divide the oldest and ripest nations.

5. *The Party Structure*

Both American parties, the Republicans (ancestors of the Democrats of to-day) and the Federalists (of whom the present Republicans are residuary legatees), accepted the Federal Constitution as their common basis, although each accused the other of wishing to subvert it. Both believed in free trade, though for different reasons. Their respective principles were agrarianism and the Revolution, against capitalism and Britain. If the one in 1794 stood for state rights, and the other for a strong Federal government, it was only because the one was out and the other in. The distinction was accidental, and was exchanged after the Republicans came in and the Federalists went out.

Each party attempted to undercut the other on its home field, by appealing to some local interest or feeling contrary to the dominant one. Thus Maryland, the Leah to Virginia's Rachel, was normally a Federalist state. In Virginia, Federalists were found in the wheat-growing Shenandoah valley, which hated the planter aristocracy. In South Carolina, Charleston and the lowlands were Federalist. Similarly the Republicans reached out to the under-dog in New England. Maine, the frontier district of Massachusetts, was largely Republican; and the Baptists, Methodists, and other dissenters, who disliked their inferior status to the Congregational churches, were faithful Jeffersonians. All of which is an early illustration of another factor in American politics that makes them so puzzling to outsiders — the fact that both in motive and in purpose national politics are partly local. Thousands of votes in every presidential election are dictated by state politics, local hatreds, and neighborhood feuds.

Outside New York, where the Clintons and Burr proved more than a match for Hamilton and Jay, the most important group of northern Republicans was in Pennsylvania. Here were the genuine radicals and the professional politicians of the party. Pennsylvania politics had long been a matter of class and race, as we have seen. The back-country refused to pay Hamilton's excise; the mechanics were becoming class-conscious. Philadelphia carpenters struck for a twelve-hour day in 1791. Journeyman shoemakers organized in 1792 the first American labor union, which by strikes and boycotts, managed to force up their wages almost a hundred per cent, in the prosperous years of neutral trade. In 1805 one of these strikes occasioned the first labor conspiracy case in American judicial annals. The defendants were fined eight dollars and costs each, for 'entering into a combination to raise their wages.' These, and their compeers in New York, were the men who welcomed Genet and formed Jacobin clubs, and who stoned Hamilton when he spoke for Jay's treaty. The New York and Pennsylvania democracy became a firm ally to the Virginia aristocracy. But the Boston shipcaulkers and shoemakers, stout fellows who had done the mobbing for Sam Adams and Jim Otis in the 1770's, were won over by a younger Otis to the party that fostered shipping. The most lively hope of the Republicans was the West. Here was the most favorable soil for the growth of a party that opposed strong government, financiers, and Britain. The gallomania of 1792 lasted for some years beyond the Appalachians. Republicanism increased as backwoods population increased; and the Federalists, realizing that they were doomed to a minority position, adopted after 1800 an anti-Western policy that could end only in the division of the Union, or the submergence of Federalism.

Jefferson and Hamilton typified the two eternal spirits that contend for the government of all that men do or say: the spirit that creates and the spirit that denies, the hope that man can raise himself through the ages a little nearer God, and the mocking doubt that human nature can ever change its ways. There was not the same difference between the two parties that they organized. The Republicans may have had the greater share of optimism, and the Federalists of pessimism; but both had something to give their country, and both were guilty of appealing to men's fears and appetites. Jefferson's 'botanical excursion' of 1791 began the substitution of expediency for idealism, of the desire to win for the desire to serve; while the character of Washington, the genius of Hamilton, and the intellect of Marshall sublimated from a selfish and material policy the ideals of national integrity and international justice.

XIII

WASHINGTON CHOOSES PEACE

1794–1797

1. *Border Politics and Neutral Rights*

THE follies of Genet, and his disgrace, cooled American ardor for France. Yet no sooner had he been disposed of than fresh dry tinder was thrown on the hot embers of Anglo-American relations. By March 1794 the frontier and commercial controversies had become roaring furnaces; and it was doubtful whether the cool, calm temper of Washington was adequate to quench them.

John Graves Simcoe, Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Canada, was the principal disturbing factor on the border. Like Genet, Simcoe lends comic relief to a period of stress, and with the best of motives did mischief to his cause. It was a fixed idea with him that the rulers of America were cunning, deceitful, and revengeful; that the constant aim of Washington was to use the Northwest posts as a springboard for the conquest of Canada. Simcoe regarded himself as a promoter of Anglo-American concord; but his formula to attain that desirable result had the sole merit of originality. The British Government should endeavor to jockey Washington, Jefferson, and Hamilton out of office, to dissolve the Union, and to induce the Americans to 'adopt a Prince of the House of Brunswick for their future President or King.' Thus 'the happiness of the two nations would be interwoven and united — all jealousies removed and the most durable affections cemented.'

Grenville paid no attention to these hints; he had conceived a practical project for solving the Northwestern question. His Majesty's government would evacuate the occupied posts, if the United States would renounce all claims to them, and consent to the erection of a neutral Indian state covering the entire territory between the Lakes and the Ohio, together with a strip of northern New York and Vermont. Obviously, this solution would be even better for the Canadian fur-traders than holding the posts. It would fling the Canadian frontier southward to the line of 1774, and deprive the United States of the entire Middle West. Simcoe offered to mediate a peace between the United States and the Northwestern Indians with whom they were still at war. Jefferson refused (December 1792) to admit foreign mediation in a question that he regarded as domestic, but gratefully accepted the good offices of Simcoe to bring the Indians to a peaceful frame of mind. The Lieutenant-Governor then used every means fair and foul to produce the contrary result. Consequently, when the American commissioners were finally permitted to meet the Indian envoys, the latter refused to accept anything less than a retrocession of the whole Northwest Territory, with sections of Pennsylvania and New York that were already settled by whites. Reluctantly, the United States prepared to renew the Indian war.

The Northwest posts having failed him as a lever to deprive the United States of territory, Lord Grenville proposed to hold them for what they were worth. So he informed Pinckney in London, near the end of 1793, frankly abandoning the pretence that they would be evacuated when the United States gave full satisfaction for the debts. Washington's patience, Jefferson's forbearance, and Hamilton's long, uphill pull towards good understanding had apparently come to naught. What was left but war, for America to secure her own? The other burning issue of Atlantic commerce was flaring a like signal.

When England is at war, and the royal navy is measuring the extent of neutral rights, neutral commerce with her enemy is apt to thin out. The weaker naval powers had long endeavored to build up a positive law of neutral rights, with the doctrines of effective blockade, limited contraband, and 'free ships make free goods': doctrines which publicists long labored to write into law, only to see them go smash in 1914. The United States had subscribed to these principles in her treaties with Holland, France, and Prussia. As a neutral in the war of the French Revolution, she hoped to benefit by them. The first blow to her hope was the 'provision Order in Council' of 8 June 1793 instructing British naval commanders to bring in neutral grain vessels destined to France, for pre-emption of their cargoes. Before Jefferson had time to search his Vattel for verbal ammunition, a new Order in Council of unprecedented severity was issued on 6 November. Among other things, it directed the detention and adjudication of all ships laden with French colonial produce, whether French or neutral property; and all vessels carrying provisions to the French colonies.

The Caribbean was swarming with Yankee schooners and brigs when the order reached naval officers on that station. It was executed in a manner that reflected the navy's sharp hunger for prize-money, and the low salaries of admiralty judges in the West Indies. Everything was fish that came to their net. If a Maine schooner, laden with plank and salt cod, ventured into the harbor of St. George's, Bermuda, she was boarded by a gang of ruffians, stripped of her rudder and sails, spoiled of her stores, her seamen consigned to a calaboose if not impressed, and the vessel libelled in His Majesty's court of vice-admiralty. The burden of proof that the cargo was not somehow tainted by French association was placed upon the Yankee skipper. Of course he could appeal to a British court from the almost certain condemnation: an illusory privilege for the masters of small craft.

News of these captures brought consternation to the American trading community, which was the backbone of Hamilton's party. Hamilton himself was exasperated. Congress began war preparations, and clapped an embargo on the seaports. In the midst of the crisis, news leaked into the American papers of a truculent speech by the Governor of Canada to an Indian delegation, encouraging them to look for the king's aid shortly in driving the ' long knives ' across the Ohio for good and all.

A new British invasion of American territory had occurred, but fortunately was not yet known. As a ' defensive measure ' Simcoe built and garrisoned a new fort, on American soil at the Maumee rapids, a hundred miles southwest of Detroit.

In Congress the opposition party was not eager for war, but for Jefferson's and Madison's favorite plan of commercial retaliation, which would surely have led to war, as it did when Jefferson and Madison later tried it. The Federalists, scorning such measures as mischievous and futile, were beginning to think that war was inevitable, when Lord Grenville revoked the Order in Council under color of which the commerce spoliations had been perpetrated. This information was communicated to Congress on 4 April 1794; and on the 16th Washington nominated Chief Justice Jay as envoy extraordinary to Great Britain.

' My objects are, to prevent a war,' Washington wrote the Secretary of State, ‘ if justice can be obtained by fair and strong representations . . . of the injuries which this country has sustained from Great Britain in various ways,’ injuries which ‘ leave very unfavorable impressions of their friendship, and little to expect from their justice.’ Jay's nomination was confirmed by the Senate, and he left immediately for London. Through the influence of the new French minister with the opposition, the embargo was allowed to lapse. A large fleet of provision ships then sailed from the Chesapeake and slipped safely into Brest, in time to relieve the famine that accompanied the reign of terror.

2. *Jay's Mission and Treaty*

The appointment of Chief Justice Jay as envoy extraordinary to the Court of St. James's was not a happy one for the United States. John Jay was a model of abstract propriety and unblemished character, but his leaning toward Britain was too pronounced, and his self-esteem opened the way to judicious flattery. ‘ He can bear any opposition to what he advances, provided that regard is shown to his abilities,’ Grenville was advised. ‘ Mr. Jay's weak side is *Mr. Jay.*’

The atmosphere of Whitehall was favorable to negotiation for the first time since the fall of Shelburne's ministry, for things were going very ill for the coalition against France. There was danger of the United States joining the Northern powers in a second League of Armed Neutrality — Jay was instructed to do so if his mission failed. War with the United States would mean the loss of England's best customer, the possible loss of Canada, an unprofitable diversion of the battle fleet, and a new enemy of potential naval strength. It would mean a serious embarrassment of the British West Indies, deprived of their collusive supplies of American grain. Finally, a batch of Hammond's dispatches that arrived with Jay in June, 1794, showed that quick action was necessary to undo the mischievous work of Dorchester, Simcoe, and the Caribbean squadron.

Such was the diplomatic hand, as it might have been played by a shrewd diplomatist who knew all the cards. Unfortunately for both countries, John Jay was not a shrewd diplomatist. He was blind to the cards that fate had placed in his hands, and ready to pay a higher price for peace than his opponent. Moreover, the only ace that Jay possessed, the threat to join the League of Armed Neutrality, was thrown away by Alexander Hamilton, who gratuitously informed Hammond that it was the settled policy of his government 'to avoid entangling itself with European connections.' Hamilton was right and the policy was correct; but it was hardly the moment for such excessive frankness. Lord Grenville received the news in time to stiffen him against concessions.

The treaty of London, 19 November 1794, has always been known as Jay's treaty. After comparing the treaty with Jay's instructions, and with his and Grenville's first drafts, one is at a loss whether to wonder more at the weakness of the American, or the keen tenacity of the Briton, who at the same time was handling with equal ability the many other and more important lines of British foreign policy. Jay secured the main object of his mission, the evacuation of the Northwest posts. In return, he had to admit fur-trading over the northern border. No renunciation of the pretended right to meddle with the Indians on the American side of the border could be obtained. Grenville, in fact, instructed Hammond to revive the Indian buffer-state project, on the very day after the treaty was signed, in the hope of getting it through before the evacuation of the posts was completed. Wayne's victory over the Indians prevented this; but the project was not finally put to sleep until 1814. Jay did, however, prevent a rectification of frontier in the Northwest, which would have given Canada a corridor to the site of St. Paul, Minnesota; and eventually would have made the international boundary the forty-fifth instead of the forty-ninth parallel of latitude. Questions of British spoliations on American commerce, of uncollected debts, and of the Maine–New Brunswick boundary, were wisely referred to mixed commissions — a precedent of great value for subsequent diplomacy.

In the commercial articles of the treaty, which were limited to ten years' duration, the principle of most-favored nation was established. Jay acquiesced in the British doctrine of contraband and neutral rights, contrary to the previous policy of his Government, and obtained no stipulation on impressment, which was already beginning to disturb Anglo-American relations. Article XII, which was struck out before ratification, was the most exceptionable. In return for a limited entry to the British West Indies of American vessels not over seventy tons burden, Jay agreed to the prohibition of export from the United States, in American vessels, of sugar, coffee, cocoa, and cotton; all of which articles, as he should have known, were of increasing importance in American foreign trade. The concession, however, was immaterial, for the British West India ports were almost continuously kept open by local proclamations and orders in council to American ships and products from 1793 to 1813, so dependent were they upon America for provisions.

Jay's treaty was a victory for British diplomacy. The United States was forced to ransom its own property, the Northwest posts, by humiliating concessions as to commerce, shipping, and maritime rights. It embroiled the United States with France, and thus threw American weight into the allied scale, until the Peace of Amiens. In driving so sharp a bargain, Lord Grenville really served his country ill. More generous concessions might have lost British merchants and shippers a few hundred thousand pounds; but would have had the same political result, and left no bitterness behind. Jay's treaty is largely responsible for the American popular tradition that British diplomatists are more to be feared than British battleships.

Washington read the treaty with dismay. In his usual deliberate manner he gathered the opinions of his advisers; and decided to accept it, as the only honorable alternative to war. He wrote Morris:

> 'Peace has been the order of the day with me since the disturbances in Europe first commenced. My policy has been, and will continue to be, while I have the honor to remain in the administration of the government, to be upon friendly terms with, but independent of, all the nations of the earth; to share in the broils of none; to fulfil our own engagements; to supply the wants and be carrier for them all; being thoroughly convinced that it is our policy and interest so to do. Nothing short of self-respect, and that justice which is essential to a national character, ought to involve us in war; for sure I am, if this country is preserved in tranquillity twenty years longer, it may bid defiance in a just cause to any power whatever; such in that time will be its population, wealth and resources.'

While the treaty was still before the Senate in secret executive session, the terms of it leaked out; and a howl of execration went up from one end of the country to the other. Any British treaty would have been opposed by some; and it took a long view like Washington's to see the value of Jay's. Randolph, the Secretary of State, was against ratification, the French Minister actively intrigued against it, but a bare two-thirds' majority was obtained, and the President ratified the treaty on 25 June 1795. It was one of his wisest and bravest acts in a life filled with wisdom and courage.

Nevertheless, there was one last chance that the posts would not be evacuated. In 1796 the House of Representatives threatened to wreck the treaty by withholding supply for the mixed commissions; but a powerful speech by Fisher Ames obtained just enough votes to prevent the mischief. Michilimackinac, the last frontier post, was evacuated on 2 October 1796, twelve years after the treaty of peace was ratified. Lord Shelburne, who had been responsible for the treaty line so long withheld, wrote to an American friend in 1797:

> 'I cannot express to you the satisfaction I have felt in seeing the forts given up . . . the deed is done; and a strong foundation laid for eternal amity between England and America. General Washington's conduct is above all praise. He has left a noble example to sovereigns and nations; present and to come.'

3. *The Frontier Gates Swing Open*

While Jay was absent on his mission, General Wayne gave the Northern Indians a tragic proof of their folly in listening to Simcoe. In October 1793 he moved the 'Legion of the United States,' a regular army of two thousand men, into winter quarters at the site of Greenville, in the heart of the Ohio wilderness. 'Mad Anthony,' as Wayne had been called after his gallant storming of Stony Point in 1779, had a cool head. An admirable disciplinarian, he trained his troops in the technique of forest warfare, and the Indians gave them plenty of practice. Several hundred Kentucky mounted riflemen, as hard-bitten a lot of troopers as ever swung steel, dressed in coonskin caps and buckskin hunting shirts, and mounted on wiry, catlike nags that responded to the hideous clamor of the war-whoop as to a view-hallo, joined him in the spring of 1794.

Simcoe, convinced in spite of repeated official denials that Wayne's real objective was Detroit, strengthened his new fort on the Maumee and bent all his energy to mobilizing the Indians. Cautious counsels from the home government went unheeded. Wampum belts, 'speeches,' even Yankee scalps obtained in early skirmishes, were sent out by forest trails, in order to induce all the braves to join. Provisions, blankets, muskets, powder and ball, and vermilion war-paint, were dispensed from government depots and arsenals to the enemies of a country with which His Britannic Majesty was at peace.

When the oak leaves were fully out and nature's ambush was complete, the Indians attacked Wayne's fort. After beating them off, Wayne took the offensive. Advancing cautiously through the primeval hardwood, protected by a screen of picked scouts, he debouched into the Erie plain, and found himself in the granary of the Indians. The margins of the Maumee and the Glaize were one continuous village, with log cabins, fruit trees, and fields of rustling corn extending to the forest edge. In the midst of these savage gardens Wayne built Fort Defiance, a stockade with block-house bastions. There he offered peace once more, and once more it was rejected. The Indians retreated to the vicinity of the new British fort, and took cover behind a natural stockade of fallen trees. There were fifteen hundred to two thousand of them: Miamis under Little Turtle who had ambushed St. Clair in 1791, Black Wolf with his Shawnee, the 'three fires' of the Ottawa, Chippewa, and Pottawatomi under Blue Jacket, Sauk and Fox from Lake Superior, a few Iroquois die-hards, and seventy white Canadian rangers under an old loyalist captain. On 20 August Wayne marched forth to meet them. A squadron of dragoons charged on the Indians' left flank. Both the American captains were picked off, but a lieutenant took command, and the troopers, jumping their game little horses over the fallen timber as in a steeplechase, burst in on the redskins and gave them cold steel. On their front the infantry and riflemen poured in a volley of hot stuff, and charged with fixed bayonets before the Indians had time to reload. In forty minutes it was all over.

The Indians fell back on the British fort at the rapids, with the cavalry hard at their heels. A Campbell was in command of the fort. He ordered Wayne to keep off. The cannon were shotted, and the port fire was lighted. Wayne's men were eager to storm; but 'Mad Anthony' didn't like the looks of the guns. He remembered his instructions to respect the British flag, and kept his men beyond range.

Wayne had done enough. This 'Battle of the Fallen Timbers' scattered the distant tribesmen, and enabled him ruthlessly to destroy the Indian villages and lay waste their cornfields. Fort Wayne was built at the forks of the Maumee, and the legion returned to Greenville, to await envoys of peace. Lord Dorchester and Governor Simcoe still had enough influence with the Indians to keep them from negotiation by the pleasing hope that Jay would be forced to recognize the Ohio boundary at London. As soon as the news of Jay's treaty reached the frontier, Indian delegations began to pour in on Wayne at Greenville.

On 16 June 1795 there were enough sachems and warriors assembled for Wayne to open the peace conference. Imagine a broad clearing in the forest; the great bark-roofed council house, open at the sides and with a council fire in the middle; on one side of the fire a semicircle of war-chiefs, warriors, and sachems, splendid in their gaudy match-coats, quills, and feathers; on the other General Wayne and his lean officers; a ring of lounging soldiers beyond; and a background of hickory, oak, and buckeye trees in the green of early summer. The calumet of peace is passed around, and Wayne opens the conference in the name of the 'Fifteen Fires of America.'

> 'I take you all by the hand as brothers, assembled for the good work of peace. . . . The Great Spirit has favored us with a clear sky and refreshing breeze. . . .
>
> 'I have cleared this ground of all brush and rubbish, and opened roads to the East, to the West, to the North, and to the South, that all nations may come in safety and ease to meet me. The ground on which this council house stands is unstained with blood, and is as pure as the heart of General Washington, the great chief of America. . . .
>
> 'I have this day kindled the Council Fire of the United States: we will now cover it up and keep it alive, until the remainder of the different tribes assemble, and form a full meeting and representation.
>
> 'I now deliver to each tribe present a string of white wampum, to serve as records of the friendship that is this day commenced between us.
>
> 'The heavens are bright, the roads are open; we will rest in peace and love; and wait the arrival of our brothers. In the interim, we will have a little drink, and wash the dust out of our throats. We will, on this happy occasion, be merry, without however passing the bounds of temperance and sobriety.'

A little drink it had to be, for Greenville was seventy miles from the nearest frontier distillery, and fresh delegations of thirsty redskins came pouring in until warriors and sachems, representing all the tribes between the Great Lakes, the Mississippi, and the Ohio, were assembled to the number of eleven hundred and thirty. The tedious conferences went on through interpreters. The dignified chief Tetabokshke spoke for the Delaware; the thirsty New Corn for the Pottawatomi; the officious Mashipinashiwish or Bad Bird for the Chippewa; and Agooshaway for the Ottawa braves. Little Turtle came, sulky and contumacious after a hungry winter among his devastated cornfields; and the plausible Blue Jacket, with an interesting story of Canadian efforts to keep him from the council fire. General Wayne, instructed by the President to require no more land than the Indians had already ceded in 1789, bent his efforts toward obtaining the unanimous consent of the conference. Overlapping claims of various tribes, the stubbornness of Little Turtle, and the difficulty of adjusting compensation, consumed over six weeks' time, together with enormous quantities of corn and flesh, wampum and whiskey.

On 30 July the articles were read, and the assembled warriors gave the shout of assent. Three days passed in eating and drinking while the treaty was engrossed; and on 3 August 1795 the General signed his name, and the chieftains their marks, to the Treaty of Greenville. By this treaty the Indians ceded the southeastern corner of the Northwest Territory, together with several small enclaves such as Vincennes, Detroit, and the site of Chicago, in return for annuities to the value of some ten thousand dollars. So ended almost twenty years of fighting: the last phase of the War of Independence. Peace came to the border from the Genesee country to the Mississippi. Pioneers began to swarm up the valleys of the Scioto and the Muskingum, and in ten years' time their insatiable greed for land made the Treaty of Greenville a mere scrap of paper.

* * * *

Spanish-American relations were badly befogged in 1795, when Jay's treaty came as a clearing breeze. The Baron de Carondelet, governor of Louisiana, continued Miró's policy of cutting out a buffer state from trans-Appalachia, by his method of angling in western waters with golden bait. Not to be outdone by Simcoe, Carondelet established a new fort on American territory, at Chickasaw Bluffs (Memphis), which helped him to control the Mississippi. The Creek and Cherokee nations were persuaded to denounce their treaties of 1790–91 with the United States. This exposed them to attacks from backwoodsmen and land-jobbers of Tennessee and Georgia. One of Genet's disbanded major-generals attempted to establish a 'Trans-Oconee Republic'; Wilkinson's conspiracy continued in Kentucky; yet even if Kentucky seceded from the United States, a Spanish-American war could not be much longer delayed.

When Jay's treaty was published, Spain had made her peace with France, and was preparing to enter the French system of alliances. Her statesman, Godoy, observing that the Western intrigues had failed, deemed it prudent for Spain to meet the United States halfway, rather than risk losing all Louisiana to American filibusters. In the Treaty of San Lorenzo (27 October 1795) His Catholic Majesty accordingly granted the right to navigate the lower Mississippi, as well as the ' right of deposit ' at New Orleans so ardently desired by the West; and recognized the thirty-first parallel as the southern boundary of the United States. It was not, however, until 1798, after exhausting all its rich resource in procrastination, that the Spanish government evacuated the posts it held north of that line. So that, in all, fifteen years elapsed before the United States obtained control of their own territories from European powers.

4. *The Whiskey Rebellion*

In the very week that Wayne crushed the Indians, President Washington was calling out fifteen thousand militia to put down pale-face rebels in western Pennsylvania. This Whiskey Rebellion, as it was humorously named, tested the ability of the Federal government to enforce federal law. Hamilton's Excise Act of 1791 appeared as unjust and tyrannical to the Westerners as had the Stamp Act to the Colonists. Beyond the mountains distillation was the only practical method to dispose of surplus corn, unless you had gold to grease the palms of Spanish officials down-river. Whiskey also did duty as currency — a gallon jug of ' moonshine ' passing for a shilling in every store on the western slope of the Alleghanies. Modifications of the excise law, which Hamilton wished to enforce more as a measure of social discipline than as a source of revenue, obtained some measure of compliance in the Southern mountains. Western Pennsylvania, however, was peopled by men of the Ulster breed, who had a moral sanction for their interests and appetites. Covenants were formed never to pay the hated tax; there were masked night-riders, and whippings and other methods of terrorism, familiar even yet in parts of the United States. In 1794, when a federal marshal appeared at Pittsburgh with a bundle of writs against delinquent distillers, he and the nearest excise-man were roughly handled. Led by two backwoods demagogues named Bradford and Husband, the people held mass meetings, appointed a committee of public safety, and called out the militia of the four western counties to protect the spirituous liberties of the people. But for the moderating influence of Albert Gallatin, an embryo statesman of the frontier, there would probably have been a declaration of independence. Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania minimized the affair, and refused to lend the aid of state forces.

It was the essence of the Federal Constitution that the Federal government should have a compulsive operation on individuals. Coercion by law was preferred to coercion by arms; but to deal with forcible obstruction of judicial process, Congress was given power 'to provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union.' By law, Congress had authorized the President to call out state militia, in such contingency. It remained to be seen whether he would dare exercise the authority, and whether the militia would obey. Washington, on Hamilton's urgent plea, decided to make a test case of the Pennsylvania defiance of federal law.

Everything worked smoothly. The militia of four states, including Pennsylvania, turned out upon the President's proclamation. They were given a good, stiff hike across the Alleghanies in the glorious Indian summer. The more violent leaders of the rebels fled, and the covenanters promptly caved in. Two ringleaders, who were apprehended and convicted of treason, were pardoned by the President. Henceforth, persons and interests who had a grievance against the law, had to carry their state, and evolve the doctrine of state rights as a shelter against federal authority. That form of resistance was not conclusively dealt with until 1865.

Hamilton, unable to support an expensive family on his salary, resigned his office after the Whiskey Rebellion was suppressed, and resumed his law practice in New York. His intelligence and judgement had so impressed Washington and the cabinet that they continued to consult him by letter on all important questions of foreign and domestic policy. On the determination of both, Hamilton's pen was the most powerful single influence until he broke with John Adams, in 1799.

5. *The Western Policy of 1796*

Now that Jay's treaty and Wayne's victory had caused the gates of the frontier to swing open, it was time to decide how the land ceded by the Indians should be disposed of. An American colonial policy had been determined once and for all by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, but the land policy blocked out in the Ordinance of 1785 was not binding on the Federal government. Owing to the attitude of the Northwest Indians, there had been little settlement north of the Ohio before 1796; but now that a good part of the territory was really open to settlement, it was time to decide matters of land disposal.

Every feature of American society that men of Hamilton's stamp disliked — political democracy, rude plenty, undiversified economic system — depended on an ample supply of cheap land for settlers. In the Federal Convention of 1787 Charles Pinckney predicted that the

> 'vast extent of unpeopled territory, which opens to the frugal and industrious a sure road to competency and independence, will effectually prevent for a considerable time the increase of the poor and discontented, and be the means of preserving that equality of condition that so eminently distinguishes us.'

Albert Gallatin, in the debate on the Land Bill of 1796, said that

> 'if the cause of the happiness of this country was examined into, it would be found to arise as much from the great plenty of land in proportion to the inhabitants . . . as from the wisdom of their political institutions.'

Forty-three years later Lord Durham in his report on Canada asserted 'that the amazing prosperity of the United States is less owing to their form of government, than to the unlimited supply of fertile land, which maintains succeeding generations in an undiminishing affluence of fertile soil.'

Yet the converse is also true. Self-government and democracy were necessary conditions of opening the public domain to the American people. We have already followed the attempts of the British government to restrict western settlement in 1763–64. The public land system of Canada is a fair example of what the American pioneer would have had imposed upon him if the War of Independence had turned out differently. In order to foster loyalty on the basis of privilege, Lord Dorchester produced a bureaucratic travesty of the New England township system, with extensive crown and clergy reserves, and enormous free grants to loyalists and officials. During the administration of one Canadian governor, almost a million and a half acres were granted to sixty individuals; yet would-be settlers found it almost impossible to obtain land at a reasonable price.

Some such device for keeping the poor from the land would have been adopted in the United States if men like Hamilton, Jay, and Morris had determined the public land policy. Many influential Easterners had land of their own, purchased from the states or from the Confederation, which they wished to dispose of before throwing open the West. Others regarded pioneers as a public nuisance. Hamilton's ideas on the subject were determined by his zeal for a division of American labor. He wished to populate more thickly and exploit more fully the Eastern States, and to retard migration of any sort. With labor running off to the backwoods, how could you build up manufactures? Washington, however, owned western land and was Western-minded. In 1784 he proposed that the public domain be sold at a sufficient price to deter speculators, but to accommodate the more solid sort of settler.

If any member of Congress in 1796 shared Hamilton's views he did not dare avow it. William Smith of South Carolina, who reported the land bill, said that the committee had two objects in view: 'to raise revenue, and to sell land in such lots as would be most convenient for settlers.' Madison, who thought the main thing was 'to fill the treasury as soon as possible,' was for throwing the whole public domain on the market at once, in lots six miles square, in order to pay off the national debt. Gallatin, a backwoods philosopher of noble birth, pointed out that this wholesale disposal would place the public domain in the hands of speculators. He proposed to encourage a gradual alienation to actual settlers, at a fixed price, in lots of one hundred to six hundred acres.

The point of view of this Congress, as of its successors, was quantitative rather than qualitative; yet there were a few members who believed the vital question was not how fast the West could be settled, but the sort of West we would have when it was settled. American colonial experience proved that land tenure and distribution largely determined the nature of society. New England, as we have seen, had been settled by compact groups, detaching themselves successively from the older settlements, and presenting an unbroken frontier line to the wilderness. The proprietary colonies treated their wild land mainly as a source of revenue for the proprietor, who sold it in convenient lots to individual settlers, retaining a quit-rent for himself. In Virginia, and the South generally, the practice of ' indiscriminate location ' prevailed. An individual obtained a land warrant entitling him to so many acres; ' located ' them whereever he pleased in the public domain, and received a title from the Crown after performing some rite of cultivation or settlement. From this method arose the dispersed settlement, large plantations, loose government, and individualism characteristic of the South, as compact village communities were characteristic of New England. The New England way preserved the rudiments of civilization — the church, the common school, an instinct for orderly government, and a way of life that found room for contemplation, if slight place for beauty. Kentucky pioneers had as good stuff in them as the Yankees; but circumstances led them to slough off the slight cultural equipment they brought from an individualistic society. Only a few years ago one could find in log cabins of the Kentucky mountains calf-bound volumes of Pope and Johnson that ' great-grandpaw toted over from old Virginny '; but that great-grandson could not read. The Southern pioneer often had to descend to the redskin's level before he could rise again; and the leaven that made him rise was not infrequently furnished by a New England neighbor or by a Southern aristocrat bringing his library and his traditions together with his slaves.

In the debates of 1796 a few members expressed this qualitative point of view; and, curiously enough, they were not New England members. Robert Goodloe Harper, from the Carolina Piedmont, insisted that the first object of a national land policy should be ' to secure order and good government ' in the newly settled regions. William Findlay, a Pennsylvania democrat of Irish birth, pointed out that dispersion had caused much unhappiness on the frontier; whilst compact settlement enabled pioneers to obtain good schools and social intercourse. He did not think it practicable to reproduce the New England system absolutely, ' but he would have it approached to.' A model was ready at hand, the Ordinance of 1785, which adopted the New England unit and method of survey, as opposed to the Southern system of indiscriminate location, which had covered most of Kentucky and Tennessee with a triple layer of irregular and conflicting grants. So by the Congress of 1796, as by the Congress of the Confederation, the township six miles square, surveyed in compact ranges or columns, starting on the western boundary of Pennsylvania, was made the unit of public land. Each township was divided into thirty-six sections of one square mile (640 acres) each. No land was to be placed on sale until surveyed, or surveyed until the Indian title of occupancy was extinguished.

This method of survey made for simplicity, cheapness, and a clear title. It set the pattern of the American West. Ranges, townships, and sections marched across the continent with the pioneer, imposing their rigid rectangles on forest, plain, and mountain.

The question of large plots or small was determined by a compromise, which one member called a wholesale and retail method. The Act of 1796 required alternate townships to be sold in blocks of eight sections; intervening townships in single sections of 640 acres. Government land offices were established at Philadelphia for the sale of the large lots, which it was expected would appeal to moneyed men and speculators, and at Pittsburgh and Cincinnati for the sale of the sections, in order to serve the actual settlers. For both large and small lots the method of sale was public auction, at the upset price of two dollars an acre, to be paid by instalments within three years. Salt springs were reserved in order to prevent the monopolizing of that frontier necessity, and four sections in every township were withheld from sale until 1804, in the hope of a higher price. Two dollars an acre was fixed upon as a sufficient price to prevent large areas being engrossed by speculators; and it proved to be adequate for a time; but the smallest unit was too large and the price too high for the ordinary sort of pioneer, who at that time could obtain land in Maine, New York, and the Western Reserve, for as little as fifty cents an acre.

The Act of 1796 applied only to the land ceded by the Treaty of Greenville; and, owing to the delay of Congress in making appropriations for surveys, only seven ranges of townships were sold before 1800. In that year Congress lowered the unit of sale to a quarter-section of 160 acres. As thus amended the Act was copied for every new acquisition from the Indians in the Northwest Territory until 1820.[1] By that time eighteen federal land offices were open for sales to settlers. When Ohio, the first 'public land state,' was admitted in 1802 the Federal government adopted the precedent of retaining title to all ungranted land within the state boundaries, excepting a donation of one section in each township to a state fund for education. Thus the Act of 1796, drafted by ordinary members of an average Congress, set the rhythm of American social development for a century to come.

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[1] In 1803 it was extended to the remainder of the Mississippi Territory that was not covered by state grants; and two years later the system of survey was extended to the Louisiana purchase, although the complicated French and Spanish grants prevented the sale of government land west of the Mississippi until twelve years more had elapsed.

Until 1825 the frontier in the northwest was advanced mainly by pioneers and settlers of the Kentucky type. Adventurous youths of New England and New York contributed their quota to the army of professional pioneers, who acted as a shock battalion for the permanent settlers. These men, inured to hardship and danger, seldom acquired a title to land, and remained in one spot only long enough to deplete the game, or exhaust their clearings by crude cropping with rude implements. When large plantations cultivated by slave labor became established in Kentucky, the hardened pioneer moved southwest or northwest as a stage in his journey to Texas and the Pacific. 'No people are so adapted to encounter the fatigues and privations of the wilderness; none form such efficient pioneers of civilization,' said an English observer. They lightened the labors of the settlers that followed, and provided the trained scouts and sharpshooters for Indian wars. Their wild, free life gave America much of its old-time gusto and savor; and if they left a taint of lawlessness and violence, they also carried forward the robust tradition of individual prowess that has given America its present place in the world.

Closely connected with Western land problems were Indian relations, the old stumbling-block of English statesmen and colonial politicians. Washington believed that friendly relations could not be maintained 'whilst land-jobbing, and the disorderly conduct of our borderers, are suffered with impunity.' Earlier precedents and piecemeal laws were codified and rounded out in another Act of 1796 'to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indian tribes, and to preserve peace on the frontiers.' The basic principle, which Parliament had vainly tried to enforce in the Thirteen Colonies, was the right of the natives to protection from encroachment by the whites, so long as they kept within recognized boundaries. These were described in the Act by tracing a frontier line, incorporating all previous treaties with the Indians.[2] Beyond this frontier no lease or sale of land was valid, unless by public treaty between a tribal assembly and the United States. Traders must take out a federal licence and obey federal regulations. Superintendents of, and agents for, the Indians were empowered to enforce the law, and adjust disputes.

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[2] See map in frontispiece.

In order to give the Indians an opportunity for fair trade, and to push American influence in competition with the organized companies of Canada (which by Jay's treaty had the right to trade with Indians on United States territory), a system of government trading-houses was established. The federal agencies or 'factories' met with strong opposition from private American fur-traders, with whose profits and rapacious methods they interfered. After a precarious existence, hampered by red tape and starved by Congress, they were wound up in 1822. Nor did the Act 'to preserve peace on the frontiers' accomplish much. Few Indian chiefs were strong enough to deter young braves from their hobbies of horse stealing and scalp collecting; and neither superintendents nor frontier garrisons could prevent chronic trespassing on Indian lands, which had been going on since the colonies were founded, and which is likely to continue so long as Indians hold lands that white men covet.

6. *The Farewell Address*

Organization of a government, establishment of national credit, a wise fostering of maritime commerce, recovery of territory withheld under the Confederation, the crushing of red rebels and white, the establishment of a land policy which set the rhythm of American society, and the preservation of peace: these were the notable achievements of the two administrations of President Washington. By refusing to run for a third term he established the two-term tradition in national politics, and on 17 September 1796, he summed up his political experience in a farewell address to his countrymen.[3]

For a paper addressed to a people in a peculiar stage of their development, its permanent truth and value are surprisingly great. An eloquent plea for union as *pax Americana* is followed by a pointed exposition of disruptive tendencies: the politician's device of misrepresenting 'the opinions and aims of other districts' in order to acquire influence within his own; the forming of combinations to override or control the constituted authorities; the ' baneful effects of the Spirit of Party,' a spirit ' having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind.' As to foreign policy:

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[3] The authorship of this address is discussed in W. C. Ford's *Washington,* and in Lodge's edition of Hamilton's *Writings,* vii. 143–5. Washington began it in 1792, when he was thinking of retiring; and the final version was so much the result of an interchange of drafts between him and Hamilton that some of the latter's biographers have claimed for him the full credit. There is no doubt that the address owes much of its point and polish to Hamilton's revisions; yet the real authorship was Washington's in a more fundamental sense than the Monroe Doctrine was Monroe's; for the ideas were his.

> 'Observe good faith and justice towards all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . . In the execution of such a plan nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded; and that in place of them just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The Nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred or an habitual fondness is in some degree a slave.'

Washington's famous doctrine of isolation is contained in the following sentences:

> 'Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation. — Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities. Our detached and distant situation invites us to pursue a different course. . . . 'Tis our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances, with any portion of the foreign world. . . . Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.'

The Farewell Address fell on deaf ears in a Europe that was ringing with the exploits of a new hero, Bonaparte. But there it was written, for whosoever cared to read, that a new power considered herself outside the European system. It was little heeded in America, where the leading politicians believed that the dearest interests of their respective parties were bound up with England or with France.

' I now compare myself,' wrote Washington on 2 March 1797, ' to the wearied traveller who seeks a resting place, and is bending his body to lean thereon. But to be suffered to do *this* in peace is too much to be endured by *some*.' During his last year in office the President was assailed with a virulence such as few of his successors have suffered. Jefferson, in a private letter which found its way into print, referred to the President as a ' Samson in the field and Solomon in the Council ' whose head had been ' shorn by the harlot

England.' The Philadelphia *Aurora,* on the morrow of Washington's retirement, proclaimed that 'this day ought to be a Jubilee in the United States . . . for the man who is the source of all the misfortunes of our country, is this day reduced to a level with his fellow citizens.'

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A generation passed before Washington's services in time of peace were adequately appreciated in his own country; and as his personality has faded into legend, it has been clothed in army uniform. Washington's unique place in history rests not only on his leadership in war, and his influence in organizing the Federal government; not merely on his integrity, good judgment, and magnanimity, but also on his courageous stand for peace when his countrymen were clamoring for war. This quiet, plain-speaking gentleman of Virginia glimpsed a truth hidden from his more talented contemporaries: that the means by which a nation proceeds, especially in its adolescence, are more important than the ends which it pursues.

XIV

JOHN ADAMS'S ADMINISTRATION

1797–1801

1. *French Policy and Federalist Apprehensions*

THE presidential election of 1796 was the first to be contested by party candidates, but there were no formal nominations; everything was arranged through private consultation and correspondence among the national and state leaders. By the implied terms of the Virginia-New York alliance, the Republicans decided to support Jefferson and Burr for President and Vice-President; the Federalists, to make a balanced ticket, nominated John Adams and Thomas Pinckney. Jay's treaty was the central issue of the campaign. The result was a narrow Federalist victory. Adams obtained the Presidency with 71 votes in the electoral college. Jefferson's 68 votes made him Vice-President by the curious method of choice that then prevailed.

When John Adams became President, on 4 March 1797, he found the situation more difficult than Washington had in 1794. Jay's treaty had embroiled the United States with a more powerful and aggressive France than the country that sent Genet to America. Danton and Robespierre, uniformly friendly to the United States, had been guillotined. France was under the five-headed executive known as the Directory, which had completely abandoned the republican idealism of 1792 for the traditional idea of a French hegemony of Europe. With some justice, the Directory regarded Jay's treaty as evidence of an Anglo-American entente, for by accepting the British view of neutral rights, the United States was forced to order French privateers out of her harbors and to permit the capture of provision ships destined for France. James Monroe, who had been received as American minister under an earlier regime with enthusiastic speeches and fraternal embraces, lost his balance and his usefulness under these new circumstances, and was recalled by

Washington in 1796. Party feeling was so bitter in the United States that several followers of Jefferson even urged the French minister at Philadelphia to advise his government to retaliate against American shipping — largely owned by Federalists. The Directory, accordingly, loosed its corsairs against the American merchant fleet. The ensuing French spoliations on commerce made those of Britain in 1793 seem mild in comparison. Even provision ships sent to the French islands by French consuls were taken and condemned. In June 1797 the Secretary of State reported that over three hundred American vessels had been captured under color of French authority.

The Directory refused to receive Monroe's successor at Paris, and its official language towards the United States became insolent and provocative. President Adams declared that he would not submit to further indignities, but hoped to maintain Washington's policy of neutrality. Hamilton wished to avoid a rupture with France, until it were known how her negotiations with Britain were coming out. Following the Jay precedent, another effort was made to obtain justice through diplomacy. In order to satisfy the Republicans that he was not seeking a quarrel, Adams appointed Elbridge Gerry, *persona grata* to them and to France; and in order to keep Gerry out of mischief, John Marshall and C. C. Pinckney were joined with him in the mission.

The first year of Adams's administration passed before news arrived from the three ambassadors. In the meantime, the party cleavage became deeper. The Republicans, refusing to believe that the French Government had changed its character since 1792, stoutly defended the spoliations as a proper answer to Jay's treaty. To the Federalists, on the other hand, France had become just such an object of fear and loathing as, in 1920, the Soviet Union became. Even Hamilton, in reviewing 'the disgusting spectacle of the French Revolution,' bemoaned free love and worship of reason, which, he insisted, were still officially supported in Paris. A New England clergyman, reading Robison's *Proofs of a Conspiracy,* spread the news that the French Revolution was simply a conspiracy engineered by the 'Illuminati' of Bavaria against government, religion, and morality; and that Jefferson was their head agent to subvert American Society.[1] This simple explanation of hateful but bewildering phenomena was no less satisfying in 1797 than in the 1920's when professional patriots in England and the United States revived the hoary hoax.

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[1] President Dwight of Yale predicted in his Fourth of July Sermon of 1798 that Jeffersonian Republicanism meant nothing less than 'our wives and daughters the victims of legal prostitution; soberly dishonored; speciously polluted . . . our

European events gave reason to those who asserted that France was a world menace. The Directory, in its endeavors to conquer the ' natural frontiers ' of France, erected vassal republics beyond by exporting the Jacobinism that it proscribed at home. The civilized world was fast dividing into those who had made terms with France, and those who had not; and at the end of 1797 Britain and the United States were the only two countries who had not. ' If England will persevere,' wrote Senator Cabot, ' she will save Europe and save us; but if she yields, all will be lost.' ' She is now the only barrier between us and the deathly embraces of our dear Allies — between universal irreligion, immorality and plunder, and what order, probity, virtue and religion is left.' Surely, as in 1917, the alternative was to fight on England's side, or fight alone later.

So reasoned the Federalists. We now know that their fears were exaggerated, for the rulers in Paris were too well informed to try in America their favorite formula of revolution pushed home by invasion. Yet the French designs on Canada, Louisiana, and Florida were more definite and dangerous than even the Federalists supposed. Reviving a policy that brought on the Seven Years' War, the Directory sought to cover both flanks of the United States with French territory, and push back their boundaries to the Appalachians. The *habitants* of Quebec were being plied with propaganda for a Canadian republic under French protection. Pressure was brought to bear on the Spanish court to obtain the Floridas and Louisiana, as the French ministers in America had been urging since 1789. General Collot stated the argument neatly:

> ' France must acquire Louisiana and the Floridas by negotiation, and Canada by force, as the only means to contain the United States within peaceful bounds, to break their exclusive relations with England, to preserve our colonies exclusively to ourselves by feeding them with the products of our own soil, and, finally, to recover in both hemispheres that preponderance to which nature entitles us.'

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sons become the disciples of Voltaire, and the dragoons of Marat.' Similar arguments, with the Robison *Proofs*, have often been used against liberal and anti-militarist organizations since the World War.

With the Spanish possessions, the Directory proposed to take over Spain's American policy. In 1796 relations were renewed with Genet's unpaid warriors, a fresh lot of agents was sent into the western country, and Milfort, the half-breed war chief of the Creek nation, was commissioned brigadier-general in the armies of the French Republic.

The American peace commission arrived at Paris in October 1797, an unpropitious moment, since the Directors had just pulled off a *coup d'état* against the peace party, and Bonaparte had won a successful treaty with Austria. The Directors, at least one of whom had a pecuniary interest in privateering, felt they could with impunity continue *une petite guerre clandestine* against the United States. A comic, if one-sided, bit of bargaining ensued. Talleyrand, the Directory's minister of foreign affairs, sent some hangers-on (referred to in the dispatches as X, Y, and Z) to play on the fears of the American envoys, and sound their pockets. A bribe for the minister, and a loan as compensation for the President's message, were the prerequisites to negotiation. Pressed for an alternative, Monsieur Y hinted at the power of the French party in America, and recalled the fate of recalcitrant republics. The American envoys, understanding that bribery was necessary in dealing with the Directory, were prepared to come down handsomely for some definite concession; but a loan of ten million dollars on doubtful security together with a gift of $250,000 to Talleyrand, seemed excessive for mere recognition. 'Our case is different from that of the minor nations of Europe,' Marshall informed Monsieur Y. 'They were unable to maintain their independence, and did not expect to do so. America is a great, and, so far as concerns her self-defense, a powerful nation.' After several months of this sort of thing, Marshall and Pinckney took their leave. Gerry, fondly believing his presence necessary to avert war, remained in Paris.

The envoys' dispatches, recording in detail their strange experiences, were submitted by President Adams early in 1798 to Congress, and published in April, 1798. The public was deeply moved by this first-hand view of French diplomacy. On the Republicans their effect was stupefying. 'Trimmers dropt off from the party like windfalls from an apple tree in September,' wrote Fisher Ames. Jefferson 'thought it his duty to be silent.' Loyal addresses poured in on President and Congress, indignation meetings were held, reams of patriotic poetry were produced, and ' millions for defence, but not one cent for tribute ' became the toast of the day.

2. *Hostilities but not War*

Alexander Hamilton, underestimating his old acquaintance Talleyrand, expected the French Government to be so angered by the publication of the dispatches as to lose all sense of its proper interest, and declare war. At his advice the Federalists adopted a policy of armed neutrality, counting on a declaration of war by France to unite all honest men to their standard. Congress created the Navy Department, revived the marine corps, fitted for sea the *Constitution, Constellation,* and *United States,* frigates, and purchased several smaller vessels that were promptly built by maritime communities. National ships and armed merchantmen were authorized to capture French armed vessels wherever found. The French treaties of 1778 were formally abrogated. By the end of 1798 there were fourteen American men-of-war at sea, and some two hundred merchant vessels had taken out letters of marque and reprisal. The picaroons were fairly swept out of West Indian waters, and on 9 February 1799 the *Constellation,* Commodore Truxton, captured off Nevis the crack French frigate *L'Insurgente.* A year later, off Guadeloupe, the *Constellation* (36 guns) chased the *Vengeance* (54 guns) all day, brought her to action at eight in the evening, and fought broadside to broadside within pistol-shot until one in the morning. The French commander struck his colors twice during the action, but, luckily for him, Truxton did not perceive it in the smoke and darkness, and the *Vengeance* escaped. These naval actions had no effect on the Directory, which began to change policy before they happened; but an American navy was at least created, and its officers and men given training for later and more serious hostilities.

In the congressional elections of 1798–99 the Federalists won a strong majority, which was destined to be their last. Jefferson and his party appeared to be utterly discredited by their pro-French leanings, but time was preparing their revenge. A rift appeared in the Federalist party between the President and Hamilton, and into this rift Talleyrand insinuated a wedge.

It was a difference in objective and in temperament that caused the trouble. President Adams's object was to teach the Directory good manners, and force it to respect the American flag. He was willing to accept war if declared by France, but hoped to avoid it. The bulk of his party agreed. Hamilton and the New England Federalists, on the contrary, regarded the French imbroglio not as an affair to be wound up, but as an occasion to be improved. It was to be a starting-point for spirited measures that would strengthen the Federal government, discipline the American people, discredit the Republicans with all that they stood for. Hamilton expected some of the Jeffersonians to help the enemy in case of war, and for this reason, no less than to meet a French invasion, the regular army was increased, the *cadres* for a provisional army created, Washington appointed Lieutenant-General, and Hamilton his second in command. Adams growled over these excessive military preparations, but complied. The only thing wanting, it seemed, to militarize the United States, was an open and declared war with France — which France was not so obliging as to offer.

Talleyrand, though annoyed at the exposure of his venality to the amused laughter of all Europe, saw the real point: that war with America would mean a new ally for England. Jefferson advised him, and he advised the Directory, to keep cool, and not fall into the trap. No use trying to start a revolution, he said. 'In no country is anarchy so much feared as in the United States.' Hence the French government used every available channel to communicate pacific intentions to America. In evidence of sincerity, West Indian letters of marque were annulled, and the French agents were ordered to respect American ships. An official explanation of the X Y Z episode was issued, in a tone of injured dignity. The American ministers, it appeared, had been imposed upon by charlatans. The Directory had intended to treat with them, but they shut themselves up in their hotel, and went off in a huff before they could be received! For just such a cue the discomfited opposition in America had been waiting. Every Republican paper took up the cry that the X Y Z affair was a Federalist hoax.

These evidences of an accommodating spirit took the war Federalists aback — but only for a moment. 'I hope we shall remember,' declared Secretary of State Pickering in January 1799, 'that the tyger crouches before he leaps upon his prey.' It was decided to treat the French overtures as insincere, to continue war preparations, and to declare war on France as soon as Congress convened.

A grandiose plan was forming in Hamilton's brain. He would lead the new American army overland against New Orleans, and the British would co-operate in blockading the mouth of the Mississippi. Louisiana and the Floridas having fallen, Hamilton might march into Mexico, while the British navy, in concert with the South American patriot Miranda, liberated the Spanish main. The American West would be reconciled to a Federal government clothed in all the panoply of sovereignty. Anglo-American friendship would be cemented by dividing the spoils of Spanish America. Hamilton would return laurel-crowned, at the head of his victorious legion, to become the first citizen of America, as Bonaparte was already the first citizen of France.

On 18 March 1799 the war program was going very nicely in the House. Harrison Gray Otis, the most eloquent orator on the Federalist side, was speaking on a subsidy bill for privateers. There was a slight commotion near the door, as a messenger entered from the Senate. Parker of Virginia rose and asked for privilege, which Otis graciously accorded. The gentleman from Massachusetts, said the interrupter, is wasting his time, the subsidy bill is already obsolete; for the President has just sent down to the Senate the nomination of a minister plenipotentiary to the French Republic! Otis turned pale, the Federalists seemed thunderstruck, the Republicans could hardly keep from shouting for joy, and from the general confusion an adjournment was moved and carried.

The President had asserted his prerogative, and brought his country out of the dangerous shoals into which Jay's treaty had led her. John Adams was not a man to argue and convince, as Washington would have done; but he could act. His decision to negotiate with France was made without consulting a single person. Like the hard-case Yankee skipper that he was, honest John kicked the tricky helmsman off the quarterdeck, grasped the wheel, and brought the ship of state back to Washington's course — full and by.

The Adams family have generally been right, but they are uncommonly disagreeable about it; and the President's manner created no less indignation than his act. Hamilton's friends were furious. The Senate was in a sad dilemma. Wishing to reject the nomination of an envoy to France, it dared not meet the Republican charge of prolonged hostilities after the President had initiated peace.

Adams compromised by appointing a commission instead of a single envoy; but Secretary Pickering managed by subterfuge to hold up their sailing, so that the commission did not reach Paris until the year 1800. Napoleon Bonaparte, now First Consul, received them cordially and appointed his brother Joseph as negotiator. For seven months the negotiation dragged, while Napoleon crossed the Alps to thrash the Austrians again, at Marengo. Bonaparte would admit no liability for the French spoliations, unless the United States recognized the treaties of 1778, which Congress had denounced at the height of anti-gallican feeling. No alliance, no money! The Americans, fearing to bring home a renewed entangling alliance, signed a mere commercial convention, each party reserving its rights as to treaties and spoliations. It was high time to come to terms with France, for even England was on the point of making peace.

On the very next day, 1 October 1800, France secretly obtained the retrocession of Louisiana from Spain. But Jefferson later secured by purchase what Hamilton intended to conquer at incalculable cost.

3. *The Alien and Sedition Acts*

While organizing defence and drumming up war enthusiasm, the Federalists did not neglect their real enemies at home. The Naturalization, Alien, and Sedition Acts of 1798 were aimed at domestic disaffection rather than foreign danger. These laws provoked the first organized state rights movement under the Constitution, and promoted the election of Jefferson to the presidency. They afford an instance of political intolerance which is unfortunately a part of the American character, as of human nature.

Those who remember the hysteria about ' hyphenated Americans ' and German spies in 1917–18 are inclined to look somewhat indulgently on what Jefferson called the ' Federalist reign of terror ' in 1798–99. Many excellent citizens expected to be murdered in their beds as soon as the French landed; and in a country so young and with so imperfect a sense of nationality, there was some ground for alarm.

Gouverneur Morris had remarked in the Federal Convention that he wanted none of ' those philosophical gentlemen, those citizens of the world as they call themselves, in our public councils.' The French Revolution, however, sent a good many of them to America; and one who came earlier, Albert Gallatin of Geneva, was leading the House minority in 1798. Dr. Priestley, accused of trying ' to decompose both Church and State ' with his chemical formulae, had found refuge in Pennsylvania after being mobbed as pro-French in England. Thomas Cooper, who followed him, founded an opposition newspaper; and both were very much 'wanted' by the Federalists. The French minister, Adet, who interfered in the election of 1796, was also a chemist by profession; the French botanist Michaux did espionage for his government. Victor du Pont, son of the economist, was one of the French consuls who had to leave the United States hastily in 1798. At the height of excitement that year, the Directory requested passports for a delegation from the Institute of France, under Victor's father, Du Pont de Nemours, to visit the United States 'with the view of improving and extending the sciences.' John Adams replied, 'We have too many French philosophers already, and I really begin to think, or rather to suspect, that learned academies . . . have disorganized the world, and are incompatible with social order.' As these were the persons whom super-patriots wished to expel in 1798, it is interesting to note that Gallatin became one of our greatest statesmen, Priestley a notable figure in the history of science, Cooper a college president; while the Du Ponts settled in Delaware to engage in a highly respectable mode of disorganizing the world: — the manufacture of high explosives.

Immigrants who were neither philosophers nor gentlemen gave even more trouble to the Federal government. Noisy Jacobins began to come over. French agents were stirring up sedition in the West. Equally unwelcome from the Federalist point of view were the Irish refugees, who lost no time in becoming naturalized and in joining the anti-British party. A Federalist senator reported that in a journey through Pennsylvania he had seen many Irishmen, who with few exceptions were 'United Irishmen, freemasons, and the most God-provoking democrats this side of hell!'

As of late, the notion that political refugees were engaged in treasonable activities against the United States produced legislation against them. The Naturalization Act of 1798 extended the required period of residence for citizenship from five to fourteen years; the Alien Act gave the President power to expel foreigners by executive decree. Adams never availed himself of the privilege; but two shiploads of Frenchmen left the country in anticipation.

For the Sedition Act of 1798 there was a legitimate need. There being no common law of the United States, the federal courts required statutory authority before taking cognizance of conspiracies against the government, or libels on high officials. One section of the act, however, declared any speech or writing against President or Congress 'with the intent to defame' or to bring them 'into contempt or disrepute' a misdemeanor punishable by fine or imprisonment; and it was this section only that was enforced. Federalists never recognized the value of party opposition, and from their quarterdeck point of view the Republicans were little better than mutineers. About twenty-five persons were arrested and ten convicted, most of them Republican editors who were conveniently got out of the way by heavy fines or jail sentences.

Another act of the 1798 crop is still on the statute books. Dr. Logan, a Philadelphia Quaker, went to Paris in the hope of preserving peace. Congress, fearing lest he succeed, passed the Logan Act, declaring it a misdemeanor for an American citizen to correspond with a foreign government on the subject of a dispute between it and the United States. It is still perfectly legal, however, for any American citizen to do his utmost to stir up war with a foreign government.

4. *The Kentucky and Virginia Resolves of 1798*

Out of this unwholesome atmosphere of persecution came two startling protests from state legislatures: the resolves of Virginia drafted by Madison, and those of Kentucky drafted by Jefferson. Both declared the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional. As to the Alien Act, there is no getting round the doctrine, later adopted by the Supreme Court, that the power of expelling aliens belongs to the Federal government not the states. The Sedition Act stands in a different light, for the Constitution (Amendment I) forbids Congress to pass any law abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. Federalist lawyers, like many American lawyers to-day, attempted to extract all meaning from this clause by assuming Blackstone's definition that freedom of the press is merely freedom from censorship, or by asserting that it was not meant to apply in time of war, or by confounding criticism with libel. The First Amendment, however, was written by 'men to whom Wilkes and Junius were household words,' and who determined to have no prosecutions for mere criticism of the government in the United States.[2] A much more drastic sedition law (the Espionage Act) was passed in 1917, and enforced by sentences far more severe than those of the Federalists. But in 1798 the American Revolution was too close for government to punish opinion with impunity.

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[2] Z. Chafee, Jr., *Freedom of Speech,* p. 23. Prosecutions in State courts under the English common law of sedition continued to be made, however, for many years after this. Hamilton, who disapproved the Sedition Act, was counsel for one such defendant in 1803.

It is the theory rather than the arguments of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolves that is significant. They develop the 'compact' or 'state rights' theory of the Constitution that Jefferson adumbrated in his opinion on the bank bill in 1792. Kentucky declares that whenever Congress palpably transcends its powers, as in the Sedition Act, each state 'has an equal right to judge for itself, as well of infractions as of the mode and measure of redress.' She calls upon her 'co-states' to 'concur . . . in declaring these acts' void, and to unite 'in requesting their repeal'; while Virginia hints at 'interposing' state authority between the persecuted citizen and his government.

These principles are not logically expressed, nor is it likely that their implications were yet thought out. Both state legislatures had their eyes on the coming presidential election, and were really engaged in lighting a fiery cross to rally the Republican clans. Yet the principles of the Kentucky and Virginia Resolves of 1798 became a platform to all later movements in state rights. Within ten years the New England Federalists were flinging them back at Jefferson and Madison; and to the Southern particularists of a later generation they became an indispensable gloss on the Constitution.

In any federal government there is a possible conflict between powers of the nation and powers of the states. A minority party, or minority sectional combination, if ridden too hard or too proud to be ridden at all, will try to escape the consequences of its position by raising the banner of state rights. In American history the 'doctrine' of state rights has not been a cause, but an effect of this condition. Almost every man in public life between 1798 and 1860 spurned it when his section was in the saddle, and embraced it when his constituents deemed themselves oppressed. Almost every state in turn declared its own absolute sovereignty, only to denounce as treasonable similar declarations by other states.

There is no doubt that the 'Federalist reign of terror' alarmed a people who had rather strong notions of liberty. Virginia talked of secession. Congress kept the new army on foot 'to suppress or prevent rebellion';[3] Thomas Jefferson alone remained hopeful and serene. Strong in his faith that the people would 'recover their true sight,' Jefferson presided impeccably over the Senate, writing letters far and wide to his political lieutenants, and enjoying the spectacle of Federalists hanging themselves on their own rope. 'Hold on then, like a good and faithful seaman,' he wrote a discouraged congressman, 'till our brother sailors can rouse from their intoxication and right the vessel.' It was John Adams, however, who drove the drunken sailors from the quarterdeck — only to bring the ship into port for Thomas Jefferson.

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[3] A good instance was the 'Fries Rebellion' of 1798–99. Some Pennsylvania Germans led by John Fries, resisted federal tax assessors in 1798, had their leaders

5. *The Election of* 1800–1801

If the Directory had only been so accommodating as to land even a corporal's guard on American soil, the presidential election of 1800 might have gone very differently; but as time went on, and no enemy appeared, and the new direct tax was assessed, the patriotic fervor of 1798 faded out. In the meantime there were fresh difficulties with England over impressment, the sedition prosecutions were having their effect, and the Republican editors were throwing out a wide net for political martyrs.

Presidential candidates for the election of 1800–1 were selected by party caucuses in Congress. The Republicans, as in 1796, decided to support Jefferson and Burr. The Federalists reluctantly renominated John Adams, with C. C. Pinckney of the X Y Z mission for Vice-President. No sooner was the decision made than the Hamiltonian faction planned to bring in Pinckney over Adams's head, by persuading some presidential elector to throw away a vote that should normally have gone to the President. A Republican paper published a silly letter John Adams had written years before, accusing the Pinckney brothers of British influence, because of their English education. Hamilton then composed a peppery pamphlet on Adams for private circulation; but Aaron Burr purloined a copy, and had it reprinted for public consumption. A majority of Republican electors was chosen; but as no one of them dared throw away his second vote, Jefferson and Burr tied for first place with 73 votes each, as against 65 for Adams and one less for Pinckney.

The Twelfth Amendment to the Constitution (1802) removed the possibility of a tie between two candidates on the same ticket.

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arrested by military force, and three of them tried for treason and sentenced to death. But President Adams pardoned all three.

But in 1801 the House of Representatives, voting by states, had to choose between Jefferson and Burr, a majority of one state being necessary for election. The Federalists saw an opportunity to thwart their enemies by supporting Burr, thus electing a cynical and pliant politician over a 'dangerous radical.' Party division was so close that during thirty-five ballots, and until 17 February 1801, the House was deadlocked. There was talk of preventing an election, and of civil war. Finally Hamilton brought his influence to bear, three Federalists cast blank ballots, and Jefferson was elected President by a majority of two states. At the congressional elections in 1800 the Republicans obtained emphatic majorities in House and Senate; and in 1801 the Federalists went out of power in every branch of government except the judiciary.

So passed into minority the party which obtained more talent and virtue, with less political common sense, than any of their successors. The Federalists went down with colors flying; but their usefulness had gone. It had been their task to tame the wild forces set loose by the American Revolution, to integrate discordant elements, to lead an inchoate nation to enduring union. To a remarkable degree they succeeded. But their chosen basis, an oligarchy of wealth and talent, was not sufficiently broad or deep. Their patience and vision were not great enough for their task. Their Old World precepts of vigor, energy, and suppression had become fixed ideas, enclosing them in a network of delusion that set them in antagonism to deep-rooted popular prejudices; and the expanding forces of American life enveloped and overwhelmed them.

XV

JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY

1801–1805

1. *Jefferson's Ambition*

THOMAS JEFFERSON, ruminating years later on the events of a crowded lifetime, thought that his election to the Presidency marked as real a revolution as that of 1776. He had saved the country from monarchy and militarism, and brought it back to its true principles of republican simplicity. But there never had been any danger of monarchy; John Adams had saved the country from militarism, and a little simplicity more or less cannot be deemed a revolution. His defeated rivals, the Federalists, feared that America was in for a turbulent era. With a ' Jacobin ' President, a reign of terror could not be far off. Yet the four years that followed were one of the most tranquil of Republican olympiads, marked not by radical reforms or popular tumults, but by the peaceful acquisition of territory as large again as the United States. The election of 1800–1 brought a change of men more than of measures, and a transfer of federal power from the latitude of Massachusetts to that of Virginia, rather than a weakening of the Federal government in favor of the states. Jefferson ruled eight years and was succeeded by his Secretary of State, Madison of Virginia. Madison, after eight years, gave way to his Secretary of State, Monroe of Virginia. Monroe ruled eight years, and was succeeded by his Secretary of State, J. Q. Adams. The year 1829, when this second Adams was defeated by a militant democracy, may more properly be termed revolutionary than 1801.

Jefferson was not in any social sense a democrat, and only in a political sense by contrast with his contemporaries. A gentleman philosopher like many of the French *noblesse,* with a classical education, an exquisite taste, a lively curiosity, and a belief in the perfectibility of man, he was of the eighteenth rather than the nineteenth century. Deeply religious without being a churchman, he had the serenity of one to whom now and then the Spirit has not disdained to speak. The extraordinary ascendancy that he enjoyed in the hearts of the masses was attained without speech-making, military service, or catering to vulgar prejudices. The secret of Jefferson's power lay in the fact that he appealed to and expressed America's better self: her idealism, simplicity, youthful mind, and hopeful outlook, rather than those material, practical, and selfish qualities on which Hamilton based his policy. Jefferson's political object was to prove that people circumstanced like the Americans were ripe for 'a government founded not on the fears and follies of man, but in his reason, on the predominance of his social over his dissocial passions.'

It is easy to be cynical about Jefferson. In order to get support, he was forced to give men offices; and Hamilton's financial schemes were mere pleached alleys to the golden vista opened by Louisiana. Yet it was a bold experiment even to attempt to base a government on man's better nature, at a time when France had almost come full circle; and it was something to have kept the country straight to Washington's course in the midst of Napoleonic wars. Jefferson realized that 'an important means of giving free course to this experiment is to keep Europe and its quarrels at a distance,' and his foreign policy was aimed at an isolation that would be cultural and economic as well as political.

Jefferson was sensitive but not sentimental. He loved birds and flowers, lacked a sense of humor, and hated the sight of blood. Unlike most Virginians he did not engage in field sports, and regarded dogs as a useless race, deserving extirpation. But he despised Rousseau's romanticism; and, if he thought mankind perfectible, it was because Americans had advanced so rapidly in his own time. The dead hand of the past had been lifted from their government; why not from their religion and society? And this fastidious gentleman was a finished politician. His inaugural address of 4 March 1801 was eighteenth-century idealism rubbed through the sieve of practical politics. Instead of denouncing the Federalists as monarchists, they were invited to rejoin the true republican church: 'We are all republicans—we are all federalists. If there be any among us who wish to dissolve this Union, or to change its republican form, let them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.' This government, 'the world's best hope,' must not be abandoned 'on the theoretic and visionary fear' that it is not strong enough. 'Sometimes it is said that Man cannot be trusted with the government of himself. Can he then be trusted with the government of others?'

'Separated by nature and a wide ocean from the exterminating havoc of one quarter of the globe,' 'possessing a chosen country, with room enough for our descendants to the hundredth and thousandth generation' practising the social virtues, the only thing 'necessary to close the circle of our felicities' is 'a wise and frugal government, which shall restrain men from injuring one another, shall leave them otherwise free to regulate their own pursuits of industry and improvement, and shall not take from the mouth of labor the bread it has earned.'

If a government of that nature ever was attainable, it was so in the simple rural America that the physiocrats admired. In his inaugural address Jefferson dropped a plain hint that shipowners and manufacturers might expect no favors from him. And if net result of his administration was to bring Hamilton's dream of a warlike and industrial nation nearer fulfilment, it was because of world forces beyond Jefferson's or America's control.

2. *Simplicity and Frugality*

Jefferson was fortunate in the circumstances and surroundings of his first administration. His party had a majority in both houses of Congress, and no rival leader was hankering for his place or for the succession. The truce of Amiens made a breathing-space in the European war, which left him free to concentrate on domestic problems. The civil service had not yet acquired that *esprit de corps* and resourceful obstruction which have thwarted so many reforming statesmen; and the President had a right to remove any member of it without cause. There was no mess to clear up; John Adams turned over the administration in superb order. And the Federal government had been transferred from aristocratic Philadelphia to an appropriate setting for republican simplicity, the new capital city of Washington.

Congress decided in 1790 to fix the federal District of Columbia on the Potomac. President Washington chose the exact site, in a sparsely populated region a few miles up-stream from Mount Vernon, just below the Great Falls. Maryland and Virginia[1] ceded their jurisdiction, local landowners were indemnified by federal commissioners, and the capital city of Washington was planned on a generous scale by a French engineer, Major L'Enfant.[2] Ten years had elapsed, but Washington was little more than a cleared space with scattered buildings, between primeval forest and the river. One wing of the Capitol, a graceful Palladian structure on a noble site, was ready for occupancy, and the other wing nearly completed; but the rotunda was open to the heavens. Near by were a few brick houses, wooden cabins of workmen and negroes, and possibly three shops. Pennsylvania Avenue, a broad clearing studded with stumps and alder bushes, led northwestward from the Capitol through a morass to the simple and dignified executive mansion, or White House, designed by James Hoban of Dublin. Here, on higher ground, were a few hundred houses, mostly of wood, the nucleus of the future residential city. Two miles farther to the westward was Georgetown, a comfortable little place that afforded the officials an agreeable change from each other's and their landladies' society. The red clay soil of Washington became fine dust in dry weather and liquid cement in rain; swarms of mosquitoes spread malaria among the new-comers, and inoculated the remainder with a parasitic attitude towards life. Several fine groves of tulip-trees were the only features of natural beauty within the city site. Jefferson's one recorded wish for despotic power was to save these trees from the inhabitants, who proceeded to fell them regardless of property rights, and to sell the logs to shivering new-comers. Except for scornful Federalists, and a complaining diplomatic corps, everyone made light of the difficulties, and looked forward to some magic transmutation of their backwoods capital into a seat of commerce and the muses,

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[1] In 1846 that part of the District on the right bank of the Potomac, including the town of Alexandria, was retroceded to Virginia.

> Though nought but woods and Jefferson they see,
> Where streets should run and sages ought to be,

as Tom Moore wrote after his visit in 1804. Eventually the 'city of magnificent distances' grew up to its magnificent plan; but until after the Civil War it was squalid and slovenly compared with Baltimore, Charleston, or the Northern cities.

Washington, then, was a fit setting for experiments in *laissez-faire*. Members of Congress, forced to leave their wives at home and live in crowded boarding houses, finished the public business in annual sessions of three to five months' duration. Written presidential messages were substituted for the annual ' speech from the throne,' and the answers from both houses were omitted. As a widower, Jefferson was free to establish a new code of republican etiquette. The White House was open to all comers every morning. Anthony Merry, in full uniform of His Majesty's minister plenipotentiary, was received by the President in morning undress of faded threadbare coat, red waistcoat, corduroy breeches, and slippers. Invitations to dine were issued in the name of Mr. Jefferson instead of The President of the United States. The White House dinners were well cooked by a French chef, and Jefferson's wine bill for one year was twenty-eight hundred dollars. But the rule of first come first served, which he adopted to do away with precedence, was not understood by the diplomatic corps or relished by the secretaries' wives; and Washington has since become the most precedence-ridden capital in the western world.

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[2] Jefferson suggested the spacing of the Capitol and the White House. William Thornton, an American, and B. H. Latrobe, an Englishman with a Pennsylvania mother, designed the Capitol. The two interior wings, still standing, are their work.

Jefferson's inaugural pledge of the honest payment of the public debt, and promise to preserve ' the general government in its whole constitutional vigor ' caused joy in the Federalist camp. Hamilton, who had prophesied that his rival would pursue a temporizing rather than a violent system, viewed the inaugural message ' as virtually a candid retraction of past misapprehensions, and a pledge to the community that the new President will not lend himself to dangerous innovations, but in essential points will tread in the steps of his predecessors.' That, in the main, was what Jefferson did. He took over Washington's administrative machine ' in the full tide of successful experiment,' but fed a slightly different material into it.

Madison became his Secretary of State. For Secretary of the Treasury he chose Albert Gallatin, an off-shoot of aristocratic Geneva who had arrived young in the land of promise, made his living in the backwoods of Pennsylvania, and risen by character and ability to the opposition leadership in the House. He and Jefferson regarded the national debt as a mortgage, to be paid off without delay. Gallatin would even have retained the excise on distilled liquors, which his former constituents had resisted; but Jefferson insisted on removing this detested relic of Federalism, and made his name immortal in the mountains.

Two important reforms were made by Gallatin in treasury practice: a stricter accounting, and detailed appropriations. Hamilton, and indeed all officers of government who handled money, had followed the practice of English chancellors of the exchequer, in accounting to the legislature for the moneys that passed through their hands only after they had left office. A congressional request for financial details procured only a rebuke for this ‘hitherto unusual proceeding’ from Hamilton. Gallatin now did away with these easy-going methods, and introduced a system of strict accountability. It was a reform pregnant with red tape, but an excellent precaution.

Under Washington and Adams, Congress had often appropriated lump sums to the different departments, to spend at their discretion. The Republicans always opposed this feeder to ‘executive influence,’ as violating the sacred principle of separation of powers. Jefferson and Gallatin, with unusual self-denial, now recommended a change, and Congress adopted the practice of detailed appropriations. This led to one of the gravest abuses in the American system, ‘log-rolling’ and the ‘pork-barrel.’ Instead of appropriating a lump annual sum for dockyards and post offices, members by trading votes compile unnecessary projects in order to make work for their constituents; as the frontiersmen helped one another in rolling away felled trees. The resulting bill of largely useless expenditure forms the ‘pork-barrel’ for the sustenance of congressmen against the next election.

Jefferson's remark ‘We are all republicans — we are all federalists’ caused no little dismay in his own camp. Gallatin's father-in-law asked if enemies were to be kept ‘in office to trample upon us.’ William B. Giles, of Virginia reminded the President that

> ‘a pretty general purgation of office, has been one of the benefits expected by the friends of the new order of things. . . . It can never be unpopular to turn a vicious man out and put a virtuous one in his room. . . . Taking it for granted, therefore, that this salutary check will be applied, I take the liberty of mentioning to you a neighbour of mine as properly qualified to fill the office of marshall for this district of Virginia, when the same shall be vacated.’

No one seriously pretended that the federal civil service was inefficient or corrupt; but it was almost completely Federalist. Washington and Adams had never knowingly appointed a member of the opposition to office. Offices were already regarded as proper rewards for public service; and Jefferson's followers were eager to feed at the public crib. Yet, as he complained, functionaries seldom die, and never resign. The only thing to do, then, was to create vacancies by the presidential prerogative of removal. It soon became clear that, in respect of the Federalists, Jefferson 'intended to entice the flock with one hand and belabor the shepherds with the other.' There was no general purgation, but performance did not square with the bland professions of the inaugural discourse. It was a good instance of what Hamilton called Jefferson's 'ineradicable duplicity' — seeming to say one thing while meaning another.

3. *A Maritime Adventure*

Although foreign commerce was threatened with neglect, it was actually treated as a distinct and valuable interest until 1807. Neither Jefferson nor Congress tampered with the discriminating tonnage duties, the fishing bounties, or Jay's treaty. Theoretically the whole Republican party was hostile to the army and navy, which, according to John Taylor, would 'only serve to excite wars, squander money, and extend corruption.' Jefferson reduced the army by a 'chaste reformation,' as he called it, from four thousand to twenty-five hundred men. Yet he reduced the naval establishment no farther than an Act of the last Federalist Congress permitted; and he employed the fleet, as neither Washington nor Adams had done, to protect the American carrying trade against the Barbary corsairs. The most brilliant achievements of his first administration were in war and diplomacy.

Franklin's reported maxim of the London merchants — 'If there were no Algiers, it would be worth England's while to build one' — may be only a saying of Poor Richard; but the complaisance of great powers for the Barbary corsairs, their toleration of white slavery for others so long as they were able to purchase immunity for themselves, filled Americans with disgust. Morocco, Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli quickly discovered that the United States were independent, and preyed upon the American schooners and brigs that passed the Pillars of Hercules. Washington, unprovided with a navy, was forced to follow the European precedent and pay tribute. In ten years the United States paid almost two million dollars in tribute, ransom, and usance to these squalid barbarians.

Jefferson, the lover of peace, calculated that force in this instance would be cheaper in the long run. When the Pasha of Tripoli, discontented with his annual tribute, repudiated his treaty with the United States, Jefferson dispatched a naval squadron to deal with him. Hostilities began, and continued for several years. The American navy, four thousand miles from its base, starved by a niggardly Congress and an economizing Treasury, operated under most difficult conditions. The Barbary coast, a lee shore during the winter months, could not be properly blockaded. Yet officers and men showed a gallantry and resourcefulness that earned them the esteem of the British service, and the hospitality of Malta and Gibraltar; American traders were able to go their way unmolested, and the final treaty with Tripoli (1805) was more honorable and less expensive than any European power had previously extorted. Tributes continued to be paid to other Barbary potentates until 1815, when Algiers was forced to respect the American flag.

4. *The Louisiana Purchase*

While Tripoli was being taught a lesson, the boundary of the United States advanced from the Mississippi to the Rocky Mountains.

Louisiana, which comprised the whole of that vast territory,[3] had been in Spanish possession since 1763. Less than one per cent of its area was settled. The Creoles, numbering with their slaves about forty thousand in 1800, were concentrated on both banks of the Mississippi below the thirty-first parallel. There were a few garrisons and trading posts on the west bank of the river between that point and St. Louis, and a few more on the Red river; the rest was in undisputed possession of the redskins. Sugar cane and cotton had recently been introduced from the West Indies, but the province was a drain on the Spanish exchequer.

We have already seen the importance of the Mississippi River commerce to the American West. The retrocession of this great province from Spain to France, by the secret treaty of San Ildefonso on 1 October 1800, completed the Western policy which the successive French governments had followed since 1792. Their main object was to establish a political and commercial base in North

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[3] Including the present states of Louisiana, Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Kansas, Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, the Dakotas, Nebraska, Iowa, Minnesota.

America. Napoleon proposed to give France a maritime and colonial empire; to make her the first power in the New World, as in the Old.

As France did not take immediate possession of Louisiana, the Treaty of San Ildefonso was kept secret for over a year. Late in 1801 Jefferson got wind of it, and another event revealed its implications. Bonaparte dispatched an expeditionary force to Santo Domingo, with orders to suppress Toussaint l'Ouverture's insurrection, and then take possession of New Orleans and Louisiana. The prospect of a veteran French army at America's back door was not pleasant. On 18 April 1802 Jefferson wrote to the American minister at Paris:

> 'The day that France takes possession of New Orleans. . . . We must marry ourselves to the British fleet and nation. We must turn all our attentions to a maritime force' and 'make the first cannon which shall be fired in Europe the signal for . . . holding the two continents of America in sequestration for the common purposes of the united British and American nations. This is not a state of things we seek or desire. It is one which this measure, if adopted by France, forces on us.'

Astounding as this letter may appear, it was a logical development of Jefferson's policy for the last twelve years. Jefferson hated England not as such, but as the embodiment of monarchy, militarism, and aristocracy. With the Federalists in power he feared British influence on American social and constitutional development; with Jefferson in power that danger was obviously ended! He was an isolationist in a deeper sense even than Washington; but his experience of the Nootka crisis convinced him that so long as the mouth of the Mississippi was in foreign possession, the United States was in danger of being drawn into every European war. Isolation was not a fact but a goal; and to attain it Jefferson was ready to adopt Washington's formula of 'temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.'

Up to this point Jefferson's Louisiana diplomacy had been secret; but another event almost forced his hand. Late in 1802 the Spanish Governor withdrew the 'right of deposit' from American traders. This privilege had been guaranteed only for three years by the Treaty of San Lorenzo (1795); but the inhabitants of the Ohio valley, who were annually transshipping a million dollars worth of produce at New Orleans, believed they had secured it for ever. An explosion of indignation followed in the West. The Federalists, delighted at an opportunity to divide Jefferson from his western admirers, fanned the flame and clamored for war. Jefferson remained serene and imperturbable. His annual message, in December 1802, breathed platitudes of peace, friendship, and economy. In the meantime, some of his friends pushed through Congress an appropriation of two million dollars for 'expenses in relation to the intercourse between the United States and foreign nations.' And in March 1803 the President commissioned James Monroe as envoy extraordinary to France, with the following instructions to himself and to the resident minister, Robert Livingston.

First they were to offer anything up to fifty million francs for New Orleans and the Floridas, which would give the United States the whole east bank of the Mississippi, and the Gulf coast to the eastward. If France refused, three-quarters of the sum should be offered for the Island of New Orleans[4] alone; or space on the east bank should be purchased for an American port. Failing here, they must press for a perpetual guarantee of the rights of navigation and deposit. That was Jefferson's ultimatum. If the last terms were refused, Monroe and Livingston were ordered to 'open a confidential communication with ministers of the British Government,' with a view to 'a candid understanding, and a closer connection with Great Britain.' If a treaty were concluded with Britain, a mutual promise not to make a separate peace with France could not 'be deemed unreasonable.'

Livingston began the negotiation before Monroe sailed; and it made little progress at first. But Napoleon was turning back from the West towards the Orient. Troops had been poured into Santo Domingo to the number of thirty-five thousand, but yellow fever swept away those that the blacks did not massacre. Without Santo Domingo, Louisiana lost half its value to France. The renewal of war with England seemed inevitable. When war came, Louisiana would be Britain's for the plucking. Why not sell it to the United States while there was yet time?

Napoleon reached decisions quickly. On 11 April 1803 he hurled defiance at the British ambassador. The same day, when Livingston approached the Minister of Foreign Affairs to repeat his usual arguments for selling New Orleans, Talleyrand suddenly remarked,

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[4] New Orleans is on an island, made by Lakes Pontchartrain and Borgne, the River Iberville, the Mississippi, and two short bayous.

'What will you give for the *whole* of Louisiana?' Livingston gasped out that he supposed the United States would not object to paying twenty million francs. 'Too low!' said Talleyrand, 'Reflect, and see me tomorrow.' On the morrow Talleyrand was evasive; but Napoleon had already determined to sell the whole. On 30 April 1803 the treaty of cession was signed. Sixty million francs were paid for the province of Louisiana, as acquired from Spain in 1800, and the United States assumed the claims of its citizens against France. The inhabitants of Louisiana were guaranteed the rights of American citizens, and eventual admission to the Union.

The Louisiana purchase turned out to be the greatest bargain in American history; but in 1803 it seemed quite likely that the United States was paying twelve million dollars for a scrap of paper. Her title was defective on several points. The province was still in the hands of Spain. Bonaparte had never performed his part of the agreement with Spain, which also forbade France to dispose of Louisiana to a third power. The French Constitution forbade the alienation of national territory without a vote of the legislature; and Napoleon's brothers protested against it on that ground. The boundaries were indefinite; how far north Louisiana extended, and whether it included West Florida or Texas or neither, was uncertain. Finally, the treaty was illegal under the American Constitution, by every canon of interpretation ever promulgated by the Virginia Republicans.[5] If the Federal government, as Jefferson had always claimed, possessed no power not expressly granted, President and Senate had no right to increase the national domain by treaty, much less to promise incorporation in the Union to persons outside its original limits.

Jefferson's scruples on the latter point vanished when a letter arrived from Livingston, urging immediate ratification, before Napoleon could change his mind. Jefferson's Virginian friends furnished him with some good Hamiltonian constitutional arguments; and the treaty was ratified by the Senate. On 30 November 1803 Louisiana was formally handed over by the Spanish governor to the French *prefect,* who promptly established the *code Napoléon,* and as many other institutions as he could. On 20 December the final transfer to the United States was effected.

'Never was there an administration more brilliant than that of

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[5] The constitutionality of the Louisiana purchase was eventually upheld in American Insurance Co. *v.* Canter, 1828.

Mr. Jefferson up to this period,' said John Randolph in after years. 'We were indeed in the "full tide of successful experiment." Taxes repealed; the public debt amply provided for, both principal and interest; sinecures abolished; Louisiana acquired; public confidence unbounded.'

XVI

CONSPIRACIES AND COMPLICATIONS

1803–1809

1. *Crumbling Federalism*

JEFFERSON yearned to convert New England from her perverse Federalist ways. He appreciated the danger of attempting to govern a loosely knit federal union by a sectional party, and hoped by his moderation to persuade the Yankees that their mercantile and shipping interests were safe in Republican hands. Republican gains in the congressional elections of 1802–3 showed that he was succeeding; but the Federalist leaders grew bitter and desperate as their power waned.

To the clergy and party leaders of New England Jefferson's victory was the triumph of democracy; and democracy to them was only another name for terror, atheism, and free love. It meant just what communism does to many respectable Americans to-day. 'The principles of democracy are everywhere what they have been in France,' wrote Fisher Ames. New England was yet pure; but the barriers to her virtue were falling. 'And must we with folded hands wait the result?' wrote Senator Pickering of Massachusetts. 'The principles of our Revolution point to the remedy — a separation.'

Thus Virginians like John Taylor had reasoned in 1798, when Virginia was hag-ridden by Hamilton. Jefferson then had calmed them with a promise of victory. No such hope could console New England Federalists for the Louisiana purchase. Their minority was dwindling, and they knew it. Ohio, admitted to the Union in 1802, looked to Virginia for guidance, although largely settled by Yankees. It was certain that the new states to be formed from French Louisiana would follow the same light; and their political weight would be increased by the federal ratio of representation. The annexation of Louisiana, upsetting the balance of power within the Union, absolved New England from allegiance to the Union; at least so the Federalists reasoned. Before 1803 was out the 'Essex Junto' of Massachusetts and the 'River Gods' of Connecticut began to plan a new confederacy, 'exempt from the corrupt and corrupting influence and oppression of the aristocratic democrats of the South': a Northern Confederacy with New England as a nucleus, and New York as a barrier state against Virginia. New England conservatives in 1804, like Southern conservatives in 1861, assumed that a political boundary could protect them from ideas.

Knowledge of the conspiracy was confined to the high churchmen of New England Federalism, and the British minister at Washington. Hamilton would have none of it. Intrigue was repulsive to his character, and reasoning such as Pickering's to his intellect. The conspirators then turned to Aaron Burr.

Burr had carried New York for Jefferson in 1800, and without that state Jefferson would have lost. Yet once safe in office, Jefferson ignored Burr's wishes in distributing the patronage, and the Republican party dropped him from the presidential ticket in 1804. Burr then decided to contest the governorship of New York with the regular Republican candidate. In return for Federalist aid in this contest, he agreed, if successful, to swing New York into the Northern Confederacy, and become its president. Hamilton, on hearing of this deal, advised his friends not to vote for Burr, and Burr was defeated. The Federalist conspiracy dissolved. How remote was its chance of success the presidential election of 1804 proved. Jefferson carried all New England save Connecticut, and every other state except Delaware.

Burr was now a ruined politician. He had broken irretrievably with the Republicans, and failed the Federalists. Hamilton was responsible. It was not the first time that Hamilton had crossed his path; it must be the last. On 18 June 1804, six weeks after the New York election, Burr wrote his enemy, demanding 'a prompt and unqualified acknowledgement or denial' of a slur upon his character reported in the press. Hamilton refused to retract, and answered, 'I trust on more reflection you will see the matter in the same light with me. If not, I can only regret the circumstances, and must abide the consequences.'

According to the code of honor observed by the gentry of the South and of New York, such language was an invitation to a challenge; and the challenge quickly came. Hamilton had a wife and seven children dependent upon him, and his affairs were much involved. Burr was a widower, and his only child was married. Hamilton, who had led troops through heavy fire up to the ramparts of Yorktown, did not need to prove his courage. Further, he believed it murder to kill an adversary in a duel. Yet the infirmity of a noble mind forced him to accept the challenge.

Hamilton was enmeshed in a double net of theory and ambition. He might differ from the New England Federalists as to the cure for democracy, but he judged the future by their gloomy formula. A crisis was impending. The year 1804 in America corresponded to 1791 in France. Jefferson would disappear like Mirabeau; dissolution and anarchy would follow; finally America would demand a Bonaparte. Hamilton intended to be ready at the call — but no one with a stain or suspicion of cowardice could save his country. So Hamilton went to his doom, resolved to prove his courage and yet not to kill: to reserve and throw away his first fire, in the hope that Burr would miss and honor be satisfied. Aaron Burr did not intend to miss.

At six o'clock on a bright summer morning, 11 July 1804, Hamilton and his second were ferried across the Hudson to a grove of trees under the Palisades, where Burr and his friends were engaged in clearing the duelling ground. The distance agreed upon was ten paces. When the signal *present* was given, Burr raised his arm slowly, took deliberate aim, and fired. Hamilton received the bullet just below his chest, and as he fell a convulsive movement of the fingers discharged his pistol aimlessly. Death relieved him after thirty hours of intense suffering.

So perished one of the greatest men of the age, for his little faith in the government he had formed, and in the people he had served so well.

2. *The Judicial Barrier*

Aaron Burr fled to Washington, where the President received him amiably, and conferred upon his friends the three best offices in Louisiana Territory. It was not that Jefferson wished to reward the slayer of Hamilton, but that he desired something of Burr. For the Vice-President must preside over the United States Senate, sitting as a court of impeachment to try Justice Chase of the Supreme Court.

This trial was part of a Republican attack on the federal judiciary. Under Chief Justice Jay the federal courts had exercised their constitutional powers without much opposition. They had, however, made two false steps, and others that were unseemly to Republican eyes. In a case involving land claims, the Supreme Court ordered the State of Georgia to appear before the bar as defendant, and entered judgment against it by default. State susceptibilities, thus aroused, produced the eleventh amendment to the Constitution, forbidding suits against states by citizens of other states or nations. In 1798 certain federal judges, excited by the supposed Jacobin menace, enforced the Sedition Act with excessive severity, and delivered political harangues to grand juries in the best seventeenth-century style. When the last Federalist Congress, in 1801, increased the number of federal courts, President Adams filled all the new places with members of his party, and conferred the chief justiceship on John Marshall, a kinsman and enemy to Jefferson. The new President came into power on the crest of a Republican wave, only to find his defeated rivals entrenched in the judiciary; and Chief Justice Marshall defied him, at the first subsequent session of the Supreme Court, by an opinion in the case of Marbury *v.* Madison.

Marbury was a justice of the peace for the District of Columbia, a ' midnight appointment ' by President Adams in the last hours of his administration. Madison, the new Secretary of State, refused to deliver his commission to Marbury, who applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus, under section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Chief Justice Marshall, delivering the opinion of the court (February 1803), first considered the point whether Madison had a right to withhold the commission of a properly appointed official, and decided against the Secretary of State. ' Is it to be contended that the heads of departments are not amenable to the laws of their country? ' Mr. Marbury's hopes were dashed by the rest of the opinion, on the point whether the Supreme Court was competent to grant him a remedy. The Federal Constitution, in defining the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, did not include the issue of writs to executive officers. The real question, then, was whether the Court should follow section 13 of the Judiciary Act, or the Constitution.

It was Marshall's opinion on this point that has vitally influenced the development of constitutional law in the United States.

> ' The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose is that limitation

committed to writing, if these limits may, at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained? . . . It is a proposition too plain to be contested, that the Constitution controls any legislative act repugnant to it. . . . A legislative act contrary to the Constitution is not law. . . . It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. . . . The particular phraseology of the Constitution of the United States confirms and strengthens the principle, supposed to be essential to all written constitutions, that a law repugnant to the Constitution is void; and that *courts,* as well as other departments, are bound by that instrument.'

Judging from the current comment, Marshall's reasoning on this point was generally acceptable; but his rebuke to Madison was strongly resented in administration circles. Jefferson promptly incited some of his henchmen in the House to move an impeachment of certain federal judges. A district judge who had become intemperate to the point of insanity was removed by impeachment; and the next victim was being prepared for the sacrifice when Aaron Burr reappeared in Washington.

Justice Chase of the Supreme Court, an American Dr. Johnson in appearance, intellect, and manners, had made himself peculiarly obnoxious to the Republicans. Before a trial for sedition in 1798, he had ordered the marshal to strike off the panel 'any of those creatures or persons called democrats.' The House of Representatives presented him for impeachment on several counts of malfeasance and misfeasance in office. Strange to relate, after all that had been said about the danger of monarchical trappings, the Senate was fitted up in imitation of the House of Lords at the impeachment of Warren Hastings. Aaron Burr presided impeccably, the best lawyers in the country were engaged for the defence, and the eloquent Randolph of Roanoke prosecuted for the House. There was insufficient evidence to substantiate the serious charges against Justice Chase; and those that were proved were points of manners rather than of justice. The Republicans in the Senate had the necessary two-thirds majority to convict; but when it came to a vote on 1 March 1805 the impeachment failed.

Had Chase been found guilty, there is reason to believe that the entire Supreme Court would have been impeached, and purged. As it was, this trial proved to be the high-water mark of 'Jacobinism.' Federalism and conservatism rallied under the captaincy of Chief Justice Marshall, and from behind the Supreme Court barricade developed a subtle offensive of ideas — the supremacy of the nation and the sanctity of property — that in due time would leave nothing of Jeffersonian democracy but a memory and a tradition.

3. *Florida and the Southwest*

Jefferson, having purchased the whole of Louisiana for little more than half again as much as he had been prepared to pay for a small portion of it, was discontented with the bargain. In the matter of boundaries he believed that the United States had been cheated.

The question whether Louisiana rightfully included Texas and West Florida is a complicated one that need not concern us. Napoleon and Spain insisted that Louisiana included neither; Jefferson and Madison, after examining such maps as they could find, believed that it included both. Jefferson had never wanted the bulk of Louisiana; but he set an exaggerated value upon West Florida, which included Mobile Bay, the only good naval harbor in the Gulf, and the lower courses of the rivers that drained the Mississippi Territory and the Creek Nation. Continued possession of West Florida by Spain would enable her to play the same diplomatic game as in the eighteenth century.

Jefferson never understood the fortuitous combination of European events that procured him Louisiana. He believed it to be due to the diplomatic skill of his friend Monroe. That favorite son of the Virginia dynasty was accordingly sent to Madrid in order to see what could be done with money and threats. The Spanish government was not in a ceding mood; and the good offices of Napoleon were invoked in vain. One needed a long spoon, and a golden one, to sup with the foreign offices of Europe in the decade between Austerlitz and Waterloo.

In December 1805 the President tried another game. Informed by the American minister at Paris that Napoleon might be persuaded to extort West Florida from Spain if it were made worth his while, Jefferson in his annual message adverted to the Spanish 'aggressions' in terms that led the people to expect war. Then followed a special and secret message to Congress, hinting at his need for money. The stage was all set for another secret appropriation of two million dollars for 'diplomatic intercourse.'

This message was the signal for a schism in the Republican party. John Randolph of Roanoke, brilliant in intellect, erratic in conduct, but steadfast in the faith of ideal republicanism that had carried Jefferson into office, had for some time been chafing under the yoke of party discipline. Jefferson, he observed, had done little more in his first years of office than spell federalism backwards; he was now beginning to spell it forwards again. Randolph followed him to Louisiana, but it was time to call a halt. He now announced that he would stand for no shifting of responsibility; if the President wanted money, he must ask for it without evasion. Invited to a conference with the Secretary of State, Randolph was told by Madison that 'France wants money, and we must give it to her or have a Spanish and a French war' — a phrase that Randolph promptly published, and that the Federalists did not allow the country to forget. In the end Jefferson got his two million dollars from Congress, but it proved to be useless in a shifting Europe. He lost the support of John Taylor, high priest of Virginia republicanism; made an enemy of John Randolph, who for the next eight years assaulted him with scorn and mockery from the floor of the House; and convinced the Federalists that he was sold to Bonaparte.

The concluding episode of this crucial year in Jefferson's fortunes was the so-called Burr conspiracy, an enterprise that still remains a mystery. Before leaving Washington at the expiration of his term as Vice-President, Burr approached the British minister with an offer to detach the western states from the Union for half a million dollars. Probably this was a mere blind for obtaining money. Mr. Merry thought well of it and urged his government to pay, but received no reply. Downing Street was no longer interested in promoting American secession.

Burr then proceeded to the headwaters of the Ohio and floated down the river in a flat-boat. The Westerners, inveterate duellers themselves, were charmed by the polished gentleman and statesman from New York. Herman Blennerhasset, a romantic Irish exile, was fascinated with a plan to conquer Mexico, to make Burr emperor, and himself a grand potentate of the court. In Tennessee Burr met and won Andrew Jackson among others, who proposed to elect him to the Senate. With General Wilkinson, who was still in Spanish pay while Governor of Upper Louisiana and ranking general of the army, Burr discussed some project yet unknown. At New Orleans he got in touch with certain Creole malcontents, and with an association of American filibusters who were eager to 'liberate' Mexico. The Catholic bishop of New Orleans and the mother superior of the Ursuline convent gave Burr their support and blessing. Returning overland, he found the Westerners everywhere eager for war with Spain. Louisiana had whetted their appetite for Texas, as it had Jefferson's for Florida. In Washington again, Burr obtained ten thousand dollars from the Spanish minister, ostensibly for the purpose of defending Spanish America; and then attempted to promote an attack on Mexico. After all, war with Spain was supposed to be imminent.

In the summer of 1806 the former Vice-President pushed off once more down the Ohio, with a few flat-boats and sixty followers. The chance of war with Spain had passed; and it is probable that Burr's present object was to take up a land claim he had purchased in western Louisiana. General Wilkinson, deciding that Burr was worth more to betray than to befriend, sent a lurid letter to the President denouncing 'a deep, dark, wicked, and wide-spread conspiracy' to dismember the Union. Similar warnings came from loyal Westerners. In the late autumn of 1806 Jefferson issued a proclamation for the arrest of Burr, and put a price on his head. He was apprehended and brought to Richmond for trial, on a charge of treason against the United States.

Although it should have been obvious that a Western secession from the Union could not be performed by Burr and sixty men, Jefferson left no stone unturned to obtain a conviction. Fortunately for the prisoner, Chief Justice Marshall presided at his trial, and took care that the constitutional definition of treason, 'levying war against the United States or adhering to their enemies,' and the constitutional safeguard of 'two witnesses to the same overt act,' should be strictly observed. Burr was acquitted, and sought exile in France. Wilkinson, a traitor to every cause he embraced, retained his command and the confidence of the President.

Acquittal of Justice Chase, defection of John Randolph, frustration as to Florida, and the Burr fiasco; the turn in Jefferson's fortunes had come.

4. *Impressment*

Returned to the presidency by an overwhelming majority, Jefferson began his second term on 4 March 1805, expecting to pursue the 'wise and frugal' policy of 1801 to its logical conclusion. Instead, his party began to break up into its constituent sections of land-hungry Westerners, Yankee under-dogs, Virginian Republicans who cared only for principle, and Middle-State Democrats who cared little for principle but much for place. Peace in Europe had been the condition of Jefferson's earlier success; but there was to be no peace in Europe for ten years. Before the end of 1805 Napoleon was made supreme on land by Ulm and Austerlitz; and Britain on the sea by Trafalgar. Each side sought to starve or strangle the other by continental or maritime blockade. It was a more difficult situation for the American government than in the wars of 1792 to 1801. Washington, Hamilton, and Adams had had to deal with but one belligerent at a time; Jefferson was confronted with both at once. A clever diplomatist might conceivably have played off one country against another, if he had possessed an armed force as a stake in the game. But neither Jefferson nor Madison could grasp the realities of Napoleonic Europe, and the President abandoned his energetic naval policy before peace was concluded with Tripoli.

During the Mediterranean hostilities American naval commanders had felt the need of small gunboats for use in shoal waters and light winds. Jefferson, as civilian administrators are apt to do, took this suggestion for more than it was worth. Gunboats were cheap, they could be hauled out when not in use, and their construction, by numerous petty shipbuilders, made votes. Congress, instead of providing the frigates that the navy wanted, had sixty-nine gunboats built by 1807. Each of these wretched little schooners was equipped with a battery of two guns, which in foul weather had to be stowed below to prevent capsizing. When one of them, torn from her moorings by a tropical storm, was deposited in a cornfield, a Federalist declared: 'If our gunboats are no use on the water, may they at least be the best on earth!'

Until 1807 Jefferson's principal problems were connected with British sea power. As soon as the British navy considered the renewal of war likely, it resumed the practice of impressing British subjects from American vessels on the high seas.

The British government never claimed the right to impress native-born Americans; but until other means were found to recruit the navy, it claimed the right to impress its own subjects from foreign vessels within British waters or on the high seas. As Britain did not then recognize the right of expatriation — nor did the United States for that matter — American naturalization was no protection to British-born seamen. It was notorious that the high wages in the American merchant marine and navy attracted British subjects. The

Constitution in 1807 had 149 avowed British subjects, and only 241 who claimed American citizenship, in her crew of 419.

When a short-handed man-of-war visited an American merchantman, the boarding officer was apt to impress any likely looking lad who had the slightest trace of an Irish or British accent. Mistakes were inevitable, and difficult to rectify. Easily ninety per cent of the correspondence of American ministers at the Court of St. James's had to do with attempts to obtain the release of their compatriots. Many were finally discharged, but probably as many more were unable to get in touch with their government, and served until they found an opportunity to desert, or were killed in action. There were enough instances of brutality and palpable injustice to create indignation, quite apart from the question of law.

With the renewal of European war in 1804, impressments increased, and men were plucked off American ships just outside New York harbor. At the same time, the old controversies over neutral rights were revived. American merchants and shipowners were making such profits out of neutral trade that they remained silent under these restrictions. But the British courts became aware that Americans were landing French colonial produce in their own ports in bond, relading it in time to escape customs duty, and then taking it to a European port under Napoleon's control. Hence the courts began to condemn such cargoes on the ground that the voyage broken in the United States was really one continuous voyage with enemy property between enemy ports. The United States found this precedent very useful in 1861–65, but it was inconvenient in 1805, and the merchants complained bitterly. The situation was not unlike that of 1793 over the British spoliations in the West Indies. Jefferson followed Washington's example to the extent of negotiation, but no farther.

The negotiations began at London in the summer of 1806, between James Monroe and William Pinckney, and Lord Holland. The American envoys soon realized that it was impossible to obtain the terms desired by Jefferson, so they followed Jay's precedent of disregarding instructions, and signed (31 December 1806) the best terms they could obtain. It was very similar in character to the Jay treaty — which Monroe had vehemently denounced. Britain compromised on her maritime practice without abandoning complete reciprocity. But this treaty was lost. At the last moment the British government inserted an unnecessary and unwise reservation, and

Jefferson refused to submit it to the Senate. There followed an Order in Council (7 January 1807), further narrowing the scope of neutral commerce, and an impressment outrage that brought the two countries to the verge of war.

A British squadron, stationed at the capes of the Chesapeake in order to attack some French frigates when they came out of the bay, lost many men by desertion, and had reason to believe that Jenkin Ratford, the ringleader, had enlisted on the United States frigate *Chesapeake*. He had been searched for by the Navy Department, but not detected. On June 22 the *Chesapeake,* flying the broad pennant of Commodore Barron, got under way from Norfolk Roads. As she passed Lynnhaven Bay, the frigate *Leopard* detached herself from the British squadron and followed; but no one on the *Chesapeake* suspected her intent. When both vessels were about ten miles outside the capes, the *Leopard* luffed up about half a cable's length to windward, and signalled ' Dispatches.' Barron supposed that she wished him to carry mail to Europe, a common courtesy between the two navies in those days. He backed his main topsail and invited the British captain to send a boat on board. The dispatches proved to be an order from Admiral Berkeley to search for and remove deserters. Barron, ignorant of Ratford's presence, replied that the only British deserters in his crew were three Americans formerly impressed; and that he could not permit the search. The boarding officer was recalled, and eight minutes after, the *Leopard* fired her full broadside into the American, and poured in two more before Barron could reply; for the *Chesapeake's* decks were littered with stores, and few of her guns were mounted. After suffering twenty casualties, Barron struck his flag. His crew were then mustered by the *Leopard's* officers, and the three Americans and Ratford taken off. Barron offered the *Leopard's* commander his sword, which was refused; and the *Chesapeake* limped back to Norfolk.

News of this insult to the flag brought the first united expression of American feeling since 1798. Even the Federalists, who had hitherto defended every move of British sea power, were confounded. If Jefferson had summoned Congress to a special session, he would have had war at the drop of a hat; and it would have been a far more popular and successful war than the one finally declared in 1812. But Jefferson's serenity was undisturbed. He instructed Monroe to demand apology and reparation in London, and ordered British warships out of American territorial waters. When Congress met, in late October, the President obtained an appropriation of $850,000 for the building of 188 more gunboats, and ordered three of the largest vessels of the small sea-going navy to be laid up in ordinary.

5. *Embargo*

George Canning, the British foreign secretary, expressed his 'concern and sorrow' at the first news of the *Chesapeake* affair, and his intention to take all proper steps as soon as the facts could be ascertained. Jefferson, however, made reparation impossible by ordering Monroe to accept none that did not include the complete abandonment of impressing British subjects from American merchant ships. Insult was then heaped upon injury by a royal proclamation of 17 October 1807, directing the navy to impress British subjects from neutral shipping to the fullest possible extent.

By the time this order arrived in America the popular ardor for war had cooled; but Congress was ready to follow any lead from the executive. No suggestion of war, or of preparation for war, came from the President. For Jefferson imagined he had England by the throat, and could strangle her by a mere turn of the wrist. For years he had been aching for an opportunity to try commercial exclusion as a substitute for war. The moment had arrived. Jefferson sent a brief message to Congress and in one day, 22 December 1807, it passed the famous Embargo Act. American or other vessels were forbidden to clear foreign, all exports from the United States whether by sea or land were prohibited, and certain specified articles of British manufacture were refused entrance.[1] The Act went into effect immediately; and for fourteen months all the American ships that were not already abroad, and could not escape, lay in port or went coasting.

It is true that between British orders and French decrees, American vessels could visit no part of the world without rendering themselves liable to capture by one or the other belligerent. The neutrals, wrote Spencer Perceval, 'will have no trade, or they must . . . accept it through us.' But the American merchant marine throve on such treatment; shipowners wanted no protection other than that which the British navy afforded them. European restrictions merely increased the profit with the risk; and there were plenty of lines of trade open to neutral shipowners who were willing to put up with British inspection and licence, which was far less rigorous than the system during the World War. At Smyrna, for instance, American ships enjoyed the privileges of the Levant Company and the protection of the British consul. In 1810 a Salem ship that forced the Dardanelles was saved from confiscation by the British Ambassador. Consequently the embargo was detested by the very interest it was supposed to protect. Smuggling of British goods and American products went on over the Canadian and Florida boundaries, but unemployed seamen and shipwrights emigrated in such large numbers to the British provinces that a sarcastic loyalist called the embargo 'an act for the better encouragement of the British Colonies in America.' The greater shipowners who had a fleet abroad survived the embargo very well; but numerous small ones were ruined, and some of the lesser seaports such as New Haven never recovered their earlier prosperity. Agricultural produce fell, and the interior had to live on its own fat; but cotton, tobacco, and wheat could bear storage better than ships. Consequently the embargo bore most heavily on New England and New York; and it was there that its political effects were felt by the administration. As a successful weapon of offence, commercial retaliation requires an unusual combination of circumstances, such as actually occurred in 1812. The embargo of 1807–9 was completely futile. It caused a shortage of provisions in the French Antilles, and of colonial produce in France; but Napoleon confiscated every American vessel that arrived at a French port, on the ground that he was helping Jefferson to enforce the embargo! In the English manufacturing districts the embargo caused some distress, but the usual exports soon found their way into the United States through Canada, and a new South American market was opened. When the American minister in London offered to lift the embargo if Britain would withdraw the Orders in Council, George Canning replied that His Majesty 'would gladly have facilitated its removal as a measure of inconvenient restriction upon the American people!' As J. Q. Adams once remarked, Canning 'had a little too much wit for a minister of state.'

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[1] The last measure was not, strictly speaking, a part of the embargo of December 1807, but the Non-importation Act of 16 April 1806, which did not go into effect until the embargo was adopted.

Jefferson's mistake was the Federalists' opportunity. Their strength had been dwindling steadily, even in New England, where in 1807 every state government except Connecticut was Republican. Senator Pickering, the conspirator of 1804, rallied New England opinion by a public letter, roundly asserting that the embargo was dictated by Napoleon, and adopted by Jefferson in the hope of destroying the shipping interest and impoverishing New England. Northern Republicans were restive under a measure that turned their constituents Federalist; and in New York City the embargo produced a schism in the Republican party. When Madison was nominated for the presidential succession by a congressional caucus, the New York legislature placed George Clinton in nomination as an anti-embargo Republican. In Virginia John Randolph's sect of 'pure Republicans' nominated Monroe, who had been disaffected since the rejection of his treaty. If a union could have been effected between these factions and the Federalists, Madison might have been defeated; as it was, the Federalists carried little but New England, and Madison was elected President by a comfortable majority.

Jefferson intended to maintain the embargo until the British orders or the French decrees were repealed. In January 1809 Congress passed the 'Force Act,' permitting federal officials without warrant to seize goods under suspicion of foreign destination, and protecting them from legal liability for their actions. George III and Lord North had been tender in comparison. The people of New England, now in their second winter of privation and distress, began to look to their state governments for protection; and by this time all the state governments of New England were in Federalist hands. The legislatures hurled back in the teeth of Jefferson and Madison the doctrines of the Kentucky and Virginia resolves of 1798. Connecticut resolved that 'whenever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed bounds of their constitutional powers,' it becomes the duty of the state legislatures 'to interpose their protecting shield between the right and liberty of the people, and the assumed power of the General Government.' A proposal to summon a New England convention for nullification of the embargo was being discussed in February 1809.

By that time the embargo had been in force fourteen months. The Northern Republicans revolted; and Jefferson was shaken by a volley of protests from New England town meetings, some of them threatening secession. A bill for the repeal of the embargo was rushed through Congress, and on 1 March 1809 it was approved by Jefferson. Three days later his term ended, and he retired to Monticello.

The embargo was intended to be the crowning glory of Jefferson's second administration, as Louisiana was of his first. It failed to influence the policy of Britain or of Napoleon; it failed to protect the merchant marine. It wasted the fruit of Jefferson's first administration: the creation of a broad, country-wide party in every state of the Union. As Randolph said, the four lean kine ate up the four fat kine. It convinced many good people that the 'Virginia dynasty' was bound to that of Bonaparte; that the Republican party was a greater enemy than British sea power to American shipping.

Yet this mistake must not efface the good that Jefferson had done during his eight years of office. He was one of the greatest of presidents, and the most tolerant of revolutionists. Few men have combined in like degree a lofty idealism with the ability to administer a government. Few minority leaders have resisted when in power, as he did, the temptation to persecute their opponents. Accustomed as we are to the spectacle of patriots imposing their policies and philosophers their dogmas by the most rigid tyranny or cruel oppression, it is a relief to find one who deliberately preferred the slow process of reason to the short way of force. By his forbearance even more than by his acts, Jefferson kept alive the flame of liberty that Napoleon had almost quenched.

XVII

THE WAR OF 1812

1809–1815

1. *Drifting into War*

THE change in the Presidency was not for the better. Madison surpassed Jefferson in knowledge of political science, but lacked his genius for politics and administration. Slight in stature and unimpressive in personality, anxious to please but with an air of perplexity on his wizened features, James Madison was beloved by a few intimate friends, but unable to inspire loyalty in his subordinates, or enthusiasm in the nation. His talent for the marshalling of words in a contest of reason was of little use in dealing with European statesmen who took the trouble to reason only when their cause was desperate.

Madison's inaugural address (4 March 1809) was a colorless echo of Jeffersonian principles. He chose a cabinet of respectable mediocrities, excepting Gallatin, who retained the Treasury. Yet within six weeks of his inauguration Madison was being hailed as a great peacemaker. Apparently he had reached a settlement with Great Britain. With the British minister at Washington he concluded the so-called Erskine agreement, the gist of which was that Britain would exempt American vessels from the Orders in Council in return for the United States lifting all commercial interdicts from England, and forbidding American ships to trade with France. Madison had gone the limit in concession; he had even consented to postpone the troublesome subject of impressment.

If the Erskine agreement had been ratified at London — it was in a form that needed no ratification at Washington — there might have been no second Anglo-American war. Like Jay's treaty, it would have embroiled the United States with France, and made her a silent partner of the Allies. But for reasons that no one has been able to explain, much less to justify, Canning repudiated the agree-


THE SEAT OF WAR 1812-14
St. Marys two Forts
I. St. Joseph
Manitoulin Isles
Ft. Michillimackinac
White Wood I.
Beaver I.
L A K E
H U R O N
Gr. Traverse B.
Thunder B.
Chippeways
Saguina Bay
Mc Askins
French R.
Rapids
L. Nipissing
Falls
Canoe Ro
U P P
Cabots Hd.
Gloucester B.
Pt. William Henry
L. Simcoe
Gwillia
Hollands R.
Yonge St.
York
YORK
Burlington B.
Lincoln
Street
Great Tract of Woodland
White Rock
Monistic R.
MICHIGAN
TER.
LAKE MICHIGAN
Masagon R.
Grand R.
Maranic R.
Six Nations
Ft. St Clair
Shawnees
Kent
Oxford
Dundas
London
Moravian Vil.
Delawares
Thames R.
Norfolk
L. St. Clair
Newark
Ft. George
Queenstown
Falls
Chippeway
Ft. Erie
Ouse R.
Six Nations
Turkey Pt.
Pt. Abino
Long Pt.
DETROIT
Sandwich
Suffolk
Pt. Aux Pins
Brownstown
Raisin R.
Malden
Frenchtown
South Foreland
L A K E   E R I E
Ashtabula R.
Connaught R.
Chagrin R.
Chautau
Erie
Warren
Waterford
Meadville
Smetl
Pottowatamies
Ft. St. Joseph
Miami B.
P. au Plait
Sisters
Put in Bay
Rapids
Ft. Meigs
Cleveland
Sandusky B.
Miami R.
St. Joseph
Ft. Defiance
Lower Sandusky
U. Sandusky
Huron
Black R.
Rocky R.
Cuyahoga R.
Grand R.
Ft. Franklin
Warren
Ft. Wayne
Au Glaise R.
Sandusky R.
Canton
New Lisbon
Beaver
Alleghany R.
P E N
Ft. Adams
St. Marys R.
Tawa T.
Girtys T.
Indian Boundary Line
Pittsburg
Greensburg
Ft. Recovery
Ft. Loramie
Muskingum R.
O H I O
Urbanna
Wheeling
Some
Piqua
Ft. Greenville
Ft. Jefferson
Mad R.
Franklinton
Zanesville
Brownsville
Youghiogheny R.
Bedf
Mc C
Ft. St. Clair
Dayton
N. Lancaster
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Drawn from John Melish's contemporary map of the Seat of War in North America


Miles
0 20 40 60 80 100
Roads
Many Rapids
Little Rapids
R. North
Immense Forests
Portage des Sables
L. Chat
L. Chaudière
Outawas or Grand R.
Carrying place
UPPER CANADA
3 Rivers
Berthier
St. Sulpice
L. St. Peter
St. Francis
Sorrel
Assumption R.
St. Rose
I. Jesus
Montreal
St. Denis
Sorrel R.
St. Louis
Cochnewaga
F. Chamblee
F. St. John
I. Aux Noix
Coleaude
Grand T. Falls
Chateauguay
Montreal R.
Dundas Street
Johnstown
Cornwall
St. Francis
L. Cannanoque
Ft. Prescot
Brockville
Chateauguay
Champlain
Hamilton
Potsdam
Plattsburg
St. Albans
Northumberland
Ogdensburg
Morris
Parrishville
Burlington
Frontenac
Pittsburg
Kingston
Hastings
Rice L.
Trent R.
Street
Dundas
Durham
1000 Islands
Oxbow
Russel
Willsborough
Montpelier
Vergennes
Brownsville
Newcastle
St. Peters B.
Harrisburg
Crown Point
Ticonderoga
Sackets Harbour
Minos
Stony I.
Black R.
Hudson R.
L. George
Otter R.
Rutland
Windsor
LAKE ONTARIO
Redfield
Leyden
Mexico
Ft. Oswego
Great Sodus B.
Ft. George
Skeenesboro
VERMONT
NEW YORK
Ft. Niagara
Lewistown
Niagara
Batavia
Sodus
Oneida L.
Rome
Herkimer
Saratoga
Auburn
Geneva
Utica
Mohawk R.
Bennington
Buffalo
Buffalo R.
Canandaigua
Genesee R.
Schenectady
Waterford
ALBANY
Greenbush
Leicester
Pittsfield
North'pton
MASS.
Hudson
Painted Post
Springfield
Ceres
Tioga
Esopus
Wellsborough
Coudersport
Hartford
Poughkeepsie
Hudson R.
CONN.
Connecticut R.
West Branch
Williamsport
Wilkesbarre
New Haven
L. I. SOUND
Northumberland
Wind Gap
N. YORK
Sunbury
Easton
Lehigh R.
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW JERSEY
LONG I.
Jamaica
Amboy
Narrows
Rockaway
Huntingdon
Juniata R.
Raritan R.
Brunswick
S. Amboy
Sandy Hook
Reading
Schuylkill R.
Harrisburg
TRENTON
Carlisle
Chambersburg
Somerset
Susquehannah R.
Lancaster
PHILADELPHIA
Barnegat Inlet
York
Delaware R.
Wilmington
Petersburg
Connelstown
79 78 77 76 75 74 73
45 44 43 42 41 40

F. W Welker

ment, recalled Erskine, restored Anglo-American relations to their normal instability, and gave free play to the forces that were pushing the United States into war.

The Congress that assembled in December 1809 had no idea what to do, and received no lead from Madison. At length, on 1 May 1810, it passed the so-called Macon's Bill No. 2, which restored commercial intercourse both with Britain and France, but offered to the first power which recognized neutral rights the bait of refusing to trade with her enemy. In the event of either country exempting the United States from its edicts, the President was authorized to forbid Americans to trade with the other — provided the other did not follow suit within three months. American shipping was soon engaged in making profits under British licence, and in 1811 American tonnage reached figures that were not again attained for twenty years.

Madison took advantage of the interlude in commercial warfare to take a bite of West Florida. The Republican administrations claimed this province as part of Louisiana; but forbore to enforce their claim while there was hope of inducing the Spanish government to admit it. In 1810 there were two Spanish governments, and the Spanish Empire was breaking up. Accordingly the inhabitants of that portion of West Florida bordering on the Mississippi, 'self-determined' for the United States, seized Baton Rouge, and were incorporated by presidential proclamation into the Territory of Orleans, which two years later became the State of Louisiana.

The American minister at St. Petersburg undertook to explain this act to Alexander I. The Emperor bowed and remarked pleasantly, 'Everybody is getting a little bigger, nowadays.'

Napoleon, who had done a good deal of that sort of thing, found time enough between his campaigns and administrative problems, and divorcing and re-marrying, to cast his eye over Macon's Act, and perceive an opportunity to incorporate the United States in his continental system.

For five years Napoleon had treated American shipping arbitrarily and the American government insolently. In July 1810, the American merchantmen at Naples were seized by imperial command, and on 5 August Napoleon ordered the sale of all sequestrated ships and cargoes. But on the same day, the imperial government informed the American minister that 'His Majesty loves the Americans,' and as proof of his tender solicitude for their prosperity had seen fit to declare 'that the Decrees of Berlin and Milan are revoked, and that after 1 November they will cease to have effect — it being understood that the English are to revoke their Orders in Council.'

The equivocal language of this note was unaccompanied by any such pledge of good faith as the release of sequestrated American vessels. John Quincy Adams warned Madison that it was 'a trap to catch us into a war with England.' But the guileless President snapped at the bait. By a proclamation of 2 November he announced that non-intercourse would be revived against Britain, if in three months' time she did not repeal the Orders in Council.

In London William Pinkney urged repeal on the Foreign Secretary, asserting that the Berlin and Milan Decrees were actually revoked. Lord Wellesley could perceive no evidence that they were, and President Madison ignored all evidence that they were not. Every mail brought news of fresh seizures and scuttlings of American vessels by French port authorities and privateers. Yet Madison, with the obstinacy of weakness, insisted that 'the national faith was pledged to France,' and on 11 February 1811 forbade trade with Great Britain, under authority of Macon's Act. Had the United States formally adhered to Napoleon's continental system, the result would have been no different.

This was the third instance within four years that the United States government prohibited Anglo-American commerce, in order to procure repeal of the Orders in Council. On the two former occasions, when there was justice in the American complaints, commercial restriction had had no effect. In 1811–1812, when the American complaint was grounded on Napoleon's falsehood and deception, circumstances brought the first and only victory for peaceful persuasion — too late to preserve the peace.

The winter of 1811–1812 was a bitter one for the English people. Napoleon's continental system had reached its zenith. Practically all Western Europe was closed to British goods. American non-intercourse shut the only important market yet open save Russia, which Napoleon was forcing into his cordon. A crop failure drove the price of wheat to unheard-of figures. Warehouses were crammed with goods for which there was no market, factories were closing, workmen rioting. Deputations from the manufacturing cities besought Parliament to repeal the Orders, if only to recover their American market. Various delays postponed a decision, but finally, on 16 June

1812, Castlereagh announced in the House of Commons that the Orders in Council would be suspended immediately.

It was too late. On 18 June 1812 Congress declared war against Great Britain. But the fundamental reason for this act had little or nothing to do with maritime affairs.

2. *Tecumseh and Tippecanoe*

The reason for this abandonment of Jefferson's policy at the very point of scoring its first and only success must be sought on the American frontier. It was not that seamen wanted freedom of the seas, but that frontiersmen wanted free land, which could be obtained only at the expense of the Indians and the British Empire.

One may well gasp at the appetite of a people who had not yet settled their original limits, who had just doubled their area by the Louisiana Purchase, yet hankered for more. The West felt crowded in 1812 for the same reason that England felt crowded in 1612; because population had outstripped the supporting capacity of an outgrown economic system. It always seems easier and more manly to relieve a pressure of population by conquest than by economic adjustments that will enable the land to support more people.

The American frontier was advanced by hunters and rough-and-tumble pioneer farmers, who purchased their acres from a speculator or a government land-office, cleared a small part of them, cropped their fields until the fertility was exhausted, and then sold out to a more substantial class of emigrants, and moved on. Kentucky and Tennessee and part of Ohio by 1812 were in the hands of farmers who owned slaves (if south of the Ohio), produced wheat, hemp, tobacco, and cotton, planted orchards, built frame instead of log houses, founded schools, churches, and colleges, and were introducing the refinements of the East and the culture of Europe. The pioneer farmer had neither the patience, the knowledge, nor the desire for these things. He was pushed into the less fertile and mountainous regions, or, like Abraham Lincoln's shiftless father, deciding that 'old Kaintuck was no place for a pore man no more,' packed his belongings on a raft or wagon, and proceeded west or south. Even the better farmers swelled the tide of migration by their huge families; and every farmer, then as now, took up more land than he could possibly cultivate, in the hope of selling at a profit.

The pioneer of 1812 was a woodsman. He relied upon standing timber for his building, fencing, and fuel; and until the industrial revolution furnished him with substitutes, he shunned the treeless prairies of Illinois and the Far West. The prairies were remote from rivers and streams, and their tough sod was too much for the crude ploughs of the day. The greater part of the Louisiana Purchase, moreover, was in the hands of powerful Indian tribes. No land-office for these regions had as yet been opened by the government. Hence the land-hungry pioneer turned longingly to the forest lands still held by the redskins in Illinois and Indiana; and to a still more accessible region, the fertile, wooded peninsula of Upper Canada, between Lakes Huron, Erie, and Ontario, with its vast uncultivated crown reserves and its sparse population of loyalists.

Down to 1808 or thereabouts, the pioneers had been kept quiet by government purchases from the Northwest Indians. The Treaty of Greenville in 1795, following the Battle of the Fallen Timbers, ended a period in which the Indians had on the whole been the aggressors, and began one in which the Americans were decidedly on the offensive. Washington and Adams stood by that treaty. Jefferson professed the most benevolent principles towards the Indians, but coveted their lands in order to keep the United States an agricultural country. He hoped to induce them to abandon hunting and adopt agriculture as their sole means of livelihood, when they would require a mere fraction of the lands they still possessed. Eventually they must remove across the Mississippi. Such a policy could square with humanity and justice only by protecting the Indians from the whites during the process. Although the Indians faithfully fulfilled their treaty stipulations, white men committed the most wanton and cruel murders on them with impunity. It was impossible to persuade a pioneer jury to convict. A good Indian was a dead Indian on the frontier. From time to time a few hungry and desperate chiefs were rounded up by government officials, and plied with oratory and whiskey until they signed a treaty alienating forever the hunting grounds of their tribe. Jefferson encouraged the process; and William Henry Harrison, superintendent of the Northwest Indians and Governor of Indiana Territory,[1] pushed it so successfully that between 1795 and 1809 the Indians of that region parted with forty-eight million acres.

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[1] Indiana Territory, created in 1800, included all the Northwest Territory except Ohio, which became a state in 1802. Michigan Territory was detached from it in 1805, and Illinois Territory (including Wisconsin) in 1809.

There came a halt in this process in 1809, owing to the efforts of Tecumseh and his brother the Prophet, two noble red men indeed. Tecumseh, son of a Shawnee brave, undertook the task of saving his people by reforming their habits, stopping the alienation of their land, keeping them apart from the whites, and welding all the tribes on United States soil into a confederacy. It was a movement of regeneration and defence, menacing indeed the indefinite expansion of the West, but in no sense its existence. The Indians had so decreased in the last decade that scarcely four thousand warriors were counted in the space between the Lakes, the Mississippi, and the Ohio. Opposed to them were at least two hundred thousand white men of fighting age in the Ohio valley.

The partnership of warrior and priest was for a time irresistible. The Prophet kindled a religious revival among the tribes of the Northwest, and Indians came from far and wide to listen to his teachings. He actually induced them to give up intoxicating liquor. All intercourse with white men, except for trade, ceased; rum and whiskey were refused with disdain. In 1809 Tecumseh and the Prophet began settlement at the Great Clearing, where the Tippecanoe Creek empties into the Wabash river. The whole frontier was alarmed. Dry Indians were something new to backwoods experience.

Governor Harrison met the situation with an act that Tecumseh could only regard as a challenge. Rounding up a few score survivors of tribes whom he frankly described as 'the most depraved wretches on earth,' Harrison concluded with them a treaty which deprived Tecumseh of his remaining hunting grounds, and brought the white border within fifty miles of the Tippecanoe. Tecumseh, with justice, declared this treaty null and void. More western nations joined his confederacy; and in July 1811, again assuring Governor Harrison that his object was defensive, he journeyed south to obtain the alliance of the Creeks. Harrison then decided to force hostilities. With the tacit approval of the War Department, he collected a force of about eleven hundred men, and marched them up the Wabash valley into the Indian country. On 6 November 1811 they encamped hard by Tecumseh's village at the mouth of the Tippecanoe. Envoys from the Prophet brought a pacific message; but the presence of an armed force of white men was too much for the reckless young braves. There was a sharp two hours' fight, and the Indian village was destroyed. Harrison was hailed as victor of the battle of Tippecanoe.

Throughout the West it was believed that Britain was behind Tecumseh's confederacy. It is true that the Governor of Canada encouraged the formation of Tecumseh's confederacy; but he withheld the customary presents of ammunition early in 1812, and discouraged hostilities with the United States. Tecumseh's league would have been formed, and Tippecanoe have been fought if there had not been a single Englishman in Canada. Unfortunately, however, it is not the truth, but what people believe, that makes history. The notion that every defensive move of the Indians was due to British machination not only served to cover and excuse the frontiersmen's lust for Canada, but to convince thousands of people who desired no extension of territory that the only safety for the West lay in driving British power from North America. And a new Congress in which this belief and desire became articulate met at Washington just three days before the battle of Tippecanoe.

The congressional elections of 1810–1811 had been a landslide. Nearly one-half of the members of the inept House that enacted Macon's Act failed of re-election. A new generation came into power. From Kentucky there was Henry Clay, from Tennessee came 'Citizen' Sevier, and Felix Grundy, who had had three brothers killed by Indians. From western New York came Peter B. Porter, who lived within a gunshot of the Canadian border; and from the Carolina Piedmont, John C. Calhoun. These 'war-hawks,' as they were called, were far short of a majority; but they quickly combined with other new members to place Henry Clay in the speaker's chair; and the Speaker of the House has the appointment of important committees, including that of foreign relations.

These young Westerners, who had never seen the ocean in their lives, and whose communities were completely immune from the influence of Orders in Council and French decrees, quickly learned the vocabulary of neutral rights, and catch-words of the freedom of the seas. Not content to wrap their desires in the American flag, they cursed Canadian 'scalp-buyers,' boasted that Canada could be conquered in six weeks, and elaborated upon the destiny of the United States to reach the North Pole. In vain John Randolph poured out his scorn on this 'cant of patriotism,' this 'agrarian cupidity,' this chanting 'like the whip-poor-will but one eternal monotonous tone — Canada! Canada! Canada!' New members from North and South joined the chorus. There was an accidental engagement between the frigate *President* and the corvette *Little Belt,* under circumstances that increased the ardor of the American navy for a good stand-up fight, and enhanced the contempt of the Royal navy for American 'fir-built frigates.' A feeling was rising that the Jeffersonian system of commercial retaliation was dastardly, that America must show the world she was not too proud to fight. Since 1806 the American government had ceased publicly to complain of impressment; but the practice continued, and a tardy but generous reparation for the *Chesapeake* affair proved insufficient balm for the growing public irritation at having American seamen removed from American ships because they were conveniently mistaken for British.

Madison long held out against the clamor for war; and it is not necessary to explain his final yielding by the story that Clay exacted it as the price of his renomination to the Presidency. In the last week of May 1812 the British minister at Washington communicated a dispatch from his government which seemed to close all hope of the Orders in Council being repealed. This convinced Madison that commercial retaliation had failed. Too obstinate to see that Napoleon had duped him, and that the Berlin and Milan Decrees had never been repealed, Madison, on 1 June, sent Congress a message recommending war with England on four grounds: impressment, violations of the three-mile limit, paper blockades, and Orders in Council. On 18 June war was declared.

The vote on the declaration was 79 to 49 in the House; 19 to 13 in the Senate. The inland and western States of Vermont, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee lacked but one vote of unanimity for war. The maritime sections of New England were unanimous for peace. A majority of the congressmen from New England, New York, and New Jersey, the states which owned three-quarters of the tonnage and provided most of the seamen, voted against war; and one-quarter of the Republicans refused to vote.

Congress adjourned on 6 July without voting war taxes, or providing for any increase of the navy. It was to be a short war; a mere frontiersman's frolic into Canada, to dictate peace at Quebec.

3. *On to Canada!*

The War of 1812–1815, forced upon the Republican party by its fighting frontier wing, was unsuccessful and generally unpopular in the United States until it was over. From the Canadian point of view it was a defensive war, gallantly maintaining imperial integrity against overwhelming odds. The British nation, absorbed in its struggle with Napoleon, paid little attention to America until the Yankee frigates and privateers touched it in a tender spot; and it was not until Napoleon was disposed of that any serious effort was made to win this outlying conflict.

The Federalists, with a different vision of national honor from that of the party in power, believed that the great issue was Napoleon and military despotism against the Allies and nationalism. One week after America declared war, Napoleon invaded Russia with his Grand Army. Thousands of Americans deemed it immoral to hamper the Allies at that crisis. If war were required to cleanse the national honor, they argued, it should have been declared against Napoleon, who had not only deceived the administration, but by Madison's own admission had captured more American vessels since 1807 than the British. A war for 'free trade and seamen's rights,' forced by a section that had neither ships nor sailors, and accepted by a party that refused appropriations for the navy, could only be regarded with loathing in maritime New England. Robert Smith of Baltimore, Madison's first Secretary of State, issued a public address against the war. John Marshall wrote to him that as Chief Justice he could take no active part in politics, yet as an American he was mortified at his country's base submission to Napoleon; that the only party division henceforth should be between the friends of peace and the advocates of war. That was indeed the division in the presidential election of 1812. The Federalists supported DeWitt Clinton, who was nominated by a peace faction of the New York Republicans, and carried every state north of the Potomac save Pennsylvania and Vermont; but Madison was re-elected by the votes of the South and West.

The 'war-hawks' had good reason to expect a prompt victory. The population of the United States in 1810 was seven and a quarter millions, of which sixteen per cent were slaves. The population of British North America was in the neighborhood of five hundred thousand, of which a large majority were French. A considerable part of the English-speaking Canadians were isolated in the Maritime Provinces; another part, consisting of emigrants from the United States, was disaffected. There was no great difference, however, in the forces ready to meet the first shock of war. Canada contained four regiments of the line, with forty-five hundred effectives, about four thousand Canadian regulars, most of them specially raised for the occasion, and the same number of militia. Tecumseh's confederacy would provide three or four thousand Indian auxiliaries.

The United States regular army was less than seven thousand strong on 8 June 1812, and enlistments came in very slowly. Over four hundred thousand state militia were called into service during the war; but only a small part of these served on the Canadian front, where they proved the uselessness of untrained militia in offensive warfare. William Eustis, the American Secretary of War, was an amiable politician who had been a surgeon in the War of Independence. Henry Dearborn, the senior major-general, had been a deputy quartermaster general in the same war. America did not discover Andrew Jackson until the close of the war: Canada had Isaac Brock at the start.

The United States was unprepared in strategy as in armament. The settled portions of Canada in 1812 were shaped like a tree, of which the St. Lawrence was the trunk, the Great Lakes and their tributaries the branches, and the sea lanes to England the roots. Chatham had reduced Canada in 1759–1760 by grasping the roots and grappling the trunk. Madison had no proper navy to attempt the former, but he might well have attempted to hew the tree by a sharp stroke at Montreal. Instead, he attempted several feeble and unsystematic loppings at the branches.

A week before war was declared, General William Hull was placed in command of fifteen hundred troops at Urbana, Ohio, and ordered to march two hundred miles, cutting his own road through the wilderness, to Detroit, and thence to invade Upper Canada. Hull begged the government to obtain control of Lake Erie, in order to secure his communications and hamper those of Brock; but nothing was done. He got his force to Detroit in safety, and on 12 July crossed the river into Upper Canada. Parading through that thinly settled country, he found the inhabitants so poor and unfriendly that he shortly fell back on Detroit. In the meantime, the commander of the British post at the Sault Ste. Marie forced the American garrison at Michilimackinac to surrender (17 July), which brought Tecumseh's confederacy definitely to the British side. General Brock promptly transported to Detroit all the troops he could spare from the Niagara front, and summoned Hull to surrender. A broad hint in Brock's note, that the Indians would be beyond his control the moment fighting began, completely un-nerved the American general. Dreading a massacre of women and children, deserted by some of his militia, and cut off from his base, Hull surrendered on 16 August 1812. So ended the first invasion of Canada. Fort Dearborn (Chicago) was also lost, and the effective military frontier of the United States was thrown back to the Wabash and the Ohio.

One week later Brock was back at Niagara with Hull's army as prisoners of war, and eager to attack his enemy on the New York side of the Niagara river. Prevost restrained him, and the Americans took the initiative on 13 October. Captain John E. Wool led a small detachment of regulars across the river, to a gallant and successful attack on Queenston heights, where General Brock was killed. Wool should have been supported by the New York militia under General Van Rensselaer; but the militia refused to budge. They had turned out to defend their homes, not to invade Canada. General Van Rensselaer exhorted them in vain; the militia calmly watched their comrades on the other bank being enveloped, shot down, and forced to surrender.

Alexander Smyth, a regular army officer, was then given command on the Niagara front. After issuing another proclamation to the Canadians, and exhorting his soldiers to 'Be strong! Be brave! And let the ruffian power of the British king cease on this continent!' General Smyth threw up the sponge, and refused to cross Niagara river. His men joyfully discharged their muskets in every direction, showing a preference for the General's tent as target. Smyth followed Hull and Van Rensselaer into retirement.

There still remained a considerable force at Plattsburg on Lake Champlain, under the immediate command of General Dearborn. This army should have struck the Canadian trunk at Montreal. On 20 November Dearborn marched twenty miles north of Plattsburg, when the militia refused to go farther. The general then marched them back to Plattsburg.

4. *'Fir-built Frigates'*

On the ocean there is a different story to tell. At the beginning of hostilities the American navy consisted of sixteen sea-going vessels, excluding Jefferson's gunboats. The pride of the Navy was its three oldest frigates, the 44's *Constitution, United States,* and *President,* which had been designed to outclass all other frigates, and to outrun ships of the line. They threw a heavier broadside than the British frigates, and were so heavily timbered and planked as to deserve the name 'Old Ironsides'; yet with such fine, clean lines under water that they could outsail almost anything that floated. The American crews were volunteers, and the officers, tried by experience against France and Tripoli, were burning to avenge the *Chesapeake*. Such were the 'few fir-built frigates, manned by a handful of bastards and outlaws' — a London journalist phrase that became quite popular with the Americans.

Admiral Sir John Borlase Warren, who commanded the consolidated transatlantic station at the beginning of the war, had under him ninety-seven sail, including eleven of the line and thirty-four frigates. The conquerors at Cape St. Vincent, Trafalgar, and the Nile were the spoiled children of victory, confident of beating any vessel not more than twice their size. Hence, when the *Constitution* knocked the *Guerrière* helpless in two hours and a half (19 August 1812) and reduced the *Java* to a useless hulk (29 December); when the sloop-of-war *Wasp* mastered the *Frolic* in forty-three minutes, and the *Hornet,* after a close fight of fifteen minutes off the Demerara river, sank the *Peacock* (24 February 1813); and when the frigate *United States,* Captain Decatur, entered New London harbor with the British frigate *Macedonian* as prize (4 December 1812), there was amazement and indignation in England, and rejoicing in the United States. In four out of the five engagements the American vessel threw the heavier broadside, and deserved the victory; but the British commanders were no less ingenious in finding excuses for defeat than they had been brisk in seeking battle.

The moral value of these victories to the American people, following disaster on the Canadian border, was beyond all calculation; but the military value was slight. Most of the American men-of-war that put into harbor during the winter of 1812–13 were there blockaded during the remainder of the war. Captain Lawrence of the unlucky *Chesapeake,* with a green and mutinous crew, unwisely accepted a challenge from Captain Broke of the *Shannon,* and sailed from Boston harbor to defeat and a glorious death (1 June 1813); the *Essex,* after clearing British privateers from the South Pacific, was destroyed by the *Phoebe* and *Cherub* while seeking asylum within the three-mile limit of Chile (28 March 1814); and Decatur lost the *President* while trying to elude the New York blockading squadron (17 January 1815). When the war ended, only the *Consti-*

tution and four smaller vessels of the United States navy were at sea. American privateers managed to continue their depredations, although forced by convoys and blockades to transfer their operations to European and far eastern waters.

Hostilities might have ended with the year 1812, had Lord Liverpool's government been willing to abandon impressment. There was no desire for war on the part of the British people, and the government was anxious to terminate it as soon as possible. After the Orders in Council were repealed (23 June 1812), and the news of the American declaration of war reached London, the American chargé d'affaires endeavored to negotiate an armistice, on the condition that impressment from American vessels be suspended. In return he was instructed to promise that the enlistment of British-born seamen in American ships would be forbidden. Castlereagh replied (29 August) that His Majesty could not give up his ' ancient and accustomed practice.' Discussions were then transferred to America, and Admiral Warren proposed an armistice to the Secretary of State. Monroe replied (27 October) that no armistice would be concluded without at least a suspension of impressment. 'Having gone to war,' he wrote John Taylor, ' it seemed to be our duty not to withdraw from it till the rights of our country were placed on a more secure basis.' Hence the war continued on the single ground of impressment — for the conquest of Canada had never been alleged as an official war aim.

Congress, swept off its feet by enthusiasm over the naval victories, authorized an increase of the navy in December 1812 by four ships-of-the-line and six heavy frigates. None of the new vessels got to sea during the war; but in the meantime freshwater naval history was being made on the Great Lakes.

Hull's surrender of Detroit convinced the American government that command of the Lakes was essential. At the same time the Canadian authorities determined to retain the supremacy they already enjoyed. It was comparatively easy for the power that controlled the Lakes to bring in more guns and fresh supplies. The Americans surmounted their greater difficulties through the energy and resourcefulness of Captain Oliver H. Perry, with headquarters at Presqu'ile on Lake Erie. All the cordage, sails, ordnance, and other supplies for the Lake Erie flotilla had to be hauled over the Alleghany Mountains to Pittsburgh and thence poled up the French river to the old carrying place between Fort Le Bœuf and

Presqu'ile. Nevertheless, Perry managed to get a fleet of stout little vessels constructed during the winter of 1812–13. As the larger units had to be helped over a harbor bar by pontoons, and receive their guns outside, the British Commodore Barclay found it easy to contain the American fleet by blockade.

General Harrison, a commander in whom the West had confidence, advanced from the Ohio towards Detroit in three divisions during the winter of 1812–13. General Proctor did not wait for them to unite, but beat two of them separately in fierce wilderness fights. Harrison then decided to await the decision on Lake Erie. Owing to a temporary relaxation of Barclay's blockade, Perry was able to get his fleet over the bar on 4 August, and to seek out the British squadron. He found it on 10 September at Put-in-Bay among the islands toward the western end of the Lake. A strange sort of naval battle ensued, between vessels hastily built of green wood, manned largely by militiamen, negroes, frontier scouts, and Canadian *voyageurs*. Perry's plans were foiled for want of wind, and the fight was a matter of fire-away-Flannagan until one or the other went down. Superior weight of metal gave the Battle of Lake Erie to Perry. His laconic report, 'We have met the enemy, and they are ours,' was literally true.

Harrison then pursued Proctor to the center of the Ontario peninsula and defeated him at the Battle of the Thames (5 October 1813). Tecumseh was killed, Proctor saved his life only by flight, the Indian confederacy was broken up, and the American military frontier in the Northwest was re-established.

On Lake Ontario, where another fleet was improvised by Captain Isaac Chauncey, there was no such decisive result in 1813. In April 1813 Chauncey and General Dearborn raided York (later Toronto), the capital of Upper Canada. A large powder magazine exploded when the Americans were advancing upon the village, killing General Pike and about three hundred men. As a result of this incident, or of general indiscipline, the American troops got out of hand after the surrender, burnt the two brick parliament houses, the governor's residence, and other buildings as well. As the British had a considerable naval force on Lake Ontario, the Americans had to evacuate York; but Chauncey's fleet co-operated with the American forces on the Niagara front in a successful attack on Fort George.

A devastating American invasion of Upper Canada now began in earnest. General Vincent stopped it at Stony Creek, near Hamilton, and captured both American commanders (27 May 1813). Their subordinate, a militia general named McClure, burned the town of Newark and as much as he could of Queenston (19 December), turning the inhabitants out of their houses on a cold winter's night, before he retreated across the Niagara river. For this atrocity the innocent inhabitants on the American side paid dearly. On 30 December Fort Niagara was taken by surprise, the Indians were let loose on the surrounding country, and the villages of Black Rock and Buffalo were destroyed. In the meantime, two American columns were converging on Montreal: General Wilkinson, proceeding down the St. Lawrence from Sackett's Harbor, and General Wade Hampton advancing west from Plattsburg. Both allowed themselves to be turned back by mere skirmishes — at Chrysler's Farm (11 November 1813) and Chateauguay (26 October).

The second year of the war then closed with Canada cleared of American troops, and the Canadians in possession of Fort Niagara. American reoccupation of Detroit, and command of Lake Erie, ended all danger of a flanking movement from the Northwest, and made it impossible for Great Britain, at the peace conference, to annex the southern shores of the Lakes. So far, the British forces in Canada had waged defensive warfare; but the tables were turned in 1814.

5. *From Chippewa to New Orleans*

The Allies entered Paris on 31 March, Napoleon abdicated on 6 April, Bayonne, the last Napoleonic stronghold, capitulated to Wellington three weeks later. At last Britain was able to provide Canada with an adequate army, to carry the war into the United States, to concentrate her navy on the American coast, and to force her own terms of peace. The plan was to invade the United States from three points successively: Niagara, Lake Champlain, and New Orleans; and simultaneously to raid the American coast, under cover of a strict blockade.

On the Niagara front the Americans were able to take the initiative before British reinforcements arrived. Their army had learned much from two years of adversity. Incompetent officers had been weeded out, and promising young men promoted; more reliance was placed on regulars, and less on militia. On 4 July General Jacob Brown got his army of five or six thousand men across the Niagara river, and forced the ill-garrisoned Fort Erie to capitulate the same day. On the 5th, his subordinate, Winfield Scott, after giving the men of his brigade a Fourth of July dinner that they had been too busy to partake of on the proper date, was marching them across a creek to hold a holiday parade on the plain beyond, when it appeared that three British regiments were there to break up the celebration. Scott deployed his brigade under fire, and the parade became the battle of Chippewa. The two lines advanced in close order, stopping alternately to load and fire; when they came in contact the British line broke. The battle of Lundy's Lane on 25 July, hard by Niagara Falls, was the most stubbornly contested fight of the war, but inconclusive.

Very few of the reinforcements from Europe appear to have been engaged at Lundy's Lane; but by the middle of August Sir George Prevost commanded ten or eleven thousand of Wellington's veterans near Montreal, in readiness to invade the United States by Burgoyne's route of Lake Champlain and the Hudson. Prospects were very black for the United States, particularly as the War Department had lately transferred most of the regulars from Plattsburg to Niagara. Early in September, Prevost moved down the western side of Lake Champlain, synchronizing his movements with that of a freshwater flotilla, and forcing the Americans back to a strong position behind the river that empties into Plattsburg Bay. There they were protected by a line of forts, and by the American lake squadron, which was anchored inside the entrance to the bay in such a position as to rake enemy ships upon entering.

Prevost reached Plattsburg with his magnificent army on 6 September. Facing him were only fifteen hundred American regulars, and a few thousand militia. He has been severely criticized for not pushing home a frontal attack; but the American forts, constructed by West Point engineers, were formidable; and he wished first to secure control of the Lake. Early in the morning of 11 September the British fleet hove to off Cumberland Head. There followed a murderous engagement. Small vessels, without bulwarks to protect their crew, anchored side by side at pistol range and attempted to pound each other to pieces. The American fleet under Commodore Macdonough was the better handled and won the day. Prevost retreated to Canada; and the naval Battle of Plattsburg proved decisive in the war.

It was not, however, the last battle. Throughout the summer of 1814 the Royal navy had its will on the Atlantic coast. Maine was occupied to the Penobscot, and a base for the blockading fleet established at the tip of Cape Cod. During the previous year a naval squadron under Admiral Cockburn had waged inglorious warfare on the fowl-houses, cow-barns, and movable property along the shores of Chesapeake Bay. In June 1814 a British expeditionary force was sent from Bordeaux in order to make a diversion in this region. The campaign that followed reflected little credit on the one side, and considerable disgrace on the other. General Ross, commander of the land forces, was instructed by Admiral Cochrane 'to destroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast' as he might find assailable.

A fleet of Jeffersonian gunboats, retreating up the Patuxent river, led Ross's army from Chesapeake Bay to the back door of Washington. For five days the army marched along the banks of this river, approaching the capital of the United States without seeing an enemy or firing a shot. In the meantime, Washington was in a feverish state of preparation. About seven thousand militia, all that appeared out of ninety-five thousand summoned, were placed under an unusually incompetent general, and hurried to a strong position behind the village of Bladensburg, athwart the road over which the invaders must advance, and only five miles from the Capitol. President Madison and some of the cabinet officers came out to see the fun. After the militia had suffered only 66 casualties they broke and ran, leaving Commodore Barney with 400 seamen and five guns of the gunboat squadron to dispute the field. Their gallant resistance was soon overcome, and the British army pressed on to Washington that evening (24 August). Some of the officers arrived in time to eat a dinner at the White House that had been prepared for the President and Mrs. Madison.

All the public buildings of the capital were deliberately burned. There was no looting and little destruction of private property — small consolation for the loss of the White House and Capitol.

It was a dark period for Madison's fugitive administration. Only discouraging news had arrived from the peace negotiators at Ghent. New England was disaffected, and the last national war loan had failed, and all the banks south of New England had suspended specie payments. Prevost was expected to march south again; and a new British expeditionary force was expected at New Orleans.

Fortunately, the destruction of Washington only showed that invading a country like the United States is like hurling a hammer into a bin of corn. A few kernels were hurt, but the hammer had to be withdrawn quickly, or lost. On the night of 25–26 August 1814 the British army withdrew to its transports and proceeded to the next objective, Baltimore. Here the inhabitants were prepared, and the Maryland militia showed a very different spirit from that of their Virginia comrades. A naval bombardment on Fort McHenry made little impression, and General Ross was killed at the head of a landing party (12 September). That was the end of the Chesapeake campaign.

By the time the third British expeditionary force reached New Orleans, 18 December 1814, the West had produced a military leader. General Andrew Jackson, a frontiersman who had gone to Tennessee as a young man and grown up with the state, had been winning laurels in warfare against the Creeks. That nation had endeavored to remain neutral, but some northern Indians visited the Creek villages in 1813, and stirred up the younger warriors. The result was a series of raids on the frontier, and the capture of Fort Mims above Mobile, together with some 250 white scalps.

This news reached Andrew Jackson in bed at Nashville, as he was recovering from a pistol shot received in a street brawl with the future Senator Benton. In a month's time he had 2,500 militia and a band of Choctaw auxiliaries in the Creek country. Nothing was accomplished that year; but after General Jackson had executed a few militiamen to encourage the others, the campaign went very well. The Creeks were beaten, their military power broken, and their territory dismembered by treaty (9 August 1814).

A few days before this, a small British force landed at Pensacola in Spanish Florida, and its leader, an impetuous Irishman named Edward Nicholls, proceeded to organize and drill Creek refugees with a view to renewing the war in that quarter. Jackson then invaded Florida on his own responsibility and captured Pensacola. Ignorant of the exact destination of the approaching British expeditionary force, he was ordered to New Orleans just in time to defend it. Mistaking the route by which the British would approach, Jackson allowed them to arrive unnoticed within a few miles of the city. Their commander, Sir Edward Pakenham, ought to have attacked New Orleans at once. Delay was fatal for any one facing Andrew Jackson. This lank, long-haired general in his 'well-worn leather cap, a short Spanish cloak of old blue cloth, and great unpolished boots whose vast tops swayed uneasily around his bony knees,' was master of the situation the moment his enemy was in sight. Taking a strong position on the left bank of the Mississippi, between the levee and a swamp, he awaited an attack; and on the morning of 8 January 1815 the attack came. It was one of the most foolhardy events in British military annals: a frontal assault in close column formation against earthworks protected by artillery and riflemen. General Pakenham was killed, together with over 2,000 of all ranks; and the second and third generals in command were fatally wounded. Exactly thirteen Americans were killed before the attacking columns melted. The only surviving general officer withdrew the British army to its transports.

This Battle of New Orleans had no military value, since peace had been signed on Christmas eve; but it made a future President of the United States, and created the American tradition of the War of 1812, as a ‘second War of Independence.’ Although the Treaty of Ghent was a peace without a victory, and the Americans did not attain a single object for which their government had declared war, the people came to believe that they had won a just and glorious contest for free trade and seamen's rights.

6. *New England and the War*

New England's opposition to the war increased with its duration, although it was paradoxical that she should not be the most bellicose section of the United States. A war for free trade and seamen's rights was regarded with loathing in the maritime State of Massachusetts; a war for the conquest of Canada was resented by the section whose power in the Union would have been enhanced by the annexation of Canada. And hostilities enriched New England at the expense of the rest of the country.

The British blockade of the American coast was not extended to Massachusetts until the spring of 1814. Consequently, practically all the American imports came through New England custom houses, and most of the specie in the United States flowed into Yankee banks. And, strangest of all, Jefferson's embargo and Madison's war had the effect of diversifying the economic life of New England, as Hamilton hoped to do for the entire country.

In 1807 there were only fifteen cotton mills, with eight thousand spindles, in the United States. By 1810, after two winters of Jefferson' embargo, there were eighty-seven mills with eighty thousand spindles; three-quarters of them located within thirty miles of Providence, Rhode Island, and all operated by water power. Madison's non-intercourse proclamation of 1811 again shut off English competition; and by the close of the War of 1812 there were half a million spindles in operation. While John Lowell, leader of the Boston Federalists, was advocating a New England Confederation as the only cure for commerce, his brother Francis C. Lowell was picking up information in England about power looms. On his return to the United States, Lowell invented a power loom of his own, and in 1814 at Waltham, Massachusetts, equipped the first complete American cotton factory.

While the War of 1812 was preparing New England for a necessary transition from seafaring to manufacturing, the New England Federalists cried ruin. Blind to new economic forces, their ideas of the Republican administrations and of their own consequence became hardened and fixed. The doctrine that New England depended exclusively on shipping and commerce, the charge that ' Mr. Madison's war ' was dictated by Napoleon and designed to ruin their section, was propagated in the press, and in pamphlets of great pith and cogency. The Yankees were told again and again that they were the earth's chosen people, that the Constitution was weighted against them, and that the annexation of Louisiana absolved them from all obligation to remain in the Union.

In 1813 the Federalists controlled all the state governments of New England, and were again in a position to employ the doctrine of state rights against the administration. Up to that time, their opposition had been individual rather than corporate. Enlistments were discouraged, the President's requisitions for militia refused. Allied victories in Europe were celebrated, and a vote of thanks to a naval hero was rejected in the Massachusetts legislature as ' not becoming a moral and religious people.' However justified these stern puritans may have been in refusing to support a war of conquest against a kindred people, there was no excuse for their continuing the same policy after Napoleon had been disposed of and the character of the war had been changed. They chose the darkest moment for the American cause to agitate state rights, and to summon a sectional convention.

For some years there had been talk of holding a New England convention to concert protest or action against Republican policy. Events of the summer of 1814 conspired to bring it about. Massachusetts was thrown upon her own resources for defence. Eastern Maine had been occupied by the enemy, the blockading squadron was making descents on various parts of the coast, and for all their heavy war taxes the New England States were receiving no protection from the Federal Government. That this condition existed was largely the fault of the Federalist governors in refusing to place their militia under officers of the United States army; but New England was past reasoning on these matters. On 5 October 1814 the legislature of Massachusetts summoned a New England Convention at Hartford, for the express purpose of conferring upon 'their public grievances and concerns,' upon 'defence against the enemy . . . and also to take measures, if they shall think proper, for procuring a convention of delegates from all the United States, in order to revise the Constitution thereof.'

The language of this summons showed a compromise between the moderate and the extreme Federalists. The former, led by Harrison Gray Otis, were not disunionists, but wished to improve the situation in order to obtain concessions for New England. Alarmed at the rising tide of secessionist sentiment, they hoped the Convention would act as a safety valve to let it off; and their desire to concert defensive measures against the enemy was sincere. But the violent wing of the Federalist party, led by Timothy Pickering and the 'Essex Junto,' had other objects in view. It was their belief that the British invasion of New Orleans would succeed; and the West, shut off from the ocean, would then secede. The Hartford Convention would draft a new Federal Constitution, with clauses to protect New England interests, and present it as a pistol to the original Thirteen States. If they accepted it, well and good; if not, New England would act on her own, and make a separate peace with Great Britain. The extremists desired no further union with the democratic West.

The Hartford Convention, representing mainly the States of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Connecticut, met in secret session on 15 December 1814. President Madison was apprehensive, and the war party feared the worst. Fortunately the moderates gained control and issued a sensible and statesmanlike report (5 January 1815). Madison's administration, and the war, were severely arraigned. 'But to attempt upon every abuse of power to change the Constitution, would be to perpetuate the evils of revolution.' The policy of secession was squarely faced, and ruled out as inexpedient and unnecessary, since the causes of New England's calamities were not deep and permanent, but the result of bad administration, and of partisanship in the European war. The New England States were invited to nullify the conscription bill then before Congress, if it should pass. A suggestion was thrown out that Congress might permit them to assume their own defence, applying to that purpose the federal taxes collected within their borders. A few constitutional amendments were proposed. But there was no suggestion of a separate peace, or of kicking the West out of the Union.

The report of the Hartford Convention was praised for its moderation by the war press, and secession agitation in New England immediately calmed down; but presently the news from Ghent and New Orleans put Madison's administration on stilts, and made New England the scapegoat for government mismanagement. A stigma of unpatriotism, from which it never recovered, was attached to the Federalist party. Yet no stigma was attached to the doctrine of state rights; and within five years it was revived by politicians who had denounced the Hartford Convention as treasonable.

7. *Ghent*

Peace negotiations began as soon as the war. Even before Admiral Warren had been able to offer an armistice, the Emperor of Russia proposed to mediate between England and the United States. For reasons still somewhat obscure this came to nothing, and it was not until January 1814 that Madison received a direct offer from London to treat. He replied favorably at once. After further delay, Ghent was decided upon as the place of negotiation. But by the time the American commissioners arrived there, in June 1814, the Liverpool ministry was in no hurry to negotiate. News of decisive victories in America was shortly expected, when Britain would be in a position to dictate, instead of negotiate.

The Americans had been instructed to insist upon the abandonment of impressment as a first condition of peace. The British commissioners were instructed not to admit impressment or neutral rights as subjects of discussion. They further informed the Americans that the United States must abandon its rights to the Newfoundland and Labrador fisheries: a proposal that infuriated John Quincy Adams, the head of the American delegation. The Canada-United States boundary must be revised in the Northeast, to provide a direct British road between St. John and Quebec; and also in the Northwest, to give Canada access to the upper Mississippi. Finally, the old project of a neutral Indian barrier state was revived. When Gallatin inquired what was to be done with the hundred thousand or so white inhabitants already settled within the proposed Indian state, one of the British commissioners remarked that they must undoubtedly shift for themselves.

J. Q. Adams, an experienced diplomatist, thought that the negotiations would terminate on this point, and prepared to go home. His western colleague Henry Clay, untrained in diplomacy but skilled in the ways of men, was confident that the British would recede, as they did. They dropped the barrier project, and at the same time Madison withdrew his conditions of abandoning impressment.

The next obstacle was a British proposal to settle the boundary on the basis of *uti possidetis,* which would mean the cession of eastern Maine, and of any territory that Sir George Prevost might conquer. The Americans refused to entertain any other basis than *status quo ante bellum.* Again came a deadlock, which was broken by the battle of Plattsburg and the Duke of Wellington. Lord Liverpool wrote to the Duke at Paris, on 4 November, suggesting that he should take the chief command in America, ' with full powers to make peace, or to continue the war . . . with renewed vigor.' Wellington, who had studied the battle of Plattsburg, replied to the effect that he could do nothing without a naval superiority on the Lakes and that he saw no means of acquiring that superiority; that in his opinion England had no military grounds for demanding a cession of territory.

By this time the ministry was anxious to conclude the war. The Congress of Vienna was suffering one of its recurrent crises, Englishmen were crying out against taxation, and Wellington's arguments seemed irresistible. The American principle of *status quo* was accordingly accepted for the boundary.

A third crisis occurred over the navigation of the Mississippi and the fisheries. Britain insisted that she must be secured in the one, if she conceded the other; and in so doing divided the American delegation. These five Americans of diverse origin and temperament, after living together in stuffy lodgings for several months, had got upon each other's nerves. Adams, a man of irritating virtues, would rise at five on a winter's morning to indite documents, when Henry

Clay's card party was breaking up in the next room. Bayard had a feeling that some of his colleagues were not quite gentlemen; and Russell was a trouble-maker. This personal friction exaggerated a sectional divergence. Adams insisted on the fisheries, and was for treating the navigation of the Mississippi as of little importance. Clay declared that New England deserved to lose the fisheries for her treasonable conduct; but as a Westerner he would never admit so much as a Canadian canoe to a river that flowed from its source to its mouth through American territory. 'A dreadful day. Angry disputes,' wrote Gallatin's son in his diary on 28 November. It was Gallatin's tact, patience, and good humor that finally brought Adams and Clay to a compromise. Nothing was said in the treaty about the fisheries or the Mississippi; but the United States agreed to restore Tecumseh's Indians to the lands they possessed in 1811.

In the end, nothing very much was said about anything in the Treaty of Ghent (24 December 1814). Both sides agreed to disagree on everything important except the conclusion of hostilities, and pre-war boundaries. Yet, like Jay's treaty, it provided the machinery for disposing of present and future disputes. Four boundary commissions were created to settle the line between Canada and the United States; claims, commercial relations, the question of naval forces on the Lakes, and that of Oregon, were postponed to future negotiations; and before the next maritime war took place, impressment had been given up as a means of recruiting the British navy.

So ended a futile and unnecessary war, which might have been prevented by a little more imagination on the one side, and a broader vision on the other. A different and victorious result for either side would have been worse; but the event was bad enough. Anglophobia became a tradition in the United States, when, by a happier combination of events, it might have been exorcized. Dislike of America was never so rife in Britain as during the generation after 1815. On the relations between the two governments, however, the war had rather a happy effect. The soldiers, sailors, and diplomatists learned to respect one another; and the United States were never again refused the treatment due to an independent nation. Comparing Anglo-American relations before 1812 and after 1814, one must agree that in one respect at least the War of 1812 was a second War of American Independence.

XVIII

THE ERA OF GOOD FEELINGS

1815–1822

1. *The Key to the Period*

EIGHTEEN hundred and fifteen is a turning-point in American as in European history; and a point of divergence between them. Up to that time the development of the United States had been vitally affected by European forces. In spite of independence, colonial rivalries and maritime commerce kept the contact warm between the two worlds, and the European war had been projected into America. With the Peace of Vienna, Europe turned to problems that had little interest for America; and with the Peace of Ghent, America turned her back on the Atlantic. Every serious difficulty under which the young republic had labored since the War of Independence dropped out of sight. With national union achieved, a balance between liberty and order secured, a trifling national debt, and a virgin continent awaiting the plough, there opened a serene prospect of peace, prosperity, and social progress. No one suspected that expansion would bring its problems no less than encircling pressure, that the 'self-evident truths' of the Declaration of Independence would be challenged anew, and that within half a century Americans would be slaughtering one another in the valleys of Virginia, and the rolling farmlands of Pennsylvania.

An 'era of good feelings,' as contemporaries called it, followed a quarter-century of rivalry between Federalists and Republicans. President Madison and his party accepted the nationalism of Washington and Hamilton as if they had been born to it; and Federalist enmity did not long survive Republican conversion. A Congress in which Republicans were dominant resurrected Hamilton's report on manufactures, and passed the first American protective tariff in 1816. The same year it chartered a second Bank of the United States, on the model of Hamilton's. Several outstanding controversies with Great Britain, any one of which would earlier have aroused political bitterness, were quietly settled. James Monroe, legitimate heir of the Virginia dynasty, succeeded to the Presidency in 1817 almost unopposed; in 1821 he obtained every electoral vote but one, and two years later, with unanimous approval, issued a momentous declaration of American foreign policy.

American politics did not long continue in this placid rhythm. No real conversion to nationalism had taken place. The United States, like Europe, had found no permanent balance. They were tired of sectional strife, as she of war and revolution. New forces were transforming the states of the Union; and while this readjustment was taking place, Americans acquiesced in the sort of nationalism represented by President and Congress, as Europeans endured the sort of internationalism represented by the Holy Alliance. That is the key to the era of good feelings. Manufacturing was displacing the carrying trade as the premier interest of New England and Pennsylvania. Society and politics were being democratized in New York. Virginia was slowly declining as an agricultural state, but finding no other interest than slave-breeding to take the place of tobacco. King Cotton's domain was advancing from South Carolina and Georgia into the new Gulf States. The Northwest, rapidly expanding in population and influence, was acquiring new wants and aspirations. A series of sharp and bitter sectional conflicts brought out the underlying antagonism; by 1830 the sections had again become articulate, and defined the stand they were to take until the Civil War. It became the major problem of politics to form combinations and alliances between sections whose interests were complementary, in the hope of achieving their common wants through the Federal government; and the first end of statesmen was to reconcile rival interests and sections through national party organizations.

With new interests came a change in the attitude of the different sections towards the Constitution, completely reversing the similar change that had taken place during Jefferson's administration. As nationalist legislation began to cramp the economic life of certain states and sections, their public men adopted the state rights theories which New England Federalists had taken over from Jefferson in 1807. Daniel Webster of Massachusetts, who in 1814 had warned Congress that his state would not obey conscription, in 1830 was intoning hymns to the Union; while John C. Calhoun of South Carolina, leader of the 'war-hawks' in 1812 and of nationalistic legislation after the war, began in 1828 to write text-books of state rights. Of all the American publicists and statesmen whose careers bridged the War of 1812, only three were consistent, and all were Virginians: Chief Justice Marshall, who refused to unlearn the nationalism he had learned from Washington; John Taylor of Caroline who went on writing, and John Randolph of Roanoke who went on talking, as if nothing had happened since 1798.

2. *Nationalism and the Courts*

Every nationalistic feature of the era of good feelings aroused bad feelings in states that were suffering from growing or dissolving pains. Calhoun, introducing the bill chartering a second Bank of the United States, declared that to discuss its constitutionality would be a useless consumption of time. The bill passed, and the B.U.S., as contemporaries abbreviated its title, began operations in 1817. It was a bank of deposit, discount, and issue, having the government as principal client, and holder of one-fifth of the capital stock, differing from the Bank of England mainly in the power to establish branches in the principal towns and cities. This feature, necessary for the fiscal operations of a federal government, hampered the ordinary banks operating under state charters. The Maryland legislature levied a heavy tax upon the notes of the Baltimore branch of this 'foreign corporation.' The B.U.S. refused to pay. Maryland was sustained by the state court of appeals, whence, in accordance with the Judiciary Act of 1789, the case was carried on appeal by writ of error to the Supreme Court of the United States. This case of McCulloch *v.* Maryland became a milestone in American nationalism, and gave Chief Justice Marshall an opportunity to pronounce one of the greatest of his constitutional opinions.

There were three great issues at stake. Are the states separately, or the people of the United States collectively, sovereign? Was the Act of Congress chartering the B.U.S. constitutional? If constitutional, had a state the reserved right to tax its operation? On the first point, the counsel for Maryland followed Jefferson's Kentucky resolutions of 1798. 'The powers of the general government are delegated by the States, who alone are truly sovereign; and must be exercised in subordination to the States, who alone possess supreme dominion.' Marshall met this argument with an historical survey of the origin of the Constitution, and concluded: 'The government of the Union, then — is emphatically and truly a government of the people. In form and substance it emanates from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their benefit.' Here is the classic definition of national sovereignty, cutting the whole ground of the state rights theory from underneath.

On the second point, the defendant followed the Virginia remonstrance of 1790, and Jefferson's opinion on the bill chartering the first Bank of the United States. The power to charter corporations is not expressly granted to Congress by the Constitution. It cannot be inferred from the ' necessary and proper ' clause. A national bank is not necessary, as the want of one since 1811 proved. All powers not granted to the Federal government are reserved to the states, by the eleventh amendment to the Constitution.

Marshall found little more to say on this point than Hamilton had written in his Bank opinion of 1791.

> 'The government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme within its sphere of action. . . . We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the Constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.'

Here is the classic ' loose construction,' the doctrine of implied powers.

Finally, may a state, by virtue of its reserved power of taxation, levy a tax upon the operations of the B.U.S.? Marshall disposed of this point by a bold analogy to a state tax on the United States mails, or on custom house papers.

> 'The result is a conviction that the States have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in the general government. This is, we think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the Constitution has declared.'

'A deadly blow has been struck at the sovereignty of the states,' declared a Baltimore newspaper in printing the opinion of the court in McCulloch *v.* Maryland. Pennsylvania proposed a constitutional amendment prohibiting Congress from erecting a 'moneyed institution' outside the District of Columbia; and in this amendment, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois concurred. The legislature of South Carolina, on the contrary, declared that 'Congress is constitutionally vested with the right to incorporate a bank,' and 'they apprehend no danger from the exercise of the powers which the people of the United States have confided to Congress.' South Carolina would not speak this language much longer: Pennsylvania would shortly speak no other.

The Supreme Court was not to be deterred, however, by local opposition, or influenced by public opinion. So long as Marshall was Chief Justice, it went straight ahead along the lines which he had marked out as early as 1803,[1] giving judicial sanction to the doctrine of centralization of powers at the expense of the states, and erecting judicial barriers against democratic attacks upon property rights. To the first category belong Martin *v.* Hunter's Lessee (1816), Cohens *v.* Virginia (1821), McCulloch *v.* Maryland (1819), Gibbons *v.* Ogden (1824), Martin *v.* Mott (1827) and Worcester *v.* Georgia (1832), to mention only a few of the most important. In Martin *v.* Hunter's Lessee the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 giving it the power to review and reverse decisions of the state courts where they conflicted with rights guaranteed under the Constitution. In Cohens *v.* Virginia Marshall not only vigorously reasserted this principle, but partially nullified the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment by accepting appellate jurisdiction over a suit against a state provided the state had originally instituted the suit. In connection with this case Marshall set forth in forceful terms the doctrine of nationalism:

> 'That the United States form, for many, and for most important purposes, a single nation, has not yet been denied. In war, we are one people. In making peace, we are one people. In all commercial relations, we are one and the same people. In many other respects, the American people are one; and the government which is alone capable of controlling

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[1] So completely did Marshall dominate the court, despite numerous changes in personnel, that in 34 years' service he dissented only 8 times. Of the 1106 opinions handed down by the Court during this period, Marshall wrote 519.

> and managing their interests, in all these respects, is the government of the Union. It is their government, and in that character they have no other. America has chosen to be, in many respects, and to many purposes, a nation; and for all these purposes her government is complete; to all these objects, it is competent. The people have declared, that in the exercise of all powers given for these objects, it is supreme. It can, then, in effecting these objects, legitimately control all individuals or governments within the American territory.'

In Martin *v.* Mott the Court denied to a state the right, which New England had asserted during the War of 1812, to withhold her militia from the national service when requisitioned by the President. In Gibbons *v.* Ogden, most luminous and far-reaching of his decisions, Marshall not only smashed a state-chartered monopoly of steamboat traffic, but mapped out the course that Congress would follow for a century in regulating interstate commerce. The case involved an interpretation of the commerce clause of the Constitution. The Chief Justice, in vigorous and prophetic words, defined commerce as ' intercourse ' of all kinds, and the power of Congress as complete, absolute, and exclusive. ' If the sovereignty of Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations and among the several states is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a single government. . . . The power therefore is not to be confined by state lines, but acts upon its subject matter wherever it is to be found.' Under this ruling Congress has been able to control not only interstate but a large part of intrastate commerce as well. It was decisions of this nature that led Jefferson to write: ' The great object of my fear is the Federal Judiciary. That body, like gravity, ever acting with noiseless foot and unalarming advance, gaining ground step by step, and holding what it gains, is engulfing insidiously the special governments into the jaws of that which feeds them.'

To the second category of Marshall's decisions, those throwing the protective veil of the Constitution over property interests, belong, most notably, Fletcher *v.* Peck (1810), Dartmouth College *v.* Woodward (1819) and Craig *v.* Missouri (1830). In the first of these, the so-called Yazoo land fraud case, Marshall prohibited the state of Georgia from rescinding a grossly corrupt sale of western lands on the principle that such action impaired the obligation of a contract. The issue involved in the Dartmouth College case was the same. This case had to do with the right of the legislature of New Hampshire to rescind the pre-revolutionary Royal charter of Dartmouth College and grant it a new, more democratic, one. It has become famous in the annals of American law and in the minds of the American people due principally to the appearance of Daniel Webster who defended his Alma Mater with characteristic eloquence and illogic. Marshall's decision that a charter to a corporation was a contract within the meaning of the Constitution, and so inviolate and beyond the control of a state, was of far-reaching importance. Together with the Yazoo decision it gave to corporations an immunity from legislative interference that was only gradually destroyed through the extension of the police power of the states.

In Craig *v.* Missouri the Court was confronted with an attempt on the part of a state to evade the constitutional prohibition against the emission of bills of credit. Marshall's decision declaring the Missouri law null and void and upholding the principle of sound money against the soft-money panaceas of the frontier states, aroused deep resentment against the Courts.

Marshall's opinions were the most enduring feature of the new nationalism of 1815; the only enduring feature, excepting Monroe's doctrine. As Bryce has written,

> 'The Constitution seemed not so much to rise under his hands to full stature, as to be gradually unveiled by him till it stood revealed in the harmonious perfection of the form which its framers had designed. That admirable flexibility and capacity for growth which characterize it beyond all other rigid or supreme constitutions, is largely due to him, yet not more to his courage than to his caution.'

Yet if Marshall worked with 'the spirit of the times' in fostering nationalism, he worked against it in opposing democracy and majority rule, and the passage of a century has justified not a few of Jefferson's fears.

3. *The 'American System'*

Henry Clay and John C. Calhoun were the nationalist leaders in Congress at this period. Both men saw and feared the growing particularism of the sections. Like Hamilton, they could imagine no stronger binding force than self-interest; and their policy was but a broader version of his reports on public credit and manufactures. Their formula, which Clay christened the 'American System,' was protection and internal improvements: a protective tariff for the manufacturers, a home market and better transportation for the farmers. 'We are greatly and rapidly — I was about to say fearfully — growing,' said Calhoun in 1817. 'This is our pride and our danger; our weakness and our strength. . . . Let us, then, bind the Republic together with a perfect system of roads and canals.' Protection 'would make the parts adhere more closely. . . . It would form a new and most powerful cement.'

It was a propitious moment to raise the customs tariff. National pride had been wounded by dependence on smuggled British goods. War industries, suffering from the dumping of British manufactures, were crying for protection, from which almost every section of the country expected to benefit. In New England few cotton mills managed to survive the fall in prices unless they had adopted improved spinning machinery and the power loom. The few experimental mills in the Carolinas were staggering. Pittsburgh, already a flourishing center of the iron deposits of the northern Appalachians, was eager to push its iron pigs and bars into the coastal region, in place of British and Swedish iron. In Kentucky there was a new industry of weaving local hemp into cotton bagging, which was menaced by the Scotch bagging industry. Both these western centers needed roads and canals. The shepherds of Vermont and Ohio wished protection against English wool; the granaries of central New York, shut out of England by the corn laws, were attracted by the home market argument. Even Jefferson, outgrowing his old prejudice against factories, wrote, 'We must now place the manufacturer by the side of the agriculturist.'[2] Congressmen from states that a generation later preferred secession to protection, eagerly voted for the tariff of 1816; it was maritime New England, destined to pocket the chief benefits of protection, which voted against it.

Textiles, in the tariff of 1816, were taxed at twenty-five per cent *ad valorem;* but no cotton cloth was to be rated at a less value than twenty-five cents a yard. As some of the India print-cloths then being imported were worth only one-quarter of that sum, this 'minimum principle' erected an insurmountable barrier about the coarse sheetings and shirtings produced by northern cotton factories, whilst the constitutional provision of internal free trade gave them the entire home market. Apart from this cunning provision, the tariff rates of 1816 did not afford much protection against British woollens, cottons, and iron; but were high enough to whet the appetite of American manufacturers for more.

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[2] When forced, however, to pay treble the pre-war price for suitings, Jefferson reverted to free trade.

'Internal improvements' — roads and canals at federal expense — were the complement to protection. Immediately after the War of 1812 there was a rush of emigrants to the West, eager to exploit the lands conquered from Tecumseh and from the Creek. Between 1810 and 1820 the population of the states and territories west of the Appalachians increased from 1,080,000 to 2,234,000. Four new states, Indiana (1816), Mississippi (1817), Illinois (1818), and Alabama (1819), were admitted from this region, as well as the State of Louisiana in 1812.

Owing to the difficulty of ascending the Mississippi and Ohio rivers, western supplies of manufactured goods came by wagon road from Atlantic seaports. After the war the increasing use of steamboats on the western rivers threatened the Eastern cities with loss of this western trade. In 1817 a steamboat managed to reach Cincinnati from New Orleans, and two years later there were sixty light-draught stern-wheelers plying between New Orleans and Louisville, Kentucky. Their freight charges to the upper Ohio were less than half the cost of wagon transport from Philadelphia and Baltimore. For local and selfish reasons the Eastern cities would not combine to further the Western desire for federal roads and canals. New England and the Carolinas feared isolation. Virginia lent state assistance to two companies which hoped to pierce the Appalachians with canals. Pennsylvania went in for road building, and New York State began in 1817 the construction of the Erie canal, which was destined to make New York City outstrip all her rival seaports.

Clay and Calhoun induced Congress to push through a national road from Cumberland on the upper Potomac to Wheeling on the Ohio.[3] Connected with Baltimore by a state road, this 'national pike' became the most important route for emigrants to the Northwest until 1840. In 1817 Congress proposed to earmark certain federal revenues for bolder projects of the same sort. President Madison so far had accepted every item in the nationalist program; but here he drew the line, and vetoed the internal improvement bill. President Monroe had similar constitutional scruples; and by the time J. Q. Adams reached the White House, with even more ambitious plans for the expenditure of federal moneys, Congress proved disappointingly stubborn. The Appalachians were destined to be crossed and tunnelled by state authority and corporate enterprise.

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[3] The national or Cumberland road was afterwards pushed across Ohio and Indiana to Vandalia, Illinois, by successive appropriations between 1822 and 1838; but the Federal government relinquished each section, upon its completion, to the state within which it lay.

4. *The Western Panic of 1819*

Other and more serious problems than transportation were raised by the westward movement after the war. The new settlers, tempted by rising prices of cotton, cattle, and grain, purchased land far beyond their capacity to pay; for the Public Land Act of 1796 extended long credit. Much of the best land was engrossed by speculators. When cotton rose to thirty-four cents a pound in 1818, planters paid up to $150 an acre for uncleared land in the black belt of Alabama. All this led to a wide dispersal of settlers, instead of the orderly progression along a definite frontier that the Act of 1796 had planned. Until vacant spaces were settled, the scattered frontier farmers found themselves without schools, means of communication, or markets, yet deeply in debt to the Federal government or to 'wild-cat' western banks. These in turn were indebted to the B.U.S. and to eastern capitalists, who at the same time were erecting new manufacturing and other corporations far in advance of the country's needs. It was just what happened after the Civil War and the World War: the piling up of credits in a gigantic top, which could be kept whirling for some time by the lash of optimism, but was certain in the end to topple by its own weight.

The Bank of the United States, which might have put a brake on inflation, was second to none in the mad scramble for wealth. The western branches discounted recklessly. Late in 1818 the directors took steps to curtail credits. Branches were ordered to accept no bills but their own, to present all state bank-notes for payment at once, to renew no personal notes of mortgages. The result was to hasten the inevitable panic; and in 1819 it came. State banks collapsed; and enormous amounts of western real estate became the property of the B.U.S. At this juncture came the decision in McCulloch *v.* Maryland, forbidding the states to tax the 'monster.' It became the Western bogy. 'All the flourishing cities of the West are mortgaged to this money power,' declared Senator Benton of Missouri. 'They may be devoured by it at any moment. They are in the jaws of the Monster. A lump of butter in the mouth of a dog — one gulp, one swallow, and all is gone!' Ohio, ignoring the Supreme Court's decision, laid a tax of $100,000 on a local branch of the B.U.S. Ohio congressmen were bawling for 'internal improvements' at federal expense, but their state legislature declared the Kentucky and Virginia resolves of 1798 to be 'the settled construction of the Constitution.'

Would the panic and the McCulloch case, then, turn the West against nationalism, and some new Wilkinson or Burr arise to plot secession? Or would West and South shake hands, conquer the Federal government by votes, and turn it against the money power?

When the panic came in 1819, payments due to the Government for public land were in arrears many millions, most of which never were and never could be paid. It was clearly time for an alteration in the land laws. By the Public Land Act of 1820 credit was stopped, the upset price was lowered to a dollar and a quarter an acre, and the minimum unit of sale to eighty acres. This made it easier for a poor man to acquire land; but the West was not satisfied. Hard times lasted until 1824, affording an ideal culture-bed for the movement afterwards known as Jacksonian Democracy. Some of the same remedies for sectional indebtedness were tried as in 1786. Kentucky, for instance, incorporated a bank without stockholders, with state officials as directors, and no other capital than an appropriation of $7,000 for printing notes, which were to be lent on mortgage security to all citizens who applied, 'for the purpose of paying his, her, or their just debts.' By this subterfuge the constitutional prohibition against the emission of paper money by states was evaded; but the courts refused to enforce acceptance of the bank-notes.

5. *The Missouri Compromise*

While debt, deflation, and hard times were producing these preliminary symptoms of a vertical cleavage between East and West, another Western question, that of slavery extension, threatened to cut the Union horizontally into North and South. Ever since the

Federal Convention of 1787 there had been a tacit political balance between these two great sections, along the old Mason and Dixon's line and the Ohio river which divided the slaveholding states and territories from those in which slavery was abolished, or in process of extinction. In 1789 North and South were approximately equal in numbers, but in 1820 the Northern or free states had a population of 5,152,000 with 105 members in the House of Representatives; while the Southern or slave states had 4,485,000 people with 81 Congressmen. An even balance had been maintained in the Senate by the admission of free and slave states alternately; after the admission of Alabama in 1819 there were exactly eleven of each.

In the territory of the Louisiana purchase, Congress had done nothing to disturb slavery as it existed by French and Spanish law. Consequently, in the westward rush after the War of 1812, several thousand slave-owners with their human property emigrated to the Territory of Upper Louisiana, establishing wheat and cotton plantations in the rich bottom lands of the lower Missouri river, or on the west bank of the Mississippi near the fur-trading post of St. Louis. When the people of this region decided to claim admission to the Union as the State of Missouri, slavery was naturally permitted by their proposed state constitution. In February 1819 a bill admitting Missouri as a state came before the House of Representatives. To the surprise and indignation of Southern members, James Tallmadge of New York offered an amendment prohibiting the further introduction of slaves into Missouri, and requiring that all children subsequently born therein of slave parents should be free at the age of twenty-five. Thus amended, the bill passed the House, but was lost in the Senate.

Congress dissolved in March, and the question of slavery or freedom in Missouri went to the people. In state legislatures, in the newspapers, and in popular mass meetings it was discussed and agitated — not as a moral question but as one of sectional power and prestige, yet no less bitterly for that. Northerners had long been dissatisfied with the 'federal ratio' which gave the slave states twenty seats in Congress and twenty electoral votes, based on the enumeration of human chattels. They regarded the admission of Missouri, which lay almost wholly north of the then dividing line between freedom and slavery, as an aggressive move towards increasing the voting power of the South; and many threatened secession if slavery were not defeated. Southerners did not defend the rightfulness of slavery, but asserted their right to enjoy human property in the trans-Mississippi West; and threatened secession if they were denied. Surviving Federalist politicians, and middle-state Republicans, saw an opportunity to create a solid North; to 'snatch the sceptre from Virginia for ever,' as H. G. Otis said. 'Federalism,' wrote the aged Jefferson, 'devised this decoy to draw off the weak and wicked from the Republican ranks. . . . The East is replaced in the saddle of government, and the Middle States are to be the cattle yoked to their car. . . . My hope and confidence however is . . . that they will retrace their steps back to those honester brethren of the South and West.'

Equally important with the slavery issue was the question of the power of Congress to place qualifications upon the admission of new states. A precedent had been established in the case of the states created out of the Northwest Territory and Louisiana. The principle was now challenged by one of the greatest of Southern statesmen, William Pinkney of Maryland, who solemnly warned the West that if this power of Congress were once definitely admitted, the older eastern states might use it to keep new western states in a permanently subordinate position, and that the Union would become one 'between giants and dwarfs, between power and feebleness.'

But Jefferson's confidence was rewarded. When the new Congress took up the question, in January 1820, enough Northern Republicans were detached from the anti-slavery bloc by fear of a Federalist renaissance, to get a compromise measure through House and Senate. Missouri was admitted as a slave-holding state, and slavery was prohibited in the Louisiana territory north of latitude 36° 30′. As part of the compromise, Maine, which had just detached itself from Massachusetts, was admitted as a free state, making twelve of each.

This was the famous Missouri Compromise, which put the question of slavery extension at rest for almost a generation. It was a fair enough solution. The South obtained its immediate object, with the prospect of Arkansas and Florida entering as slave states in the near future; the North secured the greater expanse of unsettled territory, and maintained the principle of 1787, that Congress could keep slavery out of the Territories if it would.

Angry passions quickly subsided, the sectional alignment dissolved, and politics resumed their delusive tranquillity. For a moment the veil had been lifted, and there were some who saw the bloody prospect ahead. ' This momentous question, like a fire bell in the night, awakened and filled me with terror,' wrote Jefferson. ' I considered it at once as the knell of the Union.' And J. Q. Adams recorded in his diary: ' I take it for granted that the present question is a mere preamble — a title-page to a great, tragic volume.'

6. *Anglo-American Adjustments*

Almost a century of diplomacy was required to clear up all the questions left open between Britain and America by the Treaty of Ghent. That diplomacy did settle them is perhaps the greatest triumph of that much abused profession during the nineteenth century. Neither the treaty, nor the situation in 1815, nor the mutual disposition of the British and American peoples, gave much ground for hope of a lasting peace. J. Q. Adams wrote before the year was out that the treaty was ' a truce rather than a peace. Neither party gave up anything; all the points of collision which had subsisted between them before the war were left open.' Canada with a long and vague boundary, rival peltry and fishing interests, and a fresh-water naval force, promised so many points of friction between the two countries that Alexander Baring wished his government would give up Canada at once. It ' was fit for nothing but to breed quarrels.' No more attempts were made, as in 1783–95, to evade just debts or to stir up Indians; but there was no abatement of rival pretensions respecting the carrying trade and West India commerce that had caused so much trouble in the eighteenth century. *The Times,* in its editorial on the Treaty of Ghent, predicted ' the speedy growth of the American navy, and the recurrence of a new and more formidable American war.' A dangerous business, indeed, to give Neptune a black eye but leave him the trident!

Many Americans, and not a few Britons, were thinking of Rome and Carthage. Naval victories and New Orleans had drawn off much of the Anglophobia that had been festering in America since 1783; but there was plenty of bad humor left. As George Canning wrote to the first British minister to the United States after the war, the hardest lesson he must learn was ' not what to do, but what to bear.' English tories no longer regarded the United States as a jest, but as a menace to British institutions; there was grave danger lest the success of republicanism and the progress of democracy might delude the weak and wicked into a belief that such things might be in England! That uneasy feeling was largely responsible for the sneering strictures upon American life, character, and letters with which the *Edinburgh* and the *Quarterly* teemed during the years following 1815; an attitude which prevented the common ties of blood and language from having their natural effect.

During the first fifteen years of peace the tories were in power. Yet it was a leader of that party who did most to bring the two nations together. Lord Castlereagh coined no phrases about Anglo-Saxon solidarity during his long career. In England his achievements were eclipsed by the plausible Canning; in America he is known chiefly through Byron's savage verses. Yet, judged by his deeds, this great and silent statesman must be placed beside Washington, Hamilton, Peel, and Bright as a promoter of Anglo-American concord. He was the first British statesman to regard friendship with America as a permanent British interest. His policy was to treat the United States in every respect as an equal, 'to smooth all asperities between the two nations, and to unite them in sentiments of good will as well as of substantial interest, with each other.' And he was met half-way by Madison and Monroe, founders of a party traditionally anti-British.

Few would assert that Castlereagh was met half-way by J. Q. Adams, who became Monroe's Secretary of State in 1817. Adams really desired peace and friendship, but the spectacle of Downing Street bearing gifts was new to his experience, and a challenge to his suspicious nature. Adams, moreover, was an aggressive nationalist. He loved his country with a bitter intensity that was not returned. To advance every American interest and defend every American right, well knowing that others would get the credit of success and he alone the blame of failure, afforded him that sort of pain which in a puritanic nature becomes pleasure. Harsh and irascible in personal intercourse, Adams made a poor diplomatist, and as Secretary of State his notes needed pruning and softening by the kindly and mellow Monroe. But his perception was abnormally keen, and alone of contemporaries he portended America's future place in the world.

Disarmament on the Great Lakes was the first fruit of Anglo-American diplomacy after the war; and the most lasting. Peace found each side feverishly building ships against the other on Lake Ontario. The Canadians, apprehensive of further American aggression, frustrated in their hope of a buffer state that would give them complete control of the Lakes, looked for large outlays by the British treasury to complete this building program.

It used to be the habit of Americans to prepare for war only when war came, and when war was over to prepare for peace; and while that habit endured, the United States expanded and prospered as no other nation. In 1815, as in 1920, the initiative in disarmament came from the United States. An Act of Congress of 27 February 1815 authorized President Madison to sell or haul out all the Lake fleet not necessary for enforcement of the revenue laws; and this he promptly did. The army at the same time was reduced to ten thousand men, and in 1820 to six thousand. During the summer occurred several ' untoward incidents ' on the Lakes connected with the right of search; and in the autumn came a disquieting rumor from London, that the British Admiralty had determined to carry on its building program in Canada. President Madison then made the momentous proposal of naval disarmament on the Lakes. Adams, in London, won over Castlereagh to the policy, and on the 28–29 April 1817 an agreement was effected by an exchange of notes at Washington. The Rush-Bagot agreement, as it is called, provides that the naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes by the two governments shall be limited, on each side, to a single-gun vessel of one hundred tons on Lake Champlain, another on Lake Ontario, and two of the same sort on the other Great Lakes. The treaty might be denounced at six months' notice; but in spite of strong pressure at periods of Anglo-American tension, it is still in force, although modified in detail by mutual agreement in order to meet changed needs of revenue control, and newer methods of naval propulsion.

Madison deserves all credit for the initiative, but Castlereagh took the greater risk. An ordinary diplomatist would have wished to ' insure ' Canada by naval supremacy against an ' inevitable ' aggression by the growing American West. That Castlereagh, like Shelburne, foresaw a westerly expansion of the United States, that he regarded their northward aggression in 1812 as fortuitous and temporary, may perhaps be doubted; but events justified his policy. Yet, in weighing the causes of American-Canadian amity, we must not forget that the Rush-Bagot agreement, important as it was in removing causes of irritation, could have been maintained only by the United States abandoning designs on Canada, and by Canada renouncing her dream of a buffer Indian state. Without violating that agreement, the American-Canadian boundary might have been lined on both sides with forts and armed encampments. Mutual respect and goodwill have kept it undefended and unfortified. The cry of 'On to Quebec!' heard intermittently since 1685, was never again raised.

With frigates rotting on the ways, it was a much easier matter to adjust this four thousand mile boundary, of which a scant two hundred miles had as yet been determined beyond dispute. Several joint commissions for this purpose were provided in the Treaty of Ghent. The first promptly settled where the eastern end of the boundary should run, between the islands of Passamaquoddy Bay. The second was quite unable to discover the whereabouts of the famous highlands between the St. Lawrence and the Atlantic Ocean, mentioned by the Treaty of 1783. This question was then referred to the arbitrament of the King of the Netherlands who, pleading similar inability, recommended a compromise which the United States refused to accept; and the matter went over to the Webster-Ashburton negotiation of 1842. The third joint commission drew the boundary from the forty-fifth parallel of latitude, through the St. Lawrence and the Lakes, just short of the Sault Ste. Marie between Huron and Superior; Webster and Ashburton continued it as far as the Lake of the Woods. At that point the international frontier had been left hanging in mid-air by the Treaty of 1783. No line could be drawn thence 'westerly to the Mississippi,' because that river happened to rise considerably to the eastward and southward. This and the Oregon question were dealt with in the Convention of 1818, which extended the Canadian-American boundary along the forty-ninth parallel to the 'Stony Mountains.'

West of the Rocky Mountains, between Spanish California and Russian Alaska, was the region vaguely known as Oregon. Britain had challenged Spain's exclusive claim to this territory in the Nootka Sound affair of 1789; but a Boston seaman's discovery of the Columbia river in 1792 gave the United States a claim. No settlement had yet been made, but the Hudson's Bay Company and an American fur company had established trading posts there before the war. . . . American jurisdiction was restored by the Treaty of Ghent. No agreement could be reached in the negotiation of 1818 as to the partition of Oregon, so the region was left open for ten years to the vessels, citizens, and subjects of the two powers. Before the decade elapsed, the claims of Russia and Spain had been eliminated, and in 1827 the agreement for joint occupation was renewed.

The Newfoundland fisheries question, on which the Ghent negotiators failed to agree, was also dealt with in the Convention of 1818. Certain privileges within the three-mile limit on parts of the Newfoundland and Labrador coasts were restored to American fishermen, but, unfortunately, the treaty was not carefully drawn, and efforts of the Newfoundland government to police the Yankee fishermen produced an almost continuous diplomatic controversy until 1910, when the Hague Tribunal gave an arbitral decision which, it is devoutly hoped, will put the questions to sleep permanently.

7. *Arbuthnot and Ambrister*

It was on the southeastern border, between the southern tier of states and Florida, that Anglo-American amity was gravely endangered. East Florida was a Spanish province, but Spanish authority was hardly exercised beyond the three fortified posts of Pensacola, St. Marks, and St. Augustine. The loyalist settlers of 1782 had long since left; the only breaks in the vast stretches of semi-tropical forest and morass were made by Seminole villages and a few obscure encampments of maroons, fugitive slaves from Georgia. After the battle of New Orleans, Lieutenant-Colonel Nicholls took his 'colonial marines' to Florida, built a fort on Spanish territory near the Georgian border, concluded an alliance with the Seminoles and refugee Creeks, and encouraged the latter to believe that the disastrous treaty exacted of them by Jackson in 1814 was nullified by the Treaty of Ghent. Returning to England in the summer of 1815, Nicholls was promptly disavowed by the government, which nevertheless bestowed costly presents on his Indian allies, and on one a brigadier's commission and a scarlet coat. To the Colonial Office, all this was nothing more than a graceful dismissal; the Indians and the American frontiersmen naturally did not see it that way.

About the time that Nicholls disappeared there arrived on the coast of Florida an elderly Scot named Arbuthnot, in his trading schooner *Chance*. By fair dealings he gained the Indians' friendship, but with mistaken kindness he too suggested that Jackson's Creek treaty of 1814 was void. This, too, was dangerous doctrine from the point of view of the American frontiersman. And now returns to Florida a former subaltern in Nicholls' regiment, a young adventurer named Ambrister, in search of fun and fortune. After a short time in Arbuthnot's employ, he leaves it to join a group of Seminoles on the Suwanee river, under a chief whom the whites called Billy Bowlegs. Splendid fellows Ambrister found them — best soldiers in the world if properly led and equipped. If only those damned clerks at the Colonial Office would not interfere! However, the shooting was magnificent, and the land was certain to be the garden spot of America one of these days. A few days' march across the peninsula one could visit M'Gregor and his boys, at Amelia Island. Pirates if you like, but generous, open-handed chaps who put it in a fellow's way to make a little money.

In 1817 the Seminoles on the American side of the border defied settlers to enter upon the Creek lands which had been ceded three years before, and scalped some of those who did. General Andrew Jackson was ordered by President Monroe to raise a force of Tennessee militia, chastise the offenders, and pursue them into Spanish Florida if necessary. While Jackson was destroying Seminole villages an army detachment on the way to join him, with women and children, was ambushed by the Seminole chief Himollemico, and destroyed. Jackson burst into Florida like an avenging flame. Himollemico and Hillis Hago, he of the scarlet coat and brigadier's commission, fled to St. Marks. In the bay was a small gun-boat with the Union Jack at her peak — help at last from the Great White Father! Eagerly the two chiefs rowed out to greet their allies. With mock honors they were received, and promptly clapped into irons. It was an American gun-boat and the Union Jack was a ruse. The next day (7 April 1818) Jackson entered St. Marks against the protest of the Spanish governor, hauled down the Spanish flag and hanged the two chiefs without trial. Arbuthnot was arrested when about to leave the town. Reserving him for later attention, Jackson pushed eastward through the gloomy forest festooned with Spanish moss, to surprise Billy Bowlegs at the Suwanee. The Indians escaped to the impenetrable thickets and everglades of central Florida. Jackson, furious and baffled, learned the cause of their escape when Ambrister blundered into his camp. On one of his escort was found a letter from Arbuthnot, warning Billy of Jackson's approach, and offering him ten kegs of gunpowder.

A court martial was quickly constituted at St. Marks, Arbuthnot placed on trial for espionage and inciting the Indians against the United States, Ambrister for actively leading them in war. Arbuthnot put up a stout defence, Ambrister threw himself on the mercy of the court. Both were found guilty and sentenced to death. The verdict was reconsidered in the case of Ambrister, whose youthful recklessness appealed to the court; but General Jackson sternly set it aside. How could he spare these ' unprincipled villains ' as he deemed them, ' wretches who by false promises delude and excite an Indian tribe to all the horrid deeds of savage war '? Within a few hours Ambrister went before a firing squad, and Arbuthnot, protesting with the dignity of seventy years that his country would avenge him, was hanged from the topsail yard of the *Chance*.

The Seminoles' power was broken, but Jackson had not finished. Another forced march through the jungle and Pensacola was taken, the Spanish governor ejected, and the fortress garrisoned with Americans. Then Jackson returned, to be acclaimed once more a hero by the West; but Easterners thought of Roman history and trembled. ' It was in the provinces that were laid the seeds of the ambitious projects that overturned the liberties of Rome,' said Clay. In Monroe's cabinet, Adams alone took the high ground that Jackson's every act was justified by the incompetence of Spanish authority to police its own territory; and Adams had his way.

When the news reached London in the autumn of 1818, Parliament fortunately was not in session. But the press rang with denunciation of America, and of the ' ruffian ' who had murdered two British subjects. Public opinion demanded instant disavowal, apology, reparation. Lord Castlereagh's firmness was the main cause of preventing a rupture, wrote the American minister, Richard Rush. War would have been declared ' if the ministry had but held up a finger.' Unmoved by public clamor, the Foreign Secretary calmly examined the documents from Washington, and decided, as he wrote Bagot, ' that the unfortunate sufferers, whatever were their intentions, had been engaged in unauthorized practices of such a description as to have deprived them of any claim on their own government for interference.'

There was no need to repeat the warning that the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister was intended to convey.

Castlereagh's life ended in September 1822. George Canning, his successor, was a man of different metal. Five new American nations had come into existence. Let them be linked up with Britain and Canada, and the United States be made to feel the cost of isolation!

XIX

MONROE AND J. Q. ADAMS

1817–1829

1. *Revolution in Latin America*

IN 1815 the United States was the only republic in a colonial hemisphere. During the next seven years almost the whole of the continental area from Canada to Cape Horn had freed itself from European control, and the greater part was republican. A status meagre in elements of stability, rich in possibilities of trouble, had been created. Armed intervention by the Holy Alliance, a new balance of power, an Anglo-American entente, or a Pan-American alliance — anything might have happened. Out of the confusion of voices came one clear note: the Monroe Doctrine, to which American foreign policy has more or less been tuned ever since.

In the eighteenth century Latin America had few points of contact with the United States, and nothing in common. An inert mass of Indian serfs, negro slaves, and mixed breeds was exploited by a small governing class of Castilians, highly intelligent in many matters, but ignorant of liberty and content to be ruled by Spanish viceroys under the laws of the Indies. The few men, such as Bolívar and Miranda, who aspired to something different and better were forced into exile; Miranda's attempt in 1806 to free his native province with British aid was a complete fiasco.

Two years later, when Napoleon invaded Spain, Spanish America got the taste of liberty that gave appetite for more. The governing classes, unwilling to obey a usurping Bonaparte, formed provisional juntas which professed to govern Spanish America in the name of Ferdinand VII until his happy restoration. By 1812 all the mainland provinces were *de facto* independent of Spain. Their commerce was thrown open to the world, their intellect to modern ideas. Congress appropriated money for the relief of sufferers from an earthquake in Venezuela, and the first newspaper in Chile was set up by new-comers from New York. So many Yankee ships resorted to South American ports that President Madison sent consuls to Buenos Aires and Carácas in the years 1810–12.

The restoration of Ferdinand VII in 1814 took by surprise the South American leaders, who rejected his peremptory demand for unconditional submission. The king, however, had an army and a fleet. By 1816 he had reduced all the *de facto* states but La Plata (the Argentine), and restored the Spanish colonial system.

José de San Martín kept the revolutionary flame alive in a remote and recently settled province of La Plata, among a population not unlike the North American frontiersmen. In January 1817 he began his epic march across the Andes with thirty-five hundred men, several thousand animals, and artillery, by a pass over half again as high as the Grand St. Bernard. At Chacabuco on the Pacific slope he defeated a royalist army. Chile was then liberated, and organized as a republic under Bernardo O'Higgins, son of an Irish soldier in the Spanish service, as supreme dictator. In the meantime, Simón de Bolívar had spread revolution up the Orinoco valley, and framed a fantastic constitution for the Republic of Venezuela.

Recognition of their independence at Washington was both sought for and expected by the three new republics. Henry Clay, in an oration describing the 'glorious spectacle of eighteen millions of people struggling to burst their chains and be free,' gave the lead to North American opinion. Yet Clay was unable to prevent Congress from passing a neutrality act in 1818; and on President Monroe his eloquence had slight effect. J. Q. Adams, the Secretary of State, never allowed sentiment to weaken his grasp of his own country's permanent interest. 'That the final issue of their present struggle would be their entire independence of Spain, I had never doubted,' he told Clay.

> 'That it was our true policy and duty to take no part in the contest, I was equally clear. The principle of neutrality to *all* foreign wars was, in my opinion, fundamental to the continuance of our liberties and of our Union. So far as they were contending for independence, I wished well to their cause; but I had seen and yet see no prospect that they would establish free or liberal institutions of government. . . . Arbitrary power, military and ecclesiastical, was stamped upon their habits, and upon all their institutions. Civil dissension was infused into all their seminal principles. . . . I had little expectation of any beneficial result to this country from any future connection with them, political or commercial.'

This passage reveals the policy of Monroe's administration towards the Latin Americans. Their independence was desired as an additional bulwark for American isolation; but not with sufficient ardor to risk a European war. It was a policy unadventurous and frankly selfish, as Latin-American publicists have pointed out. Yet we would be wrong in accusing Monroe, Adams, or Clay, of a desire to obtain exclusive commercial privileges, or to organize and dominate a league of western republics against monarchical Europe. Their policy was not Pan-American. So long as Europe did not actively intervene, Monroe and Adams were content to stand aside and let Spain fight it out with her colonies; but they would certainly oppose any attempt of the Holy Alliance to interpose.

Castlereagh and Canning were torn between a desire to uphold the monarchical principles in South America, and preserve it as a British market. British exports to South America by 1822 surpassed British exports to the United States; Englishmen obtained mining concessions in Mexico, Brazil, Colombia, and La Plata, and London floated several loans of the revolutionary governments. Hence England endeavored to reconcile Spain with her colonies on the basis of autonomy and free trade. She was equally opposed to absolutism, which would restore the exclusive Spanish colonial system, and independence, which would mean republicanism and perhaps a Pan-American alliance.

From 1817 to 1822 Castlereagh and Monroe frequently invited each other to co-operate towards the solution they respectively desired: on the one side reconciliation; on the other independence. Each government refused the other's advance because each thought it could obtain what it wanted by waiting. The United States could better afford to wait than Britain, as Adams well knew. He anticipated that the reconciliation policy would fail, as fail it did at the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle in 1818. Castlereagh could not induce Spain to listen to peaceful mediation; and in turn vetoed the Franco-Russian proposal of armed intervention.

The clash of British and continental views at Aix-la-Chapelle caused a rift between England and the Holy Alliance, which Russia sought to increase. Alexander I, who looked to America for a counterpoise to British naval power, invited the United States to enter the Holy Alliance. Doubtless he expected a seat on the European areopagus to alter American policy: a point of view not yet altogether extinct. Adams's reply to this strange invitation foreshadows not only the Monroe Doctrine, but American foreign policy since the World War:

> 'To stand in firm and cautious independence of all entanglements in the European system has been a cardinal point of their policy under every administration of their government from the peace of 1783 to this day. . . . Yet in proportion as the importance of the United States . . . increases in the eyes of the others, the difficulties of maintaining this system, and the temptations to depart from it, increase and multiply with it. . . . A direct though unofficial application has been made by the present Russian minister here, that the United States should become formal parties to the Holy Alliance. . . . As a general declaration of principles . . . the United States not only give their hearty assent to the articles of the Holy Alliance, but will be the most earnest and conscientious in observing them. But . . . for the repose of Europe as well as of America, the European and American political systems should be kept as separate and distinct from each other as possible.'

Now that England was actually if not formally detached from the Holy Alliance, Adams believed he could afford to act without risking a collision. Early in 1819 he informed Castlereagh that the United States would recognize the Argentine republic 'at no remote period, should no event occur which will justify a further postponement of that intention.' Such an event did occur, very shortly. On 22 February 1819 Adams obtained the signature of the Spanish minister at Washington to a very important treaty, by which Florida was ceded to the United States.

Since 1810 the United States had been nibbling at the Floridas. General Jackson was forced to disgorge his rather generous bites, but his invasion of the province in 1818 convinced Madrid that Florida had better be sold before it was seized. Accordingly; Spain ceded all her lands east of the Mississippi, together with her ancient rights to the Oregon country, in return for five million dollars (22 February 1819). In addition, the boundary between the United States and Mexico was determined. Reluctance of the Senate to relinquish the American claim to Texas, no less than the change of government at Madrid, delayed ratification of the Florida treaty for two years, during which Monroe dared not offend Spain by recognizing her revolted provinces.

Before the Florida treaty was ratified (22 February 1821), events in Spanish America had begun to march with great rapidity. The

Argentine and Chile, having established their independence, went to the aid of Peru. Bolívar, at the same time, was rolling up the Spanish armies westward from the Orinoco, consolidating the liberated territory in the Great Colombian Republic. His subordinate, General Sucre, entered Quito in triumph in May 1821. A year later when Bolívar and San Martín met at Guayaquil, only one Spanish army was left in the field, and that surrendered after the battle of Ayacucho in 1824. Dom Pedro of the House of Braganza proclaimed the independence of Brazil in September 1822. A mutiny in the Spanish garrison at Vera Cruz forced the viceroy to accept a provisional treaty for the independence of Mexico, including Central America. Thus, by the autumn of 1822, America from the Great Lakes to Cape Horn was independent. European sovereignty was maintained only in Belize, the Guianas, Bolivia, and the West Indies.

Already the United States had acted. There was danger lest the Latin-American republics, if longer refused a recognition by their elder sister, might cease to be republics. The Argentine had narrowly missed getting a Bourbon prince. Fickle Mexico actually did become a monarchy for a short time under Iturbide. Accordingly, in a message to Congress of 8 March 1822, President Monroe declared that the new governments of La Plata, Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Mexico were ' in the full enjoyment of their independence,' of which there was ' not the most remote prospect of their being deprived ' and had ' a claim to recognition by other powers, which ought not to be resisted.' Congress, disregarding protests from the Spanish minister, appropriated money to defray the expenses of ' such missions to the independent nations on the American continent as the President might deem proper.' Formal recognition was then extended, and diplomatic relations established with the five states.

' So, Mr. Adams, you are going to make honest men of them? ' said the British minister when he heard the news. ' Yes, sir! ' said Adams. ' We proposed to your government to join us some time ago, but they would not, and now we shall see whether you will be content to *follow* us! ' And follow us George Canning did, for all his wrigglings — in one of which he touched a switch that released the Monroe Doctrine on an astonished world.

2. *Canning proposes and Adams disposes*

France invaded Spain in 1823, with the avowed object of delivering Ferdinand VII from a constitution that had been forced upon him. Contrary to Canning's calculations, the French were received as saviors. It was a matter of common talk that a Franco-Spanish expeditionary force to South America would follow this military promenade. What possibilities did that not open up! The great work of Wolfe and Chatham undone, France once more firmly seated in America, sharing a colonial monopoly to the exclusion of England, and deriving new strength from the valley of Mexico, the mines of Peru, and the plains of the Argentine. 'If the Pyrenees had fallen, England would maintain the Atlantic,' wrote Canning. But by what means short of war?

The obvious policy for Canning was to follow Adams, recognize the independence of Latin America, and face Europe with an accomplished fact. The *London Times* urged such a course. But neither George IV nor the tory party were ready to admit rebel republican colonists to the family of nations. Recognition of O'Higgins might encourage O'Connell! On the other hand, if England did not do something, Canning feared lest Monroe and Adams would obtain exclusive commercial advantages, and a Pan-American republican alliance.

On 16 August 1823 Canning put to Richard Rush, the American minister at London, a question that started many wheels revolving in the United States. What would he say to joining England in warning France to keep her hands off South America?

It was a brilliant plan that had flashed into Canning's brain, and the more he thought it over, the more it seemed to be the only escape from his dilemma. A joint Anglo-American protest against intervention would not only thwart the Holy Alliance, but maintain England's new markets, and break up American republican solidarity. England, without endorsing the republican principle, could pose as the protector of Latin America no less than the United States; and at the same time bring America's weight into the British scale of power. On 20 August Canning followed up this conversation by a note stating certain principles of foreign policy in which he hoped that Rush might immediately and publicly concur, as the basis of a joint Anglo-American declaration to the Holy Alliance.

England 'conceived the recovery of the colonies by Spain to be hopeless,' but was not disposed to impede an amicable negotiation between them, and considered that 'the question of their recognition was of time and circumstances.' 'She aimed not at the possession of any portion of the colonies for herself,' but could not permit their transfer to any other power.

Richard Rush was somewhat taken aback by Canning's overture, the most flattering ever received by an American diplomatist. In contrast to his predecessors, whose social experience at the Court of St. James's had been somewhat pallid, Mr. Rush had been made to feel a person of consequence in London society, and *persona grata* in great country houses. But the favor of the great and the flavor of their port had not dulled the keenness of his scent for entangling alliances. Without positive instructions he refused to commit the United States to anything of that nature. Canning's object, he feared, was to check France, not to promote American liberty.

When Canning, three days later, insisted that something must be done at once, Rush recollected his instructions of 1818, to obtain a concurrent Anglo-American recognition of Latin-American independence. He promised to join a British protest against intervention in the name of his government, provided that Great Britain would instantly recognize the new republics. Had Canning been able or willing to give this required gage of good faith, Anglo-American co-operation would have been an established fact before Monroe and Adams had had an opportunity to pass a decision upon it. The Monroe Doctrine would not then have been declared. But the tory party was not yet ready to recognize insurgents.

Rush's dispatches embodying these conversations and notes arrived at Washington on 9 October 1823. President Monroe, on the point of departure to his plantation of Oakhill in Virginia, sent copies of them to his political mentors, the ex-presidents Jefferson and Madison. The covering letter stated his own opinion that Canning's overture should be accepted.

Jefferson, then eighty years old, was in placid retirement at Monticello. Horace and Tacitus, he wrote Monroe, were so much more interesting than the newspapers that he was quite out of touch with public affairs. But this question of co-operation with Great Britain was

> 'the most momentous which has ever been offered to my contemplation since that of Independence. . . . America, North and South, has a set

> of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should, therefore, have a system of her own, distinct from that of Europe. . . . One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition we detach her from the bands [of despotism], bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke. . . . With her then, we should most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affections than to be fighting once more, side by side, in the same cause.'

Here indeed was support for Canning. Jefferson, who had helped to lay the foundations of isolation, who once had regarded the touch of England as the touch of death, was willing to accept an Anglo-American alliance! Madison, from Montpelier, gave similar advice, and even proposed an Anglo-American declaration in favor of Greek independence.

Three white-haired statesmen, each on his Virginia hill-top, pondering this great question of foreign policy: what a delightful aroma of antique republicanism! It would have amused George Canning to have known the perturbation he had caused among the patriarchs, at a time when he considered the incident closed. For on 9 October 1823, France abjured all design of acting against the Spanish-American colonies by force of arms, and disclaimed any intention to annex any part of the Spanish heritage. These were the very principles for which Canning had asked American support.

John Quincy Adams, in the meantime, was pondering the meaning of Canning's astounding offer. His information from Gallatin, who had just returned from Paris, indicated slight danger of armed intervention in Latin America; and he knew that England had both the will and the power to prevent it in any case. What then was Canning's game? The clue, he thought, was the proposed pledge, in Canning's note of 20 August, against either power acquiring a part of Spanish America — a pledge that would be inconvenient if Cuba voted herself into the United States. That was probably just what Canning was thinking of; it was the one partially true implication of the many that he deduced from Monroe's policy. For fifteen years the statesmen at Washington had kept anxious eyes on Cuba, although even in 1823 they were not actually fishing for her. Monroe and Adams were worrying lest France or England should seize the Pearl of the Antilles; and if Adams did express the hope that Cuba would stick to the Spanish tree until ripe for the United States basket, it was because he feared lest some other naval power might shake the trunk.

Canning's refusal to recognize the new republics seemed very significant to Adams. So long as the British government maintained that attitude, he wrote Rush, their only common ground with the United States was a casual aversion from European intervention. At the first subsequent cabinet meeting in Washington (7 November 1823) Adams declared 'It would be more candid, as well as more dignified, to avow our principles explicitly to Great Britain and France, than to come in as a cockboat in the wake of the British man-of-war.'

For Adams, moreover, the question was not a mere choice between accepting or declining Canning's overture. It was the larger one of future relations between the Old World and the New. While the Holy Alliance seemed to threaten South America, Russia was pushing her trading posts from Alaska southward even to San Francisco Bay. On the 4/16 September 1821 the Tsar issued a ukase extending Alaska to the fifty-first parallel, well within Oregon, and declaring *mare clausum* the waters thence to Bering Strait. Adams believed that colonial establishments were immoral and destined to fall. With the North American West divided between Canada, the United States, and Mexico, and with South America independent, the New World might now be considered closed to further colonization by European powers; and on 17 July 1823 Adams told the Russian minister just that.

While the Tsar made his power felt in the Pacific, he was denouncing American principles from across the Atlantic. In October 1823 the Russian minister at Washington communicated two notes to Adams: one a rather striking refusal to receive a minister from Colombia; the other a characteristic homily on the Holy Alliance. Although inoffensive by intent, for Alexander had a strange liking for the United States, it contained remarks on 'expiring republicanism' and the like, as offensive in fact to the American government as were the Moscow manifestoes on expiring capitalism a century later.

As Adams saw it, his government had been approached or challenged on four different points, all of which could be answered at once: (1) the proposal of Anglo-American co-operation, (2) rumored European intervention in Latin America, (3) Russian extension of colonial establishments, (4) the Tsar's denunciation of principles upon which every independent state in America was now based. 'I remarked,' Adams wrote of the cabinet meeting of 7 November, 'that the communications lately received from the Russian Minister . . . afforded, as I thought, a very suitable and convenient opportunity for us to take our stand against the Holy Alliance, and at the same time to decline the overture of Great Britain.' Monroe and the cabinet appeared to agree, but Adams found it difficult to keep them straight. Calhoun, the Secretary of War, wished to follow Canning, even at the cost of perpetually renouncing Cuba and Texas. He fancied that the underlying motive of European monarchs was jealousy and hatred of the United States, whose turn would come after Mexico had fallen: a very persistent American opinion. President Monroe vacillated between the extremes of doing nothing for fear of the Holy Alliance, and of carrying the war into Turkey to aid the Greeks. Their struggle for independence had aroused immense interest in the United States. One of those emotional currents that threaten to pull America out of her isolation, was sweeping over the country. 'The mention of Greece fills the mind with the most exalted sentiments and arouses in our bosoms the best feelings of which our nature is susceptible,' said Monroe in his annual message of 1822. The legislature of South Carolina petitioned Congress to acknowledge Greek independence, and Albert Gallatin proposed to lend the Greek government a fleet; Bryant wrote *The Greek Partisan,* and Daniel Webster much preferred the Greeks to 'the inhabitants of the Andes, and the dwellers on the borders of the Vermilion sea.' The martyrs of Chios and the exploits of Ypsilanti were commemorated in the names of frontier hamlets. Classic colonnades were added to modest farmhouses, and Greek grammar was forced on wretched schoolboys who knew little Latin. A gentleman from western New York, desirous of aiding the Greeks, said he could furnish from his sparsely settled region 'five hundred men, six feet high, with sinewy arms and case-hardened constitutions, bold spirits and daring adventurers, who would travel upon a bushel of corn and a gallon of whisky per man from the extreme part of the world to Constantinople.'

All this struck a reminiscent chord in Monroe's kindly heart. He had never forgotten the supreme moment of his early diplomatic career: his reception as American minister by the French Convention, the sonorous speeches against tyranny, and the fraternal accolade. Time had mellowed James Monroe without changing the quality of his mind. Another great war of revolution against tyranny, so he wrote Jefferson, was about to begin; could not America take a bolder stand for liberty than in 1793? In the first draft of his epoch-making message, Monroe proposed to reprove the French invasion of Spain, to acknowledge the independence of Greece, and to ask Congress for a diplomatic mission to Athens! President Monroe would fulfil the dreams of 'Jacobin' Monroe.

Against this meddling in European affairs Adams argued for the better part of two days. 'I spoke to him again, urging him to abstain from everything in his message which the Holy Allies could make a pretext for construing into aggression upon them,' Adams notes in his diary.

> 'If the Holy Alliance were determined to make up an issue with us, it was our policy to meet, and not to make it. . . . The ground that I wish to take is that of earnest remonstrance against the interference of the European powers by force with South America, but to disclaim all interference on our part with Europe; to make an American cause, and adhere inflexibly to that.'

3. *Monroe's Message*

In the end Adams had his own way; except that he would have preferred to announce his doctrine in a sharp note to Russia, instead of the less offensive mode of embedding it in the President's annual message to Congress. Monroe consented to omit his proposed reproof to France, and all but a pious wish for the success of Greece; Adams was forced to delete a high-pitched exposition of republican principles. The passages on foreign relations in Monroe's annual message of 2 December 1823, although written by the President in more concise and dignified language than Adams would have used, expressed exactly the conception of his Secretary of State. We may summarize the original Monroe Doctrine in the President's own words:

1. Positive principles: (*a*) 'The American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.' (*b*) 'The political system of the allied powers is essentially different . . . from that of America. . . . We should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.'

2. Negative principles: (*a*) 'With the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere.' (*b*) 'In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy so to do.'

Therein is the whole of President Monroe's doctrine, whatever later developments may be included under the name of the Monroe Doctrine.

Monroe's message was well received by public opinion; but as no one outside the cabinet knew the dramatic circumstances of its birth, few appreciated its significance. Polk was the first President to appeal to Monroe's principles by name; and it was not until after the Civil War that these principles became a doctrine, deriving its sanction no less from faith than from experience, and, like religious doctrines, assuming at times a Protean shape. Critics of Monroe have pointed out that his message was a mere declaration; that intervention had already been thwarted by the obstinacy of Ferdinand VII; that in view of the exclusive power of Congress to declare war, a mere presidential announcement could not guarantee Latin-American independence. True, but irrelevant. What Adams was trying to do, and what he accomplished, was to raise a standard of American foreign policy for all the world to see; and to plant it so firmly in the national consciousness that no later President would dare to pull it down.

4. *The Second President Adams*

In December 1823 America was much more interested in the coming presidential election than in the Holy Alliance. The Republican party was breaking up into factions, and no one knew how they would divide or blend to make the parties of the future. Monroe's second and last term would expire in March 1825, and three members of his Cabinet aspired to the succession. J. Q. Adams was the most highly qualified, if faithful and efficient public service for thirty years were to be considered an asset. William H. Crawford, Secretary of the Treasury, was heir-apparent of the Virginia dynasty. By birth Henry Clay had an equal pretension; as a Westerner and advocate of the 'American system' he made a wide appeal; and his charming personality and oratorical gifts made him the second choice of everyone who did not place him first.

But Clay had a Western rival, General Andrew Jackson. Quarrelsome, uneducated, and self-willed, Jackson might be regarded as a dangerous radical by bankers and a possible Caesar by old-fashioned Republicans; but to the rising democracy he appeared an apostle of equality, and to Westerners a man of their own metal.

All the candidates were Republicans and nationalists. No Federalist dared raise his head, and no state-rights partisan yet ventured to come forth. Jackson carried Pennsylvania, the Carolinas, and most of the West, with a total of 99 electoral votes. Adams carried New England, most of New York, and a few districts elsewhere, making 84. Crawford, who had suffered a paralytic stroke during the campaign, was a poor third, and Clay last. As no candidate had a majority of the electoral vote, the election went to the House — the only instance of that sort since the passage of the twelfth amendment. There Clay asked his supporters to vote for Adams, who was accordingly elected, and took office on 4 March 1825.

John Quincy Adams was a lonely, friendless figure, unable to express his burning love of country in any way that would touch the popular imagination. Short, thick-set, with a massive bald head and suspicious eyes, his port was stern and his manners unconciliatory. A lonely walk before dawn, or an early morning swim in summer, fitted him for the day's toil, which was concluded by writing his perennial diary. The uncomfortable labor of compiling a massive report on weights and measures during a long hot summer in Washington, when he might have been playing with his children on the coast of Massachusetts, was a real dissipation to Adams. Even in his own New England he was respected rather than loved, and other sections resented his election by the House over their favorite sons. It was, said Senator Benton, with a wild plunge into what he believed to be Greek, a violation of the *demos krateo* principle. When Adams defiantly gave Clay the State Department, the cry of 'corrupt bargain' was raised; Randolph of Roanoke called it 'the coalition of Blifil and Black George — the combination, unheard of till then, of the puritan with the blackleg.' There followed a duel between Randolph and Clay; fortunately both were bad shots.

Adams was too conscientious to cultivate political arts that were repulsive to him. He would do nothing in the way of appointments to obtain or to retain editorial support; his concessions were ungraceful, and his refusals were bitter to the taste. In his anxiety to be upright he was often disagreeable; and his arguments, as British diplomatists well know, were pushed home with stinging sarcasm.

He made the grave political error of trimming his sails to the nationalism of 1815, after the wind had changed. A sentence in his first annual message: 'The great object of the institution of civil government is the improvement of those who are parties to the social compact,' was the key-note of his domestic policy. He would transcend the nationalism of Hamilton, and use the ample revenues of the Federal Government to increase the navy, build national roads and canals, send out scientific expeditions, and establish institutions of learning and research. All these things came in due time; but Adams urged them in the midst of a centrifugal reaction. If, asked the cotton states, we admit federal powers of this scope, will not some future administration claim the power to interfere with our 'peculiar institution?'

Foreign affairs were the President's peculiar province, and the special aptitude of Mr. Adams. But here, at every turn, he met Mr. Canning. Castlereagh regarded the United States as a turbulent younger brother, to be conciliated by tact and justice; Canning, as a rival to be checked and thwarted. Both Adams and Canning wished to settle all outstanding questions between the two countries, but Adams had no spirit of give and take, and Canning could not resist being clever at other people's expense. The Americans, wrote Captain Basil Hall, 'are plaguey sore at the dressing he gives them in his short pithy Terentian sort of sentences. . . . The more we are in the right, the more is to be gained by not thrusting our rectitude down our opponent's throat.'

The 'no future colonization' clause of Monroe's message irritated Canning profoundly. In spite of Monroe's assurance that it meant no interference with 'existing colonies or dependencies,' Canning thought it meant Oregon. The British and American representatives at St. Petersburg were then about to begin a joint negotiation with Russia, having for its object the abatement of the Russian claims to Oregon. Canning promptly broke it off, and was much irritated when in 1824 the Imperial government signed a treaty with the United States fixing latitude 54° 40′ as the southern boundary of Russian Alaska.

Canning's transatlantic policy was to break up the continental isolation that Adams wished to defend, as well as to prevent the United States acquiring that hegemony which erroneously he thought Adams intended to establish. Obviously, the first move for England was to recognize the Latin-American republics, without waiting until they ceased to be republics. When that was done, in January 1825, Canning wrote jubilantly, 'Spanish America is free, and if we do not mismanage our affairs sadly, she is English.'

President Adams's policy towards Latin America was transparently honest, and exceedingly cautious. He wished to obtain commercial treaties on the basis of most favored nation and 'free ships make free goods'; to encourage the new nations to observe republican principles and live at peace among themselves; and to discourage them from provoking Spain by attacking Cuba. With Brazil, Peru, Chile, and the Argentine he was fairly successful; but Canning thwarted him by slipping into Mexico and Colombia, as a counter-weight to the United States in a new balance of power.

Mexico, largest and most conservative of the new republics, having many points of possible friction with the United States and a pressing need for capital and markets that England could best supply, was the most promising ground for British influence. Joel R. Poinsett, the first United States minister to Mexico, found his British colleague serenely installed in the confidence of President Victoria, with whom he had concluded an Anglo-Mexican commercial treaty. Poinsett, an accomplished gentleman from South Carolina, appeared to have the ideal qualifications for his post: experience in public affairs, and a knowledge of the Spanish language and character, acquired by extensive travels in Europe and Latin America. But he had a superfluity of zeal, that fatal quality in diplomatists, and he was a Mason. In order to counteract Britain and the monarchists, Poinsett stood in with the *federalistas*. This party was eager to establish York rite Masonic lodges, in opposition to the Scottish rite, organized by their political enemies. Poinsett obtained charters from New York for his friends' lodges, which had a surprising and embarrassing success. All Mexico became divided into 'Escoceses' and 'Yorkinos'; civil war broke out between them, and Poinsett's name became a rallying point for one party and the target for the other. In the end England profited, and Poinsett was recalled under a cloud. But the cloud had a scarlet lining: the *Poinsettia Pulcherrima* which the minister introduced to northern horticulture.

At the Panama Congress of 1826 Canning scored again. Bolívar the Liberator summoned this meeting of American nations, primarily in order to discuss commercial treaties, to adopt a code of international law, and to arrive at some common policy towards Spain. Jealous of Monroe and suspicious of the United States, Bolívar proposed to leave them out; but to invite England in the hope that she might become leader of a Latin-American league. Mexico and Colombia, however, invited the United States, and President Adams accepted as a 'token of respect to the Southern republics.' That he hoped to win a sort of moral hegemony for the United States is probable; but neither his private writings nor his public utterances disclosed a thought of political hegemony, or entangling alliance. His practical object was to induce the Congress to keep its hands off Cuba, and to adopt the American principles of most favored nation and freedom of the seas. Adams managed the matter very ill, and was practically defeated in the Senate. The opposition was mainly political (of which more anon), but certain Southern senators were genuinely opposed to United States' representatives sitting in the same assembly with mulatto generals; and others feared dangerous commitments. As the British minister at Washington wrote, the 'backwardness and the opposition' of Congress towards the Mexican invitation could hardly be reconciled with the 'supposed anxiety of the United States to form a general Federation of America, with themselves at the head of it.' In the end the United States were not represented at Panama, and Canning had it all his own way.

Only four republics took part in the conference, which accomplished nothing; but the British representative by some clever propaganda managed to make the United States appear as an enemy to Cuban freedom, and a false friend to that of South America.

A clever policy this, and dangerous. Had it leaked out what Canning was doing, Adams would have had plenty of support for an active Pan-American policy. Central America would have become the Balkans of the New World, with England and the United States playing the rôles of Russia and Austria. Mischief was prevented by concealment, by the death of Canning in 1827, and the instability of the Latin-American states, which led Canning's successors at Downing Street to drop all efforts towards redressing the balance of the Old World with the New.

5. *The Election of 1828*

Adams's campaign for re-election began as soon as he was inaugurated President. The election of 1828 was much simpler than that of 1824, because there were only two candidates; but it was still a personal contest. Just as the Jeffersonian and Hamiltonian factions of 1791 were the nuclei of the Republican and Federalist parties, so the Jackson-Calhoun and Adams-Clay factions of 1823–28 developed into the Democratic and Whig parties that occupied the political stage until the eve of the Civil War.

National political parties in the United States are almost always of local origin, and they never quite lose their essential character as a bundle of local factions and interests. In this instance, the impulse for the defeat of Adams and the election of Jackson came largely from state politicians seeking national power. During the 'era of good feelings,' while the Republican party appeared to be united under Monroe, it was breaking up into conservative and democratic factions within the different states. The precise differences between them varied from one region to another; but, generally speaking, the democratic group wished to level down all political inequalities that still remained in the state constitutions. One result of their efforts was the abolition of property qualifications for the franchise, thus diluting the electorate with elements susceptible to a different sort of appeal from that of the Jeffersonian school. Another effect was to breed a new litter of professional politicians, among whom enjoyment of state office and state patronage had created appetite for the more luscious emoluments of federal power. The best of these men represented some genuine aspiration towards equality, the worst were mere tub-thumping demagogues; but at the head of them were able men of lowly origin but ingratiating form and phrase, such as Martin Van Buren of New York and James Buchanan of Pennsylvania. Their obvious strategy was to join democratic factions in other states, under some national figure who would reflect glory upon themselves, and lead all to victory and spoils. Adams, stiff and scrupulous, was no sort of leader for such as these; Calhoun, the Carolina high-brow, was little better, and Clay's lot was now cast with the President. General Jackson, the hero of New Orleans, subjugator of the Creeks and executioner of Arbuthnot, was a man who would reward his friends and punish his enemies, a heaven-sent leader for democracy.

It did not matter that there was no national issue or popular grievance; the politicians would see to that in due time, and principles could be attended to after victory. Adams must be discredited. The 'corrupt bargain' charge, engineered by Buchanan, was the opening gun of the Jackson campaign. Then, in December 1825, Adams innocently introduced the Panama Congress project, which the Jackson supporters regarded as a sort of gala performance invented by Clay to dazzle the public mind, and divert attention from the 'bargain.' That is why the President's nomination of commissioners to Panama was held up in the Senate by the Jackson men, while Calhoun, as Vice-President, tolerated the most outrageous imputations on the President's and the Secretary's motives. Calhoun was rewarded by the second place on the Jackson ticket, with the assurance of the succession after one term. We shall later see the feminine and other reasons why this assurance was not honored.

The pro-Jackson minority in Congress became a majority in the mid-term congressional elections. 'Investigations' of alleged presidential corruption were started, but not pushed home; so that the victim had no chance to clear himself. All the old prejudice against the Federalists was aroused in order to defeat the son of John Adams, reputed author of the Sedition Act of 1798. The South, now in full tide of reaction against nationalism, was assured that Jackson would defend state rights. The West's lingering loyalty to Henry Clay was destroyed by Adams's professed intention to administer the public lands on business principles, rather than squander it on shiftless squatters. The most absurdly mendacious tales were made up and broadcasted. Adams had furnished the White House at his own expense with a billiard table and a set of chessmen; in the mouth of a Jackson orator, these became 'gaming tables and gambling furniture' purchased from public funds. The newspapers that supported Adams, however, were not idle; there was a famous 'coffin hand-bill' on the shooting of six militiamen by Jackson for insubordination, and the General's frontier brawls and alleged pre-marital relations with Mrs. Jackson were described in detail. Altogether, it was the most unprincipled and degrading presidential election the United States had ever experienced.

The result was fairly close. Adams's popular vote was 44 per cent of the total; but Jackson received 178 electoral votes, carried the Southern and Western States, Pennsylvania, and most of New York, winning by a large majority in the electoral college. Virginia held her aristocratic nose, and voted for Jackson, believing him the lesser evil; South Carolina voted for Jackson as a state-rights man, which she soon had reason to regret. But in the last instance it was classes rather than sections that elected Jackson: the Southern hunters and backwoods farmers whom he had led to glory; the Northern democracy, tired of respectable, gentlemanly promotions from the Cabinet to the White House. They cared little for policies, but much for personality, and they voted for Jackson because he was their sort of man. After all, the most sophisticated among us often have no better reason for voting as we do than had the American democracy of 1828, in exalting a man of their own sort; uneducated, intolerant, yet professing the immortal principles of Thomas Jefferson. And the democracy was not disappointed.

John Quincy Adams never understood why he was spurned by the country he loved with silent passion, and rejected by the people he had served so faithfully. In the four sad months between the election and the end of his term, there kept running through his head the refrain of an old song he had first heard at the court of Versailles,

O Richard, O mon Roi,
L'univers t'abandonne.

Yet the noblest portion of his long career was still ahead.

XX

ANDREW JACKSON

1829–1837

1. *Old Hickory*

WASHINGTON had never held such crowds as assembled there on 4 March 1829 to see the people's champion installed. It was their day, without pomp or pageantry, scarcely even a uniform to be seen. General Jackson, a tall, lean figure dressed in black, with the hawk-like frontier face under a splendid crest of thick white hair, walked through the crowds and the mud up Pennsylvania Avenue, unescorted save by a few friends. At the top of a great stone stairway to the east portico of the Capitol, he took the inaugural oath and read his inaugural address. With difficulty he pushed through the shouting masses, all eager to shake his hand, to where his horse was waiting; then rode to the White House at the head of an informal procession of carriages, farm wagons, people of all ages, colors, and conditions. Since it would have seemed unbecoming for democracy's chieftain to make distinctions of persons, the White House was invaded by a mob of men, women, and boys who stood on chairs in their muddy boots, fought for the refreshments, and trod glass and porcelain underfoot. 'It would have done Mr. Wilberforce's heart good,' wrote an onlooker, 'to have seen a stout black wench eating in this free country a jelly with a gold spoon at the President's house.' Jackson was glad to escape by a window; and the mob was finally drawn off like flies to honey, by tubs of punch being placed on the lawn. Washington society thought of the Tuileries on the 10th of August, and shuddered.

One might search European history in vain for any counterpart to Andrew Jackson. He was a typical American, of a sort that is no longer typical. Born on the Carolina frontier in 1767, to immigrant parents from Northern Ireland, he had all the virtues and many of the faults of the American backwoodsman; but none of the vices. Loyal, pugnacious, and honest, he was also credulous, intolerant, and unlearned, with slight conception of the complex forces that were moulding themselves under the shadow of his personality into the Democratic party. His policy was summed up in a sentence, 'The Federal Constitution must be obeyed, State-rights preserved, our national debt must be paid, direct taxes and loans avoided, and the Federal Union preserved. These are the objects I have in view, and regardless of all consequences, will carry into effect.'

Jackson's frontier simplicity made him over-trusting of friends and too suspicious of opponents. An intellectual check on his emotions was wholly wanting. Yet Jackson's simplicity was his strength, for the American people looked through his eyes, and thought with his brain. Now that a century has elapsed, few will deny that his intuitive decisions were generally right; that his mistakes were fewer and less costly than those of more experienced and better educated presidents. Although quick to anger and slow to cool, rough-hewn out of native oak, and without polish, Jackson had a fine sense of honor, a deep reverence for women, and a natural, straightforward courtesy. His Talleyrand, Martin Van Buren, never had to complain that so great a man had been *si mal élevé*.

Jackson's administration opened badly. His first mistake was in the choice of a cabinet. Four places were filled by incompetent and unknown men, followers of Calhoun; but the choice of Martin Van Buren for the Department of State was excellent.

The President's first and obvious task was to 'cleanse the Augean stables.' He believed the election charges of corruption in the civil service; and his partisans took care that he did not forget, so hungry were they for the spoils of victory. Actually there was incompetence among those in office, but no corruption. The federal departments and post offices were full of aged functionaries who had been appointed from charitable or political motives. Jackson's views of office-holding were of the eighteenth century, distorted by the democratic principle of rotation. In his first annual message he declared,

> 'The duties of all public officers are . . . so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify themselves for their performance; and I cannot but believe that more is lost by the long continuance of men in office than is generally to be gained by their experience. . . . No one man has any more intrinsic right to official station than another.'

But Jackson's remedy was worse than the disease. He removed everyone suspected of having supported Adams, and when their places proved insufficient swept out others. Only 252 out of 612 presidential appointments, and about one in fourteen of the post-office department, were vacated; but the precedent was established for more drastic removals later in the century. Broadly speaking, Jackson introduced the spoils system from the states, where it had always existed, into the Federal government. His appointments lowered the general tone and efficiency of the service. Aged and respectable Jeffersonians were replaced by young, often disreputable, and sometimes corrupt Jackson men. The spoils system did not noticeably increase the power of the President, for even Jackson had to please congressmen, and the Senate negatived many of his nominations; but it greatly increased the power of party and of the professional element within parties, by offering tangible rewards for faithful service.

2. *Peggy Eaton*

It was a woman who made the first and the most lasting trouble for Jackson. Eaton, the Secretary of War, a former Senator from Tennessee, was an old crony of the President. Mrs. Eaton had long been a notorious character in Washington as Peggy O'Neil, the fair, free-and-easy daughter of the leading publican. Married at an early age to a hard-drinking naval purser, she remained at the paternal tavern during her husband's tours of duty; and her flirtations with the guests, especially with Senator Eaton the 'star boarder,' were the talk of the town. When the purser committed suicide after a drunken frolic, and his widow married her senatorial lover, the gossips' tongues wagged faster than ever. But Mrs. Jackson received the wife of her husband's old friend. Thenceforth, for the gallant General, she was above reproach. Mrs. Jackson died just before her husband's inauguration. He was devoted to her memory; and the fact that many years before they had been the innocent victims of boarding-house scandal made him the more determined to champion Mrs. Eaton, and to insist that official society should receive her.

Mrs. Vice-President Calhoun was a proud Carolinian, and the other Secretaries' wives were also determined to give the hussy no countenance. They refused to call, and at official receptions or White House dinners refused to speak. Neither would the ladies of the diplomatic corps, nor the wives of senators and congressmen. Van Buren, however, was a widower, and Charles Vaughan, the British minister, a bachelor. They could afford to show the lady marked attention, which was not difficult, for she had both wit and beauty. But the dinners they gave in her honor were declined by other ladies, and at balls she was so snubbed that she soon gave up attempting social recognition. The President, however, refused to surrender. He actually held a cabinet meeting about Mrs. Eaton, where he pronounced her 'as chaste as a virgin'; but the female rebellion continued. Even Mrs. Donelson, niece of the President and mistress of the White House, would not call on the persecuted lady; and when Jackson gave her the alternative of doing so or leaving the White House, she left.

This 'Eaton malaria' was catching, and no laughing matter for the Jackson men. It was not only making a breach between the administration and respectable society, but making a fool of the President. The Adams-Clay party was jubilant; for if the American people can once be got to laugh at, instead of with, a national figure, it is all up with him. Still, there was some use to be made of the affair by Van Buren, who coveted the presidential succession. This sly fox from New York was burrowing into the heart of the old hero. It was 'little Van' who bound up the wounds of the disappointed office-seekers, who arranged the diplomatic appointments, and directed the negotiations which brought prestige to the administration. His round little figure could be seen every fair day bobbing up and down on horseback, beside the lean, easy-seated President on his daily constitutionals. Many a time they must have discussed the Eaton affair. Jackson, unable to account for the solid female phalanx against his dear departed's friend, was sure there must be politics behind it. And we may be sure that Van Buren, Oh! so gently and discreetly, would have eliminated one plotter after another until Jackson burst out 'By the e-ter-nal! it's that proud aristocrat Calhoun' (for did not Mrs. Calhoun start the snubbing game, and were not all the recusant ministers Calhoun's friends?). And how Van Buren would protest that it could never, never be that high-souled pattern of chivalry and devoted Democrat! And how, if Jackson seemed too easily convinced, he would remind him of an ugly rumor that in Monroe's Cabinet, at the time of the Arbuthnot and Ambrister affair, it was Calhoun who said General Jackson should be arrested, and tried for insubordination!

Calhoun, it will be remembered, was Vice-President and heir-apparent.

Were all this merely a question of whether Martin or John should succeed Andrew, it would not be worth our attention. But the 'Eaton malaria,' as treated by Dr. Van Buren, was a mere symptom of the sectional and economic forces that presently isolated Calhoun and his adherents in a state-rights ward; whence the infection escaped into the entire South.

3. *The Tariff and the South*

South Carolina evolved politically between 1820 and 1830 (as earlier Massachusetts) from a dominant state professing the most ardent nationalism to a semi-impoverished community, blaming her poverty on the measures of the Federal government. English constituencies in like circumstances have turned from free trade to protection. South Carolina reversed the order. As a state in a federal union, she had a reserve weapon to use against a national majority, when votes and arguments failed.

The protective tariff of 1816 was largely the work of two South Carolinians, Lowndes and Calhoun. Although national in outlook, they expected South Carolina to share the benefits. Like New England, their native state had water-power, and unlike New England she had cotton; then why not manufactures? And was it wise for her planters to depend exclusively upon the English market? The next few years, however, proved these expectations to be hollow. Competent managers were rare in the South, and Yankee mill superintendents were unable to handle slave labor, which, after all, could be employed with more immediate profit in cotton growing. All the benefits of protection appeared to be going to the Northern manufacturers, while Southern planters bore the burden of higher prices. As the tariff schedules rose by successive acts of Congress, and the country as a whole grew richer, South Carolina remained stationary in population, and declined in prosperity. Her more enterprising planters emigrated to the black belts of Alabama and Mississippi, where their bumper crops enriched Mobile and New Orleans instead of swelling the exports of Charleston. As the cotton growing area increased, the price declined to a point below the cost of production on worn-out land.

Actually, the protective tariff only aggravated a distress for which the wasteful, land-destroying system of cotton culture was fundamentally responsible; but the South Carolina planters could hardly be expected to reason with cool logic in such a state of affairs. By 1825 there had been created among them just that atmosphere of pride, poverty, and resentment which favors the growth of nationalist movements in Europe, and separatist movements in the United States. In South Carolina this took the form of a local state-rights party, propagating the doctrine that the protective tariff and 'internal improvements' were unconstitutional devices for taxing the South for the benefit of the North. The New England Federalists had taken the same line not long before, and had ended at Hartford in talk; but ten degrees of latitude separated Charleston from Boston. Climate and race relations had produced in the South Carolina aristocracy a different temper. And behind all the heat and fury of the sectional movement we are about to describe was the fear lest nationalism, in any form, lead to congressional tampering with slavery. Calhoun admitted in 1830 that 'the real cause of the present unhappy state of things' was 'the peculiar domestic institution of the Southern States.'

Protected interests are seldom content with what they have. Northern manufacturers were not satisfied with the tariff of 1824. In 1828 the 'tariff of abominations' was passed. It was a politicians' tariff, concerned mainly with the manufacture of a President. The pro-Jackson congressmen wished to present their candidate to the South as a free-trader, and to the North as a protectionist; they therefore introduced a bill with higher duties on raw materials than on manufactures, hoping that New England votes would help defeat it, and the onus fall on Adams. As Webster said, 'Its enemies spiced it with whatever they thought would render it distasteful; its friends took it, drugged as it was.'

At a great anti-tariff meeting in Columbia, S. C., Thomas Cooper asked, 'Is it worth our while to continue this Union of States, where the North demands to be our masters and we are required to be their tributaries?' More and more South Carolinians became inclined to answer this question with a thumping 'No!'

4. *Calhoun's Doctrine*

Calhoun, aloof in the Vice-Presidential office, was not indifferent to this local turmoil. He had always been alive to the danger of disunion in a country so rapidly expanding. Like Hamilton, Adams, and Clay he had sought to prevent disintegration by the cement of national legislation. Now he realized his mistake. Protection, instead of a binding force, had proved an instrument of class and sectional plunder. And as Calhoun saw his beloved Carolina rushing past him down the road to secession, he completely revised his principles, jettisoned the Hamiltonian formula, and produced a new and dynamic version of state rights. The measure of federal power must now be determined by the vital interest of any individual state, not by a transient majority in Congress, or in the Supreme Court.

Nullification was the name of this device by which Calhoun proposed to protect the peculiar interests of his state, and preserve the Union that he loved. Set forth in a document called the South Carolina Exposition, it was approved in 1828 by the legislature of that state. Nullification was based on two postulates: the common enough assertion that the Federal Constitution was a compact between states, and the theory of indivisible, indestructible sovereignty. The Constitution was established not by the American people, but by thirteen sovereign states. Sovereign in 1787, they must still be sovereign in 1828. As sovereigns, they have severally the right to judge when their agent, the Federal government, exceeds its powers. A state convention, the immediate organ of state sovereignty, may then determine whether a given Act of Congress be constitutional or otherwise; and, in the latter event, take measures to prevent its enforcement within the state limits. Calhoun, however, recognized one authority on the Constitution superior to the interpretation of a single state; an interpretative federal amendment, adopted by three-fourths of the states.

Such was the doctrine of nullification. It was not wholly new or original. The Kentucky and Virginia resolves of 1798 postulated the same state sovereignty; but the remedy to which they pointed against unconstitutional acts of Congress was, in the one case, a collective nullification by *all* the states; and in the other a collective 'interposition,' whatever that might mean. Nullification by a single state, disobeying the laws of the Union while claiming the privileges of the Union, was a very different matter. As the aged Madison declared, 'for this preposterous and anarchical pretension there is not a shadow of countenance in the Constitution.' It had been adumbrated, to be sure, by Massachusetts and Connecticut at the time of the embargo and the War of 1812; but neither they nor the numerous other states which had denounced this or that measure of the Federal government as unconstitutional had done more than protest, and threaten to secede if their protests were not heeded.

Calhoun's unrealistic, humorless logic is tedious as his noble-Roman pose, with hand resting on heart and over-handsome features surmounted by a dramatic mop of hair. But we must admit his sincerity. His political principles changed, but never his object. Confronted, like Jefferson and Adams in 1775, with an accepted constitutional theory that supported tyranny, he sought a new one to preserve liberty. Like them, he would preserve it within the existing body politic if possible, outside it if necessary. The South, with its growing economic particularism, could only remain in union with the more populous North, if some constitutional check were applied to majority rule. So Calhoun sought in the Federal Constitution some implicit theory that would provide that check; and discovered nullification. But, unless the other side would yield, the only possible result, as in 1776, must have been disunion.

Calhoun's authorship of the 'Exposition of 1828' was secret; and he advised his state to hold nullification in reserve, hoping that President Jackson would insist upon a reduction of the tariff. But Jackson was indifferent to the tariff; and Van Buren's Northern wing of the party was interested in maintaining protection. Months stretched into years, and the 'tariff of abominations' remained on the statute books. It became clear to the Southerners in the House that they could obtain no reduction without Western votes; and Western votes against nationalism could only be purchased by conceding something that the West wanted more eagerly than protection.

~ 5. *The West and the Union*

The West, as we have seen, looked to Jackson to reform certain features of the national land system. The poorer public lands, unsaleable at the minimum price of $1.25 per acre, made large blocks of untaxable wilderness between the settled areas. To remedy this Senator Benton proposed the device of 'graduation': a progressive reduction in the price of public land unsold after a given period. Frontiersmen who squatted on the public domain before it was placed on sale disliked having their illegal holdings sold to outsiders. The squatters, better men with fist or rifle than the settlers who bought the lands they occupied, could generally make the latter pay handsomely for 'improvements,' and then move farther West. But they preferred, or politicians thought they preferred, to legalize their position by a pre-emption act, giving them an option to purchase at the minimum price the quarter-section where they had squatted, whenever it was offered for sale by the government.

Older communities, both North and South, were opposed to any measure likely to encourage emigration. The northeastern manufacturing states had a somewhat special attitude. Emigration tended to keep up the price of factory labor; but if the tariff schedules were to be maintained, some way must be found to get rid of the surplus revenue coming in from the public lands. In order to catch Western votes for protection, Henry Clay proposed a clever scheme of 'distribution.' The proceeds from land sales would be distributed among the states, for use in public works and education, giving a special bonus to those states wherein the lands lay.

It was all a game of balance between North, South, and West, each section offering to compromise a secondary interest, in order to get votes for a primary interest. The South would permit the West to plunder the public domain, in return for a reduction of the tariff. The North offered the tempting bait of distribution, in order to maintain protection. On the outcome of this sectional balance depended the alignment of parties in the future: even of the Civil War itself. Was it to be North and West against South, or South and West against North?

On 29 December 1829 Senator Foote of Connecticut offered a resolution to inquire into the expediency of restricting the sale of public lands to those already in the market. Senator Benton of Missouri denounced this proposal as a barefaced attempt of the manufacturers to keep their laborers from 'the blooming regions of the West.' He summoned the gallant South to the rescue of her Western brothers; and Senator Hayne of South Carolina, a recent convert to nullification, responded. One after another the giants of the Upper House rushed into the fray, and there took place one of those classic debates that America used to love — speeches hours long, each consuming a whole day's session, yet delivered from mere scraps of notes held in the palm of the hand, and every word reported in the newspapers; one of those contests of eloquence that seemed to mobilize the whole latent manliness and shrewdness of the nation.

As the debate progressed, less was said about the public land, more on the essential sympathy of Northern or Southern ideals for the West, and most of all on constitutional theory. The acme came on 26 January 1830, when Daniel Webster of Massachusetts replied for the second time to Hayne. Webster was the most commanding figure in the Senate, a swarthy Olympian with a crag-like face, and eyes that seemed to glow like dull coals under the precipice of brows. It has been said that no man was ever so great as Daniel Webster looked. His magnificent presence and deep, melodious voice gave distinction to the most common platitudes; but his orations were seldom commonplace. He carried to perfection the dramatic, rotund style of oratory that America learned from Chatham. Slumberous he was at times, even ponderous; but the South Carolinian's attack on the patriotism of New England, no less than his bold challenge to the Union in its own upper chamber, called forth all Webster's immense reserve of vitality and intellectual power. His reply is the greatest recorded American oration, thrilling to read even today in cold print, when the issues with which it deals are long since settled by the men who followed in 1861 the standard that Webster raised in 1830.

Imagine, then, the small semicircular Senate chamber in the Capitol;[1] gallery and every bit of floor space behind the desks of the forty-eight senators packed with visitors; Vice-President Calhoun in the chair, his handsome, mobile face gazing into that of the orator, and reflecting every point; Daniel Webster, in blue tailed coat with brass buttons and buff waistcoat, getting under way slowly and deliberately, then turning on power until he moved with the effortless speed of a great airplane. Hour after hour the speech flowed on, always in good taste and temper, relieving the high tone and tension with a happy allusion or turn of phrase that provoked laughter, thrilling his audience with rich imagery, crushing his opponents with a barrage of facts, passing from defence of his state and section to a devastating criticism of the 'South Carolina doctrine,' and concluding with an immortal peroration on the Union:

> 'It is to that Union we owe our safety at home, and our consideration and dignity abroad. It is to that Union that we are chiefly indebted for whatever makes us most proud of our country. That Union we reached only by the discipline of our virtues in the severe school of adversity. It

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[1] Now the Supreme Court chamber. A good contemporary painting of the great debate is reproduced in Webster's *Writings* (National ed., 1903), vi. 5.

had its origin in the necessities of disordered finance, prostrate commerce, and ruined credit. Under its benign influences, these great interests immediately awoke as from the dead, and sprang forth with newness of life. Every year of its duration has teemed with fresh proofs of its utility and its blessings; and although our territory has stretched out wider and wider, and our population spread farther and farther, they have not outrun its protection or its benefits. It has been to us all a copious fountain of national, social, and personal happiness.

'I have not allowed myself, Sir, to look beyond the Union, to see what might lie hidden in the dark recess behind. I have not coolly weighed the chances of preserving liberty when the bonds that unite us together shall be broken asunder. I have not accustomed myself to hang over the precipice of disunion, to see whether, with my short sight, I can fathom the depth of the abyss below; nor could I regard him as a safe counsellor in the affairs of this government, whose thoughts should be mainly bent on considering, not how the Union may be best preserved, but how tolerable might be the condition of the people when it should be broken up and destroyed. While the Union lasts we have high, exciting, gratifying prospects spread out before us, for us and our children. Beyond that I seek not to penetrate the veil. God grant that in my day at least that curtain may not rise! God grant that on my vision never may be opened what lies behind! When my eyes shall be turned to behold for the last time the sun in heaven, may I not see him shining on the broken and dishonored fragments of a once glorious Union; on States dissevered, discordant, belligerent; on a land rent with civil feuds, or drenched, it may be, in fraternal blood! Let their last feeble and lingering glance rather behold the gorgeous ensign of the republic, now known and honored throughout the earth, still full high advanced, its arms and trophies streaming in their original lustre, not a stripe erased or polluted, not a single star obscured, bearing for its motto, no such miserable interrogatory as "What is all this worth?" nor those other words of delusion and folly, "Liberty first and Union afterwards"; but everywhere, spread all over in characters of living light, blazing on all its ample folds, as they float over the sea and over the land, and in every wind under the whole heavens, that other sentiment, dear to every true American heart,—Liberty *and* Union, now and forever, one and inseparable!'

It was this peroration, declaimed on thousands of school platforms by the lads of the coming generation, that established in the hearts of the Northern and Western people a new, semi-religious conception of the Union. One of its earliest readers was an awkward, dreamy youth on the Indiana frontier, named Abraham Lincoln.

Time only could reveal the full import of Webster's reply to Hayne; but it went home instantly to the old patriot in the White House. Jackson counted himself a state-rights man, but he never doubted the sovereignty of the nation. State rights for him was merely a formula to prevent the jobbery and corruption and consolidation towards which Adams and Clay seemed to be tending. It could never justify disobedience to the laws of the Union. Yet Calhoun and the nullification party counted upon his sympathy, as a Carolinian born; and at an anniversary dinner that they arranged for Jefferson's birthday, 13 April 1830, they proposed to enlist him in their cause. The formal toasts and speeches were all so worded as to prove a connection between nullification and Democratic-Republican orthodoxy. Jackson sat through them outwardly impassive, inwardly fuming. When his turn came for a volunteer toast, the old chieftain arose to his full height, fixed his glaring eyes on Calhoun, and flung out a challenge:

'Our Federal Union — it must be preserved!'

Calhoun took up the challenge with another:

'The Union — next to our liberty, the most dear!'

The issue was now joined between President and Vice-President; events moved fast to separate them. An authoritative letter reached the President asserting that Calhoun, who had always posed as Jackson's defender in the Arbuthnot and Ambrister affair, had been the one cabinet member to demand his arrest and trial. He enclosed it in a note to the Vice-President, inquiring if the charge were true. Calhoun replied evasively, and Jackson endorsed the letter, 'This is full evidence of the duplicity and insincerity of the man.' That form of personal disloyalty was the unforgivable sin to a man of Jackson's metal.

To complete Van Buren's triumph and Calhoun's isolation, it now remained to cure the 'Eaton malaria' which still hung over the administration like an unwholesome fog. No easy matter that; but not too difficult for little Van. On one of his daily horseback rides with Jackson, the President alluded to the cabinet discord, and wished the women would give him peace. Then Van Buren played his master stroke. 'There is but one thing can give you peace — my resignation.' 'Never, Sir!' said Jackson. But he was convinced after a few more rides; and when the matter was discussed with other cronies, Van Buren so deftly turned the argument that Eaton, as the original cause of the trouble, offered to resign with him. It was then natural for Jackson to tell the other ministers, Calhoun men all, that they must follow; and protesting they retired to the obscurity whence they came. In the summer of 1831 the cabinet was completely reorganized. Van Buren, whose apparent sacrifice assured him of the presidential succession, was nominated minister to Great Britain. His place in the cabinet was given to Edward Livingston, a statesman and jurist whose penal code for Louisiana has been universally admired. Lewis Cass, an energetic Yankee of the Northwest, replaced Eaton, and Roger B. Taney of Maryland, who later proved a worthy successor to Chief Justice Marshall, became Attorney-General. Jackson's administration was now of the North and West, and ready for the nullifiers to do their worst.

6. *Nullification Attempted*

For two years after the famous dinner, Calhoun and the South Carolina nullifiers were held in check by the unionists of their own state: in 1832 Henry Clay forced their hands. With the aid of Western votes, attracted by his distribution scheme, Clay pushed a new tariff bill through Congress on 14 July 1832. Some of the abominations of the 1828 tariff were removed, but the high duties on iron and textiles were maintained; and the new Act had an air of permanence which acted upon South Carolina as a challenge.

In the state election that autumn the state-rights party, the 'pinks of chivalry and fire-and-brimstone eaters,' carried all before them. The new legislature promptly summoned a state convention, which on 24 November 1832 declared in the name of the sovereign people of South Carolina that the tariff Act was 'unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States . . . null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this State, its officers or citizens.' This so-called Ordinance of Nullification forbade federal officials to collect customs duties within the state after 1 February 1833, and threatened instant secession from the Union if the Federal government attempted to blockade Charleston, or otherwise to use force.

President Jackson took prompt precautions to maintain the law of the land. Forts Moultrie and Sumter were reinforced, revenue cutters were ordered to collect the duties if the customs officials were resisted, and close touch was maintained with the South Carolina unionists. On 10 December he issued a ringing proclamation to the people of South Carolina. Their nullification ordinance, he said, was founded upon no right of revolution against oppression, but on the strange position that a state might retain its place in the Union, and yet be bound only by those laws that it might choose to consider as constitutional.

> 'I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed by one State, incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed.'

South Carolina was not to be conquered by proclamation. Her legislature hurled back defiance at Old Hickory, and raised a volunteer force to defend the state from 'invasion.' President Jackson, encouraged by loyal addresses that poured in from all parties and sections, wished to throw an army into South Carolina at the first show of resistance to the customs officers. But could he afford to? It was no question of suppressing a mere local insurrection, as Washington had done in 1794, but the very delicate and dangerous matter of coercing a state. Virginia regarded nullification as a caricature of her resolves of 1798, Georgia 'abhorred the doctrine,' and Alabama denounced it as 'unsound in theory and dangerous in practice'; but the majority in all the Southern States probably believed in the constitutional right of secession, and Georgia had made the very dangerous proposal of a Southern Convention.

Extremists aside, every one wished to avoid bloodshed. Jackson's friends feared lest coercion disrupt their party; and what the nullifiers really wanted was repeal of the tariff. Within three weeks of the President's proclamation, the House Committee of ways and means proposed to reduce the duties. An informal meeting at Charleston resolved on 21 January 1833 to suspend the nullification ordinance until the new tariff bill became law; and the customs officials at Charleston were not molested. In Congress concession and compulsion went hand in hand. On the same day (2 March 1833) Jackson signed (*a*) the Force Bill, authorizing him to use the army and navy to collect duties if judicial process were obstructed; and (*b*) Clay's compromise tariff, providing a gradual scaling down of all schedules until they should reach twenty per cent *ad valorem* in ten years' time. The South Carolina Convention then reassembled, and repealed the nullification ordinance, and nullified the Force Bill.

Each party marched from the field with colors flying, claiming victory. Both seemed to have derived new strength from the contest. Nationalism was heartened by Jackson's proclamation and the Force Act, but South Carolina had proved that a single determined state could force her will on Congress, and change the commercial policy of a country which she still denied to be a nation. Jackson would have preferred to concede nothing until Calhoun and his party had passed under the Caudine forks; for beyond nullification he saw secession. The 'next pretext,' he predicted, 'will be the negro, or slavery question.' With Old Hickory to lead the battle, it was a golden opportunity to crush disunion — if indeed it could have been crushed without removing the cause.

7. *The War on the Bank*

In the midst of these alarums and excursions came the presidential election of 1832, memorable in the history of political organization. Jackson men from all parts of the Union, organized as the Democratic party, sent delegates to a national party convention, which adopted the famous two-thirds rule, and renominated Jackson for the Presidency. The opposition organized as the National Republican party (for which the name Whig, of happy memory, was shortly substituted), and nominated Henry Clay. These were the two major parties of the future. In 1832 there was a third party in the field, the Anti-Masons.

That a party of so strange a title should contend for national power was of social rather than of political significance. Americans of the nineteenth century were so in love with the methods of democracy, that no sooner did a few earnest men capture a bit of what they took to be eternal truth, than they proceeded to organize it politically. If some local success proved the scent good, it brought politicians hot-foot to the hunt that they might partake of the kill, or to lead off the field in pursuit of bigger game. This Anti-Masonic party arose in 1826, out of the disappearance of a New York bricklayer named Morgan, who had divulged the secrets of his Masonic lodge. A corpse was found floating in the Niagara river. It could not be proved to be Morgan's; but, as a politician said, it was 'good enough Morgan until after election.' Both the event and the Masons' efforts to hush it up revived an old prejudice (now quite dead) against secret societies. Several young politicians, such as William H. Seward, Thurlow Weed, and Thaddeus Stevens, threw themselves into the Anti-Masonic movement, which became strong enough to elect a state governor or two. In 1831 it held a national convention and nominated presidential candidates, who took thousands of Northern votes from Clay. In a few years' time the Anti-Masons faded out; but the sort of people who were attracted by a one-idea party easily took up with the next that came along, and successively became Free-Soilers, Know-Nothings, and Republicans.

This presidential election of 1832 decided the case of Andrew Jackson *v.* the Bank of the United States. He had been elected in the first instance as a popular champion against the B.U.S. Since 1819 the Bank had been well managed, to the profit alike of the Government whose funds it handled, the business community which it served, and the stockholders; but it was still unpopular in the West. Jackson shared this prejudice, together with a profound conviction that the money power was the greatest enemy to democracy. As the Bank's charter would expire in 1836, if not sooner renewed by Congress, Jackson's opinion was of some importance.

In the Eastern States the B.U.S. had established itself as a necessary part of the business mechanism; and the Pennsylvania Democrats and Carolina state rights people had no complaint to make of it.[2] Calhoun had no constitutional qualms on the subject, although by any consistent standard of strict construction the chartering of a national monopoly was a more palpable invasion of state rights than a mere raising of tariff schedules to a protective level.

Nicholas Biddle, President of the B.U.S., was no mean antagonist for President Jackson. Precursor of a race of energetic autocratic financiers, he had the same dislike of democracy that Jackson had of banking; but was anxious to keep the Bank out of politics, which was impossible. His social and business relations were largely with Jackson's opponents. Daniel Webster was at the same time a director of the B.U.S., its leading retained counsel, its debtor by personal notes to the sum of many thousands, and Senator from Massachusetts. Congressmen were often paid their salaries by the Bank in advance of the annual appropriation bill, without interest charges.

[2] In January 1832 the Bank Stock was distributed as follows (in round numbers): New York, 31,000; Pennsylvania, 51,000; Maryland, 34,000; South Carolina, 40,000; New England, 15,000; the West, 3,000; Europe, 84,000. Catterall, *Second B. U. S.*, p. 508.

Journalists like James Gordon Bennett, father of the yellow press, obtained loans on very favorable terms. Other newspapers were paid to insert in their columns ' real and positive information ' on the patriotic services of the B.U.S.

' I do not dislike your bank more than all banks,' President Jackson informed President Biddle. ' But ever since I read the history of the South Sea Bubble, I have been afraid of banks.' What he wanted was a mere bank of deposit attached to the Treasury Department, with officials appointed under the spoils system. However, the backwoodsman's axe might grow rusty in Washington. Little favors by the Bank to Jackson's friends, careful consideration of the Treasury's wants, and by 1830 Jackson was speaking ' in most exalted terms ' of Biddle. The octopus was closing in on the old warrior, sucking away his prejudice. Yet no one could induce him to say on what terms, if any, he would accept a rechartering bill.

As the election of 1832 approached, Biddle was badgered by the opposition to allow Congress to bring forward a rechartering bill. McLane warned him that such a measure would arouse Jackson's pugnacity. He begged Biddle to wait until after the election. But Henry Clay, most inadvisedly, wished to make the B.U.S. an issue in the election, and won Biddle's consent. A recharter bill passed Congress on 3 July 1832. Jackson vetoed it, with an explanatory message that identified the Democratic party with radicalism. The bank recharter, according to the President, was not only an unconstitutional invasion of state rights;[3] it would continue a monopoly and exclusive privilege, the profits of which must come ' out of the earnings of the American people,' in favor of foreign stockholders and ' a few hundred of our own citizens, chiefly of the richest class.' He could not permit the ' prostitution of our Government to the advancement of the few at the expense of the many.'

The logic of the veto message was defective, the economics unsound; but as an appeal to the people it was irresistible. Jackson was re-elected, together with a House of Representatives upon which he could depend. Yet Nicholas Biddle refused to admit defeat. ' This worthy President thinks that because he has scalped Indians and imprisoned judges, he is to have his own way with the Bank. He is mistaken.'

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[3] Yet the bill had been reported from a committee on which George McDuffie, Calhoun's lieutenant in the nullification movement, was chairman, and was voted for by most of Calhoun's partisans in both Houses!

Instead of waiting for the Bank to die a natural death in 1836, Jackson decided at once to deprive it of government deposits. One Secretary of the Treasury had to be kicked upstairs to the State Department, and another dismissed, before one could be found to obey orders. After 1833, government receipts were deposited in local banks — Jackson's 'pet banks,' which he believed to be safer than the expiring 'monster.'

This financial war came in the midst of a period of unparalleled speculative activity, coincident with improvements in transportation, a brisk demand for cotton, and increased westward migration. The passing of the B.U.S., with its wholesome if unpopular habit of promptly presenting the notes of local banks for payment, took off the last brake. The currency was already chaotic, when an Act of 1834 made matters worse by establishing the coinage ratio of 16 to 1 between silver and gold, which drove silver from the country. Yet the only embarrassment to the Treasury was a surplus which rapidly mounted with increased sales of public land, and the final payment of the national debt in January 1835. Henry Clay, fearing lest the administration devise some way to spend the surplus, managed to get through Congress a 'distribution' scheme in 1836. About $28,000,000 was presented by the Treasury to the state governments. Some states used the money for public works, others used it as a fund for education, one even made a *per capita* distribution; but mostly it fed speculation. Jackson then administered a severe astringent, in the 'specie circular' of 1836, ordering that the Treasury receive no paper currency for public lands. Shortly atfer, the panic of 1837 burst upon the country; and the surplus disappeared almost overnight. Short-time treasury notes tided over the crisis, but the whole of the next administration (1837–41) was spent in seeking a substitute for the B.U.S.; and none was found comparable with it for service and efficiency until 1913.

Jackson's war on the Bank was not only a symptom of growing pains in America, but an aspect of that fundamental hostility to monopoly and special privilege which the colonists brought from England, and which broke out in the Boston tea-party, in Jeffersonian democracy, and in the progressive movement of the present century.

8. *Indian and Foreign Affairs*

Jackson's attitude towards the Indians, like his war on the Bank, betrayed a dyed-in-the-wool Westerner. He carried out a policy suggested by Jefferson, the removal of all Indian tribes to the Far West. Between 1829 and 1837 ninety-four Indian treaties were concluded, several million acres relinquished, and many thousand redskins more or less forcibly transferred to the trans-Mississippi West.

Most of the Indian tribes were too feeble to resist the process, but at three points there was trouble. Chief Black Hawk of the Sauk and Fox endeavored to retain the ancient tribal seat at the mouth of the Rock river, Illinois. Squatters encroached on his village, enclosed the Indians' cornfields, and even ploughed up the graves of their ancestors. So in 1831 Black Hawk withdrew into Missouri territory. There famine followed, and hostile Sioux threatened. Hoping to find a vacant prairie in which to plant a corn crop, Black Hawk returned the following year with about a thousand of the tribe. Misinterpreting this move as a hostile expedition, the Illinois militia turned out — Abraham Lincoln commanding a company — and pursued the starving Indians up the Rock river into the Wisconsin wilderness. It was a disgraceful frontier frolic, stained by a wanton massacre of Indians, including women and children, when attempting to recross the Mississippi. The only redeeming feature was the chivalrous consideration of Black Hawk by Lieutenant Jefferson Davis of the regular army, when the captured chieftain was placed in his charge.

In the South the Creek, Chickasaw, and Choctaw nations were amenable, and removed to the Indian Territory (Oklahoma), where their descendants still live. Two nations, the Cherokee and Seminole, were refractory.

The Cherokee, after ceding their hunting grounds in the late eighteenth century, fell back on their mountainous lands in northwestern Georgia, guaranteed to them by treaty with the Federal government. It had always been a grievance against the Indians that they would not settle down to civilized ways. The Cherokee, however, built themselves neat houses and good roads, preserved the peace, received Christian missionaries kindly, published books in an alphabet invented by their tribesman Sequoya, adopted a national constitution, and, on the whole, were more civilized in 1830 than the Georgia crackers who coveted their land. In plain derogation of the Cherokee treaty with the United States, the State of Georgia claimed them as her subjects and tenants-at-will. An unfortunate discovery of gold in the Cherokee country about 1829 brought in a rough class of whites. It was a case of federal supremacy against state rights as clear as that of South Carolina; but President Jackson let Georgia have her way. Regulars sent in by President Adams to protect the Indians were withdrawn; and when Chief Justice Marshall decided, on a test case (Worcester *v.* Georgia), that the Cherokee nation occupied a territory within which the laws of Georgia could have no force, Jackson is said to have remarked, 'John Marshall has made his decision. Now let him enforce it.' A portion of the Cherokee then exchanged their lands in Georgia for a section of the Indian Territory, and five million dollars. The rest held out for a few years; but in 1838 they too were driven westward from the lands of their ancestors.

A similar controversy with the Seminoles of Florida had a more tragic solution. A treaty of removal was negotiated with a few chiefs, but repudiated by the greater portion of the tribe, led by its brave chieftain Osceola. Secure in the fastnesses of the everglades, Osceola baffled the United States army for years, and was only captured by treachery when bearing a flag of truce. His people kept up the fight until 1842, when they were almost exterminated; but they cost the United States some twenty million dollars, and fifteen hundred lives.

At the end of Jackson's second term practically all the Eastern Indians had been provided for, west of a 'permanent' barrier that ran from Lake Superior through Wisconsin and Iowa Territories, and thence along the western boundaries of Missouri and Arkansas to the Red river. A chain of military posts, garrisoned by dragoons and mounted riflemen, was established to keep whites and reds apart. Jackson declared in 1835 that the nation was pledged to keep this barrier permanent. All but the southern limb of it was torn up within twenty years.

Foreign affairs in Jackson's administration are a very different story. Jackson entertained the most friendly feelings towards the nation he had thrashed so soundly at New Orleans. There were moments of irritation and even danger over the unadjusted northeastern boundary; but Vaughan and Van Buren smoothed things over. Adams had clashed with Canning in Mexico and South

America; Jackson recalled Poinsett, and forgot the doctrine of Monroe. Adams and Clay had been wont to prefer minor complaints in diplomatic notes; Vaughan and Van Buren settled such matters by conversation, possibly with the fair mediation of Mrs. Eaton. Adams had stood out stiffly for impossible demands in respect of American trade with the West Indies; Van Buren induced the British government to remove all restrictions from American produce and ships in the West Indies, save a moderate duty to maintain imperial preference. That question was settled permanently. In his annual message of 1830 to Congress, Jackson wrote:

> 'It gives me unfeigned pleasure to assure you that this negotiation has been throughout characterized by the most frank and friendly spirit on the part of Great Britain, and concluded in a manner strongly indicative of a sincere desire to cultivate the best relations with the United States. To reciprocate this disposition to the fullest extent of my ability is a duty which I shall deem it a privilege to discharge.'

Jackson's dealings with Great Britain were the more noteworthy in contrast with his handling of a controversy with France. There was a claim for spoliations under the Berlin and Milan decrees, for which the government of Louis Philippe, in a treaty of 1831, agreed to pay twenty-five million francs. The French chambers adjourned without voting the money, and a draft for the first instalment, drawn by the Secretary of the Treasury, was protested.

Jackson at once alarmed American business and offended the French government by ordering the navy to prepare for active service, and recommending Congress to authorize the seizure of French property (5 October 1834). Finally the Chambers voted the money, on the condition that it should not be paid until the United States offered 'satisfactory explanation' of the President's words. Jackson refused to apologize. There matters stood until the close of 1835, when the President disclaimed any intention to insult France, though he would not apologize 'for the statement of truth and the performance of duty.' At this point the British government mediated with success. Wounded honor was satisfied, and the treaty was duly carried out.

Many of Jackson's more conservative supporters had been alienated by his breach with Calhoun, his financial vagaries, and his unfit appointments; but with the people at large he never stood higher than towards the close of his second administration: and his party allowed him to dictate the nomination of Van Buren as his successor. The whigs were as yet so loosely organized that their strategy in 1836 was to vote by local units for 'favorite sons' like Webster and Harrison, hoping thereby to throw the election into the House of Representatives. But Van Buren polled a majority, and was elected President.

The next 4th of March marked the passing of a vital personality, and the founding of a new presidential dynasty. Up Pennsylvania Avenue wound a military procession, escorting a small phaeton (built from the wood of the *Constitution*) drawn by a team of four grays. The old President, feeling his seventy years and emaciated by long illness, sat erect with his fine white head bared to the March sunshine, and the old indomitable spirit flashing this last triumph from his eyes. Beside him, and a head lower, sat Martin Van Buren, with the bland aspect of the cat who had swallowed the canary. Chief Justice Taney administered the inaugural oath to the new President; and there followed a more seemly reception at the White House than that of 1829. Andrew Jackson then returned by easy stages to his beloved Hermitage in Tennessee.

Few Presidents accomplished so much as Old Hickory, and none has made a greater appeal to popular imagination. In his person he proved that the average American of sound character and common sense could win, and was fit to administer, the most powerful elective office in the world. But democracy left the White House with the first Democrat.

XXI

THE NORTHERN STATES

1820–1850

1. *America's Awkward Age*

LEAVING the 'Little Magician' safely seated in the White House, let us turn to the material and moral forces that were pulsing through the United States of his generation. Statesmen and parties had done much to shape those forces, and more could be done with foresight and courage. Without violence they had transferred power to a new class and sectional combination. They had weathered the storm of nullification, and had evolved from the political anarchy of the twenties two national parties, both pledged to preserve the Union. Yet, in spite of their efforts, social and economic forces were pulling North and South apart. Both were progressing, but divergently. Northern society was being transformed by the industrial revolution, by cheap transportation, and by educational, humanitarian, and migratory movements that touched the border slave states very little, and the lower South not at all. Southern society was readjusting itself to the cotton plantation, tilled by slaves. By 1850 two distinct civilizations had been evolved, as different in their material basis, moral ideas, and view of life, as Canada and Mexico of today.

In superficial appearance the Northern States had not changed much since 1790. Harriet Martineau in 1836, like Volney in 1797, was never out of sight of the woods, save in the prairies of Illinois; but there was a good deal less forest. The most striking new feature in the Northern landscape was not the occasional railway or canal, but the factory village, new and bright, built near some waterfall or rapid; containing from two to ten mills plainly built of wood, brick, or stone, as many pretentious mansions of the owners or superintendents, and hundreds of operatives' houses, exactly alike. New York City, as Dickens saw it in 1842, was low, flat, and straggling, enclosed by a hedge of masts; a city without baths or plumbing, lighted by gas and scavenged by pigs. Georgian architecture had given place to the neo-classic. Public buildings were being constructed of gray granite, and the wealthier farmers and country lawyers masked their wooden houses with a classic colonnade and pediment. In the Middle West the white-painted farm house was beginning to predominate; but in new settlements the log cabin and untidy clearing dominated the landscape. American scenery began to be appreciated for its 'romantic' contrasts of mountain with valley, sandy beach or rocky coast with island-studded sea, and its 'stupendous' gorges and cataracts. Barrack-like hotels with long covered verandas were being put up at places like Saratoga Springs, Niagara Falls, Newport, and Nahant, in order to accommodate sight-seers, to provide for the brief vacations of business men, and the vacuous pleasures of their valetudinarian wives. Gimcrack Italian villas and Gothic cottages multiplied near the larger cities in the forties; proclaiming that wealth was being amassed faster than good taste, and portending a new class of city-bred gentleman farmer.

It was America's awkward age. The rather attractive child who had left his parent's roof, the marvellous boy who had proclaimed great truths (or perhaps delusions) to a candid world, was now a gawky hobbledehoy. He had fashioned for himself an excellent pair of skis that he called republicanism and democracy; but like pioneer skiers, he was in the stick-riding stage of development. His outrageous antics in the snow, his hair-breadth escapes, and colossal tosses were viewed with mingled amusement and disgust by devotees of the old-fashioned snow-shoe. Avid of praise, he resented advice; believing that observers were really criticizing him for skiing at all.

Republicanism and democracy did work, and the resources of a new country, exploited by the inhabitants under laws of their own making and breaking, had brought a degree of comfort and security to the common man that he had not known since the days of good Queen Bess. It was not surprising that Americans were full of bounce and bluster, contemptuous of old-world monarchies. Even a frontier bully had some redeeming qualities, if only, as Emerson's grandfather remarked at the village reprobate's funeral, that he was 'useful at fires.' The American had many unpleasant habits, particularly in connection with tobacco; and no manners. Respect and deference were not to be had of him at any price;

but those who addressed him as an equal discovered a natural civility and spontaneous kindness that took the place of manners. Intercourse between man and man was easy and pleasant because there was no assumption of social superiority on the one side, or acknowledged inferiority on the other. It was not so much the freedom, simplicity, and good humor of the people that endeared them to Harriet Martineau, as the ' sweet temper . . . diffused like sunshine over the land,' and due to ' the practice of forbearance requisite in a republic.'

Forbearance the Americans carried to excess in their uncritical attitude towards their own books, customs, institutions, and abuses. Almost every English traveller of the period remarked the patience of Americans under the afflictions of contemporary travel, denounced their deference to majority opinion, and deplored their fear of expressing unpopular theories. This meant that the Americans were becoming less independent and more gregarious; a deference to the opinion of others being a condition of social intercourse on a democratic basis. Yet so complex was the American character that the excess of one quality was balanced by the excess of its reverse. Intolerance appeared in the persecution of unpopular groups such as free negroes, immigrants, abolitionists, and Catholics; and in hot resentment of unfavorable criticism. Yet we should be mistaken in ascribing these qualities wholly to democracy or to immaturity. Spain, as proudly isolated beyond the Pyrenees as America once was beyond the Atlantic, still shows many of the characteristics of America in her awkward age.

Nor was distinction wanting in a country that produced in one generation Calhoun, Webster, Hawthorne, and Irving; and in the next, Emerson, Whitman, Lee, and Lincoln. There was merely a lack of those differences in dress, manner, and mode of living by which Europeans were accustomed to recognize the distinguished man. Clerks dressed almost as well as their employers, factory girls copied the latest Paris fashions. Scarcity of ' help ' and total lack of good servants — since Americans regarded domestic service as a badge of inferiority — made it difficult for the wealthiest Northern merchant to keep up a large establishment. Young married couples in the cities generally lived in hotels or boarding houses. Arthur Hugh Clough, after trying to live at Harvard like an Oxford don, wisely concluded that to enjoy America one must live roughly and simply.

It was America's busy age, or one of them. Eighteenth-century travellers railed at the Americans for their indolence; nineteenth-century travellers criticized their activity. 'Lazy dogs' apparently begat 'dollar chasers.' Each Northern community was an ant-hill, intensely active within, and constantly exchanging ants with the other hills. Every man worked, or at least made a semblance of it; the few who wished to idle, and could afford idleness, fled from the opprobrium of 'loafing' to Europe, where they swelled the chorus of complaint against democratic institutions. Nothing struck English travellers more forcibly than the total want of public parks and pleasure resorts, of games and sports, or of simple pleasures like country walking. The northern American had not learned how to employ leisure; his pleasure came from doing things. Frontiersmen were fond of shooting and fishing, and country boys played games such as hare and hounds, prisoner's base, and rounders. But the average adult American regarded games as a waste of time. Baseball and intercollegiate rowing did not begin until just before the Civil War.

Bad cooking, an atrocious regimen, and lack of outdoor exercise made the 'females' of the period pallid and delicate; and the robust constitutions of frontiersmen were undermined by fevers and agues, particularly in the river bottoms of the Mississippi and its tributaries. 'We was sick every fall regular,' reminisced the mother of President Garfield.

Yet, with all these drawbacks, the Northern and Western States were a land where dreams of youth came true; where the majority were doing what they wished to do, without restraint by class or administration. 'We were hardly conscious of the existence of a government,' wrote a Scandinavian immigrant in New York. The fun of building, inventing, creating, in an atmosphere where one man's success did not mean another's failure, gave American life that peculiar gusto that Walt Whitman has caught in his poetry. Europeans often mistook this joyous activity for avidity: the incidental results for the object. Half the population were engaged in realizing the ambition of frustrated peasant ancestors for a farm of their very own, clear of rent and charges. The other half, having achieved the farm, had tired of it; and like the boy who loses interest in his completed rabbit hutch, had turned to some other occupation, or taken up pioneering again.

2. *Transportation and the Westward Movement*

The westward movement recovered its momentum after the hard times of 1837–40. New Englanders, who a generation before had settled the interior of New York and Ohio, were pressing forward into the smaller prairies of Indiana and Illinois, where the tough sod taxed their strength but repaid it in the end with bountiful crops of grain; where shoulder-high prairie-grass afforded rich pasturage for cattle, and groves of buckeye, oak, walnut, and hickory furnished wood and timber. A favorite objective for Yankee settlement was southern Michigan, a rolling country of 'oak openings,' where stately trees stood well-spaced as in a gentleman's park. As a popular song of the period put it:

> Come all ye Yankee farmers who wish to change your lot,
> Who've spunk enough to travel beyond your native spot,
> And leave behind the village where Pa and Ma do stay,
> Come follow me and settle in Michigania, —
> *Yea, yea, yea, in Michigania!*

Others were hewing farms from the forests of southern Wisconsin, and venturing across the Mississippi into land vacated by Black Hawk's redskins — to Minnesota and

> Ioway, Ioway, that's where the tall corn grows!

Yankees direct from New England, German immigrants, and the old pioneer stock from Pennsylvania and Kentucky were swelling the stream.

Improved transportation was the first condition of this quickening life. Canals, roads, and railways took people west, and connected them with a market when they got there; increased the marketing radius of cities and factory towns; made it worth while to be industrious.

In 1826, when Charles Vaughan took a trip on the newly opened Erie Canal, the country on each side of it between Utica and Rochester had been cleared to a width of not more than one mile. Yet only the next year the governor of Georgia was complaining that wheat from central New York was being sold at Savannah more cheaply than wheat from central Georgia. By bringing the Great Lakes within reach of a metropolitan market, the Erie Canal opened up the hitherto neglected northern regions of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois. At the same time it made New York City the principal gateway to the farther West.

As soon as it became evident that little help could be expected from the Federal government for internal improvements, other states followed New York in constructing canals, or lending their credit to canal corporations. Ohio linked the Great Lakes with the Mississippi valley in 1833–34. Cleveland rose from a petty frontier village to a great lake port by 1850; Cincinnati, at the other end of the state canal system, sent pickled pork down the Ohio and Mississippi by flatboat and steamboat, shipped flour by canal boat to New York, and in 1850 had a population of 115,000 — more than that of New York City in 1815. Three hundred lake vessels arrived at Chicago in 1833, although its population was but 350. Three years later the first cargo of grain thence arrived at Buffalo for transhipment by the Erie Canal. An English traveller pronounced Chicago in 1846 to be a city of 'magnificent intentions'; and predicted that after being burnt down once or twice it might amount to something. In 1856 the city was connected by railway with New York, and by 1860 it was almost as large as Cincinnati, and threatening St. Louis.

The Erie Canal forced Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore into rival activity. Philadelphia was shocked to find that her cheapest route to Pittsburgh was by way of New York City, Albany, Buffalo, and wagon road from Lake Erie. The State of Pennsylvania then put through the great portage system to Pittsburgh, surmounting the Alleghenies at an elevation of 2,300 feet by a series of inclined planes, up which canal boats or railroad cars were hauled by stationary steam-engines. Pennsylvania had almost a thousand miles of canals in operation by 1840; in twenty years' time the railways had rendered most of them unprofitable.

Baltimore's plan for cheap transit to the West was the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. The first spadeful was turned in 1828 by the last surviving signer of the Declaration of Independence, Charles Carroll; but the project encountered unexpected difficulties, and did not reach the Ohio river until 1833. American railroads were not created to connect important cities, but to increase the distributing radius of individual cities, around which they were disposed like sticks on a fan, each system having its own gauge, lest rivals use the line. Railways were regarded merely as an improved sort of road, and one of their chief competitors down to 1850 was the plank road — a familiar feature of Civil War maps — constructed by turnpike companies as a cheap substitute for macadam. Although very few canals were constructed in the forties, while railway mileage tripled, the former kept the better part of the freight traffic. In the early fifties the completion of the Hudson River Railroad from New York to Albany, where it was connected with the New York Central for Buffalo, and of the Pennsylvania Railroad from Philadelphia to Pittsburgh, caused such an astounding transfer of freight from canals to railroads, particularly in the winter season, as to prove the superiority of rail for long-distance haulage, and to suggest that it was the proper instrument for penetrating the continent.

The first locomotives used in the United States were purchased at the Stephenson works in England, and iron rails were largely imported from England until the Civil War. But the Americans began at once experimenting. The swivel or bogie truck was soon invented, as were the open one-class coach and sleeping car. In safety appliances, however, the American railroads were very backward. Collisions were frequent, strap-iron rails curled up over the wheels, and the wood-burning locomotives belched forth showers of sparks that ignited the forests, as well as the passengers' clothes.

3. *The Packet-Ship and Immigration*

America was the first country to make practical use of the steamboat, but lagged behind England in applying steam to the deep-sea merchant marine. The wooden paddle-wheel steamboat was an ideal type for rivers, or for protected tidal waters like Long Island sound and Chesapeake bay; but the ocean steamer was born in the tempestuous waters about the British Isles. American shipbuilders concentrated their skill and energy on sailing vessels. From 1817 to 1849 the direct carrying trade between England and the United States was on the same level of competition, so far as the laws of the two countries could effect it; and until 1830 British bottoms had the exclusive privilege of the West Indies' triangular trade. Yet by 1824 the freight and passenger traffic from Liverpool to New York and Boston had been captured by the Americans. 'The reason will be evident to any one who will walk through the docks at Liverpool,' wrote an English traveller, W. N. Blane, in 1824. 'He will see the American ships, long, sharp built, beautifully painted and rigged, and remarkable for their fine appearance and white canvas. He will see the English vessels, short, round and dirty, resembling great black tubs.' The former were the flash packets of the American marine, the famous Swallow Tail and Black Ball liners, that were driven by their dandy captains, bucko mates, and Liverpool Irish crews across the Western Ocean, winter and summer, blow high blow low, in little more than half the average time taken by British vessels. It was a proud seaman in those days who earned the right to sing:

I served my time in the Black Ball Line,
To me way-aye-aye-hurrah!
In the Black Ball Line I served my time,
Hurrah for the Black Ball Line!

A leading motive for the repeal of the old Navigation Act in 1849 was the desire of British merchants to employ the superior American vessels. When the East India Company lost its monopoly of the China trade in 1834, the Americans still held their own against private British competitors; and in 1845 a New York shipyard produced the clipper ship *Rainbow,* first of a type carried to perfection in the next decade.

Another favorite chanty of the square-rigger days hints at the connection between packet-ships, railroads, and immigration:

In eighteen hundred and forty-three
I sailed away across the sea,
I sailed away to Amerikee
To work upon the railway,
I'm weary of the railway,
O! poor Paddy works upon the railway.

An era of canal and railway construction created a demand for cheap labor, and made it easier to reach the cheap western lands. England, Ireland, and Germany responded. During the decade of the twenties, less than ten thousand immigrants entered annually. Between 1830 and 1840 half a million immigrants (of which 44 per cent were Irish, 30 per cent German, and 15 per cent English) entered the United States from Europe, and in the forties over one million and a half, of which 49 per cent were Irish, and the others in the same proportion. In 1850 the total population of the United States, 23 million, included almost one million persons of Irish birth, three-quarters of them in the northern Atlantic states; and over half a million of German birth, almost equally divided between those states and the West.

Liverpool, Havre, and Hamburg were the principal ports of embarkation. European governments attempted to mitigate the hardships of the passage by requiring a minimum of space and rations, and decent treatment on the emigrant ships; but without much success. Seldom was a westward passage of the Atlantic made under a month. Neither the Federal nor the state governments made any effort to protect the immigrant on his arrival. Many arrived penniless, having exhausted their savings on the journey; and those who did not, often fell a prey to water-front sharpers. But it must be admitted that as soon as they recovered their shore legs, the immigrants were quite able to defend themselvs. As early as 1835 we hear of Irishmen driving the whigs from the polls in New York, and putting the mayor and sheriff's posse to flight with showers of 'Irish confetti.' Despite the dark pictures of suffering and homesickness painted by the *Quarterly Review* and Charles Dickens, the immigrants prospered and sent for their friends.

All but a small fraction of the new-comers arrived in the Northern ports, and remained in the Northern states. Irish immigration reached its peak just after the great famine of 1846. Although mostly country folk, the Irish were tired of farming, and congregated in the cities, where thousands of the men were recruited for construction work, and the women for domestic service. Peasant also was a majority of the Germans, but not in like degree; among them were thousands of artisans, a sprinkling of intellectuals, and political refugees from the revolutions of 1830 and 1848, such as Carl Schurz. German colonies were formed in the cities, especially New York, Baltimore, Cincinnati, and St. Louis; and Milwaukee was a German town by 1850. But the greater number bought western land as soon as they could earn the wherewithal, especially in Wisconsin and Missouri, which Friedrich Münch hoped to make a new Germany for exiled liberals. The sloop *Restaurationen* sailed from Stavanger in 1825 with fifty-three Scandinavian pilgrims who settled in western New York, precursors of many thousands who found pine forests and lakes in Wisconsin and Minnesota similar to those of their native land.

Practically all the immigrants of the period 1820–50 belonged to the northern European races. They quickly became citizens and Jackson Democrats, and contributed greatly to the wealth and progress of their adopted country. Yet the immigrants of that era encountered as bitter opposition as the South Europeans and Asiatics of our own day. Street fights between natives and foreigners were a common occurrence; Catholic convents and churches, and German Turnverein headquarters were sometimes attacked and destroyed. In part the antagonism was religious, since practically all the Irish and many of the Germans were Roman Catholics. In part it was due to emigration assisted by English and Irish authorities, who in order to relieve the rates dumped thousands of paupers into the United States. Most of them were paupers only in a technical sense, who wanted only an opportunity to work; but many became a public charge the moment they landed. For the most part, however, the hatred of immigrants was economic in motive. They competed with mechanics who were trying to protect their standard of living by labor unions. Natives refused to work with the newcomers, who were thus forced into manual labor, whatever their education. ‘ No Irish need apply ’ was a common sign on workshops and counting-rooms, but not on army recruiting offices.

4. *City and Factory*

These new methods and instruments of transportation not only helped to people the North and West, but by extending the domestic market hastened the industrialization of the East, threatened the self-sufficing farm, and brought farmers' boys into urban communities. Between 1820 and 1850 the combined population of New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Boston increased from 343,000 to 1,162,000.[1] In the latter decade, while the population of

[1] POPULATION OF PRINCIPAL CITIES

	1790	1800	1810	1820	1830	1840	1850
Boston . . .	18,038	24,937	33,250	43,298	61,392	93,383	136,881
New York . .	33,131	60,489	96,373	123,706	202,589	312,710	515,547
Philadelphia .	42,520	69,403	91,874	112,772	161,410	220,423	340,045
Baltimore . .	13,503	26,114	35,583	62,738	80,825	102,313	169,054
Charleston . .	16,359	20,473	24,711	24,780	30,289	29,261	42,985
New Orleans .	.....	.....	17,242	27,176	46,310	102,193	116,375

the United States increased 36 per cent, that of the towns and cities of 8,000 or more increased 90 per cent. Measured by numbers the urban movement was more important than westward migration; and its effect on the American character was the more lasting.

The factory system, as we have seen, became firmly established as a result of the War of 1812. Textile machinery replaced foreign importations and household manufacture, instead of, as in England, destroying a domestic industry; consequently the factory was introduced without friction. By 1840 there were twelve hundred cotton factories in the United States, operating two and a quarter million spindles, two-thirds of them in New England. Ring or frame spinning had been invented, power looms were being manufactured in large numbers, and even exported.

Francis C. Lowell, inventor of the first American power loom, was a man of social vision. At New Lanark he learned that it was possible to have factories without a degraded labor force. Farmers' daughters were attracted to Waltham by relatively high wages, and the scruples of their pious parents were overcome by a provision of strictly chaperoned boarding houses. The same maternal system was extended to the city of Lowell, which was founded by Boston capitalists in 1822, and to other mill towns on the Merrimac river. For a generation the Lowell factory girls, with their neat dresses, correct deportment, and literary weekly, were a wonder of America; but not typical of America. The usual effect of the factory system was simply to transfer the scene of a family's labor from the home to the factory; but on account of the wider opportunities in a new country, no permanent proletariat was created. Factory girls generally graduated from the mills in three or four years, and child laborers elsewhere usually managed to find some other occupation by the time they reached their majority.

Woollen manufactures developed more slowly, and although protected by even higher tariff schedules than those of cotton, were less successful in capturing the domestic market. Power looms and spinning-jennies were generally adopted in the twenties, and in 1840 Crompton invented a power loom for fancy woollens, just in time to produce the loud checked cassimeres favored by the beaux of the forties. Lawrence, a woollen counterpart to Lowell, was established on the same river in 1845. Already there were over fifteen hundred woollen mills in the Northern states, most of them small individually owned establishments with a few sets of machinery, employing country people of the neighborhood, and producing blankets, flannels, or satinet. Few attempts to compete with English worsteds were made before 1860.

As a result of this factory development, which continued to advance independently of tariff fluctuations, spinning and weaving in the home had almost disappeared by the Civil War, and factory-made goods had reached all but the remoter parts of the West. The picturesque linsey, fur, and buckskin of the pioneer, and the homespun of his wife, were replaced by factory cottons and woollens, made up in the clothing shops of the eastern cities.

In England the industrial revolution turned largely on coal and iron; but it was not so in the United States. Textile and other mills were operated largely by water power, and the iron industry developed very slowly. Suitable coal for cokeing was not found east of the Appalachians, but wood for making charcoal was abundant. Pennsylvania ironmasters were more adept in obtaining tariff protection against English iron than in improving their own methods of production. Cort's puddling process, invented in 1783, was not introduced in America until 1830, and then on a small scale. Even Pittsburgh used charcoal for smelting previous to 1840, rather than the bituminous coal which was plentiful in the neighborhood. And Pittsburgh, although it commanded the iron market of the Mississippi valley, could not sell its productions in the industrialized eastern states until it obtained through railroad connection with Philadelphia.

Eastern Pennsylvania was the principal coal- and iron-producing region until 1860. Here anthracite coal and iron were found in abundance, and a rather inferior method of smelting the one by the other was adopted about 1836. The production of pig-iron increased from 54,000 tons in 1810 to 564,000 tons in 1850; but by that time Great Britain's production was almost three million tons, and the United States was importing thence iron, steel, and the manufactures thereof to almost twice the value of its own product. Little steel was produced in America before 1870, and the engineering trades were undeveloped. Typical American iron manufactures of the period were nails, iron piping, and cast-iron air-tight stoves, which caused travellers as early as 1830 to complain of over-heated American houses.

Textiles and iron do not exhaust the list of factory industries in the United States at this time, nor had mass production become



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WISCONSIN TERRITORY
MICHIGAN
IOWA TERRITORY
Green Bay
Prairie du Chien
Madison
Milwaukee
Dubuque
Galena
Lansing
Detroit
Ann Arbor
Ypsilanti
Iowa City
Davenport
Chicago
Toledo
ILLINOIS
Nauvoo
Keokuk
Sandusky
OHIO
St. Joseph
Hannibal
Springfield
INDIANA
Indianapolis
Columbus
Dayton
Steubenville
Independence
St. Charles
Chillicothe
Cincinnati
Jefferson City
St. Louis
Vincennes
Louisville
New Harmony
Lexington
MISSOURI
Shawneetown
KENTUCKY
Bowling Green
Nashville
TENNESSEE
Knoxville
Memphis
Little Rock
ARKANSAS
Huntsville
Chattanooga
Atlanta
Columbus
Tuscaloosa
Augusta
Vicksburg
Jackson
LOUISIANA
MISSISSIPPI
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
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

THE SETTLED REGION
of the
UNITED STATES
1840

Miles
0
50
100
150
200
Under 2 inhabitants per sq. mile
From 2 to 18 inhabitants per sq. mile
" 18 to 45 " " " "
45 and more " " " "
Population less than 8,000
" 8,000 to 10,000
" 20,000 to 47,000
" over 100,000
MAINE
N. HAMP.
VERMONT
MASS.
CONN.
R.I.
NEW YORK
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW JERSEY
MARYLD.
DEL.
VIRGINIA
CAROLINA
CAROLINA
Eastport
Bangor
Augusta
Bath
Portland
Biddeford & Saco
Portsmouth
Newburyport
Gloucester
Lynn & Salem
Boston
Taunton
Nantucket
New Bedford
Newport
Providence
Lowell
Camb.
Worc.
Manchester
Springfield
Hartford
New Haven
Troy
Albany
Burlington
Saratoga
Utica
Syracuse
Auburn
Rochester
Lockport
Buffalo
Ithaca
Elmira
Erie
Poughkeepsie
Newburgh
New York
Brooklyn
Newark
Wilkesbarre
Lewistown
Reading
Harrisburg
Carlisle
Lancaster
Philadelphia
Wilmington
Dover
Alleghany
Pittsburg
Wheeling
Cleveland
Winchester
Baltimore
Annapolis
Washington
Alexandria
Staunton
Richmond
Lynchburg
Petersburg
Norfolk
Portsmouth
Danville
Raleigh
Fayetteville
Newbern
Wilmington
Columbia
Charleston
Savannah
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W. T. Wright

a necessary condition of American industrial success. 'Their washing machines, refrigerators, rocking-chairs, all articles made of India rubber, are admirable,' wrote a travelling Englishwoman in 1846. Charles Goodyear had invented the vulcanization of rubber in 1839. Connecticut, in particular, was famous for small factories and workshops where specialized articles were produced by native ingenuity. The Colt revolving pistol and Winchester rifle were the result of Eli Whitney's invention of interchangeable parts for firearms. Connecticut tinware and wooden clocks were carried by Yankee pedlars far and wide. One of the most popular exhibits at the Crystal Palace in 1851 was the array of sewing machines and other 'Yankee notions.'

Of the many American industries that were still in the domestic stage at this period, the most important was shoemaking, for which no machine process of any importance was invented until 1850. In New England it was a winter occupation of farmers and fishermen, who, when the harvest was gathered, or the vessel hauled out for the winter, formed a 'crew' to make boots and shoes in a neighborhood workshop, from stock put out by some local merchant. Every man was master of his own time, and had something to fall back on when demand slackened; there was no clatter of machinery to drown discussion. A boy was often hired to read to the workers. It was said that 'every Lynn shoemaker was fit to be an United States Senator'; and one Henry Wilson, the 'cordwainer of Natick' became Vice-President. The shoemakers of New York and Philadelphia, more hard-pressed than their Yankee brethren by the capitalist and the immigrant, were pioneers in the first political labor movement in America.

XXII

LABOR, EDUCATION, AND EMANCIPATION

1825–1850

1. *The first American Labor Party*

ACTIVITY, growth, and expansion are only one side of American social history in this period. Playing in and out of the material forces, like summer lightning in heavy clouds, were spiritual currents, intellectual sparks, thunderbolts of radicalism: portents of that clear flame of emancipation that split the American firmament, and set its very stars a-rocking.

Most of them came from Europe, and their repercussion was felt in Europe. Almost every event in the early labor history of America followed similar occurrences in the British Isles. This may have been due to the same causes producing like effects: the industrial revolution came to the Northern states a generation later than to England. But when we reflect that thousands of skilled artisans were emigrating to the United States, that religious bodies like the Friends kept up a constant intercommunication, and that reformers like Robert Owen were flitting to and fro, it is difficult to believe that there was no conscious imitation. Conversely, English radicals of such different types as William Cobbett, Major Cartwright, Gibbon Wakefield, and Joseph Sturge, were heartened and inspired by American example; the six points of the People's Charter might have been selected from the established points of American democracy. Some day, it is to be hoped, this cultural field of Anglo-American relations may be as thoroughly explored as the diplomatic; and with more detachment.

The first labor movement in America, as in England, was initiated by urban handicraftsmen rather than factory operatives; but it took a different direction. Merchant-capitalists, in order to exploit the new western markets that the canals were opening up, were organizing trades, such as tailoring and shoemaking, on a larger scale, with a system of long credits, division of labor, and wholesale marketing, that drove small establishments out of business. The old-time master workman, who employed a few journeymen and apprentices, was degraded to a foreman or boss under an entrepreneur. Minute specialization broke down the apprentice system. With the introduction of gas in the cities, the old working hours of sun to sun were lengthened in the winter, making a twelve-hour day the year round.

Unions already existed in many of the handicrafts, but they had not yet received legal recognition; and the ranks of labor were so constantly diluted by immigrants and women[1] that the artisans were alarmed over their declining status. This was an old story in England; but the American workman had the vote. Manhood suffrage was established in every Northern state save Rhode Island by 1825. Three years later a group of Philadelphia artisans organized the Workingmen's Party. The platform of this pioneer labor party had nothing to do with wages, everything to do with status: free public education, mechanics' lien laws to protect wage-earners from rascally contractors, and the abolition of imprisonment for debt. This last was a crying evil. Five-sixths of the prisoners in New England and the Middle States were confined for debt, the majority of them for sums under twenty dollars.

There have always been two great obstacles to political labor parties in the United States: social democracy and federal government. Opportunity for social betterment prevented the worker from becoming class-conscious. Westward pioneering was in the back of his mind in 1825, as is the new car today. The federal form of government made it both impossible and useless for the workers to gain control of a congress that had no power to enact social legislation. It was to the state governments that labor looked for the laws they wanted. Yet no party organized for purely state purposes could hope to survive as an independent unit, since 'voting the straight ticket' — for the same party in national, state, and municipal elections — was becoming a fixed habit.

The most that a labor party could do was to wage a vigorous state campaign, and acquire enough strength to give it bargaining power with the Democratic Party, whose hostility to banks made a point of contact. The Workingmen's Party, with its moderate program of social betterment, was making fast progress in the cities of Pennsylvania and New York, when it fell into the hands of malpractitioners.

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[1] Although women were not generally employed in shops or in offices until after the Civil War, they were to be found in over a hundred different occupations in 1835, and had even attained trades such as printing, from which the unions later excluded them.

Robert Owen was the earliest foreign radical who imagined that because America had achieved political liberty, she would be receptive to every form of libertarianism; who came to reform, and remained to scold. In 1825 he purchased a German Rappite settlement at New Harmony, Indiana, and experimented in a form of communism. His son Robert Dale Owen, a product of Van Fellensburg's famous school at Hofwyl, took it over. In two years' time New Harmony had become new discord, and Robert Dale Owen joined forces with Frances Wright (Madame D'Arusmont), a vigorous, short-haired Scotchwoman who had founded a community in Tennessee for the purpose of emancipating slaves. When that, too, came to an untimely end, Miss Wright became a lecture-platform apostle of woman's rights, free inquiry in religion, free marital union, birth control, and a system which she called 'National, Rational, Republican Education, Free for All at the Expense of All, Conducted under the Guardianship of the State,' apart from the contaminating influence of parents.

These 'Free Enquirers' had attracted much unfavorable attention from the Northern press in 1829, when the artisans of New York City, at the end of a hard winter of unemployment, organized a Workingmen's Party for that state. Grateful for intellectual leadership, they eagerly accepted the aid of George Henry Evans, a young editor imbued with the agrarian ideas of Thomas Spence, and recently arrived from England. Evans was also an ardent admirer of Owen and Miss Wright, who promptly joined the workingmen in the hope of capturing their support for 'National, Rational Education.' To the consternation of conservatives, the 'Workies' polled thirty per cent of the total New York City vote in the autumn election. A press campaign at once began, hortatory towards the workingmen, denunciatory towards Miss Wright, the 'bold blasphemer and voluptuous preacher of licentiousness.' The printers' union repudiated this 'band of choice spirits of foreign origin,' and led a secession from the party, which promptly broke up. Such was American labor's first and typical experience with intellectuals. Small groups of the party then joined the Democrats, who rewarded them by obtaining a mechanics' lien law, and the abolition of imprisonment for debt, in New York State; and these reforms led the way to similar laws in other states.

2. *Trade Unionism*

In 1833, when a period of prosperity and increasing costs began, the American labor movement adopted contemporary British methods. Politics were abandoned in favor of trade organization, the closed shop, and the strike. Unionization was pursued so rapidly and widely as to include even seamstresses and cloak-makers. Trades' unions — federations of all the organized trades in a single community — were formed in twelve Northern cities; and in 1837 delegates from these cities organized a National Trades' Union. Strikes became frequent, and on several occasions included not only the organized workers but the unskilled laborers of an entire city. The ten-hour day was established in several cities for municipal employees, and in the navy yards in 1836 by order of President Jackson. Wages were generally improved, and conditions bettered. Harriet Martineau, visiting the Northern States at that time, took note of the well-nourished and intelligent 'dandy mechanic.'

Then came the panic of 1837, bringing unemployment and misery to the landless artisans. Wages fell thirty to fifty per cent, union funds were depleted, federations collapsed, and the 'dandy mechanics' were glad to sell their 'gay watch guards and glossy hats' for a bit of bread. Iron years followed, with long hours and lean wages, of which the workers were often mulcted by payment in kind; years of sporadic, desperate strikes. The Lowell factory girls, speeded up by improved machinery, petitioned the Massachusetts legislature in vain to reduce their twelve-hour day to ten. Immigrants took their places, and by 1840 these show workers of America with their white gowns and literary journal, were no longer found in the cotton mills.

3. *A Contest of Utopias*

All this convinced the American artisan, as the panic of 1825 had taught his English brother, that mere combination was futile at a moment of widespread trade depression. He also began to question the value of his vote. Jacksonian Democracy had smashed the monster Bank, but it could not supply bread and butter. As they were searching for the root of the trouble, American laborers were approached by eager, earnest idealists, each with his peculiar vision of a new world in which men and women might lead free and happy lives, neither exploiting nor being exploited. So instead of trying to assimilate and humanize this new industrial order, both workers and thinkers dissipated their energy in efforts to escape it.

Almost every known panacea was applied, with meagre or negative results. Josiah Warren, the first American anarchist, devised a system of 'time stores' and 'labor notes,' inspired by the Owenite labor bazaars. During the period of unemployment many of the unions went in for producers' co-operation, others began consumers' co-operation about 1840; and from the mistakes and failures of these early efforts the later co-operative movement has learned much. Robert Owen returned in 1845, to summon a 'World Convention to Emancipate the Human Race from Ignorance, Poverty, Division, Sin, and Misery.' The typical experiment of this period was some sort of association, or community. Emerson wrote Carlyle that any one you met in the street might produce a new community project from his waistcoat pocket. Brook Farm, the transcendentalist community so happily described in Hawthorne's *Blithedale Romance,* became one of forty Fourierite 'phalanxes' in the Northern States. Cabot's *Voyage en Icarie* inspired several others, and there were many 'small, sour and fierce schemes,' one of which, the Mormon Church, alone survived. Like New Harmony, the associations of the forties solved nothing; but they gave friendship and creative joy to thousands of generous and sanguine souls, before acquisitive society sucked them back into its vortex.

Horace Greeley kept the columns of the New York *Tribune* hospitable to all these movements; but his best advice to the worker was: 'Go West, young man, go West!' Here was a point of contact with national politics. Public land at $200 the quarter-section was not for those who needed it most, but for those who had the price, or for squatters who defied all comers to dislodge them. George Henry Evans and Horace Greeley insisted that every man had the same natural right to a bit of land, as to air and sunlight. 'Equality, inalienability, indivisibility' were Evans's three points: a free homestead from the public domain to every settler; limitation of individual holdings; no alienation of the homestead, voluntary or otherwise. 'Vote yourself a farm' was his slogan.

The first free homestead bill was introduced in Congress in 1846 by Andrew Johnson, of whom we shall hear more. Northern Whigs and Southern Democrats combined to defeat it. In 1851 a *lex agraria,* limiting inheritance of land to 320 acres, passed a second reading in the Wisconsin legislature. But the average Western farmer and lawyer was a land speculator by nature. A ' very large and respectable meeting ' at Milwaukee protested against this ' Licinian law, repudiated by Rome over 2,000 years ago.' It would ' blast the fair name ' of that ' free State, where no privileged class exists, where . . . no system of agricultural tenancy can ever find its way.' The bill did not pass. In 1920, 43 per cent of the farmers in Illinois and Nebraska were tenants.

Yet, for all the paucity of results, the labor movement in America, whether political, collectivist, or revolutionary, received more public sympathy than in England, and met with less violence. If American judges found criminal conspiracy in trade union activities, their sentences were in the form of fines that were easily paid by labor sympathizers. And Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts, in the memorable case of Commonwealth *v.* Hunt (1842), declared that a trade union was a lawful organization, the members of which were not collectively responsible for illegal acts committed by individuals; and that a strike for the closed shop was legal.[2] Jefferson had so firmly grounded his ideals of a simple agrarian society that very many Americans still regarded as alien and hideous the new industrial order, which their descendants have come to reverence as an American institution. Yet, by the same set of ideas, the American of 1840 could not use government as an instrument for social purposes. He permitted industrialism to cut deeper even than in England. Farmers could not see why factory operatives should work shorter hours than themselves; and perhaps feared that their own ' hired men ' would demand the ten-hour day. The only factory acts passed by the states before the Civil War related to the hours of child labor, and were inspired largely by a desire to give all children an opportunity for education. The first state provision for factory inspection came in 1867.

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[2] His first point became permanently established in American law: the principle of his second has been cut into by many legal decisions since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment.

4. *Popular Education*

The most tangible social gain during this period of ferment was in education. Since the War of Independence education had been left largely to private initiative and benevolence. Secondary academies and colleges had been founded, and in this the South was ahead of the North. But almost all these institutions charged fees. Elementary education, in which America now excels, was then the most neglected branch. Most of the Northern states had some sort of public primary school system, but only in New England was it free and open to all. In some instances a child had to be taught his letters before he was admitted to one of these schools, and in others only those pleading poverty were exempted from fees. In addition the Quakers and other philanthropic bodies maintained charity schools for the poor. Consequently a stigma was attached to free schools. In New York City, around 1820, nearly half the children went uneducated because their parents were too poor to pay fees, and too proud to accept charity.

Opposition to free public education came from people of property, who thought it intolerable that they should be taxed to support common schools to which they would not dream of sending their children. To this argument the poor replied with votes, and reformers with the tempting argument that education was insurance against radicalism. New York City in 1832, and Philadelphia in 1836, established elementary public schools free from the taint of charity; and by 1850 primary education was within the reach of almost every white child in the more settled Northern states.

In the newer states, beginning with Ohio, frontier poverty was eked out by school funds, formed from the proceeds of public land granted by the Federal government. Some of these funds were mismanaged or inadequate; and the older pioneers of the Kentucky breed had a positive prejudice against book-learning. As an excellent couple of this sort remarked to a Yankee pioneer in Illinois, they ' didn't think folks was any better off for reading, an' books cost a heap and took a power of time. 'Twant so bad for men to read, for there was a heap of time when they couldn't work out and could jest set by the fire; and if a man had books and keered to read he mought; but women had no business to hurtle away their time, 'case they could allus find something to do, and there had been a heap of trouble in old Kaintuck with some rich men's gals that had learned to write.' Indiana was leavened by New Harmony. Robert Dale Owen, who remained in the state, helped to convert the Hoosier population to free schools; and established free travelling libraries, boxes of good books which made the rounds of the villages until read into shreds. Perhaps that is why Indiana, alone of the Middle Western states, produced a native literature before the end of the nineteenth century.

In the New England States the first problem was to make efficient the colonial system of free elementary schools, maintained by the townships, and taught by birch-wielding pedagogues or college students in their vacations. Horace Mann, a gifted politician who preferred the uphill work of reform to the applause of the senate, sought efficient methods in Europe, and found them in Germany. Victor Cousin's report on Prussian education (1833) was translated and widely read in the United States, and its principles adapted to American needs, when Horace Mann became chairman of the Massachusetts Board of Education. He and his able coadjutors combined the enthusiasm of Owen with an intellectual balance that brought permanent results. Under Mann's influence the first American normal school for training teachers was established in 1839. After a struggle with the older teachers, who insisted that mental discipline would be lost if studies were made interesting, the elementary school ceased to be a place of terror. Massachusetts also set the example in free public high schools; but until after the Civil War the majority of American pupils following a secondary course were in the endowed academies.

In higher education this period saw the multiplication of small denominational colleges — there were over 150 of them in existence in 1840 — and the transformation of the older colleges into universities. This process was effected by adding new faculties of law, medicine, theology, and science to the original faculty of arts and letters. Ticknor and other Harvard men who followed postgraduate studies in Germany induced their mother university to make the course for the bachelor's degree more flexible and varied, to establish professorial chairs, and to make a greater use of lectures. Although they charged tuition fees, American colleges were yet so faithful to the puritan ideal of plain living, that any poor lad of parts could earn his way through to a degree. Michigan established the first of the free state universities in 1837, and the University of Wisconsin was founded at Madison in 1848, on a wilderness site crossed by Black Hawk's warriors only fourteen years before. Oberlin College, Ohio, opened its doors to women as well as men in 1833, and Mary Lyon established the Mount Holyoke Female Seminary, in 1836; but higher education for women was unusual before 1880.

Adults were not neglected in this educational awakening. In all the cities and larger towns mechanics' institutes provided vocational courses and night schools. Free public libraries were very generally established. In towns, and even villages, the Lyceums offered popular lectures, scientific demonstrations, debates, and entertainments. Under their auspices the Northern American acquired his astounding capacity for attending lectures. The reading habit was greatly aided by mechanical improvements in printing, which made possible the penny press, one-sixth the usual price of the usual daily paper. The New York *Tribune,* Baltimore *Sun,* and Philadelphia *Ledger,* started as penny newspapers in the forties. They were by no means rowdy sheets like the scandalous New York *Herald,* but journals of information, including pirated English novels in serial form; and the *Tribune,* under Horace Greeley's editorship, became a liberal power of the first magnitude.

By 1850, then, there had been formulated, and to some extent established, the basic principles of American education today: (1) that free public primary and secondary schools should be available for all children; (2) that teachers should be given professional training; (3) that all children should attend school up to a certain age, but not necessarily the free public school, religious and other bodies having complete liberty to establish their own educational systems, at their own cost. Huxley's test of a national system, 'a great educational ladder with one end in the gutter, and the other in the university,' was satisfied. Quality had not been sacrificed to quantity: the public elementary schools of 1850 were generally superior to the private schools of 1820. Yet these reforms were in method and expansion rather than in spirit. Richard Price's exhortation to the American schoolmasters of 1785, to 'teach *how* to think rather than *what* to think,' was frankly ignored in the numerous acedemies and colleges under sectarian control, and imperfectly apprehended in the public schools and universities, unless by teachers who had received a spiritual rebirth from transcendentalism.

5. *Transcendentalism and Literature*

Just as the Virginia galaxy of political theorists was flickering to a close, the same revolutionary spirit that inspired them lighted a new constellation in a higher latitude. The year 1836, when Emerson published his *Essay on Nature,* may be taken as the focus of a period in American thought corresponding to 1776 in American politics.

Transcendentalism is the name generally given to this manifestation of the revolutionary spirit in the Northern States between 1820 and 1860. It may be defined as an intellectual overtone to democracy, a belief in the divinity of human nature. The new spirit appeared in some men as intense individualism, in others as a passionate sympathy for the poor and oppressed. It gave to Hawthorne his deep perception of the beauty and the tragedy of life, to Walt Whitman his robust joy in living. Transcendentalism touched the labor movement on its revolutionary side, the anti-slavery movement on its positive side; it inspired the majority of American men of letters who flourished between 1820 and 1860; and almost every aspect of it may be found in Emerson, who perfectly embodied the essential spirit, a belief in the soul's inherent power to grasp the truth. Historically speaking, transcendentalism was a movement to liberate America spiritually, as independence and democracy had liberated her politically; an attempt to make Americans worthy of their independence, and elevate them to a new stature among the mortals.

It may have been a mere accident that this outburst of intellectual activity occurred largely within a fifty-mile radius of Boston, during a single generation. Transcendentalism has been called the inevitable flowering of the puritan spirit; but puritanism does not necessarily bear blossoms, and the fruit thereof is often gnarled and bitter. In New England, however, the soil was conserved by a bed-rock of character, mellowed by two centuries of cultivation, and prepared by Unitarianism. The puritan ministers in and about Boston had by 1800 almost converted their congregations to a more liberal faith than Calvinism, when Boston Federalism checked the flow of sap, fearful lest it feed flowers of Jacobin red. There was just time for a gorgeous show of blossom and a harvest of wine-red fruit, between this late frost and the early autumn blight of industrialism.

Unitarianism and her sister Universalism took a great weight off the soul of New England. Longfellow's 'Psalm of Life' which seems so trite nowadays,

Life is real! life is earnest!
And the grave is not its goal;
Dust thou art, to dust returnest,
Was not spoken of the soul.

came as a message of hope to thousands of young people reared in the fear of everlasting damnation. Yet something was lacking in mere Unitarianism. A faith in the essential goodness of human nature might be a theological counterpart to democracy; but it failed to supply the note of mysticism that democrats no less than aristocrats seek in religion.

The historical function of Unitarianism in America was to pave the way for transcendentalism, and to liberate the minds of the well-to-do; to provide a church for rationalists. That church has been prolific in men of letters and reformers. But its direct influence did not go wide of the New England settlements, or deep even within them. Holmes's 'One-Hoss Shay' was a symbol of the sudden crumbling of Calvinism; but Calvinism collapsed only in eastern Massachusetts. Congregationalists, Presbyterians, Methodists, and Baptists howled down the Unitarians as atheists, and maintained their hold on the masses. The immigrants, with some notable exceptions among the Germans, remained loyal to Catholicism or to other old-country faiths, and the Episcopal churches were of social value largely as a refuge. Harvard fell into Unitarian hands as early as 1806; but Yale clung to the five points of Calvinism, and some of the little western offshoots of Yale became centers of obscurantism, like the Presbyterian colleges of the South. Even at Harvard the odor of brimstone lingered.

Emerson in 1832, at the age of twenty-nine, laid down his pastoral office in the Unitarian church because it no longer interested him. In his next four years of reading and travel, he found God again in nature; and settled down as 'lay preacher to the world' in the placid village of Concord, typical of New England in that it contained a small group of sanguine, wide-reading men and women, exceptional in harboring during one generation Emerson, Hawthorne, Thoreau, and the Alcotts.

If Jefferson was the prophet of democracy, Emerson was its high priest. Both believed ardently in the perfectibility of mankind; but Emerson knew what Jefferson never learned, that free institutions would not liberate men who were not themselves free. His task was to induce Americans to cleanse their minds of hatred and prejudice, to make them think out the consequences of democracy instead of merely repeating its catchwords, and to seek the same eminence in spirit that they had reached in prosperity. He founded no cult and gathered no disciples, because what he said did not come from any wish to bring men to himself, but to themselves.

Of the Concord group, Henry Thoreau was the best classical scholar, and the most independent of classical modes of thought. Concord for him was not only a Selborne, but a microcosm; and his revolt was not against a dying church, but against a society so confident and vigorous that it could afford to ignore him. His genius was little appreciated in his own country until our own times, when he would not be allowed to enter as an immigrant. Hawthorne of Salem, a mere sojourner in Concord, wrote tragedies of New England life that penetrate to the core of all human life.

In these three men, Emerson, Thoreau, and Hawthorne, and in Herman Melville, the New England that had slowly matured since the seventeenth century justified herself. Immigration then diluted and industrialism dissolved a society that had made such men possible. New England ceased to be a state of mind, and became a mere group of states.

The New England intellectuals had more to say than their New York predecessors, such as Irving and Cooper; but they also conveyed it in traditional forms. 'We all lean on England,' wrote Emerson. Not until 1851 did a distinctive American literature, original both in form and content, emerge with *Moby Dick*. Four years later, with Emerson's blessing, *Leaves of Grass* began to sprout. Walt Whitman, half Yankee, half New York Dutch, had grown up outside the ambit of New England respectability, in direct and intimate contact with the crude realities of American life. In the 'barbaric yawp' that has so deeply influenced the poetry of today, Walt Whitman sang the common American and his life in seaport, farm, and frontier.

Walt Whitman was the poet of democracy, but Professor Longfellow was democracy's favorite poet. The American people, when they read poetry, wished to be lifted out of themselves by verses that rhymed or at least scanned, into a world of romance and beauty. Especially the American woman, who derived little satisfaction from the activity of her partner, and was beginning to dream dreams of her own. Mostly she took the line of competitive display, which only forced her husband to quicken his pace; but partly she turned to the old world for advice. Hence the feminine stamp to American culture.

Hawthorne and Whittier and Longfellow felt that craving themselves, and filled it for others: Hawthorne by his *Marble Faun* and *Wonder Book* of classical myths, Whittier and Longfellow by creating legends from early American history, Longfellow especially by popularizing Old World stories, and translating Dante. The music of his verse was tuned to catch the ear of a busy and unlearned people. Longfellow, 'poet of the mellow twilight of the past,' as Whitman called him, 'poet of all sympathetic gentleness — and universal poet of women and young people,' had more influence on his generation than any American man of letters save Emerson.

6. *Humanitarianism and Abolition*

'It was a day' wrote John Morley 'of ideals in every camp. The general restlessness was intense among reflecting conservatives as among reflecting liberals. . . . A great wave of humanity, a great wave of social sentiment, poured itself among all who had the faculty for large and disinterested thinking.' The decades of the thirties and the forties were years of social unrest and intellectual ferment. The zeal for social and humanitarian reform left scarcely any phase of American life untouched. Emerson has described it with a quaint combination of amusement and tender sympathy in his *New England Reformers:*

> 'But some there were, high-flying souls filled with the new wine of this idealism, to whom the reality of ideas appeared to require that immediate effect should be given to their ideas; and failing this that they should refuse all participation in an order of things which they could not approve. There was an indefinite hope, and there was an assurance that all particular mischiefs were speedily coming to an end. . . . What a fertility of projects for the salvation of the world! One apostle thought all men should go to farming; and another that no man should buy or sell; that the use of money was the cardinal evil; another that the mischief was in our diet, that we eat and drink damnation. These made unleavened bread, and were foes to the death of fermentation. . . . Others assailed particular vocations, as that of the lawyer, that of the merchant, of the clergyman, of the scholar. . . . Others devoted themselves to the worrying of churches and meetings for public worship. . . . With this din of opinions and debate, there was a keener scrutiny of institutions and domestic life than any we had yet known, and there was sincere

> protesting against existing evils, and there were changes of employment dictated by consciences. . . . A restless, prying, conscientious criticism broke out in unexpected quarters. Who gave me the money with which I bought my coat? Why should the professional labor and that of the counting-house be paid so disproportionately to the labor of the porter and the wood-sawyer? Am I not a too protected person? Is there not a wide disparity between the lot of me and the lot of thee, my poor brother, my poor sister?

This 'restless, prying, conscientious criticism' led to a wide variety of reforms. Throughout the Northern States, as well as Maryland and Kentucky, imprisonment for debt was abolished and the rigors of prison life were softened. Whipping was outlawed in most of the states, although by no means stamped out; flogging was abolished in the navy in 1850, due largely to the influence of Richard H. Dana's *Two Years Before the Mast.* Public and private charitable institutions multiplied. Owing largely to the efforts of Dorothea Dix, the insane were removed from jails and outhouses and placed in asylums. Samuel G. Howe, after fighting for Greek independence, returned to America with ambitious plans for the education of the blind, which were largely realized. Elihu Burritt tried to capitalize the new tenderness for his World-Peace Movement, without much success, while William Ladd projected a plan for an international court that anticipated by eighty years the Hague Tribunal. More popular was the brisk campaign against Demon Rum, undertaken by certain evangelical sects. The prohibitory laws that were passed proved premature; but their educational work did considerably modify the drinking habits of the people. Agitation for woman's rights culminated in the Seneca Falls Convention of 1848 and a Declaration of Sentiments couched in the phraseology of the Declaration of Independence.

Of all these humanitarian and reform movements, the one that shook the Union to its foundation sought the abolition of slavery. An earlier anti-slavery movement, offshoot of the American Revolution, won its last victory in 1807 when Congress passed an act against the slave trade. The Quakers kept up a mild and ineffectual protest, while the cotton gin was creating a new vested interest in slavery; and in 1820, as we have seen, the last effort to stay the westward advance of slavery was defeated by the admission of Missouri.

The older generation of Virginia statesmen, foreseeing the tragedy of 1861, endeavored in vain to arouse their people. Few Virginians or indeed Americans would contemplate emancipation, unless at the same time they could get rid of the colored population. Free negroes were felt a nuisance and a menace throughout the United States. Most of the Northern States had severe laws against their immigration; most of the Southern States allowed benevolent masters to manumit their slaves only on condition of their removal. Yet the cotton states gagged at emancipation, even when sweetened by compensation and deportation.

The American Colonization Society, supported largely by slaveowners of Virginia, Maryland, and Kentucky, proved that this last method was practical on a small scale. In 1827, after ten years of private effort, the Society sought a congressional appropriation towards colonizing negroes in Liberia. All the northernmost tier of slave states passed favorable resolutions, but the cotton states prevented anything being done. The Georgia Legislature resolved that 'not only the retention, but the increase of the slave population' was essential to their welfare: that the colonization project was 'wild, fanatical and destructive.' They had only remained silent hitherto under the impression that the Society's object was 'limited to the removal beyond the United States of the *then* free people of color and their descendants, and none others.' Limited in resources, and attacked by extremists from both sides, the Colonization Society could do little to solve the problem, although that little was well done. By 1831 it had returned to Africa only 1420 negroes, about as many as were born into slavery in the United States every four months.

When Jackson became President in 1829, moral suasion against slavery appeared to have spent its force. Apathy could hardly have been more complete, when on 1 January 1831, the first number of the *Liberator* appeared in Boston, printed on borrowed paper with borrowed type, by William Lloyd Garrison. On the first page he announced:

> 'I shall strenuously contend for the immediate enfranchisement of our slave population. . . . On this subject I do not wish to think, or speak, or write, with moderation. . . . I am in earnest — I will not equivocate — I will not excuse — I will not retreat a single inch — AND I WILL BE HEARD.'

Therein spoke the Old Testament, not the New. With Emerson, Garrison had less in common than with Stonewall Jackson. He was all contradiction: a fighting pacifist, an aggressive non-resistant who spurned politics as a means, but employed language that made impossible the peaceful attainment of his ends. Garrison's policy was to hold up the most repulsive aspects and exceptional incidents of negro slavery to the public gaze; to castigate the slaveholders and all who defended them as man-stealers, torturers, traffickers in human flesh. He would recognize no rights of the masters, acknowledge no color problem, tolerate no delay.

Blackguarding the slaveholders would have made few converts in the South at any time, but least of all at that time. The Nat Turner slave insurrection, in which over fifty whites were murdered, occurred in August 1831. Prominent Southerners at once asserted that the *Liberator* was responsible, and demanded that the Northern States, if they valued the Union, should suppress this incendiary agitation.

Every effort short of press censorship was made in the North to satisfy the South on this point. Garrison wrote that he ' found contempt more bitter, opposition more stubborn, and apathy more frozen ' in New England than among slaveowners themselves. The workmen, especially the Irish laborers who competed with free negroes, broke up abolition meetings, with the warm approval of the respectable press. A ' broadcloth mob ' of business men forced Garrison on one occasion to seek safety in the Boston jail. One abolitionist was murdered in Illinois; few dared to cross the Ohio, or Mason and Dixon's line. Northern gentlemen like Wendell Phillips who joined the cause were black-balled at clubs and forsaken by their friends. Northern ministers who showed sympathy with them lost their pulpits. Philanthropists who established schools for colored children were hampered with lawsuits, or deterred by force. Yet the sect grew, and throve on opposition. In 1836 there were more than five hundred abolition societies in the Northern States, and by 1840 their membership was over 150,000. Whittier's pen was already consecrated to the movement: presently James Russell Lowell would lend his gift of bitter satire.

Just as Wilberforce was called hypocrite by the English radicals, so Garrison was denounced by the American associationists and other reformers for his singleness of aim, his assumption that slavery was the great evil. What boon would freedom be to the slave, they asked, if obtained without due preparation on his part, or his master's? What use to abolish chattel slavery if wage slavery were left?

To which the abolitionists replied that there could be no social reform in a nation that held one-sixth of its people in bondage, that the evils of slavery touched every one in the land, that white labor could never be secure until slave labor was abolished. It took over twenty years to induce the northern working people to see the point.

Garrison inspired more than he led. The American abolitionists included very different sorts of people. Many Quakers of Pennsylvania, some of them old enough to remember John Woolman, recovered their antique zeal in this new cause. Denied the use of the public rooms in Philadelphia, they built themselves a hall, only to lose it by arson a week after completion. William Jay, son of the Chief Justice, and the Tappan brothers of New York, gave their wealth and sacrificed their social comfort to support the cause in that state, where no cause could long keep out of politics. It was they who organized the Liberty Party, to nominate James G. Birney, a converted Alabaman slaveholder, for the Presidency in 1840. The middle-western abolitionists founded at Oberlin the first American college that welcomed negroes; they elected Joshua R. Giddings, the first abolitionist Congressman, and did the most effective work in aiding slaves to escape from bondage. All the abolitionists saw eye-to-eye on the principle of immediate uncompensated abolition; and many received negroes as equals at their meetings and in their houses. Most of them repudiated Garrison's extreme methods, and only a few followed him in denouncing the Constitution and advocating a Northern secession. But it was the editor of the *Liberator,* mild in manner and soft of voice, yet driven by a fierce passion for righteousness to pen words that cut and burned, who personified this new and dreadful force to the entire South.

Owing perhaps to their Quaker connection, the abolitionists preceded other reformers in permitting women to address their meetings and serve on committees. Lucretia Mott of Philadelphia, and the Grimké sisters, gentlewomen of South Carolina who freed their slaves and came north to obtain freedom of speech, were counted among the leaders. Frederick Douglass, an escaped slave of remarkable mental powers, was the first of several fugitives who wrote or dictated their memoirs. There was a close connection also with the English abolitionists. Garrison visited England in 1833, just in time to meet the dying Wilberforce; and twice again in the forties. But an address signed by Daniel O'Connell, Father Mathew, and seventy thousand Irishmen, enjoining their fellow countrymen in America to love liberty and hate slavery, was received with contumely by Irish-Americans who never failed to respond to anti-British appeals from that quarter. Yet this constant intercourse and mutual aid led to a sort of English-speaking union between humane and liberty-loving persons in each country.

Excepting that lonely fanatic John Brown, no abolitionist attempted to incite a slave insurrection; but every abolitionist took part in a conspiracy of evasion. The ' grape-vine telegraph ' carried news to the blacks of an ' Under Ground Railroad ' to liberty. The very few slaves who had the courage to strike out for freedom would take cover in the woods or swamps near their master's plantation until the hue and cry was over, then follow the North Star to Mason and Dixon's line, or the Ohio river. Once across, the ' U.G.' took them in charge. They were transferred from one abolitionist household to another, hidden by day in cocklofts or haystacks or shocks of Indian corn; piloted by night through the woods, or concealed in farm wagons; sometimes driven in a Friend's carriage, disguised in women's clothes and a deep Quaker bonnet. Others were smuggled north by sea, and made their way into Canada through the New England States. The total number of slaves thus rescued was not large, and their proportion to the total slave population was infinitesimal: about three one-hundredths of one per cent in 1850. Yet if measured by the stimulus it gave the abolitionist cause, and the rage it aroused in the breasts of Southern slaveholders, the ' Under Ground ' was a brilliant success.

Conducting the ' U.G.' was dangerous business. Pursuit was often hot and ruthless, the pursuers had the law on their side even where opinion was against them. In the southern, pro-slavery counties of Indiana and Illinois, men suspected of harboring runaways were apt to have their houses burned, their persons tarred and feathered. Without the manly zest and generous adventure that the ' U.G.' afforded, the cause of emancipation might well have languished for want of sap. Fugitive slaves, moreover, gave the abolitionists a handle to work both on public opinion and on the Federal government. One cringing black produced at a public meeting made more converts than hours of oratory and bushels of tracts.

By a federal statute of 1793, a master or his agent, who caught a runaway in a free state, could repatriate him forcibly after swearing to his identity before a magistrate. A professional slave-catcher whom the right nigger eluded was apt to conclude that any nigger would answer. Kidnapping became so frequent that Pennsylvania (1825) and other Northern states passed 'personal liberty laws' to protect their free colored citizens. The abolitionists cleverly turned the local resentment against kidnapping, and the Northern dislike of domineering Southerners, into a public opinion against the return of genuine fugitives. A plain duty to sister states became a shameful truckling to the 'slave power' as Whittier presented it:

> We hunt your bondsmen, flying from Slavery's hateful hell;
> Our voices at your bidding take up the bloodhound's yell;
> We gather, at your summons, above our fathers' graves,
> From Freedom's holy altar-horns to tear your wretched slaves!

Gradually the personal liberty acts were strengthened to a degree that made a runaway's identity almost impossible to establish. The Supreme Court invalidated a Pennsylvania law of that description in 1842. But if the states had no right to obstruct, by the same token they had no obligation to assist the federal authorities; [3] and without such assistance the slave-catchers began to receive the attention of mobs, more often than abolitionists. A runaway from Virginia was forcibly rescued from his captors in Boston in 1843, and his freedom purchased by a popular collection. The abolitionists for the first time voiced a popular sentiment, when Whittier declared:

> No slave-hunt in our borders — no pirate on our strand!
> No fetters in the Bay State — no slave upon our land!

Southerners played into the abolitionists' hands by stifling criticism of slavery when they had the power, and by demanding its supression where they had not; for Northerners who were indifferent to slavery, and disliked negroes, still valued freedom of speech, of the press and of petition. In 1835 Abolition began to influence national politics, when a Quaker meeting petitioned the Senate to abolish slavery and the domestic slave trade in the District of Columbia. Washington was then a point for shipping blacks from Virginia and Maryland to the cotton states. Even from the windows of the Capitol one could watch coffles of slaves marching by, to the music of clanking chains. Why, as Henry Clay inquired, should Northern members 'be outraged by a scene so inexcusable and detestable'? Because the slave states felt that Washington was a strategic outpost of their principles, to be held at all costs. Senator Calhoun declared that any intermeddling with slavery in the federal district would be ' a foul slander on nearly one-half the states of the Union '; and all such petitions were rejected. Other abolitionist petitions, not always so limited in their scope, came pouring in on the House, which at the insistence of the Southern members passed the ' gag resolution,' a rule to the effect that all petitions having to do with slavery, whether within or without the legislative competence of Congress, be laid upon the table.

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[3] Prigg *v.* Pennsylvania; an important principle in American constitutional law, apart from the slave question.

Ex-President Adams, then a member of Congress, was not an abolitionist; but the gag rule awakened in him memories of Stuart tyranny. It was a thing to be resisted in its prime, like taxation without representation. Session after session he fought for the right of petition, using his deep knowledge of parliamentary practice and rich resource in harsh and bitter eloquence. Every attempt short of personal violence was made to silence, to censure, or to expel Adams; but the tough old puritan persisted. The Northern States finally forced their representatives to support him, and in 1844 the gag rule was abandoned. It made no difference to the slaves. But on the day when the news reached South Carolina, the leading Whig newspaper of Columbia discontinued printing instalments from Washington's Farewell Address, and substituted an appeal for secession.

How, then, shall we estimate the abolitionists? Their sincerity and courage is no longer denied by friend or enemy; of their wisdom no enemy was ever convinced, and many friends are now doubtful. Channing predicted in 1835 that Garrison had only succeeded in stirring up ' bitter passions and a fierce fanaticism which have shut every ear and every heart against arguments.' Yet, as one of his followers answered Channing:

> ' We are not to blame that wiser and better men did not espouse . . . the cause of our oppressed, colored countrymen. . . . We Abolitionists are what we are — babes, sucklings, obscure men, silly women, publicans, sinners, and we shall manage this matter just as might be expected from such persons as we are.'

Certain it is that they closed every avenue to emancipation save civil war: their means almost defeated their end. Abolition came in spite of the abolitionists rather than because of them; and in the worst way. But could it have come in any other way? Garrison broke a great conspiracy of silence. His indignant pity seared the Northern conscience with the image of a slave cowering under his master's lash — but at what cost in hatred, bloodshed, and uncharitableness!

Two generations have elapsed since the thirteenth federal amendment destroyed chattel slavery on United States soil. We now know that the slavery question was but one aspect of a race problem that is still far from solution. The grapes of wrath have not yet yielded all their bitter vintage.

XXIII

THE COTTON KINGDOM

1820–1850

1. *The Land of Cotton*

COTTON was king in almost every aspect of Southern life from 1815 to 1861; and the principal bulwark of his throne was slavery. Almost sixty per cent of the slaves in the United States, in 1850, were employed in growing cotton. Like rice, sugar, and tobacco, it was a plantation crop, requiring continuous attention of a sort that the most ignorant negroes were well able to perform. In 1820 the cotton crop of one hundred and sixty million pounds was already the most valuable Southern interest. Meeting a constantly increasing demand, it rose to twice as much in 1830, and more than doubled in the next decade. By 1850 it had passed a thousand million pounds; and the crop of 1860 was almost twenty-three hundred million pounds in weight, making two-thirds of the total exports of the United States in value.

This enormous increase in production was not occasioned by any radical improvement in method, but by a rapid extension of the cotton-growing area. Somewhat as a Tartar horde moved across Asia, eating the fat of the land and leaving devastation behind, so the cotton planters advanced from South Carolina and Georgia across the 'black belts' and Indian cessions of Alabama and Mississippi, occupied the great valley up to Memphis, pushed up the Red river of Louisiana to the Indian Territory, and passed the boundary of Mexico into Texas. On the march King Cotton acquired new subjects: moneyed immigrants from the North, or ambitious yeomen who purchased a slave or two on credit, and might with good luck become magnates. But for the most part the pioneers of the Southwest disliked the planters, who in turn accused the poor-white 'crackers' and 'hill-billies' of exchanging moonshine whiskey with the slaves for stolen goods. In every region fit for cotton, the richest lands were absorbed by plantations during the first generation of settlement. Hunter folk moved westward, yeomen farmers took to the hills or to the pine-barrens, and a shiftless and vagabond class of 'pore white trash,' afflicted with the hookworm disease and despised alike by master and slave, closed in on the gullied hillsides and abandoned fields. Some of the best minds of the South endeavored to arrest this process by scientific methods of agriculture; but so long as good land remained plentiful and cheap, whether within the United States or adjacent under feeble sovereignty, the cotton planters preferred their own ways.[1]

Sugar planters of Louisiana and the tobacco planters of Kentucky were allies of the cotton kingdom; the border slave states were tributary provinces, supplying labor, food, and mules; and much of the plantation revenue found its way to the Northern centers of banking and manufacturing. North Carolina, a state where little cotton was grown, remained an enclave of antique republicanism in the new monarchy; western Virginia and the mountainous regions of Kentucky and Tennessee were Northern salients. Kentucky had the most varied agriculture of any of the slave states; her people were a fine blend of the old West with the older Virginia. Eastern Virginia could not longer profitably employ her dense slave population on depleted land, and many a tobacco or wheat plantation was maintained only through the sale of surplus negroes. Her economic decrepitude was a spiritual loss to the nation. The Old Dominion squirearchy, which once had led the progressive thought and statesmanship of the United States, now devoted itself to sustaining a hopeless cause.

Cotton plantations differed greatly both in size and character, and the greater planters differed from the less as an Irish gentleman of the time from an Irish peasant.[2] Absenteeism was frequent in the

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[1] Abandoned farms later became as common in New England as in the South, and for the same reason: western competition. Slavery merely hastened the process by the opportunity it afforded for large-scale exploitation; and there were no industries in the South to take up the slack.

[2] The following statistics roughly indicate the social classes in the South as a whole (including the District of Columbia), and in the cotton states (South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas), in 1850:

	All Slave States	*Cotton States*
Number of slaveholding families	347,525	154,391
Number of families owning 1 to 9 slaves	255,258	104,956
Number of families owning 10 to 49 slaves	84,328	43,299
Number of families owning 50 or more slaves	7,939	6,144
White population	6,242,418	2,137,284
Free negro population	238,187	34,485
Slave population	3,204,077	1,808,768

lower South, although hardly the rule outside the bottom lands between Vicksburg and New Orleans. Many a show plantation of the older South, where visitors were received with lavish hospitality and impressed with the happy life of devoted blacks, was supported by latifundia in the newer South. One of the better sort in Mississippi, described by Olmsted, covered several square miles. The mansion house, which the owner had not seen for two years, was four miles distant from the nearest white neighbor. The cleared portion, about fourteen hundred acres, was tilled by a plough-gang of thirty men and a larger hoe-gang, mainly women, who were encouraged by a black driver with whip in hand. Enough corn and pork were usually raised to feed the cattle and the 135 slaves, who included three mechanics, two seamstresses, four teamsters and cattle-tenders, a midwife, and a nurse who had charge of a pickaninny crèche. The overseer maintained a pack of hounds to hunt runaways. He kept the field hands working from sun to sun, but gave them most of Saturday as well as Sunday off, except in the picking season. They cut their fuel in the master's woods, and were allowed to make boards for sale in their free time. Everywhere in the South slave families were given allotments on which they could raise vegetables and poultry to eke out the rations of corn and pork, or even cotton for sale to the master.

A 'middle-class plantation,' which did not produce enough surplus to enable the owner to travel or reside elsewhere, would have four hundred to one thousand acres under cultivation, and ten to fifty slaves. A planter of this class might be a younger son, a self-made pioneer, an ex-overseer, or a professional man using his plantation to enhance his dignity in the community. In few instances did he enjoy comforts or amenities superior to those of the poorest sort of farmers in the North: a bare house without conveniences, a diet largely of 'hog and hominy,' no literature but a weekly paper, no diversion but hunting, and an occasional visit to the county seat. That sort of planter belonged to the governing class, and had things much his own way in Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas. Like most Americans of the time, he distrusted other parts of the country than his own, and held the rest of the world in hearty contempt. Although division of labor was most effective on plantations with fifty to one hundred slaves, virtually half the cotton crop

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Century of Population Growth, p. 136; J. D. B. De Bow, *Statistical View of the U. S.* (1854), pp. 45, 63, 82, 95, 99. Slaveholding families are counted more than once if they owned slaves in different counties.

was made by small farmers with one to half a dozen slaves. Mark Twain describes 'one of these little one-horse cotton plantations' in *Huckleberry Finn:*

> 'A rail fence round a two-acre yard; a stile, made out of logs sawed off and up-ended, in steps, like barrels of a different length, to climb over the fence with, and for the women to stand on when they are going to jump on to a horse; some sickly grass-patches in the big yard, but mostly it was bare and smooth, like an old hat with the nap rubbed off; big double log house for the white folks — hewed logs, with the chinks stopped up with mud or mortar, and these mud-stripes been white-washed some time or another; round-log kitchen, with a big, broad, open but roofed passage joining it to the house; log smoke-house back of the kitchen; three little log nigger-cabbins in a row t'other side the smoke-house; one little hut all by itself away down against the back fence, and some outbuildings down a piece the other side; ash-hopper, and big kettle to bile soap in, by the little hut; bench by the kitchen door, with a bucket of water and a gourd; hound[3] asleep there, in the sun; more hounds asleep, roundabout; about three shade-trees away off in a corner; some currant bushes and gooseberry bushes in one place by the fence; outside the fence a garden and a watermelon patch; then the cotton fields begin; and after the fields, the woods.'

On a first-class plantation, with improved implements, healthy negroes, strong mules, and a competent overseer, ten acres of cotton and ten of corn could be cultivated per able-bodied field hand. On rich soil, with a proper division of labor, five bales (two thousand pounds) or more of cotton per field hand could be produced; but a more nearly average figure, in the Carolina and Georgia Piedmont, would be twelve hundred pounds. The average annual price of middling upland cotton at Liverpool fluctuated between 11 and 17½ cents a pound from 1820 to 1840, fell to 8 cents in 1845–48, rose to 14 in 1850, and averaged about 12 cents until the Civil War. Of course a planter was lucky to get half the Liverpool price for himself; the rest was consumed by transportation, brokerage, and interest on advance-money.

Although cotton growing was the most profitable employment for slaves, slave labor was an uneconomical method of growing cotton. Once entangled in the meshes of the system, no planter could escape it, and few wished to. Slaves were the only available labor for large-scale production by men of capital, but their cost absorbed an inordinate amount of capital. The most expensive sort, a 'prime field hand' 18 to 25 years old, was worth $500 in 1832, whence the price rose to $1,300 just before the panic of 1837. The same 'buck nigger' who brought $650 in 1845 at the age of eighteen, sold readily for $1,000 when five years older; and the price of this class of slave reached $1,800 on the eve of the Civil War. Negro wenches on cotton-plantations were such poor breeders that the labor supply had to be replenished by purchase, and land was always wearing out; hence the profits that on a Northern farm would have been invested, or spent on better buildings and more comforts, in the South went into more land and more slaves. Even the planters most opulent in nominal wealth found it difficult to keep out of debt, and the poorer depended on the money-lender for maintenance between crops.

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[3] 'Hound' in the Southwest means a mongrel. As the Missouri anthem has it:

It makes no difference if he is a houn',
You gotta stop kickin' my dawg aroun'.

2. *The Slave*

As for Sambo, whose wrongs moved the abolitionists to wrath and tears, there is some reason to believe that he suffered less than any other class in the South from its 'peculiar institution.' The majority of slaves were adequately fed, well cared for, and apparently happy. Competent observers reported that they performed less labor than the hired man of the Northern States. Their physical wants were better supplied than those of thousands of Northern laborers, English operatives, and Irish peasants; their liberty was not much less than that enjoyed by the North of England 'hinds' or the Finnish *torpare*. Although brought to America by force, the incurably optimistic negro soon became attached to the country, and devoted to his 'white folks.' Slave insurrections were planned — usually by the free negroes — but invariably betrayed by some faithful darky; and trained obedience kept the slaves faithful throughout the Civil War.

Between a Virginian slave major-domo, whose ancestors had been American for two centuries, and a Carolina rice hand, who might have been smuggled over from Africa within a year, there was an immense gap. Topsy and Tom Sawyer's nigger Jim were nearer to the average childlike, improvident, humorous, prevaricating, and superstitious negro than the unctuous Uncle Tom. Many were quick at picking up trades, and became skilled artisans who were hired out by the month or year; nor are we much impressed by the complaint of a planter that his slave bricklayer would lay but one thousand bricks per day. Occasionally a humane owner would allow such a one to purchase his freedom out of his earnings; but the laws made this increasingly difficult. American, as contrasted with ancient slavery, offered no legal escape to the talented or intellectual slave; it subjected a writer like Frederick Douglass or a born leader of men like Booker T. Washington to the caprice of a white owner, his inferior in every respect save pigment. A Virginian planter wrote in 1819 that overseers 'in these days are little respected by our intelligent negroes, many of whom are far superior in mind, morals, and manners to those who are placed in authority over them.' And one drop of African blood made anyone a nigger.

While the average Englishman or American disliked the negro as negro, Southern slaveowners understood him as slave; Southern gentlemen still love him 'in his place.' There was no physical repulsion from color in the South. White children were suckled by black mammies, and played promiscuously with the pickaninnies. In a stage-coach or railroad car, as a squeamish abolitionist observed, 'a lady makes no objection to ride next a fat negro woman, even when the thermometer is at ninety degrees; provided always that her fellow travellers understand she is her *property*.' There was a great difference between one region and another, even between one plantation and another, in the treatment of slaves; and everywhere the house servants fared better than the field hands. In central Mississippi, Olmsted passed a plantation owned by a 'very religious lady' who worked her slaves from half-past three every weekday morning, frequently until nine at night, and alternately catechized and whipped them every Sabbath. But a few days before he had stopped with the jolly owner of twenty slaves who had not been 'licked in five year,' who taught one another to read, who swung their master's hoes to their own languid cadence, and shared his dinner 'right out of the same fryin'-pan.' In every part of the South a small slave-owner worked side by side with his men in the field, and treated them like his own children, as indeed they sometimes were. But if he rose to planter's estate, that sort of thing became undignified. Just as the apprentice sank to *proletaire* when his master became *entrepreneur*, so woolly-headed Uncle Daniel, who had learned to read the Bible in the log cabin with his old master's children, moved into slave quarters when young master built a mansion.


BALTIMORE
WASHINGTON
ST. LOUIS
LEXINGTON
MEMPHIS
WILMINGTON
CHARLESTON
SAVANNAH
NEW ORLEANS
☐ LESS THAN 10 PERCENT.
▨ LESS THAN 50 PERCENT
■ MORE THAN 50 PERCENT

DISTRIBUTION OF SLAVES
IN THE SOUTHERN STATES

TAKEN FROM "EFFECT OF SECESSION UPON COMMERCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE NORTH AND SOUTH" (1861).

Flogging with the rawhide or blacksnake whip was the usual method of punishing slaves. Imprisonment lost the master their time, and short rations their health. Although the law forbade cruelty, a master or overseer was not often brought to book for it, since a negro's testimony was not received against a white man; and the abolition agitation created a feeling in the South that the white man must always be right. A slave had rather less chance for redress at that period than a seaman against his Yankee skipper, or an enlisted man in the army against his officer. Severity pushed too far was apt to turn the slaves into runaways, if not into dead niggers; and a live one was a valuable piece of property. Yet the most civilized communities need societies for the prevention of cruelty to children and animals. It was an old plantation maxim 'never to threaten a negro, or he will run.' Consequently, little time elapsed between detection and a punishment which was not softened by reflection. Few travellers in the lower South failed to record some observed instance of cruelty.

The feature of slavery that most appealed to human sympathy was the separation of families by private sale or auction. It was often asserted in defence that negroes had a very slight family attachment; that Whittier's 'Farewell of a Virginia Slave Mother,' with its haunting refrain:

Gone, gone, — sold and gone
To the rice-swamps dank and lone,
From Virginia's hill and waters:
Woe is me, my stolen daughters!

was mere abolitionist cant. Yet when a young Northerner asked John Randolph of Roanoke to name the greatest orator he had ever heard, the old Virginian snapped out: 'A slave, Sir. She was a mother, and her rostrum was the auction-block.'

After a slave insurrection at Charleston, in 1822, a system of control was adopted throughout the lower South, which was extended to the upper South after the Nat Turner insurrection of 1831. Blacks were forbidden to assemble or to circulate after curfew without a written pass. A system of night patrols — the 'patter rollers' of Uncle Remus — enforced these laws. The abolitionist agitation caused a general tightening up of black codes. A free negro who left his state was not allowed to return, for fear he might bring pernicious doctrines; and for the same reason it became a misdemeanor to teach a slave to read. As a Carolina magistrate wrote, 'Such laws look to me as rather cowardly. It seems as if we were afraid of our slaves.' The free negroes fared worst under this regime of fear; a Georgia law of 1859 even allowed them to be sold into slavery for a violation of city ordinances.

It has sometimes been claimed that Virginia was within an ace of emancipation in 1831, when Garrison's intemperate attitude stiffened the slaveholders, and defeated the movement. What actually happened was the defeat, by a single vote in the state senate, in January, 1832, of a bill for the colonization of free negroes, and of such as might be manumitted by their masters. Later, similar bills with smaller appropriations were passed, and a certain amount of colonization went on under Virginia authority until the Civil War. A little earlier a resolution to the effect that the state ought 'to adopt some legislative amendment for the abolition of slavery' was defeated by a vote of 58 to 73, the original proposal and almost all the 'ayes' coming from the anti-slavery Shenandoah valley and western Virginia. Similar proposals at the time in Tennessee met the same fate. In neither instance is there any evidence that Garrison's *Liberator* had the slightest influence; it was the Turner insurrection that prompted those last state movements looking toward Emancipation.

If we overlook the original sin of the slave trade, there was much to be said for slavery as a transitional status between barbarism and civilization. The negro learned his master's language, and accepted in some degree his moral and religious standards. In return he contributed much besides his labor — music and humor for instance — to American civilization. The trouble was that the South, after 1830, no longer regarded slavery as transitional, but as a permanent basis of society. That it could not remain, in a world growing more tender of human rights, without artificial bulwarks that only the North could build; without banners and emblems of prestige to which the North must consent.

3. *Southern Society*

Slavery and cotton preserved in the South a rural, almost feudal, society.[4] The old Anglo-Virginian contempt for merchants still

[4] Of twenty-eight cities in the United States with a population of 20,000 or more (1850), only eight were in the slave states, and only three (New Orleans, Charleston,

prevailed. Agriculture, the army, the church, and the law were the only proper careers for a planter's son. Northern and European merchant-bankers and shipowners handled the cotton crop, and took most of the profits. Shopkeepers in the market towns were largely Yankees, Germans, or Jews. There were few factories; for capital was tied up in slaves, who produced greater profits by growing than by spinning cotton. The upland whites were too independent, and the poor lowland whites too enervated by malaria and hookworm, to become factory operatives. European immigrants shunned a region where manual labor was regarded as nigger's work, and where they had even less protection than in the North against violence. Railway development was slow, for the relatively sparse population of the uplands was largely self-sustaining, and cotton afforded freight traffic during a brief season of the year. The main roads in Kentucky, Virginia, and the Carolinas were considerably improved, and provided with decent inns; but west and south of these states one followed the usual pioneer sloughs and trails. Horseback travellers who, for want of inns, were forced to pay well for vile meals and swarming beds at the homes of lesser planters and poor whites, became somewhat bitter at the mention of Southern hospitality. Frontier conditions still prevailed through the greater part of the lower South in 1850, combined with a turbulence and ignorance that seldom lingered in the Northern frontier beyond the first generation.

Michigan and Arkansas were admitted to the Union together, in 1836.[5] The constitution of Michigan prohibited slavery. The consti-

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and Mobile) in the cotton belt. The combined population of these three, together with Richmond, St. Louis, and Louisville, was not equal to that of Philadelphia.

[5] At the time they were admitted to the Union, Arkansas and Michigan had approximately the same population. The following statistics from the Census of 1850, are instructive:

	Arkansas	*Michigan*
White population	162,189	395,071
Free colored population	608	2,583
Slave population	47,100	0
Number of colleges	3	3
Number of pupils in colleges	150	308
Number of public schools	353	2,714
Number of pupils in public schools	8,493	110,455
Income of public schools from taxation	$250	$88,879
Total income of public schools	$43,763	$167,806
Number of academies	90	37
Number of pupils in academies	2,407	1,619

tution of Arkansas prohibited the legislature from tampering with slavery. The first Michigan legislature founded a university, at Ann Arbor. The first Arkansas legislature was remembered for a fatal brawl, when the Speaker of the House came down from his chair and slew a member with his bowie-knife. This was, to be sure, only the ugly side of the rollicking, rough-and-tumble society so well described by Augustus B. Longstreet in those parts of the South where there was no gentry to set the tone. It was a society that made admirable soldiers, as the North shortly learned; but poor citizens, as the South has since learned to its cost. ‘Bleaseism,’ a recent brand of poor-white politics named after one of the breed that led it to power, was part of the price the South has paid for the cultivation of cotton and the neglect of men.

Religion, which had been neglected in the South when the section was liberal and anti-slavery, was much cultivated after it became conservative and pro-slavery. The influence of the evangelical sects among the planters increased in proportion as their ministers found pro-slavery arguments in the Bible. The Catholic and Episcopalian Churches remained neutral on the slavery question, and stationary in numbers. Thomas Jefferson, dying, saluted the rising sun of Unitarianism as destined to enlighten the South; but it sent only a few feeble rays beyond Mason and Dixon's line. Horace Holley, the gifted young Unitarian who had made of Transylvania University in Kentucky a southern Harvard, was driven from his post by the Presbyterians. Priestley's old friend Thomas Cooper, who had taken refuge in the South from the anti-Jacobin spirit of the North, was promised by Jefferson the first chair of chemistry in the University of Virginia; but Cooper was a Unitarian, and the Virginians raised such an outcry that he resigned. Later, in spite of his services to the state-rights cause, Cooper was ‘tried’ for atheism, and ejected,

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Number of adult white illiterates	16,819	7,912
Value of farms and plantations	$15,265,245	$51,872,446
Number of newspapers and periodicals	9	58
Circulation of newspapers and periodicals	7,250	52,718
Number of public libraries	1	280
Volumes in public libraries	250	65,116
Number of churches	362	399
Value of church property	$89,315	$723,600

The student must beware, however, of reading too much out of these statistics. Even had slavery been abolished in 1830, conditions would probably have been approximately the same.

at the age of seventy-five, from the presidency of the College of South Carolina.

The Presbyterian became the fashionable church of the planters; Methodists and Baptists enjoyed successive revivals among the poor whites and colored folk. For a time these churches were a bond of union between North and South; but when the Northern Methodists unreasonably insisted that a Southern bishop emancipate slaves which he had inherited and could not conscientiously get rid of, the Southern members seceded and formed the Methodist Church South (1844). The Baptists followed, and doubled their membership in fifteen years. While these Southern evangelicals sprinkled holy water on the slave-pen and the lash, they banned card-playing and dancing; by 1860 the bastard puritanism of the age was more prevalent in Alabama and Mississippi than in Massachusetts and Connecticut. Joseph Le Conte, a precursor of Darwin, belonged to the cultivated circles of Charleston, but could not influence them. It was in the former slave states that theology would make its last stand against biology, in the twentieth century.

The finest product of the plantation regime was the Southern gentleman. Although few in number, he ruled the older Southern states by virtue of his personality even more than his property; and governed them honorably and efficiently, although not with enlightenment. Discriminatingly hospitable, invariably gracious to women, endowed with a high sense of personal honor and civic virtue, he led his beloved Southland to the worst disaster in modern history. Yet the image of him, dressed in black broadcloth and wide-awake hat, directing from horseback the labors of his slaves; or in gray uniform leading a cavalry charge under the stars and bars, appeals to the imagination of an era that has repudiated everything, good or bad, that he represented.

Of this ruling class, only a small fraction belonged to the eighteenth-century aristocracy of Maryland, Virginia, and the Carolinas. The supreme type of colonial gentleman that Washington was, appeared undiminished in his Lee kinsmen; but the old Huguenot families of Charleston were dying out, and the Creoles of Louisiana were easygoing and unambitious. Apart from these three persistent types, the mass of the greater planters, in 1850, were self-made men like Jefferson Davis, whose parents had lived in log cabins. If not well educated themselves, their sons and daughters were. The South, despite poverty in elementary education, had good secondary schools, especially of the military type, and more students in college than the North.

Life on a resident plantation of the better sort was neither sordid as the abolitionists asserted, nor splendid as the novelists have depicted it. The mansion house, seated on a rising bit of ground, was generally a well-proportioned wooden building of neo-classic style, with a columned portico or veranda that gave dignity to the front elevation and afforded shade to the ground floor and first story. The rooms, seldom more than fifteen in number, were high-ceiled and simply furnished. There were plenty of flowers, although negro gardening was by no means thrifty; and masses of native flowering shrubs and creepers such as the Cherokee rose, in which the Southland was rich. Simplicity rather than ostentation was the dominant note in the planter's life. His recreations were the wholesome ones of the English country gentry, but he enjoyed little leisure. On a Virginia plantation visited by Olmsted, not ten consecutive minutes elapsed, even during dinner, when the proprietor was not importuned by his slaves. He must lock his stables every night as the alternative to finding his horses hag-ridden in the morning, and rise at dawn to unlock them. Even if an overseer were employed to direct the field force, the owner's wife must keep linen, silver, food, and household supplies under lock and key from the pilfering house-servants, must serve out supplies with economy, and admonition with tact; must bind up wounds, and nurse the sick. Mrs. Ann R. Page of Virginia devoted her life to the welfare of her slaves, ran heavily into debt to avoid selling their increase, and when, at her husband's death, the property had to be divided, she sat apart in her room praying that none might fall into alien hands. Yet even Mrs. Page had to put up with meals an hour late, with tasks undone and orders forgotten, with prevarication and sluttishness. And how the hearts of Southern mothers were wrung by knowledge of the temptations to which their growing boys were exposed!

Such a life was a continuous exercise of tact, self-control, and firmness; yet the condition of unlimited power over a race with exasperating habits was a constant temptation to passion. The sort of bluster which was considered gentlemanly in the eighteenth century was accentuated by these conditions, at a time when smoother and more reticent manners had become the mark of good breeding in England and the North. The Southern gentleman had the same conflicting character as a Russian or Hungarian landlord. He would tolerate an amount of shirking and evasion that would drive any Northern employer frantic; but cross his will or question his authority, and you found the Tartar. An outburst of temper was a sign of high mettle, not a mark of poor breeding. Duelling was frequent, and not all disputes between gentlemen were settled on the 'field of honor.' Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia was unable to take part in the political campaign of 1848 because disabled by stabs received in an 'affray' with Judge Cone. Southerners in Congress made great efforts to master their passions, not always with success. When Senator Foote of Mississippi invited Senator Hale of New Hampshire to visit his good state, and promised him 'that he could not go ten miles into the interior before he would grace one of the tallest trees of the forest, with a rope around his neck, with the approbation of every virtuous and patriotic citizen; and that, if necessary, he himself would assist in the operation,' Northerners might be pardoned for wondering whether gentleman and bully were not synonymous terms in the South.

4. *The Literature of Chivalry*

The 'Southern chivalry' tradition was created in the generation of 1820 to 1850. In *Ivanhoe* and the flood of imitative literature that followed, the cotton lord and his lady found a romantic mirror of their life and ideals. Some one remembered what the Washingtons and Lees had forgotten, that certain Virginia planters were descended from Stuart refugees, who forthwith were adopted as ancestors by the entire South. Every owner of ten negroes, however dubious his origin or squalid his existence, became a 'cavalier,' entitled to despise the low-bred shopkeepers, artisans, and clerks of the North.

Pickenses, Boggses, Pettuses, Magoffins, Letchers, Polks, —
Where can you scare up names like them among your mudsill folks?

We should ill begrudge this romantic compensation to an isolated, almost beleaguered people, had it not fed an unwholesome pride and dangerous insolence. What the South wanted was a Cervantes; what it got was Brummagem gothic.

To comprehend the psychology of the Southern planter, we must remember that his social system was on the defensive against the

North, and indeed the civilized world. All his bluster and proud assertiveness was the sign not of confidence but of fear. It was fear, not insensibility, that made him indifferent or hostile to the new tenderness that was dissolving the harsher social relations in England and the Northern states. Just as New England in 1800 refused every quickening current from France or Virginia, for fear it might bear the seeds of Jacobinism; so the South, a generation later, rejected a literature and philosophy which might conceal abolition. The enthusiasm for popular education that swept over the North stopped short at the Potomac and the Ohio. The University of Virginia, which Jefferson had intended to be the crown of a public school system, became instead the seminary of a privileged class. At a time when Bryant, Emerson, Longfellow, and Whittier were redeeming Northern materialism with cheerful song, Southern silence was broken only by the gloomy and romantic notes of Edgar Allan Poe. Southern novelists such as Simms, Kennedy, and Caruthers merely glorified the past; and it was Stephen C. Foster of Pennsylvania who attuned the beauty and pathos of the old South to the human heart in 'Uncle Ned,' 'Old Black Joe,' and 'My Old Kentucky Home.'

Ruthless suppression of all criticism of slavery was one phase of the Southern reaction to abolition. The Northern mails were seized upon and censored. Ministers, teachers, professional men, and politicians who would not bow down to mumbo-jumbo were eliminated. Laws were even passed against criticism outside the South of Southern institutions, and a price was placed on the heads of prominent abolitionists. Bishop Moore of Virginia, in conversation with Dr. Daubeny of Oxford, 'spoke of the certainty of an abolitionist being lynched, not indeed as a thing he approved, but without any expression of moral indignation.' Similar sentiments the Doctor 'heard from the lips of laymen, avowed in a more vehement and offensive manner.' The 'cavalier' blood of Moncure Daniel Conway did not save him from being hustled off Virginian soil when he returned there from Harvard a Unitarian and an abolitionist.

Mere denial was not enough. What the ruling class wanted was some positive pro-slavery theory of society corresponding to the political doctrine of state rights. It was provided by Thomas R. Dew, a bright young Virginian who returned from study in Germany to a chair at William and Mary College. In a pamphlet of 1832, he proved that slavery had been the condition of classical culture, that the Hebrew prophets and St. Paul admitted its moral validity; that civilization required the many to work and the few to think. William Harper of South Carolina worked out the corollaries of these propositions, while hundreds of clergymen undertook to prove it 'God's law that fetters on black skins don't chafe.' George Fitzhugh, in a tract entitled 'Cannibals All,' showed the negro to be something less than man, and in his 'Sociology for the South' provided a new set of principles to replace the 'glittering generalities' of a century of enlightenment. John C. Calhoun gave pro-slavery doctrine the sanction of his name and character, and so cunningly combined it with American prepossessions that slavery appeared no longer the antithesis, but the condition, of democracy.

Calhoun began with the axiom that no wealthy or civilized society could exist unless one portion of the community lived upon the labor of another. White wage-earners, class-conscious in England and enfranchised in the Northern states, were threatening property and civilization. Chartism, agrarianism, and trade-unionism proved that social stability could not be maintained where labor was free. It was too late to re-establish serfdom in Europe and the North. But to the South a mysterious providence had brought a race marked by God with mental and physical inferiority, created to be hewers of wood and drawers of water for His chosen people. In return, kind masters provided for all reasonable wants of their slaves, and saved them from the fear of misery and destitution that haunted the white proletariat. The masters themselves, relieved from manual labor and sordid competition, would reach that intellectual and spiritual eminence of which the founders of the Republic had dreamed. 'Many in the South once believed that slavery was a moral and political evil. That folly and delusion are gone. We see it now in its true light, and regard it as the most safe and stable basis for free institutions in the world.'[6]

Such was the doctrine that most educated Southerners accepted between 1830 and 1850, because it was what they had unconsciously come to believe. It harmonized with the facts of their existence as Jeffersonian democracy had never done. Yet it is doubtful how wide or deep the new faith really went. It was never accepted by those Virginian planters who fought so valiantly for the Confederacy. There was no place in the system for poor whites, from one of whom, Hinton R. Helper, came the first prophecy of disaster. Even the planting class did not accept the logical deduction that the slave trade should be reopened. Even Calhoun, more humane than his doctrine, refused privately to condone the domestic slave trade, although he might publicly threaten that the South would secede rather than have it forbidden in Washington. The non-slaveholding and illiterate whites continued to dislike slavery, but they agreed with the planters that it would never do to emancipate the slave, for the South must be kept a ' white man's country.' We would make a grave error to suppose that profits dictated all this valiant if feverish defense of slavery. The South did not view the institution in terms of economics but in social terms, as the only possible way to maintain white supremacy.

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[6] Calhoun, *Works* (Grallé ed.), iii. 179–90; cf. ii. 631–2.

Just as the new imperialism of 1763 had created a self-conscious unity in the Thirteen Colonies, so the new abolitionism of 1831 created self-conscious unity in the thirteen slave states. In both instances there was a basic social unity, which wanted only political passion to become nationalism. Just as the Seven Years War made England less tolerant of colonial autonomy, so industrialism, westward expansion, and humanitarianism made the Northern States less tolerant of a ' slave power ' within their democratic empire. It was not inevitable in 1850 that Southern society would take a nationalist form: but the prospect of any other result was dubious. The Southern ruling class might be brought to face facts. They might learn to conserve their land, diversify their economic life, and look forward to a gradual extinction of slavery. English ruling classes have done as much, again and again: but English ruling classes were never isolated, or in a position to seek a way out by secession. By 1850 the cotton kingdom had killed practically every germ of creative thought, had excluded every means of purifying discipline, and had resolved to make negro slavery, in an ever-widening radius, a permanent basis of society.

XXIV

WHIGS AND DEMOCRATS

1837–1844

1. *Party Machinery*

NATIONAL politics long concealed the growing divergence between North and South. Churches might split, social differences might deepen, and extremists revile one another; but, so long as the Whig and Democratic parties remained national in scope, the Union was safe. The nature of a political system that not only postponed disunion but survived it, is a matter of some consequence to American history.

After forty years' growth party organization acquired in the Jackson era a settled character. In contrast to its British prototype, which exists normally in a single plane for electing members of Parliament, the American party became tri-dimensional, functioning not only in federal but in state and municipal elections. Analysis of the Whig and Democratic parties and their successors reveals a bundle of local, sectional, and class interests. Their cross-sections, instead of displaying a few simple colors, were a jig-saw puzzle of radicalism and conservatism, nationalism and state rights, personal loyalties and local issues. Party strategy was directed towards accumulating as many bundles as possible; and statesmanship was the art of finding some person or principle common to all the bundles that would make them forget their differences and in union find strength.

Constitutional developments in the states were quickly reflected in the national party organization, as new sectional interests, during the era of good feelings, had thwarted or transformed national party policy. State constitutional changes between 1830 and 1850 tended towards government of, for, and by the people. They continued the process which began during the War of Independence, but which, so far as the Eastern States were concerned, came to a halt about 1790. Religious tests and property qualifications for office were generally swept away, and manhood suffrage adopted. The newer state constitutions, beginning with that of Mississippi in 1832, transferred many offices from the appointive to the elective class. County officials such as sheriffs and justices of the peace, heads of executive departments such as the state treasurer and attorney-general, even judges of the higher courts, were now made elective by the people; and the democratic principle of rotation limited both the number and the length of their terms. Furthermore, these constitutional changes were effected in almost every instance by the democratic method initiated by Massachusetts in 1780: a popularly elected constitutional convention, with a popular referendum on the result. The most noted statesmen were elected to the state conventions, the people took a keen interest in them, and voted intelligently on their work. Nevertheless, in the long run, the making of so many minor officials elective made the ballot too long to be intelligently studied, and decreased the responsibility of officials. As the urban movement gathered volume, new municipalities with elective mayors and bi-cameral councils were established. Political partisanship extended down from the federal to the state and municipal governments: a good Democrat would no more think of voting for a Whig governor or a Whig mayor than for a Whig congressman or President. Federal, state, and local politics were so closely articulated that the misconduct of a state treasurer might turn a presidential election; and the attitude of a President on the tariff or the public lands might embarrass his party's candidate for a municipal office. The state legislatures consumed much time in drafting resolutions on federal matters outside their competence, with the idea of attracting voters or of influencing Congress.

The convention method of nominating candidates for elective office was invented by the Democrats, and by 1840 had been adopted by the Whigs. Local caucuses sent delegates to county conventions for nominating candidates to county office; county conventions sent delegates to state conventions for nominating state candidates, and to district conventions for nominating congressional candidates; state conventions sent delegates to the quadrennial national conventions for nominating the presidential candidates and drafting the platform. Few but professional politicians managed to survive these successive winnowings. Every state had its captains of hundreds and captains of thousands, working for the party every day in the year, and looking for reward to the spoils of victory. Annual or biennial state and local elections kept interest from flagging in the course of a presidential term, and were regarded as portents of the next general election. Innumerable local rallies, often held on the same day with a county fair, barbecue, or anniversary, gave the leaders an occasion for inspiring the faithful, 'spellbinding' the doubtful, and confounding the enemy. Steamboats and railroads carried political orators long distances without undue waste of time, enabling them to speak in other parts of the country than their own. In 1840, for instance, Senator Rives of Virginia addressed a great outdoor gathering at Auburn in New York for three hours and a half, after which Mr. Legaré of South Carolina carried on for two hours and a half more. The long endurance of mid-century audiences was marvellous!

It was a good system for socially democratic regions, where politics still offered the most attractive career to talented and ambitious men, and where the people, for want of other diversions, took a keen interest in their government. Men like Abraham Lincoln rose through the caucus and convention to heights that they could hardly have attained otherwise. But in the cities and manufacturing districts of the North, and wherever social inequality was the rule, property went in search of power, and power in search of property. The multiplicity of elective offices and the spoils system led to corruption. The rough-and-tumble of politics repelled many excellent men from public life, and the civil service was degraded in America at a time when it was improving in England. Yet these political methods, in so far as they aroused the active interest of the average voter and stimulated party loyalty, strengthened the Federal Union.

2. *Van Buren and Tippecanoe*

President Van Buren inherited from Jackson (4 March 1837) an organic party whose dominant note was equality, and whose common tendency was westward expansion. Eventually this Democratic party became an instrument of slaveholders, but in the thirties it was a well-balanced alliance of North, South, and West. Shortly it became identified with state rights, but in 1837 the sturdy nationalism of Andrew Jackson was dominant. 'Old Hickory' had caught the imagination or catered to the appetite of Southern yeomen and petty planters, of pioneer farmers in the Northwest, German and Irish immigrants in the Northern states, and plain country folk in New England and New York. They voted for his adopted heir in 1836, and were prepared to support him so long as he trod in Jackson's footsteps, if not longer. The 'little magician,' however, could not dispel the whirlwind that Jackson's blasts had sowed. He had been in office only a few months when the panic of 1837 broke. The distress that followed seemed to justify the alarmist prophecies of the moneyed men, and gave the administration grave financial embarrassment. Several 'pet banks' defaulted, carrying several millions of federal deposits, and bringing to light corrupt gambling with public money by certain Jackson appointees. A government which in 1836 had been trying to get rid of a surplus was in 1837 at a loss to meet current expenses. Van Buren obtained from Congress a temporary issue of treasury notes. As a permanent fiscal policy, he proposed to lock up government funds in an 'independent treasury' at Washington and 'sub-treasuries' in the federal mints, safe from the clutches of the money power and the wild-cats.

Van Buren's Independent Treasury Bill of 1837 was a sound and statesmanlike measure; and was hailed with delight by the 'loco-foco' or radical wing of the New York Democracy. This faction (so called from having provided themselves at a party caucus with candles and the new loco-foco matches, which enabled them to carry on when the conservatives turned out the gas), was an outgrowth of the old Workingmen's party of 1829, and included many idealists and reformers who held paper money and the credit system responsible for poverty and the panic of 1837. Conversely the 'hunkers' or New York conservative Democrats, who had profited corruptly by the connection between state-chartered banks and federal deposits, viewed Van Buren's new policy with alarm. A general exodus of conservatives from the Democratic party elected William H. Seward, a brilliant young Whig of western New York, the Governor of that state. In Congress the conservative Democrats prevented the Independent Treasury bill from becoming law until 1840. Repealed by the Whigs in 1841, it was re-enacted by the Democrats in 1846 and established the federal fiscal system until the Civil War.

By Van Buren going 'loco-foco' the Democrats became the party of poverty and numbers, and the Whigs the party of property and talents. As Emerson remarked, Democrats had the best principles, Whigs the best men. In the North, where their favorite son was Daniel Webster, they carried on the nationalist and paternal tradition of Hamilton. The manufacturing interest which wanted protection, the merchants and bankers who suffered from Jackson's financial vagaries, went Whig. Earlier third-party movements, such as the Anti-Masons, the nativists, and the anti-slavery followers of J. Q. Adams, were also absorbed, introducing a radical strain that contended with the conservative element. A large number of Westerners, including young Abraham Lincoln, were attracted to the Whig party by the personality of Henry Clay, and the hope of getting something done about the public lands. In the South the Whigs were the party of gentility and property, owning over two-thirds of all the slaves. Sugar planters of Louisiana, who wanted protection against Cuba; big cotton planters, who regretted the United States Bank, and who in state politics resisted the repudiating tendencies of their poorer fellows; antique republicans of Virginia and North Carolina, who disliked Jackson's aggressive nationalism and 'executive tyranny'—all went Whig. Nowhere but in America could a political party have been formed from such heterogeneous elements.

South Carolina followed Calhoun out of the Democratic party in 1832, but refused to ally with the Whigs, noting with alarm the anti-slavery and nationalist tendencies in their Northern wing. It was Calhoun's policy to unite the entire South under the banner of state rights to protect slavery, while the political abolitionists endeavored to unite the North under the banner of anti-slavery. Both Whigs and Democrats very wisely endeavored to keep this dangerous issue out of national politics; but events were to force it in.

Senator Archer of Virginia wrote Sir Charles Vaughan in 1840 that the presidential election of that year was a 'contest between radicalism and the property and education of the country.' Sir Charles must have had some difficulty in distinguishing which was the conservative party, since the Whigs were too wise to appear in their true character. It was necessary to out-demagogue the Democrats, and carry the West. To this end Clay revived his 'distribution' scheme for public land; and the Whig national convention, instead of nominating Clay or Webster or a Southern planter, chose old General Harrison, the 'hero of Tippecanoe.' John Tyler, a Virginian who had sympathized with nullification, was nominated for the Vice-Presidency in order to attract Calhoun's followers. The Whig convention wisely adopted no platform. Catch phrases such as 'Tippecanoe and Tyler too,' 'Harrison, two dollars a day, and roast beef,' served better than principles.

Harrison's nomination was a milepost in the evolution of the Presidency. Wise politicians realized that when sectional issues threatened the national parties, they could nominate a 'favorite son' such as Webster, or a statesman with a definite policy such as Clay, only at a risk of alienating other members of the party alliance, and losing the election. Since 1840 successful presidential candidates have not been prominent and experienced statesmen, but military heroes or relatively obscure men who had not had time to make enemies. Only by inadvertence, as in the case of Lincoln, did the President prove to be a man of outstanding ability.

The campaign of 1840 was the jolliest presidential election America has ever known. Van Buren suffered from the same buncombe that he had used against Adams in 1828; and the Whigs had plenty of money to influence the numerous unemployed. Clay happily denounced the Independent Treasury as 'The perilous union of the purse and sword, so justly dreaded by our British and Revolutionary ancestors.' A sensible reorganization of the state militia, proposed by the Secretary of War, was compared to Persian satrapies. Van Buren was pictured with cologne-scented whiskers, drinking champagne out of a crystal goblet at a table loaded with costly viands and massive plate. An unlucky sneer in a Democratic newspaper, to the effect that Harrison would be content with a log cabin and plenty of hard cider, gave opportunity for effective contrast. It became the log-cabin, hard-cider campaign. There were log-cabin badges and log-cabin songs, a *Log Cabin* newspaper and log-cabin clubs, big log cabins where the thirsty were regaled with hard cider that the jealous Democrats alleged to be stiffened with whisky; little log cabins borne on floats in procession, with latch-string out, cider barrel by the door, coon-skin nailed up beside, and real smoke coming out of the chimney, while lusty voices bawled:

Let Van from his coolers of silver drink wine,
  And lounge on his cushioned settee.
Our man on his buckeye bench can recline,
  Content with hard cider is he,
    The iron-armed soldier, the true hearted soldier,
    The gallant old soldier of Tippecanoe!

Huge balls, supposed to represent the gathering majority, were rolled by men and boys from village to village and state to state, singing as they rolled:

What has caused this great commotion, motion, motion,
 Our country through?
—It is the ball a-rolling on, for
(*Chorus.*) TIPPECANOE and Tyler too:—
 Tippecanoe and Tyler too.
And with them we'll beat little Van, Van, Van,
 Oh! Van is a used-up man.

Tippecanoe and Tyler too rolled up 234 electoral votes, a four-to-one majority.

General Harrison, an honest, simple soldier of sixty-eight years, was expected by the Whig politicians to place himself in the hands of such men as Clay and Webster. The latter had the insolence to offer him a ready-made inaugural address of his own composition. But the General had already compiled from schoolboy memories of Plutarch and Roman history a turgid address of which he was very proud. With some difficulty he was induced to let Webster revise it. After one day of this work the 'god-like Daniel' arrived late for dinner, and so haggard that his hostess was alarmed. She hoped that nothing had happened? 'Madam,' replied Webster, 'you would think something had happened, if you knew what I have done. I have killed seventeen Roman proconsuls as dead as smelts!'

On 4 April 1841, a month after delivering his emasculated inaugural address, the Hero of Tippecanoe died. John Tyler succeeded to his office, and title too.

It was soon demonstrated that desire for office was the only binding force in the Whig party. Henry Clay expected to be mayor of the White House as well as leader of the Senate; but the new President was an obstinate man of commonplace mind and narrow views. Clay, like Hamilton, wished to integrate the Federal government by catering to substantial interests; and his immediate ambition was to charter a new Bank of the United States. Tyler believed it his mission to assert Virginian state-rights 'principles of 1798,' and to strip the Federal government of its 'usurped' power; but he lacked both the personal magnetism and the saving common sense of Jefferson.

Tyler took over Harrison's cabinet, carried through the purgation of the civil service that Harrison had begun, signed a 'distribution-pre-emption' bill of Clay's to discharge the party debt to the West,[1] and accepted an upward revision of tariff schedules as a necessary measure for the revenue. But he vetoed all bills for internal improvements and harbor works, and refused to accept any fiscal device that bore the remotest resemblance to the B.U.S. of detestable memory. Clay's bill for a new bank was returned with the President's veto, as was a second bill especially drafted to meet his constitutional scruples (9 September 1841).

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[1] This Act provided what the squatters had long wanted, the right to pre-empt a quarter-section of public land at the minimum price. It provided for distributing

From that moment there was open warfare between Tyler and Clay. Four days later the cabinet resigned — excepting Webster, who wished to appear independent of Clay — and the President was read out of the Whig party.

Here was Calhoun's chance to count in the sectional balance of power. For three years (1841–43), while Tyler attempted to form a party with a corporal's guard of faithful Whigs, Calhoun played a waiting game, repressing a secession movement among his hotheaded followers in South Carolina, intriguing to obtain the Democratic nomination for the Presidency in 1844. Webster left the cabinet in 1843; and in March 1844 Calhoun became Tyler's Secretary of State.

The new combination was revolutionary in American politics. It meant that Tyler had gone over to the Democrats, and Calhoun returned to them. Calhoun's purpose was to 'reform' the Democratic party on the basis of state rights; to force upon it the formula which he believed to be necessary to preserve the Union. And this state-rights formula was a mere theoretic cover for the main purpose of his devoted followers, to perpetuate slavery where it existed, and extend it into regions where it existed not. Calhoun tipped the internal balance of the Democratic party very definitely southward; the loss of Tyler inclined the internal balance of the Whig party slightly, but no less definitely, northward. The important question of which side the West would take was decided when the Democrats nominated James K. Polk for the Presidency in 1844, on a platform of westward expansion. It was even more significant that in the same platform the Democrats neglected to reaffirm their faith, as had been their wont, in the principles of the Declaration of Independence.

So soon did the clean-cut division between the Democrats as the

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ten per cent of the proceeds from sales to the states within whose limits lay the land disposed of.

party of poverty and numbers, and the Whigs as the party of property and talents, become blurred. Only ten years more, and the main division between them would be sectional, and then, woe betide the Union!

3. *Anglo-American Relations*

From Lake Champlain to the Rocky Mountains the Canadian-United States boundary had been determined and fixed after the Peace of Ghent,[2] but the two ends of it were still hanging loose, wanting definition or compromise, when a fresh expansive movement of the American population threatened once more to involve the two countries in war.

Although war was averted through diplomacy, there was a deeper reason why the two nations remained at peace during a period when their press was provocative, and their expansive energies seemed certain to clash. Each country was bound to the other by economic ties the rupture of which would have been disastrous. In spite of tariff fluctuations the United States remained Britain's best customer, taking on the average about fifteen per cent of her total exports. At the same time England was America's best customer for raw materials, especially cotton;[3] a fact which counteracted Southern hostility towards the foremost anti-slavery nation. American products supplanted only the coarser sort of British cottons and woollens in the United States, and competed very slightly with British manufactures in South America and the Far East. At the same time the American textile industry created a market for British machinery, the export of which had been permitted since 1825, and provided new employment for emigrating artisans. And although each country considered its own interest when framing tariff schedules, it could not ignore the other's purchasing power. Sir Charles Vaughan, when British Minister at Washington, supplied his Southern friends with free-trade statistics and arguments, which may well have influenced votes for the gradual scaling down of American tariff schedules that began in 1833; and this reduction helped the English free-traders in their drive on the Corn Laws. When the American tariff was again raised in 1842, there was a chorus of 'We told you so' from the English free-traders. Conversely, the repeal of the British Corn Laws — described by Senator McDuffie of South Carolina as 'the greatest of all the measures of modern times' — was an effective free-trade argument in the American tariff debates of 1846 against the Whig catchwords of 'home market,' 'British dumping,' and 'pauper labor.' In this Walker Tariff of 1846 the United States adopted schedules more moderate than those of the principal European countries, and with the Tariff of 1857 America may be said to have joined the free-trading nations. Wheat and cotton might well have kept her in that column through the nineteenth century, had not the secession of the Southern States given the protectionists a new opportunity.

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[2] Chapter XVIII.

[3] The percentage of the American cotton crop taken by Great Britain varied from 46.7 in 1847 to 67.3 in 1827; it was 54 per cent in 1860.

If commercial relations had a pacifying influence on the two countries, financial relations had quite the contrary effect for several years after 1837. England was then the principal source of capital for American industrial development. During the frenzy of speculation in 1835–36 millions of dollars' worth of state bonds had been floated in London in order to finance state-aided canal, railroad, and banking enterprises. The panic of 1837, and the hard times that followed, made it impossible for some of the states and corporations to meet their obligations. The collapse of the 'Cairo City & Canal Co.,' in which Charles Dickens had invested, was responsible for his western tour of 1842 and his subsequent onslaught on the American character. A suspension of interest payments on the Pennsylvania bonds, in which Sidney Smith had invested, caused his famous outburst against 'a nation with whom no contract can be made because none will be kept,' and his facetious proposal to divide the raiment of Pennsylvanian visitors in London among the creditors of their state. Pennsylvania eventually paid every penny due, with interest; but as late as 1845 the interest payments were still suspended on the bonds of seven states, two of which, Michigan and Mississippi, were repudiated. Since the non-suability of states was protected by the eleventh Federal amendment, there was no way of forcing them to pay up. These financial vagaries, and Dickens's literary exploitation of them, made the task of preserving Anglo-American peace in the early forties much more difficult.

4. *Northern Boundary Controversies*

Against this confused background of commercial rivalry and financial irritation occurred several 'regrettable incidents' along the northern border. In the autumn of 1837 rebellion broke out in Upper and Lower Canada. The long constitutional controversy that preceded this outbreak bore so marked a resemblance to the history of the Thirteen Colonies that most Americans hailed the Canadian rebellion as a new American Revolution. Northern New York and Vermont, adjoining the centers of disturbance, harbored numerous smugglers and refugees from Canadian justice; and among their permanent population were thousands of active, energetic young men who were ready for any sort of row. A network of secret societies called the Hunters' Lodges, pledged to expel British dominion from North America, was formed along the border.

President Van Buren, well informed and friendly to the British Empire, endeavored to maintain a strict neutrality; but on the long, unfortified boundary his means were few and feeble, while the state governments were weak in will, and not much stronger in means. Hence, for a period of over a year (1837–38), Mackenzie and his followers were able to obtain money, supplies, and recruits in the United States, and return to loot and burn in Canada. A force of regulars under General Scott was stationed at Buffalo, just after Mackenzie had recruited two or three hundred 'liberators' among the bargees, lake sailors, and others who were suffering from winter unemployment. The rebel headquarters on Navy Island were supplied from the New York shore by a small American steamer called the *Caroline*. On the night of 29 December 1837, as she lay at her wharf in the United States, a picked band of Canadian volunteers performed the hazardous feat of rowing across the Niagara river where it rushes at seven knots to the head of the falls, cutting out the *Caroline,* and setting her on fire. It was a violation — or counter-violation — of neutrality analogous to that of Jackson in Florida; but New York was not a Spanish province, and peppery Palmerston was in Downing Street instead of calm Castlereagh.

Lord Durham, who had been sent to Canada to report on conditions there, saw the real significance of these incidents. No matter how firmly the rebellion might be suppressed, protracted discontent in Canada must lead to Anglo-American war, or to the liberal elements in Canada seeking annexation to the United States. Canada owes her grant of responsible government in 1841, in some measure at least, to the disturbing presence of her neighbor. Later, the federation movement was inspired by similar considerations; and if Canadian union assumed a more nationalist form than the union of the

States, it was largely because the action of New York in 1837–41, and of the Southern States in 1860–61, had bared the weakness of American federalism. A similar repulsion from the congressional form of representative government led Canada to adopt the British parliamentary system, a guarantee against political connection with the United States.

In 1840, before the United States could obtain an admission from Palmerston that the attack on the *Caroline* had been deliberate and official, a Canadian named McLeod boasted in a New York bar-room that he had killed an American in the affray, and was promptly arrested and indicted for murder. Palmerston then admitted that the ship had been destroyed under orders as a necessary means of defence against American 'pirates,' and demanded the immediate release of McLeod. Execution of him, so he wrote the British minister at Washington, 'would produce war, war immediate and frightful in its character, because it would be a war of retaliation and vengeance.' President Tyler and Secretary Webster, anxious as Van Buren to preserve the peace, were equally hampered by the limitations of Federal government. Governor Seward of New York insisted that the justice of his state should take its course, and Webster could do no more than provide counsel for the prisoner.

In other directions Anglo-American relations were dangerously strained. The Maine boundary controversy had just been rendered more acute by fresh *ex parte* surveys and reports. Palmerston was not prepared to give an inch on this point, and his temper was rising against slave-traders who claimed immunity under the American flag. In a note of 27 August 1841 he emphatically asserted the right of visit, which the United States government refused to admit, as an entering wedge for the humiliating right of search. On that day the two countries were nearer war than at any time between 1815 and 1861; but on the following day the Melbourne ministry resigned, and Sir Robert Peel formed a new one with Lord Aberdeen in the Foreign Office.

Instantly the war clouds rolled away. In England, Aberdeen appointed a special mission to Washington; in New York, McLeod sober managed to find an alibi for McLeod drunk, and was acquitted.

The northeastern boundary controversy was already sixty years old. On the merits it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that 'the

British claim had no foundation of any sort or kind' in law.[4] It had been the intention of the negotiators in 1782–83 to give the United States the territory of the old Province of Sagadahoc (eastern Maine), and the United States claimed no more. The northern part of that region was then, as much of it still is, a wilderness; hence the provincial boundaries had never been marked, and the negotiators of 1782 merely copied the terms of former grants and governors' commissions in agreeing that the international boundary should follow the 'Highlands which divide those rivers that empty themselves into the St. Lawrence from those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean.'

East of Lake Champlain, if this treaty were followed literally, the boundary would run inconveniently close to the St. Lawrence river and obstruct the natural land route between Quebec and the Maritime Provinces. Accordingly, a British case for flattening out the Maine salient was built up, largely on the quibble that the Bay of Fundy was not the Atlantic Ocean. If that interpretation were admitted, the entire valley of the St. John, which flowed into the Bay of Fundy, must be included in Canada. The War of 1812 emphasized this strategic consideration; and in course of time this interpretation became, in the minds of most British subjects, a prescriptive right, the denial of which by Americans was accounted low and grasping. The question was referred to Dutch arbitration in 1831; but the King of the Netherlands expressed his inability to locate the 'highlands,' and proposed to divide the disputed territory by an arbitrary line which the United States refused to accept. More legal briefs were then accumulated, more surveys were made, and Maine lumber-jacks had some gorgeous fights with their rivals from New Brunswick. In 1838 British 'trespassers' along the Aroostook (a tributary to the St. John) seized a 'trespassing' official of Maine; both state and provincial governors called out their militia, and the resulting 'Aroostook War' remained bloodless only because President Van Buren was willing to arrange a *modus vivendi* until the diplomatists could try their skill again.

So matters stood early in 1842, when Aberdeen sent Lord Ashburton of the house of Baring to negotiate at Washington with Daniel

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[4] Lieut.-Col. D. H. Mills, in *United Empire*, ii. 687. New Brunswick subsequently made the United States' case her own, in demanding from Quebec such part of the disputed territory as Ashburton had obtained; and a royal commission in 1851 sustained New Brunswick's case, indirectly validating that of Maine and the United States.

Webster, sometime of the house of Biddle. Both men, and Aberdeen and Tyler too, were ardent for peace. To that end Webster stepped down from the Olympian atmosphere in which he was wont to move, conducted the negotiations informally, discarded the treaty of 1783 as inexecutable, and compromised. The negotiation, conducted wholly in private and largely by conversation, resulted in the Webster-Ashburton treaty of 9 August 1842, which established the present boundary. Great Britain obtained about five-twelfths of the disputed territory — better than the Dutch proposal of 1831, and sufficient for a connecting link between Quebec and New Brunswick. The United States with the other seven-twelfths obtained a rectification of frontier on Lake Champlain, sufficient to include a fort that had inadvertently been built on Canadian territory. The international lake and river boundary, which a joint commission under the Treaty of Ghent had completed only to the Sault Ste. Marie, was continued thence to the Lake of the Woods.

It was one thing for Webster and Ashburton to sign a treaty; quite another to get it ratified by the Senate and accepted by Parliament. This contest was won by what Webster called the 'battle of the maps.' An American historian had discovered in Paris, and placed in Webster's hands, an early French map with a red line sustaining the British claim. Both he and Webster assumed that this map represented Franklin's understanding of the treaty of 1783: a conclusion quite erroneous, but temporarily useful. One look at it brought the delegates of Maine to Webster's heel; and in the Senate it helped to obtain the necessary two-thirds majority. On the other side, the director of the British Museum had discovered, and the Foreign Office impounded, a map formerly belonging to George III, which showed the 'boundary as described by Mr. Oswald' (one of the peace commissioners of 1783), exactly along the line of the American claim! Aberdeen happily produced this map in Parliament when Palmerston attacked the treaty as the 'Ashburton capitulation.'

XXV

WHERE ROLLS THE OREGON

1825–48

1. *The Far West*

THE Webster-Ashburton treaty left only one Anglo-American controversy unadjusted; and that too was a question of the northern border. Both countries claimed the whole of Oregon,[1] while submitting to joint occupation under the treaty of 1818, until the question of sovereignty could be settled. Castlereagh in 1818, Canning in 1824 and 1826, refused the offers of J. Q. Adams to divide Oregon by latitude 49°. By the Florida treaty of 1819 the United States inherited all the Spanish claims north of latitude 42°; and Russia, by later treaties with the United States and Great Britain, withdrew the southern boundary of Alaska to latitude 54° 40′. But the rival pretensions of the Hudson's Bay Company and of American pioneers were to force an issue between England and the United States.

Since 1806, when Lewis and Clark returned from their overland exploration of a trans-continental route to the Pacific, the United States government had not taken much interest in the Far West. Major Long's expedition of 1819 reported the Great Plains 'almost wholly unfit for cultivation,' and laid down on the map of that region, which now supports a thriving population of several millions, the legend 'Great American Desert.' In 1821 the Canadian Northwest Company, which had purchased the American trading-post of Astoria on the Columbia river, amalgamated with the Hudson's Bay Company. Three years later Fort Vancouver was constructed by the Company on the north bank of the lower Columbia. It became an emporium for fur, salmon, and timber, the resort alike of native and white trappers, and the center of a small agricultural settlement. The Hudson's Bay factor, Dr. John McLoughlin, ruled the community with wisdom and humanity, preserved the peace between whites and savages, upheld civilized standards of social life, and later received American missionaries with kindness and hospitality that he did not extend to American traders—the rivals of his company.

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[1] Including not only the present State of Oregon, but Washington, Idaho, a part of Montana, and British Columbia. The name, derived from Jonathan Carver's Munchausen-like *Travels,* was popularized by Bryant's *Thanatopsis* in 1817:

> The continuous woods
> Where rolls the Oregon and hears no sound
> Save his own dashings.

Distance and the Indians were the principal obstacles to an American settlement of Oregon. After two centuries of colonization, the settled frontier of the United States in 1830 was only half-way across the continent. Independence, Missouri, was its farthest point from the Atlantic. Thence the frontier line sloped away easterly; the Pacific coast was distant fifteen hundred miles as the crow flies. North and South through Independence ran the Andrew Jackson Indian barrier, near the present Kansas City. Transplanted Indians occupied the area where the prairies rise into the great plains.

The great plains of the United States cover an area equal to that of European Russia. Their smooth or gently rolling surface, rising gradually or by step-like escarpments from an elevation of two thousand to six thousand feet, was covered with a carpet of grass, rank and thick in the eastern portions, but giving way to tufts of short buffalo-grass and sage-brush in the parched high plains. An occasional rocky dome, butte, or mesa established a welcome landmark. The Platte and Missouri rivers, with their short tributaries, cut deep gashes in the soil and watered a thin line of willow, cottonwood, and wild plum trees. A short summer of blistering heat, with fierce thunderstorms and frequent cyclones, followed hard on a long winter of bitter northwest winds and heavy snow. Over this area roamed the Kansa, Pawnee, Sioux, Cheyenne, Blackfoot, Crow, and Arapaho tribes: the plains Indians who were to the modern movie of yesterday what the forest Indians were to Fenimore Cooper. Countless herds of buffalo grazed on the plains and supplied the redskins with every necessity of life: with meat for immediate use, or, dried and pounded into pemmican, for winter subsistence; with skins for clothing, shields, harness, vessels, and the cover of the tipis or tents; with sinews for thread, cordage, and bowstrings; with bone for arrow-heads and implements; with peltry to sell the traders; even with fuel. These Indians had long since



THE FAR WEST
1830 ~ 1848

Town or Settlement
Indian Village
Indian Pueblo
Trading Post
Army Post
Mission Settlement
Battles
Continental Divide
U.S.-Mexican Boundary, 1819-45
" " " 1848
State & Territorial Boundaries
Trails
Railways, 1850
OTO Indian Tribes
IOWA States & Territories of the U.S. & Mexico
VANCOUVER
Str. of Juan de Fuca
Ft. Victoria
Ft. Langley
HUDSON
LINE
Bow Ft.
Saskatchewan R.
C. Disappointment
Columbia R.
CHINOOK
Nisqually
Mt. Rainier
Ft. Colville
COEUR D'ALENE
Portland
Ft. Vancouver
Ft. Walla Walla
Waiilatpu
Champoeg
Salem
Oregon City
CASCADE
CAYUSE
OREGON
NEZ PERCE
FLATHEAD
Rocky Mts.
Ft. Benton
Milk R.
BLACKFOOT
The Great Falls
CROW
Big Horn
UMPQUA
Rogue R.
Klamath Lakes
Mt. Shasta
SHOSHONE
Ft. Boise
Ft. Hall
TRAIL
South P.
C. Mendocino
Sacramento R.
SIERRA
PAIUTE
Great Salt Lake
Ogden's Hole
Ft. Bridger
Salt Lake City
Green R.
UTE
Sonoma
Sutter's Ft.
Sacramento
CALIFORNIA
San Francisco
San Jose
San Joaquin
Santa Cruz
Monterey
NEVADA
SPANISH
NUEVO
HOPI
NAVAJO
Santa Miguel
San Luis Obispo
C. Concepcion
Santa Barbara
San Gabriel
Los Angeles
San Pascual
San Diego
MOJAVE
Colorado R.
Zuni
Jemez
Santa Fe
Laguna
Acoma
MEXICO
APACHE
Gila R.
PIMA
BAJA CALIFORNIA
GULF OF CALIFORNIA
SONORA
CHIHUAHUA
Chihuahua
SIERRA MADRE
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

N B A Y CO.
ASSINIBOINE
L. WINNIPEG
Ft. Garry (Winnipeg)
METIS
Pembina
L. of the Woods
Rainy L.
Ft. William
Grand Portage
L. SUPERIOR
1818
Ft. Union
Yellowstone R.
MANDAN
Missouri
Red R. (of North)
C H I P P E W A
WISCONSIN (Ter. 1836: State 1848)
S I O U X
Ft. Snelling
St. Paul
Mississippi R.
Wisconsin R.
Fond du Lac
L. MICHIGAN
Ft. Pierre
CHEYENNE
DAKOTA
Black Hills
Powder
Ft. Winnebago
Madison
Ft. Crawford (P du Chien)
Milwaukee
Racine
IOWA
Des Moines
Dubuque
Lead Mines
Galena
Chicago
Davenport
Rock R.
Elgin
OMAHA
PAWNEE
Laramie
North Fork
OREGON TRAIL
Council Bluffs
(1846)
Burlington
Ft. Armstrong
Nauvoo
Peoria
Springfield
Long's Pk.
S. Fork
Platte R.
OTO
ARAPAHO
Ft. Kearney
Kansas R.
MIS-SOURI
St. Joseph
KICKAPOO
Ft. Leavenworth
ILLINOIS
Illinois R.
National Rd.
Pikes Pk.
KANSAS
Boonville
Independence
Vandalia
Pueblo
Ft. Bent
DELAWARE
Westport
St. Louis
Jefferson Barracks
Osage R.
Lead Mines
Shawneetown
Wabash
Ohio R.
MIAMI
IROQUOIS
Cairo
OSAGE
KEN.
Taos
SANTA FE TRAIL
Santa Fe
CHEROKEE
Tennessee
KIOWA
Arkansas R.
TENN.
Canadian R.
CREEK
Ft. Gibson
ARKANSAS
Memphis
Pecos
Ft. Smith
CHICKASAW
CHOCTAW
Little Rock
(1836)
MISSISSIPPI
COMANCHE
Ft. Towson
Red R.
Llano Estacado
Rio Pecos
Rio Trinidad
Sabine R.
Yazoo R.
Vicksburg
Rio Brazos
LOUISIANA
Natchitoches
Natchez
Rio Colorado
Nacogdoches
TEXAS
Bayou Sara
Port Hudson
Austin
Washington
Liberty
Opelousas
New Orleans
San Antonio de Bexar
Houston
S. Felipe
San Jacinto
Atchafalaya Bay
Galveston Bay
Alamo
Rio Guadalupe
Rio S. Antonio
Goliad
Matagorda
Rio Nueces
Rio Grande del Norte
COAHUILA (1830-36)
TAMAULIPAS
GULF OF MEXICO
Monterey
Saltillo
Buena Vista
Palo Alto
Matamoras
Miles
0 100 200 300 400
107 105 103 101 99 97 95 93 91 89 87 85
51 49 47 45 43 41 39 37 35 33 31 29 27 25
103 101 99 97 95 93 91 89

F W Walker

domesticated the wild mustang, offspring of those set free by the Spanish *conquistadores,* and showed marvellous skill in shooting buffalo with bow and arrow while riding bareback.

The plains Indians seldom practised agriculture, and knew little or nothing of pottery, basketry, or weaving; but they were the finest physical specimens of the race, and in warfare, once they had learned the use of the rifle, were more formidable than the eastern tribes that had yielded so slowly to the white man. Politically they were even less developed; tribe warred with tribe, and itself knew no common head or council. A highly developed sign language was the only means of intertribal communication. The effective unit was the band or village of a few hundred souls, which might be seen in the course of its wanderings encamped by some watercourse with tipis erected; or pouring over the plain, squaws and children leading the dogs and pack-horses with their trailing travois, superbly dressed braves loping gaily ahead on their wiry steeds. Like other redskins, they lived only for the day, recognized no rights of property, robbed or killed any party of whites who could not defend themselves, inflicted cruelty without a qualm, and endured torture without flinching.

The only white men who penetrated this region before 1830 were explorers, fur traders, and trappers. As soon as Lewis and Clark brought news of the untouched store of fur-bearing animals in the core of the continent, commercial companies were organized to hunt them. The plains Indians were able to supply plenty of buffalo skins, but disliked trapping; hence the trading companies organized bands of *engagés,* trappers who spent most of their time in the Rocky Mountains or Black Hills, and returned yearly to a company post on the upper Platte or Missouri, in order to turn in their furs, and enjoy a week's riotous living on the proceeds. Peltry was also obtained from free-lance trappers who managed by prowess or address to obtain a certain immunity from the Indians. Supplies and trading goods were sent up-river from St. Louis in the spring floods, as far as possible by steamboat, and farther in rough *bateaux* manned by French-Canadian *voyageurs*. Peltry and buffalo hides were sent down in the same way; or, if the year's taking surpassed the available tonnage, in ' bull-boats ' made of buffalo-hides stretched on a wicker frame, bound with buffalo sinews and paid with buffalo tallow. Every river, valley, mountain, and water-hole of the Far West was known to the trappers before 1830: and without their guidance and knowledge transcontinental emigration would have been impossible. It was they who discovered the South Pass of the Rockies in Wyoming, a wide valley of rolling hills that takes one to the transcontinental divide by easy gradients. A party of trappers led by Jedediah Smith and William Sublette took the first covered wagons from the Missouri to the Rockies, in 1830. Six years later Captain Bonneville, whose adventures provided literary material for Washington Irving, took the first loaded wagons through the South Pass, and down the Snake valley to the Columbia.

2. *The Oregon Trail*

The methods of the fur trade, and much of the personnel, were of French Canada. As in the Canada of Louis XIV, missionaries followed close on the heels of traders, but the missionaries in this instance were Protestant Yankees. In 1832 a group of Methodists under the Rev. Jason Lee joined a fur-trading party on the long overland route, and by 1834 had established a mission in the valley of the Willamette, which flowed into the Columbia at the site of Portland. Two years later a band of Presbyterians, including the energetic Dr. Marcus Whitman about whom a legend was soon built up, and the first white woman to cross the American continent, founded mission stations in the Walla Walla country, at the junction of the Snake and Columbia. Supply ships were sent to them round the Horn, and Dr. McLoughlin gave them every aid and encouragement, although he had more reason to favor the French Canadian priests who were coming to the Bitter Root valley and the Cœur d'Alêne country, somewhat northward.

Proselytizing among the tribes of Oregon was not notably successful, but the missionaries in the Willamette valley found themselves in clover. Western Oregon has a delightfully mild and equable climate. The country was a mixture of open prairie with magnificent pine woods, rich soil for tillage and natural meadows for grazing cattle. The missionaries' widely published letters spread the notion of Oregon as a home, while Washington Irving in his *Astoria* (1836) and *Adventures of Captain Bonneville* (1837) stressed the wilderness theme. Settlers began to arrive from New England; not many, to be sure, but enough to give Oregon a permanent Yankee flavor.

In 1842 the 'Oregon fever' struck the frontier folk of Iowa and

Missouri, eager to renew their forest pioneering. Independence was the 'jumping-off place' for the Oregon trail. Covered wagons converged there from the eastward in May, when the plains grass was fresh and green. More supplies were taken in, since hunting was a precarious source of food; and no help could be expected on the two-thousand-mile hike to the Willamette, unless from fur-trading posts that were not too well stocked themselves. Parties were organized, a captain appointed, an experienced trapper or fur trader engaged as pilot; and amid a great blowing of bugles and cracking of long whips, the caravan, perhaps a hundred wagons strong with thousands of cattle on the hoof, moved off up the west bank of the Missouri. At Fort Leavenworth, one of the bastions of the Indian frontier, the emigrants broke contact with their flag and its protection.

Near the Council Bluffs, where the Missouri is joined by the Platte, the Oregon trail turned west to follow the latter river over the Great Plains.[2] Until a road had been beaten into the sod, it was easy to lose the way. Numerous tributaries of the Platte, swollen and turbid in the spring of the year, had to be forded or swum, to the great damage of stores and baggage. Francis Parkman in 1846 found ancient tables and chests of drawers which perhaps had served some family in a dozen homes between England and the Mississippi, left cracking in the sun where this latest wave of migration had grounded them. Every night the caravan made a hollow square of wagons round its fire of cottonwood or buffalo chips. Sentries stood guard to protect the hobbled horses and grazing cattle, and the howling of prairie wolves was drowned by the chorus of an old Appalachian ballad:

Then o'er the hills in legions, boys,
  Fair freedom's star
Points to the sunset regions, boys,
  Ha, ha! ha, ha!

Until the forks of the Platte were reached, near the present northeastern corner of Colorado, the herbage was luxuriant, and the grades easy. Following the north fork, the trail became hilly and then mountainous, as one turned north to avoid the Laramie spur of the Rockies. Beyond the South Pass came the worst part of the journey — a long, hard pull across the arid Wyoming basin, where the grass was scanty, and alkali deposits made the water almost undrinkable. Between the Gros Ventre and Teton ranges of the Rockies the Oregon emigrant found westward-flowing waters, and took heart; but there were still eight hundred miles to go to the lower Columbia, following the meanderings of the Snake river. As there was no good road in early days through the heavily forested country along the Columbia, wagons were often rafted down the stream; and with fair luck a party that left Independence in May might expect to celebrate Thanksgiving Day in the Willamette valley. But it was a lucky caravan indeed that arrived with the same number of souls that started; and some of the weaker parties disappeared — whether by starvation after losing the trail, or at the hands of Indians, no one knows.

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[2] Later, the Oregon trail cut straight across the prairie from Independence to the southernmost bend of the Platte, near the site of Kearney, Nebraska.

Up to this time there had been no law in the Oregon country outside the Hudson's Bay settlement; and it speaks well for the character of the first emigrants that there was no crime. A group of Willamette valley settlers who gathered to hear a Fourth of July speech in 1843 remained to form a government by compact, as their ancestors had done in the Appalachian valleys. The heavy immigration of 1843–45, four to five thousand strong, including pioneers of lawless proclivities from Missouri, Arkansas, Iowa, and Illinois, strained the provisional organization, and convinced Congress that something must be done to provide this remote colony with government, law, and land titles. First, however, the Federal government wished to reach a settlement with Great Britain.

Webster and Ashburton discussed the Oregon question informally in 1842, but reached no conclusion. The next year, agitation for annexing the whole of Oregon up to 54° 40′ was begun in the Western states, and Democratic politicians scented a good issue to win the Western vote in the next presidential election. A bill for organizing Oregon as a United States Territory passed the Senate in February 1843, but the House, fortunately ignorant of Palmerston's threat that the passage 'would be a declaration of war,' let it drop. Secretary Calhoun opened negotiations on the subject in 1844 with the British minister at Washington, and repeated the proposal thrice made by Adams, to divide the territory along latitude 49°. Aberdeen, like Castlereagh and Canning, refused to retire from the north bank of the Columbia.

If the question were to be decided by extent of actual occupation the British claim was just; and it would be difficult to discover any other basis of division. North of the Columbia, about Fort Vancouver and along Puget Sound, were living over seven hundred British subjects, and only half a dozen American citizens. The United States, however, could well afford to wait. A decline in the Columbia valley fur trade was making Fort Vancouver unprofitable, and the menacing attitude of the latest American immigrants threatened its security. At Dr. McLoughlin's suggestion the Company abandoned Fort Vancouver to the Americans in 1845, and erected a new post on Vancouver Island.

By this time the expansionist James K. Polk had become President of the United States. In his inaugural address (4 March 1845) the President shouted defiance at Britain; and in December, asserting that the American title to the whole of Oregon was clear and unquestionable,' he asked Congress for authority to terminate the joint occupation agreement of 1818. To a timid congressman Polk remarked that 'the only way to treat John Bull was to look him straight in the eye; that he considered a bold and firm course on our part the pacific one.'

3. *The Mormons*

Before the Oregon question was finally adjusted came the hegira of the Mormons to the Great Salt Lake.

In New England, and that part of the Middle West settled by Yankees, there was a class corresponding to the 'poor white trash' of the South; shiftless people unable to get on in an atmosphere of energy and thrift, resenting the pity or disdain of their successful neighbors, susceptible to religious charlatanry. The Southern underdog was at this period a frontier individualist, who took his religion in violent revivalist doses. 'When I hear a man preach I like to see him act as if he were fighting bees,' said Abraham Lincoln. But the more social Yankee liked to merge his identity in a communal movement, preferably of a sort that gave him a definite place in some theocracy, however squalid, and promised him glorious compensation beyond the grave for his worldly humiliations. Further, the Yankee population had an excess of women. Dozens of new sects such as the Millerites competed in the thirties and forties for this Yankee substratum, which was completely immune to such intellectual movements as Unitarianism. The most permanent and successful upheaval from these cultural depths was the 'Church of Jesus Christ of the Latter-day Saints.'

Joseph Smith was the village ne'er-do-well and champion liar of Palmyra, N. Y., with a hobby of digging for buried treasure. An Angel of the Lord, so he claimed, showed him the hiding-place of a package of inscribed gold plates, together with a pair of magic spectacles which enabled him to read the 'reformed Egyptian' characters. The resulting Book of Mormon, a dull and illiterate parody of the Old Testament, described the history of certain lost tribes of Israel — the Indians forsooth, whom the Saints were commanded to redeem from paganism. Joseph Smith promptly organized the Church of the Latter-day Saints. As Prophet, he received from time to time appropriate and sustaining revelations, including the one sanctioning polygamy, which he and the inner circle of elders were already practising. A hierarchy was duly promulgated, providing place and title for almost everyone, but all power to the Prophet. A community was founded near Cleveland, Ohio, where the Saints were set to work under the Prophet's direction, and rigorously tithed for his advantage. In order to approach the Lost Tribes, the community moved to a spot near Independence, Missouri; but the hostility of other frontier folk forced a transfer to Nauvoo, Illinois, on the east bank of the Mississippi river. At first the Mormons were welcomed in Illinois, courted by both political parties, and given a charter that made Nauvoo practically an autonomous theocracy. But the settlement grew so rapidly — faster even than Chicago — that the Illinoisians became alarmed; and the Mormons were aggressive and thievish neighbors who contributed nothing to the general welfare. In 1844 Joseph Smith and his brother were murdered. Brigham Young, who succeeded to the mantle of the Prophet and to five of his twenty-seven widows, directed retaliation on the 'Gentiles' by a corps of 'Avenging Angels'; and for two years terror reigned in western Illinois. It was clearly time for another move, before they were hopelessly outnumbered and exterminated.

Yet the Mormons had made an astonishing gain in numbers. Missionaries had been raking in converts from the Northern States since 1831; and by 1840, when Brigham Young visited Liverpool, England had become one of their principal harvest fields. For in England thousands of poor laborers were allured by the prospect of a decent living, and the promise of heavenly 'thrones, kingdoms, principalities and powers.' Almost four thousand English converts reached Nauvoo between 1840 and 1846, and forty or fifty churches of Latter-day Saints in the old country contributed modest tithes to the Prophet's bulging treasury.

Under their new Moses, a cunning and ruthless autocrat but a leader of energy and vision, the Mormons abandoned their homes in Nauvoo, and in 1846, twelve thousand strong, began their great westward trek. After wintering near the Council Bluffs, Brigham Young pushed ahead with a pioneer band along a new 'Mormon trail' on the north bank of the Platte; and in July reached the promised land, the basin of the Great Salt Lake. Many flinched from the long journey, but by the end of 1848 five thousand had arrived in the future State of Utah.

This new Canaan was a dry and inhospitable land. Young chose it in the hope that his Saints would no longer be molested by Gentiles. Arid wastes, where salt and alkali deposits glistened among sage-brush thickets, sloped down from the Rocky Mountains to the Great Salt Lake, desolate and repulsive as another Dead Sea. Up in the mountains lay natural reservoirs of rain and snow, the means of quickening life.

For such unfamiliar conditions the individualistic tradition of English-speaking pioneers was inadequate; the communal, theocratic customs of the Mormons appropriate. Brigham Young was equally competent as ruler and lawgiver, priest and patriarch. He caused irrigation canals and ditches to be dug, appointed committees to control the water for the public benefit, discarding the common-law doctrine of riparian rights, and adopted a system of small farms, intensively cultivated and carefully fertilized. He forbade speculation in land, but respected private property and accumulated a considerable fortune for himself. He kept the Indians quiet by a judicious mixture of firmness and justice. He repressed heresy and schism with a heavy hand, organized foreign and domestic missions, and financed the transcontinental immigration. By means of a complicated hierarchy he controlled both temporal and spiritual affairs with Yankee shrewdness, rough humor, and substantial justice, and held himself responsible only to God.

For ten years there was intermittent want and starvation in Utah, and the gold rush of '49 caused unrest. Brigham Young announced in the Tabernacle at Salt Lake City, 'If you Elders of Israel want to go to the gold mines, go and be damned!' The wiser Saints found it more profitable to sell corn and potatoes to the Argonauts. Yearly the community grew in numbers and in wealth, a polygamous theocracy within a monogamous and democratic nation. Utah was organized as a territory of the United States in 1850, but federal control was practically suspended when President Fillmore appointed Brigham Young the territorial governor. Federal judges were driven from the territory when they refused to obey the Mormon Church; Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston and fifteen hundred regulars could obtain only a nominal submission by the Saints in 1858, and President Lincoln mostly left them alone.

The Pacific Railway brought Salt Lake City into closer touch with the outside world in 1869, but the Mormons have in general remained near to the cultural level from which they were recruited. Polygamy has died out with a rising cost of living, but the Mormon government was too autocratic for a wholesome civic life. Freedom of thought and liberty of action are still narrowly restricted by the Church, and Utah has been as barren in the arts as prolific in progeny. Yet the Mormons brought comfort, happiness, and self-respect to thousands of humble folk; and Brigham Young must be placed among the successful empire-builders of the English-speaking world.

XXVI

FROM THE RIO GRANDE TO MEXICO CITY

1820–1848

1. *Texas*

WHILE one column of pioneers was deploying into the prairies of Illinois and Iowa, and another winding over the Oregon Trail, a third had crossed into Mexican territory, and taken possession of the coastal plain of Texas. Expansion in that direction was no simple matter of endurance or driving back Indians. There the English-speaking pioneer came into contact with a proud and ancient civilization, no longer upheld by a dying empire, but by the young republic of Mexico. Who could tell whether Mexico might not develop the same expansive force as the United States, and Spain recover in the New World the moral dominion she had lost in the Old?

There was little sign of it in 1820. Upper California, New Mexico, and Texas, frontier provinces of the old vice-royalty, spread out fanwise towards the United States, and were attached to the parent trunk by the frailest of stems. Explored as early as the sixteenth century by the Spaniards, they had been thinly colonized after a long interval, and in the Roman rather than the English sense. Missions had been planted among the Indians as centers of civilization and exploitation; *presidios* or frontier garrisons established to protect the fathers in their work; and such few colonists as could be persuaded to venture so far were generously endowed by the Spanish government with lands and Indian serfs. A constant drain on the mother country, the frontier provinces had been maintained simply as a protection to Mexico against the enterprising peoples to the North and East. Once, all North America had been a Spanish bastion, with feeble forts and missions studding the coast as far north as Virginia. The American conquest of Texas and California was a large chapter in the volume that began with the settlement of Jamestown in 1607 and ended with the Spanish-American War of 1898.

Spain has left the stamp of her distinction on the architecture, the place-names, and the customs of these frontier provinces, but her hold on them was slight, as their connection with Mexico was tenuous. Weak, distracted, lacking expansive energy, Mexico knew not how to use them and was too proud to dispose of them. Garrisons were withdrawn, the missions secularized, and the Indians allowed to relapse into barbarism. Upper California, a province the size of Asia Minor with a mild and equable climate, forests of giant pines and sequoias, broad valleys of marvellous fertility, and mountain ranges abounding in mineral wealth, contained little more than six thousand white men in 1846. The large free-handed life of these Mexicans of California has been admirably described in *Two Years before the Mast,* by a seaman of one of those Yankee ships which were their principal connection with the outside world. Already in 1835 hundreds of Yankees had 'left their consciences at Cape Horn' to live and trade in this delightful country; and about 1840 overland emigrants began to trickle in from the Oregon trail through the passes of the Sierra Nevada.

Between the Sierra and the Rocky Mountains was another vast region, nominally under Mexican dominion, that did not contain a single white settler until 1846, when Brigham Young led his Saints into the basin of the Great Salt Lake.

Fifteen hundred miles from Vera Cruz, and a thousand from the Mexican border, was Santa Fé, the capital and only town of New Mexico. It was the gateway to a country of marvels and enchantments, shimmering plains with no vegetation but strange cacti, mesas striped with ochre and vermilion, aboriginal cliff-dwellings which the *conquistadores* had mistaken for the Seven Cities of Cibolá, and the stupendous cañon of the Colorado river. Annually an armed caravan of American traders assembled at Independence, and followed the Santa Fé trail with pack-mule and wagon through the country of the Osage and Comanche, to this lonely emporium of New Mexico, returning with silver and peltry.

It was in Texas that the first compact wedge of English-speaking people was thrust across Mexico's borders. Texas, seven hundred and fifty miles long from the Sabine river to El Paso, and of equal depth from the tip of the 'panhandle' to the mouth of the Rio Grande del Norte, is a province larger than France, and almost as varied in climate and natural resource. The pioneers found moist gulf plains studded with cane-brakes, and cold arid plateaux; dense forests of pine and hardwood; prairies of a deep, black, waxy loam, perfect for cotton growing, and others of lighter soil, adapted for grain; sage-brush and yucca deserts; and the Llano Estacado or high plains, where roamed immense herds of buffalo and mustang.

We must tread warily here; for a major controversy of American history rages round Texas and the Mexican War. One theory, invented by the abolitionists, made orthodox by the Republican party, and given literary currency by such men as James Russell Lowell, regards the American colonization of Texas, the Texan annexation to the United States, and the Mexican War, as the fruit of a gigantic conspiracy of Southern politicians to get 'bigger pens to cram with slaves.' The other theory regards the whole movement as a more or less conscious and entirely justifiable effort of high-souled pioneers to advance civilization and democracy in a region feebly held by a decadent society. Probably we shall find the truth somewhere between the two extremes.

Texas never formed part of Louisiana, and the United States' claim to it, renounced in the Florida Treaty of 1819, was based on nothing better than the fact that Napoleon was prepared to seize the province, before he decided to sell Louisiana to the United States. However, no sooner had the United States renounced Texas, and agreed upon the Sabine and the Red rivers as the American southwestern boundary, than they regretted the supposed loss. Adams was accused of abandoning American territory, and he had not been in office three weeks when he instructed Poinsett to propose the purchase of a whole or a part of Texas, with the amazingly naïve argument that 'it would have the effect of placing the City of Mexico nearer the centre of its territories.' Jackson pressed the same proposal as Adams, with more persistence and even less tact. At Washington there was 'no comprehension of the out-at-elbows pride of the average Mexican, his vanity and his fierce dreaminess.' The mere offer was an insult; its repetition aroused suspicion.

Yet, with strange inconsistency, Mexico encouraged American emigration to Texas. In 1823 the Emperor Agustín I (Iturbide) confirmed to Stephen F. Austin a concession granted to his father by the Spanish Viceroy, to colonize two hundred American families in one of the most fertile regions of Texas. In 1824 the Mexican Congress offered the same privilege *empresario,* with sixty-six thousand acres free, to any one who could persuade two hundred families to emigrate and receive each 177 acres of rich tillage, or 4,428 acres of prairie pasture and scrub-oak.

Why these terms were offered is one mystery; why they were not more fully taken advantage of is another. In 1825 Austin's colony, then four years old, included but 1,347 whites and 443 slaves, and by 1834 the white English-speaking population of Texas was probably not higher than eighteen thousand, with two thousand slaves. Every frontier community in the United States was growing more rapidly than that. Austin, son of a roving Connecticut Yankee, a grave, gentle, and persistent young man with a profound knowledge of human nature, picked the materials for his colony with care, and ruled it with autocratic power until 1829. It resembled in social structure one of the English proprietary colonies of New England or Carolina, and was more law-abiding and better governed than any American frontier of the nineteenth century except Utah.

Austin seems to have been anti-slavery by preference, but found himself confronted by the dilemma that meets all colonists with capital: the choice between log-cabin poverty and using some form of forced labor. There were no Indian peons in that part of Mexico, and the soil offered such opportunities for cotton and sugar culture that Southern planters would not come unless permitted to bring their slaves, and could not prosper without them. The Mexican Congress, the state legislature at Saltillo, and various Mexican dictators passed laws or decrees declaring the abolition of slavery throughout the Republic. But Austin was always able to obtain some 'explanation' of these decrees which allowed the Americans to hold their slaves in fact, if not by law.

Insecurity of slave property was but one of many factors pulling towards the separation of Texas from Mexico. Austin and the older American *empresarios* tried to be good Mexicans; but it was difficult to respect a government in constant turmoil and revolution. The American colonist admired the horsemanship of his Mexican neighbor, adopted his saddle and trappings — and sometimes, we fear, appropriated his horse — but his general attitude towards Mexico was one of humorous contempt for the people, and impatience at the restrictions which their government sought to impose. As time went on the contempt did not lessen, and the irritations multiplied. There was trouble about the tariff, representation, and immigration; conflicts with Mexican garrisons, whose proud officers resented the crude wit and boisterous individualism of the settlers. And in the early thirties the quiet law-abiding pioneers of Austin's first hegira began to be outnumbered by men of another type — swashbucklers like Sam Houston, once a subordinate of General Jackson, then Senator and Governor of Tennessee, and sometime resident among the Comanche Indians; Burnet of New Jersey, who had followed Miranda to Carácas in 1806, Archer of Virginia who had almost joined Burr, and had fled his state after a successful duel; the Bowie brothers of Louisiana, slave-smugglers who designed the long and deadly knife that bears their name; Davy Crockett, a professional backwoodsman of Tennessee; and many others of restless ambition and pungent personality, who had left their country for their country's good.

2. *The Lone Star Republic*

The break came in 1835, when Santa Anna proclaimed a unified constitution for Mexico that made a clean sweep of state rights. The American settlers of Texas then established a provisional government and expelled the Mexican garrison from San Antonio de Bexar. Over the Rio Grande came Santa Anna with three thousand men. In the Alamo, the fortified mission at San Antonio, was a garrison of less than two hundred Texans. They refused to retreat or to surrender. On 5 March 1836 Santa Anna assaulted the Alamo, captured it after every Texan had been killed or wounded, and put the wounded to death.

Already a convention elected by the American settlers had proclaimed the independent Republic of Texas, and adopted a flag with a single star. Santa Anna quickly advanced eastward with his wiry Mexican troops, the settlers fleeing before him, and for a few weeks it looked as if the Lone Star Republic would be snuffed out. Generalissimo Sam Houston managed to keep an army together, and awaited the Mexicans in an ilex grove by the ferry of the San Jacinto river, not far from the site of the city that bears his name. On 21 April, shouting 'Remember the Alamo!' the Texans burst on Santa Anna's army, scattered it, and took the leader prisoner. Mexico made no serious effort towards reconquest. The Texans ratified their new constitution, legalized negro slavery, elected Sam Houston their President, and sent an envoy to Washington to demand annexation to the United States, or recognition as an independent republic.

Enthusiasm over the defence of the Alamo, and liberal land offers by the republic drew hundreds of American adventurers into the Texan army. President Jackson made no attempt to prevent this unneutral aid, but on the questions of recognition and annexation his attitude was diplomatically correct. Only on his last day but one of office (3 March 1837), after Congress had approved, did Jackson recognize the Lone Star Republic.

Texas, unsatisfied, pressed for annexation to the United States. Unfortunately for her ambition, it was a year of agitation in Congress over the slave trade and the right of petition. On 23 May 1836 Calhoun remarked in the Senate, that 'there were powerful reasons why Texas should be a part of this Union. The Southern States, owning a slave population, were deeply interested in preventing that country from having the power to annoy them.'[1] The same year an abolitionist named Lundy brought out a pamphlet called 'The War in Texas; . . . showing that this Contest is the result of a Long Premeditated Crusade against the Government set on foot by Slaveholders.' Therein was first presented the theory that the Texas revolution was a conspiracy to open new slave markets, and gain slave territory for cotton. Lundy spoke with an appearance of authority, for he had been to Texas; and with the bitterness of frustration, for he had hoped to found there an abolitionist colony. His pamphlet, describing the Texans as a gang of horse-thieves, land-jobbers, and desperadoes, appealed to that widespread Northern sentiment opposed to the political dominance of the South and the extension of the slave territory: the same sentiment that resented the admission of Missouri as a slave state in 1820. Almost in a moment the whole country realized that the annexation of Texas would affect the balance of power between North and South. On 1 November 1837 the Vermont legislature 'solemnly protested' against the admission 'of any state whose constitution tolerates domestic slavery.' Of course that was the very way to arouse a contrary feeling in the South. Calhoun solemnly announced that any attempt to exclude a state on account of its 'peculiar institutions' would be a virtual dissolution of the Union.

The slave states were already beginning to realize that they had got the small end of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, which prohibited slavery in the federal territory north of 36° 30′. Arkansas and Michigan had just been admitted to the Union, making thirteen free and thirteen slave states. Florida was the only slave territory left; but three free territories, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota would be demanding admission in a few years; and more might well follow if the Indian barrier to the great plains were broken. The Alabama legislature, on Christmas Day 1837, resolved: 'It needs but a glance at the map to satisfy the most superficial observer that an overbalance is produced by the extreme northeast, which as regards territory would be happily corrected and counterbalanced by the annexation of Texas.' Texas, greater in area than the nine free states of the northeast, might be carved into several slave states, a New Slavonia to balance New England.

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[1] *Congressional Globe*, iii. 394.

A resolution for the annexation of Texas was promptly introduced in Congress. President Van Buren, engaged at the time in some delicate negotiations with Mexico, and anxious to keep the slavery issue out of politics, used his influence against the resolution, which was finally smothered by a speech of J. Q. Adams that took three weeks to deliver (July 1838).

The politicians were content to let so explosive a question rest. In the meantime, thousands of petty planters, ruined by the panic of 1837, were glad to leave their debts at home, and start life anew across the Sabine.

Texas acquired a navy, accumulated a national debt, and received British and French recognition. The Lone Star Republic belonged to the family of nations, but for how long? Her white population was barely fifty thousand; Mexico had six or seven millions. Except for a fantastic raid in 1842, Mexico made no attempt to reconquer Texas, and in 1843 the British minister to Texas negotiated a truce between the two republics. But at any turn of the political wheel in Mexico City the truce might be denounced, and hostilities renewed. Political conditions in Texas were chaotic. A Texan President who bore the conquering name of Mirabeau B. Lamar hoped to incorporate New Mexico, California, and the northern tier of Mexican states in his government, and himself led a forlorn hope against Santa Fé. Sam Houston, who succeeded him after that escapade, knew that Texas needed protection and security. He probably preferred to obtain it through annexation to the United States. But there was no hope of obtaining American consent until 1843, when Webster left Tyler's cabinet, and Upshur of Virginia became Secretary of State. Houston's second string was a dual mediation by Britain and France to obtain recognition of

Texan independence by Mexico; and a dual or triple guarantee to maintain it.

Such a project was certain to appeal to European statesmen. The desire to extend the European balance of power to America, and erect a barrier to further expansion by the United States — the policy successively pursued by Talleyrand, Canning, and Napoleon III — was awakened by Texan independence. Here was a ready-made wedge between the United States and Latin America, an independent source of supply for cotton, sugar, and tobacco, a possible center of British or French influence. How Canning would have hastened to ' slip in between '! But Aberdeen was in the Foreign Office. He toyed with the idea. What sweetened it for him was the notion that in return for British guarantee and financial assistance Texas might be induced to abolish slavery. The convention of the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society at London, in the summer of 1843, put the proposition to Aberdeen, definitely. He would not say he would, but refused to say he might not. A year later, he went so far as to tell the Mexican minister at London that if Mexico would recognize Texan independence, and France would co-operate, England would guarantee both the independence of Texas and the boundaries of Mexico against the United States and the world. At the same time King Louis-Philippe warmly urged the same plan on the Mexican minister at Paris, pointing out the analogy to his own recognition of Belgian independence and neutrality.

That the Peel and the Guizot ministries were really prepared to set up an American Portugal or Belgium is improbable, but not impossible, given Aberdeen's propensity for assuming dangerous responsibilities. If neither Government was brought to the test, it was owing to Mexican obstinacy. There was little doubt of Texan acceptance, if the offer were made in time. But no Mexican cabinet dared recognize Texan independence. Common sense at Mexico City in 1844 might have changed the entire course of American expansion.

Amid the cross-currents of notes, suggestions, and conversations between London, Paris, Washington, Austin and Mexico City, another fact stands out clearly: the fear of Southern statesmen that Texas might abolish slavery. It leaked out that Aberdeen had agreed to guarantee a Texan loan if the Lone Star Republic would abolish slavery. The prospect of Texas becoming a refuge for fugitive slaves from the Gulf States, alarmed the South to the point of panic. Upshur, Tyler's new Secretary of State, at once began to negotiate a treaty of annexation with the Texan minister at Washington, and informed the Texan government that the abolition project was inadmissible. Aberdeen, as soon as he heard of the misunderstanding, denied the report of his intentions in a note imprudent in its frankness. 'Great Britain desires, and is constantly exerting herself to procure, the general abolition of slavery throughout the world. But the means which she has adopted, and will continue to adopt, for this humane and virtuous purpose, are open and undisguised.' Calhoun's reply, which he published at once, seized upon this admission to justify the annexation treaty; and proceeded to read the British government a lesson on negro slavery. Adducing some questionable statistics, Calhoun offered to convince the noble lord that the negro race would be reduced to wretchedness and vice by his misdirected charity! In other words, Tyler's administration declared that the mere prospect of abolition in a neighboring republic was sufficient reason to absorb it; and suggested that the mission of the United States was to make the world safe for slavery.

Annexation, urged on such grounds and from that source, repelled more votes from one section than it attracted from another. Calhoun's annexation treaty failed to pass the Senate. Then came the presidential election of 1844, in which the Democratic party cleverly lifted the Texas question out of its slavery setting, and made it one of national expansion and prestige.

In the Democratic nominating convention of 1844 there was the usual strife between Northern and Southern elements. Then James K. Polk of Tennessee, the first 'dark horse' in a presidential race, trotted out on to a platform where 'reoccupation of Oregon and reannexation of Texas' was written large. Washington heard the result in a minute, by the new electric telegraph. Henry Clay, the Whig candidate, was expected to rally the divided forces of the Whigs, and to win the election; but he remained on the fence too long. His non-committal policy as to Texas diverted so many New York votes to Birney, the abolitionist candidate, that Polk carried the state by a trifling plurality; and the thirty-six electoral votes of New York decided the contest.

There was a deeper reason, however, why Polk carried the election over his popular and distinguished rival, and that reason had nothing to do with slavery or abolition. Another movement of westward expansion had begun, both in thought and in fact. The Oregon Trail and the Lone Star Republic appealed to a people recovering confidence after the hard times of 1837 to 1840. The 'manifest destiny' of the United States to expand westward and southward, and prove the democratic principle on a scale hitherto undreamed, became the theme of countless leaders, Fourth of July orations, and political speeches. Much talk there was, too, of Anglo-Saxon genius in colonization and self-government. Parson Wilbur of the Biglow Papers might preach that 'all this big talk of our destinies is half on it ignorance, an' t'other half rum,' but no good Democrat or Westerner believed him. 'Reoccupation of Oregon and reannexation of Texas,' 'Fifty-four forty or fight,' rallied the same sort of people who bawled for 'Tippecanoe and Tyler too' in 1840. Jeffersonian simplicity was dead, and the new note of emancipation was silenced by the war-whoops of strutting democracy.

Congress, persuaded that quick action was necessary to forestall England, voted by joint resolution on 18 February 1845 to admit Texas into the Union. And on his last day of office, President Tyler had the satisfaction of sending off a courier to inform Texas that only her consent was necessary to become the twenty-eighth United State. But the ambition of his successor soared far beyond the Lone Star Republic.

3. *James K. Polk*

'Who is James K. Polk?' was the Whig slogan in the election of 1844. 'The Democrats here cry "Hurrah for Polk!" in the street,' wrote a Southern Whig, 'and come round to ask me who the devil he is.'

After all, Polk had been Speaker of the House, if only by dint of keeping a firm hold on the coat-tails of Old Hickory. Like Jackson he was a Tennesseean of Scotch-Irish ancestry. There the resemblance ceased. He who became President of the United States on 4 March 1845 was a stiff, angular person, with sharp grey eyes in a sad, lean face, and grizzled hair overlapping a black coat-collar. Polk lacked personal distinction, but industry was not wanting. His working day in the White House was nearer eighteen than eight hours, and in four years he was absent only six weeks from Washington. His will controlled a cabinet of experienced and distinguished men. Determined and tenacious, seldom smiling and never relaxing, Polk recalls that other presidential puritan and diarist, J. Q. Adams. Their domestic policies were as wide as the poles, but Polk adopted the same foreign policy as Adams, and he had a way of getting things done. He aspired to reduce the tariff, re-establish Van Buren's independent treasury, settle the Oregon boundary, and acquire California. Within four years his ambition was fulfilled.

Although Polk was a slaveholder, he did not think in terms of slavery. The 'peculiar institution' had no more influence on his expansionist ambitions than on those of Adams. Tyler robbed him at the eleventh hour of the glory of acquiring Texas, but California was still wanting to flatten out the re-entrant angle in the western boundary.

Polk's desire for California was quickened by the fear lest England or France should forestall him. Both countries were then active in the Pacific. New Zealand had been acquired in 1840 by the British who did not want it, in order to keep it from the French who did want it. In 1842 Admiral Dupetit-Thouars took the Marquesas and in 1843 he bombarded Queen Pomaré out of Papeete. In the same year the Hawaiian monarch Kamehameha III, hitherto a friend to American whalemen and protector of New England missionaries, prepared to place the Sandwich Islands and his royal person under the protection of Queen Victoria. Rumor reached Polk that Aberdeen was fishing for California. It was only his agents who were, and Mexico refused to bite; but Aberdeen would not remain Foreign Secretary forever, and circumstances might alter.

Shortly after Polk entered office, Mexico protested against the annexation of Texas, and broke diplomatic relations. From her point of view, Texas was still a rebellious province. In July 1845, when Texas had accepted annexation by a plebiscite, Polk ordered a detachment of the regular army under General Taylor to take up a position on the Nueces river, the southwestern border of Texas, to protect the new state against a possible Mexican attack. Polk's apologists make much of the sophistry that as soon as Taylor crossed the Sabine river into Texas, he was invading Mexico from the Mexican point of view; hence war was inevitable, whatever else Polk might do. This argument makes no allowance for Latin disinclination to acknowledge a disagreeable *fait accompli*. In 1845 Spain was still technically at war with most of Spanish America, although hostilities between them had long since ceased; but no Latin-

American state would have thought itself thereby justified in attacking Porto Rico, or some other region still faithful to Spain. If Polk had been content with Texas, and had not reached out for something besides, there is no reason to suppose that Mexico would have initiated hostilities; although she must long have delayed acknowledging the annexation of Texas to the United States.

On 24 June 1845 the Secretary of the Navy sent secret orders to Commodore Sloat, commanding the Pacific station, to seize San Francisco if he should 'ascertain with certainty' that Mexico had declared war on the United States. In October 1845 the Secretary of War wrote to Larkin, the American consul at Monterey (California), 'Whilst the President will make no effort and use no influence to induce California to become one of the free and independent States of the Union, yet if the people should desire to unite their destiny with ours, they would be received as brethren, whenever this can be done without affording Mexico just cause of complaint.' John C. Frémont, a young captain of United States Engineers, was also on his way to California with an exploring expedition. He had no political instructions, but did not need them.

While Polk was priming revolt in California, he proposed to see what could be got out of Mexico in exchange for claims. Like most nations at most times, the United States had claims on Mexico for repudiated bonds, revoked concessions, and damage done to American property during the civil war that broke out every few months. Hitherto the United States had been forbearing, in comparison with the French government, which sent a squadron to bombard San Juan de Ulúa in 1839. A mixed commission awarded the United States about a million and a half dollars in 1841, since when about three million more had accumulated. In 1843 the two countries ratified a convention by virtue of which Mexico was to pay the whole with accrued interest in twenty quarterly instalments. After three instalments Mexico suspended payment — as several states of the Union had done on their bonds — but did not repudiate her debts, like Michigan and Mississippi. Torn by civil dissension and virtually bankrupt, she could then do no more, as President Polk knew and admitted.

On 10 November 1845 the President commissioned John Slidell minister plenipotentiary to Mexico, with instructions to offer that the United States should assume the unpaid claims of its citizens against Mexico, in return for Mexican recognition of the Rio Grande as the southern boundary of Texas and of the United States. Five millions additional would be paid for the cession of New Mexico as well, and 'money would be no object' if the cession of California could also be obtained. Polk's enemies doubted his sincerity in this matter, as the Mexican government, since breaking relations on account of Texas, had offered to receive an American 'commissioner,' not a 'minister.' But Polk was simply contemptuous of diplomatic procedure, and ignorant of the Mexican character. A practical man, he hoped to put through a business deal with a government that lacked all business sense.

Slidell was refused reception by the Herrera government to which he was accredited. No Mexican minister could afford to receive an American plenipotentiary, any more than the Spanish government could afford to think of South American independence in 1824. Notwithstanding this refusal, General Paredes at once raised the standard of revolution, on the ground that Herrera was proposing a treasonable bargain with the United States. The revolution succeeded, as most Mexican revolutions do; and by New Year's day 1846 the government was in the hands of a military faction that was spoiling for a fight with the United States.

Polk did not give them long to wait. On 13 January 1846, the day after he had received word of Herrera's refusal to receive Slidell, but before he knew of the Paredes revolution, Polk ordered General Taylor to take his army across the Nueces river, and to occupy the left bank of the Rio Grande del Norte.

Thereby the President attempted to force the solution of a boundary controversy. That is the important point. It also happens that his view of the controversy was wrong. The Nueces river had been the southern boundary of the Province and State of Texas during a century past. The territory between the Nueces and the Rio Grande, and east of longitude 100°, was a barren tract belonging to the State of Tamaulipas. Texas laid claim to the Rio Grande in her declaration of independence; but her authority as state or republic had never been exercised beyond the Nueces, where the few scattered inhabitants remained under Mexican jurisdiction. The United States, in annexing Texas, was pledged to adjust the southern boundary, but not committed to insist upon the Rio Grande.[2]

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[2] This was also Calhoun's view. Certain writers make much of a convention that Texas concluded with General Santa Anna, when in captivity, recognizing the Rio Grande boundary. Santa Anna had no authority to conclude such a convention; he was not a free agent; and it was not ratified by the Mexican Congress.

4. '*War by Act of Mexico*'

General Taylor, in obedience to orders, took up a position on the left bank of the Rio Grande, with his guns bearing across it upon the Mexican town of Matamoras (23 March 1846). The Mexican general in command of that district ordered him back to the Nueces (11 April). Taylor replied by blockading the Rio Grande in order to cut off food supplies from Matamoras (23 April). In spite of furious threats by the Mexican press, and by its own members, the Paredes government had made no military disposition threatening Texas, and had kept its forces out of the disputed territory between the two rivers. The responsibilities of office were making the new government more cautious in action than in speech; but more than Mexican caution was now needed to stop Polk.

On 12 March 1846 the Mexican foreign minister informed Slidell definitely that he could not be received, that Mexico still regarded the annexation of Texas as a just cause of war, which would be inevitable if the United States persisted in its present course of adding insult to injury. Having thus asserted his own and his country's dignity, the foreign minister 'intimated a willingness to negotiate' with a commissioner *ad hoc*, on the simple question of the annexation of Texas. This distinction without a difference, so dear to the Latin-American mind, was dismissed by Polk as insincere and treacherous. On 25 April he began to prepare a message to Congress urging war on the sole grounds of Slidell's rejection and the unpaid claims — which amounted to exactly $3,208,314.96 when adjudicated by a United States commission in 1851. On 8 May Slidell saw the President, and urged him to act promptly. On Saturday morning the 9th, Polk informed the cabinet that he believed it his duty to send the war message to Congress the following Tuesday. All agreed but Bancroft, who thought that war should not be declared until Mexico committed some definite act of hostility. Buchanan, the Secretary of State, said that he would feel better satisfied if that happened, but that as matters stood there was ample ground for war against Mexico. The cabinet adjourned at two o'clock. At six, dispatches from General Taylor reached the White House. It appeared that on 25 April — two days after Taylor blockaded Matamoras — a Mexican force had crossed the Rio Grande, engaged in a cavalry skirmish with United States dragoons, killed a few of the troopers, and captured the rest. Polk called another cabinet meeting for half-past seven. The consciences of Bancroft and Buchanan were now satisfied; it was agreed unanimously that a war message, with documents proving the 'wrongs and injuries' the United States had suffered from Mexico, should be laid before Congress on Monday. All day Sunday, except for two hours spent at church, Polk labored with his secretaries preparing the war message. 'It was a day of great anxiety to me,' wrote the President in his diary, 'and I regretted the necessity which had existed to make it necessary for me to spend the Sabbath in the manner I have.'

At noon on Monday, 11 May 1846, the war message was sent to Congress. 'The cup of forbearance has been exhausted,' declared the President. 'After reiterated menaces, Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American soil.' In the evening the President received visits of congratulation from Senator Sam Houston of Texas, and Governor Archibald Yell of Arkansas. Two days later Congress declared that 'by the act of the Republic of Mexico, a state of war exists between that Government and the United States.'

In the Mississippi valley the war was highly popular. Mexico evoked visions of gold and glory among the men of the frontier, as in other days to the men of Drake and Hawkins. Thousands of western volunteers came forward, eager to 'revel in the halls of the Montezumas.' In the older states there was little enthusiasm and much opposition. The Mississippi valley and Texas together furnished forty-nine thousand volunteers; the original Thirteen States thirteen thousand. Most of the elder statesmen of the South were content with Texas; Calhoun's clear vision foresaw that the conquest of more territory would upset the sectional balance and revive the dangerous question of slavery in the Territories. The Whig party opposed, although with more wisdom than the Federalists of 1812 they voted for war credits and supplies, in the hope that the Democrats would be hanged if given plenty of rope. Anti-slavery men and abolitionists regarded the war as part of a slavery conspiracy:

They may talk o' Freedom's airy
  Tell they're pupple in the face;
It's a grand gret cemetary
  Fer the barthrights of our race;

They just want this Californy
So's to lug new slave-states in
To abuse ye, an' to scorn ye,
An' to plunder ye like sin.

Thus James Russell Lowell castigated the Mexican War, in his *Biglow Papers*. And although few agreed with him that it was time to part from the slave states, the legislature of Massachusetts declared that the Mexican War was a war of conquest, a war to strengthen the 'slave power,' a war against the free states, unconstitutional, insupportable by honest men, to be concluded without delay, and to be followed by 'all constitutional efforts for the abolition of slavery within the United States.'

President Polk expected a quick and easy victory, for which twenty thousand volunteers, in addition to the regular army of seventy-five hundred, would suffice. In Europe many doubted whether the United States could beat Mexico. People admitted a great disparity of population and resources, but remembered American failure in offensive warfare against Canada. Mexico was confident enough. An officer boasted that his cavalry could break the 'gringo' infantry squares with the lasso. There was wild talk of breaking into Louisiana, arming the slaves, and loosing the Comanche and Sioux on the American frontier. And the unsettled Oregon question suggested that Mexico might soon have a powerful ally.

5. *The Oregon Compromise*

In April 1846, after a long Senate discussion, Polk threw Oregon into hotchpot by giving notice to England that in twelve months' time the joint occupation would expire. He did not, however, shut the door on negotiation. Every previous attempt at compromise had been thwarted by a Colonial Office notion that the Columbia river was a western St. Lawrence, an essential link of communication between Hudson Bay and China. Aberdeen now knew better. After sounding the President, he proposed to extend the boundary along latitude 49° to Puget Sound, thence to the ocean through the straits of San Juan de Fuca, leaving Vancouver Island to Canada. Polk submitted this offer to his cabinet on 6 June 1846. Buchanan 'said the "fifty-four forty" men were the true friends of the administration, and he wished no backing out on the subject.' Mr. Buchanan was properly admonished; the President laid the proposition before the Senate for advice and consent, which it promptly gave in the affirmative; and on 15 June the Oregon treaty, describing the boundary between the United States and British Columbia, was signed. Another Anglo-American crisis had passed, largely by reason of the conciliatory disposition of Lord Aberdeen and the desire of Polk to be free to thrash Mexico. There can be little doubt that England gave up a just claim to territory; but so had the United States, in the Maine negotiation of 1842.

6. *Glory and Conquest*

California, the main objective, lay beyond the principal seat of war; but was the scene of amusing if confused conflicts. Frémont rushed about distractedly, and a few dozen American squatters in the Sacramento valley took possession of Sonora with its commandant, declared their independence, and hoisted a white flag with a bear painted on it. From this 'Bear Flag revolt' (14 June 1846), California dates her birth as a sovereign state. On 7 July Commodore Sloat, having heard of the outbreak of hostilities on the Rio Grande, hoisted the Stars and Stripes at Monterey, and declared California a part of the United States. The Spanish-speaking Californians, not relishing these proceedings, rose in arms, reoccupied Monterey for a time, and had a brush with Colonel Kearny, who had led 150 troopers overland from Independence, mopping up Santa Fé on the way. But by the end of 1846 California was completely in the hands of the Americans.

General Zachary Taylor began what was intended to be a march on Mexico City by pushing across the Rio Grande before war was even declared, and winning two minor engagements; but refused to move farther from his base until properly reinforced and supplied. Polk, who had never seen northern Mexico, thought that Taylor ought to live on the country. Finally men and munitions were sent. Taylor's army then advanced and captured the town of Monterey, after a three days' battle (21–23 September 1846).

President Polk was not altogether pleased with this brilliant victory. 'Old Rough and Ready' Taylor, an outspoken, blaspheming veteran of the Jackson breed, was becoming dangerously popular, and the Whigs began to talk of nominating him for the Presidency in 1848. As a way out, Polk conceived the brilliant stroke of creating

Thomas H. Benton, the aged Senator from Missouri, Lieutenant-General in command of the United States Army. Unfortunately for Mexico, Congress refused to create this new grade. The President then turned to Major-General Winfield Scott of the regular army, a Whig indeed, but a dandy swashbuckler whose airs and foibles were unlikely to win golden opinions from democracy. Scott's plan to end the war by marching on Mexico City from Vera Cruz was now adopted.

In the meantime, Polk had provided Mexico with a leader. General Santa Anna was in exile at Havana when the war broke out. Although he had twice broken his word to the Texans, he was able to persuade Polk that, once in possession of the Mexican government, he would sign the sort of treaty that was wanted. By the President's command, Santa Anna was allowed to slip past the United States blockading squadron into Vera Cruz. He entered Mexico City in triumph in September 1846, and assumed the dictatorship.

O Santy Anna gained the day
Hooray! Santy Anna.
He lost it once, but gained it twice,
All on the plains of Mexico.

So runs a rousing old chanty, completely reversing the facts. For Santa Anna could not even dispose of the rival to his American benefactor. General Taylor beat him badly at Buena Vista (22–23 February 1847) — a splendid picture-book battle on a sun-soaked plain; a fight that made two American soldiers future Presidents: General Taylor and his son-in-law, Colonel Jefferson Davis.

General Scott's campaign was a brilliant feat of arms. With little more than half the twenty thousand troops he wanted, hampered by insubordinate volunteer officers who had been appointed for political reasons, thwarted by the jealousy and incompetence of the administration, often forced to live on the country and to fight with captured ammunition, he yet accomplished his ends. Vera Cruz surrendered on 27 March 1847, and the American army started for Mexico City along the road Cortez had followed three centuries before. In two weeks' time it reached the pass of Cerro Gordo, which the ubiquitous Santa Anna had fortified. Captain Robert E. Lee found a way to outflank the Mexicans by a mountain slope, a brilliant operation in which Captain George B. McClellan and Lieutenant U. S. Grant took part. The army pushed on to Puebla, and remained there for three months, renewing half its numbers by replacements for the volunteers whose terms of enlistment had expired. On 7 August General Scott cut connection with the coast. Three days later his army reached the divide ten thousand feet above sea level, with the wonderful Valley of Mexico stretching before, and the towers of Mexico City rising through the mist. More good staff work carried out by the engineers, stiff fights at Contreras and Churubusco (7–20 August), and the army was ready to follow the fleeing Mexicans into the city.

Just in time to stop them, Santa Anna accepted an armistice for which Scott had already paid him ten thousand dollars, and consented to begin peace negotiations. He was promised a million more at the conclusion of them. Polk had attached to the American army as peace commissioner an absurd little gentleman named Trist, the chief clerk of the Department of State. His instructions were to obtain the Rio Grande boundary, with New Mexico, Upper California, and a right of transit across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, one of the proposed inter-oceanic canal routes. The Mexican politicians, unable to face reality, raised such a babble on hearing these terms that Santa Anna decided to try another throw of the dice with Scott. The American army, refreshed by a fortnight among the orchards and orange groves of the Valley of Mexico, marched forward to a blood-bath at Molino del Rey (8 September), and five days later stormed its last obstacle, the fortified hill of Chapultepec. On they pushed, taking cover under the arches of the aqueducts, Lieutenant U. S. Grant cleverly mounting a howitzer in the belfry of a suburban church. At dawn of 17 September a white flag came out from Mexico City.

The chattering Mexicanos were silent for once, as a vanguard of battered, mudstained doughboys and hard-boiled marines, led by a brigadier general who had lost a boot in the latest fight, swung along their streets to the Plaza de la Constitución. There the conquerors gazed with wonder on the great baroque Cathedral and the lofty pink-walled palace — the Halls of the Montezumas at last. Presently a clatter of hoofs was heard on the stone-paved streets; and as the weary veterans snapped into 'Atten — *shun!* Present — *arms!*' General Scott, splendidly uniformed and superbly mounted, escorted by a squadron of dragoons with gleaming swords, came dashing into the plaza.

Santa Anna promptly abdicated, for the third but not the last time; and two months elapsed before Scott and Trist could find a Mexican government willing to negotiate peace. In the meantime Trist had been recalled, on account of his muddling the August negotiations. Instead of obeying orders he remained, and negotiated the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (2 February 1848) in accordance with his original instructions. Mexico ceded Texas with the Rio Grande boundary, New Mexico (including Arizona), and Upper California to the United States. The victor assumed the unpaid claims, and paid fifteen million dollars to boot — three-fifths of the amount Slidell had been instructed to offer for the same territory in 1846.

In the meantime, American public opinion was beginning to demand that the whole of Mexico should be annexed. Buchanan, who more than once had been reproached by Polk for his ' contracted and sectional views ' of American destiny, chimed in with the new *vox populi,* and advised the President to repudiate both Trist and the treaty. Polk coldly reminded the Secretary of his inconsistency, and sent the treaty to the Senate, which ratified it after the usual bitter debate. It was, in fact, a more emphatic victory than the war.

The United States had rounded out her continental area substantially to the present limits. It remained only to complete the present southwestern boundary of the United States by the ' Gadsden purchase ' from Mexico (1853) of the Gila river valley, in southern Arizona. But it also remained to be seen whether these immense and valuable acquisitions would be added to ' Freedom's airy,' or provide ' bigger pens to cram with slaves.'

XXVII

THE COMPROMISE OF 1850

1846–1850

1. *The Wilmot Proviso*

NO sooner were Polk's clutch of eaglets hatched, than North and South began to quarrel over them. Inspection of the nest revealed a young cuckoo whose strident squawks, despite frantic efforts of papa Democrat and mamma Whig to glut him into silence, soon drowned all other notes in the national aerie.

The slavery question was the intruder. Southern Democrats had obtained Northern support for the annexation of Texas up to the Rio Grande, even though it meant war; and then let their allies down to latitude 49° in Oregon, because 54° 40′ would have meant another war. An unforgivable sin in politics or diplomacy! So that when Polk asked Congress for two million dollars to buy more territory from Mexico (August 1846), a disgruntled Pennsylvania Democrat named David Wilmot tacked on to the bill a proviso to the effect that 'neither slavery nor involuntary servitude shall ever exist' in the territory so acquired.[1] There was no need of this prohibition. So far as any one could foresee, the arid wastes of New Mexico and the cattle-ranches of California were unsuitable for slave labor. Once put forward, however, the Wilmot proviso was maintained as a matter of principle and sectional strategy. Every Northern legislature but one, whether Whig or Democrat, passed resolutions approving it, and acclaiming Wilmot a great statesman.

If Northern Democrats were mischievous in demanding an abstract and unnecessary slavery restriction, Southern Democrats were reckless in opposing it; and the fury of their opposition gave color to the charge that the Mexican War was being fought for slavery. The Wilmot proviso seemed to them an insulting abstraction, an attempt to put their 'peculiar institution' in the wrong. Polk proposed that latitude 36° 30′ (the old Missouri Compromise line of

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[1] The phrase was copied from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787.

1820) should divide freedom and slavery in the new Territories as in the old; but there were too many extremists for this common-sense compromise. Southern Whigs who voted for the proviso in the interest of peace were denounced as 'Southern traitors'; Northern Democrats who voted the other way, for the same reason, were denounced as 'dough-faces' or 'Northern men with Southern principles.' The Wilmot proviso did not pass, nor did any measure to organize the newly acquired territory. American settlers in the Far West lacked law and government, because Congress could not decide whether or not they should have slaves. Oregon was finally organized as a territorial government without slavery in 1848, but Polk's presidential term ended (4 March 1849) before anything had been done about California, New Mexico, or Utah.

Hitherto, every one supposed that Congress could legislate slavery in or out of the territories, since the Constitution gave it the power to 'make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States.' Congress had introduced slavery into some territories, such as Mississippi, and banned it from others, such as Indiana and Minnesota. Now, from the Wilmot proviso debates emerge new theories on the subject. (a) Congress has the moral duty to prohibit slavery wheresoever its jurisdiction extends: freedom must be national, slavery sectional. In a little while the Free Soil and Republican parties will be founded to enforce this doctrine. (b) Congress has no power to prohibit slavery in the territories, but a duty to protect it there. In a little while the South will support this doctrine almost unanimously.

It was difficult to sustain this extreme Southern view, traversing as it did a constitutional practice of sixty years; but the mind of John C. Calhoun was equal to the task. The territories, he argued, belonged to the states united, not to the United States. Congress was merely the attorney of a partnership, and every partner had an equal right to protection for his property in his territories. Slaves were common-law property; Lord Mansfield's contrary dictum in the Sommersett case (1772) did not affect America; consequently the Mexican laws against slavery ceased to have effect in California and New Mexico when they were annexed to the United States. If Congress had, in 1820, prohibited slavery in the territories north of 36° 30′, that act was unconstitutional and void. Slavery followed the American flag, wherever firmly planted. Calhoun's new doctrine, embodied in resolutions by the Virginia legislature in 1847, became the 'platform of the South'; and in the Dred Scott case of 1857 it was read into the Federal Constitution. Only one more step, feared many Northerners, and slave-owning would come to be regarded as a natural right, which not even a state legislature could impair.

It is idle to debate whether Wilmot or Calhoun, North or South was the aggressor in this matter. All depends on the moral standpoint. If slavery were a positive good or a practical necessity, any attempt to restrict or to pinch it out by degrees would justify Southern indignation, if not secession. If slavery were an evil and a curse, any attempt to establish it in virgin territory, even nominally, would be an insult to the free states, and an affront to the public opinion of the Christian world. Motives on both sides were fundamentally defensive. Even when Calhoun wrote of forcing the slavery issue in the North, his motive was to protect the domestic institutions of the slave states. Even when Seward and Chase asserted that every inch of the new territory must be free soil, their object was to defend Northern farmers, wage-earners, and lovers of peace and liberty, against further wars and encroachments of the 'slave power.' Both sides were thinking in terms of principles and precedents. To yield on the purely technical issue of the territories, it was feared, would merely encourage extremists on the other side to new aggressions. It is just such matters of prestige, punctilio, and strategic advantage that bring on great wars.

The state of the American Union in 1848 may be compared with that of Europe in 1905. Political and diplomatic moves will become frequent and startling. Integrating forces will win apparent victories, but in reality grow feebler. The tension will increase, until some event, that in ordinary times would have little consequence, precipitates a bloody conflict.

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President Polk, exhausted by the labors of his eventful term, refused to stand for re-election in 1848. Lewis Cass of Michigan, an ardent expansionist, received the Democratic nomination. The Whigs again passed over Henry Clay, and nominated General Taylor, the hero of Buena Vista. A third party, the Free Soil, was formed in the North by a coalition of three hitherto separate and hostile elements — the abolitionist Liberty Party, the 'Barnburner' faction of the New York Democracy, who had been punished for their opposition to the war by loss of federal patronage, and the ' conscience ' or anti-slavery Whigs of New England. Their first object was to pass the Wilmot proviso; their platform was comprised in the phrase ' free soil, free speech, free labor and free men.' Martin Van Buren became the Free Soil candidate for the Presidency. He carried no state, but robbed Cass of so many votes in New York that the Whigs won its electoral vote; and as New York went, so went the nation.

Nathaniel Hawthorne in 1849 lost his place in the Salem Custom House, and proceeded to write *The Scarlet Letter*. Walt Whitman the same year lost his position with an unsuccessful Democratic newspaper, and proceeded to write *Leaves of Grass*. These were the most memorable results of Zachary Taylor's election, and of the clean sweep that followed in the civil service. ' Old Zach ' was a simple, honest soldier, who detested the sophistries of politicians and regarded the slavery question as the artificial abstraction that it was. He was ready to sign any sort of bill Congress might pass for organizing the new territories; but before Congress could resolve the deadlock, California proposed to skip the territorial stage altogether, and to become a non-slaveholding state of the Union.

2. *Oh! California*

On 24 January 1848, shortly before peace was signed with Mexico, a workman in the Sacramento valley discovered gold in Sutter's mill-race. In a few weeks the news spread along the Pacific coast; and in a few months all America was repeating tales of fortunes made from the stream beds of the Sierra Nevada, merely by separating the golden grains from the sand in a common washbowl. Farmers mortgaged their farms, pioneers deserted their clearings, workmen downed tools, clerks left their desks and even ministers their pulpits, for the California gold washings. Young men organized companies with elaborate equipment and by-laws, and were ' grub-staked ' by local capitalists as the Elizabethan sea-dogs had been financed by merchant adventurers. Five ' California and Mining ' companies were registered in London in January 1849, with a capital of a million and a quarter pounds. Any and every route was taken by the ' forty-niners ' : round the Horn in the slowest and craziest vessels, across the continent by the Oregon or more southern trails, or, if pressed for time, by the deadly Isthmus of Panama. It seemed as if all the world were chanting, to the tune of 'Oh! Susanna'—

Oh! California,
  That's the land for me;
I'm off for Sacramento
  With my washbowl on my knee.

By the end of 1849 thousands of Argonauts from every region of Europe, North America, and the antipodes, were jumping each other's claims, drinking, gambling, and fighting in ramshackle mining villages such as Red Dog, Grub Gulch, and Poker Flat. San Francisco arose in a few months from a village to a city of twenty or twenty-five thousand, where eggs laid on the other side of Cape Horn sold for ten dollars a dozen, and a drink of whiskey cost a pinch of gold dust; where Englishmen and Frenchmen, Yankees and Hoosiers, Georgia crackers and Missouri pikers rubbed shoulders with Indians, Mexicans, Sydney ducks, and the Heathen Chinee. Fortunes were made in the gold-diggings, to be lost in a night at a 'Frisco faro palace; even more were made by speculation in goods and land. It was a state of nature that would have made Rousseau a tory. Owing to the neglect of Congress the government was still military in theory, though impotent in fact; *alcaldes* and *ayuntamientos* appointed by the military governor administered any sort of law they pleased — it might be the code of Mexico or of Napoleon, or of Judge Lynch.

If Congress would not organize California as a territory, California might make herself a state. The suggestion came from President Taylor. In August his military governor issued writs of election for a convention which met at Monterey in September 1849, and drafted a state constitution prohibiting slavery. This constitution was ratified by a popular vote of over twelve thousand ayes to eight hundred noes; and without waiting for congressional sanction, the people chose a governor and legislature which began to function in 1850. Only formal admission to the Union was wanting; but on that issue the Union almost split.

Up to this time the most extreme Southerners had admitted the right of a state to prohibit slavery — for slavery was emphatically a state matter. But if California were admitted to the Union with its 'Wilmot proviso' constitution, slavery would have lost over half the American conquests from Mexico. During 1849 the temper of the South had been steadily rising. The governor and legislature of South Carolina only hesitated from secession because they hoped to unite the entire South on that program. Calhoun wrote 'I trust we shall persist in our resistance [to the admission of California] until the restoration of all our rights, or disunion, one or the other, is the consequence. We have borne the wrongs and insults of the North long enough.' California's demand for admission, when Congress was convened in December 1849, at once started a movement for a Southern convention. Like the Hartford Convention of 1814, this was intended by extremists to form a stepping-stone towards a new confederacy.

It is difficult to grasp the real reason for all this sound and fury. After all, as Henry Clay pointed out, the Southern States had an equal vote in the Senate, a majority of the Cabinet and the Supreme Court, and a President who was Virginia born and Louisiana bred. Since 1801 the South had in the end obtained from the Union what it really wanted — free trade, protection to slavery in the national capital and on the high seas, vast theatres of slavery such as Louisiana, Florida, the Creek and Cherokee lands, and Texas, which had greatly augmented the economic and political power of the slave-holders. Only the abolitionists hoped to interfere with slavery where it already existed; and the Garrisonian abolitionists at that time had come out openly for a separation of North from South — secession would be playing their game. And although passenger traffic on the Underground Railroad was increasing, its effect upon the security of slave property in the cotton states was negligible.

But after all, Southern 'cavaliers' were tired of hearing their form of society denounced by Northern 'mongrels and mudsills,' who, according to the popular Southern economics, fattened upon the tribute forced from the South. From every side — England and New England, Jamaica and Mexico, Ohio and the Northwest, and now California, abolition seemed to be pointing daggers at the heart of the South. It is under circumstances such as these that men call upon imagination to supersede thought. The vision of a great slave-holding republic stretching from the Potomac to the Rio Grande, governed by gentlemen and affording perfect security to their property in human beings, monopolizing the production of cotton and so dictating to the world, was beginning to lift up Southern hearts.

3. *The Union Preserved*

The House of Representatives that met in December 1849 was so factional that sixty-three ballots were taken before it could elect a speaker, and even the opinions on slavery of candidates for the post of doorkeeper had to be made the subject of careful inquiry. President Taylor recommended the immediate admission of California with her free constitution, and the organization of New Mexico and Utah Territories without reference to slavery. To protesting Senators from Georgia, the old soldier declared his determination to crush secession wherever and whenever it might appear, if he had to lead the army himself.

In the Senate, leaders of the coming struggle such as Davis, Douglas, Seward, and Chase, sat with giants of other days such as Webster, Clay, and Calhoun. It was Henry Clay who divined the high strategy of the moment. The Union was not ripe to meet the issue of secession. Concessions must be made to stop the movement now; time might be trusted to deal with it later. On 27 January 1850 he brought forward the compromise resolutions that kept the peace for ten years. The gist of them was (*a*) immediate admission of free California as her right; (*b*) the organization of territorial governments in New Mexico and Utah, without mention of slavery; (*c*) a new and stringent fugitive slave law; (*d*) abolition of the domestic slave trade in the District of Columbia; (*e*) adjustment of boundary dispute between Texas and New Mexico with assumption of Texan debt by the Federal government.

These resolutions brought on one of those superb Senate debates that did so much to mould public opinion. Clay defended them in a speech that lasted the better part of two days. Haggard in aspect and faltering in voice he rose to speak, but his passionate, unwavering devotion to the Union seemed to bring back all the charm and fire of 'Young Harry of the West,' and to lift him and his audience to high issues. His appeal was to the North for concession, and to the South for peace. He asked the North to accept the substance of the Wilmot proviso without the principle, and honestly to fulfil her obligation to return fugitive slaves. He reminded the South of the great benefits she derived from the Union, and warned her against the delusion that secession was constitutional, or could be peaceful, or would be acquiesced in by the Middle West. For Clay was old enough to remember the excitement in Kentucky when Spain and France had attempted to stop her river outlet. 'My life upon it,' he offered, 'that the vast population which has already concentrated . . . on the headwaters and the tributaries of the Mississippi, will never give their consent that the mouth of that river shall be held subject to the power of any foreign State.'

Calhoun, grim and emaciated, his voice stifled by the catarrh that shortly led to his death, sat silent, glaring defiance from his hawk-like eyes, while his ultimatum was voiced for him by Senator Mason of Virginia, (4 March 1850). 'I have, Senators, believed from the first that the agitation of the subject of slavery would, if not prevented by some timely and effective measure, end in disunion.' 'The cords that bind the States together' are snapping one by one. Three great evangelical churches are now divided. The Federal Union can be saved only by satisfying the South that she can remain within it in safety, that it is not 'being permanently and hopelessly converted into the means of oppressing instead of protecting' her. The Senator from Kentucky cannot save the Union with his compromise. The North must 'do justice by conceding to the South an equal right in the acquired territory'—by admitting slavery to California and New Mexico—by doing her duty as to fugitive slaves, by restoring to the South, through constitutional amendment, the equilibrium of power she once possessed in the Federal government;[2] and she must 'cease the agitation of the slave question.'

Three days later Webster rose for his last great speech. His voice had lost its deep resonance, his massive frame was shrunk, and his face was lined with suffering and sorrow. But in his heart glowed the ancient love of country, and the spell of his personality fell on Senate and galleries with his opening words: 'I speak to-day for the preservation of the Union. "Hear me for my cause."' Viewing the situation eye to eye with Clay, Webster merely restated in richer language the points made by his old-time rival; but the North could never have been induced to swallow a new fugitive slave law, unless Webster held the spoon. Just as his reply to Hayne in 1830 stimulated the growth of Union sentiment, so the Seventh of March speech of 1850 permitted that sentiment to ripen, until it became irresistible.

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[2] There seems no doubt that Calhoun's proposed amendment would have taken the form of a dual executive, one President elected by the North and one by the South, each armed with a veto.

Senator Seward of New York, in opposing the compromise from the opposite angle, spoke for the ' conscience ' Whigs, and for the yet unborn Republican party. He admitted that Congress had the constitutional power to establish slavery in the territories. ' But there is a higher law than the Constitution which regulates our authority over the domain ' : the law of God, whence alone the laws of man can derive their sanction. The fugitive slave bill would endanger the Union far more than any anti-slavery measure. ' All measures which fortify slavery or extend it, tend to the consummation of violence; all that check its extension, and abate its strength, tend to its peaceful extirpation.'

As the debate progressed compromise sentiment developed. The Southern convention at Nashville, of which the disunionists had high hopes, adjourned in June, after passing some harmless resolutions. Yet much parliamentary manoeuvring, and the steady, loyal support of the Southern Whigs both in and out of Congress, were necessary to get the compromise through. In early September 1850 the essential bills passed: the admission of California; the fugitive slave law; the organization of New Mexico and Utah as territories free to enter the Union with or without slavery when sufficiently populous; abolition of the slave trade in Washington; adjustment of the Texan boundary. Once more the Union was preserved by the same spirit of compromise that created it; but for the last time.

Another year elapsed before it was certain that the secession movement in the cotton states could be stopped. In the state elections Whigs and Democrats disappeared. The contest was between a Union party led by the Georgian triumvirate, Stephens, Toombs, and Cobb; and a ' Southern rights ' or immediate secession party, led by Rhett, Quitman, and Yancey. The Unionists met the secessionists on their own ground, squarely denying the existence of a constitutional right of secession; although, like all Americans, they freely admitted the Lockean ' right of revolution ' in case the South were really oppressed. In every cotton state the Unionists won, though in South Carolina and Mississippi the contest was close.

In the North the Democrats accepted the compromise; the Free-Soilers and Abolitionists denounced it in the most frenzied terms; the Whigs, in spite of Webster's eloquence, were divided in sentiment between acquiescence and repudiation. It was the Fugitive Slave Act which stuck in Northern throats. If only the South could have realized that the one hope for slavery was to let the North forget about it, instead of perpetually rubbing it in by hunting runaways through northern streets and countryside! Even Emerson, the philosopher who had serenely advised the abolitionists to love their neighbors more and their black brethren less, wrote in his journal 'This filthy enactment was made in the nineteenth century, by people who could read and write. I will not obey it, by God!'

Already two of the principal antagonists had passed away. Calhoun died on 31 March 1850. His coffin made a triumphal progress through the Southern States to Charleston, where friends and followers pledged devotion to his principles by the marble tombstone over his grave in St. Philip's churchyard. His real monument, as Walt Whitman heard a soldier say in 1865, was the ruined South, a generation of young men destroyed, society torn up by the roots, and slaves become masters.

President Taylor died on 9 July 1850. His vice-presidential successor, a colorless New York Whig named Millard Fillmore, signed the compromise bills. 'Old Bullion' Benton was defeated for re-election to the Senate in 1851. His Andrew Jackson nationalism had grown old-fashioned in Missouri. Clay and Webster, the one denounced as traitor by Southern hotspurs, the other compared with Lucifer by New England reformers, had two years only to live: but that was time enough to teach them grave doubts whether their compromise could long be maintained. With their death the second generation of independent Americans may be said to have gone. The galaxy of 1812 that had seemed to bind the heavens together was extinguished.

XXVIII

YOUNG AMERICA

1850–1854

1. *Irredentist Democracy*

WITH the passage of the compromise of 1850 the slavery question subsided, and other matters occupied the public prints, if not the public's mind. Higher prices for cotton restored prosperity to the South, and confidence to her sons. In the North, Jenny Lind and the Rochester spirit-rappings supplanted the compromise as a topic of conversation. Not that slavery was forgotten. *Uncle Tom's Cabin,* published in 1852, served to keep it in the back of peoples' minds; but every one save Northern abolitionists and Southern 'fire-eaters' wished to let it remain there.

The period 1849 to 1857 was one of industrial development, along the lines already marked out between North and South. The railroad supplanted the canal as a freight carrier, and opened the prairies to profitable settlement. Immigration reached a new high level, and occasioned a new nativist movement in politics. Industrial expansion and westward migration allowed wages to rise evenly with prices. In the labor movement talk gave way to action. Unions of the later American type were concluding trade agreements with their employers, federating nationally on craft lines, but strictly avoiding politics. Marxian socialism came in with the German immigrants, but the 'Proletarierbund' that one of them founded quickly expired. The American workingman discarded Utopia for two dollars a day and roast beef. Neal Dow won an apparent victory for cold water with the Maine prohibitory law; humanitarian reform and education marched hand in hand; Melville and Walt Whitman joined the increasing ranks of men of letters. Baseball became popular; yacht racing and intercollegiate rowing were introduced, together with vulgar luxury. In New York, Newport, and Saratoga, according to the season, could be found 'a set of exquisites — daintily arrayed men who spend half their income on their persons, and shrink from the touch of a woollen glove . . . delicate and lovely women, who wear the finest furs and roll in the most stylish equipages.'

At the same time the cotton kingdom was consolidating, and becoming more conscious of its strength. Kentucky backwoodsmen, who in the thirties had taken up land in the black belts, were now gentleman planters, who mingled on equal terms with the first families of Virginia in the thermal stations of the mountains. Their elder sons, after leading volunteers in the Mexican War, had become lawyers or planters in turn; their younger sons were patronizing the newer colleges of the lower South, or attending the University of Virginia, with hounds and hunters and black servants. Dread of abolition, with its implication of negro equality, was binding the yeomen and poor whites more closely to their slaveholding neighbors. Economically, the cotton kingdom appeared to be growing stronger. The annual cotton crop rose from a thousand million to twenty-three hundred million pounds, but never lacked purchasers. De Bow's *Review* was preaching the use of guano, conservation of soil, diversification of crops, and local manufactures. Southern society was ripening into Southern civilization. If only the South could have achieved security for her social system, or had dared to lift her ban on creative thought, the late fifties might well have brought an outburst of literary activity that would have surpassed that of New England. Instead, they brought a fierce propaganda for Southern independence.

The presidential election of 1852 proved that an overwhelming majority of Americans were disposed to regard the compromise of 1850 as final. As such it was proclaimed by the Democratic party when nominating Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire. A winning smile and a blank (hence blameless) political record were the only apparent qualifications of this gentleman. No more were needed. The New York 'Barnburners,' starved by four lean years with the Free-Soilers, returned to their Democratic allegiance; and thousands of Southern Unionists, disgusted by the anti-slavery tendencies of Northern Whigs, went over to their opponents. General Winfield Scott, the Whig presidential candidate, made himself rather ridiculous in the campaign; and, although he was a Virginian by birth, that asset was cancelled by a nationalist career which recalled Jackson, Harrison, and Taylor. The result was a 'landslide' for Pierce. Scott carried only four states.

The Whig party never recovered from this defeat. Wanting organic unity, they could not survive when their rivals undertook to maintain the great compromise and the great silence. The Democratic party, purged of democracy, became a national conservative party, directed by Southern planters and maintained by Northern votes. It controlled the Federal government for eight years, while the doting Whigs grew almost cross-eyed trying to discern which way thirty-one cats were going to jump.

For a time it seemed as if more expansion would be the thing. The revolutions of 1848 seemed a fulfilment of American destiny no less than the victory over Mexico. France adopted a constitution which was a centralized edition of that of the United States. Republicanism and democracy appeared to be sweeping the world. A 'Young America' movement sprang up within the Democratic party, a movement devoted at first to creating ideals of service and duty, then to enlisting young America's aid for democratic movements beyond the seas — and finally to electing Stephen A. Douglas to the Presidency. Walt Whitman spoke for young America in his poem on the flag:

O hasten flag of man — O with sure and steady step, passing highest
    flag of kings,
Walk supreme to the heavens' mighty symbol — run up above them all
Flag of stars! thick-sprinkled bunting!

When the events of 1850 dashed these generous hopes Walt sounded the note of robust optimism that has heartened thousands of imprisoned and exiled patriots:

Liberty, let others despair of you — I never despair of you!

There had been wild talk in 1848 of annexing Ireland and Sicily, as certain revolutionists in those countries requested; and when the news came that Hungary had fallen, the legislatures of New York, Ohio, and Indiana called for action. In Congress most of the Western Senators voted for a resolution offered by Lewis Cass, to suspend diplomatic relations with Austria; but the cautious Whigs and Southern Democrats voted it down. Even Webster indulged popular sentiment by insulting the House of Hapsburg in a diplomatic note. Louis Kossuth, brought to New York as guest of the nation in 1851, was given an overwhelming ovation. ' Europe is antiquated, decrepit, tottering on the verge of dissolution,' declared Senator Douglas. ' It is a vast graveyard.'

American diplomacy was particularly truculent when directed by Southern gentlemen who wanted new slave territory, as compensation for the ' loss ' of California. Cuba, during these eventful years, was in its normal state of unrest. Certain Southern statesmen professed to fear lest the island should fall to England, or become a black republic like Hayti. Others had an eye on the large and redundant slave population there. Polk proposed to buy it in 1848 for a hundred million dollars, but Spain rejected his offer with contempt. Then came filibustering expeditions, frowned upon by Taylor, tolerated by Fillmore and Pierce; and consequent interference by the Spanish authorities with Yankee traders. One such instance, the case of the *Black Warrior* (1854), seemed a good opportunity to provoke Spain into war. The Secretary of War, Jefferson Davis, urged President Pierce to take that line; but the Secretary of State, W. L. Marcy, kept his head; and Spain disappointed the annexationists by apologizing. There was a comic anticlimax when the American ministers to Spain, France, and Great Britain held a conclave at Ostend, and issued a farcical manifesto (18 October 1854). ' In the progress of human events the time has arrived,' they informed the world, ' when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale as those of the United States in the purchase of the island ' of Cuba. With the purchase money, Spain might ' become a centre of attraction for the travelling world,' and ' her vineyards would bring forth a vastly increased quantity of choice wines.' Should she be so unreasonable as to refuse, then, ' by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain if we possess the power.' The Ostend manifesto had no other result than to lower American prestige in Europe, and that of Pierce at home.

2. *Pacific and Caribbean Waters*

The more solid achievements of American diplomacy under Fillmore and Pierce flowed from the territorial acquisitions in 1846–48. Oregon and California together became the mainspring of American history for ten years. Desire for the one led to the Mexican War; the acquisition of both brought on the slavery dispute of 1846 to 1850. Together they inspired a remarkable diplomatic adventure in the Pacific that broke down Japanese isolation. The difficulty of communicating with Oregon and California by overland trails led (*a*) to projects of inter-oceanic canals, which raised another controversy with Great Britain; (*b*) to the perfection of the sailing ship, and a temporary ascendency of the American merchant marine; (*c*) to projects of transcontinental railways, which raised once more the question of slavery in the territories, and led directly to the Civil War.

Diplomacy lagged far behind the American merchant flag in the Pacific, until it was planted firmly on Pacific shores. In 1844 Caleb Cushing negotiated a treaty with China, in which he obtained access to the treaty ports and extra-territorial privileges for American merchants, but expressly discountenanced those who were dealing in opium. Japan had been closed for two centuries to all foreign intercourse, save a strictly regulated trade with the Dutch and Chinese at Nagasaki, when the gold rush to California brought American steamships into the Pacific. A desire for a coaling station and for trade prompted the first American mission to Japan. Commodore Matthew C. Perry, brother of the hero of Lake Erie, was entrusted with the mission. On 8 July 1853 his armed squadron, including a new steam frigate, anchored in the Bay of Yedo. Although forbidden to use force, Perry so impressed the Shogunate by his display of force, that, contrary to all precedent, his credentials were received and referred to the Mikado and the daimios. Perry tactfully sailed away to China, in order to give the daimios time to make up their minds; and by the time he returned (February 1854) they had decided to yield. Picturesque conferences were held at the little village of Yokohama. Gifts were exchanged: the rarest lacquers and most beautiful brocades for a set of telegraph instruments, a miniature locomotive, and an assortment of farming implements, death-dealing weapons, and munitions, including several barrels of rye whiskey. It was old Japan's first taste of the blessings of western civilization. On 31 March 1854 the epoch-making Treaty of Kanagawa was signed. The United States was allowed to establish a consulate, and American vessels were permitted to visit certain Japanese ports for supplies and a limited trade. Such was the famous opening of Japan. But, as Mr. Dooley once observed, 'We didn't go in; they kim out.'

In the matter of communications between the older United States and its Pacific territories, the simplest solution appeared to be an inter-oceanic canal. Three different routes were seriously considered: the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, the Isthmus of Panama, and through Lake Nicaragua. Over the first route, which was impracticable for a canal, President Pierce obtained a right of way for American traffic in 1853. Over the Isthmus of Panama, Polk obtained a right of transit by treaty with Colombia, in return for guaranteeing to that republic her sovereignty over the Isthmus, and undertaking to defend its neutrality. A Panama railway was undertaken by American capital and completed in 1855. The Nicaragua route brought on a dangerous controversy with Great Britain.

When the Monroe Doctrine was declared, the British Empire already had two bases in Central America: the old log-wood establishment of Belize, and a shadowy protectorate over the Mosquito Indians on the Nicaraguan coast. Owing to the weakness of the local republics, the enterprise of British agents, and the lapse of the Monroe Doctrine at Washington, British influence and dominion sensibly increased in Central America between 1825 and 1845. A British superintendent of Belize took possession of the Bay Islands off the coast of Honduras in 1838, and at his suggestion Aberdeen stationed a British resident in 'Mosquitia,' which became a sort of Indian native state, with a distinctive flag incorporating the Union Jack. Palmerston, who returned to the Foreign Office in 1846, believed it high time to check 'manifest destiny' in that part of the world, and in 1848 formally declared the sovereignty of 'Mosquitia' over San Juan or Greytown, the eastern terminus of the proposed ship canal.

Further and unauthorized activities of American and British agents in Central America then brought about a very ticklish situation, from which their two countries were only able to emerge by negotiating the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (15 April 1850). It was agreed that neither government would ever fortify, or obtain exclusive control over, the proposed Nicaragua canal. Both guaranteed its neutrality, and invited other nations to join. Later generations of Americans regarded the Clayton-Bulwer treaty as a self-denying ordinance, and condemned the Senate for ratifying it. At the time, however, it was a very fair compromise of the interests that Britain had acquired in Central America without protest from the United States, and the new interest that the United States had acquired in Isthmian communication. Nevertheless, it marked a retreat from the position taken by Adams and Polk.

As American capitalists showed much less enthusiasm than the diplomatists for a ship canal, the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty might have caused no embarrassment for fifty years, but for a clause on the exact meaning of which both Clayton and Bulwer agreed to disagree.[1] The United States government supposed that it meant British withdrawal from the Bay Islands, Greytown, and the Mosquito coast; although it did not object to the ancient custom of crowning some black-and-tan Sambo with an old admiral's hat as King of Mosquitia, if that gratified him and amused the authorities of Belize. The British government insisted that the treaty merely forbade future acquisition, and held on to what it had. This dispute became dangerous in 1854, when President Pierce and the Democrats were looking for an issue to distract the country from the slavery question, and their opponents were determined to prevent them from running away with it. The game of 'twisting the lion's tail' then began, the object being to produce a roar that would be grateful in the ears of Irish-American voters and native American jingoes. The equally dangerous game of converting a doubtful interpretation into a prescriptive right was played by Palmerston. And the filibustering game was played in Nicaragua by William Walker, the 'grey-eyed man of destiny,' with the object of bringing it into the Union as another slave state. Fortunately both governments had more sense than their words would suggest. In 1859–60 Great Britain ceded the Bay Islands to Honduras and the Mosquito coast to Nicaragua — with a string to it, to be sure, but a string that was never pulled. In the end, the whole subject of Isthmian diplomacy served to clear up Anglo-American relations. America became more attached to the Monroe Doctrine, and England very definitely renounced the policy of Canning, Aberdeen, and Palmerston, of establishing a British counterweight in Latin America.

3. *Reciprocity with Canada*

Midway in the Isthmian negotiations there was established a landmark in North American commerce and diplomacy, the Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854. The onward march of free trade in Britain had harassed Canadian feeling, and played fast and loose with Canadian interests. Preference to colonial grain and flour gave Canada an unwonted prosperity through milling American wheat for the British market. Peel's repeal of the Corn Laws abolished the Canadian preference and prostrated this industry. At the request of the Canadian legislature the British government attempted to negotiate at Washington a reciprocity treaty for Canada, and Parliament passed an enabling act.

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[1] 'The Governments of the United States and Great Britain hereby declare that neither one nor the other will ever . . . occupy, or fortify, or colonize, or assume, or exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast, or any part of Central America.'

Canada could offer *quid pro quo:* the free navigation of the St. Lawrence, which the United States had been demanding as a natural right; and the fishing grounds off Labrador and the Gulf, where the sportive mackerel was wont to elude Yankee fishermen. But it was a difficult matter to effect that exchange. The Foreign Office and the State Department had no trouble in concluding a reciprocity treaty, but such a treaty required concurrent Acts of Parliament, of Congress, and of four Canadian legislatures; and the Maritime Provinces were loath to admit Yankees to their shore fisheries. William L. Marcy, the New York spoilsman who became Pierce's Secretary of State, greased the way at Halifax, Fredericton, and St. John by judicious bribery; and Lord Elgin, a hard-headed but genial Scot, is said to have floated the treaty through the United States Senate on oceans of champagne. Both served their respective countries well. The treaty (5 June 1854) opened the United States to Canadian farm produce, timber, and fish, and gave a finishing blow to Canadian disloyalty. Yankee fishermen obtained new privileges in Canadian territorial waters. The navigation of the Lakes, the St. Lawrence, and their connecting canals became common to both nations. Thus Britain maintained her political dominion over Canada by sanctioning an economic union with the United States.

4. *The Clipper Ship*

While the diplomatists were wrangling over imaginary canals to the Pacific, the shipwrights of New York and New England were engaged in cutting down the time of ocean passage round Cape Horn. In one month of 1850 thirty-three sailing vessels from New York and Boston entered San Francisco bay after an average passage of one hundred and fifty-nine days. Then there came booming through the Golden Gate the clipper ship *Sea Witch* of New York, ninety-seven days out. At once the cry went up for clipper ships at any price.

This new type of sailing vessel — characterized by great length in proportion to breadth of beam, an enormous sail area, and long concave bows ending in a gracefully curved cutwater — had been invented for the China-New York tea trade. The voyage of the *Sea Witch* showed its possibilities. Her record was broken by the *Surprise* within a year, and in 1851 the *Flying Cloud* made 'Frisco in eighty-nine days from New York, a record never surpassed. As California then afforded no return cargo save gold dust — the export of wheat began only in 1855 — the Yankee clippers proceeded in ballast to the Chinese treaty ports, where they came into competition with the British marine; and the result was more impressive than the victory of the yacht *America*. Crack East-Indiamen humbly waited for a cargo weeks on end, while one American clipper after another sailed off with a cargo of tea at double the ordinary freights. When the *Oriental* of New York appeared at London, ninety-seven days from Hong-Kong, crowds thronged the West India Docks to admire her beautiful hull, lofty rig, and patent fittings; the Admiralty took off her lines in dry dock, and the *Times* came out with a leader challenging British shipbuilders to set their ' long practised skill, steady industry and dogged determination ' against the ' youth, ingenuity and ardour ' of the United States.

In answer to this challenge, the first British clipper ships, the *Stornoway* and *Chrysolite,* were promptly built. Yet so swiftly was the type developed that by the time British designers had caught up with the *Oriental,* their Yankee rivals had far outdistanced them. In 1852 Donald McKay of Boston launched the *Sovereign of the Seas,* the largest merchant vessel yet built, and the boldest in design: stately as a cathedral, beautiful as a terraced cloud. A young American naval officer, Lieutenant Maury of Virginia, had just been doing what the British Admiralty, with all its opportunities, had neglected to do: charting trade-winds and ocean currents by the study of ships' logs. It was he who discovered that the strong and steady westerly gales were to be found in the ' roaring forties ' south latitude. Following his sailing directions, the *Sovereign of the Seas* on her homeward voyage made a day's run of 411 nautical miles, a run surpassed only four or five times in the history of sailing vessels, only once by the product of another shipyard than McKay's, and that was in the State of Maine.

By this time the British Navigation Acts had been repealed, and gold had been discovered in Australia. For that destination the

Sovereign was chartered in Liverpool, and made so successful a voyage that four clippers were ordered of Donald McKay for the Australian Black Ball Line. Two of them, the *James Baines* and *Lightning,* were the fastest sailing ships that ever sailed under the red ensign. The *Baines,* with her skysail studding-sails and main moonsail, established the record transatlantic sailing passage — 12¼ days Boston to Liverpool — and then another from Liverpool to Melbourne — 63 days — that still holds good. The *Lightning* on her maiden voyage made a day's run never equalled by a sailing vessel, and not surpassed by a steamship for a generation afterward: 436 nautical miles.

Nightingale and *Witch of the Wave, Northern Light* and *Southern Cross, Young America* and *Great Republic, Golden Age* and *Herald of the Morning, Red Jacket* and *Westward Ho!, Dreadnought* and *Glory of the Seas* — 'I cannot tell their wonder, nor make known . . . these splendid ships, each with her grace and glory.' No sailing vessel ever approached them in power, majesty, or speed. It seemed as if all the ingenuity of the Yankee race, with its latent artistic genius, had at last found perfect and harmonious expression. Yet the Yankee clipper fulfilled a very limited purpose: speed to the gold-fields at any price or risk. When that was no longer an object, no more were built; and when the panic of 1857 brought a world-wide depression in shipping, it was the clipper-shipowners who suffered first and most. British builders, leaving glory to their rivals, were quietly evolving a more useful type of medium clipper, and perfecting the iron screw steamer.

The American iron industry and engineering trades were so backward, and the extent of inland and protected waters in the United States was so great, that American steamship builders clung too long to the wooden side-wheeler, unsuitable for ocean work. The Pacific Mail did well in its own sphere, and for a few years the Collins Line, heavily subsidized by Congress, challenged the Cunard; but its vessels had an unfortunate way of foundering. By 1857 the British Empire had an ocean-going steam tonnage of almost half a million tons, as compared with ninety thousand under the American flag. England had won back her maritime supremacy in fair competition, by the skill of her engineers and the sturdy courage of her shipbuilders. Civil war turned the Yankee mind to other objects; the World War revived an ancient challenge.

5. *Prairie Settlement and Pacific Railways*

Transportation also had a vital effect on the settlement of the West; and a contest over western railway routes leads us back to slavery once more.

Down to 1850 American agricultural settlement had been limited to the forests and to the smaller prairies with scattered groves of trees by the pioneer's dependence on wood and running water. The larger treeless prairies of Illinois and Iowa were devoid of shelter and remote from markets. Their earliest settlers had to live in sod cabins, and contend with wolves, prairie fires, locusts, and agues. Most emigrants preferred to take the long journey to Oregon, where they could renew the backwoods life that they loved. As late as 1849 one could look northward from a knoll near Peoria, Illinois, over an undulating plain, unbroken by house or tree as far as the eye could reach.

After 1850 the prairie farmer instead of the backwoodsman became the typical American pioneer. In part the change was due to the new agricultural machinery. Obed Hussey of Auburn, New York, invented the important principle of the modern reaper, a moving knife against a fixed finger. At Chicago, in 1847, Cyrus McCormick began to manufacture his patent reaper, admirably adapted to soil free of stumps and stones, as was that of the prairies. Marsh's harvester, which gathered the wheat into sheaves, Appleby's self-knotting binder, and the steel-toothed cultivator soon followed. An improved form of plow with a steel mould-board made it easier to break up the tough prairie sod. Steel wire solved the fencing problem. At London in 1851 and Paris in 1855, American machines beat all comers in competitive trials. Yet the greatest impetus to prairie farming came from the rising price of wheat (from $0.93 a bushel in 1851 to $2.50 in 1855 at the New York market), and the rapid building of railroads into the prairie country, from lake and river ports like Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Louis. In 1850 railroads had hardly penetrated the Middle West; by 1860 their network covered it. The railway mileage in Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, and Wisconsin increased from 660 in 1847 to 7,653 in 1861; that of the United States as a whole from 9,021 to 30,365. The prairie farmer, hitherto dependent on long wagon hauls over execrable roads, was then able to market his grain, and obtain the means of comfortable living. Most important of the prairie railways was the Illinois Central, financed and managed by capitalists of New York and Boston, and endowed by Act of Congress with alternate sections of public land on each side of its right-of-way. The completion of this line from Chicago to Cairo in 1856 opened up the central prairies to profitable settlement. And it is a curious coincidence that the same year saw the foundation of a North-and-West political party which shattered the dream of a South-and-West alliance; and which, four years later, drove the South to seek safety in independence.

In the meantime a struggle over the route of a transcontinental railway was promoting the same result. Of the many different schemes projected since 1845, the four most important were (1) the northern, from the upper Mississippi to the upper Missouri, and by Lewis and Clark's trail to the Columbia river (the route of the Great Northern Railway); (2) the central, from St. Louis up the Kansas and Arkansas rivers, across the Rockies to the Great Salt Lake and by the California trail to San Francisco (followed in part by the Missouri Pacific); (3) the thirty-fifth parallel route from Memphis, up the Arkansas and Canadian rivers, across the Rockies near Santa Fé, and through the Apache and Mojave country to Los Angeles; (4) the southern, from New Orleans up the Red river and across Texas, and by the Gila valley to Yuma and San Diego. Either of the first two would follow the natural route of emigration, and bind Oregon and California to the North; but the unorganized Indian country was an obstacle. The Southern route was the shortest, with the best contours, and led through states and territories already organized. It might well be the means of the South recovering all she had lost by the compromise of 1850. Congress, in March 1853, authorized surveys of these four routes under the direction of the War Department.

Jefferson Davis was Secretary of War and President Pierce's mentor. Although a state-rights man, his keen desire for a Southern transcontinental railway led him to advocate its construction by the Federal government under the war power — a policy that could only be justified by the nationalist theories of Marshall and Adams. As soon as it became clear that such a railway would have to pass through a bit of Mexican territory, Davis induced the President to buy the land for ten million dollars. In the Gadsden treaty of 30 December 1853 this purchase was effected.



TRANSCONTINENTAL ROUTES
& TERRITORIAL ADJUSTMENTS
1850-58

To illustrate the Compromise of 1850, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and the Pacific Railway Surveys

o Towns and Settlements
◆ Trading Posts ✱ Army Posts

HUDSON'S BAY CO.
WASHINGTON TER. 1853
OREGON TER. 1848
NEBRASKA TER. 1854
MINNESOTA 1858
IOWA 1845
MISSOURI
KANSAS TER. 1854
UTAH TER. 1850
CALIFORNIA
NEW MEXICO TER. 1850
INDIAN TER.
ARK.
TEXAS 1845
GADSDEN PURCHASE 1853
MEXICO
Astoria
Ft. Vancouver
Columbia R.
Walla Walla
Salem
Ft. Benton
Stevens' Survey for Northern Route
Ft. Union
Yellowstone R.
Missouri R.
Red R. of the North
Ft. Garry
Ft. Snelling
St. Paul
Mississippi R.
Snake R.
Central Pacific and Union Pacific Railway 1866-69
Pony Express Route
Salt Lake City
Provo
San Francisco
Sacramento
Carson City
Stockton
(Cheyenne)
Platte R.
Omaha
Council Bluffs
Des Moines
To Chicago
Ft. Kearney
St. Joseph
Ft. Leavenworth
Ft. Riley
Westport
(Denver)
Pikes Pk.
The Central Route
Bent's Ft.
Kansas R.
Topeka
Lawrence
Osawatomie
St. Louis
Council Grove
Arkansas R.
Ft. Defiance
Zuñi
Santa Fe
Albuquerque
The Thirty-Fifth Parallel Route
Canadian R.
Ft. Smith
To Memphis
Red R.
Preston
Shreveport
New Orleans
San Diego
Ft. Yuma
G.R.
Tuscon
The Southern Route
Ft. Bliss
El Paso
Rio Colorado
Rio Grande del Norte
Miles
100
200
300
400

W T Wright

The stage was now set for Congress to sanction the southern route.

Stephen A. Douglas was then senior Senator from Illinois. A lively five-footer, chock-full of bounce and swagger, the 'Little Giant' was the best stump orator in the Northwest, and the idol of Northern Democrats. As an Illinoisian and a heavy speculator in western lands and Chicago real estate, he wished the transcontinental railway to take the central route. In order to contest the southern route on even terms, law and government must be extended over, and settlers invited into, the region through which the central route must pass. Douglas, accordingly, reported a bill to organize the great plains as the Territory of Nebraska, in January 1854. Earlier bills of that nature had been defeated by Southern opposition. So Douglas baited this one for Southern votes with a principle that he called 'popular sovereignty.' It would rest with the people of the new territory to decide whether or not they would have slavery, as soon as they obtained a territorial legislature.

Popular sovereignty (or 'squatter sovereignty' as it was contemptuously called) did not satisfy certain Senators. As Nebraska would be wholly north of 36° 30′, slavery therein would be prohibited by the Missouri Compromise Act of 1820. Douglas's bill would have repealed that act implicitly; but the Senators from Kentucky and Missouri insisted on repealing it explicitly. Douglas consented. He also agreed to divide the new territory into Kansas and Nebraska, so that the Missourians might secure the one, and the Iowans the other. There was a touching scene when Senator Dixon of Kentucky told him: 'Sir, I once recognized you as a demagogue, a mere manager, selfish and intriguing. I now find you a warm-hearted and sterling patriot.'

6. *The Kansas-Nebraska Bill*

The fat was in the fire. At this proposal to repeal the Missouri Compromise the angry passions of anti-slavery and pro-slavery flared up; and there was no Clay of other days to quench them. Every one forgot about the railway. The South had not asked for Kansas, and did not want Kansas; but 'Southern rights' were involved. No one outside Missouri proposed to take slaves farther west, and even Missouri's chief interest was not so much in promoting a transcontinental railway as in preventing an extension of the Underground Railroad; but Southern honor demanded that slavery should follow the flag. Northerners, on the other hand, were alarmed at a new proposal to extend the 'slave power,' and to break a compromise of thirty years' standing. People could hardly have been more startled at a proposition to repeal habeas corpus and trial by jury, than they were by the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Stephen Douglas, morally obtuse, could not see that a principle was involved: he simply did not realize the depth and strength of Northern sentiment against opening virgin territory to the 'peculiar institution.' The North, in Lincoln's picturesque phrase, was determined to give her pioneers 'a clean bed, with no snakes in it.'

For three months the bitter debate dragged on. President Pierce, under the influence of Jefferson Davis, tried to whip his party into line; and all but a few Northern Democrats obeyed. Old Sam Houston of Texas reminded the Senate in vain that by solemn treaties it had confirmed most of Kansas and Nebraska to the Indians 'as long as grass shall grow and water run.' No one else thought of the aborigines. Hordes of emigrants to Oregon and California had killed their game and thinned their numbers by disease. Federal agents were already bullying them into renouncing their perpetual titles. The once powerful Delaware, or Leni-Lenape, accepted a small reservation with an annual bounty. Others, like the Shawnee and Miami, who had once terrorized the Kentucky frontier and beaten a federal army, were removed to the Indian Territory, which fortunately lay between the rival railway routes.

Democratic discipline triumphed, and on 25 May 1854 the Kansas-Nebraska bill passed the Senate by a comfortable majority, 'It is at once the worst and best Bill on which Congress ever acted,' declared Senator Sumner. The worst, inasmuch as it is a present victory for slavery. The best, for 'it annuls all past compromises with slavery, and makes all future compromises impossible. Thus it puts freedom and slavery face to face, and bids them grapple. Who can doubt the result?'

XXIX

THE IRREPRESSIBLE CONFLICT

1854–1859

1. *The Know-nothing Interlude*

'IF the Nebraska bill should be passed, the Fugitive Slave Law is a dead letter throughout New England' wrote a Southerner in Boston. 'As easily could a law prohibiting the eating of cod-fish and pumpkin-pies be enforced.' It did pass on 25 May 1854. The next day a Boston mob led by a Unitarian minister tried to rescue a fugitive slave from the court-house where he was detained for examination. They did not succeed. Anthony Burns, the slave, was identified by his master, and escorted to the wharf by a battalion of United States artillery, four platoons of marines, and the *posse comitatus,* through streets lined with hissing and groaning spectators, who were kept back by twenty-two companies of state militia. It cost the United States about $40,000 to return that nigger to his master; and he was the last returned from Massachusetts.

Many people who were indignant over the Kansas-Nebraska Act felt it was time to form a new anti-slavery party. A convention held under the oaks at Jackson, Michigan, on 6 July 1854, resolved to oppose the extension of slavery, and 'be known as "Republicans" until the contest be terminated.' Many places claim the birthplace of the Republican party, but Jackson at least made the happy suggestion of adopting Jefferson's old label, disused since the time when his Republican party split into Democrats and Whigs. The new party, however, was slow in gathering momentum outside the Northwest. Seward sulked in his Whig tent; the 'Anti-Nebraska Democrats' were loath to cut all connection with their party; the Free-Soilers could not see why a new party was needed; and the people were distracted by a new gospel of ignorance.

Know-nothingism was the political exploitation of an instinctive dislike for foreigners. Many native-born Americans found the rising flood of Irish Catholics and Germans most unpleasant. Others regarded the catering of Democrats to the immigrant vote as a menace, and the truculent attitude of the immigrant press towards American institutions, alarming. The visit of a tactless papal nuncio appears to have convinced many Northern patriots that the Republic was in danger from Rome; and the activities of German radicals, who had begun to preach the gospel according to St. Marx, alarmed the pious South. Accordingly a secret 'Order of the Star-Spangled Banner,' with elaborate ritual and rigid discipline, was formed by native-born Protestants. Members, when questioned by outsiders, answered 'I know nothing.' Candidates nominated secretly developed surprising strength at the polls, and many politicians joined up, thinking the cat would jump that way. In the state elections of 1854 the Know-nothings almost won New York, and did win Massachusetts, electing a new legislature that spent its time largely on clownish investigations of Catholic schools and nunneries. At Baltimore they organized the 'plug-uglies,' gangs who attended the polls armed with carpenters' awls, to 'plug' voters who did not give the pass-word. In the summer of 1855 the American party, as it then called itself, held a national convention of which the Southern members obtained control, and passed pro-slavery resolutions. The Northerners then lost interest, and outside Maryland the movement collapsed. 'Anything more low, obscene, feculent,' wrote Rufus Choate, 'the manifold heavings of history have not cast up.' Mr. Choate did not live to see the Ku Klux Klan.

2. *Bleeding Kansas, Black Republicanism*

Kansas soon diverted attention from the popish peril. Since 'popular sovereignty' was to settle the status of slavery in Kansas, pro- and anti-slavery people scrambled to get there first. The Federal government opened a land office in the territory in July 1854, before the Indian titles were fairly extinguished; and even before that Missourians began to flock across the border and stake out claims. In the meantime, some enterprising Yankees had formed a company to finance the migration of Northerners. This effort aroused the utmost indignation among the Missourians, who proceeded to blockade the Missouri river against the Northern immigrants, and to sack their first settlement at Lawrence. Presently the Emigrant Aid Company began to arm free-state settlers with a new breech-loading weapon of precision, the Sharps rifle, or 'Beecher's Bible,' so called after the abolitionist preacher who advised its use. There were merry times in Kansas for three years. Parties of Northern 'jayhawkers' gave battle with 'Kickapoo Rangers,' 'Doniphan Tigers,' and other organizations of 'border ruffians' from Missouri and points south .' We had at least seven thousand men in the Territory on the day of the election, and one-third of them will remain there,' wrote Senator Atchison of Missouri.

> 'The pro slavery ticket prevailed everywhere. . . . Now let the Southern men come on with their slaves. Ten thousand families can take possession of and hold every acre of timber in the Territory of Kansas, and this secures the prairie. . . . We are playing for a mighty stake; if we win, we carry slavery to the Pacific Ocean.'

Few Southern men, however, cared to risk valuable property in such a region, and free-state settlers came pouring in with the spirit of crusaders. One of them named John Brown accounted for quite a number of 'border ruffians' at the 'Pottawatami massacre.' Such were the workings of popular sovereignty. Kansas had become the theatre of a western flanking movement preliminary to the Civil War.

On 19 May 1856 Senator Sumner of Massachusetts delivered a speech on 'The Crime against Kansas' which contained some unpalatable truth, much that was neither truthful nor in good taste, and some disgraceful personal invective against Senator Butler of South Carolina. Three days after, a kinsman of Butler, Preston Brooks, attacked Sumner as he was sitting at his desk in the Senate chamber, and beat him senseless with a stout cane, while Douglas and Toombs looked on. Returning to South Carolina the assailant was fêted from place to place, and presented by admirers with suitably inscribed canes.

A few days after that, the Republican party held a national nominating convention at Philadelphia. It was a mass-meeting of earnest men from all the Northern states, who were convinced that the North, in self-defence, must have a Northern party. For some strange reason the explorer John C. Frémont stampeded the convention, and obtained the first Republican presidential nomination. Their platform proclaimed it 'both the right and the duty of Congress to prohibit in the territories those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy and slavery.' James Buchanan, who had been carefully coached for several years by his bosom friend Slidell, obtained the Democratic nomination; the Know-nothings put up the pallid ex-President Fillmore.

The 'Black Republicans,' as their enemies called them, made a lively campaign. 'Free soil, free speech, and Frémont' was the slogan. Slavery in the territories was the main issue. Most of the Northern Whigs came over, and the Northern Know-nothings as well. Maryland asserted her independence by voting for Fillmore. Buchanan carried the rest of the South, with Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Indiana; and was elected. Frémont swept the rest of the North.[1] No previous candidate had so nearly united the North and West against the South. Party lines were approaching dangerously close to Mason and Dixon's line; and Southerners, even in this campaign, made it perfectly clear that they would not remain in the Union if a purely Northern party elected its presidential candidate.

3. *Dred Scott*

On 6 March 1857, two days after Buchanan's inauguration, the Supreme Court published its decision on the famous case of Dred Scott *v.* Sanford. Dred was a slave who had been taken by his master to Illinois, thence to the unorganized territory north of 36° 30′, where slavery had been forbidden by the Missouri Compromise, and finally back to Missouri, where he sued for freedom on the ground of having twice been resident on free soil. Chief Justice Taney, and the four Southerners among his eight associates, welcomed this opportunity to settle the status of slavery in the territories. The opinion of the court declared against Scott's claim for freedom on three grounds: (*a*) as a negro he could not be a citizen of the United States, and therefore had no right to sue in a federal court; (*b*) as a resident of Missouri the laws of Illinois had no longer any effect on his status; (*c*) as a resident of the territory north of 36° 30′ he had not been emancipated because Congress had no right to deprive citizens of their property without 'due

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[1] The popular vote was:

Buchanan	1,838,169
Frémont	1,341,264
Fillmore	874,534

The figures include no popular vote for South Carolina. Note the close approximation to the popular vote of 1860.

process of law.' The Missouri Compromise Act, it followed, was unconstitutional and void — as Calhoun and the extreme Southerners ~~had claimed.~~

None of the Chief Justice's opinion was *obiter dictum;* but only on the second point was it sound. As Justice Curtis proved in his vigorous dissenting opinion, negroes had been considered citizens in all the Northern states, even though they had seldom possessed the vote, and as citizens had the right to sue in United States courts. If slaves ever had been common-law property, they ceased to be such upon Lord Mansfield's decision of the Sommersett case (1772). 'Due process of law,' in the Constitution [2] referred to the method of a law's enforcement, not to the substance of a law itself. Once before, in Marbury *v.* Madison (1803), the Supreme Court had declared an Act of Congress unconstitutional; but in that case the act in question directly concerned the federal judiciary, while in this it was a general law, resting on precedent, the result of sectional compromise, and enforced during a period of thirty-four years. The decision, therefore, looked like a very far-fetched and questionable attempt of the Supreme Court to sanction Calhoun's doctrine that slavery followed the flag. Oregon and Nebraska were opened to slavery, as well as Kansas. Squatter sovereignty thenceforth was no sovereignty; the slave power was theoretically supreme in every United States territory.

Events in Kansas pointed to the same conclusion. Federal troops were now keeping order, but the free-state and pro-slavery men refused to co-operate. Each group held a convention, drafted a state convention, ratified it, and appealed to Washington for statehood. The anti-slavery Topeka constitution was rejected in the Senate in 1856. The Lecompton constitution, the most out-and-out pro-slavery charter yet drafted, was accepted by the Senate; but Stephen Douglas insisted on principle that it be re-submitted to the people of Kansas, who rejected it emphatically. In the meantime slavery was legal in Kansas, and in all the western territories; but the overwhelming majority of Northerners in Kansas made that territory a certain free state, sooner or later.

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[2] The phrase is from Amendment V of the Constitution, and was a translation of per legem terrae in Magna Carta. Lincoln observed in his Springfield speech of 17 June 1858 that the Chief Justice's construction of 'due process' would invalidate every emancipatory act of a state; for a similar clause was in the bill of rights of every northern state constitution.

4. *The Lincoln-Douglas Debates*

Until the Kansas struggle Abraham Lincoln had been distinguished from hundreds of Northwestern lay-politicians only by a reputation for truthfulness and honesty, and a habit of prolonged, abstracted contemplation. He had played the usual game of Illinois politics, and not well. He had served one term in Congress as a Whig, without distinction. Mary Todd, the belle of Springfield, had married him much against his will, and made his life unhappy. Slavery he had long regarded as an evil thing; but the abolitionist agitation seemed to him mischievous in its effects: a cure worse than the disease.

About the time of the Kansas-Nebraska Act an unseen force began to work on Lincoln's soul, and to prepare him for the most arduous and distressing responsibility that has ever fallen to an American. He began to preach a new testament of anti-slavery, without malice or hatred toward slave-owners.

> 'I surely will not blame them for not doing what I should not know how to do myself. If all earthly power were given me, I should not know what to do as to the existing institution. . . . When they remind us of their constitutional rights, I acknowledge them — not grudgingly, but fully and fairly, and I would give them any legislation for the reclaiming of their fugitives which should not in its stringency be more likely to carry a free man into slavery than our ordinary criminal laws are to hang an innocent one. . . . But all this, to my judgment, furnishes no more excuse for permitting slavery to go into our own free territory than it would for reviving the African slave-trade by law.'
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> 'Slavery is founded on the selfishness of man's nature — opposition to it in his love of justice. These principles are in eternal antagonism, and when brought into collision so fiercely as slavery extension brings them, shocks and throes and convulsions must ceaselessly follow.'

These quotations are from Lincoln's Peoria speech of 16 October 1854. It made him famous throughout the Northwest. Two years later he became a rival candidate to Stephen A. Douglas for election as United States Senator from Illinois. The first paragraph of his opening speech in the campaign (16 June 1858) gave the ripe conclusion to his ponderings during the last four years; and struck the key-note of American history for the seven years to come:

> 'We are now far into the fifth year since a policy was initiated with the avowed object and confident promise of putting an end to slavery agitation. Under the operation of that policy, that agitation has not only not ceased, but has constantly augmented. In my opinion it will not cease until a crisis shall have been reached and passed. "A house divided against itself cannot stand." I believe this government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the Union to be dissolved — I do not expect the house to fall — but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing, or all the other. Either the opponents of slavery will arrest the further spread of it, and place it where the public mind shall rest in the belief that it is in the course of ultimate extinction; or its advocates will push it forward till it shall become alike lawful in all the States, old as well as new, North as well as South.'

Lincoln and Douglas engaged in a series of seven joint debates, covering every section of the state, through the summer and autumn of 1858. Imagine some parched little prairie town of central Illinois, set in fields of rustling corn; a dusty court-house square, surrounded by low wooden houses and stores blistering in the August sunshine, decked with flags and party emblems; shirt-sleeved farmers and their families in wagons and buggies and on foot, brass bands blaring out 'Hail! Columbia' and 'Oh! Susanna,' wooden platform with railing, perspiring semicircle of local dignitaries in black frock coats and two-quart beaver hats. The Douglas special train (provided by George B. McClellan, superintendent of the Illinois Central), pulls into the 'deepo' and fires a salute from the twelve-pounder cannon bolted to a flat-car at the rear. Senator Douglas, escorted by the local Democratic club in columns of fours, drives up in an open carriage, and aggressively mounts the platform. His short, stocky figure is clothed in the best that the city of Washington can produce. Every feature of his face bespeaks confidence and mastery; every gesture of his body, vigor and combativeness. Abe Lincoln, who had previously arrived by an ordinary passenger train, approaches on foot, his furrowed face and long neck conspicuous above the crowd. He shambles on to the platform, displaying a rusty frock coat the sleeves of which stop several inches short of his wrists, and well-worn trousers that show a similar reluctance to approach a pair of enormous feet. His face, as he turns to the crowd, has an air of settled melancholy. If Dickens had only visited Illinois in the summer of 1858! How he would have roared with laughter at the sight of the two champions — the frenzied gestures of Douglas, and Lincoln's awkward habit of bending his knees and then rising to his full height with a jerk, in order to enforce a point — and how he would have listened to them in the end. For no recorded debate in the English language surpassed those between Lincoln and Douglas for keen give and take, vigorous Saxon language, and clear exposition of vital issues.

The Dred Scott decision was a blow to popular sovereignty; for it meant that the territories had no legal choice but to accept slavery. But Douglas had stuck to it courageously, and defied Buchanan and the Southern Democrats, when they attempted to impose the Lecompton constitution on Kansas. In the debate at Freeport, Lincoln placed Douglas in a dilemma by asking whether the people of a territory could, in any lawful way, exclude slavery from their limits. Apparently, Douglas must either accept the Dred Scott decision and admit popular sovereignty to be a farce, or separate from his party by repudiating a dictum of the Supreme Court. But this clever statesman had already found a way out of the dilemma. 'Slavery cannot exist a day or an hour anywhere, unless it is supported by local police regulations,' and if a territorial legislature fail to pass a black code, they will effectually keep slavery out. Of course Douglas was right. The relation of a territorial legislature to Congress was similar to that of a colonial legislature, in the British Empire, to the Privy Council. Congress could invalidate a positive enactment of the territorial legislature, but not force it to pass a law against its will.

It is probable that this 'Freeport doctrine,' as it was called, won Douglas his re-election to the Senate; and he deserved it. Kansas was safe for freedom; and if theoretically slavery were legal in all the territories there was not a ghost of a chance that any, save possibly New Mexico, would become a slaveholding state. The only political justification for Lincoln's policy, the Republican policy of overriding the Supreme Court decision and outlawing slavery in the territories, was the extreme unlikelihood that the South could rest content with the Dred Scott principle, any more than she had rested content with the compromises of 1787, 1820, and 1850. Abolition, as old H. G. Otis predicted in 1835, was blowing on the South like a perpetual trade-wind. She was fated to insist on erecting barriers for slavery further and further afield until the world should cry out 'away with this foul thing.'

Lincoln furnished an even deeper justification in his Quincy speech of 13 October 1858. This controversy over strategic positions, he pointed out, was an effort to dominate the fundamental moral issue,

> ‘the difference between the men who think slavery a wrong and those who do not think it wrong. The Republican party think it wrong—we think it is a moral, a social, and a political wrong. We think it is a wrong not confining itself merely to the persons of the States where it exists, but that it is a wrong which in its tendency, to say the least, affects the existence of the whole nation. Because we think it wrong, we propose a course of policy that shall deal with it as a wrong. We deal with it as with any other wrong, in so far as we can prevent its growing any larger, and so deal with it that in the run of time there may be some promise of an end to it. . . .
>
> ‘I will add this, that if there be any man who does not believe that slavery is wrong in the three aspects which I have mentioned, or in any one of them, that man is misplaced and ought to leave us. While, on the other hand, if there be any man in the Republican party who is impatient over the necessity springing from its actual presence, and is impatient of the constitutional guarantees thrown around it, and would act in disregard of these, he too is misplaced, standing with us.’

In his reply Douglas took the ground that the right and wrong of slavery was nobody’s business outside the slave states. ‘If each state will only agree to mind its own business, and let its neighbors alone . . . this republic can exist forever divided into free and slave states, as our fathers made it and the people of each state have decided.’ Lincoln, in rejoinder, thanked his opponent for the admission that slavery must exist for ever. The North, almost unconsciously, had come to a determination that this must not be.

5. *Was Slavery Doomed?*

Lincoln and Seward believed that the next Southern demand would be to force slavery into the free states, as it had already been forced into the free territories. A case involving the status of slaves in transit across free states was actually on its way to the Supreme Court. No responsible Southerner wished to legalize slavery in such places as New York and New England, although most Southerners were becoming insistent that the Northern states should silence the abolitionists. The next desire of the slavery protagonists was for new territory to the southward, and for reopening the African slave trade.

Buchanan had been an expansionist since 1848, and his friend Slidell kept him steady on that point. In his message of 7 January 1858 the President gently chided William Walker for his filibustering activities in Nicaragua, on the ground that he was hampering 'the destiny of our race to spread themselves over the continent of North America, and this at no distant day, should events be permitted to take their natural course.' At the end of that year he asked Congress for money to buy Cuba, and Slidell introduced an appropriation for that purpose; but the Republicans were on the alert and did not allow it to be brought to a vote. The same rising anti-slavery sentiment defeated a treaty that Buchanan negotiated with the Juarez government in Mexico, giving the United States a new railway concession, and an unlimited right of intervention to preserve order.

Unquestionably the reopening of the African slave trade was the coming demand of the South. Prime field hands were becoming so highly priced that only wealthy planters could afford to buy them. Bootlegging of blacks was on the increase. Not only picaroons of the Gulf, but respectable merchantmen of Baltimore and whalers of New Bedford were loading 'black ivory' on the West Coast. The governor of South Carolina in a public message (1856) recommended the repeal of the Federal law of 1807 that outlawed the slave trade. The governor of Florida opposed repeal, from no 'sickly sentimentality,' so he said, but because it would alienate Virginia from the cotton kingdom. Repeal was advocated by the Southern business men in their annual conventions. A Senator from Florida proposed, as an entering wedge, that negroes captured on slavers by the United States Navy be 'apprenticed' to kind planters, instead of being sent to Liberia.

By most Southern gentlemen these proposals were regarded with horror. Yet it is difficult to see how the gentry could long have resisted the logic of William L. Yancey of Alabama: 'If it is right to buy slaves in Virginia and carry them to New Orleans, why is it not right to buy them in Cuba, Brazil, or Africa, and carry them there?' If slavery was 'airth's greatest boon,' as almost every articulate Southerner was now agreed, why not indeed extend its blessings to those in darkest Africa?

A rather facile assumption of a few historians that slavery was already on the decline in the South in 1860, and would have disappeared within twenty years, if the South had been left alone, is disproved by the movement of Southern opinion which these quotations indicate. Economics had nothing to do with it. Slavery never profited so few people as at the period when it had the hottest advocates. Slavery for the South was a social necessity for keeping the negro population in its proper place, for keeping the South 'a white man's country.' That many high-minded Southerners like Robert E. Lee deplored slavery is true; but even they saw no alternative, and suggested none; indeed no one had since 1832. Suppose Lincoln had not been elected, or that the Southern States had not seceded. The South, in the natural course of events, would have demanded new and more stringent guarantees to her peculiar institution, including most certainly the suppression of abolitionist agitation. Supposing that the North had conceded everything required, and left the South entirely free to deal with her race problem, what possible break in Southern mentality would have done away with slavery before the twentieth century?

6. *John Brown*

It was now the turn of the North to be the aggressor. In 1859 came two startling portents of the 'irrepressible conflict.' The Burns fugitive slave case of 1854 was followed by a new crop of state 'personal liberty laws,' which penalized their citizens for helping federal officials to perform this unwelcome duty. A certain Booth of Wisconsin, convicted in a federal court of having forcibly rescued a runaway slave, was released by the Supreme Court of his state on the ground that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was unconstitutional and void. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the state decision. The Wisconsin Legislature, quoting the Kentucky resolutions of 1798 which Southern men considered canonical, declared 'that this assumption of jurisdiction by the federal judiciary . . . is an act of undelegated power, void, and of no force.' Here was Calhoun's nullification in a new quarter. The Federal government vindicated its power by rearresting and imprisoning Booth; but that did not minimize the effect on Southern sentiment. For us the deeper significance lies in the fact that the slavery issue had transcended constitutional theory. Janus-like, each side turned to nationalism or state rights, as best suited its purpose. Had it been the South instead of the North that was growing and gaining power, Garrison's principle of 'no union with slaveholders' might well have become the nucleus of an irresistible secession movement in the Northern states.

If the Booth case aroused scorn and bitterness, the next episode of the year brought the deeper anger that comes from fear. John Brown, perpetrator of the Pottawatomi massacre in Kansas, was a belated puritan who would have found his proper work in Cromwell's invasion of Ireland. Fanatic but no madman, he formed an audacious plan to establish a sort of abolitionist republic in the Appalachian mountains, and make war on slavery with fugitive blacks and a few determined whites. On the night of 16 October 1859, leading an army of thirteen white men and five negroes, Brown seized the federal arsenal at Harper's Ferry, and took prisoner some of the leading townspeople. Daybreak brought the neighboring militia swarming about him, while the telegraph was spreading consternation through Virginia. The irrepressible conflict at last!

Governor Wise called out the entire state militia and implored the Federal government for aid. John Brown retreated to a locomotive round-house, knocked portholes through the brick wall, and defended himself. Lewis Washington, one of his prisoners, has left us a graphic description of the scene: 'Brown was the coolest and firmest man I ever saw in defying danger and death. With one son dead by his side, and another shot through, he felt the pulse of his dying son with one hand and held his rifle with the other, and commanded his men with the utmost composure, encouraging them to be firm and to sell their lives as dearly as they could.' In the evening, when Colonel Robert E. Lee arrived with a company of marines, there were only four of Brown's men alive and unwounded. The next day the marines forced an entrance, and captured the slender remnant alive.

Eight days after his capture the trial of John Brown began in the court house of Charles Town, Virginia. From the pallet where he lay wounded the old ironside rejected his counsel's plea of insanity. There could be no doubt of the result. On 31 October the jury brought in a verdict of murder, criminal conspiracy, and treason against the Commonwealth of Virginia. John Brown, content (as he wrote his children) 'to die for God's eternal truth on the scaffold as in any other way,' was hanged on 2 December 1859.

Southerners thought of Hayti and shuddered, although not a single slave had voluntarily joined the liberator. Keenly they watched for indications of Northern opinion. That Christian burial was with difficulty obtained for John Brown's body they did not know. That every Democratic or Republican newspaper condemned his acts they did not heed, so much as the admiration for a brave man that Northern opinion could not conceal. And the babble of shocked repudiation by politicians and public men was dimmed in Southern ears by one bell-like note from Emerson: 'That new saint, than whom nothing purer or more brave was ever led by love of men into conflict and death . . . will make the gallows glorious like the cross.'

XXX

LINCOLN, SECESSION, CIVIL WAR

1860–1861

1. *The Election of 1860*

THE Republican party had won the congressional elections of 1858, and had good reason to hope for victory in 1860, although the leaders of the lower South let it be clearly understood that they would not submit to the rule of a 'Black Republican' president. The four year old party was already more of an organic whole than the old Whigs had ever been; and the platform of its national convention, adopted at Chicago on 18 May 1860, showed that it was no longer a party of one idea, but a party of the North. On the slavery question it was as clear as in 1856, though less truculent: no more slavery in the territories; no interference with slavery in the states. So there was no place in the party for the abolitionists, who denounced new Republicanism as old Whiggery writ large. John Brown was condemned in the same breath with the border ruffians of Missouri, and secession was called plain treason. The Chicago platform also promised the settlers a free quarter-section of public land, and revived Henry Clay's old 'American system' of internal improvements and protective tariff, representing Northern desires that had been balked by Southern interests. Low tariffs and the panic of 1857 had brought distress to the iron-masters of Pennsylvania and to the wool growers of Ohio, both unable as yet to meet British competition on equal terms.

This careful construction of the platform showed that the Republican party was no longer guided by crusaders, but by seasoned politicians. It had lost the first flush of radicalism, and was beginning that evolution to the right which made it eventually the party of big business and finance. In 1860 Republicanism combined the solid policies of Hamiltonian Federalism with the hopeful and humanitarian outlook of its namesake, the Republican party of Jefferson.

Abraham Lincoln received the presidential nomination on the third ballot; not for his transcendent merits, which no one yet suspected, but as a matter of political strategy. His humble birth, homely wit, and skill in debate would attract the same sort of Northerners who had once voted for Andrew Jackson; and no one else could carry the doubtful states of Indiana and Illinois. Seward, the most distinguished and experienced candidate, had too long and vulnerable a record; the others were little known outside their own states.

Already the Democratic convention at Charleston had split on the question of popular sovereignty in the territories. Southern Democrats believed that they had been duped by Douglas, and his favorite principle now appeared as a stalking horse for abolition. They had plumped for popular sovereignty in 1854, expecting to get Kansas; but Kansas had gone the other way. Her territorial legislature was now in the hands of anti-slavery men, encouraged by Douglas's 'Freeport doctrine' to flout the Dred Scott decision. Nothing less than active protection to slavery in every territory would satisfy the Southerners. The Democratic party must take distinctly the position 'that slavery was right,' said Yancey of Alabama. 'Gentlemen of the South,' replied Senator Pugh of Ohio, 'you mistake us — you mistake us — we will not do it.' They did not do it; and on 30 April 1860 the cotton state delegations withdrew from the Democratic national convention.

After this symbolic secession no candidate was able to command the necessary two-thirds majority that Democratic conventions require for a presidential nomination. The rump, therefore, adjourned to Baltimore, where with fresh delegates it made Douglas the official nominee of the Democratic party. The seceders held a separate convention, which nominated the then Vice-President, John C. Breckinridge of Kentucky, on a platform of slavery extension and annexation of Cuba.

Senator Bell of Tennessee was placed in nomination by the only party in this campaign that was not sectional, the National Constitutional Union. Composed largely of what Lincoln called 'the nice exclusive sort' of old Whigs, who hoped to persuade the American people to forget everything that had occurred since 1848, this party avowed 'no political principle other than the Constitution of the country, the Union of the states, and the enforcement of the laws.'

As Minnesota and Oregon had been admitted to the Union in 1858 and 1859, there were now eighteen free and fifteen slave states. Breckinridge carried every cotton state, together with North Carolina, Delaware, and Maryland. Douglas, although a good second to Lincoln in the total popular vote, had a plurality only in Missouri. Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee went for Bell. The South, then, was divided; but Lincoln, with hardly a ballot from south of Mason and Dixon's line, carried every free state, and rolled up a large majority in the electoral college.[1]

Northern labor, including the pioneer farmers, was the decisive force in the election. The German-Americans for the most part had joined the Democratic party as soon as they became naturalized; but they had suffered too much from tyranny in the fatherland to support it in any new shape. The personality of Lincoln swept them into a new party allegiance, and in conjunction with the New England element they carried the northwestern states. Before 1854 the native American artisan had been a nigger-hater. Since then he had been aroused by the frequent sneers of Southern statesmen at wage-earners, and by deadly quotations from Southern literature on the evils of free society. He had been deeply impressed by the favorite question of Republican orators: could the free laboring man get two dollars a day wages, when a black slave cost his master but ten cents a day to keep? Or, as Senator Ben Wade put it, when a Southern colleague called the Homestead bill a sop to Northern paupers, 'Is it to be lands for the landless, or niggers for the niggerless?' And in some obscure way Northern labor had come to look upon slavery as an ally of the Northern capitalism that exploited him.

2. *Secession*

It was a foregone conclusion that South Carolina would secede if Lincoln were elected. Since Calhoun's death, if not before, the leaders of opinion in that state had been waiting for an occasion that would unite the South in a new confederacy. As soon as the result of the election was certain, the South Carolina legislature summoned a state convention. On 20 December 1860 the convention met at

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Candidates.	*Popular vote.*	*Electoral vote.*
Lincoln	1,866,452	180
Douglas	1,376,957	12
Breckinridge	849,781	72
Bell	588,879	39

These figures include no popular vote in South Carolina, where Breckinridge electors were chosen by the legislature. In the other states that seceded the popular vote was Breckinridge, 736,592; Bell, 345,919; Douglas, 72,084.

Charleston, and unanimously declared 'that the Union now subsisting between South Carolina and other states under the name of "The United States of America" is hereby dissolved.'

In the other cotton states there was a strong unionist minority. Many planters like Jefferson Davis, who had travelled in the North and maintained their sense of proportion, wished to give Lincoln's administration a fair trial; but secession was insisted upon by petty planters, provincial lawyer-politicians, and clergymen. 'The people are run mad,' wrote Alexander H. Stephens of Georgia. 'They are wild with passion and frenzy, doing they know not what.' Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana and Texas (where old Sam Houston, Jackson nationalist to the last, pleaded in vain for delay) were out of the Union by 1 February 1861. On the 8th, delegates from the seven seceded states met in Congress at Montgomery, Alabama, and formed the Confederate States of America. The next day the Congress elected Jefferson Davis provisional President, and A. H. Stephens Vice-President, of the Southern Confederacy.

The causes of secession, as they appeared to its protagonists, were plainly expressed by the state conventions. 'The people of the Northern states,' declared Mississippi, 'have assumed a revolutionary position towards the Southern states.' 'They have enticed our slaves from us,' and obstructed their rendition under the fugitive slave law. They claim the right 'to exclude slavery from the territories,' and from any state henceforth admitted to the Union. They have 'insulted and outraged our citizens when travelling among them . . . by taking their servants and liberating the same.' They have 'encouraged a hostile invasion of a Southern state to excite insurrection, murder and rapine.' To which South Carolina added, 'They have denounced as sinful the institution of slavery; they have permitted the open establishment among them' of abolition societies, and 'have united in the election of a man to the high office of President of the United States whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery.'

On their own showing, then, the states of the lower South seceded as the result of a long series of dissatisfactions respecting the Northern attitude towards slavery. There was no mention in their manifestos or in their leaders' writings and speeches of any other cause. The tariff has figured as a 'cause' in the Confederate propaganda abroad and in Southern apologetics since; but there was no contemporary mention of it because most of the Southern congressmen, including the entire South Carolina delegation, had voted for the tariff act then in force. The Morrill Tariff of 20 February 1861, the first strongly protective tariff since 1832, was only passed in consequence of the withdrawal of Southern Senators from Congress. Nor was any allusion made to state rights apart from slavery; on the contrary, the Northern States were reproached for sheltering themselves under state rights against the fugitive slave law and the Dred Scott decision. A letter of Jefferson Davis to a Northern friend, written on 20 January 1861, is a fair example of what was in the Southern mind at the moment of secession: 'Many States, like Iowa, have denied our rights, disregarded their obligations, and have sacrificed their true representatives. To us it became a necessity to transfer our domestic institutions from hostile to friendly hands, and we have acted accordingly. There seems to be but little prospect that we will be permitted to do so peacefully.' All these 'rights,' 'obligations,' and 'institutions' had reference to slavery and nothing but slavery.

The decision to secede was reached more by emotion than by reasoning; the emotion too was engendered by slavery. Already a strong minority regarded Southern independence as an end in itself. Their minds were filled with the vision of a great republic ruled by themselves and their own kind, affording perfect security to their social organism. Lincoln, we must remember, appeared to the South not as we know him, but as a coarse sort of baboon, with the serpent Garrison coiled about his body. His election inspired the same fear and loathing that would arise today from men of property if a foreign-born communist were elected president.

If the Southern people had been realists, they would have listened to Stephens when he predicted that even for the purpose of protecting slavery, secession was a colossal act of folly. Southerners and Democrats combined would have possessed a majority in both houses of Congress, at least until 1863. Lincoln could have done nothing without their consent. Republicans might outlaw slavery in the territories, but secession would lose the cotton states all rights of any sort in the territories. Northern states were not enforcing the fugitive slave law, but secession would make that law a dead letter. Abolitionists were disagreeable fellow-countrymen; but their propaganda could not be stopped by international boundaries. The Republicans proposed no interference with slavery in the Southern states, and were ready to pledge their sincerity by a constitutional amendment to that effect. Even had they wished, they could have freed the blacks in unwilling states only by constitutional amendment, or as an act of war. The one way would have been impossible even in 1930, if the slave states had kept united,[2] the other way was courted by secession. But there was very little expectation in the South that the North would care or dare to fight for preservation of the Union; and if it should, was not one Southerner a match for five Yankees? And was not cotton king? Senator Hammond of South Carolina wrote on 19 April 1860, 'Cotton, rice, tobacco and naval stores command the world; and we have the sense to know it, and are sufficiently Teutonic to carry it out successfully. The North without us would be a motherless calf, bleating about, and die of mange and starvation.'

No people of British stock enjoy revolution for its own sake. It is necessary for their comfort and peace of mind to prove rebellion no treason. The Long Parliament applied the common law against King Charles; Thomas Jefferson discovered dominion home rule in the British Constitution; and, when the British government refused to acknowledge it, appealed to the law of nature against George III. Similarly, Calhoun laid the legal foundation for the Southern Confederacy in his masterly exposition of all that was implied in state sovereignty. So ably was the case presented that many people in the North were converted, and almost every white child in the Southern States today is brought up in the belief that secession, in a legal sense, was absolutely right. Historically, the doctrine of constitutional secession, as distinct from the Lockean right of revolution, seems to have been first enunciated by John Taylor of Caroline, and first elaborated by the New England Federalists in 1814. There had been little difference between the two sections in this respect before 1850, as we have seen; every state denounced as contrary to state sovereignty national measures which were against its interests, and with complete lack of humor denounced as treasonable similar declarations by other states. The humiliation of defeat and reconstruction gave the Southern people a sentimental devotion to the principle of state rights, without affecting their practice; while in Northern eyes the principle seemed befouled with treason. Since the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment — a Southern measure! — there has been a notable reaction towards state rights in the North and West.

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[2] Thirteen states can prevent the ratification of a constitutional amendment in 1930; there were fifteen slave states in 1860.

The constitutional rightness or wrongness of secession meant a great deal to the American people for fifty years after 1860, and has been the subject of thousands of high school debates. But it is a purely academic question. With few exceptions, the Americans of 1860-61 made up their minds about secession on other than intellectual grounds, and then sought arguments to prove themselves right and the enemy wrong. The case for secession rests on the axiom that the Federal Constitution created a confederacy, not a government, and did not impair state sovereignty. Although the history of the United States affords the most perfect example of plural sovereignty in history, everyone in 1860 was thinking in monistic terms. Either the states were individually sovereign, or the people of the whole United States were. Supporters of national sovereignty were embarrassed in their search for the precise moment when it came into existence, in a Union that was ratified successively by the people of the states. Consequently, they took refuge in the historical fallacy that the Union was older than the states. Conversely, the state sovereignty supporters found it difficult to explain how states like Ohio and Arkansas, erected out of the national domain by act of Congress, obtained a sovereignty superior to their creator. Just as Rome, in arguing papal supremacy, rests her case upon authority and origin, but scorns the excellent argument of gradual growth; so the American nationalists tried to prove their theory by the language of the Constitution and the debates of 1788, instead of pointing to the gradual growth of national feeling which was their real sanction. In 1800 the vast majority of American citizens felt more loyal to their respective states than to the Union. In 1830 none but Virginians, Georgians, and South Carolinians would have followed their states out of the Union, on any possible issue. After 1844, with the growth of Southern self-consciousness, the phrase and the idea of state rights gave place in that section to 'Southern rights.' Leaders like Jefferson Davis spoke the language of state rights while thinking and acting in terms of Southern nationalism, but others like Rhett and Yancey meant what they said — a source of future trouble in the Southern Confederacy. In the North, especially among old Jackson Democrats, there was still considerable state loyalty in 1860; but the mobility of the Northern population made for nationalism, and recent immigrants understood no half-way loyalty between their old country and their new.

State rights is a relative term. Every one then believed, and believes to-day, that the states have certain rights which the Federal government has no lawful power to touch. State sovereignty is another matter. Admitting that the rights reserved to the states in the Federal Constitution are sovereign in their ordinary nature, they are hardly so in the condition under which they are enjoyed, since three-quarters of the states, including only a minority of the population, may deprive the other quarter of all their privileges (excepting equal representation in the Senate), by constitutional amendment; as recently they have done in the matter of alcoholic beverages. Secessionists made much of the reservation under which certain states ratified the Constitution, as if that could have had any effect on the others; and of the Kentucky and Virginian resolves of 1798, as if they were official glosses on the Constitution. The nationalists, on the other hand, could point to the fact that every presidential administration except Tyler's, and the Supreme Court under Jay, Marshall, and Taney, had acted on the assumption that a sovereign American people existed. No stronger assertions of nationalism were ever made than by three Southern Presidents: Washington, Jackson, and Polk. After all, effectiveness is the only test of sovereignty. Under the Articles of Confederation the states could and did do anything they pleased; their individual wills were the court of last resort. And if the American people had not cared enough about nationalism in 1861 to maintain it by force, the sovereignty of the states would have been an accomplished fact.

3. *Confusion and Attempted Compromise*

Many things happened during that awkward four months' interval between the choice of presidential electors and the inauguration of a new President. Lincoln's election was assured in early November, 1860. South Carolina seceded in December, and the Confederate government was formed on 8 February 1861; but Lincoln could not be inaugurated until 4 March. In the meantime James Buchanan was President, with a cabinet that included three secessionists, and only one strong nationalist after Cass resigned in disgust (12 December). Buchanan had the same power to defend federal property and collect federal taxes within states that obstructed federal law as Jackson possessed in 1832, but was timid by nature, scrupulous of principle, and oppressed by his surroundings. Washington was a Southern city. House, Senate, Cabinet, and all the federal departments were riddled with secession. To onlookers the Federal government seemed to be dissolving; soon there would be nothing left to secede from. Public opinion gave the President no lead. The Northern people had grown so accustomed to Southern threats of secession that when the talk became a reality they could hardly credit the fact, and few had any notion what to do about it. Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote a pleasant little poem to 'Caroline, Caroline, child of the sun,' promising to kiss the naughty child when she came home again. Horace Greeley of the New York *Tribune* and General Winfield Scott struck the key-note of Northern sentiment in January with the phrase, 'Wayward sisters, depart in peace!'

'Why not?' we are entitled to ask, in an era that has heard much of self-determination. The answer was given in Lincoln's inaugural address: 'Physically speaking, we cannot separate.' With the best will in the world, a readjustment and redistribution of federal power would have been difficult;[3] and good will was notably wanting. Peace could not have been maintained for a year between the United States and the Southern Confederacy. Fugitive slaves, adjustments of the national debt, of each government's share in the territories, of the Mississippi outlet for the Northwest, would have raised dilemmas inescapable save by force; and there was no knowing where secession might stop. The inevitable end would have been militarism, and an American balance of power; the probable end would have been the Balkanization of North America.

Buchanan's attorney-general advised him that secession was illegal, but that he had no right to coerce a state; so the good man, with many tears and prayers, spent his slender store of energy in promoting various schemes of compromise. There was still hope, he thought, of tempting back the seceded states, so long as Virginia and seven other slave states were within the Union. Although nothing came of these projects, they served the useful purpose of showing Northern conservatives that there could be no compromise between separation and coercion.

The first of these compromise schemes came in the form of constitutional amendments, proposed by Senator Crittenden of Kentucky, on 18 December 1860: (*a*) re-establishment of the 36° 30′

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[3] The matter of breaking up the federal postal service, for instance, was so difficult that the Confederacy permitted the United States mails to run their usual course through the South until 1 June 1861, six weeks after the Civil War had begun, and almost six months after South Carolina had 'resumed her separate and equal place among nations.'

division in the territories, (*b*) non-interference by Congress with slavery in the states and the District of Columbia, (*c*) compensation to owners for fugitive slaves not recovered. Lincoln, the President-elect, was willing to accept the last two, if the Southern senators would issue an appeal to their states against secession. Respecting the first proposition he had already written to a Republican congressman, ' Prevent, as far as possible, any of our friends from demoralizing themselves and our cause by entertaining propositions for compromise of any sort on " slavery extension." There is no possible compromise upon it but which puts us under again and leaves us all our work to do over again. . . . On that point hold firm, as with a chain of steel.'

The Crittenden compromise, therefore, was not supported by the Republicans; and the seceded states showed not the slightest interest in a so-called peace convention summoned by Virginia on 4 February 1861. The futility of it was brought out by an ironic amendment proposed by a Northern member:

> Whenever a party shall be beaten in any election for President, such party may rebel and take up arms, and, unless the successful shall adopt as its own the principles of the defeated party, and consent to such amendments to the Constitution as the latter party shall dictate, then, in such case, the Union shall be at an end.

A few days later Lincoln agreed that ' no concession . . . short of a surrender of everything worth preserving and contending for would satisfy the South.'

And so nothing had been done toward compromise, or indeed about anything, by 4 March 1861, when Abraham Lincoln was inaugurated President of the no longer United States.

The City of Washington appeared carefree and slovenly as usual. Actually, the people were nervously expectant of trouble. It was rumored that secessionists from Virginia or ' plug-uglies ' from Baltimore would raid the capital, surrounded as it was by slave territory, and prevent the inauguration. General Scott took every possible precaution, but the soldiers at his disposal were too few even to relieve the black-coated sombreness of the crowd. The inaugural procession, as it moved up Pennsylvania avenue under the harsh glare of a March sun, while a blustering wind blew clouds of dust roof-high, might have been a funeral procession. The Capitol, with its great uncompleted dome supporting an unkempt fringe of derricks, suggested ruination. President Buchanan, urbane and white-haired; Chief Justice Taney, stern and dignified, seemed symbols of a golden age of the Republic that was over. President Lincoln, uncouth and ill at ease, inspired no confidence until his high-pitched determined voice was heard delivering the solemn phrases of the inaugural address. One slight incident in the ceremony alone gave promise of better days. As Lincoln, ready to speak and holding his manuscript in one hand, seemed embarrassed by his high hat in the other, Senator Douglas relieved him of it, and stood by as his ancient rival made a last plea for union.

After a brief review of the constitutional issues involved in secession, Lincoln renewed the pledge of his party to respect slavery in the states, and to enforce any fugitive slave law that had proper safeguards for the colored people of the free states.

> 'In your hands,' he addressed the South, 'and not in mine, is the momentous issue of the civil war. The Government will not assail you.' But, 'I hold that, in contemplation of universal law and the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual. . . . No State, upon its own mere action, can lawfully get out of the Union. . . . I shall take care, as the Constitution itself expressly enjoins upon me, that the laws of the Union be faithfully executed in all the States. . . . The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts.'

4. *Fort Sumter, Seward, and Virginia*

Buchanan had flinched from defending those coigns of vantage, the federal forts in the Southern States; and we shall judge him less harshly when we reflect that it took Lincoln a month to meet the issue bravely. By the time he was inaugurated, all the forts and navy yards in the seceded states, save Fort Pickens at Pensacola and Fort Sumter at Charleston, had fallen unresisting to the Confederate authorities. From the extreme Southern point of view, the jurisdiction of such places passed with secession to the states, and their retention by the Federal government was equivalent to an act of war. Confederate commissioners came to Washington to treat for their surrender, a few days after Lincoln's inauguration. Although Seward refused to receive the gentlemen, he assured them indirectly that no supplies or provisions would be sent to the forts without due notice, and led them to expect a speedy evacuation.

William H. Seward, as Lincoln's chief rival for the nomination, and the most experienced statesman in the Republican party, had been given the State Department, where he was playing a deep and dangerous game. Lincoln he regarded as a mere yokel from the Middle West; and in truth Lincoln's public appearances during the crisis of the winter had been for the most part undignified, and his utterances even flippant. Of course Lincoln was always flippant when thinking most deeply, but Seward did not yet know him; nor did he know the Confederate leaders. Judging them in the light of New York politics, Seward doubted their sincerity and determination. In his opinion, secession was a mere humbug for obtaining concessions to Southern rights; if a collision could be avoided, the leaders would sneak back into the Union. If they did not, Seward would rally the Southern people to their old flag by a foreign war.

Major Anderson, commanding Fort Sumter, notified the War Department that his supplies were coming to an end, and that new Confederate batteries commanded his position. Fort Sumter had no strategic value in case of civil war. Why, then, risk war by holding it? The Confederacy made it quite clear that any attempt to reinforce or even to supply Sumter would be regarded as a hostile act, when Virginia was certain to join the Confederacy. If, however, the forts were tamely yielded, would not the principle of Union be fatally compromised? Could a recognition of the Confederacy thereafter be avoided?

Lincoln delayed decision not from fear, but because he was watching Virginia. Jefferson Davis, too, was watching Virginia. The Old Dominion was a stake worth playing for. Although long since fallen from her primacy in wealth and statesmanship, her sons were the ablest officers in the United States army, and her soil was almost certain to be the theatre of any war between the sections. The 'panhandle' of western Virginia thrust a salient between Pennsylvania and Ohio, to within a hundred miles of Lake Erie. If Virginia seceded, she must carry North Carolina with her; and Maryland, Kentucky, Tennessee, Missouri, and Arkansas would probably follow.

Virginia showed her union sentiment in 1860 by voting for Bell rather than Breckinridge; but unionism in Virginia meant a voluntary association of sovereign states. The ruling class had always regarded their state as a sovereign entity. Patrick Henry's antifederalism merged easily into the state sovereignty ideas crudely expressed in the Resolves of 1798, and kept alive by Randolph during the period of Jefferson's apostasy, until Calhoun could refine them into a dogma. Yet Virginia never spoke with a single voice. After Madison and Marshall passed away, their nationalism became orthodox in Virginia's transmontane counties of small farms, few slaves, and growing manufactures, closely knit with Pennsylvania and Ohio. On the other hand, Virginians like Dew and Fitzhugh provided Calhoun with the materials for his intellectual defence of slavery; and scions of the first families, such as Mason, Hunter, and Wise, were prominent among the ranters of Southern grievances and the roarers for Southern rights.

A Virginia state convention was elected by the people in January 1861, and met at Richmond on 13 February. A majority of the delegates were elected as Union men; but even they were torn between sympathy for the lower South, hatred of the Republicans, and suspicion of South Carolina; while the secessionist minority was united and aggressive. For two months the Convention held its hand, while compromise measures were discussed in Congress and in the 'peace conference.' Delegations of unionist members visited Washington and besought Lincoln to let Fort Sumter go. Twice the President offered to do so if the Virginian unionists 'would break up their convention without any row or nonsense'; but they could not promise so much; and it was fortunate for the Union that they did not. For, as Lincoln came to see, there were too many conditions attached to Virginian unionism. Yielding Fort Sumter would keep Virginia loyal for the time being, but would not bring the 'wayward sisters' back; and Virginia would join them the moment he raised his hand to strike. If Virginia would not accept the Union as it was, she must abide the consequences. Toward the end of March Lincoln determined to face the issue squarely. Against the advice of General Scott, and of five out of seven members of the Cabinet, he ordered a relief expedition to be prepared for Fort Sumter.

Seward then showed his hand. On April Fools Day, 1861, he presented Lincoln with a paper entitled 'Thoughts for the President's Consideration.' The most startling proposal in this extraordinary document was one that the United States should at once pick a quarrel with France and Spain, possibly with England and Russia as well, as a means of reuniting North and South for glory and conquest! And Lincoln was invited to appoint Seward his Mayor of the Palace, to execute this mad policy.

Lincoln calmly replied that he saw no reason to abandon the policy outlined in his inaugural address. As for declaring war on Europe, 'I remark that if this must be done, *I* must do it.' But Seward was too intent on his scheme to catch the President's meaning. On 6 April, when the President ordered the Sumter expedition to sail, Seward by deception obtained the President's signature directing the capital ship of the expedition to Fort Pickens.

It mattered nothing. When Lincoln's informal warning that an attempt would be made 'to supply Fort Sumter with provisions only' arrived at Montgomery, it found Jefferson Davis in a similar state of confusion and perplexity. Southern spirits were evaporating for want of a fight; in Charleston there were murmurs of dissatisfaction with the Confederacy; only a collision could 'fire the Southern heart' and bring in Virginia. Robert Toombs, Confederate Secretary of State, begged for delay. To attack Fort Sumter, he predicted, would be to 'strike a hornet's nest which extends from mountain to ocean, and legions now quiet will swarm out and sting us to death.' Finally, Davis ordered General Beauregard, commanding the Charleston district, to fire on Sumter only if absolutely necessary to prevent reinforcement. On the night of 11–12 April Beauregard sent four staff officers to Fort Sumter demanding surrender. Major Anderson, a Kentuckian who loathed the idea of civil war, had no desire for the sort of fame that would come from being the occasion of it. Nothing as yet had been seen or heard of the relief expedition. So, at a quarter past three in the morning, he offered to surrender as soon as he might do so with honor — in two days' time, when the garrison's food would be exhausted. The Confederate staff officers peremptorily refused this condition, and on their own responsibility gave orders to open fire. For, as one of them admitted in later life, they feared that Davis would clasp hands with Seward, and the chance of war would slip away forever.

On 12 April 1861, at 4:30 A.M., the first gun of the Civil War was fired against Fort Sumter. The relief expedition appeared, but for lack of its capital ship was unable to pass the batteries. All day Major Anderson replied as best he could, to a concentric fire from four or five Confederate forts and batteries, while the beauty and fashion of Charleston flocked to the waterfront as to a gala. At nine the next morning, 13 April, the barracks caught fire; in the early afternoon the flagstaff was shot away, and a few hours later, although his situation was by no means desperate, Major Anderson accepted terms of surrender. On the afternoon of Sunday, 14 April, the garrison marched out with drums beating and colors flying.

Walt Whitman caught the spirit of the moment in his

Beat! beat! drums! — blow! bugles! blow!
Through the windows — through doors — burst like a ruthless force,
Into the solemn church, and scatter the congregation,
Into the school where the scholar is studying;
Leave not the bridegroom quiet — no happiness must he have now with his bride,
Nor the peaceful farmer any peace, ploughing his field or gathering his grain,
So fierce you whirr and pound you drums — so shrill you bugles blow.

Doubt and hesitation vanished in the North. Men knew instantly that the Union was what they cared for most and the flag was what they held most sacred. Advocates of letting the 'wayward sisters' depart in peace now remembered Webster's warning, and Clay's, that there could be no peaceable secession. Those who loathed the idea of a Union maintained by force now knew there could be no Union upon any other terms. Democrats and Republicans, state-rights men and nationalists, native-born and foreign-born, had only one word for the act of firing on their flag — treason.

5. *Secession Completed*

On 15 April President Lincoln issued a call for seventy-five thousand volunteers in order to put down combinations 'too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings,' and 'to cause the laws to be duly executed.' Virginia saw no honorable alternative between contributing her quota for coercion and taking the Southern part. Already the Virginian secessionists were organizing attacks on the Norfolk navy yard and the arsenal at Harper's Ferry, and threatening to purge the state convention. That body was in a state of high-strung emotion bordering on hysteria, when Lincoln's call precipitated matters. On 17 April it voted, 88 to 55, to submit an ordinance of secession to the people. Without waiting their certain verdict, the governor placed his state under Confederate orders.

The western part of Virginia refused to leave the Union;[4] but three more states followed her greater part into the Southern Confederacy. Arkansas seceded on 6 May; Tennessee on 7 May concluded an alliance with the Confederacy, which a month later the people approved; North Carolina, having previously voted down secession, was in the impossible position of a Union enclave until 20 May, when she ratified the Confederate constitution. The attitude of Maryland was crucial, for her secession would isolate the Federal government at Washington. The first Northern troops on their way to the capital were mobbed as they passed through Baltimore (19 April), and Lincoln wisely permitted the rest to be marched round the city until he could spare enough troops to occupy it and enforce martial law. The Maryland legislature protested against 'coercion' of the Southern Confederacy, but refused to summon a state convention; and danger of disunion in that quarter passed. The government of Kentucky, where opinion was divided as in no other state, refused to obey the call for volunteers, and endeavored in vain to enforce neutrality, but by the end of the year threw in its lot with the Union. Missouri was practically under a dual regime throughout the war; Delaware never wavered in her loyalty. In California there was a fierce struggle between Southern sympathizers and the Unionists, which the latter won; but California was too remote to give the Union cause other than pecuniary aid, in which she was generous. The Indians of the Indian Territory, many of them slaveholders, threw in their lot with the South.

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[4] West Virginia was admitted as a state in 1863, but gave comparatively little aid to the Union cause. It was dislike of the planter aristocracy rather than unionism which caused this disruption of the Old Dominion.

The motives for this second group of secessions, beginning with Virginia, were obviously very different from those of the lower South. The upper South had been willing to give the Lincoln administration a try. But it was drawn to the lower South by ties of blood, neighborhood, and the 'peculiar institution,' and the determination to keep the South a 'white men's country.' This emotion was rationalized by the theory of state sovereignty, which was strong and genuine in eastern Virginia and Maryland, and western and central Tennessee. According to state sovereignty, the right of secession existed, and Lincoln's call for coercion forced the upper South to choose between defending the Confederacy or helping to put it down.

Yet the issue was not quite so simple as we relate it. Throughout the Civil War, the lines were not strictly drawn between the states that seceded and those that did not. The majority of men went with their neighbors, as majorities always do. But there were thousands who chose their side from higher motives of sentiment and opinion. It by no means follows that if Stonewall Jackson had been a Yankee he would have fought for the Union, or that Grant, if born a Virginian, would have worn the Confederate gray. The Confederate army contained men from every Northern state, who preferred the Southern type of civilization to their own; and fashionable society in Baltimore, Philadelphia, and New York was pro-Southern to the end. The United States army and navy contained loyal men from every seceded state, Americans who knew that the break-up of the Union would be the worst blow to the cause of self-government, republicanism, and democracy since the day that Bonaparte assumed the purple. Robert J. Walker, the most efficient Union agent in Europe, was the former Senator from Mississippi; Caleb Huse, the most efficient Confederate agent in Europe, was from Massachusetts. Samuel P. Lee commanded the Union naval forces on the James while his uncle, General Lee, was resisting Grant in the Wilderness; two sons of Commodore Porter, U.S.N., fought under Stonewall Jackson; Major-General T. L. Crittenden, U.S.A., was brother to Major-General G. B. Crittenden, C.S.A. Three brothers of Mrs. Lincoln died for the South, and the President's kinsmen on his mother's side were Southern sympathizers, while near kinsmen of Mrs. Davis were in the Union army. In a house in West Twentieth Street, New York, a little boy named Theodore Roosevelt prayed for the Union armies at the knee of his Georgia mother, whose brothers were in the Confederate navy. At the same moment, in the Presbyterian parsonage of Augusta, Georgia, another little boy named Woodrow Wilson knelt in the family circle while his Ohio-born father invoked the God of Battles for the Southern cause.

It is degrading to the memory of a man of Robert E. Lee's stature to assume that he acted on the vulgar principle of his country (or his state), right or wrong. Lee was a great and simple person, like George Washington, with a character so pure and well-rounded as to offer no flaw or protuberance for the historian's scalpel. His traditions, and those of his family, were nationalist. Lee abhorred the methods of the abolitionists, but agreed with them that slavery was wrong, and emancipated his few inherited slaves. He did not believe in the constitutional right of secession, and severely criticized the action of the cotton states. Lincoln's inaugural address seemed to him a sufficient guarantee for Virginia. On 23 January 1861 Lee wrote to his son, 'I can contemplate no greater calamity for the country than a dissolution of the Union. . . . Still, a Union that can only be maintained by swords and bayonets, and in which strife and civil war are to take the place of brotherly love and kindness, has no charm for me.' To a cousin and brother officer of the United States army, who determined to remain faithful to the flag, Lee wrote expressing sympathy and respect for his 'notions of allegiance.' But, 'I have been unable to make up my mind to raise my hand against my native state, my relatives, my children and my home.' With deep regret Colonel Lee resigned his commission in the United States army; only a sense of duty induced him to accept a commission in the cause of which he was to be the main prop.

Robert E. Lee might make a mistake, but he could not do wrong. He would have been right in accepting the offer of Lincoln to command the United States army, and in leading the forces of Union to victory in a year's time, as he alone might have done. He was right in choosing the part of those who were dearest to him. What anguish that decision cost him we can never know. What it cost the United States we know too well.

George H. Thomas, another great and simple Virginian in the United States army, loved his state no less than Lee; but after the guns at Sumter had spoken, 'whichever way he turned the matter over in his mind, his oath of allegiance to his government always came uppermost.'

To a third Virginian, Senator James M. Mason, we are indebted for the most accurate definition of the great struggle that was about to begin: 'I look upon it then, Sir, as a war of sentiment and opinion by one form of society against another form of society.'

XXXI

CONDITIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

1861–1865

1. *Conditions of Victory*

AT a distance of sixty years men wonder at the rash and hopeless gallantry of the Southern war of independence. A loose agrarian confederacy of five or six million whites and three and a half million slaves challenged a federal union of nineteen or twenty million freemen with overwhelming financial and industrial advantages.[1] Yet, futile as the effort proved and tragic in its consequences, the Southern cause was not predestined to defeat.

The Confederacy, in order to win, needed merely to defend its own territory long enough to weary the Northerners of war. The

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[1] By the census of 1860 the white population of the eleven seceded states was 5,449,467; the white population of the nineteen free states, 18,936,579. Both figures leave out of account the white population (2,589,533) of the four border slave states (Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri), which did not secede, but which probably contributed as many men to the Confederacy as to the Union. Subtracting the loyal regions of Virginia and Tennessee would reduce the Confederacy's white population to about five million. By the census of 1860 there were 3,521,111 slaves in the Confederate States, and 429,401 in the four border states, and from those the Union recruited about 100,000 troops. For a discussion of the insoluble problem of the numbers of the two armies, see Channing, *U.S.*, vi. 430–34, and A. B. Moore, *Conscription in the Confederacy*, pp. 357–58. Both Channing and Eckenrode believe that there were about 800,000 enrolments in the Confederate army; Moore estimates from 850,000 to 900,000. T. L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses in the Civil War*, pp. 50, 61, computes 2,900,000 enlistments in the Union army, which reduced to three-year enlistments by doubling up short terms would make 1,570,000; but his estimate for Confederate three-year enlistments, 1,082,000, is probably too high. The classic Southern estimate, accepted by most Southern historians and even inscribed on monuments, is 600,000 Confederates to 2,750,000 Union soldiers. That is certainly very far from the truth. Perhaps the most accurate basis of comparison is the census of 1890, which showed 432,020 Confederate and 1,034,073 Union veterans surviving. 'In the Union army 67,058 were killed on the field, and 43,012 died of wounds (total 110,070); 224,586 died from disease and 24,872 from accidents and other causes. The total deaths were thus 359,528. The number wounded in battle but recovered was 275,175. In the Confederate army 94,000 were killed or mortally wounded; probably 164,000 died from disease, accidents, and other causes.' J. F. Rhodes, *U.S.*, v. 186–87.


THE CIVIL WAR 1861-65
Boundary of Free Soil
" " Confederate States
(Those between are loyal Slave-holding Sts.)
Mobile • Principal blockade-running ports
Ship I. • Union blockading bases
= Principal railways
Miles
English
0 20 40 60 80 100 150
Nautical
0 20 40 60 80 100 150
102
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NEBRASKA
IOWA
ILLINOIS
Springfield
KANSAS
Ft. Riley
Topeka
Ft. Leavenworth
Missouri R.
Kansas City
Jefferson City
MISSOURI
St. Louis
Carthage
Wilson's Cr.
Cairo
New Madrid
Ft. Henry
INDIAN TERRITORY
Arkansas R.
Memphis
Shiloh
Corinth
ARKANSAS
Red R.
Mississippi R.
Yazoo R.
MISSISSIPPI
Marshall
Shreveport
Jackson
Vicksburg
TEXAS
Sabine R.
Washington
Austin
Colorado R.
LOUISIANA
Pt. Hudson
Mobile
Alabama
Houston
New Orleans
Ship I.
Columbus
Galveston
SQUADRON
The Passes
Matagorda
GULF
820 mls to Havana
Rio Grande del Norte
Laredo
Corpus Christi
WEST
Carmargo
Brownville
Matamoras
MEXICO


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PENNSYLVANIA
NEW
Pittsburg
Harrisburg
Gettysburg
Philadelphia
NEW JERSEY
OHIO
INDIANA
Columbus
Indianapolis
Cincinnati
Ohio R.
WEST VIRGINIA
Potomac R.
Shenandoah Val.
Harpers F.
Baltimore
MARYLD
Washington
DEL.
Louisville
Lexington
Prestonburg
KENTUCKY
VIRGINIA
Richmond
Ft. Monroe
Norfolk
Mill Spring
Cumberland R.
Ft. Donelson
Nashville
Murfreesboro
TENNESSEE
Knoxville
Chattanooga
Tennessee R.
Greensboro
NORTH CAROLINA
Goldsboro
Roanoke Is
C. Hatteras
Beaufort
C. Fear R.
Wilmington
C. Fear
675 mls. to Bermuda
SOUTH CAROLINA
Savannah R.
Atlanta
ALABAMA
Selma
Montgomery
GEORGIA
Charleston
Ft. Sumter
Pt Royal
Savannah
Apalachicola R.
Pensacola
Ft. Pickens
Fernandina
FLORIDA
EAST GULF SQUADRON
ATLANTIC
ATLANTIC SQ.
500 mls.
515 mls.
570 mls.
600 mls. to Havana
Bahama Chan
Nassau
Key West

F. W. Walker

United States, in order to win, had to conquer an empire[2] and crush a people. A negotiated peace, or any less emphatic result than unconditional surrender of the Southern armies and total collapse of the Confederate government, would have meant some sort of special privilege to the Southern States within the Union, if not independence without the Union: in either event a Southern victory. Material advantages were not all in favor of the Union. To offset the Northern superiority in numbers, wealth, industry, and sea-power, the Confederacy had the advantage of interior lines, and a social organization better fitted for creating an efficient fighting force. The moral scales were heavily balanced in favor of the Confederacy. Slavery was the cause of secession, but only indirectly a force in the war. From their own point of view, Southerners were fighting for everything that men hold most dear: for liberty and self government, for hearth and home, for the supremacy of their race. They could abandon the struggle only by sacrificing the very bases of their society; and defeat for them involved the most bitter humiliation to which any people has been subjected in modern times. The Northern people, on the contrary, could have stopped the war at any moment, at the mere cost of recognizing what to many seemed an accomplished fact, and without any sacrifice of the solid and material factors that most closely touch the life of the individual. They were fighting merely for an idea and a sentiment, the sentiment of Union, which, translated into action, seemed to tender souls scarcely different from conquest. Negro emancipation, itself an ideal, came more as an incident than as an object of the war. It was not the abolitionist 'Battle-Hymn of the Republic' that sent the blood leaping through Northern veins in those years of trial, but the simple sentiment of:

The Union forever, hurrah! boys, hurrah!
  Down with the traitor, up with the star,
While we rally round the flag, boys, rally once again,
  Shouting the battle-cry of Freedom.

Under these circumstances there was every reason to expect that the South would win. Europe as a whole so believed, as soon as Russell's letters to *The Times,* and the news of Bull Run, seemed to prove that the South was in earnest, and that the North was not.

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[2] The area of the Confederacy at its greatest extent was equal to that of the whole of Western Europe, less Scandinavia and Italy. Texas alone was the size of France, and had a greater man-power than the two Boer republics in 1899–1901.

The Thirteen Colonies, the Netherlands, and in recent memory the South American and the Italian States had achieved their independence against greater odds; and if Hungary had failed, it was because Russia threw her weight on the other side. Even devoted partisans of the American Union like John Bright hardly dared hope for its complete restoration; and among the statesmen, the military experts, the journalists, the men of letters, and leaders of public opinion in Western Europe, those who before the end of 1864 doubted the permanency of separation were few and inconspicuous. For there was one imponderable and unique factor of which almost every one in Europe was ignorant: the steadfast devotion to the Union which alone made it possible for the superior material resources of the United States to prevail.

2. *The Confederate States of America*

The opposing governments were nearly identical in pattern. The Constitution of the Confederate States differed only from that of the 'fathers,' said Jefferson Davis, in so far as it was 'explanatory of their well-known intent.' In making explicit those guarantees of slave property and state rights, that the South found implicit in the older document, she did not improve it as a framework of government, still less as an instrument of war. Bounties, protective tariffs, and 'internal improvements' were forbidden. Federal officials and even judges could be impeached by the legislatures of the state in which their functions were exercised. No 'law denying or impairing the right of property in negro slaves' could be passed by the Confederate Congress, and in all new territory acquired 'the institution of negro slavery, as it now exists in the Confederate States, shall be recognized and protected.' In two respects only was the Confederate Constitution an improvement over its model. Congress, unless by a two-thirds majority, could appropriate money only upon the President's transmitting the request and estimate by some head of an executive department; and these heads of departments, who constituted an informal cabinet in the new government as in the old, might be granted a seat in Congress and the privilege of discussion. The President, further, had the right to veto items of appropriation bills. Actually these provisions, which Lord Acton declared alone to be worth a revolution, remained inoperative during the short lifetime of the Confederacy. President Davis and his Congress worked less in harmony than had any President and Congress of the United States since Tyler. Davis, in four years of office, vetoed thirty-eight bills, all but one of which were passed over his veto. Lincoln in the same period vetoed only three bills.

In the view of outsiders, the Southern Confederacy seemed animated by a single will and purpose; actually it was weakened by faction and shaken by its inherent vice of localism. Davis and most of the Southern leaders had been talking state rights but thinking Southern nationalism; yet many important men, especially in Virginia and the Carolinas, loved state rights more than Southern unity, and feared a centralizing tyranny at Richmond no less than they had at Washington. No Union general ever had to write, as Lee did of Georgia and Carolina when contemplating an advance: 'If these states will give up their troops, I think it can be done.' The composition and character of the Southern people was unfavorable for united and intelligent effort. The gentry, more accustomed to direct slaves than to control themselves, full of fixed notions on politics as on slavery, could not co-operate effectively with their President, and were only comfortable in the army. The Southern democracy made excellent fighting material, and up to a certain point could easily be led; but that point, as we shall see, happened to be at the crucial moment. Ignorant and provincial, this Southern democracy never even remotely realized what the Confederacy had to face, and the government did nothing to enlighten it. Slaves proved to be a material asset for war production. If Davis could have made up his mind to arm them before Lincoln decided to free them, they might well have been the decisive military factor.

3. *The Two Presidents*

During the war both Davis and Lincoln were regarded by their enemies as fiends incarnate; and by many of their own people were accused of everything from incompetence and corruption to tyranny and treason. At the outset few doubted that the Southerner was the abler, as he appeared the more dignified figure of the two. Successively lieutenant of dragoons, colonel of volunteers, congressman, senator, and Secretary of War, Davis brought experience such as Lincoln had never had, and talents that he never claimed, to the Southern presidency. Courage, sincerity, patience, and integrity were his; only tact, perception, and inner harmony were wanting to make him a very great man. Davis was torn between a desire to command and a taste for intellectual solitude; between nationalist instinct and state-rights faith. Isolated from the Southern democracy out of which he had sprung, he moved as to the manner born among the whispering aristocracy of Richmond; yet he had a perverse knack of infuriating the gentlemen who tried to work under him, unless they would place their minds in his keeping.

His pronounced military tastes and slight military experience led Davis to attempt to direct military operations as well as civil administration. Only a Bonaparte could successfully have played the dual rôle in the Confederacy; and even Bonaparte had a general staff and a centralized government. Davis had neither the time to exercise effective control nor the talent to choose effective instruments. Thus the Confederacy lacked the strategic unity that would have given it the full benefit of interior lines. The President's health and nerves gave way, and his state papers show an increasing querulousness and bitterness, which contrast sadly with the sustained dignity and magnanimity of all that Lincoln wrote during the war.

Davis selected his cabinet for work, not for politics. It contained only two members of the governing class, Robert Toombs and Pope Walker, both of whom soon quarrelled with the President and resigned. The others, able and devoted servants to the Confederacy, exerted no influence and inspired slight confidence. Secretary Memminger of the Treasury was a German, and Secretary Mallory of the Navy half Yankee in race and British West-Indian by birth; Judah P. Benjamin, the ablest of the group and the closest to Davis, was a British subject and a Hebrew, whose perpetual smile and imperturbable suavity were peculiarly irritating to the Southern gentry.

If Lincoln's cabinet carried more political weight than that of Davis, it had less cohesion. Not a single member was a personal friend or follower of the President. His choice was restricted by the need of representing every element in the Republican party, and every loyal section of the Union. Seward's appointment brought the administration confidence, and eventually strength; but not until he had almost wrecked it by his aggressive foreign policy. Simon Cameron, the Secretary of War, was a Pennsylvania manufacturer who proved to be criminally careless if not corrupt. Salmon P. Chase, an apostle of righteousness with a superiority complex, received the Treasury as a party chieftain, and a rival for the Republican nomination in 1860. He never developed more than a moderate talent for administration and finance. Gideon Welles, formerly a bureau chief in the Navy Department, latterly a newspaper editor in a small inland town, was appointed Secretary of the Navy as a New Englander and a recent convert from the Democratic party. His Biblical name and patriarchal beard made Welles the butt of the administration; later he took appropriate revenge by writing a pungent autobiography. Edward Bates and Montgomery Blair, the Attorney-General and Postmaster-General, were good second-rate characters who represented the loyal slave states in the cabinet.

At the beginning of Lincoln's administration the members of the cabinet distrusted one another, and Blair alone had much respect for the President. Seward assumed the rôle of premier — as he liked to be called and considered. After the firing on Sumter, several months elapsed before the President was really master in his own house. The change of scene, the hurly-burly of war preparations, seemed for a time to cut his contact with that unconscious, unseen force that lifted him from the common herd. Yet his feeling for the democratic medium in which he had to work, for its limitations, imperfections, and possibilities, was akin to that of a great artist for the medium of sculpture or painting. He could capture the imagination of the common soldier and citizen; and at the same time make the outstanding quality of an ill-balanced character, as of McClellan and Stanton, an instrument of his great purpose. This rail-splitter, this prairie politician with his droll stories and his few, poor, crude social devices, had an innate tact and delicacy that carried conviction of his superiority to all but the most obtuse, and a humanity that has opened the hearts of all men to him in the end.

If Lincoln was slow to direct the conduct of the war, he never faltered in his conception of the purpose of the war. From Sumter to Appomattox, it was for him a war to preserve the Union. The power that lay in that word came less from an instinct of nationality than from the passionate desire of a youthful people to prove its worth by the only test that all the world recognized. The Union, which for Washington was a justification for the American Revolution, and for Hamilton a panoply of social order, had become, in the hands of Jackson, Clay, and Webster, a symbol of popular government. Lincoln drove home this conception in his every utterance, and gave it classical expression in the Gettysburg address. He made the average American feel that his dignity as a citizen of a free republic was bound up with the fate of the Union, whose destruction would be a victory for the enemies of freedom in every country.

Lincoln could not bring every one to this conception. Many members of the Democratic party in the North still looked upon the states as the symbol of democracy. Many believed civil war too great a price to pay for union. The abolitionists would support the Union only on the condition of its serving their immediate purpose. Nor did Lincoln completely dominate his own group. Many Republicans regarded the war as a mere assertion of Northern superiority; for the Republican party in 1861 was essentially a Northern, not a Union party. Because Lincoln, ignoring all appeals to hatred, sectionalism, and humanitarianism, raised the standard of Union at the beginning and kept it paramount, the Union was preserved. Prominent Democrats such as Stephen Douglas promptly rallied the best elements of their party to the colors; and in a few months the entire Ohio valley, half slaveholding in fact, and largely pro-slavery in sentiment, was secure. His enemies sneered, 'Lincoln would like to have God on his side, but he must have Kentucky.' His friends doubted whether even God could preserve the Union without Kentucky. Nor did he ever forget that those whom he liked to call 'our late friends, now adversaries' must, if his object were attained, become fellow citizens once more. Lincoln could never bring himself to contemplate the South with other feelings than sorrow and compassion.

4. *The Two Armies*

In the matter of military preparations the Confederacy had a start of several months on the United States, and secured the ablest officers of the United States army then in active service — Lee, both Johnstons, Beauregard, J. E. B. Stuart, and A. P. Hill; as well as Jackson and D. H. Hill, who were teaching in Southern military colleges. No other nation has ever had commanders of such calibre at the very beginning of a great war. The Union army found its proper leaders only through the costly method of trial and error. McClellan, Grant, Sherman, indeed most of the West Pointers who rose to prominence in the Union army, were in civil life at the beginning; and it was fortunate for the Union that they were, since the regular army of the United States — only sixteen thousand strong — was kept intact. Hence many brilliant young officers like Philip Sheridan were confined to small regular units, instead of being used as their seceding brethren to leaven the loaf.

The forty United States naval vessels in commission were scattered over the seven seas. Until mid-April no attempt was made to enlarge or even to concentrate these slender forces, for fear of offending the Virginia Unionists. In the meantime the Confederate States had seized upon the United States arsenals and navy yards within their limits, had obtained munitions from the North and from Europe, had organized state armies; and on 6 March 1861 President Davis called for and quickly obtained a hundred thousand volunteers for twelve months.

Winfield Scott, General-in-Chief of the United States Army, infirm in body but robust in mind, advised the President that at least three hundred thousand men, a general of Wolfe's capacity, and two or three years' time would be required to conquer even the lower South. No one else dared place the estimate so high; and Seward believed with the man in the street that one vigorous thrust would overthrow the Confederacy within ninety days. The President, in his proclamation of 15 April 1861, called for only seventy-five thousand volunteers, for three months. Militia regiments fell over one another in their alacrity to aid the government; New York alone voted to supply thirty thousand men for three years. Within two weeks thirty-five thousand troops were in Washington or on their way thither, and twenty thousand more were waiting for transportation. Undoubtedly the government should have taken advantage of this patriotic outburst to create a really national army for the duration of the war. Instead, Lincoln on 3 May called for forty more volunteer regiments of 1050 men each, and forty thousand three-year enlistments in the regular army and navy, leaving the recruiting, organization, and equipment of all volunteer regiments to the states. Over-zealous states were coldly admonished, 'it is important to reduce rather than enlarge this number.' That Lincoln, inexperienced and bewildered, should have lost this golden opportunity is not surprising, for the War Department preferred the traditional American method of raising an army by state quotas, as in 1776, 1812, and 1846.

As a basis for the new army, every Northern state had some sort of volunteer militia force which was mobilized for an annual 'muster' and 'Cornwallis' (sham battle) — usually not much more than a drunken frolic. The company officers were elected by the men, the regimental and general officers appointed by the state governor. A few militia regiments, like the Seventh New York, were well officered and drilled. There were also a number of semi-social, military companies, such as the Fire Zouaves and Sarsfield Guards, which performed fancy evolutions in showy uniforms. Many of these volunteered *en masse,* and proceeded on the road to glory without undue delay. Walt Whitman describes how two Brooklyn companies were provided with pieces of rope, tied to their musket barrels, with which to bring back 'traitors' from the South. (Similarly the Southern volunteers armed themselves with huge bowie-knives to terrorize their presumably pallid enemies.) But for the most part, the volunteer regiments that made up the bulk of the United States army during the war were regiments created on the spot. A patriotic citizen would receive a colonel's commission from his governor, and raise a regiment by his own efforts and those of men who expected to be officers under him. When the regiment was reasonably complete and partially equipped, it was forwarded to a training camp, and placed under federal control. The Federal government in practice had to respect state appointments until they were found wanting in action; and its own were scarcely better. Prominent politicians like Banks and Butler, without the slightest military experience, received major-generals' commissions from the President, and outranked seasoned officers of the regular army. There was something to be said for this system as a means of giving an unmilitary country a stake in the war, and utilizing community pride and competition. But something better was wanted before a year had elapsed.

By much the same system was the first Confederate army raised. The Southern respect for rank and caste gave prompt recognition to natural leaders. Indeed the earlier Southern armies were embarrassed by a plethora of officer material. J. E. B. Stuart remarked of one Virginian unit, 'They are pretty good officers now, and after a while they will make excellent soldiers too. They only need reducing to the ranks!' The Southern troops had the advantage of being accustomed to the use of arms — for every slaveholder had to keep weapons by him in case of insurrection, and the non-slaveholders were good marksmen. Both classes were lovers of horseflesh, and it was a poor white indeed who did not own a saddle-horse. Northern troops, unless from the West, had outgrown the hunting and horseback-riding frontier, and the Northern gentry had not yet adopted field sports or fox-hunting for recreation. Discipline, from which the more primitive individualistic Southerners were averse, soon ironed out these differences. The two armies became as nearly equal in fighting capacity, man for man, as any two in history; and they took an unprecedented amount of punishment. If the Confederates won more battles, it was due to their better leadership, which gave them a 'tactical' superiority on the field of battle, against the 'strategical' superiority of their enemies on the field of operations. Again and again we find a numerically inferior Confederate army defeating its enemy in detail; or a Union commander failing to get his available forces into action in time to influence the result. As the North had the greater immigrant population, it had a larger proportion of foreign-born soldiers; but the average Northern soldier was a farmer's son rather than a clerk or factory hand. There were large numbers of Irish and Germans on both sides; Dick Taylor's Louisiana Creoles gave quite as good an account of themselves as Stonewall Jackson's dour Presbyterians.

Throughout the war the Union army was the better equipped in shoes and clothing, and more abundantly supplied with munitions; yet the red tape of War Department bureaus, and the prejudice of elderly officers, prevented the adoption of the breech-loading rifle. Both in artillery and small-arms, it was largely a war of the muzzle-loader, and to a great extent of the smooth-bore. When the blockade stopped regular shipments from Europe, which was not until the end of 1863, the Confederate ordnance service, under a resourceful Pennsylvanian named Josiah Gorgas, was able to keep the army supplied; and the Confederacy never lost a battle for want of ammunition. Richmond was one of the principal coal- and iron-producing centers in the United States, and her Tredegar Iron Works were well equipped for the manufacture of heavy castings and ordnance. It was there that the iron armor of the *Merrimac* was rolled, her rifled guns cast, and that the first practical submarine vessel was built. But these were the only works in the Confederacy so equipped until 1863, when a newly established plant at Selma, Alabama, began to turn out cannon. Much enterprise was also shown by the Confederate government in organizing Southern woollen mills to turn out cloth for uniforms, but the Southern armies were never properly supplied with shoes. Deficiencies in clothing, equipment, artillery, and small-arms, were constantly made good from the supplies abandoned by Union armies in their frequent retreats.

5. *Terrain, Tactics, and Strategy*

Civil War battles were fought in a rough, forested country with occasional clearings — Antietam, Gettysburg, and Fredericksburg were the only important battles fought in open country. The defending infantry is drawn up in a double line, the men firing erect or from a kneeling posture. The attacking force moves forward by brigade units of 2,000 to 2,500 men, covering a front of 800 to 1,000 yards, in double rank; captains in the front rank, the other officers and non-coms. in the rear, to discourage straggling. They are preceded by a line of skirmishers. Normally the attack moves forward in cadenced step, and is halted at intervals to fire and reload, the enemy returning fire until one or the other gives ground. Occasionally the boys in blue, more often the boys in gray, advance on the double-quick, the former shouting a deep-chested 'Hurrah!', the latter giving vent to their famous 'rebel yell,' a shrill staccato yelp. An attack of this sort generally ends in a bayonet encounter; but both sides, ill-trained in bayonet work, prefer to club their muskets. There was slight attempt at concealment, and so little entrenchment until 1864 that the moments of actual combat were more deadly to officers and men than the battles of the Great War; but as soon as contact was broken the men were comparatively safe. A regular feature of the Civil War was the fraternizing of picket guards, and even whole units of men, during the intervals between fighting.

Union strategy, aggressive by the nature of the Union cause, took a form dictated by the geography of the Confederate States. The Appalachians and the Mississippi river divided the Confederacy into three parts, nearly equal in area: the eastern, the western, and the trans-Mississippi theatres of war. The scene of the most spectacular campaigns and battles was in that part of the eastern theatre bounded by North Carolina, the Appalachians, the Susquehanna, and Chesapeake bay. Here were the two capitals, Washington and Richmond, and between them a rough wooded country, crossed by numerous streams and rivers. Of course the enemy's army, not the enemy's capital, is the proper object in warfare, but in a civil war, especially, possession of the enemy capital is of immense moral value, and the Union spent more money and effort on trying to attain Richmond than on all its other operations combined. In the retaliating threats to Washington, the Shenandoah-Cumberland valley, pointing like a long cannon at the heart of the Union, played an important rôle, and was the scene of the most dashing exploits of Jackson and Sheridan. Military operations beyond the Mississippi had little effect on the result. But the western theatre of war between the Mississippi and the Appalachians, was at least of equal importance with the eastern. Lee might perform miracles in Virginia, and even carry the war into the enemy's country; but when Grant and the gunboats had secured the Mississippi, and Sherman was ready to swing round the southern spurs of the Appalachians into Georgia, the Confederacy was doomed. Control of the sea was a priceless asset to the Union. The navy maintained communications with Europe, cut off those of the South, captured important coastal cities, and on the western rivers co-operated with the army like the other blade to a pair of shears.

A threefold task lay before the armed forces of the Union: constriction, scission, and defeat of the Southern armies. Both the nature and the magnitude of the task were imperfectly apprehended in 1861, unless by Winfield Scott, whose 'anaconda policy' of constriction was dismissed as the ravings of an old fogy.

6. *The War in 1861*

The Union plan of campaign for 1861 was to blockade the Southern coast, and occupy strategic points along its edge; to mobilize and train the volunteer army in regions convenient for invading the Southern States, and to capture Richmond, which, it was fondly supposed, would cause the Confederacy to collapse. Kentucky had to be nursed carefully out of neutrality during the summer and the autumn, and Confederate sympathizers in Missouri threatened the Union right flank. Hence the first forward movements were from Columbus, St. Louis, and Washington.

Congress, convened in special session on 4 July, voted loans and taxes, and authorized the President to recruit half a million men for the duration of the war. Already there were some twenty-five thousand three-months volunteers at Washington, spoiling for a fight. The Northern press and people were vociferous for action. Against General Scott's advice, President and Cabinet yielded to the cry of 'On to Richmond.' General McDowell, with a 'grand army' of thirty thousand, crossed the Potomac in order to seek out Beauregard's army near Manassas Junction, Virginia. A throng of newspaper correspondents, sightseers on horse and foot, and congressmen in carriages came out to see the sport.

On 20 July McDowell attacked Beauregard on a plateau behind the small stream called Bull Run. The troops on both sides were so ill-trained, the officers so unused to handling large numbers, the opposing flags so similar, and the uniforms so varied that a scene of extraordinary confusion took place. For hours it was any one's battle, although the famous stand of the Stonewall Virginia brigade, probably averted a Union victory. Union retreat turned to rout. All the next day, soldiers came straggling into Washington without order or formation, dropping down to sleep in the very streets; rumors flying about that Beauregard was in hot pursuit, that the Capitol would be blown up if not abandoned; treason openly preached everywhere. But Lincoln did not flinch, and Beauregard did not pursue. 'The Confederate army was more disorganized by victory than that of the United States by defeat,' wrote General Johnston. There was no more talk of a ninety-days war. From the dregs of humiliation the Union was nerved to make adequate preparations for a long war; while the South, believing her proved superiority would dissolve the Northern 'hordes' and procure foreign recognition, indulged in an orgy of conceit and self-applause.

On 24 July 1861, the day after Bull Run, President Lincoln summoned General McClellan to Washington, and gave him command of the army in that department. George B. McClellan was only thirty-four years old. A graduate of West Point on the eve of the Mexican War, in which he performed distinguished service, his subsequent business experience accustomed him to deal with large affairs in a large way, and gave him the confidence of men of property; his personal magnetism and some easy successes in western Virginia in June, 1861, made him a popular hero. The Northern States provided him with plenty of three-years volunteers. Congress was generous with money and equipment, and the President gave him the fullest support. No untried general in modern times has had such abundant means as McClellan enjoyed during the nine months that followed Bull Run; and few have been so cruelly deprived of them when the opportunity came to use them.

McClellan proved an ideal organizer. His precise, methodical mind, his appetite for detail and love of work, and above all his attractive personality and genuine interest in his men were exactly the qualities needed to form an army from a mob. But his defects in conduct and character impaired his usefulness and weakened his support when the time came for action. There was never a grain of truth in the charges against McClellan's loyalty. There can no longer be any reasonable doubt of his technical military ability. His position, however, required not only military ability, but some perception of the democratic medium in which he must work; and that perception, which was given to Grant and Lincoln, McClellan wholly lacked. Impatient democracy demanded quick results, and McClellan neither gave them nor explained in terms that people could understand why quick results could not be expected. His love of display, the Orléans princes on his staff, too frequent mention of 'my army,' a short way with politicians combined with frequent public statements as to what the politicians should do, seemed out of place in a republican soldier. The note of self-laudation and of contempt for Lincoln that runs through McClellan's confidential letters makes it difficult to do him justice today. He was the type of man who is not content merely to do well the task at hand, but must be forever dreaming of the future in terms of self: victorious McClellan, dictator McClellan, President McClellan. Yet no Union general was so beloved as 'Little Mac' by the untrained volunteers whom his genius turned into a superb instrument of war, the Army of the Potomac.

Weeks stretched into months, and the newspapers had nothing to report but drills and reviews. 'All quiet along the Potomac' appeared so often in the headlines as to become a jest. Joseph E. Johnston extended his lines along the south bank of the Potomac, and closed the river to traffic in October. McClellan estimated the enemy's number at 150,000. Actually, at that time, the Confederate army of Northern Virginia was less than 50,000 strong, and wretchedly equipped. General Johnston, dogmatic in temper and choleric in disposition, had much the harder task of the two. President Davis found him recruits with some difficulty, for every section of the South wished a large home guard, and looked upon the Washington army with contempt.

Lincoln refused to let the politicians worry him into ordering an advance. When General Scott got in McClellan's way, the President on 1 November appointed McClellan General-in-Chief of all the armies of the Republic. At his instance the War Department took over all matters of recruiting, equipment, and organization from the states. Yet McClellan persistently snubbed the President, and on one occasion affronted him in a way that no other ruler would have pardoned. ' Never mind,' said Lincoln, ' I will hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us success.' November passed with no preparations made for an offensive. December came, and the general began to play with plans for an oblique instead of a direct advance on Richmond. ' What are you waiting for, tardy George? ' was the burden of a new popular song. ' If something is not done soon, the bottom will be out of the whole affair,' said the President. ' If General McClellan does not want to use the army I would like to *borrow* it.'

It was no mere temperamental caution, or illusion of the enemy's strength, that was holding McClellan back. Loving his army and his country, and loathing bloodshed, he sought ' to heal as well as to conquer.' A mere victory, he believed, would be indecisive; but one dramatic coup such as the capture of Richmond, if accompanied by satisfactory assurances as to slave property, would win back the South. ' I shall carry the thing *en grande,* and crush the rebels in one campaign,' he wrote to his young and adoring wife.

Now McClellan was not alone in this delusion that rebellion could be stamped out as suddenly as it arose. Lincoln, Seward, Grant, and the mass of the Northern public shared it, until the year 1862 ended in the horror of Fredericksburg. He differed from others only in his estimate of the preparation necessary for a fatal blow. Yet McClellan's strategy of delay was correct, as his policy of crushing was mistaken. Since 1914 we have learned to our cost that it takes time to create an army from a mob. Nothing was to be gained by stirring up Johnston prematurely. He would have fallen back, and the Confederacy would have been aroused from its fool's paradise of over-confidence, as it finally was in April 1862. The Confederacy was defeated in 1865, as Germany was in 1918, by attrition and constriction. It was the true policy of the Union to postpone offensive movements until its superior resources were organized for offensive war. It was the true policy of the Confederacy to force an issue promptly. The Union could not afford another Bull Run; the Confederacy could not afford to let another such opportunity slip. McClellan was inspired, in so far as he spent his efforts in preparation; and Lincoln was inspired, in so far as he supported McClellan's strategy. Neither could rationalize an instinct that ran counter to his reasoned policy of crushing; hence neither was able to explain himself to the other, or to his country. McClellan, from Yorktown to Antietam, thought he was 'striking at the heart of the rebellion,' while his strategy was uniformly directed by this instinct of delay and constriction. On the Confederate side, Lee certainly, and Johnston probably, had the right instinct of agression; but they were overruled by their President's academic policy of defence and delay.

7. *The Union Navy and the Blockade*

For the Union navy, the policy of constriction was so obvious that it was consciously applied from the first. President Davis invited applications for letters of marque on 17 April 1861; two days later President Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of the Southern ports. The following day brought a naval counterpart to Bull Run. The navy yard at Norfolk, which the United States government had neglected to reinforce for fear of offending Virginia, was captured without a blow by the troops of that state, together with enormous stores of ordnance, munitions, and the hull of the *Merrimac* frigate.

The Navy Department then awoke, and Gideon Welles proved to be one of Lincoln's lucky finds. Painstaking and methodical as an administrator, respectful of navy traditions, his meagre knowledge of the service was supplemented by his highly capable assistant secretary, Gustavus V. Fox. Between them the navy was much more efficiently directed than the army, and without costly mistakes in higher command — since the country did not force it to make rear-admirals out of politicians. But the problem of blockading 3,550 miles of coastline from Washington to Matamoras, with the vessels and seamen available, seemed at first insoluble. The sixty sailing-vessels proved as obsolete as medieval galleys. Congress had begun to build a new steam navy in 1850; but as yet only twenty-four steamers had been placed in commission, and only twelve of these were in the home squadron. The American merchant marine had a very small supply of screw steamers suitable for conversion, and the number of machine shops capable of turning out good engines was small. Although American inventors had for some years been planning ironclads, whose value had been suggested by the Crimean War and proved by Napoleon III; and although the Navy Department was eager to experiment in that direction, Congress had refused to appropriate money for that purpose, or even, latterly, for proper upkeep of the existing fleet. There was no naval reserve. Without waiting for Congress to assemble, a large construction program was undertaken, and side-wheelers, screw steamers, clipper ships, tugboats, and even ferry-boats were purchased in wholesale quantities, at retail prices. Time and legislation were required to build ironclads, to retire aged officers, and to establish promotion by merit. Throughout the war old-fashioned seamen were placed in command of steamers, where they were apt to be more anxious about their boilers than about the enemy.

It was a paper blockade for two or three months after 19 April, but by the end of July four blockading squadrons were stationed off the seven or eight enemy ports that were commercially important. According to a report of the Confederate State Department, dated 21 April 1862, almost eight hundred vessels entered and cleared from the ports of the Confederacy during the first year of the blockade; but the corresponding figures for the last year of peace had been in excess of six thousand.

Owing to the character of the coast it was impossible to close the Confederate ports completely. From the Chesapeake to Wilmington the coast proper is protected by long barrier beaches, jutting out in Cape Hatteras, Cape Lookout, and Cape Fear, and pierced by numerous inlets. Again, from Georgetown, S. C., to Fernandina, the littoral is protected by the ‘ sea islands ’ which make an intricate network of channels. Small vessels clearing from a Carolinian port could sneak along an inside passage until they reached an outlet to a clear horizon, and then make a dash for the high seas. It was about six hundred miles from Mobile to Havana, and even less distance from the South Atlantic ports to protected waters in the Bahamas, where Nassau quickly acquired an importance it had not known since the days of the buccaneers, and a prosperity it did not recover until the days of the bootleggers. Until 1862 the Confederacy had no naval vessels that could even challenge the blockading squadrons; but the more important Southern harbors had been provided by the United States with excellent fortifications, which served to keep hostile ships at a respectful distance.

During the summer of 1861 the Navy Department began to establish bases on the Southern coast. Cape Hatteras, Ship Island in the Gulf of Mexico near New Orleans, and Hilton Heal on the sea islands off Port Royal, S. C., were captured between August and

November 1861. This last was the only important Union victory of that year. And in February-March, 1862, General Burnside, at the head of a joint naval-military expedition, captured Roanoke Island, Newbern, and Beaufort, N. C., giving the Union control of Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds. But Wilmington, N. C., remained a major leak in the blockade until nearly the end of the war. For want of military co-operation these successes were not followed up by raids into the interior; but they kept thousands of Southern troops out of Lee's army.

8. *The Attitude of Europe*

From the very start the British and French people were deeply interested in the Civil War. Their opinion divided along lines of political thought. Europe in general saw the issue eye-to-eye with Lincoln. Restoration of the Union would mean a new triumph for democracy; destruction of the Union a mortal wound to democracy. The United States had long been obnoxious to European ruling classes for the encouragement that its success afforded to European radicals. 'An involuntary instinct, all-powerful and unconquerable,' wrote the Comte de Montalembert, 'at once arrayed on the side of the pro-slavery people all the open or secret partisans of the fanaticism and absolutism of Europe.' Many Englishmen outside that category favored the South, for, as Henry Adams wrote, 'the English mind took naturally to rebellion — when foreign.' Most liberals could see no difference between the Southern struggle for independence and the nationalist movements in Europe with which they had always sympathized. Dissenters and humanitarians, who would have welcomed a war against slavery, were put off by the repeated declarations of Lincoln and Seward that slavery was not an issue. The commercial classes marked the return of the United States to a high protective policy, which the Confederate constitution forbade; and Southern propaganda made much of the contrast. Shipping interests hoped for the ruin of their most formidable competitor, and approved a new cotton kingdom for which they might do the carrying trade. Indeed it is not surprising that the Union had few articulate partisans in the England of 1861. In such an atmosphere there was grave danger lest some untoward incident should precipitate hostilities between the Union and the Empire. Fortunately there were no outstanding disputes between the two countries in 1860;

but with England in the unusual rôle of neutral sea-power, they were certain to arise.

Southern expectations of victory were based on three delusions: that 'cavaliers' were invincible, that the Ohio valley would not fight, and that England would break the blockade to get cotton. The theory that inspired the Association of 1774 and Jefferson's embargo, the old delusion that American staples ran the wheels of industry in Europe, had gathered strength with the growing export of cotton to Great Britain and France. British and French industry did depend on American cotton to a surprising extent; but in April 1861 there was a fifty per cent over-supply both of cotton and of cottons in the English market. So instead of demanding intervention to get more cotton, the big textile interests of England and France welcomed the opportunity to work off surplus stocks. A second factor ignored by the South was the British doctrine of naval warfare. As Lord John Russell wrote, the American blockade satisfied the British standard; and in view of England's sea-power, it would be highly imprudent for her to insist on a higher standard which would hamper her offensive strength in the future. The reiterated Southern complaints of the ineffectiveness of the blockade, Russell shrewdly suspected to be indications to the contrary.

International complications first arose from the fact that the United States officially regarded the war as a domestic insurrection, yet tacitly accorded belligerent status to the Confederacy by declaring a public blockade. Lincoln might simply have declared rebel ports closed to foreign commerce, as any government would do under similar circumstances to-day. But the world was not then prepared to respect a blockade unless the word were pronounced, and the fact proclaimed; nor would neutral vessels on any other terms submit to visit and search.

Lord Palmerston's government, alarmed by the probable consequences of the war to British commerce, hastened to define its attitude in the Queen's Proclamation of 13 May 1861, declaring her 'Royal determination to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality in the contest . . . between the Government of the United States of America and certain states styling themselves the Confederate States of America,' and her intention to enforce the Foreign Enlistment Act against unneutral aid. This proclamation was greatly to the advantage of the Union. A Foreign Office circular of 1 June, forbidding British and Imperial port authorities to admit prize ships, was decidedly to the disadvantage of the Confederacy. But the very promptitude and explicitness of the neutrality proclamation and its unprecedented mention of a rebel government by its chosen name, seemed unfriendly to the Northern people, and raised false expectations of recognition in the South. Seward at once drafted an aggressive protest which Lincoln carefully toned down, and which he instructed the American minister at London to communicate in substance only. Otherwise diplomatic relations between the two countries would have been severed at the outset. France and the other continental countries soon issued neutrality proclamations of their own.

The first positive danger of European intervention came over the *Trent* affair. The British mail steamer of that name was conveying to Southampton two Confederate diplomatic agents, J. Y. Mason and John Slidell, when on 8 November 1861 she was boarded from the U.S.S. *San Jacinto,* Captain Wilkes commanding, deprived of her two distinguished passengers, and allowed to proceed. Of course Captain Wilkes should have sent in the *Trent* for adjudication, when she would have been condemned for performing unneutral service. When the news reached England the press rang the tocsin of war, the government sent reinforcements to Canada, and Russell drafted a demand for apology and reparation, in terms which resembled those of the famous Austrian ultimatum to Serbia.

Fortunately Prince Albert toned down Russell's dispatch; and by a notable dispensation of Providence the Atlantic cable had ceased to function. Yet the minatory tone of the British press made it difficult for the United States government to give way, and the glorification of Wilkes in the American press made it impossible for the British government to recede. Seward from the first saw that Mason and Slidell must be surrendered; but Lincoln feared the political effect of yielding to British menace. Not until Charles Sumner, armed with admonitory letters from Bright and Cobden, had argued before the cabinet during a four-hour session on Christmas Day, could the President be persuaded to yield. Seward's note to Lyons, designed more to placate the American than the British public, contained no apology; but Mason and Slidell were promptly released and forwarded to their uncomfortable posts.

In the end the *Trent* episode cleared the air. Seward now appeared in the new rôle of conciliator; an Anglo-American war had been faced and found disagreeable to both governments; and the British cabinet was stiffened in its policy of neutrality. The Northern people even forgot their resentment in laughing over the London *Times'* warning to Mason and Slidell that they, personally, were nothing to the English people, who would 'have done just as much to rescue two of their own negroes.'

XXXII

THE WAR IN 1862

1. *Plans and Personalities*

ALMOST half a year had elapsed since Bull Run, and nothing had happened. In the North, McClellan's inaction increased day by day the political difficulties that were gathering about Lincoln. The united spirit formed by the guns that fired on Fort Sumter was evaporating; and from the Republican party a faction emerged to challenge Lincoln's leadership. This was the radical group, led by 'Bluff Ben' Wade and 'Zach' Chandler, Middle-Western senators of coarse fibre but fine talent for politics. From their point of view the war was one of revenge on the insolent slave power; and abolitionist doctrine gave moral sanction to their hatred. The policy they wished to force upon the President was immediate emancipation and arming of the slaves — a policy which, if adopted in 1861, would have driven the border slave states into secession, alienated the Northern Democrats, and narrowed the war party to a faction.

Lincoln's statement in his first annual message to Congress (3 December 1861): 'I have been anxious and careful that the inevitable conflict . . . shall not degenerate into a violent and remorseless revolutionary struggle,' seemed to the radicals a challenge and a sign of weakness. McClellan, a Democrat, and even more conservative than Lincoln on the slavery question, was the particular object of their jealousy and suspicion, while General Frémont's pretence to free the slaves in Missouri by proclamation, an act which Lincoln sternly rebuked, received their hearty approbation.

'A new temper was forming throughout the land, . . . a blend of all those elements of violent feeling which war inevitably releases, . . . the resurrection of that primitive bloodlust which lies dormant in every peaceful nation like a sleeping beast.'[1] To this temper the radicals appealed by voice and pen, during the recess of Congress (August–December 1861). To their standard surged the hundred-per-cent unconditional-surrender sort of patriots, sincere in their desire to win the war, yet certain to lose it for any government that yielded to their misguided zeal. The first product of this complex of hatred and zeal, suspicion and patriotism, was the appointment by Congress of a joint committee on the conduct of the war (20 December 1861). Radical Republicans were the dominant spirits of this committee. Throughout the war their inquisitorial activities, *ex parte* investigations, and missions to the front, hampered the executive, undermined army discipline, and discouraged the more competent generals. Frémont, Butler, and Hooker were, in the opinion of this committee, the three peerless leaders who could do no wrong.

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[1] N. Stephenson, *Lincoln*, p. 195.

Owing to the efforts of another House committee, corruption on a gigantic scale was uncovered in the War Department, and the scandal smirched Secretary Cameron. Lincoln sent him on a foreign mission and appointed a 'War Democrat,' Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Gloomy, ill-mannered, and vituperative, Stanton was another cross for Lincoln to bear. Ignorant of military matters and contemptuous of military science, intolerant of delay and harsh to subordinates, he was hated by almost every officer with whom he came in contact; and on several he did cruel injustice. Yet for all that, Stanton's determination, thoroughness, honesty, and system proved him a fit instrument for Lincoln's purpose. He stood for discipline against the President's desire to pardon all deserters. He browbeat politicians and got things done. As Lincoln remarked at a dark period for the Union cause, 'Folks come up here and tell me that there are a great many men in the country who have all Stanton's excellent qualities without his defects. All I have to say is, I haven't met 'em! I don't know 'em! I wish I did!'

When Stanton took office (15 January 1862), McClellan had already prepared, and the President approved, the general outlines of a plan of operations for 1862, which we can mention bit by bit as we take it up. In brief, it was to capture and hold the line of the Mississippi; to occupy Kentucky and Tennessee and cut the Memphis and Charleston railway; and to catch Richmond between two nippers, one operating from Albemarle Sound, and the other from Washington. The blockade, of course, was to be pressed home by the occupation of more bases on the Southern coast.

Lincoln was so pathetically eager to have something to show for all these elaborate preparations, that he issued 'War order no. 1,' designating Washington's Birthday as the date for a general forward movement of all the sea and land forces of the Republic. Needless to say, February 22 passed without McClellan, at whom the order was aimed, making any forward move. But already the first substantial victory for the Union had come in an unsuspected quarter, from an unknown general.

2. *Grant and Farragut*

Ulysses S. Grant, an officer who disliked war and loathed army routine, had fallen on evil days since the proud moment before Mexico City. After promotion to a captaincy he was forced to resign from the army in order to avoid a court-martial for drunkenness. Unable to extract a living from 'Hardscrabble Farm' near St. Louis, he attempted to sell real estate, and failed again. His father bestowed a clerkship in the family leather store at Galena, Illinois. Brothers condescended, fellow townsmen sneered. Only his wife had faith; and the meanest horses were docile to his voice and hands.

Fort Sumter fell two weeks before Grant's thirty-ninth birthday. His love of the Union blazed forth and kindled a new faith in himself. After many rebuffs he obtained a colonelcy of volunteers. His regiment, the 21st Illinois, was promptly ordered into Missouri, to dislodge a Confederate regiment under a Colonel Harris. Approaching the reported position, so Grant relates, fear gripped his heart; but he had not the moral courage to halt and consider what to do. Suddenly there opened a view of the enemy's encampment — abandoned! 'It occurred to me at once that Harris had been as much afraid of me as I had been of him. This was a new view of the question I had never taken before; but it was one I never forgot afterwards.'[2]

In August 1861 Grant received a brigadier's commission. 'Be careful, Ulyss,' said his father, 'you are a general now — it's a good job, don't lose it!' In the late autumn he was assigned to Halleck's department, and stationed at Cairo, Illinois, at the junction of the Ohio with the Mississippi. In the summer of 1861 the Confederates began to throw up earthworks at strategic points along the Mississippi where the old Spanish forts used to choke down-river trade. In order to force a passage past them, J. B. Eads of St. Louis undertook to construct a fleet of river gunboats, each with a partially armored casemate shaped like a mansard roof, resting on a flat-bottomed hull.

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[2] *Personal Memoirs*, i. 250. Throughout the Civil War there was partisan fighting of the most bitter and ferocious nature in Missouri, between Union and Confederate partisans. It had little influence on the outcome of the war elsewhere.

Less than fifty miles up the Ohio from Cairo the Tennessee and Cumberland rivers offered parallel routes into Tennessee, Alabama, and Mississippi. Grant observed that Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, the two Confederate earthworks which closed these rivers, were the twin keys to the Confederate West. Their capture would open a navigable waterway into the enemy's center, and drive in his flanks. On 11 January Grant obtained Halleck's reluctant consent to try, and was furnished with the necessary transports and gunboats. On 7 February Fort Henry was reduced by the gunboat flotilla before Grant's army arrived.

Fifteen miles across country, on the high left bank of the Cumberland, was the strong entrenched camp called Fort Donelson. There Albert Sidney Johnston, the Confederate commander in that department, had stationed half his army of 30,000, and thither the Fort Henry garrison retired. Grant disposed his troops in a semicircle about Fort Donelson on the land side, while the gunboats steamed down the Tennessee and up the Cumberland. On 13 February they attacked the fort at a range of 400 yards, but were driven back disabled. It seemed that a siege would be necessary. Two days later the Union right, occupying dense woods on either side of the road to Nashville, was surprised by a sortie. Grant, who was then conferring with the gunboat commander, arrived in the thick of the battle to find his right in disorder and his center in danger. With the utmost coolness he thought out the situation. Deducing from the three-days' rations in a captured Confederate's haversack that the enemy was trying to cut his way out, and perceiving a certain confusion in his movements, Grant made exactly the right tactical disposition to drive the Confederates back into their entrenchments. It was a fierce, blind battle in the forest, but the result justified Grant in asking and the Confederate generals in granting unconditional surrender of army and fortress.

The results of this Battle of Fort Donelson (15 February 1862) were unexpected, even to Grant. Nashville was no longer tenable by the enemy, and A. S. Johnston retreated to the Memphis-Chattanooga railway. Grant had practically restored Tennessee to the Union; and, if his victory were followed up, the Mississippi would be open. Equally important was the moral gain to the then dispirited

North. The prairie boys of the new Northwest had tried their mettle with the rangy foresters of the old Southwest; and the legend of Southern invincibility collapsed.

'Unconditional Surrender' Grant had still an old army reputation to live down. His jealous and pedantic superior, General Halleck, instead of allowing him to pursue A. S. Johnston, held up his advance and withdrew his troops to attack the northernmost Confederate strongholds on the Mississippi. In consequence Johnston found time to concentrate at Corinth with gallant Beauregard and that notable man of God, Bishop and General Leonidas Polk.

These caught Grant napping, on 6 April. His army, encamped in an ill-chosen position at Pittsburg Landing, with its rear to the swollen Tennessee river and its front unprotected by entrenchments, had forced upon it the Battle of Shiloh. For twelve hours there was confused fighting between detached portions of the Union lines and the dashing Confederates, superbly led. If the Union army was not routed it was due less to Grant's steadfast coolness than to the fiery valor of divisional commanders like William Tecumseh Sherman, and to the pluck of individual soldiers. By the end of the day the Confederates had captured the key position at Shiloh church, the Union lines were dangerously near the river, and thousands of stragglers were cowering under the bluffs at Pittsburg Landing. But the South had lost her most gallant leader. Albert Sidney Johnston, leading a charge, was mortally wounded. All night a torrential rain drenched both armies, and the Union gunboats dropped shells on the Confederates. When the battle reopened at dawn on 7 April Grant had been strengthened by Lew Wallace's division, and the van of General Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio. After ten hours more of desperate fighting Beauregard withdrew the Confederate army to Corinth. Grant's army was too exhausted to pursue.

Shiloh was a Union victory at a dreadful price. Out of 63,000 Union troops engaged, the loss was 13,000; the Confederate loss was 11,000 out of 40,000. One could walk on corpses across some of the clearings on the battle-field. A storm of controversy arose. Pressure was put upon the President to remove Grant. Lincoln replied, 'I can't spare this man; he fights.' But General Halleck thought he could spare Grant, and did so by taking command of his army in person; in consequence of which, little more was accomplished by the army during 1862 in this western theatre of the war. But the river gunboats continued their advance down the Mississippi, defeating a Confederate flotilla off Memphis, running up the White river into the heart of Arkansas, forcing the enemy to evacuate Missouri, and on 1 July 1862 joining Farragut's fleet above Vicksburg.

Captain Farragut had to force his way up the Mississippi from the Gulf without a single ironclad; but his old wooden walls were manned by stout hearts. At Plaquemines Bend, twenty miles from the head of the Passes and ninety miles below New Orleans, the river was protected by Forts Jackson and St. Philip, by sunken hulls supporting a boom, by a fleet of rams and armed steamers, and by a current of three- to four-knot strength. In the small hours of 24 April Farragut's fleet of eight steam sloops-of-war and fifteen wooden gunboats, with chain cables secured as a coat of mail abreast the engines, crashed through the boom single line ahead, and ran the gauntlet of armored rams, fire-rafts, river defence fleet, and the two forts.

In the gay creole city of New Orleans, largest and wealthiest of the Confederacy, there had been no business since the blockade closed down, and little laughter since the news of Shiloh. When Farragut's fleet anchored off the levee on 25 April, New Orleans was already abandoned by the Confederacy, and the following day the United States forces took possession. New Orleans was a rough city, and the troops of occupation were commanded by a tough character, General B. F. Butler. Repeated insults to his men by the creole wenches were put a stop to by his famous order rendering such a person 'liable to be treated as a woman of the town plying her avocation,' or in other words to be lodged in the common jail. Butler was declared a felon and an outlaw by President Davis, denounced in the British Parliament, and finally removed from his post in consequence of diplomatic protest.

After landing the army Farragut proceeded up-river, receiving the surrender of Baton Rouge and Natchez, and running past Vicksburg to join the up-river gunboat fleet. But as Halleck could not be induced to provide troops for a joint attack on Vicksburg, that 'Gibraltar of the Mississippi' held out for a year longer, enabling Richmond to maintain communication with Arkansas, Missouri, and Texas.

The Confederacy was tightly pinched along its waistline; but the blood could still circulate. The Union offensive in the West had failed in its great purpose, yet accomplished much of value. That was more than could be said of the grand campaigns of this year in the eastern theatre of war.

3. *The Peninsular Campaign Begins*

'In ten days I shall be in Richmond,' declared General McClellan on 13 February 1862. It was one of those rash boasts that belied his sound instinct, and made men doubt his sincerity. He was planning to outflank J. E. Johnston — then stationed at Manassas — by the Rappahannock, and race him for Richmond. A glance at the map will show the extreme unlikelihood of his success; and Johnston countered by moving to Fredericksburg (7 March). McClellan promptly emulated the famous King of France by marching a portion of his army to the deserted Confederate headquarters at Manassas, and back again to Washington. For Lincoln this was the last straw.

Throughout the winter Lincoln had stood between McClellan and a rising tide of popular impatience, radical suspicion, and denunciation by the committee on the conduct of the war. His patience was now exhausted, his confidence impaired, his resistance worn down. Stanton was even beginning to suspect the general's loyalty. Lincoln offered McClellan the choice between an immediate frontal attack on Richmond, covering Washington as he advanced, and a wide flanking movement by the York peninsula. McClellan chose the peninsular campaign. The President then (11 March) stripped McClellan of his superior command, leaving him only the Army of the Potomac; and within the next few weeks detached Blenker's division and McDowell's corps from that army, gave Stanton supreme control of military operations, created a new department in western Virginia for Frémont with more troops than he knew how to handle, and, just as the campaign was beginning, allowed Stanton to stop recruiting, and to dismantle the new federal recruiting machinery established at McClellan's instance in December. McClellan received these distressing orders as a soldïer and a gentleman should, and went forward gallantly to do his best with his means in hand. But his hands were tied. There were three independent commands beside his in Virginia alone, and at sundry points the War Department dictated his movements. There was no peninsular campaign of McClellan. It was the campaign of Lincoln and Stanton.

The peninsular plan, at least, was McClellan's, and it was a good one, enabling the Union army to be supplied and reinforced by sea. Fortress Monroe, at the tip of the York peninsula, was in Union possession. The navy could protect the army's right flank as it advanced up the peninsula as far as White House on the Pamunkey river. On its left flank the James, with deep water up to the suburbs of Richmond, was a better line of approach; but the *Virginia* (ex *Merrimac*) closed it to the Union navy during the first few weeks of the campaign. The *Virginia* — a more powerful edition of the armored gunboats already being used on the Mississippi — met her equal in the *Monitor* in Hampton Roads on 8 March 1862. A new principle of naval armament, the revolving turret, thereupon obtained the sanction of success. But so long as the *Virginia* was afloat she protected the mouth of the James, and held the North Atlantic Squadron in Hampton Roads.

The Army of the Potomac, well armed, trained, and equipped, and 100,000 strong, was the most formidable military force yet seen on American soil. The men were eager for action, their discipline was at top notch, their devotion to their young commander absolute; and now that they were finally in motion, popular confidence rallied to them. In the York peninsula they were on a classic ground of American history. Here were the ruins of Jamestown, the Chickahominy river, arising north of Richmond in the old hunting grounds of Powhatan, the colonial capital of Williamsburg, and Yorktown where the War of Independence was concluded. A few mansions of the eighteenth century still lined the York and James, but the greater part of the peninsula had reverted to its savage state. Even the environs of Richmond were a wilderness, broken by occasional farms and clearing; Lee speaks of impassable swamps, dense forests, and even unknown country, in his report on the Seven Days.

McClellan intended and expected to take Richmond, and crush the rebellion that summer. His sense of injury at the hands of the administration, his suspicion that they did not really wish him to win, only made him the more ardent of success. Splendid visions were in his brain. Himself, on prancing charger, entering Richmond in triumph, the Comte de Paris and Duc de Chartres conspicuous among his glittering staff. Davis, Stephens, and Toombs playing the rôle of suppliants. Magnanimous terms to the gallant enemy: civil rights restored, slave property guaranteed. Discomfited administration not daring to refuse ratification. Grand review at Washington.



The Eastern THEATRE OF WAR

Miles
0
25
50
75
100
Railways thus
PENNSYLVANIA
PITTSBURG
Johnstown
Carlisle
Harrisburg
Lancaster
PHILADELPHIA
Chambersburg
South Mt.
York
Gettysburg
Susquehanna R.
Wilmington
Sharpsburg
Antietam Cr.
Hagerstown
Potomac
Havre de Grace
To Ohio
Romney
Frederick C.
BALTIMORE
Harpers Ferry
Dover
Winchester
MARYLAND
DELAWARE
Delaware Bay
Strasburg
Manassas Gap
Annapolis
Woodstock
WASHINGTON
Front Royal
Bull Run
Alexandria
Manassas Jun.
Eastern Shore
Franklin
Patuxent R.
Chesapeake Bay
Potomac R.
Cedar Mt.
Rapidan
WILDERNESS
Fredericksburg
Princess Ann
Pt. Republic
Chancellorsville
Staunton
Gordonsville
Rappahannock R.
Charlottesville
N. Anna R.
Mattapony R.
VIRGINIA
S. Anna R.
James R.
Chickahominy R.
West Point
Richmond
Lynchburg
Appomattox C.H.
Appomattox
Williamsburg
Northampton
To Memphis
Burkesville
Petersburg
Yorktown
Five Forks
Fort Monroe
Hampton Roads
Portsmouth
Norfolk
Suffolk
Danville
Roanoke R.
Weldon
Built 1864
Greensboro'
Albemarle S.
Roanoke I.
Raleigh
Pamlico R.
NORTH CAROLINA
Goldsboro'
Pamlico Sound
C. Hatteras
Hatteras Inlet
Ocracoke Inlet
Newbern
To Wilmington
Beaufort
C. Lookout
Blue Ridge
Appalachian Mts.

Modest savior of his country resigns sword to Congress and returns to wife and baby at Cincinnati. Nominated by acclamation for President in 1864.

Yet McClellan did not employ the only methods that had the slightest chance of realizing these dreams: audacity, mobility, dash. His strategy throughout the campaign was determined not by his ambition, but by his inner perception of the true Union policy of cautious constriction. This first appeared in his allowing Confederate field-works extending across the Peninsula from Yorktown to hold his advance up for the entire month of April. For, as the Comte de Paris wrote, 'Thinking that the national cause could endure delays and slow movements, but not such another disaster as that of Bull Run, he preferred to rely upon the superiority of his artillery in order to dislodge the enemy from his lines.' 'Spades are trumps,' sneered McClellan's enemies.

4. *Lee and Jackson*

The Confederate government had been shaken out of its lethargy by Grant's capture of Fort Donelson. Its military organization had been improved by the President's appointment of Lee as his military adviser (13 March). Yet it was difficult to see how Richmond could be saved, certainly not by the theory of the bigger battalions. No men could be spared from the West, and at least 50,000 were held in the lower South by the thrusts and threats of Union expeditionary forces. Looking out from Richmond along the roads and waterways that led to the Union periphery, McClellan with over 100,000 men would soon be advancing up the York peninsula, and J. E. Johnston had less than 60,000 to oppose him. McDowell's corps of 40,000 was before Fredericksburg (21 April) with only 11,000 Confederates between him and McClellan's right flank. Banks with 20,000, having defeated Stonewall Jackson's 10,000 near Winchester, had apparently corked up the Shenandoah valley. Frémont with 15,000 was approaching the upper valley through the Appalachian passes, and only 3,000 Confederates faced him. Ewell's shuttle division of 8,000 Confederates was just east of the Blue Ridge. Upon Lee's advice President Davis on 16 April adopted the strategy of delaying McClellan before Yorktown until Jackson could confuse the Union forces in the Valley, threaten Harper's Ferry, and thus frighten the Union government into recalling McDowell's corps from its advanced position. On the same day the Confederate Congress adopted conscription. Of doubtful constitutionality, this courageous act drove a wedge between Davis and his state-rights critics, who feared that their precious theory was being done to death in the house of its friends. But conscription retained in the ranks the men who saved Richmond.

On 14 May, McClellan at last free from the Yorktown lines and within three days' march of Richmond, wired 'for every man the War Department can send, by water.' But Secretary Stanton ordered McDowell's corps to join the Army of the Potomac by land. It was destined never to reach him, and it made just the difference between victory and a drawn campaign. Lee, instead of recalling the scattered legions of the Confederacy to her capital, had the glorious audacity to use Jackson to neutralize three Union units, and to break up McClellan's plans by threatening Washington.

Stonewall Jackson, a stern and bearded puritan, brought to the Southern cause a mastery of the principles of strategy and a religious faith that enabled him to perform what seemed miracles to his enemies. The nucleus of his division was the 'Stonewall brigade' recruited in the Shenandoah valley, whose population, Unionist in the spring of 1861, as Jackson himself then had been, was now whole-hearted for the Southern cause. The valley itself, a long, rolling plateau of copses and cornfields, white wooden farmhouses and great red barns, was enclosed by the wooded ridges of the Appalachians and the Blue Ridge, through which numerous 'gaps' or passes offered innumerable combinations to the clever strategist; and Jackson knew every hole and corner of it. Although greatly outnumbered, he was faced by inferior generals: by Nathaniel P. Banks, promoted from the speakership of the House to a major-generalcy, and Frémont, the abolitionists' darling. Nor were the military deficiencies of these gentlemen made good by the efforts of Stanton to move them as upon a chess-board, from Washington.

Having neutralized Frémont on 8 May (Battle of McDowell), Jackson returned to the upper valley, got around behind Banks, crushed his outposts, almost cut his communications with Washington, administered a stinging defeat at Winchester, and sent him whirling north to the safe side of the Potomac (26 May). Washington was panic-stricken by Jackson's rapid advance, although shielded by double his numbers. Stanton, in a blue funk, telegraphed the governors of the loyal states, 'Enemy in great force advancing on

Washington'; and Lincoln did exactly what Lee intended him to do: on 25 May he recalled McDowell's corps, on the point of marching to join McClellan.

Jackson, after a feint at Harper's Ferry, doubled on his tracks, passed between his enemies' converging columns, and on two successive days, 8 and 9 June, whipped Frémont at Cross Keys and one of Banks's divisions at Port Republic. He was then ready to transfer his army to the York peninsula, while large Union forces remained immobile in the Valley, to protect Washington from another attack of nerves. In a few days McClellan would be on the defensive.

If McClellan had had the ordering of his campaign, he would have made his base on the James river (controlled by the Union navy since the *Monitor's* victory), instead of the Pamunkey. But in order to reach out to McDowell, he had to extend his army well to the north, and divide it. And after all, McDowell never came. On 31 May, when abnormal rainfall had flooded the sluggish Chickahominy to a zone of swirling waters, J. E. Johnston fell upon McClellan's two corps on the south bank. The pious Army of Northern Virginia doubtless expected that the Lord had delivered up the heathen to be stubble to their swords. But Johnston's orders were not well executed, he was severely wounded, and a part of Sumner's corps managed to cross the Chickahominy by swaying bridges and save the day.

After this battle of Fair Oaks (or Seven Pines), McClellan, true to his instinctive strategy of caution and constriction, dug himself into a stronger position, and waited for good weather to advance on Richmond, under cover of his superior artillery. By the testimony of his enemies his strategy was sound. 'We are engaged in a species of warfare at which we can never win,' Johnston had written Lee. 'It is plain that General McClellan will adhere to the system adopted by him last summer, and depend for success upon artillery and engineering.'

Lee, who succeeded the wounded Johnston as commander of the Army of Northern Virginia on 1 June, saw that McClellan must win Richmond if he were permitted to choose his own 'species of warfare.' The closing cordon must be broken. Accordingly, on 11 June, he ordered Jackson to sweep down from the Shenandoah upon McClellan's right flank while the Army of Northern Virginia attacked him in front. McClellan, warned by an untimely cavalry raid by J. E. B. Stuart, prepared a new base on the James river, and studied with his usual thoroughness the intervening terrain.

5. *The Seven Days' Battles*

McClellan's advance on Richmond, by positions, was timed for 25 June. The next day Lee took the initiative, and the great Seven Days' battles[3] began. Lee planned to crumple up McClellan's right, north of the Chickahominy, with A. P. Hill's and Jackson's divisions, to cut his communications with White House, harass his army front and rear, and force him either to retreat down the peninsula or to surrender. Superb strategy, but too ambitious for his army to execute. Neither his staff nor his commanders were yet equal to the task of executing an exact combination of several columns in a thickly wooded country. And the Jackson of the Seven Days was not the Jackson of the Valley. His delay in arriving at Mechanicsville (26 June) was probably due to a Sabbath halt to propitiate the God of Battles; but his failure to cross White Oak Swamp on the 30th is still a mystery.

After beating off the first attack on his extreme right at Mechanicsville (26 June), McClellan withdrew Fitz John Porter's corps, which occupied that wing of his army, to a much stronger position near Gaines' Mill. There the Union troops threw up hasty field entrenchments, that mark a stage in modern tactics; if spades were not yet trumps, they would be shortly. Against them, on the 27th, Lee developed his plan. The massed commands of Jackson, both Hills, and Longstreet (57,000) were hurled in line after line against the Union defenders (34,000), and at nightfall broke through.

Towards midnight McClellan made his great decision: to move his army by the left to the newly prepared base on the James. It was either that or retreat down the peninsula (which would have fitted Lee's plans exactly), or march round Lee's right towards Richmond. During the evening McClellan considered the possibility of this 'swing into Richmond,' and promptly dismissed it as offering not even a sporting chance of success. Richmond was not an open town that a hostile army could stroll into at will. The Army of the Potomac would have been placed in an impossible position, cut off by Lee from its base; and unless Lee made some colossal error, would have been surrounded and captured.[4] Again McClellan's instinct for cautious constriction won over his ardent desire to 'crush the rebellion at one blow'; and again his instinct was inspired. The distress that decision cost him, after the slaughter of Gaines' Mill, found vent in an unforgivable dispatch to Stanton: 'If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington.' To which Lincoln replied:

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[3] Mechanicsville (26 June), Gaines' Mill or first Battle of Cold Harbor (27th), Savage Station (29th), Frayser's Farm or Glendale (30th), Malvern Hill (1 July).

> 'Save your army, at all events. . . . I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you . . . neither you nor the government is to blame.'

On the night of 27–28 June McClellan withdrew his right across the Chickahominy, and began to move by the left, southward, to the James. Lee was completely baffled. His cavalry was sent sweeping eastward, to cut communications that were no longer there. During thirty precious hours the Confederate leader lost all touch and knowledge of an army of ninety thousand men, whose rear-guard was only a few hundred yards from his pickets, and whose van was within a few miles of his capital. Only at sunrise on the 29th did Lee discover that he had concentrated on empty camps and deserted entrenchments. Promptly he drafted another brilliant plan of concentration, but again his staff and his divisional commanders were unequal to the task. McClellan's manœuvre was conducted with the precision of a grand review. 'Throughout this campaign we attacked just when and where the enemy wished us to attack,' wrote D. H. Hill. The Army of the Potomac, 90,000 strong, with its trains of artillery, 5,000 wagons, and 2,500 beeves, marched by two narrow country roads, crossing the highways that led from Richmond, defending itself flank and rear in fierce bayonet encounters at Savage Station and Frayser's Farm (29–30 June) against Lee's pursuing army. On Malvern Hill (1 July), in a position carefully chosen by its commander, the Union army stood at bay, while Lee hurled his divisions without order or unity over artillery swept wheatfields, in a last desperate attempt to trap the host he had hoped to destroy. By the close of the second day of July, while Lee was withdrawing his decimated legions towards Richmond, the Army of the Potomac, with trains intact and morale unimpaired, was safe within its fortified base at Harrison's Landing on the James.

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[4] One of the most unaccountable things in Civil War literature is the persistent criticism of McClellan for not doing in 1862 what Grant, with infinitely superior means, was unable to do in 1864, after a battle on the identical ground of Gaines' Mill. Apparently the unwarranted expectation of 'crushing the rebellion' in 1862, and the disappointment at McClellan's getting so near Richmond without taking it, has continued to color Northern writings.

It was magnificent, and it was not a retreat. McClellan, outnumbered in effective force at the beginning of the Seven Days, had inflicted a superior loss on his adversaries.[5] His army was still full of fight, and ready to resume the advance on Richmond if properly reinforced. The summer was still young. McClellan entreated Lincoln, who visited Harrison's Landing on 9 July, to give him an opportunity to attack Richmond via Petersburg. But General Halleck (who had replaced Stanton in control of operations) pronounced this plan, by which Grant brought the war to an end, to be impracticable; and Lincoln feared that the Administration could no longer carry McClellan. The country had lost confidence in him, if the army had not. Politicians and public could see nothing save that Richmond was still in rebel hands after a costly campaign. Accordingly, on 3 August, Halleck ordered the Army of the Potomac back to the river gave it birth; and all the gains of the Peninsular Campaign were thrown away. Not for over two years did another Union army approach so near Richmond.

So ended the first grand campaign of the war. Lee by audacious strategy, Jackson by brilliant execution of Lee's orders, had taken full advantage of the enemy's mistakes, and saved Richmond. But Richmond alone was hardly worth the loss of 20,000 men; only the capture or destruction of the Army of the Potomac could have won Southern independence. McClellan too had been wanting; but he missed no such opportunity as that. Asked to do the impossible, he had saved his army, and with it the Union. Intuitively, almost unconsciously, he had adapted his strategy to the true Union policy of attrition. For all that, the Peninsular Campaign, so interesting a study from the point of view of military strategy and tactics, is one of the most beautiful illustrations of the futility of fighting. By August, 1862, the Union after immense effort and over a year's preparation, was not an inch nearer its goal in this theatre of the war than it had been a year before. And on the Southern side, if Lee and

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[5] Union effectives engaged, 91,169; Union loss (killed, wounded, and missing), 15,849. Confederate effectives engaged, 95,481; Confederate loss, 20,614. T. L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses,* p. 86.

Jackson could have foreseen future events and acted upon them (which being men of honor they could not possibly have done!) their best policy for their people would have been to have surrendered to McClellan their entire army and Richmond as well — especially if it could have been arranged to include all the Confederate ' fire-eaters ' in the bag. For if the war had ended that summer, the horrors of reconstruction could not have occurred, slavery would not have been abolished by violence, or Southern society gutted, and the South would have had some voice in whatever means of gradual emancipation might subsequently have been adopted. In a little while, President Lincoln would feel that he had more need of the moral forces represented by abolition, than of the border slave states: that God, after all, had a higher fighting value than Kentucky.

6. *Weighing the Imponderables*

The eight weeks that followed the Seven Days were pure sunshine for the Confederacy. Davis and Lee were masters of the situation. Although New Orleans was gone, Vicksburg kept in touch with the Far West; delegates from Arizona and the Indian Territory sat in the Confederate Congress. Morgan's brilliant cavalry raid through Kentucky, in July, seemed to prove that state ripe for Southern picking. With Chattanooga in Confederate hands railway communications were maintained with all parts of the republic, and thousands of replacements for Lee's army came pouring into Richmond. If the blockade was tightening, the Confederate cruiser *Florida,* built at Liverpool and armed at Nassau, was beginning to embarrass the blockaders; and on 28 July the *Alabama* left Liverpool for a cruise that proved equally costly for the American merchant marine and the British taxpayer.

'There is an all but unanimous belief that you *cannot* subject the South to the Union,' Cobden wrote Senator Sumner on 11 July, when news of the Seven Days' battles reached England. 'I feel quite convinced that unless cotton comes in considerable quantities before the end of the year, the governments of Europe will be knocking at your door.' The same day W. S. Lindsay, M.P., the largest shipowner and most active Southern partisan in Great Britain, introduced a motion for Franco-British mediation in the Civil War. On 16 July, at Vichy, Napoleon III listened graciously to John Slidell's offer of one hundred thousand bales of cotton if

France would denounce the blockade. The Emperor telegraphed to his foreign minister: 'Ask the English government if it does not think the moment has arrived to recognize the South.' Palmerston was still against recognition; but the cotton shortage was becoming more acute, and Lee's army was preparing to break through. 'The pinch has again passed by for the moment and we breathe more freely,' wrote Henry Adams from the London legation. In his opinion only victory, or a prompt and definite stand on the slavery question, could prevent interference.

For Lincoln the slavery question was somewhat more complicated than for a young Bostonian in the London legation. Lincoln always remembered what it seemed all the world had forgotten, that he was President of the United States — not of the Northern States. His policy in that respect was stated in the famous letter to Horace Greeley, of 22 August 1862:

> 'As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not meant to leave any one in doubt. I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be — "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery, and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views. I have here stated my purpose according to my view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.'

From the first advance into Southern territory, slaves of rebel owners had flocked into the Union lines, embarrassing both government and commanders, until the irrepressible Benjamin F. Butler declared them 'contraband of war.' The 'contrabands' were organized in labor battalions. Welfare workers and school teachers were provided to look after them in the several occupied portions of the

Southern coast where they congregated. Emancipation was not really a practical question, for wherever the Union armies penetrated, slavery dissolved; beyond their reach slavery would thrive whatever the United States might decide. But it was a burning question of politics, sentiment, and constitutional law.

On one hand the border states, sensitive on the subject of slavery, blocked proposals for compensated emancipation on which the President had set his heart. In April and June 1862 Congress finally carried out a party pledge by abolishing slavery in the District of Columbia and the territories. This failed to satisfy abolitionists who since the summer of 1861 had been trying to free all the slaves without compensation, and recruit them for the Union army.

An even larger question intruded: of what avail to restore the Union if slavery, the original cause of disruption, remained? James Russell Lowell expressed this admirably in his 'Biglow Paper' that appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* of June 1862. Hosea is conversing with the shade of his 'gret-gret-gret-gran'ther,' sometime colonel in the New Model Army:

> 'Hosee,' sez he, 'I think you're goin' to fail:
> The rettlesnake ain't dangerous in the tail;
> This 'ere rebellion's nothin' but the rettle, —
> You'll stomp on thet an' think you've won the bettle;
> It's Slavery thet's the fangs an' thinkin' head,
> An' ef you want selvation, cresh it dead, —
> An' cresh it suddin, or you'll larn by waitin'
> That Chance wun't stop to listen to debatin'.' —
> 'God's truth!' sez I, — 'An' ef *I* held the club,
> An' knowed jes' where to strike — but there's the rub!'

'The moment came,' said Lincoln, 'when I felt that slavery must die that the nation might live.' In the cabinet meeting on 22 July he proposed to declare that on the next New Year's Day all slaves in rebel territory would be free. Seward pointed out that such a proclamation at such a time would be interpreted as 'our last shriek on the retreat' from Richmond. Emancipation was then put aside to be a crown to the first victory.

Victory seemed well within reach that summer, if one merely counted the battalions; but Northern morale had been gravely impaired by McClellan's failure to take Richmond. There was a panic in Wall Street; and the gold dollar reached a seventeen per cent premium over paper, in mid-July, when Congress authorized a new issue of $150,000,000 in fiat money. Lincoln called upon the states for 300,000 volunteers for nine months. There were patriotic rallies at which ' John Brown's Body ' was set to new words, ' We are coming, Father Abraham, three hundred thousand more,' but less than 80,000 actually came, and they were organized in new nine-months' regiments instead of being used like the Confederate conscripts as permanent replacements.

Yet, if the situation had changed for the worse, Lincoln had attained new stature. Resolute in purpose and sure of vision he had always been; but often vacillating and uncertain in performance. From those anxious vigils at the White House during the Seven Days the perplexed, over-advised, and humble Lincoln emerged humble only before God, but the master of men. He seemed to have captured all the greater qualities of the great Americans who preceded him, without their defects: the poise of Washington without his aloofness, the mental audacity of Hamilton without his insolence, the astuteness of Jefferson without his indirection, the conscience of J. Q. Adams without his harshness, the democracy of Jackson without his ignorance, the magnetism of Clay without his vanity, the lucidity of Webster without his ponderousness; and fused them with a sincerity and magnanimity that were peculiarly his own.

7. *The Second Bull Run and Antietam*

From the Peninsular Campaign Lincoln had learned the folly of divided command and civilian direction; but the instruments of victory he had not yet found. On 11 July he relegated Stanton to his proper place as war minister, and summoned Halleck from the West to become General-in-Chief in control of operations. ' Old Brains ' Halleck, as the army called him, wrote excellent treatises on military science, but was helpless before actual problems. .

McClellan was still at Harrison's Landing, begging for reinforcements to attack Richmond by way of Petersburg; but Halleck withdrew his army by driblets to reinforce the War Department's favorite plan of an overland march on Richmond, covering Washington. To lead this advance, he summoned General John Pope, who had won some trifling successes on the Mississippi, but had the confidence of a Napoleon. Now was Lee's most precious opportunity to break the wall of steel that was closing about the Confederacy, to carry the war into the free states, and win peace and recognition on Northern soil. Again with Jackson's close co-operation in an audacious manœuvre, he got behind Pope, drew the Army of the Potomac into the spot he wanted, and badly defeated it in the Second Battle of Bull Run, or Manassas (29–30 August 1862). It was the neatest, cleanest bit of work that Lee and Jackson ever performed. Their irresistible combination of bold strategy and perfect tactics had undone the Union gains of an entire year in the Virginia theatre of war.

General Halleck, confounded by the rapid movements of the last few days, sat in the War Department, perpetually rubbing his elbows and gazing with watery eyes at a mounting pile of dispatches. One bright thought came, to summon McClellan, then a general without command at Alexandria. On 1 September, as the news from the front became more and more alarming, McClellan conferred with Halleck and the President. Early the next morning Lincoln, without consulting Halleck or his cabinet, placed McClellan in 'command of the fortifications of Washington, and of all the troops for the defence of the capital.' The general at once rode out to meet Pope's retreating army, and to receive the wild enthusiasm that his presence always inspired among troops.

In the meantime Lincoln faced his cabinet meeting. Stanton and Chase were vehement in their opposition to McClellan, and all their colleagues but Seward and Blair concurred. Lincoln admitted most of their allegations — but pointed out that no one else had the confidence of officers and men, or the ability to cope with so desperate a situation.

> 'In stating what he had done,' wrote Gideon Welles, 'the President was deliberate, but firm and decisive. His language and manner were kind and affectionate, especially toward two of the members who were greatly disturbed; but every person present felt that he was truly the chief, and every one knew his decision, though mildly expressed, was as fixed and unalterable as if given out with the imperious command and determined will of Andrew Jackson.'

When, three days later (5 September), news came that Lee was crossing the Potomac above Washington into Maryland, Lincoln verbally gave McClellan 'command of the forces in the field.'

Of many crises for the Union this was the most acute. With Virginia clear of invaders Lee was about to break through into the heart of the Union. In the West a Confederate offensive was undoing the work of Grant and Buell;[6] in England the sentiment for intervention was coming to a head.

Lee expected to win Maryland for the Confederacy; but his prime objective was the railway bridge over the Susquehanna at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Possession of that bridge and of the line of approach would come perilously near cutting the Union in two. It would leave Washington connected with the West only by the roundabout Hudson river and Great Lakes route. The victorious Southern army would be in a central position to attack Washington, Baltimore, or Philadelphia. President Davis, on Northern soil, would propose peace on the basis of Southern independence; and if Lincoln's government refused they would have to reckon with the people in the November election, and face the likelihood of foreign intervention. On 7 September the French minister at Washington informed Seward that in his opinion it was time to recognize the independence of the confederacy. Napoleon III was only waiting for English approval to do so; and the private correspondence of the English cabinet shows that they would be ready after the next Confederate victory.

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As they splashed through the fords of the Potomac the regimental bands of Lee's army played the stirring air in which an ardent citizen of Maryland implored his state to 'clothe her beauteous limbs with steel' and 'be the battle-queen of yore.'

Come, for thy shield is bright and strong,
  Maryland! My Maryland!
Come, for thy dalliance does thee wrong,
  Maryland! My Maryland!

But she did not come. Southern influence in Maryland extended little beyond Tidewater. The prudent farmers of the western counties were more impressed by the ragged uniforms of Lee's barefooted veterans than by his invitation to throw off their 'foreign yoke.' It was the harvest season in that rich Maryland piedmont. Orchards heavily fruited, well-stocked piggeries, and ripe 'roastin' ears' refreshed the foot-weary boys in gray, but tempted many to remain. Lee lost more men by desertion than he gained by recruiting.

[6] Kirby Smith had taken Lexington and was threatening Cincinnati; Braxton Bragg, Davis's favorite general, was racing Buell for Louisville; if he won, Kentucky might be secured for the Confederacy, and a Southern invasion of Ohio might follow.

Lee counted on McClellan taking weeks to reorganize; but McClellan's energy and personality worked miracles with Pope's defeated army. Within a week of Manassas he was marching on Frederick town with 70,000 men, followed by frantic telegrams from Halleck to the effect that Lee's move was a mere feint to draw him from Washington. But McClellan kept on, 'with a halter around his neck' — and the committee on the conduct of the war at the other end of the rope — for he had no formal written order to command the army in the field.

South Mountain, as the Blue Ridge is called where it crosses Maryland, separated the hostile armies. Sending his van to force the passes, McClellan sat his horse as in review by the roadside, pointing to where clouds of smoke showed that the battle of South Mountain had begun. Men and officers as they passed cheered themselves hoarse, falling out of ranks to touch and caress his charger Dan, and cry 'God bless you, Little Mac!' That day (14 September) South Mountain was carried. 'I thought I knew McClellan, but this movement of his puzzles me," exclaimed his West Point classmate, Stonewall Jackson. Lee knew what it meant, and hastened south from Hagerstown just in time to prevent the Union army interposing between his great lieutenant and himself. An over-careful reconnaisance by the Union commander gave Jackson time to cross the Potomac and join Lee on the 16th; but the reunited Army of Northern Virginia was fairly caught in a cramped position between Antietam Creek and the Potomac, where Lee had no room to perform those brilliant manœuvres that were his delight and the enemy's confusion. He had no alternative but to fight or to retreat, and he chose to fight.

The battle of the Antietam or Sharpsburg (17 September) was a series of desperate unco-ordinated attacks and equally desperate but skilful counter-attacks, that exhausted Lee's army but did not drive it from position. Although fresh reserves were available, McClellan refused to renew the battle the next day, as Grant or Sherman would certainly have done under like circumstances. Without further pressure from him, Lee recrossed the Potomac into Virginia on the night of 18 September. The crisis was ended.

Antietam was the most nearly decisive battle of the Civil War. It might have been really decisive if McClellan had attacked more promptly, combined his attacks properly, and held on persistently. Two years and a half more elapsed before the war closed, but the

Confederacy was never so near independence as on that bloody day in the Maryland hills. Thereafter, if the Northern will to victory could be maintained, Union victory was inevitable. A better general might have destroyed Lee's army; but McClellan by his restoration of morale to the army, by his prompt divination of the enemy's plans, and his brave assumption of responsibility in the absence of precise orders, had frustrated Lee's campaign and parried the most serious thrust at his country's heart. Antietam averted foreign recognition of the Confederacy; and by giving Lincoln the opportunity he sought to issue the Emancipation Proclamation, it brought the liberal opinion of the world to his side.

8. *Forever Free*

It was on the 22nd of September, five days after Antietam, that Lincoln opened a momentous cabinet meeting by reading Artemus Ward's 'High-handed Outrage in Uticy.' The President had not summoned his cabinet for their advice, so he told them. He had made a covenant with God to free the slaves as soon as the rebels were driven out of Maryland; God had decided on the field of Antietam. His mind was fixed, his decision made. Blair and Bates, both from border slave states, thought the moment inopportune; the President reminded them that for months he had urged their states to take the initiative in emancipation. He must now take the forward movement. In the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation the President, by virtue of his power as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, declared that upon the 1st of January 1863 all slaves within any state or district then in rebellion against the United States, 'shall be, then, thenceforward, and forever free.'

This proclamation, potentially more revolutionary in human relationships than any event in American history since 1776, lifted the Civil War to the dignity of a crusade. But it was very slow to influence public opinion; and only a complete Union victory could give it practical effect. The South, indignant at what she considered an invitation to the slaves to cut their masters' throats, was nerved to greater effort. The Northern armies received from it no new impetus. The Democratic party, presenting it to the Northern people as proof that abolitionists were responsible for the duration of the war, obtained signal gains in the autumn elections. Julia Ward Howe saw in it the glory of the coming of the Lord; but many radicals and abolitionists received it as a tardy surrender to themselves. In England and Europe the proclamation was greeted by liberals and radicals with joy, but by most people with contempt, as a flat political manœuvre. Only by degrees did public opinion at home and abroad perceive that the cause of American Union had been definitely fused with that of human liberty.

Antietam did not alter the opinion held by almost every member of Palmerston's ministry that the Union could never conquer the South; but it did convince every member of the cabinet save Gladstone that the moment was inopportune for intervention. Joint mediation between North and South, which Lord John Russell began to advocate after the second Bull Run, died in the hands of his colleagues by the end of October. A more concrete proposal from Napoleon III, that England, France, and Russia should join in proposing an armistice and lifting the blockade for six months, was definitely rejected by the British Cabinet on 13 November. So passed the second and great crisis in foreign relations.

9. *Fredericksburg*

Lee's Army of Northern Virginia retreated up the Shenandoah valley in a demoralized condition. 'The absent are scattered broadcast over the land,' Lee wrote the Secretary of War, on 23 September. 'There is great dereliction of duty among the regimental and company officers, and unless something is done the army will melt away.' And the invasion of Kentucky had proved as disappointing as that of Maryland; the spirit of Henry Clay was too strong. 'Unless a change occurs soon, we must abandon the garden spot of Kentucky to its cupidity,' wrote Braxton Bragg on 25 September. On 8 October Buell won a western Antietam, at Perryville; and Bragg retreated to middle Tennessee.

Public opinion in the North was less grateful to McClellan for what he had done than indignant because he had let Lee escape. On 6 October Lincoln ordered McClellan to 'cross the Potomac and give battle to the enemy, or drive him South.' Instead of moving at once, McClellan began to clamor for supplies and clothing and to bandy words with the President. The prospect of another winter of bickering and procrastination was more than Lincoln thought the Union cause could stand. And the fall elections had begun. Towards the end of October Lincoln decided that if McClellan permitted Lee to get between him and Richmond, McClellan must go. Lee did just that; and on 7 November the President relieved McClellan of command of the Army of the Potomac, and appointed Burnside in his place.

That ended forever the military career of the Union general of whom Lee afterwards said that he was the ablest of his opponents 'by all odds.' The reasons for Lincoln's action are clear; the consequences are no less certain. It was the greatest mistake Lincoln ever made. On the morrow of victory the Army of the Potomac was deprived of its beloved commander, then fast learning the art of offensive strategy, and was sent to useless sacrifice under a general distinguished for manners and side-whiskers, who had already proved his incompetence as a corps commander at the Antietam. And Halleck was still General-in-Chief.

Burnside reverted to the old plan of a 'covering advance' on Richmond, from a base behind the Rappahannock opposite Fredericksburg. As Johnston had done in March, so Lee and Jackson now hastened across Northern Virginia, and before Burnside had obtained the means of crossing, were posted on the south bank of the Rappahannock, on the wooded heights above Fredericksburg. There, on 13 December, they met an attack by Burnside that presented the most inspiring spectacle and the most useless slaughter of the Civil War. Six times the Union infantry — long double lines of blue, bright national and regimental colors, bayonets gleaming in the sun — pressed on across an open plain, completely covered by the Confederate artillery and entrenched riflemen, to the stone wall at the foot of Marye's heights. Six times the survivors were hurled back, leaving seven thousand killed and wounded lying literally in heaps. 'Your soldier's heart almost stood still as he watched those sons of Erin fearlessly rush to their death' General Pickett wrote his wife. 'The brilliant assault on Marye's Heights of their Irish Brigade was beyond description. Why, my darling, we forgot they were fighting us, and cheer after cheer at their fearlessness went up all along our lines.' 'It is well this is so terrible!' said Lee, as he watched the battle; 'we should grow too fond of it.'

10. *Political Intrigue*

The South hoped that this battle would end the war; but the Fredericksburg position was not one from which Lee could pursue the enemy with profit. Yet to many loyal men in the North it must have seemed, as it did to an English war correspondent, that the day of Fredericksburg would be a memorable one to the historian of the decline and fall of the American Republic. Elections in October and November to the new House of Representatives had increased the Democratic delegation from 44 to 75 members. New York elected a Democratic governor by 10,000 majority; Pennsylvania, Republican by 60,000 in 1860, went Democratic by 4,000 in 1862. Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois — Lincoln's own state — together returned 33 Democrats and only 11 Republicans to the new House; and in this number were several of the so-called 'copperheads,' the pro-Southern defeatists. Only in New England and the trans-Mississippi West did the Emancipation Proclamation seem to strike a responsive note; those regions and (strangely enough) the border slave states saved the Republican majority.

Instead of being drawn more closely to the President by emancipation and misfortune, the radicals were still his bitterest enemies. A few days after Fredericksburg, the Republican members of Congress held a caucus, and on Senator Sumner's proposal appointed a committee of seven radicals to call on the President and demand a change of men and measures. Seward must go, for Seward was the friend of McClellan; and the jealous Chase, angling for the Presidency in 1864, had convinced his friends in Congress that Seward was the cause of all the nation's woes. That night the President confided his distress to an intimate friend, Senator Browning, 'We are now on the brink of destruction. It appears to me the Almighty is against us, and I can hardly see a ray of hope.'

Apparently, Lincoln must choose between yielding to the radicals by sacrificing the indispensable Seward, and defying the Republican party by expelling Chase. He must, in derogation of established constitutional practice, allow Congress to choose his cabinet, or separate himself wholly from Congress. Either horn of the dilemma would entail disaster. Browning told him that the game was to surround him by a radical cabinet. 'The President said with a good deal of emphasis that he was master, and that they should not do that.'

Seward promptly offered his resignation. Holding it in his pocket, Lincoln confronted the visiting committee with all his cabinet but Seward. Questions were asked. Chase, who had been the tale-bearer, wriggled and squirmed, but in the presence of his colleagues said that the cabinet was harmonious. The committee retired convinced that Chase had lied; still they would have Seward's scalp. In the hope of recovering their confidence and support, Chase proffered his resignation to the President. Lincoln, his eye lighting up, almost snatched the paper from his secretary's hesitating hand. Laughing, he exclaimed with a graphic frontier metaphor, 'Now I can ride! I have got a pumpkin in each end of my bag.' He wrote identical letters to both secretaries, refusing to accept their resignations; and both resumed their duties. Lincoln was master indeed.

To crown this eventful year there only remained for Lincoln to issue the definite Emancipation Proclamation, which faint-hearted Union men had urged him to postpone indefinitely. In anticipation, on New Year's eve, pro-Union meetings were held in several English cities, and stout resolves were passed that heartened the President and his people. 'The erasure of that foul blot upon civilization and Christianity — chattel slavery — during your Presidency will cause the name of Abraham Lincoln to be honored and revered by posterity,' declared a meeting of six thousand working men at Manchester, the city which suffered most from the Union blockade. To which Lincoln replied on 19 January 1863: 'I know and deeply deplore the sufferings which the working men at Manchester, and in all Europe are called to endure in this crisis. . . . Under the circumstances, I cannot but regard your decisive utterances upon the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country. It is indeed an energetic and reinspiring assurance of the inherent power of truth and of the ultimate and universal triumph of justice, humanity and freedom. I do not doubt that the sentiments you have expressed will be sustained by your great nation; and, on the other hand, I have no hesitation in assuring you that they will excite admiration, esteem and the most reciprocal feeling of friendship among the American people. I hail this interchange of sentiment, therefore, as an augury that whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which now exist between the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual.'

XXXIII

BEHIND THE LINES

1861–1865

1. *Liberty in War Time*

IN the cabinet crisis of December 1862, only Lincoln's astuteness saved him from becoming a mere premier, instead of a President. As it happened, Lincoln wielded a greater power throughout the war than any other chief magistrate, not excepting Wilson; a wider authority than any English-speaking ruler between Cromwell and Lloyd George. Contemporary accusations against him of tyranny and despotism are strange reading to those who know his character, but not to students of his administration. If Lincoln was the ideal tyrant of whom Plato dreamed, he was none the less a dictator from the standpoint of American constitutional law and practice; and even the safety of the republic would not justify some of the acts committed under his authority. President Davis is open to the same charge. In the Confederacy, as in the United States, there were many men of high standing and character who preferred to risk defeat at the hands of the enemy rather than submit to an arbitrary government by their own President.

The war power of the President as commander-in-chief of the army and navy is, in practice, limited only by public opinion and the courts. At the very beginning of the war, Lincoln of his own authority called for enlistments not yet sanctioned by Congress, declared the blockade, and suspended the writ of habeas corpus in parts of Maryland. The first assumption of power was shortly legalized by Congress, the second by the Supreme Court; but Chief Justice Taney protested in vain against executive suspension of the famous writ (*ex parte* Merryman). At the same time military officers, acting under orders from the State or the War Department, began to arrest persons suspected of disloyalty or espionage, and to confine them without trial in military prisons, for indefinite terms. Lincoln could not afford to indulge a meticulous reverence for the

Constitution when the Union was crumbling; but the power he asserted was grossly abused. A loyal mayor of Baltimore, suspected of Southern sympathies, was arrested and confined in a fortress for over a year; a Maryland judge who had charged a grand jury to inquire into illegal acts of government officials was set upon by a provost marshal's guard while his court was in session, beaten and dragged bleeding from his bench, and imprisoned for six months; a former Congressman from Ohio, seventy years old, was arrested in his home by military authority, for alleged 'discouragement of enlistments.' His constituents elected him to the state legislature while in prison.

Simultaneously with the Emancipation Proclamation, the President issued an order that seemed to deny to white citizens the liberty he proposed to accord to negro slaves. He proclaimed that all persons resisting the draft, discouraging enlistment, or 'guilty of any disloyal practice affording aid and comfort to rebels' would be subject to martial law, tried by court martial, and denied the writ of habeas corpus. Under this proclamation, over thirteen thousand persons were arrested and confined by military authority, for offences ranging from the theft of government property to treason. Earlier in 1862 — only a few days after he had scathingly denounced Lincoln's tyranny — President Davis obtained from his Congress the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and promptly did so in Richmond and other places, where equally arbitrary and unjust proceedings occurred.

Undoubtedly the provocation was great, especially in the North, where opposition to the war was open, organized, and active in almost every state. One of the most delicate and difficult subjects with which both Lincoln and Davis had to deal was the peace movement. On both sides it included doctrinaire pacifists and defeatists; but the great body was composed of sincere persons who, if Northerners, believed that the Union could be restored, or if Southerners, that independence could be established, by negotiation: that only the obstinacy of Lincoln, or the ambition of Davis, prevented peace. The 'copperheads,' as the Northern opponents to the war were called, held a great mass-meeting in Lincoln's home town, on 17 June 1863. They resolved 'that a further offensive prosecution of this war tends to subvert the Constitution and the Government,' and proposed 'a national Convention to settle upon terms of peace, which should have in view the restoration of the Union as it was.'

In North Carolina over one hundred peace meetings were held within two months after Gettysburg, in order to promote negotiations for reunion. On both sides the defeatists organized secret societies. In the North the 'Knights of the Golden Circle' harassed loyal households by midnight raids and barn-burnings; in the South the 'Heroes of America' gave aid and comfort to the enemy.

Neither the Union nor the Confederate government made any systematic effort to suppress these organizations: they were too formidable. In Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, where treason flourished side by side with the most stalwart loyalty, General Burnside attempted repression in 1863 with slight success. In a general order he declared, 'The habit of declaring sympathy for the enemy will not be allowed in this department.' For violation of this order, in a campaign speech, a prominent copperhead named Vallandigham was arrested, tried by a military commission, and sentenced to confinement for the duration of the war. Lincoln humorously altered the sentence to banishment, and Vallandigham was dumped within the military lines of the Confederacy. He received *in absentia* the Democratic nomination for Governor of Ohio, and conducted a campaign for peace and reunion from Canadian soil, although his unwilling Confederate hosts had made it perfectly clear that they would accept peace only with independence. After the war was over the Supreme Court took cognizance of a very similar case (*ex parte* Milligan), and declared in unmistakable terms that neither the Constitution nor any usage of war would sanction the military trial of a civilian in districts where the civil courts were open.

Personal liberty, freedom of speech, and of the press, were subject to a far more arbitrary control under this military régime during the Civil War than during the World War. Yet no one who has studied the administration of Lincoln, and lived through the second administration of Wilson, can doubt that pacifists, conscientious objectors, the outspoken press, and critics of the government, fared better under the earlier President. The Espionage Act of 1917, administered by a Department of Justice with a corps of paid spies and volunteer informers, enforced by judges and juries often maddened with war propaganda, was much more drastic in its effect and unjust in its operation than the courts martial of 1861–65. Throughout the Civil War active disloyalty was effectively dealt with wherever it raised its head; but there was no censorship of the press (although

Burnside for a time stopped the circulation of the New York *World* and the Cincinnati *Inquirer* in his department), and discussion of war aims and peace terms was seldom hindered. Hardly a Northern community lacked a few 'unterrified Democrats' who maintained with impunity that Jeff Davis was a better man than Abe Lincoln, that secession was legitimate, and the Union forever dissolved. Sentences of the courts martial were comparatively mild, and offenders were pardoned promptly with the coming of peace; while sentences of twenty years and over were not uncommon during the World War, and pardons were difficult to obtain after it was over.

2. *Northern Industry and Westward Expansion*

It was an article of faith among subjects of King Cotton that Northern industry, cut off from its Southern markets and its supply of fibre, would collapse. On the contrary, Northern industry grew fat and saucy during the war. Union sea-power maintained the routes to foreign markets; the waste of war stimulated production. In Philadelphia alone 180 new factories were built during the years 1862–4. The government, generous in its contracts and lavish in expenditure, helped to create a new 'shoddy aristocracy' of profiteers, who became masters of capital after the war. Paper money and the high protective tariff that Congress imposed as a counterweight to internal taxation brought a sharp rise of prices, which the government made no effort to control. Owing to the relatively slight development of labor unions, wages did not rise in the same proportion,[1] and the salaried classes suffered considerably. After the middle of 1862 enough cotton was obtained from the occupied parts of the South, and even from Liverpool, to reopen many of the cotton mills. Indeed the only essential Northern industry that suffered from the war was the carrying trade. Only 257 American merchantmen were accounted for by Confederate cruisers, but many more took foreign registry to escape capture; and with the diversion of the better ships into government service, the share of foreign bottoms in American trade greatly increased.

In many ways the drain of men into the army and navy was compensated. Immigration never reached the high record of 1854 until twenty years later; but the total for the five war years was almost eight hundred thousand. Labor-saving devices, invented before the war, were now generally applied. The Howe sewing-machine proved a boon to the clothing manufacturer, and a curse to the poor seamstress, whose wage dropped to eight cents an hour in 1864. The Gordon McKay machine for sewing uppers to shoe-soles actually speeded up that process one hundred-fold, and revolutionized the industry. Petroleum, discovered in Pennsylvania in 1859, was so rapidly extracted that the production increased from 84,000 to 128,000,000 gallons in three years; and refining methods were so rapidly improved that kerosene in cheap glass lamps had begun to replace candles and whale oil by 1865.

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[1] Average prices rose 117 per cent, 1860–65; average wages 43 per cent.

Like causes speeded up the revolution in American agriculture. The mechanical reaper, hitherto confined to the better prairie farms, came into general use, giving every harvest hand fivefold his former capacity with scythe and cradle. The annual pork pack almost doubled, the annual wool clip more than tripled between 1860 and 1865. Westward migration and the opening up of new prairie wheatfields were greatly stimulated by the passage of the Homestead Act in 1862, after almost forty years' agitation by agrarians and pioneers. Under this law the Federal government offered a quarter-section of public land (160 acres) free to any bona fide settler. Fifteen thousand homesteads, including two million and a half acres, were thus given away during the war. Every autumn brought bumper crops of wheat and corn, while Europe suffered a succession of poor harvests. England, deprived of her normal sources of food supply, turned to the United States, whence her imports of wheat and flour in 1862 bulked fifty times what they had been in 1859. Although the lack of cotton threw many English factory operatives out of work, it was evident that any attempt to break the blockade, and consequently fight the United States, would bring the British Isles face to face with starvation. 'Old King Cotton's dead and buried, brave young Corn is King,' went the refrain of a popular song.

Apart from this westward extension of prairie farming, the normal development of the Far West continued during the Civil War. Colorado, the goal of the 'Pike's Peak or Bust' gold rush in 1859, was organized as a territory in 1861; and with the reorganization of Dakota and Nevada Territories the same year, no part of the United States, on paper at least, was any longer outside the dominion of law. Kansas became a state of the Union in 1861, as soon as Congress lost its Southern delegation; and Nevada was admitted prematurely in 1864, because the Republicans thought they needed its electoral vote. At least three hundred thousand emigrants crossed the plains to California, Oregon, and the new territories during the war — some to farm, others to seek gold, and many to escape the draft.

In general, the normal growth and activity of a civilized community continued in the North, without abatement. The cities increased in wealth and population. Enrolment in the universities hardly decreased beyond the loss of Southern students, although in some of the Western colleges the undergraduates enlisted in a body for short tours of service. Fifteen new colleges, including Cornell, Swarthmore, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, were founded in war time, and numerous bequests and new buildings were obtained by the older institutions. The Harvard-Yale boat-races, interrupted in 1861, were resumed in 1864, while Grant was besieging Petersburg, and not a single member of either crew enlisted.

3. *Conscription, North and South*

Northern prosperity was even great enough to clog the machinery of war. Yet the bountiful harvests and boundless opportunities for profiteering were no such detriment to recruiting as political blundering. Lincoln, having allowed Stanton to dismantle the new federal recruiting service before the Peninsular Campaign, had to appeal to the states to raise 'three hundred thousand more' on 2 July 1862; and the states, even by drafting from their own militia, produced less than eighty-eight thousand men, organized in new regiments and enlisted for nine months. Replacements for veteran regiments simply could not be obtained. Yet Congress flinched from a national conscription. During the winter of 1862–3 it became evident that unless these scruples were surmounted, the game was up; and Congress on 3 March 1863 passed the first United States Conscription Act.

It was a most imperfect law, a travesty of conscription act. All men between the ages of 20 and 45 were declared liable to military service, and had to be registered. As men were needed, the number was divided among the loyal states in proportion to their total population, and subdivided among districts, giving credit for previous enlistments. In the first draft (1863) these credits wiped out the liability of most of the Western states, which had been most forward in volunteering. Between each subsequent call and the actual draft, every state and district had fifty days' grace to furnish its revised quota by volunteering, after which the balance was obtained by drafting men on the registered lists. No attempt was made to levy first on the younger men or bachelors, and instead of exempting specified classes such as ministers and supporters of families, money payment was made the basis of exemption. One could commute service in a particular draft upon payment of three hundred dollars; or evade service during the entire war by procuring a substitute to enlist for three years — no matter if the substitute died the next month, or deserted the next day.[2] A system so inequitable to the poor was unpopular everywhere; and in the working-class quarters of New York the first drawing of names in 1863 was the signal for terrible riots.

Apparently the Irish-Americans of New York, always hostile to the negro, were disaffected by the Emancipation Proclamation, and inflamed by the importation of ' contrabands ' to break a stevedores' strike. On 13 July, while the names were being drawn, the provost marshal was driven from his office by a mob. Men, women, and boys paraded the streets during the better part of four days and nights, sacking shops, gutting saloons, burning mansions, lynching and torturing every negro who fell into their clutches. The police — who also for the most part were Irish-Americans — did their best, but it was not until troops were poured into the city that order was restored, after the loss of hundreds of lives. This was equivalent to a Confederate victory, for Meade's army was so weakened by detachments for guard duty in northern cities, that he was unable to take the offensive against Lee after Gettysburg. In fact, although there were three more drafts after the first, a very small proportion of the Union army was furnished by direct conscription, as the subjoined table shows.[3] Every fresh draft began an ignoble competition between districts to reduce their quotas by fictitious credits, and to fill the residue by bounty-fed volunteers. As recruits were credited to the district where they enlisted, and not to that of their residence, several wealthy communities escaped the draft altogether by purchasing cannon-fodder in the poorer country districts. These were left with only fathers of families and physical rejects to fill subsequent drafts — which, therefore, were not filled at all. Professional bounty-brokers so covered the country with their network that it was difficult for anyone to get into service without passing through their clutches; and as the state bounties or individual substitution fees were paid cash down, the brokers often induced the recruits they furnished to desert at the first opportunity, and re-enlist elsewhere. 'Bounty jumpers' enlisted and deserted, ten, twenty, even thirty times, before being apprehended.[4] Brokers had their crimps in Canada, offering fabulous bounties that were never paid, kidnapping civilians, and tempting soldiers of the British garrison to desert — there were almost 50,000 Canadian enlistments in the Union army. State agents scoured occupied portions of the South for negroes, and obtained shiploads of men from the poorhouses of Belgium and Germany, all of whom were credited to their

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[2] The system was so complicated that certain exceptions to these broad statements must be noted. (*a*) The basis of the quota was changed from total population to population registered for service, after the first draft. (*b*) Naval enlistments were not credited in the first draft. (*c*) In the first draft the married men over thirty-five were not to be drafted until all others had been called out; but there was no such distinction in later drafts. (*d*) From all the drafts exemption was granted to sole supporters of aged parents and eldest brothers in large families of young children, but not to supporters of families as such. Physical disability was the principal cause for exemption. (*e*) The commutation privilege was abolished for all but religious conscientious objectors by Act of 24 February 1864, but such objectors had to serve in some non-combatant branch.

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[3] The following table is compiled from the final report of the Provost-Marshal-General (1866), 39*th Cong.*, 1*st Sess.*, *House Exec. Docs.*, iv, part i, pp. 43–213 and 3 *O. R.* v. 732–9.

Draft of	1863 *July.*	1864 14 *Mar.*	1864 18 *July.*	1864 19 *Dec.*
Number called for	700,000		500,000	300,000
Reduced by credits to	407,092		234,327	300,000
Names drawn	292,441	113,446	231,918	139,024
Failed to report	39,415	27,193	66,159	28,477
Examined	252,566	84,957	138,536	46,128
Exempted for physical disability, &c.	164,855	39,952	82,531	28,631
Exempted by paying commutation	52,288	32,678	1,298	460
Substitutes furnished by registered men	84,733		29,584	12,997
Substitutes furnished by draftees	26,002	8,911	28,502	10,192
Draftees held to personal service	9,881	3,416	26,205	6,845
Voluntary enlistments	489,462		188,172	157,058
Total number obtained	537,672 *		272,463	187,092

* The excess, 130,579, credited to call of 18 July 1864.

[4] The United States Provost-General, Fry, estimated total desertions from the Union army at 201,397 — approximately one to every seven enlistments. Desertions from the Confederate army totalled 104,428, or one to every nine enlistments.

state quotas. Federal officials were bribed to admit cripples, idiots, and criminals as recruits. One can easily imagine the effect on the morale of a veteran regiment which received replacements of this class.

The success of the Union conscription, however, is not to be measured by the very small number of actual draftees obtained, or the large proportion of deserters, but by the enormous number of volunteers obtained under pressure. Unquestionably the average quality of both armies deteriorated as the war dragged on; but the men who followed Grant through the Wilderness and Sherman to Atlanta will compare well with any soldiers of modern times for courage, discipline, and tenacity.

Compared with the Union, the Confederacy was a nation in arms. During four years, war was its only business. Fighting for independence and race supremacy, the Southerners gave their government more, and asked of it less, than did the Northern people. Yet the glamor of a lost cause and the reticence of Southern writers have until recently obscured the part that selfishness, indifference, and defeatism played in losing it. Not that there was any Union party in the Confederacy, outside the mountainous regions — where no Confederate conscription officer dared show his face — but there was inveterate provincialism and widespread ignorance, and withal a certain shrewd instinct on the part of the poor whites that it was 'a rich man's war and a poor man's fight.'

The Union system of conscription was simply a series of requisitions on the states, differing from that of the War of Independence because it was administered and enforced by national authority. The Confederate system was, in theory, a *levée en masse* of Southern manhood between the ages of 18 and 35. Yet, instead of promoting solidarity, it fomented class antagonism. Originally adopted (April 1862) in order to obtain replacements, and retain in the ranks all men whose terms of enlistment were expiring, it was generally regarded as a mere temporary expedient of doubtful constitutionality. There was no answer to Senator Foote's question, 'If agents of the Confederate Government had the right to go into any state and take therefrom the men belonging to that state, how were state rights and state sovereignty to be maintained?' Most state courts supported the law, even quoting decisions of Chief Justice Marshall. But others did not. The Chief Justice of North Carolina even discharged two deserters who killed a man when resisting capture, on the ground that a state had nothing to do with enforcing Confederate conscription! Although the law granted exemptions to ministers, conscientious objectors, railway employees, postmen, apothecaries, teachers, and the like, South Carolina of her own sovereign authority proceeded to extend the privilege, and to assert the right of nullification in 1862 as roundly as in 1832. Congress was frightened into adding millers, blacksmiths, editors, printers, and plantation overseers, at the rate of one to every twenty slaves, to the already numerous classes of exempts; whereupon there arose a mighty clamor from the democracy, especially against the 'twenty-nigger' provision, and the privilege of substitution. So much fraud and skulking developed that Congress swung in the other direction until the Confederate war department had to supply labor for essential industries by details from the army. Substitution was stopped towards the close of 1863, when the price of a substitute had reached six thousand paper dollars. Early in 1864 the Confederate Congress cut down exemptions and extended the age of military service to seventeen and fifty.

No Southern city was disgraced by draft riots like that of New York, but fraud and evasion were widespread, and many of the remoter districts of the South were terrorized by armed bands of deserters and draft-dodgers, who waged a successful guerrilla warfare against the troops sent to apprehend them. President Lincoln on 10 March 1863 proclaimed amnesty to all absentees without leave who would return to the colors within the month. In June, when the percentage of absentees in the Confederate army was approaching thirty per cent, President Davis extended a similar invitation to them. So few came in that the offer of twenty days' grace was repeated shortly after Gettysburg, and accompanied by a lurid description of Union war aims. The President was right in his contention that the South was invincible if every man liable to service would do his duty.

4. *The South in War Time*

In 1863 many thousand Southerners began to feel the pinch of poverty, and as the war dragged on many more came face to face with starvation. Yet the South was an agricultural country, and the production of food steadily rose as an increasing proportion of the cotton fields were planted with corn and wheat. There was no lack of labor, for the slaves remained loyal and at work, unless a Union army appeared in the neighborhood. Only transportation was wanting.

Railway transportation was the weak point in the Confederate economic organization, comparable to state rights in its political system. Numerous local lines of varying gauges converged on market towns and seaports. Through traffic, which hardly existed in the South before the war, encountered many 'bottle-necks' and breaks — as in Petersburg, Lynchburg, Knoxville, Chattanooga, and Raleigh — where freight had to be carted from one station to another. The government was slow to assert control over railroads, and although Congress appropriated money to construct missing links, little was done. The few rolling mills and foundries were too busy with government work to replace outworn equipment. Main lines could be kept going only by using the rolling-stock and tearing up the rails of branch lines; junctions became congested with supplies, and breakdowns were frequent. That is why there were bread-riots in Richmond when the barns of the Valley were bursting with wheat; why government clerks had to pay fifteen dollars a bushel for corn that was bringing the farmer only one dollar in southwestern Georgia.

The ruling class in the South, which had most at stake, gave all it had to the cause. In the North able-bodied young men of means and position could buy substitutes without incurring social stigma; in the South the women saw to it that there were no gentlemen slackers. The patriotism of the Southern women was only equalled by their devotion. Left in charge of plantations they had to direct the necessary changes from cotton-raising to the production of food, to revive obsolete household industries such as spinning, weaving, and dyeing, to extract nitrates from the earth of cellars and smoke-houses, to care for wounded soldiers, and feed passing armies. It was the Southern women who

> Made courage from terror and bread from bran
> And propped the South on a swansdown fan
> Through four long years of ruin and stress,
> The pride — and the deadly bitterness.[5]

[5] Benét, *John Brown's Body,* Book iv.

5. *War Welfare Work*

The Union was more conspicuous for organized service than for individual sacrifice. Following the experience of Florence Nightingale and the British Sanitary Commission in the Crimean War, a number of public-spirited citizens organized the United States Sanitary Commission at the beginning of the Civil War. As an auxiliary to the Army Medical Corps, the Sanitary Commission fitted up hospital ships, organized hospital units and kept them supplied; taught company officers how to care for their men, sent men and women to nurse the wounded at the front, supplied the soldiers with clothing, comforts, and welcome additions to their abundant but unvaried army rations of bread, beef, and coffee. Clara Barton, later the founder of the American Red Cross, and Dorothea Dix were active in this work. There was also a United States Christian Commission which deluged the army with Bibles, tracts, and patriotic song-books, and supplied a certain number of coffee bars and reading rooms. If the boys in blue and the boys in gray obtained less aid and attention than the combatants of the World War, they expected less; and their standard of comfort was lower. Compared with any earlier conflict the amount and variety of volunteer organized non-combatant service was unprecedented.[6]

6. *War Finance*

Both governments attempted to finance the war by loans and taxes; both resorted to indirect taxation by fiat money. Neither Secretary Chase nor Secretary Memminger rose above mediocrity as ministers of war finance. Chase's earliest expedient of importance was an issue of 7.3 per cent three-year gold notes, to which the Northern banks subscribed liberally. The Treasury then sucked away their specie reserves to such an extent that they were forced to suspend specie payments at the end of 1861. Congress was able to devise nothing better, although William P. Fessenden, chairman of the Senate committee on finance, learned enough to make him a competent successor to Chase. The customs duties were raised; an income-tax, with rates varying between three and ten per cent, was levied; bonds were issued in small denominations, and eagerly subscribed; and in July 1862 a comprehensive scheme of internal taxation was imposed. 'No other nation,' said the London *Economist,* 'would have endured a system of excise duties so searching, so effective or troublesome.' System, however, there was none, since Chase was unable to guide Congress, and Congress could not force Chase. During the fiscal year between 1 July 1862 and 30 June 1863 the government received 111 millions from taxation, and 175 millions from bonds; but spent 715 millions; it was not until 1864 that taxation became sufficiently heavy to meet one-third of the government's expenditure. That it did reach this proportion was a matter of astonishment to foreign governments; and a tribute to the strength of popular government.

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[6] Most of the army nurses in the Civil War were men; Walt Whitman has related his nursing experiences in his *Specimen Days* and other writings.

The deficiency was made up in part by various forms of government paper, but chiefly by inflation. Legal tender notes, the famous greenbacks, were authorized by Congress, against the wishes of Chase and of Wall Street, in February 1862.[7] Gold had already disappeared; silver and copper followed as the greenbacks depreciated to thirty-five cents on the gold dollar. 'Shinplasters' — fractional paper currency, in denominations as low as three cents — had to be issued. The greenbacks rallied to seventy-eight cents on the gold dollar after Lee's surrender, but did not reach parity until 1879.

As legal tender for all debts and payments the greenbacks were fiat money pure and simple. Dan Shays was justified; Bill Bryan portended. Their influence on the financial standards of the nation was deep and pernicious. Their adoption so early in the war was a gesture at Wall Street rather than a necessity, although the initial errors of Chase and of Congress, based as they were on the expectancy of a short war, would before long have brought in some form of inflation. The banking side of Chase's financial policy was more creditable. He recommended the National Bank Act of February, 1863, which allowed banks to issue notes up to ninety per cent of their holdings in government bonds. Although comparatively few banks took advantage of this during the war, it subsequently became the basis of the federal currency system, until its inelasticity and other defects caused it to be superseded by the Federal Reserve system of 1913.

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[7] These were the first issued by Congress that were legal tender for all debts and payments, public and private. Previous and later issues of interest-bearing 'treasury notes' were receivable only for federal dues. The customs duties, however, were by special act collected in gold or the equivalent, throughout the Civil War. The Supreme Court decided in 1869 that the Legal Tender Act was unconstitutional and void in respect of debts contracted before its passage; but upon the filling of two vacancies in the Court, it promptly reversed its decision.

Inflation was almost the exclusive method of Confederate war finance. Jefferson Davis had to obtain supply from a people even less used to heavy taxation than those of the North, and much less able to bear it; and the blockade precluded any considerable income from customs duties. In four years the receipts of the Confederate government did not exceed $27,000,000 in specie value. Its expenditures ran to a couple of billions in treasury notes, payable in gold upon 'ratification of a treaty of peace between the Confederate States and the United States.' Prices, measured by this currency, rose to levels that seemed fantastic, until after the World War. The Confederate dollar did not fall below 33 cents until 1863 when it began to slide, and was worth only 1.6 cents in gold at the time of Lee's surrender.

The older historians adduce Southern financial policy as a contributing cause of Northern victory; but in the light of recent events there is some reason to believe that finance was one of the Confederacy's strongest points. Certainly the Davis government was never at a loss for money; and its methods of making money have received the sincere flattery of imitation from some of the oldest established governments in Europe.

Inflation tempted many Southerners to hoard food, to speculate in other essential supplies, and to exchange the gains from profiteering for sterling or United States dollars. The government fixed maximum prices, but had no authority to enforce them; and blockade runners imported luxuries for the profiteers rather than necessities for the army. As the stringency of the blockade increased, Southern economic life diverged more widely from the normal; but economic revolution came only with defeat and reconstruction.

After noticing these many instances of selfishness, indifference, and defeatism on both sides, we must remember that, after all, both the Union and the Confederate governments were sustained by popular suffrage in 1862 and 1864, and that no earlier war in modern history drew out so much sacrifice, heroism, and fierce energy. Vice-President Stephens probably divined the situation at the beginning of 1863, when he wrote, 'The great majority of the masses both North and South are true to the cause of their side. . . . A large majority on both sides are tired of the war; want peace. . . . But as we do not want peace without independence, so they do not want peace without union.' Similarly it might be said that the European peoples in 1916 and 1917 were tired of the World War; but none desired peace without victory. The very numerous elements that wanted peace at any price were either silenced by a repression such as Lincoln and Davis could not exert, or converted by a war propaganda in comparison with which the efforts of North and South were amateurish and unconvincing. Outwardly, at least, the American people in 1918 were more whole-heartedly in the war against Germany than their grandfathers had been in the war against each other; but in comparison with the heart-breaking struggle of 1861–65, the World War, so far as the American people were concerned, was a brief and happy adventure.

XXXIV

FROM VICKSBURG TO APPOMATTOX

January 1863 — April 1865

1. *The Diplomatic Front*

MILITARY operations became simpler as the war progressed. In 1863 both sides concentrated towards the objectives they had failed to attain the year before: the Union on strengthening the blockade, and pressing out such obstacles to military constriction as Vicksburg, Chattanooga, and Lee's army; the Confederacy on defence, and on breaking through into Kentucky, Pennsylvania, and the high seas. On that element the year was a brilliant one for the Confederacy. Two improvised 'cotton-clads' recaptured Galveston; the guns of Fort Sumter repelled three separate attacks on Charleston; and the *Alabama* and *Florida* were at large, destroying United States shipping, and orders were placed in England and France for some powerful armored rams, which, if they once got to sea would very likely break the Union blockade.

The interventionist forces in Europe, encouraged by Fredericksburg, began to make trouble again in 1863. Of these forces, Napoleon III was the most dangerous, because the least calculable. Napoleon's American policy was determined by his Mexican adventure, which began in 1861 and became a purely French enterprise the next year; in June, 1863, a French army took Mexico City, and the next year the unfortunate Maximilian of Austria accepted the imperial crown of Mexico from France. Thus the Civil War gave Napoleon III an opportunity to perform the feat of which Talleyrand, Canning, and Aberdeen had dreamed: to bring the New World into the balance of power, to re-establish European influence in America. Slidell offered him Confederate support in Mexico; and after all, two English-speaking republics gave more openings than one for the balance-of-power gain. In January, 1863, Napoleon III proposed a peace conference between North and South, with the object of establishing the Confederacy. Seward refused the offer flatly.

Spain in a small way was pursuing the same policy. At the invitation of the conservative faction in Santo Domingo she was endeavoring to convert that unstable republic into a Spanish colony. France in Mexico, Spain in Santo Domingo, meant a counter-stroke of monarchical Europe against republican America; an after-clap of the Holy Alliance. 'A little audacity,' writes a Spanish historian, 'and France was assured of her possessions, England of Canada, . . . ourselves of the treasure of our Antilles, and the future of the Spanish race. Mexico and the Southern States . . . were the two advanced redoubts which Europe in its own interest should have thrown up against the American colossus.'[1]

Impressive was the rally of liberal sentiment to the Union in England, France, and Spain, as the meaning of the Emancipation Proclamation sank in. A Confederate agent reported of France, 'With the exception of the Emperor and his nearest personal adherents, all the intelligence, the science, the social respectability, is leagued with the ignorance and the radicalism in a deep-rooted antipathy . . . against us.' Emilio Castelar, the Spanish liberal leader, declared 'An empire in Mexico is nothing else at bottom than an aid to the slaveholders of the South.' In England, the Emancipation Proclamation brought about such an upheaval of evangelical, radical, and working-class opinion in favor of the Union, that no ministry could, if it would, give aid and comfort to the slave power. Bright, Forster, and Goldwin Smith were now believed when they asserted that the cause of the Union was the cause of liberty. There were many enthusiastic pro-Union meetings like that of Manchester in 1862. Karl Marx organized a gathering of three thousand representatives of the London Trades Unions at St. James's Hall on 26 March 1863. It was there that Bright made his pithy exposition of aristocratic hostility to 'thirty millions of men, happy and prosperous, without emperor, without king . . . without state bishops and state priests.' It was there also that the Trades Unionists declared in formal resolution 'that the success of free institutions in America was a political question of deep consequence in England, and that they would not tolerate any interference unfavorable to the North.' Young Henry Adams, who reported the meeting for his father, wrote, 'I never quite appreciated the moral influence of American democracy, nor the cause that the privileged classes in Europe have to fear us, until I saw directly how it works.'

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[1] Navarro y Rodrigo, *O'Donnell y su Tiempo* (1869), p. 195.

Yet the Confederate partisans did not give up hope. Just one week before the trades union meeting the Confederacy launched its first foreign loan, precursor of a new diplomatic offensive. Bonds to the amount of £3,000,000, redeemable in cotton at a rate of exchange that promised fabulous profits, were issued at 90 and promptly rose to 95. Slidell deemed this success 'a financial recognition of our independence'; Mason wrote, 'Cotton is king at last.'

The *Alabama* and *Florida* were at large; another English-built commerce-destroyer, the *Alexandria,* was almost ready for sea; and the Lairds were building two armored rams to break the Union blockade. On 4 April Lord Russell ordered the detention of the *Alexandria.* At once King Cotton began to tremble on his new financial throne. The bonds fell to 87, and only by using the subscription money to bull the market were Mason and Slidell able to arrest their decline.

2. *The Vicksburg Campaign*

It is a relief to turn from this diplomatic front to the western theatre of war, to Union armies composed of stout fellows of the Middle West ('reg'lar great big hellsnorters, same breed as ourselves,' said an admiring enemy), officers who for the most part had risen from the ranks by merit, generals who never knew they were beaten and seldom were.

Although both sides of the Mississippi below Memphis were Confederate territory, there was nothing on the river to oppose the passage of a hostile fleet and army until it reached Vicksburg. At that point the line of bluffs that borders the Mississippi valley touches the river itself, and follows close beside its eastern bank for over a hundred miles to Port Hudson, Louisiana. At both points the Confederates had strongly fortified the bluffs, and between them troops and supplies reached the heart of the Confederacy from Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas. General Banks, who had learned something of war by this time, had 15,000 troops at New Orleans, mostly nine-months men and negroes, with which to reduce Port Hudson. He and Grant were the first generals to make any considerable use of negro troops, and it was during the Vicksburg Campaign that the famous ballad of the contrabands appeared:

Say, darkeys, hab you seen de massa,
  Wid de muffstash on he face,
Go long de road some time dis mornin',
  Like he gwine leabe de place?
He see de smoke way up de ribber
  Whar de Lincum gunboats lay;
He took he hat an' leff berry sudden,
  And I spose he's runned away.
    De massa run, ha, ha!
    De darkey stay, ho, ho!
    It mus' be now de kingdum comin',
    An' de yar ob jubilo.

Vicksburg was a difficult nut to crack. Strongly fortified and held by General Pemberton, its front was impregnable to assault from the river, its rear was two hundred miles from Grant's base at Memphis, and its right was protected by the densely wooded and water-logged valley of the Yazoo, intersected with countless back-waters and bayous. After one check, in December 1862, Grant concentrated his army on the west bank of the Mississippi north of the fortress, and spent the cold wet months of the new year in fruitless attempts to outflank Pemberton in the slimy jungle of the lower Yazoo. But he was not discouraged, as McClellan would have been. 'There was nothing left to be done but to go forward to a decisive victory.' In order to advance he must cut loose from his base of supplies, march his army below Vicksburg along the west bank of the Mississippi, cross over to the dry ground, and attack the fortress from the rear.

'I don't know what to make of Grant, he's such a quiet little fellow,' said Lincoln, whose experience had been mainly with generals who let their presence be known to the eye and ear. 'The only way I know he's around is by the way he makes things *git!*' Grant's Army of the Tennessee worked in perfect concert with the fresh-water navy. 'Grant and Sherman are on board almost every day. Dine and tea with me often; we agree in everything,' wrote Flag-Officer Porter.

Grant's plan was as audacious as any campaign by Lee; and he had difficulties that Lee never encountered. The Army of the Tennessee marched along the west bank of the Mississippi to a point south of Grand Gulf, where there was an easy crossing. The fleet had to run the gauntlet of Vicksburg on the night of 16–17 April 1863. With lights dowsed and engines stopped, it floated down stream until discovered by a Confederate sentry. Then, what a torrent of shot and shell from the fortress, and what a cracking-on of steam in the fleet, and what a magnificent spectacle, lighted by flashing guns and burning cotton-bales, as the casemated gunboats, turtle-backed rams, and river steamboats with tall flaring funnels, dashed by the batteries! 'Their heavy shot walked right through us,' wrote Porter; but all save one transport got by safely.

A part of Grant's army crossed the river south of Grand Gulf unopposed (30 April). Without waiting for Sherman, or for a line of communications to be established, Grant struck out for the rear of Vicksburg with 20,000 men, subsisting on the country. Pemberton came out to meet him; and Joe Johnston was moving south from Chattanooga with another army. By a series of masterly combinations and rapid marches, fighting as he progressed, Grant captured the important railway junction at Jackson, Mississippi, before Johnston could occupy it (14 May), then turned on Pemberton in quick pursuit. 'In eighteen days he marched two hundred miles, won five pitched battles, took eight thousand prisoners and eighty cannon, scattered a hostile army larger than his own fighting on its chosen ground, and had the rebel army penned in Vicksburg.'[2] It was as good as Stonewall Jackson's best; and Stonewall never campaigned in enemy country.

On 22 May, the siege of Vicksburg began. Civilians were living in bomb-proofs and the Confederate defenders were on the point of mutiny when Pemberton, on 3 July, sent out a flag of truce, asking for a parley. The next day he surrendered his army, and the 'Confederate Gibraltar.' Port Hudson surrendered to Banks on the 9th. Within a week a steamboat arrived at New Orleans from St. Louis, having passed the entire course of the Mississippi undisturbed by hostile shot or challenge.

3. *Chancellorsville*

Leaving Grant besieging Vicksburg, his flanks protected by the river gunboats and the Yazoo swamp, Joe Johnston prowling cautiously about his well-entrenched rear, and Banks besieging Port Hudson at the southern bastion of the Confederate river front: let us turn to the eastern theatre of war.

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[2] L. A. Coolidge, *U. S. Grant*, p. 118.

'Fighting Joe' Hooker, brave, vain, and unreliable, replaced Burnside after the Fredericksburg disaster, as head of the Army of the Potomac. He did much to restore their morale, but his first move in the direction of Richmond, on 27 April, brought on Chancellorsville, one of the bloodiest battles of the war. Again, as at the second Manassas, Lee divided his army in the face of superior numbers, and sent Jackson by a wood road through the Wilderness round the Union right, whose commander refused to change front in spite of ample warnings from his picket line (2 May). Earlier in the war, so complete a surprise as Jackson then sprung would have meant disaster. Only individual valor saved it then, for Hooker seemed to forget the very rudiments of generalship, while Lee, with half his man-power, chose time and place of attack, always outnumbering him at the point of contact. Three days of this and Hooker, dazed and bewildered, retired across the Rappahannock (5 May). A well-earned Southern victory was too dearly won by the loss of Stonewall Jackson, mortally wounded by his own men when reconnoitering between the lines.

Lee's army was soon ready for another spring at the enemy's throat, and on enemy soil. Such a victory might knock out Northern morale, already staggering from Chancellorsville, and trembling in prospect of the first draft; French and perhaps British recognition would follow. It was a bold game for the highest stake, but President Davis was not a bold player. He could not make up his mind to weaken the other Confederate forces to push this invasion home. So Lee moved northward (3 June 1863) into Pennsylvania with only 73,000 men, while 190,000 Confederate field troops were scattered between the Mississippi and the Rappahannock.

Keeping time with Lee's marching men, the Confederacy launched a diplomatic drive. Confederate bonds rose from 87 to 91 upon news of Chancellorsville, but something more than financial recognition was wanted. President Davis was becoming impatient. Benjamin wrote: 'When successful fortune smiles on our arms, the British cabinet is averse to recognition because "it would be unfair to the South by the action of Great Britain to exasperate the North to renewed efforts." When reverses occur . . . "it would be unfair to the North in a moment of its success to deprive it of a reasonable opportunity of accomplishing a reunion of the states."' Accordingly, Mason and Slidell planned with J. A. Roebuck and Lindsay, the two principal pro-Southern members of Parliament, to place the ministry in a dilemma between recognition and resignation. Their plans went astray. Debate on Roebuck's motion to recognize the Confederacy was adjourned from day to day by pro-Southern members in the hope that the next mail would bring news of a crushing victory by Lee on Northern soil. The news they finally received was of Gettysburg and Vicksburg.

4. *The Gettysburg Campaign*

General Lee, on 3 June, began to move his left towards the Shenandoah valley, having selected that well-screened highway to Pennsylvania. Ewell cleared the way for him by smashing the Union garrison at Winchester. One corps only, A. P. Hill's, remained on on the Rappahannock to watch the Army of the Potomac. Hooker was eager to make a counter-stroke at the Confederate capital, but Lincoln advised him, 'Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your true objective point. If he comes toward the upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his.' Hooker took this excellent bit of advice. On 17 June a part of Ewell's corps was across the Potomac; on the 23rd it was near Chambersburg in the Cumberland valley of Pennsylvania. The same day Lee sent J. E. B. Stuart on a cavalry raid, with orders not sufficiently precise to restrain that gallant horseman. 'Jeb' and his men enjoyed themselves as usual, and cut out a wagon train within four miles of Washington; but Hooker, by crossing the Potomac on the 25th, separated them from Lee, and deprived the Confederate army of its 'eyes' during the most critical days of the campaign.

On 27 June Lee's entire army was in Pennsylvania; his headquarters at Chambersburg. Ewell had reached Carlisle, within fifteen miles of the state capital at Harrisburg, and the next day Jubal A. Early's division laid York under contribution of dollars and shoes. Hooker, on the 28th, having concentrated the Army of the Potomac about Frederick town, resigned the command on a squabble with Halleck. Lincoln turned it over to one of his corps commanders, General George Gordon Meade. For once, swapping horses in the middle of the stream was justified. There was no counting on 'Fighting Joe,' but Meade was safe and sane, certain to do nothing foolish if unlikely to perform any brilliant feat of arms.

Lee hoped that the mere presence of his army in Pennsylvania would strengthen the copperheads, and would force Lincoln to receive Vice-President Stephens, then proceeding towards Washington under flag of truce to open peace negotiations on the basis of independence. Yet the North showed no sign of flinching. Democratic governors were not behind their Republican colleagues in offering volunteers. Militia and civilians turned out in large numbers to protect the Pennsylvania cities. Grave anxiety was felt, but no panic; and Lincoln did not recall a single unit from the West.

On 29 June, when Ewell's cavalry had reached the Confederacy's farthest north — a point within three miles of Harrisburg — Lee ordered his entire army to concentrate in the eastern slope of the South Mountain, near Cashtown. There, in a strong defensive position, he proposed to await attack. Meade intended to take position behind Pipe Creek, and let Lee attack him. But chance placed the great battle where neither Lee nor Meade wanted it; because neither knew exactly where the other was. On 30 June a part of A. P. Hill's corps, which was covering Lee's concentration, strayed into Gettysburg in search of new boots. Boots and saddles were there — on Buford's cavalry division, masking the Army of the Potomac. Gettysburg commanded some important roads; and each army was so eager for action that this chance contact drew both into the quiet little market-town, as to a magnet. There, on 1 July, the great three-day battle began, each unit joining in the fray as it arrived. Hill's zeal for footwear changed the battle from a defensive one near Cashtown to an offensive one at Gettysburg.

The first day (1 July) went ill for the Union. Hill and Ewell drove the First Corps through the town. In the nick of time, Winfield Scott Hancock, the greatest fighting general in the Army of the Potomac, rallied the fugitives on Cemetery Ridge. The position so fortunately chosen proved to be admirable for defence: a limestone outcrop shaped like a fish-hook, with the convex side turned west and north, towards the Confederates. Along it the Union army was placed as rapidly as it arrived from the South and East, while the Confederates took up an encircling position, their right on the partially wooded Seminary Ridge, parallel to Cemetery Ridge. Lee decided to attack the following day. Ignorant of the whereabouts of the rest of Meade's army, he dared not retreat to the Cumberland valley, or attempt the flanking movement that Longstreet advocated.

Lee's great opportunity came on the morning of 2 July. Before half the Union army was in line, Ewell captured Culp's Hill, on the

Union right — the barb of the hook — but Longstreet's corps arrived too late to do much against the Union left. It drove in Sickles's corps which had incautiously occupied the peach orchard in advance of Cemetery Ridge, but failed to take Little Round Top — the eye of the hook — which would have enabled his artillery to enfilade the entire Union position. Meade's army lost heavily, but he determined to stand his ground and fight it out.

The third day of the battle and of July opened with a desperate struggle for Culp's Hill, from which Ewell's corps was finally dislodged. Silence fell on the field at noon. Meade guessed what was coming, and reinforced his center. At one o'clock there came a deafening artillery fire from the Confederate lines. Deep silence again. Lee, against Longstreet's protest, had ordered a direct attack on the strongest part of the Union center with Pickett's, Pettigrew's, and Trimble's divisions, 15,000 strong. The time had come. Pickett rode up to Longstreet and asked, 'General, shall I advance?' Longstreet, unwilling to give the word, bowed his head. 'Sir, I shall lead my division forward,' said Pickett.

From Cemetery Ridge, the Union troops saw three gray lines of battle issue from the wooded ridge three-quarters of a mile away, and march with colors flying and bayonets glittering into the valley before them. Less than half-way across, the Union artillery opened fire upon them; a little nearer they came under a raking fire from the batteries on Round Top. The flank divisions melted away; but the Northern troops, peering through the smoke, could see Pickett's division still coming on, merged in one crowding, rushing line. Lost for a moment in a swale, they emerged so near that the expression on their faces could be seen. Then the boys in blue let them have it. Two of Pickett's brigadiers were killed. Fifteen of his regimental commanders were killed, and the other five wounded. General Armistead, with cap raised on point of sword, leaped the stone wall into the Union lines, a hundred men followed him, and for a brief moment the battle cross of the Confederacy floated on the crest of Cemetery Ridge. The Union lines closed in relentlessly, and Armistead's men were shot down or captured.

All the next day — 4 July — Lee remained defiantly in position. That evening his army, with baggage and prisoners, retired to a position west of Sharpsburg. There the flooded Potomac stopped his retreat, and gave Meade an opportunity that Lincoln begged him to seize. 'Act upon your own judgment and make your generals execute your orders,' telegraphed Halleck. 'Call no council of war. . . . Do not let the enemy escape.' Meade called a council of war, the Potomac fell, and the enemy escaped.

Lee was too candid to congratulate himself for having escaped. He had seen the flower of his army wither under the Union fire. He knew that all hope of peace that summer was gone, and he must have felt that slight hope for Southern independence remained. Yet after the battle, as before, his soldiers gathered only confidence and resolution from the placid countenance of their beloved 'Marse Robert.' With justice Lee might have blamed Longstreet, where failure to obey orders probably led to the disaster, but no word of censure escaped him. To President Davis he wrote, 'No blame can be attached to the army for its failure to accomplish what was projected by me, nor should it be censured for the unreasonable expectations of the public. I am alone to blame.'

Lincoln was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee's army. 'Our army held the war in the hollow of their hand, and they would not close it,' he said. 'Still, I am very grateful to Meade for the great service he did at Gettysburg.' 'General Meade has my confidence, as a brave and skilful officer and a true man.' Unpopular with his men, placed in command of an army thrice whipped within a twelvemonth, on the eve of battle with an enemy hitherto invincible, he fairly won the greatest battle of the war. And from the Wilderness to Appomattox he was the right arm of Grant.

Four months later, when a national cemetery was dedicated on the battle-field of Gettysburg, Lincoln delivered his immortal address:

> 'Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.
>
> 'Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that the nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.
>
> 'But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate — we cannot consecrate — we cannot hallow — this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living, rather,

to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us — that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth.'

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After Gettysburg, nothing of consequence occurred in the eastern theatre of war until the spring of 1864; and after Vicksburg, Grant's Army of the Tennessee was dispersed from Memphis to Matamoras, by orders from Washington.

On the diplomatic front Gettysburg and Vicksburg bore fruit. Roebuck's motion to recognize the Confederacy was already withdrawn, but the Laird armored rams, from which the Confederacy hoped much, were being rushed to completion. Lord John Russell was most anxious to prevent another *Alabama* from swelling the tide of American resentment; but the destination of the vessels was so cleverly covered by a fictitious sale that he could find no evidence to warrant detention. Fortunately he decided to stretch a point, and keep the peace. On 3 September he gave orders to prevent the departure of the rams, and a month later both were seized.[3]

John Bigelow, the American consul-general at Paris, obtained evidence in the same month that four steam corvettes and two armored rams were being constructed for the Confederacy at Nantes and Bordeaux. Napoleon III had practically invited Slidell to place the contracts, although he was careful to insist that their destination should be concealed. Now that the secret was out, he ordered the vessels to be sold to foreign governments; but only the utmost vigilance by the American authorities prevented their falling into Confederate hands. The ram *Stonewall* eventually did, but too late to help the Southern cause.

5. *From Chickamauga to Atlanta and the Sea*

The advance of the Army of the Cumberland under Rosecrans from Murfreesborough to the neighborhood of Chattanooga, in

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[3] Charles Francis Adams's famous note to Russell on the rams, 'It would be superfluous in me to point out to your lordship that this is war,' was written two days after Russell had decided to detain them.

July 1863, began a campaign that ended only with Sherman's march to the sea, and a subdivision of the Confederacy. Chattanooga, after Richmond and Vicksburg, was the most vital point in the Confederacy: a junction on the important Richmond-Knoxville-Memphis railway for lines running southwest and southeast. The Tennessee river, after flowing southward through the continuation of the Shenandoah valley, there breaks through the parallel ridges of the southern Appalachians. So long as the Confederates held Chattanooga, they could make counter-strokes towards the Ohio, and the Union armies could not hope to penetrate far into the lower South, however firmly they might press its periphery. Once in possession of Chattanooga, the Union armies might swing round the Great Smoky mountains and attack Savannah, Charleston, or even Richmond, from the rear. Rosecrans outmanœuvred the Confederates, and, without fighting a battle, marched into Chattanooga on 9 September 1863.

At first the Chattanooga campaign was conducted by third-rate generals: our old friend Burnside; General Rosecrans, who had most of McClellan's faults without his ability; and President Davis's favorite, Braxton Bragg, a dyspeptic martinet. From the first battle of the campaign, at Chickamauga (19 September), there emerged a great commander, the loyal Virginian George H. Thomas. After Bragg had swept the Union right and center into Chattanooga, George H. Thomas, for six hours that afternoon, held the left against repeated assaults by the whole Confederate army; and, when nightfall found him stripped of ammunition, retired unmolested to a safe position. 'The *élan* of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga,' wrote D. H. Hill. 'That brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever.' It broke against the lines of Thomas, 'the rock of Chickamauga.' Owing to the fact that he had no Congressmen pushing him, Thomas never had a command equal to his ability; but no military critic to-day would deny him a place among the immortals; and there are many who believe that, if given the opportunity, he could have proved himself peer to Lee or Jackson.

Next, Rosecrans allowed his army to be penned up and besieged in Chattanooga. He was approaching a state of imbecility when Lincoln sent Grant to the rescue, as supreme commander in the West. Grant placed Thomas in command of the Army of the Cumberland, and ordered him to hold Chattanooga at all hazards. 'I will hold the town till we starve,' was Thomas's reply.

Grant's manner of rescuing the Army of the Cumberland from its embarrassing situation was to resume the offensive. On 24 November he began the great Battle of Chattanooga. Simultaneous attacks delivered by Hooker, Sherman, and Thomas drove the enemy from the steep wooded ridges across the river. The capture of Missionary Ridge was perhaps the most gallant action of the war. Thomas's men, after driving the Confederates from the rifle-pits at the foot, were ordered to halt. Refusing to obey, they kept straight on up the steep rocky slope, overrunning a second and a third line of defence, rushed the Confederate guns from the crest, and turned them on the enemy; then, with Phil Sheridan leading, pursued the fleeing graycoats down the eastern slope.

This Battle of Chattanooga placed the combined armies of the Tennessee and the Cumberland (Sherman and Thomas) in a position to advance into Georgia in the early spring. The West had proved her valor in two brilliant campaigns. One portion of the Confederacy had been severed along the Mississippi, and a deep salient, resting upon the Appalachians and the great river, had been thrust into the rest. It remained to prolong that salient to the sea, somewhere between Charleston and Savannah; and to deal with Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia.

When Grant became general-in-chief, Sherman was left in command of 100,000 men in Chattanooga to continue that campaign. Sherman's objective was Joe Johnston's (late Bragg's) army, 65,000 strong, which lay between him and Atlanta, Georgia. In early May, 1864, he began the campaign, with an army stripped to the barest essentials in baggage and equipment. Johnston divined the needs of the situation when he adopted Fabian strategy. The only hope for the Confederacy lay in fretting, fighting only at a decided advantage, and wearying the Northern people of the war. Sherman restrained his natural eagerness and aggressiveness, to beat Johnston 'at his own game of patience.' His advance and Johnston's retreat to Atlanta was a pretty game of thrust and parry, with a constant development in the arts of field entrenchment, bridge-building, and railway reconstruction. On 17 July Sherman moved across the Chattahoochee river, eight miles from Atlanta, and began to besiege the capital of Georgia. With a line of communications 140 miles longer than at Chattanooga, his situation was perilous; and the appointment of J. B. Hood in Johnston's place meant that the Confederates would speedily take the offensive.

Hood, however, merely wasted life by gallant thrusts at Sherman, whose troops had acquired the instinct of victory. On 2 September Hood evacuated Atlanta, and Sherman occupied the capital of Georgia.

President Davis assured the people of Georgia that Sherman must sooner or later retreat from Atlanta. 'And when that day comes the fate that befell the army of the French Empire in its retreat from Moscow will be re-acted.' Hood proposed to do this by striking high into Tennessee at the long, thin line of Union communications. The imperturbable Sherman sent Thomas back to Nashville, and cut loose from Atlanta in the opposite direction, toward the sea (17 October 1864), marching 62,000 men without supplies into the 'garden spot of the Confederacy.'

The march to the sea, like Sheridan's campaign in the Valley, was one of deliberate and disciplined destruction. Sherman's army cut a swath sixty miles wide through central Georgia, the 'garden spot of the Confederacy,' destroying stores of provisions, standing crops and cattle, cotton-gins and mills, railways beyond all possibility of repair, in fact everything that could be useful to the Confederacy and much that was not. The looting of houses, although forbidden by orders, could not altogether be prevented, and many a Georgia family was stripped of its possessions; but outrages on persons were surprisingly few; on white women, none. 'No army ever enjoyed such freedom and kept within such bounds.' It was the sort of campaign that soldiers really love — maximum of looting and destruction, minimum of discipline and fighting: splendid weather, few impediments: broiled turkey for breakfast, roast lamb for dinner, and fried chicken for supper.

> How the darkeys shouted when they heard the joyful sound,
> How the turkeys gobbled which our commissary found,
> How the sweet potatoes even started from the ground,
>   While we were marching through Georgia.
>
>   Hurrah! Hurrah! we bring the jubilee!
>   Hurrah! Hurrah! the flag that makes you free!
>   So we sang the chorus from Atlanta to the sea,
>   While we were marching through Georgia.

For a month the North completely lost sight of Sherman. He emerged at Savannah on 10 December 1864, and was able to offer Lincoln the city as a Christmas present.

The North had a bad turn in December when Schofield's corps, overwhelmed by Hood at Franklin (Tennessee) on 30 November, fell back on Nashville. It looked like another Confederate breakthrough to the Ohio. But the Rock of Chickamauga was in command at Nashville. Despite frantic telegrams from Stanton and Grant to attack at once, he bided his time. Finally on 27 December, when the order for his supersession had already been given, Thomas inflicted on Hood at Nashville the most smashing defeat of the war. Grant made prompt amends to Thomas for his impatience; but this great Virginian, who had forsaken home and kindred for loyalty to the Union, was neglected in the distribution of post-war honors.

6. *The Wilderness*

While Sherman and Thomas were carrying on this brilliant and uniformly successful scission of the Confederacy, General Grant was having a rather unhappy time of it with Lee, whose prowess very nearly conquered the Northern will to victory in the summer of 1864.

On 9 March 1864 Grant was appointed lieutenant-general and general-in-chief of the armies of the United States. Summoned to Washington, where he had never been, to confer with Lincoln, whom he had never seen, this slightly seedy and very ordinary looking individual, perpetually smoking or chewing a cigar, caused some misgivings among those who were used to the glittering generals of the Army of the Potomac. For perhaps the only occasion in history, an American hotel clerk lost countenance, when the inconspicuous officer to whom he assigned a top-floor room registered ' U. S. Grant and son, Galena, Ill.' Keener observers were impressed with Grant's rough dignity, simplicity, and calm confidence. He was the first of all the commanders in the east who never doubted the greatness of his President; and Lincoln knew that he had a general at last ' who would take the responsibility and act.'

Grant assumed personal direction of the Virginia campaign against Lee. It appeared to be as inexorable as a nutcracker. Grant himself, leading the Army of the Potomac under Meade and an unattached corps under Burnside, was to move by the left flank towards Richmond, forcing the Confederate leader to give battle or abandon his capital. Sigel was to rush up the Shenandoah valley, with Lynchburg as his destination. B. F. Butler, worst of the political generals, was given command of the Army of the James, apparently in order to keep him out of politics. His task was to march up the south bank of the James and cut Lee's communications with the lower South. Both these movements miscarried. Sigel, checked half-way up the Valley, was superseded by Hunter; and Lee, after Cold Harbor, detached Early's corps which drove Hunter across the Appalachians. Butler was ' bottled up in Bermuda Hundred ' at a loop of the James, by Beauregard. Upon Grant fell the entire burden of the offensive. ' He habitually wears an expression as if he had determined to drive his head through a brick wall, and was about to do it,' wrote one of his officers. ' I determined,' wrote Grant himself, ' to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land.'

On 4 May 1864 Grant crossed the Rapidan without opposition, and began to march his army of 102,000 men through the same tangled Wilderness from which Jackson had fallen upon Hooker at Chancellorsville. When half-way through, Lee repeated Jackson's manœuvre. Grant accepted battle and changed his front, but his enormous army corps manœuvred with great difficulty in that dense undergrowth, and in two days' fierce fighting he lost 17,700 men. This Battle of the Wilderness (5–7 May) was a draw. Grant now knew that he had to deal with a general of different metal from Johnston or Bragg; and Lee learned that the Army of the Potomac had obtained a leader worthy of it.

Grant then tried to outflank the enemy; but clouds of dust from his marching columns warned Lee of his intention, and by the time his van had reached the cross-roads at Spottsylvania Court House, Lee was there to check him. Both armies threw up field entrenchments, and the five-day battle that followed (Spottsylvania, 8–12 May) was the first of modern trench warfare.

> ' Again and again we read in the story of these assaults that the attacking troops were thrown by their very success into confusion, and so fell easy victims to reserves who had escaped the rough and tumble of capturing trenches; again and again we read that the turmoil of the battle-field prevented the arrival of supports in time to enable the assaulting troops

to make good their success, or, as the jargon of the Great War had it, "to consolidate their position."'[4]

Having lost 31,000 more men, Grant declared, 'I . . . propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.' Again he moved by his left in the hope of outflanking Lee's right. Again the Army of Northern Virginia was there to welcome him, and in a position so well chosen and entrenched that Grant needed all his adroitness to withdraw in safety, and continue his flanking march (26 May). Lee swung with him to McClellan's old battle-field of Gaines' Mill. Both armies entrenched. The lines were six or eight miles long. On 1–3 June came the Battle of Cold Harbor, costliest and most futile in the entire war — an assault upon the entire line of Lee's trenches with no adequate preparations to improve any success. Before going over the top, the Union soldiers pinned papers on their backs, giving their names and addresses to identify their corpses. Eight or nine thousand men fell in two or three hours, but hardly a dent was made on the Confederate lines.

During ten more days the armies faced one another. War had now acquired most of its modern horrors. The wounded, unattended between the lines, died of thirst, starvation, and loss of blood. Corpses rotted on the ground. Sharpshooters kept up their deadly work. Officers and men fought mechanically without hope. The war had begun so long ago that one could hardly remember anything else. It would continue until every one on both sides was killed.

In one month Grant had advanced from the Rapidan to the Chickahominy, the exact spot where McClellan had stood two years before; and he had lost about 55,000 men to Lee's 30,000 — a greater proportion of the Confederates, to be sure, but not a brilliant result of the attrition policy. On 12 June Grant followed McClellan's exact plan — a change of base to the James, and an attempt to cut the communications of Richmond at Petersburg. The manœuvre was skillfully executed, and, unlike that of 1862, was unmolested by Lee. But an opportunity to push into undefended Petersburg was lost. Lee slipped in by the interior lines, entrenched in time, and three general assaults cost the Union 8,000 more men (15–18 June). Grant's army sat down to besiege Petersburg, and remained there for nine months. A pure war of position had arrived.

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[4] Maurice, *Lee, the Soldier,* p. 233. There are excellent descriptions of the methods of entrenching in *Cycle of Adams Letters,* ii. 138, and *Meade's Headquarters.*

Grant never had enough men or artillery to carry the Petersburg lines by assault, as the fiasco of the 'crater' affair (27 July 1864) proved. He was right in holding Lee in position while Sherman reduced the effective area of the Confederacy, for Lee, unable to manœuvre, was not dangerous.

Such, in brief, was the most desperately fought campaign of the war. Lee, with an army that despised digging as 'nigger's work,' and hated fighting from entrenchments, had developed the technique of trench warfare to a point that Europe only reached in 1916. He had saved his army, and saved Richmond. Grant, after making mistakes and suffering losses that would have broken any of his predecessors, was still indomitable. But how long would the country suffer such stupendous losses, with no apparent result? People were beginning to forget Vicksburg, and to whisper the name of Shiloh.

* * * *

Jubal A. Early, having qualified for the role of Stonewall Jackson's successor by driving the Union forces from the Shenandoah valley, now had an opportunity to repeat the drama of 1862. On 2 July 1864 his 15,000 veterans were at Winchester, marching north by the classic route. A few days later he was laying Hagerstown and Frederick under contribution, and at noon on 11 July he was at Fort Stevens in the District of Columbia, only five miles from the capital. Almost at the same moment two Union divisions, which Grant had hurriedly detached from the Army of the Potomac, disembarked at Washington. The general rode out to Fort Stevens, whose commander pointed out the enemy's pickets only a few yards away, and remarked by way of greeting, 'Well, Wright, there they are; I've nothing here but quartermaster's men and hospital bummers, the enemy can walk right in if he only tries. Let's go below and get some lager beer.' What a contrast with 1862! But Early had lost his chance. Wright's men marched forth from Fort Stevens, President Lincoln watching the engagement, as the bullets whistled past his high hat. Early was driven back a mile, and on 13 July made good his escape to the Valley, with loot and provisions. Three days later, Lincoln made one of his greatest speeches:

> 'We accepted this war for an object, a worthy object, and the war will end when that object is attained. Under God, I hope it never will end until that time. Speaking of the present campaign, General Grant is reported to have said, "I am going through on this line if it takes all

summer." This war has taken three years; it was begun or accepted upon the line of restoring the national authority over the whole national domain, and for the American people, as far as my knowledge enables me to speak, I say we are going through on this line if it takes three years more.'

On 18 July the President called for half a million more volunteers, any deficiency to be filled by draft on 6 September.

As usual, the country was not up to Lincoln's stature. The appalling toll of casualties seemed to have brought the war no nearer conclusion. It looked as if Grant could never beat Lee, or Sherman take Atlanta. Paper dollars fell to their lowest point, thirty-five cents in gold, on the day that Early appeared before Washington. And the cost of living had soared far beyond the rise of wages or salaries. Unable to look beyond their own troubles to the far greater ills of their enemy, the Northern people began to ask whether a further prosecution of the war would profit any one but the profiteers. This undercurrent of doubt and despair induced some strange developments in the presidential campaign that was already under way.

7. *The Presidential Election*

Alone of modern governments since manhood suffrage was adopted, the United States faced a general election in war time. For, as Lincoln said, ' We cannot have free government without elections; and if the rebellion could force us to forego or postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us.' Lincoln was renominated for the Presidency by acclamation on 7 June in the National Union convention, representing both Republicans and War Democrats; but in early August, before the Democrats had held their convention, there developed an amazing movement against Lincoln within his own party.

Horace Greeley of the New York *Tribune* was seized in early July by another delusion: a belief that the Union could be restored through negotiation. In answer to his passionate appeal to take notice of an alleged Confederate peace mission in Canada, Lincoln ordered Greeley to go and investigate, with these credentials: ' If you can find any person, anywhere, professing to have any proposition of Jefferson Davis, in writing, for peace, embracing the restoration of the Union and abandonment of slavery, whatever else it embraces, say to him he may come to me with you.' Greeley went to Niagara Falls, and ascertained that the Southern emissaries had no authority and nothing to offer. Instead of acknowledging his error, he lent the columns of the *Tribune* to accusations that Lincoln for his own reasons wished unnecessarily to prolong the war. One can easily imagine the effect of such hints upon public opinion, at that juncture.

Greeley now thrust himself into a new breach that had developed between the President and the radicals over the manner and method of reconstructing the Union after the war. When Lincoln, on 4 July 1864, pocket-vetoed a bill embodying the radical views, Senators Wade and Henry Winter Davis issued a public manifesto accusing the President of perpetrating a ' studied outrage on the legislative authority of the people ' from the basest motives of personal ambition. Greeley published this Wade-Davis manifesto in the *Tribune* on 5 August; and on the 18th he and the radicals began to circulate among the politicians a call for a new Republican convention, to reconsider the candidature of Lincoln. The pacifist had slipped into bed with the hundred-percenters.

It was an alarming situation. Lincoln received letters from some of his staunchest supporters, declaring the election already lost. The executive committee of the Republican party implored him to make a peace move. Lincoln sent them away satisfied that he cared nothing for himself, but that so palpable a confession of weakness as an overture to Jefferson Davis, at that juncture, would be equivalent to surrender. What Lincoln really thought of the situation is clear from the paper he wrote and sealed on 23 August.

> 'It seems exceedingly probable that this administration will not be re-elected. Then it will be my duty to so co-operate with the President-elect as to save the Union between the election and the inauguration, as he will have secured his election on such ground that he cannot possibly save it afterward.'

If Jefferson Davis had been adroit or dishonest he could have completed the distraction of Union councils by proposing an armistice or a peace conference on any terms; for once the fighting had stopped, it would have been impossible to get it started again. Had he been a supremely wise man he would have accepted the President's condition of peace: restoration of the Union without slavery. But President Davis still believed his cause invincible. Another and more adroit amateur diplomatist than Greeley, published on 20 August the result of an interview with Davis himself. 'Say to Mr. Lincoln from me, that I shall at any time be pleased to receive proposals for peace on the basis of our Independence. It will be useless to approach me with any other.'

In the face of this plain and honest statement from the Confederate President, the Democratic national convention on 29 August adopted a resolution drafted by Vallandigham:

> 'After four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war . . . justice, humanity, liberty, and the public welfare demand that immediate efforts be made for a cessation of hostilities . . . to the end that at the earliest practicable moment, peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States.'

General McClellan received and accepted the Democratic nomination for President. He repudiated the peace plank in the platform, but was not unwilling to ride into the White House on a wave of defeatism.

Jefferson Davis by his frankness, the Democrats by their shameless defeatism, and Sherman by capturing Atlanta on 1 September, knocked the bottom out of the Wade-Davis-Greeley conspiracy. Nothing more was heard of the call for a new nominating convention. On 6 September the new draft went quietly into effect, the New England radicals held a ringing Lincoln rally in Faneuil Hall, and, marvellous to relate, Ben Wade announced he would take the stump for the President! Lincoln's election, so doubtful in August, was conceded on every side in October. After Sheridan had beaten Early at Cedar Creek (19 October), and devastated the Shenandoah valley so completely 'that a crow flying over it would have to carry his own rations,' the Northern people, on 8 November, chose 212 Lincoln electors, and only 21 for McClellan.

'The election,' said Lincoln two days later, 'has demonstrated that a people's government can sustain a national election in the midst of a great civil war.'

8. *The Collapse of the Confederacy*

Sherman had now planted another army in the heart of the Confederacy; and with the capture of Wilmington in January 1865 the Union blockade became very nearly absolute. Yet, in a military sense, the Confederacy was by no means doomed to defeat. On paper there was no reason why the fight should not be kept up almost indefinitely. Communication of a sort could be maintained between the Atlantic and the Gulf states, across Sherman's swath of destruction. There were some 35,000 men under arms in the Carolinas to oppose his march northward; and Lee, emulating Napoleon's strategy of 1814, might break loose from Grant and unite with them. There were enough white men of fighting age in the Confederacy to provide its armies with half a million men, (174,223 surrendered in April and May), and enrolment of the blacks might have provided two hundred thousand more. The Confederate munitions service was independent of outside supplies, and the great munition-producing center at Selma (Alabama) was not captured until 2 April 1865. There was plenty of corn and cattle in the country south of Virginia. The starving condition of Lee's troops at Appomattox was not symptomatic, but caused by failure of the government to send ahead supplies. Every material factor justified a protracted resistance; only morale was wanting. The re-election of Lincoln, the failure to obtain foreign recognition, Sherman's march to the sea, and the increasing pinch of the blockade, took the heart out of the South. 'Two-thirds of our men are absent . . . most of them absent without leave,' admitted President Davis in September 1864. Senator Hill of Georgia, who wrote the President on 25 March 1865, 'We shall conquer all enemies yet,' admitted, nine years later, 'All physical advantages are insufficient to account for our failure. The truth is, we failed because too many of our people were not determined to win.'

Davis could see only the outer reality — so many men and rifles and cannon, so much food and gunpowder. To the deeper reality in the hearts of his people he was insensible as any old-world autocrat. His last political manœuvre was to obtain from Lincoln a clear statement of Union peace terms, in the hope of 'firing the Southern heart.' On 3 February 1865 came this strange conference on a steamer in Hampton Roads, between the President of the United States and the Vice-President of the Confederacy, who had been his friend and mentor in Congress sixteen years before. Stephens had credentials to negotiate peace as the envoy of an independent Power. Lincoln patiently repeated his refusal to negotiate on that basis. Senator Hunter, who accompanied Stephens, alleged as precedent the negotiations during the English Civil War. Lincoln replied, 'I do not profess to be posted in history. On all such matters

I will turn you over to Seward. All I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I is that he lost his head.' But 'the war will cease on the part of the Government, whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it.' Offered a lifeboat, Stephens clutched at a straw, the very straw that Seward set afloat on April Fools' Day 1861 — Union and Confederacy might ally to expel Maximilian from Mexico!

It was as Lincoln had predicted — 'Davis cannot voluntarily re-accept the Union; we cannot voluntarily yield it.' Lee might with honor surrender his army to irresistible force; Davis could not with honor surrender his nation. The inherent dignity of his refusal was marred by his frantic boast at a public meeting in Richmond that he would compel the Yankees in less than twelve months to petition him for peace on his own terms.

* * * *

It was now the sixth day of February 1865. The Confederacy was sinking fast. Even slavery was jettisoned — in principle.[5] Sherman, as he marched northward, was proving his sulphurous synonym for war. 'Columbia! — pretty much all burned; and burned *good.*' Yet the doughty Sherman passed some anxious hours, when he learned that Lee and his grim veterans were on the loose again.

For nine months the two armies had faced one another across long lines of entrenchment running through the suburbs of Petersburg. At the beginning of the siege their forces were not disparate; but by the middle of March 1865 Grant had 115,000 effectives to Lee's 54,000. If Lee did not move out of his trenches Grant would soon envelop him; but if Petersburg were abandoned, Richmond must fall. Lee first tried an assault on the Union left — a costly failure, Sheridan, having marched across Virginia from the Valley, thrust back Lee's right at the Battle of Five Forks (1 April); and on the next day Grant penetrated the center of the Confederate defences. Lee's only hope was to retreat by the line of the Danville railway, and unite with Johnston, who now commanded the remnants of his former army in North Carolina.

On the night of April 2–3 Lee's army slipped out of the Petersburg lines; and the next evening the Union forces entered Richmond. Without pause Grant pursued. Sheridan entered the important railway junction of Burkesville before the Confederates, preventing their escape southward. Rations failed Lee through some mistake at Richmond; his thirty thousand men had to live on a thinly populated country in springtime. On 9 April Sheridan closed the only avenue of escape westward. Whether Lee could have cut his way through to the mountains and continued guerrilla warfare indefinitely may well be doubted; but it is certain that, as he wrote himself, he had only to ride along the lines and all would be over. 'But it is our duty to live, for what will become of the women and children of the South, if we are not here to support and protect them?'

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[5] President Davis sent an envoy to Europe, in January, to offer abolition in exchange for recognition, and on 25 March the Richmond Congress authorized the arming of the slaves.

Lee ordered a white flag to be displayed, and requested an interview with his opponent. The scene that followed, in a house of the little village of Appomattox Court House, has become a part of American folk-lore. Lee, in the new full-dress uniform with jewel-studded sword that he had saved in the flight, Grant in his favorite private's blouse, unbuttoned, and without a sword, 'his feelings sad and depressed at the downfall of a foe who had fought so long and valiantly.'

Formal greetings. Small talk of other days, in the old army . . .

Grant writes the terms of surrender in his own hand. . . . Officers and men paroled . . . arms and *matériel* surrendered . . . not to include the officers' side-arms, and —

'Let all the men who claim to own a horse or mule take the animals home with them to work their little farms.'

'This will do much toward conciliating our people.'

The conference is over. Lee pauses a moment in the doorway, looking out over a field blossoming with the stars and stripes. Thrice, and slowly, he strikes a fist into the palm of his gauntleted hand. He mounts his horse Traveller and is gone.

A sound of cheering spreads along the Union lines.

Grant orders it to cease:

'The war is over; the rebels are our countrymen again.'

Bury the bygone South.
Bury the minstrel with the honey-mouth,
Bury the broadsword virtues of the clan,
Bury the unmachined, the planters' pride,
The courtesy and the bitter arrogance,
The pistol-hearted horsemen who could ride

Like jolly centaurs under the hot stars.
Bury the whip, bury the branding-bars,
Bury the unjust thing
That some tamed into mercy, being wise,
But could not starve the tiger from its eyes
Or make it feed where beasts of mercy feed.
Bury the fiddle-music and the dance,
The sick magnolias of the false romance
And all the chivalry that went to seed
Before its ripening.

And with these things, bury the purple dream
Of the America we have not been,
The tropic empire, seeking the warm sea,
The last foray of aristocracy
Based not on dollars or initiative
Or any blood for what blood was worth
But on a certain code, a manner of birth,
A certain manner of knowing how to live,
The pastoral rebellion of the earth
Against machines, against the Age of Steam,
The Hamiltonian extremes against the Franklin mean,
The genius of the land
Against the metal hand,
The great, slave-driven bark,
Full-oared upon the dark,
With gilded figurehead,
With fetters for the crew
And spices for the few,
The passion that is dead,
The pomp we never knew,
Bury this, too.[6]

9. *The Last Days of Lincoln*

'With malice toward none; with charity for all; with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right, let us strive on to finish the work we are in; to bind up the nation's wounds; to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow, and his orphan — to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and lasting peace among ourselves, and with all nations.'

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[6] Stephen Vincent Benét, *John Brown's Body*, pp. 374–75.

Thus closed the second inaugural address of President Lincoln on 4 March 1865. The struggle over reconstruction was already on. Ben Wade with his truculent vigor and fierce hatred of the slaveholders, the Democrats, eager for revenge on the President, Charles Sumner, with his passionate conviction that right and justice required the South to pass under the Caudine forks, were certain to oppose the terms with which Lincoln proposed to bind up the nation's wounds. But Congress would not meet until December. It might be confronted with the established fact of a restored nation, if the South were wise, and nothing happened to Lincoln.

On 11 April, two days after Lee's surrender, Lincoln delivered his last public address. After a brief allusion to Appomattox and the hope of a speedy peace, he unfolded his reconstruction policy — the most magnanimous terms towards a helpless opponent ever offered by a victor. For Lincoln did not consider himself a conqueror. He was, and had been since 1861, President of the United States. The rebellion must be forgotten; and every Southern state readmitted to her full privilege in the Union as soon as ten per cent of the whites had taken the oath of allegiance, and organized a state government.

On Thursday night, 13 April, Washington was illuminated on account of Lee's surrender, and crowds paraded the streets. A general light-heartedness was in the air; every one knew that the war was practically over. On Good Friday, the 14th, the President held his last cabinet meeting. It was decided to lift the blockade. He urged his ministers to turn their thoughts to peace. There must be no more bloodshed, no persecution. General Grant, who attended the meeting, was asked for late news from Sherman, but had none. Lincoln remarked that it would come soon, and be favorable,[7] for last night he had dreamed a familiar dream. In a strange indescribable ship he seemed to be moving with great rapidity towards a dark and undefined shore. He had had this same dream before Sumter, Bull Run, Antietam, Murfreesborough, Vicksburg, and Wilmington. Matter-of-fact Grant remarked that Murfreesborough was no victory — 'a few such fights would have ruined us.' Lincoln looked at him curiously and said, however that might be, his dream preceded that battle.

Secretary Welles, who records this incident, may be our guide to the fearful events of that night. He had gone to bed early, and was just falling asleep when some one shouted from the street that the President had been shot, and the Secretary of State and his son assassinated. He dressed, and crossed Lafayette Square to Seward's house on 15th Street. The lower hall was full of excited people. Welles went upstairs to the room where Seward was lying on a bed soaked with blood, his lower jaw sagging as if in death. In the next room lay the son, unconscious from the injuries he had received in defending his father.

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[7] Johnston surrendered his army to Sherman 26 April. Jefferson Davis was captured 10 May. The last Confederate force surrendered 26 May 1865.

Leaving the Quartermaster-General in charge of the house, Welles, who by this time had been joined by Stanton, hurried down to 10th Street in a carriage. The President had been carried across that street from Ford's Theatre to a lodging-house, and laid on a bed in a narrow back room. He never recovered consciousness. 'The giant sufferer,' writes Welles, 'lay extended diagonally across the bed, which was not long enough for him. . . . His slow, full respiration lifted the clothes with each breath that he took. His features were calm and striking.' The room and the house were uncomfortably crowded. It was a dark and gloomy night, and rain fell at dawn. Crowds remained in the street, looking in vain for hope from the watchers who came out for a breath of air. 'About once an hour Mrs. Lincoln would repair to the bedside of her dying husband and with lamentation and tears remain until overcome by emotion.' A little before half-past seven the President's breathing entirely ceased. Dr. Gurley, the Lincolns' pastor, made a short prayer. Then silence, broken only by Stanton's calm sentence: 'Now he belongs to the ages.'

Welles continues, 'I went after breakfast to the Executive Mansion. There was a cheerless cold rain and everything seemed gloomy. On the Avenue in front of the White House were several hundred colored people, mostly women and children, weeping and wailing their loss. This crowd did not appear to diminish through the whole of that cold, wet day; they seemed not to know what was to be their fate since their great benefactor was dead, and their hopeless grief affected me more than almost anything else, though strong and brave men wept when I met them.'

XXXV

THE AFTERMATH OF THE WAR

1. *The Problem*

Bow down, dear land, for thou hast found release!
Thy God, in these distempered days,
Hath taught thee the sure wisdom of His ways
And through thine enemies hath wrought thy peace!
Bow down in prayer and praise!
No poorest in thy borders but may now
Lift to the juster skies a man's enfranchised brow;
O Beautiful! My Country! ours once more!

THUS James Russell Lowell, at the Harvard commemoration service of 1865, saluted, as he believed, a reunited nation purged by war of all the grossness that had accompanied its rise to power. Yet only in the narrow sense of territorial integrity had even the Union been restored. The Old South indeed was destroyed forever, and no more would politicians proclaim the sophistry that black servitude was necessary for white freedom. But the fierce passions of warfare had burnt good with evil; and in the scorched soil the new growth showed more tares than wheat. Lowell was, in fact, delivering the swan song of the New England intellectuals and reformers. In the generation to come that region would no longer furnish the nation with teachers and men of letters, but with a mongrel breed of politicians, sired by abolition out of profiteering. Industrialism and commercialism had the Middle States firmly in their grasp and were extending tentacles throughout the Middle West. The old simplicity and idealism retreated beyond the Mississippi, and materialism soon overtook them there.

The Federal Union as it had been before 1861 was never restored. Eventually all the Southern States were readmitted to a greatly strengthened and centralized Union, and resumed the same rights of home rule as the Northern States still possessed. Until then the United States were essentially two countries: a triumphant North and West, striding ahead to achieve the conquest of the continent with railway, gang-plow, and excavator; and a conquered South torn by racial struggle, and crushed in all save spirit under the rule of Northern spoilsmen and Union bayonets. The Civil War was over; a less bloody but not less cruel conflict began between victor and vanquished.

After Appomattox the United States faced problems of far-reaching importance and enormous complexity. ① The Union and Confederate armies had to be demobilized and upwards of one and one-half million men returned to the pursuits of peace. ② The administrative activities of the War Department and the Provost-General's office had to be curbed and the supremacy of civil government restored. ③ Currency and industry needed deflation to a peace basis, and reinflation to provide for the needs of an expanding nation. ④ The material devastations of war had to be repaired; the moral devastation was never wholly repaired. Four million former slaves had to be readjusted to their new condition, to find a new place in the South. There were staggering financial burdens of the war to be liquidated. Equally serious problems were presented by the new industrial revolution in the North and the agricultural revolution in the West. Foreign affairs of a most threatening nature, both in Europe and America called for immediate attention. It remained to be seen whether the generation that came through the terrible ordeal of the war would be able to wrestle with these problems of reconstruction.

The United States stood on the threshold of a new era. Modern America emerged from the period usually denominated 'Reconstruction.' In the fiery caldron of the Civil War not only the Old South was melted down but the old America — the Federal Republic of Thomas Jefferson, Henry Clay, Daniel Webster, and Andrew Jackson was volatized. The Civil War, itself a political revolution, speeded up an inevitable revolution in material economy, society, and civilization.

2. *The Revolution*

To the South the Civil War and Appomattox brought the overthrow of the planter aristocracy that had guided the destinies of that section since the days of Thomas Jefferson. A large part of this class was excluded from participation in the government, and for some of the abler leaders such as Davis and Lee the disability was never removed. Slave property valued in 1860 at over two billion dollars, was confiscated, and so were the savings and sacrifices of the South which were represented by Confederate securities. A labor system which was the very basis of Southern society was overthrown, and the agricultural regime which it served was profoundly disarranged.

As a result of all this the old planter aristocracy almost disappeared from the South. This class had suffered in the war more severely than any other group; for if the war had been 'a poor man's fight,' the poor white had nothing to lose, and his condition in 1870 was far better than in 1850. But the planters lost not only their best blood but their means of recuperation. The blows of reconstruction, more staggering than those of defeat, wasted those impalpable moral values which had been accumulated during a century or more of stewardship. Well they learned what the Knights of Aristophanes declared, twenty-four centuries ago:

There are things, then, hotter than fire, there are speeches more shameless still
Than the shameless speeches of those who rule the City at will.

And so, many of the former planters, unable to cope with the overwhelming difficulties of the new conditions, gave up the struggle to maintain themselves on the land, moved to the towns, migrated to the Northern cities, or started life anew in the West. At the same time the small farmers and poor whites of the South took advantage of the prevailing demoralization to enlarge their farms, better their condition, and elect men of their own kind, sharing instead of scorning their prejudices, to high office. A little while, and the Tillmans, Bleases, and Heflins would sit in the seats of the Hamptons, the Lees, and Breckenridges.

Yet the most clean-cut stroke of the revolution in the South was the emancipation of four million negro slaves. This was finally consummated by the Thirteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1865. By the Fourteenth Amendment the freedmen were extended federal protection for their personal and property rights, and by the Fifteenth Amendment they were given the franchise. 'The bottom rail was on top,' in the salty phrase of the time; but the poor whites did not let it stay there long.

While the old pattern of Southern society and economy was being rearranged into a new one, a corresponding revolution was being effected in the North. With the representatives of the planter class out of Congress, the spokesmen of industry, finance, and of free western land were unopposed, unless by one another. During the war they pushed through legislation to fulfil the frustrated desires of the fifties, and after Appomattox they consolidated the fruits of victory. The Republican party was firmly, and for two decades irremovably, intrenched in power. The moderate tariff of 1857 gave way to the Morrill tariff of 1861, and that to a series of war tariffs with duties scaling rapidly upward, and carefully adapted to meet the need and greed of Northern business. By the National Banking Act of 1863 the Independent Treasury system of 1846 was swept away in favor of one more attractive to business; and an act of 1865 imposed a tax of ten per cent on all state bank notes, a fatal blow that none will regret. That there might be no shortage of labor, Congress, in 1864, permitted the importation of contract labor from Europe, and though this act was repealed within a few years, the practice itself was not discontinued until the decade of the eighties. At the same time the policy of internal improvements at national expense found expression in the extravagant grants of millions of acres of public domain to railroad promoters and financiers.

While Northern industry and finance were reaping the fruits of loyalty and victory, the century-old ambition of Western farmers was satisfied by the passage of the Homestead Law of 1862. This act, limited in its application to those who 'have never borne arms against the United States Government,' granted a quarter-section (160 acres) of public domain to anyone who would undertake to cultivate it. At the same time easy access to the West was assured through the government subsidized railroads. This legislation carried out the promise of the Repubican party platform and brought to that party the support of the agricultural West for a generation.

In order to secure these new acquisitions the Repubican party sought to throw around them constitutional guarantees. The Fourteenth Amendment, with its provision that no state could deprive anyone of life, liberty or property without due process of law, protected business interests from undue interference from the states, and taught those interests to look to the Federal government and the Republican party for protection. The Fifteenth Amendment, granting the franchise to the freedmen, secured the negro vote to the Republican party.

Most of this might have come about eventually by peaceful means, though it is difficult to believe that the South would ever have accepted negro suffrage under ordinary circumstances. But the war accelerated the process, and gave to it a drastic character. Industrial America, Alexander Hamilton's embodied vision, swaggered in under the cloak of patriotism, with bayonets as a substitute for the slow process of education and economic evolution.

3. *The Prostrate South*

Physical devastation without parallel until 1914–18 preceded the social revolution in the South. Over large sections of the country Union and Confederate armies had tramped and fought, and parts of Virginia, Tennessee, South Carolina, Georgia, Arkansas, and Alabama had the appearance of enormous battlefields. Sherman had left a broad belt of blackened ruin from Atlanta to Savannah and from Savannah to North Carolina, and Sheridan had swept down the fertile Shenandoah valley like an avenging fury, leaving a trail of blackened ruins. 'We had no cattle, hogs, sheep, or horses or anything else,' wrote a native of Virginia, 'The fences were all gone. . . . The barns were all burned; a great many of the private dwellings were burned; chimneys standing without houses and houses standing without roofs, or doors or windows . . . bridges all destroyed, roads badly cut up.' From Fairfax Court House to Petersburg the region was such a wilderness that nature came back and deer ran wild in the forests. 'The Tennessee valley' (wrote Robert Somers, an English observer) 'consists for the most part of plantations in a state of semi-decay and plantations of which the ruin is total and complete.' The Governor of Arkansas wrote of his state, 'The desolations of war are beyond description. . . . Besides the utter desolation that marked the tracks of war and battle, guerrilla bands and scouting parties have pillaged almost every neighborhood. . . . It would be safe to say that two-thirds of the counties in the State are in destitute circumstances.'

All through the countryside there was ruin and desolation. Roads and bridges had been destroyed or had fallen into neglect, farms grown up in brush, river levees broken, railroads dilapidated or destroyed. Over a stretch of over a hundred miles in Alabama 'every bridge and trestle was destroyed, cross-ties rotten, buildings burned, water-tanks gone, ditches filled up, and tracks grown up in weeds and bushes.'

Some of the cities presented a picture as appalling as the rural regions. Charleston, once the proudest city of the South, had been bombarded and twice burned, and a northern visitor, Sidney Andrews, painted it as a city ' of vacant houses, of widowed women, of rotting wharves, of deserted warehouses, of weed-wild gardens, of miles of grass-grown streets, of acres of pitiful and voiceful barrenness.' Columbia, the garden-city of South Carolina, had been left a wilderness of blackened chimneys and crumbled walls. Of Richmond, the capital of the Confederacy, we read, ' All up and down, as far as the eye could reach, the business portion of the city lay in ruins. Beds of cinders, cellars half filled with bricks and rubbish, broken and blackened walls, impassable streets deluged with *debris.*' Atlanta, Mobile, Galveston, and numerous other cities of the South were in a similar plight.

The entire economic life of the South was paralyzed. Agriculture, outside of rice-growing, quickly revived, though the crops of 1865 and 1866 were partial failures; but other industries were prostrated. What manufacturing there had been was destroyed. Not a single Southern bank or insurance company was solvent, and Confederate securities into which the people had sunk their savings were now as worthless as continental currency. Shops were depleted of their goods, and everything had to be imported from the North on credit. Transportation and the postal service were paralyzed, property almost valueless, labor demoralized. The heavy federal tax on sales and on cotton, the wholesale confiscation of cotton by villainous United States Treasury agents, the continued vandalism and lawlessness that prevailed over large sections of the country, added to the general disorganization. In the decade from 1860 to 1870 the value of property in the states of Florida, Georgia, the Carolinas, Virginia, Mississippi, and Louisiana, decreased from 2,779 to 1,294 millions of dollars. Complete recovery required fifteen or twenty years.

cial. - negroes

In some of the more devastated regions actual starvation was imminent. The negroes suffered most, because unable to adjust themselves to the new situation, and literally thousands of them died of starvation. The Freedmen's Bureau and other Northern relief agencies did what they could to alleviate the suffering, but it was estimated in December 1865 that in Alabama, Mississippi, and Georgia there were over 500,000 white people who were without the necessities of life.

Social disorganization was scarcely less complete. There were scarcely any schools for the white children. School funds had been used up in the war, endowments for colleges and universities squan-


WASH.
OREGON
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W.VA.
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N.Y.
VT.
N.H.
ME.
MASS
R.I.
CONN
N.J.
DEL.
MD.
☐ LESS THAN 100%
▨ MORE THAN 100%
▩ DECREASE
■ NOT REPORTED

Increase of Farm Property by States, 1860–1870

dered or confiscated. Churches had been destroyed, congregations and clergy scattered. Old planter communities had been permanently disrupted, the planter class reduced to penury and impotence. Young men of family who had interrupted their education to fight for Southern independence had to labor in the fields to keep their families from starving; and a planter's family which still had young men was deemed fortunate. Seventy-year-old Thomas Dabney, once a proud Mississippi planter, did all the family wash for years after the war. General Pendleton plowed his own few acres. George Fitzhugh, the philosopher of the Cotton Kingdom, who had lectured at Harvard and Yale, lived in a poor shanty among his former slaves. We hear of a Confederate Colonel peddling his wife's pies to the Northern soldiers, of a faithful black supporting his old master's family by wages earned in valeting a United States officer, of white women yoked to the plow. 'Pretty much the whole of life has been merely not dying,' wrote a Southern poet, Sidney Lanier.

4. *The Freedmen*

The negro was the central figure of reconstruction in the South, and the problems precipitated by his abrupt emancipation the most complex. Upward of a million negroes had in one way or another become free before the end of the war. Victory and the Thirteenth Amendment set free approximately three million more, but in the worst possible manner for themselves and for their white neighbors. Never before in the history of the world had full civil and political rights been conferred at one stroke on so large a body of men, and never had men been so totally unprepared to assume the new status assigned to them. Many negroes thought that freedom meant no more work and proceeded to celebrate an endless 'day ob jubilo'; others believed that every negro would be given 'forty acres and a mule' by the government, or that the property of their former masters would be divided among them.

Every nigger's gwine to own a mule,
    Jubili, Jubilo
Every nigger's gwine to own a mule,
An' live like Adam in de Golden Rule
An' send his chillun to de white-folks' school!
    In de year of Jubilo![1]

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[1] Stephen Benét, *John Brown's Body.*

Thousands took to the woods or to the road, or clustered around the United States army posts, living on doles or dying of camp diseases. Said one of the colored leaders, Frederick Douglass, the negro was 'free from the old quarter that once gave him shelter, but a slave to the rains of summer and to the frosts of winter. He was turned loose, naked, hungry, and destitute to the open sky.' Deaths among the black men from starvation, disease and violence in the first two years of freedom probably equalled the total fatalities in the Confederate army during the war. Fortunate indeed were those who remained faithful to their old masters and continued to work for mere subsistence.

Fair-minded Southerners at once addressed themselves to the problem of providing for the freedmen and adjusting them to their new circumstances. Most planters sought to keep their former slaves as hired help or as tenant farmers, or on the share-crop system, but the newly emancipated negro did not take kindly to labor during the first year of his freedom. Reason and persuasion failing, the Southern States attempted to deal with the situation by a series of laws collectively known as the 'black codes,' which embodied the Southern solution to the negro problem.

These black codes provided for relationships between the whites and blacks in harmony with realities rather than with abstract theory. They conferred upon the freedmen fairly extensive privileges, gave them the essential rights of citizens to contract, sue and be sued, to own and inherit property, and testify in court; they made some provision for education. In no instance were the freedmen accorded the vote or made eligible for juries. Owing to their well-known aversion from steady work they were required to have some settled occupation, and subjected to special penalties for violation of labor contracts. In some states laws closing to the freedmen every occupation save domestic and agricultural service betrayed a poor-white jealousy of the negro artisan. On the other hand there were special provisions to protect the negro from undue exploitation and swindling. On the whole the black codes corresponded fairly closely to the essential fact that nearly four million ex-slaves needed special attention until they were ready to mingle in free society on equal terms. But in several states there was also evident a desire to keep them in a permanent position of tutelage, if not of peonage. Southern whites who had never dreamed it possible to live side by side with the free negroes believed their new laws to be liberal and generous, and some deplored the 'sheer excess of privilege and license' with which, they asserted, the freedman was surrounded. But from the point of view of the North the black codes were a palpable evasion of the Emancipation Proclamation, and throughout this section they aroused a storm of indignation and an irresistible demand that the Federal government should step in to protect the former slaves. This object, eventually embalmed in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, was first pursued through the agencies of the Freedmen's Bureau, the Union League, and military government.

The Freedmen's Bureau of the War Department was created by Congress March 3, 1865, for a period of one year after the close of the war, and given general powers of relief and guardianship over negroes and refugees and administration of abandoned lands. General O. O. Howard, the 'Christian soldier,' was in charge of its activities, and hundreds of its agents were distributed throughout the South charged with the responsibility of aiding the negro to adjust himself to his new circumstances. This work being still unfinished in 1866, the existence of the Bureau was extended to 1869 and its educational activities to 1872.

The chief activities of the Bureau were relief work for both races, administration of justice in cases involving freedmen, and development of educational facilities for the blacks. In one month, September 1865, the Bureau distributed almost a million and a half rations to white men and black. In the four and one-half years of its existence the Bureau established over a hundred hospitals, gave medical aid to well over a million patients, and expended over six million dollars on negro schools. This was not Northern charity; far from it, for the total cost of the Bureau as well as every other federal expense in Southern Reconstruction was more than covered by a heavy tax on cotton, which, by 1869 had yielded over sixty-eight million dollars.

Although the Freedmen's Bureau gave invaluable aid to the negro during the critical period of transition from slavery to freedom, it soon ceased to fulfill its original purpose and became a political machine of the Republican party. Many of its subaltern officials were men of low character who enriched themselves at the expense of both negro and white. 'There *may* be an honest man connected with the Bureau,' said General Wade Hampton caustically, and an official report characterized the agents as 'generally of a class of fanatics without character or responsibility.' They tyrannized over the whites, kept the negro in a state of dependency, and fomented ill feeling between the races. Officials of the Bureau were almost invariably members of the Union League, a secret organization to exploit the freedmen for the benefit of the Republican party and to keep the 'carpet-baggers' and 'scalawags' in control of local politics in the South. There can be no doubt that the Freedmen's Bureau did more than almost any other agency to exasperate the Southern whites and that it complicated rather than solved the problem of adjusting the negro to his new status.

Despite this ignoble struggle for the control of the negro, and with all the vicissitudes in his own fortunes, he made real progress during these years. The process of readjustment was a painful one, and had it not been for the enlightened good-will and intelligent co-operation of the best class of Southern whites, it would have been well-nigh impossible. The negroes themselves wanted principally land and education. Agitation for political rights came almost exclusively from Northern politicians and idealists.

As rapidly as educational facilities could be provided the blacks took advantage of them. The Freedmen's Bureau erected schools, Northern philanthropic agencies helped, and the new constitutions of the reconstructed states made provision for free public education for blacks as well as whites. By 1877 there were about six hundred thousand negroes in Southern schools, several normal and industrial schools, such as Hampton and Tuskegee, had been established, and Howard, Fisk and Atlanta Universities were giving instruction in higher education. Private foundations such as the George Peabody, the John F. Slater, and the Julius Rosenwald funds have since contributed to the educational development of the negro; and Southern states now generally recognize their responsibility to black children, although seldom affording them facilities equal to those of the whites.

In land ownership, too, the freedmen made considerable progress. Beginning for the most part as tenant farmers, or share-croppers, on liberal terms, many negroes took advantage of the cheapness of land to become landowners. By 1900 they held some thirteen million acres of farm land in the South and as tenants cultivated double that amount.

Yet economically emancipation altered the form rather than the substance of the negro's status, for at least a generation after Appomattox. The transition from slave to independent farmer was a long and a painful one, made, generally, through the medium of tenancy. Without the requisite capital to purchase a farm, a mule, and agricultural implements, and without credit except such as was cautiously extended by white bankers, storekeepers or planters, the majority of the freedmen were unable to rise above the share-cropper or tenant class. The transition is vividly described by a contemporary observer in 1880:

> 'The plantation underwent all of the changes of the transition period except that in mobility of labor, for none of the Negroes left. In 1860 the Barrow's plantation of a thousand acres at Oglethorpe, Georgia, contained about 25 Negro families living in the quarters centered around the big house. For several years following emancipation the force of laborers was divided into two squads, the arrangement and method of cultivating being very much the same as in the ante bellum days. Each squad was under the control of a foreman who was in the nature of a general of volunteers. . . . The laborers were paid a portion of the crop as their wages which made them feel interested in it. . . . After a while, however, even the liberal control of the foreman grew irksome. The two squads split up into smaller and smaller squads, still working for a part of the crop with the owners' teams, until this method of farming came to involve great trouble and loss. The mules were ill-treated, the crop was frequently badly worked, and in many cases not honestly divided. It became necessary to reorganize the plantation. The owner sold his mules to the Negroes on credit, thus placing the risk from careless handling upon the tenants. The gang system was abandoned, and the land was divided so as to give each family its individual tract. When some of them had to walk a mile it became impracticable to keep the cabins grouped. One by one the workers moved their house on to their farms, settling in convenient places near springs. The plantation now contained 999 acres as one acre had been given for a schoolhouse and a church. The system of sharing was abandoned for cash rent in kind, especially cotton. The Negroes planted what they pleased and worked when they liked, except that the landlord required that enough cotton be planted to pay the rent. . . .'

Thus the blacks continued to work in the cotton fields, to live in the shacks provided for them by the former master or by his children, and on credit granted or withheld by the same hands. Their status was somewhat improved, and it was not difficult for the more industrious and brighter of them to make themselves independent. A few, indeed, achieved prosperity, a small piece of land and a

Ford car; others drifted north to work in industrial centers; but the majority remained on land that belonged to others, plodding behind the plow in the spring and picking cotton in the fall, reasonably sure of food and shelter and clothing, a Saturday afternoon in town, and a Sunday at revival meetings, continuing in the ways of their fathers and their fathers' fathers.

Socially and economically the negro in the South is now working out his own salvation. Under the leadership of enlightened men of his own race such as Booker T. Washington and Frederick Douglass, men who were more interested in getting something to recognize than in getting recognition, the freedman has succeeded in adjusting himself to his new circumstances with an extraordinary degree of success. Emancipation did not solve the negro problem but it inaugurated an era when the negro himself was to have a voice in its solution.

5. *The New South*

It is comparatively easier for an agricultural than for an industrial civilization to recover from the devastations of war, for though crops may be destroyed, machinery rust, and the arteries of commerce clogged, the land remains. Recovery began in certain sections of the South with Appomattox, and a crop was raised for market in 1865. With amazing courage the battle-scarred veterans doffed their gray and turned to the task of reconstruction. Henry Grady celebrated this theme in one of the greatest of his orations: 'As ruin was never before so overwhelming, never was restoration swifter. The soldier stepped from the trenches into the furrow; horses that had charged Federal guns marched before the plow, and fields that ran red with human blood in April, were green with the harvest in June.' The old plantation regime was gone forever, but gradually the Southern scene took on its familiar appearance. The fields bloomed white with cotton bolls, houses, roads, fences were repaired; the negro, after a year or two of wandering, returned to the farm, a tenant now, instead of a slave. By 1870 the cotton crop surpassed that of 1860; by 1900 it was almost trebled. Overnight Southern cities rose from their ruins: Atlanta was soon a bustling railroad and business center, the metropolis of the lower South; Columbia, Charleston, Richmond, and New Orleans were rebuilt, and new cities such as Birmingham and Durham sprang into existence. Physical restoration, however, was more rapid than cultural: it was half a century before the South was able to repair the damages to her educational and religious systems.

One of the most significant changes brought about by the outcome of the war was the redistribution of land, and the rise of the small farmer and the poor white to power. Everywhere in the South the ruin of the old planter class threw millions of acres of good land on the market, and there followed a redistribution of land more sweeping than at any other period in our history. If land ownership is basic to democracy, as Jefferson believed, the Civil War brought democracy to the South.

It may be illuminating to analyze somewhat more closely this redistribution of land. In 1860 there were 33,171 farms in South Carolina, 55,128 in Alabama, and 17,328 in Louisiana; twenty years later the figures were 93,328 for South Carolina, 135,864 for Alabama and 48,292 for Louisiana — an increase of over one hundred per cent in each case. As the number of farms doubled and trebled, the average acreage declined. In 1860 the average Georgia farm was 429 acres, by 1880 this had shrunk to 187; the average for Louisiana in 1860 was 536, in 1880 171. The same tendencies were observable in every one of the Southern states, and continued unabated down to the twentieth century. In the half century after 1860, the average acreage of farms in eleven Southern states decreased from 335 to 114, while in the same period the average Northern farm increased from 126 to 143 acres.[2] At the same time millions of acres were taken up in the land west of the Mississippi, indicating already before the close of the century the passing of the center of cotton production from the Atlantic seaboard to Texas.

What this meant was the rise of the small farmer to economic and, eventually, to political importance, and the partial emancipation of the poor white class. The Populist movement of the late eighties and the nineties was the political manifestation of this new status. Under the leadership of such men as Benjamin R. Tillman of South Carolina and Marion Butler of North Carolina, the rule of the old planter families and the Confederate veterans was challenged and sometimes shattered. Though the South remained solidly Democratic, in party allegiance, the passing of the old county court oli-

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[2] Average acreage of farms in eleven Southern states by decade:

1860	335	1890	139
1870	214	1900	138
1880	153	1910	114

garchies constituted a political revolution as sweeping as the economic one.

Significant as were the changes in the status of small farmers and freedmen, the agricultural revolution touched the South less than any other large section of the country. Despite the disappearance of the large plantation and the emancipation of the negro, the Cotton Kingdom of to-day is in many essential respects much as it was before the Civil War. The South is still a one-crop section — this despite the growing diversification of agriculture — and what Rupert Vance calls the 'Cotton Culture Complex' still dominates that section. The labor force shows fewer changes than in other parts of the country. Though the farms are smaller, tenancy is more widespread. The application of science and invention to agriculture has wrought fewer changes in the Cotton Kingdom than elsewhere, for cotton is the one important crop that refuses to yield to machinery and the boll weevil to science; and proportionately less money is invested in machinery and fertilizer here than in any other section.

When Henry Grady, editor of the Atlanta *Constitution,* in a famous oration at New York in 1886, celebrated the *New South,* he coined a phrase that stuck. What most strikingly differentiates the 'New' South from the 'Old' South, is the rise of industry and manufactures. The effect of the plantation system was to stratify industrial activities and to tie up all available capital in slaves. The destruction of this system released capital for new enterprises and directed energies into new channels. The result was the rise of an industrial system which profoundly affected the whole southern economy and society.

It is an error to suppose that manufacturing was unknown in the South before the Civil War. As early as 1810 the value of textile products in North Carolina surpassed that of Massachusetts, and by 1860 the South had some fifteen per cent of the manufacturing establishments of the country turning out approximately eight per cent of the total produce. The War destroyed most of these establishments and paralyzed industrial activities for a decade, but the seventies and eighties witnessed a recrudescence of manufacturing on a broader and firmer basis. The natural resources of this section were as yet but little exploited; cheap labor was available in almost unlimited quantities; coal, timber, and water-power could be had as readily as in New England or Pennsylvania; the transportation system was rapidly restored; and capital could be procured from the North. Grady, in his oration on *The South and her Problems,* boasted of these advantages, and prophesied a future of unparalleled development: ' In 1880 the South made 212,000 tons of iron, in 1887, 845,000 tons. She is now actually building, or has finished this year, furnaces that will produce more than her entire product last year. Birmingham alone will produce more iron in 1889 than the entire South produced in 1887. Our coal supply is exhaustless, Texas alone having 6000 square miles. In marble and granite we have no rivals, as to quantity or quality. In lumber our riches are even vaster. More than fifty per cent. of our entire area is in forests, making the South the best timbered region in the world.'

Grady's predictions as to the development of mining, iron and steel manufacturing and lumbering proved justified, but he neglected to emphasize the most notable of Southern industries: textiles. For generations Southerners had been accustomed to send their cotton to the mills of New England where the manufacturing establishments, capital, and facilities for world marketing were well organized. The monopoly of New England mills was challenged in the eighties; and by the beginning of the twentieth century the competition from North and South Carolina and Georgia was so serious as to threaten the derangement of the entire fabric of New England economy. Proximity to raw material, cheap labor, freedom from legal restrictions, and low taxes, all gave Southern mills an initial advantage. As early as 1906 one half the raw cotton was consumed by Southern mills. Of the first five textile manufacturing states in 1920, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia ranked second, third, and fourth.

The development of the textile industry in the South necessitated grave social and economic readjustments. It introduced to Southern economy a labor problem of an unprecedented nature; to Southern society a social problem that has so far defied solution; to Southern politics new considerations that acted as a solvent on the old political solidarity. The transition from rural to urban culture, from an agrarian to an industrial economy, proved no less painful in the New South than it had been in early nineteenth-century New England. Small mills were established in scores of little North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia towns, financed by local capital, managed by local enterprize, supported by local pride and securing their labor force from the immediate neighborhood. Some were established for sheer economic motives, others to 'benefit the town' as a whole, still others for the ostensible purpose of providing employment for the poor. These, mostly from the poor-white class, welcomed the opportunity to exchange their drab and impoverished existence for the dubious attractions of the mill village. 'To such people,' writes Holland Thompson, authority on the New South, 'the cotton-mill offered a means of escape from bitter poverty. A family whose crops often did not pay the store accounts, whose members handled almost no money, heard with amazement of twenty or twenty-five dollars earned by a family in a single week. The whole family had worked on the farm, as families have done since farming began, and for the family to work in the mill seemed a natural procedure. The usual result was that the children worked, though the father often failed to find employment and became a hypochondriac or a loafer. . . . Life, even in an isolated factory village, was more interesting than on a farm, and the houses in a mill village, however monotonous they might be in appearance, were much superior to the average tenant cabin.'[3] Woman and child labor was the normal result of this situation, and it was, until recently, unchecked either by public opinion or by law.

Though certain cities such as Albemarle, Durham, Gastonia, and Winston-Salem, in North Carolina, Columbia, in South Carolina, West Point, in Georgia, and Elizabethtown, in Tennessee, became textile centers, the industry was much less concentrated and much less specialized in the South than in New England. The establishment of local mills introduced a new element into many an old Southern town — the 'mill village,' inhabited by laborers recruited from near-by farms, its very existence often ignored by respectable folks much as respectable folks in Northern towns ignored the 'red light' districts. The mill village clustered around the smokestacks of the factory much as a medieval village clustered around the towers of the feudal castle, and the manager of the mill ruled his community much as a feudal lord ruled his manor. 'It is not surprising,' writes the same authority, 'that the manager came to think of himself as divinely appointed. In the village his word was law. He controlled the whole economic life. Any immoral or otherwise obnoxious person could be discharged from the mill and evicted from the factory tenement. No minister or teacher advanced doctrines contrary to the established mores.' By the opening of the twentieth cen-

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[3] 'The Southern Textile Situation.' *South Atlantic Quarterly,* April, 1930.


▨ REPORTING COTTON 1922
— — —LINE OF BOLL WEEVIL REGION 1922
—·—·—LINE OF BOLL WEEVIL REGION 1901

Cotton Producing Area in the United States, 1922

tury the New South had gone a long way in substituting industrial feudalism for the agrarian feudalism of the Old.

Scarcely less striking was the development of the tobacco industry, mining, the manufacture of iron and steel, lumbering and oil. Winston-Salem and Durham, North Carolina, became the greatest tobacco centers in the world and the names of Reynolds and Duke came to be conjured with in North Carolina much as those of Carnegie and Schwab in Pennsylvania. The rise of Birmingham to one of the great steel centers of the country was a phenomenon comparable to the rise of Pittsburgh. With the practical exhaustion of the timber stands of New England, New York, and Michigan, the industry moved south to the pine forests of Louisiana and Mississippi, exploiting and desolating here as in the North. And the plains of Texas and Oklahoma which was once the Cattle Kingdom became part of the domain of oil.

It is to this industrialization that students refer when they speak of the 'New' South. Yet we must not be deceived by the phrase. Industrialization is common to the whole of post-Civil War United States, and there is no more a 'New' South than there is a 'New' North or a 'New' West. Indeed, the Middle West and the Pacific coast have advanced more rapidly along the path of industry than the seaboard South: Minnesota, generally considered an agricultural state, outranked any Southern state in 1920 in the value of its manufactured products. The South of 1920 accounted for but a slightly larger proportion of the total manufacturing product of the country than the South of 1860. Indeed, far more than other sections, the South has escaped those two concomitants of industry — urbanization and immigration. Basically, indeed, the South has undergone fewer changes than almost any other section. It is still, as it was in 1860, predominantly rural; it is still largely a one-crop section, and if King Cotton has been deposed, he is still a lively Pretender. The population of the Southern States is almost entirely of native stock. The problem of white and black still hangs like a dark cloud on the Southern horizon, and the necessity of keeping his a 'white man's country' still dominates the Southerner's psychology. South of the Mason and Dixon line is still the Bible belt, home of orthodoxy and revivalism; and despite recent political reverses, that section still supports the party of Jefferson, Calhoun, and Davis.

XXXVI

RECONSTRUCTION, POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL

1. *Reconstruction*

RECONSTRUCTION had been a subject of discussion in the North since the beginning of the war. As usual with American political issues involving sectional balance, the discussion took place on the plane of constitutional theory. It turned largely on the question whether the seceded states were in or out of the Union when their rebellion was crushed. From the Northern premise that secession was illegal, strict logic reached the conclusion that former states of the Confederacy were now states of the Union, with all the rights and privileges pertaining thereto. If, on the contrary, secession was valid, the South might consistently be treated as conquered territory, without any legal rights that the Union was required to respect. Yet both sides adopted the proper deductions from the other's premise. Radical Republicans, the most uncompromising nationalists, managed to prove to their satisfaction that the Southern States had lost or forfeited their rights, or as Sumner liked to put it, were *felo de se;* while former secessionists clamored for privileges in the Union they had declared to be irrevocably dissolved!

Lincoln in his last speech, on April 11, 1865, declared that this question whether the Southern States were in or out of the Union was a 'pernicious abstraction.' 'Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had ever been abroad.' Obviously these states were 'not in their proper practical relation with the Union.' The object of all should be to 'get them into that proper practical relation' again. Lincoln, indeed, had already been actively pursuing that policy. At the time of his death loyal state governments, organized by virtue of his proclamation in 1863, controlled almost the whole of Tennessee, and a large part of Arkansas and Louisiana. But even they were subject to military control and

Congress refused to admit their elected representatives, or even to recognize their existence, even though the Vice-President, who according to the Constitution must be a 'citizen of the United States,' was from Tennessee!

Congressional opposition to Lincoln's plan was due in part to legislative *esprit de corps,* in part to the hatred engendered by the war. To the Radicals it seemed monstrous that traitors and rebels should be re-admitted to full fellowship in the Union they had repudiated. But the real motive behind this appeal to passion was political. If the Southern States returned a solid Democratic contingent to Congress, as appeared inevitable, the reunited Democratic party would have a majority in both Houses. It would be the Union as in Buchanan's time, administered by 'rebels' and 'copperheads.' Even those Northerners who were willing to admit that Davis and Stephens might be honest men did not care to see them at their old desks in the Senate, shouting for 'Southern rights.' As Thaddeus Stevens put it, the Southern States 'ought never to be recognized as capable of acting in the Union, or of being counted as valid states, until the Constitution shall have been so amended . . . as to secure perpetual ascendancy to the party of the Union'—the Republican party, of course. The amendment that Stevens had in mind was negro suffrage. By this brilliant device, selfish and cynical politicians obtained the support of humanitarians and doctrinaires who believed political franchise necessary to protect and uplift the freedmen.

If Lincoln had lived, there is some likelihood that his policy of wisdom, justice, and magnanimity would have prevailed; for in spite of his death the Radicals had great difficulty in imposing their policy of vengeance on the country. For about six weeks after the assassination there was a petty reign of terror, directed by Secretary Stanton, and enhanced by President Johnson, who had always been in favor of hanging 'traitors' when apprehended. Only the stern intervention of Grant prevented the seizure of Lee and other Confederate generals. Colossal rewards for Davis and his cabinet, as alleged promoters of the murder of Lincoln, resulted in their capture; and 'Hang Jeff Davis' became as popular a cry as 'Hang the Kaiser' in 1918. But the charge of complicity in the murder was soon seen to be preposterous, and, since it was obviously impossible to get a Virginia jury to convict Davis of treason, that charge was wisely directed to the circumlocution office. Thirst for vengeance appeared to be slaked by shooting the assassin, and by hanging his three accomplices and the unfortunate woman who had harbored them, after an extra-legal trial by a military tribunal.

2. *The South Accepts Defeat*

'I am satisfied that the mass of thinking people in the South accept the situation of affairs in good faith' wrote General Grant to the President, after a journey of observation in the summer of 1865. 'Slavery and State rights they regard as having been settled forever by the highest tribunal — arms — that man can resort to. . . . I was pleased to learn . . . that they not only accepted the situation arrived at as final, but now that the smoke of battle has cleared away and time has been given for reflection, that this decision has been a fortunate one for the whole country. . . .' 'No matter what change we may desire in the feelings and thoughts of the people South, we cannot accomplish it by force' wrote General Sherman to his brother the Senator. 'You hardly yet realize how completely this country has been devastated, and how competely humbled every man of the South is.' Every one now admits that Grant and Sherman were right. Without in the least admitting that her cause had been wrong the South accepted her defeat as final and irrevocable, and very definitely put aside all thought of revenge. The South accepted the advice of Lee, that her allegiance was now due to the United States, and that her duty was to create a new and better South within the Union. Lee himself set a noble example to his countrymen by his serene acquiescence in trial by battle, and by accepting the presidency of Washington College, at Lexington, Virginia.

Yet allegiance could not be transferred in a day, and the process was hardly complete before the century ended. Young hotheads among the Confederate officers, old 'fire-eaters' who had never been under fire, and many women, most inveterate of 'rebels,' refused to be 'reconstructed.' A few thousand irreconcilables emigrated to Europe, Brazil or Mexico, but the great majority followed the advice of Lee to 'remain, if possible, in the country; promote harmony and good-feeling; qualify themselves to vote.' Even the hardships of the next decade and the likelihood of foreign complications for the United States failed to produce any organization, open or secret, to recover Southern independence. There was no attempt to keep alive a phantom Confederacy, no watching for an hour of American difficulty to make Southern opportunity. Therein the political common sense of English-speaking peoples had, perhaps, its most striking illustration. Thereby Lincoln's belief, that the irreconcilable differences between North and South would disappear with slavery, was completely proved. Like the Scots Highlanders, the Southern gentry to this day cherish the memory of their lost cause, yet few do not rejoice that it was lost.

Although the Southern people were ready to acknowledge the Union in 1865, they expected to receive their acknowledged rights within the Union; and if they accepted the abolition of slavery, it did not mean that they acknowledged the political or social equality of the negro. Therein they were worlds apart from the Northern Radicals who expected the South not only to submit but to repent, and to do works meet for repentance, and who proposed, in the words of Thaddeus Stevens, to 'humble the proud traitors.' And the longer the restoration of their rights was postponed, the more causes for friction developed. As armies of occupation go, the Union army was small in numbers — less than 20,000 by the end of 1866 — and well behaved. But tens of thousands of negroes were enrolled in the state militias, armed and drilled. The use of negro troops for police purposes was neither wise nor just, and Grant protested against it in vain. Equally unfortunate was the attitude of the better class of Southern women. Unlike the men, they did not realize the completeness of the Union victory; and their provocative attitude of defiance and contempt towards all 'Yankees' turned many a Northern soldier who was eager to help and ready to forget, into a bitter Radical.

3. *The Presidential Plan*

Nevertheless, the presidential plan of reconstruction progressed smoothly during the year 1865. President Johnson first announced, 'Treason is a crime and must be punished. Treason must be made infamous, and traitors must be impoverished.' But after a brief interval of vindictiveness he swung around to the opposite extreme and made Lincoln's policy of reconciliation his own. While Congress was not in session, he proceeded to carry on Lincoln's reconstruction program. The theory underlying his policy was the indestructibility of a state. Johnson, later Lincoln, held that the Southern States never had been out of the Union, and that the constitutional relations of the states to the Federal government were unaffected; but that until loyal governments were re-established the vitality of the states was suspended. Johnson proceeded, therefore, to appoint provisional civil governors in all the Confederate States where Lincoln had not already done so. These governors proceeded to summon state constitutional conventions, which were elected by the 'white-washed rebels' — former citizens of the Confederacy who took the oath of allegiance required by presidential proclamation. Fourteen specified classes, assumed to be inveterate rebels, were not allowed to vote.[1] Although many of the proscribed received special pardons from President Johnson, the general effect was to exclude natural leaders and experienced statesmen from the new state governments. Broadly speaking they were poor-white governments.

The constitutional conventions declared invalid the ordinances of secession, repudiated the state war debts, declared slavery abolished, and amended the former state constitutions. Elections were promptly held under these constitutions, and by the new year 1866 regular civil administrations were functioning in all the former Confederate states except Texas. The President restored the writ of habeas corpus, and on 20 August 1866 declared the 'insurrection' at an end, 'and that peace, order, tranquillity and civil authority now exist in and throughout the whole of the United States of America.'

Such was the fact; yet within a few months all Lincoln's and Johnson's work of reconstruction was undone, and the Southern States cast once more into the political melting-pot.

4. *Congress Intervenes*

The Congress which met for the first time on 4 December 1865 showed its temper by forbidding the clerk of the House even to read the names of members-elect from the reconstructed states at the first roll-call. The Radical leaders shrewdly postponed any definite decision on the ground that Congress was not yet properly informed. A joint committee of both Houses was appointed with authority to investigate and report on the title of the Southern members-elect to be received. A majority of this Joint Committee on Reconstruction was Radical. It was in fact a resurrection of the old Committee on the Conduct of the War. Immediately it began to take testimony on the condition of the South from witnesses who, for the most part, were selected to prove that the new state governments established by the President were composed of inveterate rebels, whose object was to oppress loyal white men and re-enslave the freedmen. All this was due largely to the shrewd management of Thaddeus Stevens of Pennsylvania, leader of the Republicans in the House of Representatives, and for two years the virtual ruler of the United States.

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[1] Including all civil officers of the Confederacy and state governors, general officers of the Confederate army, former U. S. officers or congressmen who resigned their commissions or seats, and other Confederates worth over $20,000. Confederate common soldiers were not disfranchised under this or any subsequent plan of reconstruction although they were ineligible for office under the congressional plan.

Stevens is one of the most unpleasant characters in American history. A harsh, sombre, friendless old man of seventy-four, and with no redeeming spark of magnanimity, he was moved less by sympathy for the negro than by cold hatred of the Southern gentry. The former he would exalt to a status of complete political and social equality, the latter he would humiliate, disfranchise, and despoil of all landed property in favor of the freedmen. 'I have never desired bloody punishments to any great extent,' he announced, 'but there are punishments quite as appalling and longer remembered than death. They are more advisable, because they would reach a greater number. Strip a proud nobility of their bloated estates; reduce them to a level with plain republicans; send them forth to labor and teach their children to enter the workshops or handle a plow, and you will thus humble the proud traitors.' Stevens regarded the Southern States as conquered provinces, and insisted that Congress should treat them as such — 'and settle them with new men and drive the present rebels as exiles from this country.' Upon the basis of this theory Congress could do just about as it pleased with the former Confederate States, and this theory underlay much reconstruction of the next two years.

Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, Republican leader in the Senate, was a complete doctrinaire, a Yankee Brissot. Against the ex-Confederates he cherished no vindictive feelings, but without personal knowledge of the negroes he believed them no exception to the dogma of equality, and that they only wanted the vote to prove it. He advanced the theory that the Southern States had committed political suicide, had extinguished their standing as states and were in the position of territories subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. Vain, over-educated, and irritable, Sumner could be influenced only by flattery. The New England intellectuals looked to him for leadership, his polished orations impressed the commonalty, and he gave to the Radical movement a tinge of idealism and altruism that was badly needed.

While Sumner declaimed on the rights and wrongs of the colored race, Stevens played for time. It would not do to make an issue of negro suffrage on its merits, for very few Northern states outside New England allowed negroes to vote, but it was forced on the District of Columbia despite a popular vote of 7,369 against and only 36 in favor of the proposition. The Freedmen's Bureau was given a new lease on life when its legitimate work was almost completed, and made a political machine. The prospect of 'whitewashed rebels' controlling the Southern States and uniting with 'copperheads' to dominate Congress was allowed to dim the clear vision imparted by Lincoln. The new Southern legislatures, despite some prominent figureheads, were directed by men of slight experience, who innocently passed laws irritating Northern sentiment, — not only the black codes, but providing pensions for Confederate veterans, and changing the names of counties to honor chieftains of the lost cause. All this was heavy ammunition for Radical propaganda, and it made the Lincoln-Johnson reconstruction policy almost impossible of consummation.

5. *Andrew Johnson*

Lincoln's political astuteness might have defeated the sharp-witted leaders of the Radicals, if only by appealing over their heads to honest men. President Johnson simply played into the Radicals' hands. Like Tyler in 1841 he was the nominal head of a party of which he was not really a member. A War Democrat from a seceded state, he had been placed on the same ticket with Lincoln to emphasize the Unionism of the Republican party in 1864. Of origin as humble as Lincoln's, in early life a tailor in a Tennessee mountain village and unable to write until taught by his wife, he possessed many of Lincoln's virtues but lacked his ability to handle men. Self-educated and self-trained, he possessed a powerful though not well-disciplined mind, fine oratorical abilities, and a trenchant pen that was to cast consternation into the ranks of his opponents time and again. United with these intellectual qualities were the virtues of personal integrity, devotion to duty, and courage. He had been the ablest spokesman of Southern democracy, and no truer democrat ever occupied the Presidential chair. His policy was identical with

Lincoln's; but he was unable to connect with Northern opinion. Yet Johnson is perhaps the most maligned and misunderstood of all our Presidents. In the historical literature of the last half century he is represented at the best as a pugnacious ignoramus, at the worst as a drunken ruffian. Actually he had most of the civil and moral virtues, and timidity rather than pugnacity was his fault. No President was ever in a more difficult situation. The Radicals, including most of the professional Republican politicians, controlled the party machinery; and the civil service looked to them for leadership. Seward and Welles were loyal to the President, but Stanton, with his customary duplicity, used the machinery of the War Department against him, and kept the Radicals posted on Cabinet secrets.

Johnson threw down the gauntlet to Congress in February 1866 by vetoing bills which extended the Freedmen's Bureau and forbade the states to discriminate between citizens on the ground of race or color. The second, the Civil Rights Bill, was passed over his veto; and the fight was on. Having accepted the issue Johnson should at once have remodelled his cabinet, and removed federal officials who were working against him. But unlike Tyler, he did not have the courage to split his adopted party. Consequently the Radicals were able to unfold their program with no opposition save the President's vetoes, and to continue their propaganda against him and against the South. Under the greatest provocation he remained silent; while Stevens on the floor of Congress referred to him as an 'alien enemy, a citizen of a foreign state' and Sumner called him 'an insolent drunken brute in comparison with which Caligula's horse was respectable.'

In April 1866 the Joint Committee reported a congressional plan for reconstruction, in its essence a denial of statehood to the South until negro equality should be incorporated in their laws. This plan was embodied in what subsequently became the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which guaranteed civil rights to the negro, disqualified ex-Confederates who had formerly held federal office, and forbade the payment of Confederate war debts. Southern representatives would be admitted to Congress, it was announced, only on the condition of their states ratifying this amendment.

The issue was now joined between the President and the majority in Congress. Everything turned on the election of a new Congress in the autumn of 1866. A National Union Convention of moderate men from both sections pledged support of the President but it did not form a new party or create party machinery. Hence, in most congressional districts voters had to choose between a Radical Republican and a copperhead Democrat. Johnson did not manage his campaign well. He was, Seward said, the best stump speaker in the country, but as Secretary Welles shrewdly remarked, the President should not be a stump speaker. Johnson seemed incapable of advocating a policy of tolerance in a tolerant manner, and his ' swing around the circle,' a stumping tour of the Middle West, became, in many instances, an undignified contest of vituperation. Instead of appealing to the memory of Lincoln, and to the finer popular instincts, he called names and rattled the dry bones of state rights. Probably no orator, the New York *Nation* caustically remarked, ever accomplished so much by a fortnight's speaking. The Radicals, on the other hand, were remarkable political generals. Concealing their intention to force negro suffrage on the South (since the Middle West was still anti-negro) they made ' patriotism ' the single issue. Reiterated tales of Southern defiance and atrocity, race riots at Memphis and New Orleans for which Southern leaders were in no way responsible, bewildered Northern opinion. ' Jefferson Davis is in the casement at Fortress Monroe, but Andrew Johnson is doing his work,' declared Sumner.

> ' Witness Memphis, witness New Orleans. Who can doubt that the President is the author of these tragedies? Charles IX of France was not more completely the author of the massacre of St. Bartholomew than Andrew Johnson is the author of these recent massacres now crying out for judgment. . . . Next to Jefferson Davis stands Andrew Johnson as [the Republic's] worst enemy.'

Under such circumstances it is not surprising that the Northern people returned a sufficient majority to override the presidential vetoes.

Johnson has been criticised unjustly for not bowing to the ' will of the people,' and advising the Southern state governments to ratify the Fourteenth Amendment in order to mollify Northern sentiment, and get their representatives admitted. But he knew perfectly well that Congress had no intention of receiving Southern representatives until negro suffrage had been established and the land of ex-rebels confiscated: until Northern supremacy had been written into the Constitution. So Johnson nailed his colors to the mast, and defied Congress to do its worst.

6. *Reconstruction in Effect*

Congress took the results of the fall elections of 1866 as a vindication of its ‘ thorough ’ policy, and proceeded to legislate in a truculent temper. By the Tenure of Office Act, 2 March 1867, an old custom of the Constitution was overridden by requiring the advice and consent of the Senate for all removals from office. This law was expressly designed to hamper and embarrass the President,[2] and the Command of the Army Act practically deprived the Executive of control of that arm of the government. On the same day Thaddeus Stevens whipped through the most important piece of legislation of the period: the first Reconstruction Act, which swept away the existing governments in all the ex-Confederate States save Tennessee, and divided them into five military districts subject to military commanders who must take their orders from General Grant, not from the President. Restitution of state rights was offered only on the condition of ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment and instituting, under military auspices, new governments based on negro suffrage.

The President thought that he had no choice but to enforce this and subsequent Reconstruction Acts, palpably unconstitutional as he held them to be. In March, 1867, military rule replaced in the South the civil governments that had been operating for over a year. The Major-Generals then enrolled a new electorate, in which the blacks outnumbered the whites in the states of South Carolina, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and Louisiana.[3] This electorate chose in every state a ‘ black and tan ’ constitutional convention which, under the guidance of Northern carpet-baggers, drafted a new state constitution, enfranchising the blacks and disfranchising ex-Confederate leaders, and guaranteeing civil and political equality to the freedmen. By the summer of 1868 reconstructed governments had been set up in seven of the Southern States; the other three — Mississippi, Texas, and Virginia, were admitted in 1870. After the legislatures of these states had duly ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress formally readmitted them to the Union, seated their elected Representatives and Senators, and withdrew the army as soon as the supremacy of the new governments appeared to be reasonably secure.

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[2] President Johnson's contention that this law was unconstitutional was vindicated in the Supreme Court's decision in Myers *v.* U. S. in 1926.

[3] A total of 703,000 negro and 627,000 white voters were registered.

The military governments in the South ruled with a firm hand, relying upon their own courts, sometimes with a flagrant disregard for the civil rights of the inhabitants. Confederate veteran organizations, parades, historical societies, indeed the most innocent symbols and memorials of the lost cause, were prohibited. Intransigent newspapers were suppressed. Thousands of local officials were removed to make way for carpet-baggers or negroes; the governors of six states were displaced and others appointed in their stead; the legislatures of Georgia, Alabama, and Louisiana were purged of Conservatives; the Army of Occupation, aided by a somewhat comic but irritating force of negro militia, kept the South 'safe for democracy,' but highly unsafe for the Democracy. The rule of the Major-Generals was harsh, but it had the merits of honesty and a certain rude efficiency. The same cannot be said of the civil governments that they maintained. In every reconstructed state government there was a Radical-Republican majority, composed of negroes and their white leaders. These last consisted of two classes: the 'carpet-baggers' — Northerners who went South after the war, largely for the purposes of political profit[4] — and 'scalawags' — or Southern white renegades. The native Southerners who had the franchise organized themselves in a Conservative or Democratic party, and made a tardy and futile effort to swing the votes of their former slaves. In a few instances they succeeded. Respectable black Democrats were conspicuous among the honest men in the reconstructed governments; but the great mass of the negro vote was won for the Republicans. Officials of the Freedmen's Bureau and the Union League saw to that.

The resulting state administrations offered the most grotesque travesty on representative government that has ever existed in an English-speaking country. For a period varying from two to nine years the Southern States were governed by majorities composed of lately emancipated slaves, led by the lowest form of professional white politician. A certain amount of good legislation was passed, especially in the field of education; the ravages of war were repaired, and some social reforms inaugurated; but corruption was the outstanding feature. South Carolina, the most extreme instance, had a carpet-bag governor, a negro treasurer and secretary, and a legislature of 155 members, of whom 144 were Radicals, 98 were blacks, and only 22 could read or write. The Radical majority whose members paid an aggregate annual tax of $340, increased the state property tax until it amounted to confiscation, increased the state debt from seven to twenty-nine millions, stripped the state treasury, issued bonds until they could float no more, and sold charters to corporations. Under the head of legislative supplies members were furnished at the public expense with such articles as Westphalia hams, oval library tables with carved legs, Brussels carpets, gold watches, carriages, champagne, and ornamental cuspidors.

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[4] The carpet-bag, a floppy sort of portmanteau covered with remnants of carpet, was the equivalent of the modern suit-case.

The situation in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and other states was almost as bad. Taxes were everywhere increased — in Alabama four fold, in Louisiana eight fold, in Mississippi fourteen fold — though it is only fair to remember that the tax rates had been excessively low before the war, and that the fiscal burdens of reconstruction were extraordinary. So heavy was the taxation, however, that in Mississippi not less than six million acres of land was offered for sale for unpaid taxes — an area as large as Massachusetts and Rhode Island combined — and a similar condition could be found in other states. One result of this was a universal depression in the value of land, and, in consequence, its wider distribution.

The public debt of most of the Southern States doubled, and in some cases trebled, during the years of carpet-bag and negro rule. During the four and one-half years of Governor Warmoth's administration Louisiana suffered a saturnalia of corruption during which the government expended over twenty-six millions and ran up a state debt of over fifty-four millions, besides bartering away state property, franchises, and river rights, and dissipating school funds. Warmoth succeeded in garnering a personal fortune of over half a million dollars as his share of the loot.[5] Most of the Southern States, taking refuge in the immunity of the Eleventh Amendment, succeeded later in repudiating a large part of their debts, a considerable portion of which had been floated in Great Britain.

Of course corruption, extravagance, and maladministration were not confined to the South at this time. It was during these years that the Tweed Ring robbed New York of over seventy-five million dollars, and the Gas Ring in Philadelphia increased the city's debt at the rate of three millions a year; and in national politics it was the era of the Crédit Mobilier, the Star Route Frauds, and the Whiskey Ring. The corruption of the negro governments of the South was dictated largely by unscrupulous Northerners who harvested the profits, and in the end the negroes had nothing better to show for their day of power than the plunder that their more fortunate fellows managed to carry off from the state capitols.

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[5] In this connection students should read Governor Warmoth's elaborate defense of his administration, *War Politics and Reconstruction*.

One important effect of carpet-bag extravagance was to impregnate the South with the idea that economy and good government are synonymous, and to create a profound prejudice against governmental expenditures and taxation, even for legitimate purposes, that lasted to the end of the nineteenth century.

7. *Reconstruction and the Constitution*

At no time in American history has the Constitution been subjected to so severe or prolonged a strain as during the era of Reconstruction. The theory *inter arma silent leges* had been tacitly acquiesced in during the actual conflict, but it remained to be seen whether Reconstruction would be carried through on the same legal theory. There arose at once a number of knotty problems concerning the legal status of the seceded states after Appomattox, and concerning the status of persons who had participated in the rebellion. There arose finally, the problem of the division of powers in the Federal government — whether Congress or the President was the proper body to direct Reconstruction. Some of these legal questions were settled by the courts at the time, others were adjudicated in later years, and still others remained unsettled except by rude extra-legal forces.

Throughout the war the President maintained the legal fiction that the states were indestructible: that they were never out of the Union. This theory, though vigorously controverted by the Radical leaders, received judicial support in the leading case of Texas *v.* White. Chief Justice Chase, speaking for the majority, said:

> 'The Constitution, in all of its provisions looks to an indestructible union, composed of indestructible states. When, therefore, Texas became one of the United States, she entered into an indissoluble relation. . . . There was no place for reconsideration, or revocation. . . . Considered therefore as transactions under the Constitution, the ordinance of secession . . . and all the acts of her legislature intended to give effect to

that ordinance, were absolutely null. They were utterly without operation in law. The obligations of the state, as a member of the Union, remained perfect and unimpaired. It certainly follows that the state did not cease to be a state, nor her citizens to be citizens of the Union. If this were otherwise, the state must have become foreign, and her citizens foreigners. The war must have ceased to be a war for the suppression of rebellion, and must have become a war for conquest and subjugation. . . . Our conclusion therefore is, that Texas continued to be a state, and a state of the Union. . . ."

Upon what theory, then, could Reconstruction proceed? If the states were still in the Union, it was only the citizens who were out of their normal relations with the Federal government, and these could be restored through the pardoning power of the President. This, at least, was the Presidential theory. President Johnson officially declared the insurrection at an end, April 2, 1866, and the Court, in U. S. *v.* Anderson, accepted this date as legally binding.

By virtue of what authority, then, did Congress proceed to impose purely military governments upon the South, and set up military courts? The Supreme Court had already passed upon this question of military courts in *ex parte* Milligan. In this famous case, which involved the validity of military courts in Indiana during the war, but at a time when the civil courts were in operation, the Court laid down the doctrine that ' martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction.' Yet within a year, in flagrant violation of this decision, Congress established military courts throughout the South; and when the validity of this legislation was challenged, in the McCardle case, Congress rushed through a law depriving the Court of jurisdiction over the case, while the Supreme Court sat supinely by and submitted to the outrage.

While brushing aside embarrassing legal obstacles, Radical leaders nevertheless sought refuge in constitutional dialectics. The maintenance of military rule in the South and the insistence upon ratification of the Fourteenth and later the Fifteenth Amendments before re-admission, was based theoretically upon the clause in the Constitution that ' Congress shall guarantee to every state a republican form of government.' For three-quarters of a century this clause had been interpreted to mean that Congress would maintain the pre-existing governments, but now the Radicals wrenched it away from its traditional meaning and insisted that a ' republican ' form of government included negro suffrage, and the Court supported them to the extent of declaring that 'the power to carry into effect the clause of guarantee is primarily a legislative power, and resides in Congress.'

Many of the acts which Congress passed in order to carry into effect its reconstruction policy were palpably unconstitutional, but the attitude of the Radicals was well expressed by General Grant when he said of this legislation, that 'much of it, no doubt, was unconstitutional; but it was hoped that the laws enacted would serve their purpose before the question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a decision obtained.' In his messages vetoing the Freedmen's Bureau bill, the Civil Rights Act, and the Reconstruction Acts of March 2, March 23, and July 19, 1867, President Johnson scored their unconstitutionality with monotonous regularity. Nevertheless, once they were passed over his veto, he believed that he was required to carry out their provisions. It remained, then, for the aggrieved victims of these bills to test their validity in the courts. This object was sought in a number of cases, but in every instance the federal courts succeeded in evading the issue or in escaping responsibility for a decision. The State of Mississippi asked for an injunction restraining Johnson from carrying out the Reconstruction Acts, but the Supreme Court, remembering the Dred Scott case, refused to accept jurisdiction. Georgia then brought suit against Secretary of War Stanton, but once again the Court refused to intervene in what it termed a political controversy. It was evident that the South would look in vain to the courts for protection against Congress.

Individuals fared somewhat better. Though some of the Radicals wanted to prosecute Davis, Lee, and other leaders of the Confederacy for treason, it was soon apparent that no jury would convict them, and the terms of military surrender guaranteed that there would be no military trial. Efforts to punish participants in the rebellion by discriminatory legislation were equally unsuccessful. In *ex parte* Garland the operation of the Federal test oath to exclude lawyers from practicing in federal courts was declared invalid, because *ex post facto;* and in Cummings *v.* Missouri, similar state legislation was held invalid on the same grounds. And in another series of cases the courts frittered away the Force Acts until they were practically impotent: United States *v.* Reese (1875), United States *v.* Cruikshank (1875), and United States *v.* Harris (1883).

These decisions indicated clearly that the courts could not be relied on to compel the strict enforcement of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, in the South.

The delicate question to which department of the government, executive or legislative, appertained the task of reconstruction, has never been legally settled, though at the time the legislative branch was victorious. The truth is that the theory of separation of powers played havoc with the realities of the situation. In the conflict between these two departments of the government, President Johnson conducted himself with circumspection and a nice regard for the law and the Constitution, while Congress rode roughshod over both, and the courts played a negative and ineffectual rôle.

8. *Rule at Washington*

The Northern Radical leaders, not content with securing the ascendancy of their party in the South, aimed ultimately at establishing a centralized parliamentary government for the Union. The majority of Congress, not the Supreme Court, was to be the ultimate judge of the powers of Congress; the President a mere figurehead. An opening move in this game was the Tenure of Office Act, which made it impossible for the President to control his administration. The next move in the game was to dispose of Johnson by impeachment, when Benjamin Wade, president *pro tem.* of the Senate, would succeed to his office and title.

Johnson countered in August 1867, by first requesting and then ordering Secretary Stanton to resign, which he had a right to do even under the Tenure of Office Act. When General Lorenzo Thomas, the new Secretary of War, sought to take possession of his office, Stanton barricaded himself in the War Department. The House of Representatives then impeached the President before the Senate, 'for high crimes and misdemeanours' as the Constitution provides. Ten of the eleven articles of impeachment simply rang the changes on the removal of Stanton, the other consisted of garbled newspaper reports from the President's speeches. A monstrous charge preferred by George S. Boutwell of Massachusetts to the effect that Johnson was an accomplice in the murder of Lincoln was not included.

Altogether the impeachment of Johnson was one of the most disgraceful affairs in the history of the Federal government, and barely failed to suspend the federal system. The impeachment was managed by a committee led by Benjamin F. Butler, Thaddeus Stevens, John Bingham, and George Boutwell, unscrupulous parliamentarians who exhausted every device, appealed to every prejudice and passion, and rode roughshod over every legal obstacle in their ruthless attempt to punish the President for his opposition to their plans. The President was defended by able counsel: Henry Stanberry, the Attorney-General; William Maxwell Evarts, the leader of the American bar; Benjamin R. Curtis, formerly of the Supreme Court; and Thomas A. R. Nelson of Tennessee. These tore the case of the prosecution to shreds, and it was soon apparent to all but the most prejudiced that there were no valid grounds for impeachment. Yet the Radicals would have succeeded in their object but for Chief Justice Chase, who insisted upon legal procedure, and for seven Republican Senators who sacrificed their political future by voting for acquittal: Grimes, Trumbull, Ross, Van Winkle, Fessenden, Fowler, and Henderson (16 May 1868).[6] One more affirmative vote, and Ben Wade, who did not scruple to vote for impeachment though he was to be its chief beneficiary, would have been installed in the White House, the Chief Justice would next have been removed by impeachment, and the Radicals would have triumphed over the Constitution as completely as over the South.

When the trial took place, Johnson had less than one year to serve; and the Republican nominating convention met shortly after his acquittal. There was no longer any effective opposition to the Radicals within the party ranks, and the reconstructed states gave them faithful delegates. General Grant, who had been brought into the Radical camp through the influence of Rawlins, was nominated by acclamation. The Democrats, regarding Johnson as too heavy a burden, made finance the principal plank of their platform, and nominated the ineffectual Horatio Seymour, formerly war governor of New York. Although Grant won in the electoral college by 214 votes to 80, his popular majority was barely 300,000, and this despite the fact that the new negro vote of 700,000 was cast solidly for him and that thousands of Southern Democrats were disfranchised. The election indicated clearly that the people were tired of Radical Reconstruction and wanted a return to the traditions and practices of representative government.

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[6] Three other Republicans stood ready to vote for acquittal if necessary: Sprague, Willey and Morgan.

9. *Restoration of White Rule*

Postponing the general history of Grant's administration to another chapter, let us here follow the episode of Reconstruction to its close.

Thaddeus Stevens had the good sense to see that political equality would avail the negroes little, so long as the whites owned the land. His death in 1868 cost Radicalism its fighting edge, and his program of confiscation was not carried out. Thenceforth, Reconstruction was placed on the defensive. Of several attempts to hold ground already won, most notable was the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution, ratified in 1870, forbidding the states to deny any one the vote 'on account of race, colour, or previous condition of servitude.' In the end this proved a mere paper guarantee. Even before Grant's election the white South prepared to recover its supremacy by the only means open to it: a combination of tomfoolery and terror.

Adopting the methods of the Radicals who had organized the negro vote, white Southerners played upon the blacks' timidity and superstition, and made life uncomfortable for 'carpet-baggers.' The latter, for instance, were apt to find themselves bystanders in a shooting affray, 'accidental' targets for the bullets of the participants. The negroes were dealt with largely by secret societies. Of these the most famous, though not the most powerful, was the Ku Klux Klan. It began with a social kuklos (circle) of young men in Pulaski, Tennessee, who discovered that their initiation garb of sheets and pillow-cases made them authentic spirits from another world to the blacks. Realizing the political possibilities, they formed other 'kukloi,' which in 1867 organized as the 'Invisible Empire of the South.' During the next three years this and other secret societies, most notably the Knights of the White Camellia policed unruly and criminal negroes in the country districts, and delivered spectral warnings against using the ballot, thus paralyzing the Radical power at its source. Later the Ku Klux disguise became a cloak for crime and oppression, and in February 1869 the order was formally disbanded.

The answer of the Radicals to the Ku Klux Klan was renewed military occupation of evacuated districts, the unseating of Democratic state administrations, on the ground of fraud, and a new crop of supervisory laws, the most important of which were the Force Acts of 1870 and 1871, which authorized the President to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, and suppress disturbances by military force. Altogether some 7,373 indictments were found under these acts, but there were relatively few convictions. Parts of the Force Acts were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in United States *v.* Reese and United States *v.* Harris; others became a dead letter; and in spite of the efforts of President Grant and Congress the Southern whites gradually resumed control over their own states: in Tennessee, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia in 1869–71; in Alabama, Arkansas, and Texas in 1874–75; and in the others in 1876–77. Northern opinion, tired of the attempt to force Radical rule on the South, acquiesced.

When Rutherford B. Hayes was inaugurated President, 4 March 1877, the carpet-bag regime had been overthrown in every Southern state save South Carolina and Louisiana, where it was still upheld by federal bayonets. By frankly terroristic methods the whites in South Carolina had, the previous autumn, elected General Wade Hampton governor, and returned a Democratic majority to the legislature. A Republican returning board cancelled the ballots, filled vacancies arbitrarily, and with the help of federal troops excluded the Democrats from the state capitol at Columbia. The newly elected Democratic members then hired a hall, organized their own House, and with Speaker, clerks, and sergeants-at-arms forced their way into the representatives' chamber where the Radicals were sitting. During three days and three nights the rival Houses sat side by side, every man armed to the teeth, and ready to shoot if the rival sergeant-at-arms laid hands on one of his colleagues. At the end of that time the Democrats withdrew, leaving the carpet-bag Governor Chamberlain and his black legislature in possession of the State House; but the people of South Carolina obeyed the other government, which Governor Hampton administered, with the aid of voluntary contributions, from a room over a shop. A quarter-century later, Governor Chamberlain admitted:

> 'There was no permanent possibility of securing good government in South Carolina through Republican influences. . . . The vast preponderance of ignorance and incapacity in that party, aside from downright dishonesty, made it impossible. . . . The elements put in combination by the reconstruction scheme of Stevens and Sumner were irretrievably

bad, and could never have resulted except temporarily, or in desperate moments, in governments fit to be endured.'

President Hayes broke this deadlock on 10 April 1877, by withdrawing the federal troops from Columbia, when the Democrats peaceably took possession. Two weeks later, when the troops evacuated New Orleans, white rule was completely restored to the South. The principle of self-government was vindicated, and the world was given another striking proof that government without consent is impossible long to maintain.

Within less than twenty years the animosities between the North and South were forgotten, and in 1898 the last political disabilities were removed from ex-Confederates by act of Congress. But Reconstruction left deep scars upon the South, physical and moral. Politics were forced into an unnatural racial groove, allegiance to the Democratic party became synonymous to white supremacy, and from 1876 to 1916 no state below the Mason and Dixon line voted Republican. Race relations were poisoned, as the annual though diminishing crop of lynchings attests. Negroes were retarded at least a generation in their progress towards responsible citizenship; white men exhausted their energy in efforts to keep the negroes down. Southern society remained relatively static, immune to modern movements of education and social regeneration, and in the twentieth century was almost as unprepared to meet the industrial invasion as England had been a century before.

XXXVII

THE PASSING OF THE FRONTIER

1. *The West in 1860*

THE generation after the Civil War witnessed the most extraordinary and extensive movement of population in our history; a hundred per cent increase of the settled area; the rapid social and economic development of this population from primitive conditions to contemporary standards of civilization; the final disappearance of the wild Indian; the rise and fall of the mineral empire and of the cow kingdom; the development of new types of agriculture and of economic life articulated to the geography and climate of the High Plains and the Rocky Mountains; and the organization of a dozen new states with a taste for social and political experiments.

The frontier of 1860 could be described as giant parentheses: on the east an irregular line of settlement running roughly along the ninety-fifth parallel of longitude — along eastern Minnesota, eastern Nebraska and Kansas, swinging westward through Arkansas and into Texas; on the west a narrow fringe of settlement along the Pacific Ocean in the states of California and Oregon and the Territory of Washington. Between these two frontiers were fifteen hundred miles of prairie and semi-arid plain, sloping gradually to the towering ranges of the Rocky Mountains; a region popularly designated the Great American Desert, inhabited by a sparse Mexican and half-breed population in New Mexico, a few thousand white miners and trappers, and by the prosperous and flourishing Mormon settlement in Utah, numbering in 1860 some 40,000 souls. With the exception of these, the savage Indians to the number of some 225,000 held undisputed possession of the land, living on the millions of buffalo that roamed the open range, and maintaining a stubborn resistance to white penetration of their hunting grounds. The mineral and agricultural resources of this vast inland empire were comparatively unknown, though the Oregon, California and Santa Fé Trails had acquainted Americans with its topography and geography — and with its dangers as well — while the Pony Express, Butterfield's and Halladay's stages, maintained a precarious connection between California and Missouri and impressed on the nation the necessity of a trans-continental railway.

2. *The Indian Problem*

The Indians of the Great Plains and the Rocky Mountain regions were a formidable obstacle to white settlement. The strongest and most warlike of the tribes that the whites encountered were the Sioux, the Blackfoot, the Crow, the Cheyenne, the Arapahoe, and the Nez Percés in the North; and the Comanche, Southern Cheyenne, Apache, and Southern Arapahoe in the South.[1] It would be useless to trace in any detail the melancholy story of Indian relations in the period from 1860 to 1887, the year of the passage of the Dawes Act. It is a tale of intermittent and barbarous warfare, of broken pacts and broken promises, of greed and selfishness and corruption and maladministration, of alternating aggression and vacillation, on the part of the whites, of courageous defense, despair, blind savagery and inevitable defeat for the Indians. The sober historian, accepting neither the myths and legends that have clustered around the 'noble redman,' nor the bitterly prejudiced interpretation of Indian character by frontiersmen, must subscribe to President Hayes' indictment of our Indian relations in his annual message of 1877:

> The Indians were the original occupants of the land we now possess. They have been driven from place to place. The purchase money paid to them in some cases for what they called their own has still left them poor. In many instances, when they had settled down upon lands assigned to them by compact and begun to support themselves by their own labor, they were rudely jostled off and thrust into the wilderness again. Many, if not most, of our Indian wars have had their origin in broken promises and acts of injustice on our part.

Until 1861 the Indians of the Plains had been relatively peaceful, but in that year the invasion of their hunting grounds by thousands of frantic and ruthless miners, and the advance of white settlers along the Missouri frontier, together with dissatisfaction at the treatment of the United States government and the breakdown of the reservation system, resulted in numerous minor conflicts. In 1862 the Sioux of the

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[1] See map, p. 442.

Dakota region went on the warpath, devastated the Minnesota frontier, and massacred and imprisoned almost a thousand white men, women, and children. Retribution was swift and terrible, and fell indiscriminately upon the innocent and the guilty. Two years later the Northern Cheyenne attacked Ben Halliday's stage and harried the mining settlements of Colorado. For the next twenty years Indian warfare was a constant of Western history, each new influx of settlers driving the redskins to acts of desperation and bringing renewed outrages and punishments. Altogether the Indian wars between 1865 and 1880 cost the government millions of dollars and the lives of hundreds of men; yet, in 1881, President Arthur could affirm:

> 'We have to deal with the appalling fact that the Indian problem has seemed scarcely nearer solution than it was half a century ago.'

A large part of this failure was no doubt inherent in the problem, but part of it rests squarely upon the Federal government. The theory that each Indian tribe constituted a sovereign though dependent nation, to be dealt with as such through treaties, was completely divorced from reality. The Indians frequently failed to understand the terms of the treaties, nor did individual Indians consider themselves bound by tribal treaties. A further and fruitful source of difficulty was the fact that authority over Indian affairs was divided between the Departments of War and of the Interior, and that both departments pursued a vacillating and uncertain policy, the one failing to live up to treaty obligations, the other failing to protect the Indians on their reservations from the aggressions of white settlers.

In 1865, in the breathing space permitted by the conclusion of the Civil War, Congress had created a Committee on the Condition of the Indian Tribes which recommended, among other things, that the practice of dealing with the Indians as sovereign tribes be abandoned. Six years later Congress adopted this sane suggestion by abolishing the treaty system and inaugurating the practice of dealing with Indians as individuals, and concentrating them in reservations. This substitution of a 'peace' policy for the more belligerent one of the sixties, was dictated partly by the humanitarian considerations, and partly by the more cogent argument of economy — since it was obviously cheaper to herd the Indians into government reservations and feed them, than it was to fight them. The new policy was carried forward under the administration of Hayes, Arthur, and Cleveland, and culminated, in 1887, in the passage of the Dawes Act, which established the modern Indian policy.

The Dawes Act was the first serious attempt to civilize the Indian, to teach him the practices of agriculture and social life, and to merge him in the body politic of the nation. It provided for the disintegration of the tribes and the division of the tribal lands among the individual members. To protect the Indian in his property, the right of disposal was withheld for a period of twenty-five years; upon the expiration of this period of probation, the Indian was to become unrestricted owner, and to be admitted to full citizenship in the United States. In October 1901 the Five Civilized Nations of Oklahoma were admitted to citizenship; in 1917 all the remaining Indians in this state were naturalized, and in 1924 Congress granted full citizenship to all Indians in the country. Thus the long process of struggle and assimilation reached an undramatic climax.

The Indian problem is rapidly disappearing with the approaching extinction of full-blooded Indians. The proud savages who once ruled undisputed the American continent are now settled on some two hundred government reservations, eking out an existence on government doles, cut off from the free life of an earlier day, losing the power to fend for themselves, disintegrating morally and physically, pitiful and tragic representatives of the race which helped the white man to adjust himself to the American scene, of the Hiawathas and Pocahontases who for so long fired the imagination of the American people.

3. *The Mining Frontier*

The territory between the Missouri and the Pacific had been crossed and recrossed by emigrants along the great trails, but it was the miners who first revealed to the nation the resources and possibilities of this country. The first frontier of the final West was the miners' frontier. In 1849 the lure of gold had drawn to California a turbulent, heterogeneous throng of miners who later formed the nucleus of a large permanent population and who developed the varied agricultural resources of the state. This process was to be repeated time and again in the decade of the sixties: — in Colorado, in Nevada, in Arizona, in Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming. In each case precious metals were the magnet that attracted the first settlers and advertised the resources of the territory; then, as the big pay dirt was exhausted, the mining population receded, and its place was taken by ranchers and farmers who established, with the aid of the railroads and the government, the permanent foundations of the territory.

In 1859 the discovery of gold in the foothills of the Rockies, near Pike's Peak, drew thousands of eager prospectors from the border settlements and from California, bent on repeating here the fabulous story of California gold. Within a few months the roads from Council Bluffs and Independence to western Kansas were crowded with wagons bearing the slogan, 'Pike's Peak or Bust,' scrawled on their canvas. Soon brash little mining camps dotted the hills all along Cherry Creek, a branch of the South Fork of the Platte. Denver City, Leadville, Boulder City, and Pueblo arose almost overnight, the Territory of Jefferson — changed later to Colorado — was organized, and the census of 1860 recorded a population of some 75,000 souls. The following year Colorado Territory was duly created, and the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians were induced to cede their lands and settle farther to the west. The mining boom soon spent itself, and the development of Colorado was somewhat retarded by the Civil War and Indian uprisings, as well as by inadequate transportation and a failure to appreciate the agricultural and grazing resources of the country. During the ensuing decade population barely held its own, and it was not until the advent of the railroads, in the seventies, the influx of farmers, and the readjustment of the region to a new economic basis, that the foundations for a sounder development were laid.

In the same year that gold was discovered in Colorado, came the announcement of a rich strike on the eastern slopes of the Sierra Nevada, near Lake Tahoe. Here was located the Comstock lode, probably the richest single mine in the world. Within a year the roaring towns of Virginia City, Austin and White Pine sprang up in the desert wastes, the Territory of Nevada was carved out of California and Utah, and ten thousand men were digging frantically in the bowels of the earth for the precious yellow stuff.

Nevada furnishes the most extreme example of a mining community; nowhere else in history do we find a society so utterly and continuously dependent upon mineral wealth. And the history of this mining commonwealth for the first decade of its existence is largely the history of the Comstock lode. Within twenty years the lode yielded no less than $306,000,000, which helped the Federal government to resume specie payments after the close of the Civil

War. Very little of this enormous wealth, however, remained in Nevada, most of it going to California mining companies or to gamblers and speculators in the East. The Comstock lode is notable not only as the foundation of the mineral wealth of Nevada, but as the location of one of the greatest engineering enterprises of modern times — the Sutro Tunnel. It was this tunnel, penetrating into the heart of the mountain to a depth of three miles, and built by Adolph Sutro over a period of eight years at a cost of some two million dollars, that made possible the continuous and profitable mining of the fabulous lode.

The story of Idaho and Montana runs parallel to that of Colorado and Nevada. Gold was discovered in 1860 on a reservation of the Nez Percés Indians in the Clearwater valley, in the extreme eastern part of Washington Territory. Within a year a wave of prospectors from Washington and Nevada was rolling into the region. Lewiston, and, farther to the south, Boisé City, sprang into existence; and in 1863 the Territory of Idaho was carved out of Washington and Montana. 'The Idaho miners,' wrote the historian of the West, H. H. Bancroft, 'were like quicksilver, a mass of them dropped off in any locality, broke up into individual globules, and ran off after any atom of gold in the vicinity. They stayed nowhere longer than the gold attracted them.' But mining furnished a most insubstantial foundation for the development of Idaho, and the census of 1870 showed a population of less than 15,000 for the Territory.

Gold was discovered east of the Continental Divide along the headwaters of the Missouri, and in the Bitter Root valley in the eastern part of Washington Territory, by gold seekers from the Idaho camps, and from Fort Hall on the Missouri river. Alder Gulch (later Virginia City), Last Chance Gulch (Helena), and Bannack City, drew prospectors from all over the West and enjoyed a temporary flush development rivalling that of the Colorado and Nevada camps. Like other mining camps they faded out and became respectable towns, fortunately not before Mark Twain gave them immortality in the gusty pages of *Roughing It*. For a brief time the activities of the notorious Henry Plummer and his gang threatened the prosperity of the Montana camps, and it required a Vigilante organization such as that which arose in California fifteen years earlier to restore law and order to Montana. Virginia City, which may well serve as typical of the mining towns of the West, was thus described by M. P. Langford in his *Vigilante Days and Ways*:

> 'This human hive, numbering at least ten thousand people, was the product of ninety days. Into it were crowded all the elements of a rough and active civilization. Thousands of cabins and tents and brush wakiups . . . were seen on every hand. . . . Gold was abundant, and every possible device was employed by the gamblers, the traders, the vile men and women that had come in with the miners into the locality to obtain it. Nearly every third cabin was a saloon, where vile whiskey was peddled out for fifty cents a drink in gold dust. Many of these places were filled with gambling tables and gamblers. Hurdy-gurdy dance houses were numerous. . . . Not a day or night passed which did not yield its full fruition of vice, quarrels, wounds or murders. The crack of the revolver was often heard above the merry notes of the violin. Street fights were frequent, and as no one knew when or where they would occur, every one was on his guard against a random shot.
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> 'Sunday was always a gala day. . . . The stores were all open. . . . Thousands of people crowded the thoroughfares ready to rush in the direction of any promised excitement. Horse-racing was among the most favored amusements. Prize rings were formed, and brawny men engaged in fisticuffs until their sight was lost and their bodies pummelled to jelly, while hundreds of onlookers cheered the victor. . . . Pistols flashed, bowie knives flourished, and braggard oaths filled the air, as often as men's passions triumphed over their reason. This was indeed the reign of unbrideled license, and men who at first regarded it with disgust and terror, by constant exposure soon learned to become a part of it, and forget that they ever had been aught else. All classes of society were represented at this general exhibition. Judges, lawyers, doctors, even clergymen, could not claim exemption. Culture and religion afforded feeble protection, where allurement and indulgence ruled the hour.'

Though Montana produced some $165,000,000 in precious metals between 1862 and 1880, the collapse which followed the first rush was complete, and the census of 1870 recorded a population of only 20,595. Here as elsewhere in the mining country the settlers turned to grazing and agriculture, and slowly laid the foundations for later prosperity.

The early development of Wyoming and Arizona followed the same general lines of the other mining communities. The mines along the Sweetwater river at South Pass City, Pacific City, and Miners' Delight, were soon played out, and after 1865 the future of Wyoming Territory was almost wholly dependent upon ranching. The Territory was organized in 1868 but its development waited upon the completion of the Union Pacific Railway, and another forcible removal of Indians. Turning southward, we find that for many years silver had been mined by Spaniards in the Santa Cruz valley, by Americans in the Gadsden Purchase region in a small way, but the brisk development of mining in Arizona began along the Bill Williams Fork of the Colorado river, and was a by-product of the Civil War. Though a few mushroom mining towns sprang up in the Arizona deserts, the majority of the prospectors had poor luck and soon limped back to the more promising territory to the North.

The last gold-rush came in the Black Hills region of the Dakota Territory, on the reservations of the warlike Sioux. In 1874 the news of the discovery of gold here rioted along the frontier and through the mining kingdom and precipitated a lively gold-rush. The railroad to Bismarck, and the stage coach from Cheyenne gave access to this region within the hunting grounds of the Sioux. Naturally the invasion of this region by four thousand feverish prospectors forced the Indians to take the warpath. In the course of the ensuing conflict the Sioux succeeded in annihilating General George A. Custer and five companies of his men at the Battle of the Little Big Horn (1876), before they were finally crushed and deprived of their ancient lands.

Ephemeral as it was, the mining frontier played an important part in the development of the West. The miners familiarized the American people with the country between the Missouri and the Pacific and advertised its magnificent resources. They were responsible for the political organization of the territories, and laid the foundations for stable governments. They made the Indian problem more acute, emphasized the imperative need of railroads, and furnished the foundation for the later permanent farming population of the territory.

4. *The Cattle Kingdom*

One of the most dramatic shifts in the screen-picture of the West was the replacement of millions of buffalo who had roamed the Great Plains by cattle, and of the Indian by the cowboy and the cattle king. The territory between the Missouri and the Rockies, from the Red river of the South to Saskatchewan — an area comprising approximately one-third of the United States, was the Cattle Kingdom — the last and most picturesque American frontier. Here millions of cattle — Texas longhorns, full-blooded Herefords, Wyoming and Montana steers — fatted on the long luscious grasses of the public lands. The cowboys and their liege lords, the cattle-barons who ruled this vast domain, developed therein a unique culture, folk-lore, and society; and then passed away forever.

The development of the cattle industry on a large scale was due to a peculiar combination of factors: the opening up of the public domain after the Civil War, the extension of the railroads into the High Plains, the elimination of the Indian danger and of the buffalo, the invention of the refrigerator car and the growth of great packing centers and world markets.

Since the days when the American Southwest belonged to Spain, the sturdy Texas longhorn, descendant of Spanish *toros* from the plains of Andalusia, had grazed on the limitless prairie grasses north of the Rio Grande. Wild as the buffalo they supplanted, and valued only for their hides, it was not until 1857 that the first herd was driven northward to Quincy, Illinois. A decade later began the annual 'long drive' to the region of rich grasses and good prices. In 1867 the Kansas Pacific Railway began to reach out into the plains and ship live cattle to a slaughter house at Kansas City or Chicago. The refrigerator car, invented in 1868 and in common use by 1875, delivered the western dressed beef to the great eastern centers of population.

On the first of the organized long drives 35,000 longhorns pounded up clouds of dust all along the famous Chisholm Trail, across the Red and Arkansas rivers and into the land of the Five Nations, to Abilene, Kansas. Two years later no less than 350,000 long horned kine made their way along the Chisholm and Goodnight Trails to fatten on the long northern grasses, and find a market at one of several roaring cattle towns on the Kansas & Pacific: Abilene, Dodge City, or Newton. Later the 'long drive' extended north to the Union Pacific and even to the Northern Pacific.

> 'In after years,' writes the historian of the Cattle Kingdom, 'the drive of the Texas men became little short of an American saga. To all those who saw that long line of Texas cattle come up over a rise in the prairie, nostrils wide for the smell of water, dust-caked and gaunt, so ready to break from the nervous control of the riders strung out along the flanks of the herd, there came a feeling that in this spectacle there was something elemental, something resistless, something perfectly in keeping with the unconquerable land about them.' [2]

[2] Osgood, E. S., *The Day of the Cattleman*, 26. (University of Minnesota Press.)

All together some six million cattle were driven up from Texas to winter on the High Plains of Colorado, Wyoming and even Montana, between 1866 and 1888. It was this new industry of fattening cattle on the great plains that produced the last phase of the Wild West, and the highest and most picturesque development of the ancient art of cattle-droving. The experience of cattlemen along the Oregon and California Trails and in western Montana in the decade of the forties had long proved the practicability of wintering cattle in the northern ranges. Now Easterners and Englishmen of a sporting or speculating turn put their money into cattle, established their headquarters anywhere from the Rio Grande to the Canadian border, and in the absence of law managed their affairs through some *de facto* commonwealth such as the Wyoming Stock Growers' Association. Texas borderers who learned their horsemanship and 'cowpunching' from the Mexican *vaqueros* were the first and the best *bucaroos* or cowboys. Every spring they rounded up the herds in designated areas, all the way from Texas to Wyoming and Dakota, identified their owners' cattle by the brands, and branded the calves, dividing up pro rata the strays or 'mavericks.' The breeding cattle were then set free for another year while the likely three- and four-year-olds were conducted on the 'long drive' to the nearest 'cowtown' on a railway. Each outfit of cowboys attended its owners' herd on the drive, protecting it from wolves and cattle-rustlers, sending scouts ahead to locate water and the best grazing. The cowboy developed his own lingo, folk-lore and customs. His high-horned Mexican saddle, lariat, broad-rimmed sombrero, high-heeled boots, and shaggy chaparajos were perfectly adapted to his work. His jangling spurs with their enormous rowels were not too severe for his bronco — vicious little mustang of Spanish origin, hardy as a donkey and fleet as an Arab. The clownish posturing of film heroes has obscured the authentic cowboy: spare of frame and pithy of speech, reserved and courteous as the true gentleman that he was, yet with the cavalier's eternal swagger: alert with the sort of courage needed to fight Indians and bad men, to break broncos and rope steers, or to deal with stampedes and prairie fires: enduring and uncomplaining, asking no better end than to die with his boots on. Finest of our frontier types, he flourished for a brief score of years, and faded into legend with the passing of the open range.

The cattle boom reached its climax about 1885. By that time the range had become too heavily pastured to support the long drive, and was beginning to be criss-crossed by railroads and by the barbed-wire fences of homesteads. By that time, too, the range had ceased to be a frontier industry and had become a corporate enterprise, organized, capitalized and directed in the East or in Europe. New factors had begun to increase enormously the hazards of ranching. The rapid fencing-in of the open range, the increasing reluctance of the Federal government to co-operate with ranchers against the Indians, the appearance of cattle diseases and the passage of state quarantine laws, the conflict between cattlemen and shepherds, between the Northern and the Southern cattlemen, and between cattlemen and settlers; all these factors presaged the decline of the Cow Kingdom. Then came the two terrible winters of 1885–87 which almost annihilated the herds on the open ranges. Cattle owners began to stake out homestead claims in the names of their 'outfit' and to fence off vast areas to which they had no claim. Almost in a moment the cattle range replaced the open range. Cowboy costume and tradition died hard; in 'dude ranches' they still flourished; but the cowboy turned cattleman or ranch employee, penned in behind wire, and knowing not the joys and dangers of the long drive, was a clipped eagle.

5. *The Disappearance of the Frontier*

What really marked the end of the picturesque mining and cattle kingdoms, and of the old, romantic, 'wild west,' was the irresistible pressure of the farmers, swarming by the hundreds of thousands out onto the High Plains and into the mountain valleys, subduing this wilderness of prairie and mountain land to cultivation and civilization. The Civil War had not interrupted the steady flow of population into the West; it only gathered increased momentum after 1865. During the war itself the discoveries of precious ores, the necessity of maintaining communication with the Pacific coast, and the insatiable demand for wheat, all served to advertise the West. War dangers and uncertainties, especially in the border states, induced many to try their luck in the new regions, while the liberal provisions of the Homestead Act and the high rewards of farming, proved an irresistible magnet for thousands of others. During the war years the population of nine Western states and territories increased by over 300,000, while the agricultural states of Illinois, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Kansas, and Nebraska received 843,000 immigrants from Europe and the East. It is recorded that in the year 1864 no less than 75,000


FRONTIER LINE
1870


FRONTIER LINE
1880

Passing of the


FRONTIER LINE
1890


FRONTIER LINE
1900
Note Recession of Population

Frontier, 1870–1900

persons passed westward bound through Omaha alone. From Council Bluffs, Iowa, in 1864, the Reverend Jonathan Blanchard wrote:

> 'When you approach this town, the ravines and gorges are white with covered wagons at rest. Below the town, toward the river side, long wings of white canvass, stretch away on either side, into the soft green willows; at the ferry from a quarter to a half mile of teams all the time await their turn to cross. Myriads of horses and mules drag on the moving mass of humanity toward the setting sun; while the oxen and cows equal them in number.'

All this seems incredibly remote from the Wilderness and the march through Georgia. It was one of the great pulses of American life that went on beating amid the din of arms.

The close of the war brought an enormous acceleration of this movement. It was in great part the absorbing power of the West which enabled one million soldiers to resume civilian life without serious economic derangement. Southerners by the tens of thousands, despairing of recouping their fortunes in the war-stricken South, migrated westward although excluded temporarily from the privileges of the Homestead Act. Immigrants, mostly from northern Europe, found their way to the prairies of Minnesota and Dakota by the hundreds of thousands.

Yet it was the twenty years following 1870 that witnessed the greatest expansion of the West, the overwhelming of the mining and cattle kingdoms, the taking up of most of the good public and railroad lands, and the disappearance of the frontier. The railroads, crossing the continent along half a dozen lines, and immigration, which reached a total of over eight million in these twenty years, were the most influential factors in the process. Not only did the railroads provide transportation and insure markets, but they were the active colonizing agents of the time. Whole territories, such as the Dakotas, came into existence largely by virtue of the railways, while scores of towns and cities such as Cheyenne, Council Bluffs, Kansas City, St. Paul, Portland, and Seattle were created by and completely dependent upon the roads. In this twenty-year period the population of California doubled, that of Minnesota and of Texas trebled, that of Kansas increased four-fold, of Nebraska eight-fold, of Washington fourteen-fold, and Dakota Territory forty-fold. Altogether the population of the trans-Mississippi West rose from 6,877,000 in 1870 to 16,775,000 in 1890. General Phil Sheridan described the process with prophetic pen:

> 'As the railroads overtook the successive lines of isolated frontier posts, and settlements spread out over the country no longer requiring military protection, the army vacated its temporary shelters and marched into remote regions beyond, there to repeat and continue its pioneer work. In the rear of the advancing line of troops the primitive 'dug-outs' and cabins of the frontiersmen were steadily replaced by the tasteful houses, thrifty farms, neat villages and busy towns of a people who knew how best to employ the vast resources of the great West. The civilization from the Atlantic is now reaching out toward that rapidly approaching it from the direction of the Pacific, the long intervening strip of territory, extending from the British possessions to Old Mexico, yearly growing narrower; finally the dividing lines will entirely disappear and the mingling settlements absorb the remnants of the once powerful Indian nations, who, fifteen years ago, vainly attempted to forbid the destined progress of the age.'

These 'dividing lines' which were a thousand miles apart when Sheridan wrote, had by 1880, become so irregular as to be well-nigh untraceable, and ten years later, in his annual report for 1890, the Superintendent of the Census announced that

> 'Up to and including 1880 the country had a frontier of settlement, but at present the unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line.'[3]

This 'disappearance of the frontier' was shortly hailed by a great American historian, Frederick Jackson Turner, as the close of a movement that began in 1607; and the Spanish-American War of 1898 was interpreted as the beginning of a new phase of extra-continental imperialism.

After the lapse of forty years, however, it is difficult to discern any fundamental break in the rhythm of American life that can properly be ascribed to the passing of the frontier. Western colonization had by no means come to an end, nor had all the public domain been patented. On the contrary, the number of acres patented under the provisions of the Homestead Act since 1890 greatly exceed the number patented before that year. Indeed, during the six years of our greatest industrial development, 1914–1920, no less than 55,000,000

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[3] The census of 1900 revealed a positive reversion of the frontier line. See map.

FINAL ENTRIES ALL HOMESTEADS

1868	355,000	1895	2,981,000
1869	504,000	1896	2,790,000
1870	519,000	1897	2,778,000
1871	629,000	1898	3,095,000
1872	707,000	1899	3,134,000
1873	1,225,000	1900	3,478,000
1874	1,586,000	1901	5,241,000
1875	2,069,000	1902	4,343,000
1876	2,591,000	1903	3,577,000
1877	2,408,000	1904	3,233,000
1878	2,663,000	1905	3,419,000
1879	2,071,000	1906	3,527,000
1880	1,938,000	1907	3,741,000
1881	1,928,000	1908	4,243,000
1882	2,219,000	1909	3,699,000
1883	2,504,000	1910	3,796,000
1884	2,946,000	1911	4,620,000
1885	3,033,000	1912	4,306,000
1886	2,663,000	1913	10,009,000
1887	2,749,000	1914	9,291,000
1888	3,175,000	1915	7,181,000
1889	3,682,000	1916	7,278,000
1890	4,061,000	1917	8,497,000
1891	3,955,000	1918	8,236,000
1892	3,260,000	1919	6,525,000
1893	3,477,000	1920	8,373,000
1894	2,930,000		
		Total,	191,263,586

acres of land were taken up in homesteads — some ten millions more than in the entire period 1862–1890!

Taken alone, these figures are somewhat misleading, for they take no account of the millions of acres disposed of by the railroads and by the states in the years immediately after the Civil War. But there are still millions of acres of government land to be had for the asking; and even more cheap abandoned farm-lands in the East and the South, that go begging for buyers, while other sections of the country might be reclaimed by drainage or irrigation. The great wheat fields of western Canada, too, offer almost unparalleled opportunities to American farmers. But there is little likelihood of these areas being cultivated until agriculture is adjusted to the present economic order.

The driving force which swept the pioneer westward from the Alleghanies to the Pacific, the dynamic energy which for two centuries concentrated on the taking up of land, has disappeared, or has taken other directions. The frontier as a safety valve for economic unrest, the frontier as a social laboratory, the frontier as a psychological attitude or a state of mind, has disappeared, but its disappearance is rather a result of complex economic and psychological forces, than a cause of great changes. The relatively lower returns from agriculture than from other forms of industry, the heavier cost of labor and the higher risks of farming, the greater social and cultural attractiveness of urban than of rural life, the transformed values and standards of living in the last generation, have made Americans shun rather than seek the great open spaces. The ideal of the sturdy, self-sufficient, independent farmer, so seldom realized in fact, has been supplanted by the ideal of the middle-class city-dweller, drawing a good salary and making money on the stock market.

This change in ideals is associated with a sense of frustration and of dissatisfaction that was part of the westward movement and of pioneer life. Both have been the subject of so much romantic sentimentality that we are apt to overlook some of the more realistic aspects. In the first place the continuous exodus of a large part of the population meant the unsettling, in a social sense, of the more settled regions of the East and South. Western colonization went on at the expense of older communities. What it meant for the men and women who participated in it is more difficult to determine, for the pioneers were not given to writing their memoirs. Often it meant release from wage-slavery, inhibitions, and maladjustment, a chance to be a man among men, and grow up with a new country. Often, too, it meant the exchange of an ordered, civilized, neighborly community with hard-won standards of propriety, for primitive conditions, an unequal contest with the wilderness, with loneliness and fear and disease. To break new pathways into the West and to wrest a living from the soil was not easy; and the process laid a heavy hand upon those who were not rough-hewn for pioneering. The pioneer women, laboring beneath intolerable burdens, denied the homely pleasures of social intercourse, cut off from aid in time of need, suffered the most, as the moving pages of the stories of

Rölvaag and Hamlin Garland have revealed. The terrible toll that pioneering exacted from the men and women who engaged in it can be neither discounted nor overlooked in any evaluation of the westward movement and the significance of the frontier.

6. *Political Organization*

In 1860 something over one-third of the area of the United States was divided into territories and under the control of the Federal government. From Minnesota to Oregon, from Texas to the Canadian border, there were no states. Within thirty years all this territory, comprising something over a million square miles, had been organized politically, and the major part of it included in states of the Union. Statehood was an important step in the assimilation of the West. Federal control and the frontier disappeared simultaneously.

The admission of Nevada in 1864 had been dictated by the desire to obtain its three electoral votes for Lincoln. The inhabitants of Colorado had rejected the proffer of statehood in the same year. Nebraska was brought into the Union in 1867 over President Johnson's veto, in time to cast its vote for the impeachment of that unfortunate executive. With the creation of Wyoming Territory in 1868 the territorial subdivisions of the West had been rounded out, but few of these territories, most of them based upon mineral wealth, showed any prospects of being prepared for statehood in the immediate future.

The building of transcontinental railroads, however, put an entirely different face upon the situation, for they brought to the Western territories a permanent farmer population and a solid economic foundation for statehood. This first became apparent in the northernmost tier of territories. In 1870 the population of Dakota, Montana, Idaho, and Washington Territories was only 73,000; by 1890, after the Northern Pacific had been completed and the Great Northern almost completed, their population had increased to 1,128,000. The influence of the railroads, both in bringing a permanent population and in providing markets, was a controlling one in the creation of most of the other Western states.

Agitation for statehood, especially in the Dakotas and Washington Territory, was continuous. It is somewhat difficult, however, to distinguish between popular enthusiasm and that of professional politicians, eager to become congressmen and state officials. The situation in both Washington and Dakota was complicated: the inhabitants of Washington sought to incorporate the Idaho panhandle in their state, and in Dakota Territory there was an irresistible popular demand for a separation into two states. Though these and other territories were amply entitled to statehood, on the score of population, action was held up for a full decade by political differences in Washington. The decisive influence of Colorado's vote in the disputed presidential election of 1876 brought the statehood question into party politics. Except for the two years of the forty-seventh Congress, 1881–83, control of the government was divided between the two parties during the entire period from Hayes to Harrison. Favorable action upon the demand of the Dakotas for admission in 1881 was held up by Eastern fear of Western radicalism, and Eastern resentment over the repudiation of certain railway bonds by Yankton county. Senator Ingalls of Kansas was led to exclaim, 'I believe that all the objections which have been hitherto urged against the passage of that bill are purely partisan and malignant.' By playing politics shamelessly with the fortunes and the futures of the Western territories, both parties forfeited the confidence of those embryo states.

The so-called blockade, however, came to an end abruptly in 1888 with the election of Benjamin Harrison and the prospect of complete Republican control of the government. Both parties and both Houses then made frenzied efforts to get the credit for the admission of the Western states. The result of this eager rivalry was the Omnibus Bill, which, as originally drafted by the Democratic House, provided for the admission of Montana, Washington, New Mexico, and one state from Dakota, but in its final form, admitted both Dakotas, Washington, and Montana. New Mexico was excluded by the Republican Senate, just as the division of the Dakotas had been opposed by the Democratic House, for partisan reasons. No provision had been made, in the Omnibus Bill, for Wyoming and Idaho, but in both of these territories constitutional conventions met without specific authority, and a few months later both were admitted by a debate-weary but vote-hungry Republican Congress.

With the admission of these six (for New Mexico had to wait until 1912), there existed for the first time a solid band of states from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The same year that the Omnibus Bill was passed, President Harrison threw Oklahoma open to settlement, and it was organized as a territory the following year. The fertility and accessibility of its soil attracted large numbers of settlers and speculators. The literal race over the plains, for the best land, by foot, horse, and buggy when the gun was fired on April 22, 1889, the magic overnight growth of Guthrie and Oklahoma City, forms one of the most exciting chapters in the history of the West. Within a decade the population had almost reached 400,000, and the question of statehood became prominent. The problem of the disposition of the Indians of Indian Territory complicated matters considerably, and it was not until 1906 that a bill was finally passed providing for the admission of Oklahoma and Indian Territory as one state.

It was in 1898, too, that the Mormon government in Utah accepted the inevitable and promised to abandon the institution of polygamy, thus removing the last objection to its admission to statehood. Under the able administration of the Mormon Church the Latter-Day Saints had prospered amazingly, and when Utah was finally admitted to statehood, in 1896, it was with a flourishing population of some 250,000. The territories of Arizona and New Mexico, both containing a large admixture of Mexicans and Indians, had rejected joint admission as a single state in 1907, and it was five years before they were admitted individually.

Thus was completed a process inaugurated by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Since that time the United States had grown from thirteen to forty-eight states. Texas came in as an independent republic, Maine and West Virginia were separated from other states, Vermont and Kentucky were admitted without previous territorial organization; but all the others, after passing through the territorial stage, were admitted as states in a Union of equals, in accordance with the policies laid down by the enlightened Ordinance. The greatest experiment in colonial policy and administration of modern times had been brought to a conclusion successful beyond the wildest dreams of those who inaugurated it.

The constitutions of the new states differed little from those of the older entities. Americans, on the whole, have hesitated to seize the opportunity for political experiment and differentiation offered by our federal system. What difference there was, took a slightly radical form; the constitutions of Wyoming and Utah provided for woman suffrage from the beginning, and Colorado and other Western states incorporated this provision in their constitutions shortly after. Some of the new constitutions provided for the initiative, referendum, and even the recall, while others contained lengthy and stringent provisions for the control of railroads and corporations. On the whole the constitutions resembled codes of law rather than basic principles of government, and constituted striking documents in the ' case of the American People *versus* Themselves.'

XXXVIII

TRANSPORTATION AND ITS CONTROL

1. *The Railway Key*

TURNING from the political to economic developments after the Civil War, we find this era marked by the application of machine power, in constantly increasing units and over a widely expanded area, to the processes of industry and of agriculture. Transportation was the key; mass production the result. We have already seen how railroads developed from local feeders into the eastern trunk lines, which connected the Mississippi valley with the northern Atlantic coast and helped to win the war. Immediately after the war came mechanical improvements such as the gradual replacement of the old type of engine (which looked like a wash boiler hitched to a big funnel and a cow-catcher), by coal-burning expansion-cylinder locomotives, the Pullman sleeping car (1864), the safety coupler, and the Westinghouse air brake (1868). But it was the old wood-burning, spark-belching 'bullgine' gay with paint and sporting a name instead of a number, tugging unvestibuled coaches with swaying kerosene lamps and quid-bespattered wood stoves, which first wheezed across the Great Divide and linked the Atlantic to the Pacific.

There were 35,000 miles of steam railway in the United States in 1865. During the next eight years as many more were constructed. In the years 1874–87 some 87,000 additional miles of track were laid, and in 1900, with just under 200,000 miles in operation, the United States had a greater railway mileage than all Europe.

A transportation system such as this required state and Federal legislation, colossal sums of money, and the labor of myriads. It affected the fortunes of almost everyone in the country, and of millions abroad as well. It gave a new wrench to the body politic, already distorted by the war. Railway expansion touched American life at countless points. It closely interacted with western migration and settlement, with the iron and steel industry; and with agriculture;

greased the way for big business and high finance, polluted politics, and gave birth to the new type of successful corporation lawyer. Another revolution in transportation wrought by the internal combustion engine and the motor-car has so overshadowed the railroads that it is hard for the present generation to realize how completely they dominated the industrial and political world for almost fifty years after the Civil War.

We have already seen how the agitation for transcontinental railroads affected the fortunes of Stephen A. Douglas, and helped the Republican party to ride into power on a wholly different issue; how competing routes were advocated and surveyed, but deadlocked by sectional jealousy and politics. While the Civil War was wrecking the railway system of the South, it accelerated railway development in the North and across the continent. As a connection between the Mississippi valley and the Far West, Halliday's Overland Stage was more picturesque than efficient; but military necessity brought the dream of Asa Whitney and Stephen Douglas to fulfilment. With the active co-operation of the War Department, and under the supervision of Generals Dodge and Sherman, the first transcontinental line was projected and constructed.

On 1 July 1862, President Lincoln signed a bill providing for the construction of the Union Pacific Railway by a corporation, which by the same act was granted liberal aid in the form of land grants and promised loans up to $48,000 for every mile completed. Active construction, financed by the notorious Crédit Mobilier, was begun in 1865, and the road was pushed rapidly westward from Omaha through Nebraska and Wyoming Territories, near the line of the old Oregon and Mormon Trails, and across the Wasatch Range of the Rockies into the Great Salt Basin. In the meantime the Central Pacific, chartered in 1858, and directed by Collis P. Huntington and Leland Stanford, was pushed eastward from Sacramento over the difficult grades of the Sierras and across the arid valleys of Nevada to meet the U. P. The lurid details of their race have lost nothing in their telling by Zane Grey; but there is no need to exaggerate or to idealize this spectacular achievement. The obstacles to be overcome seemed almost insuperable: engineering problems, labor and financial difficulties, the constant struggle with mountain blizzard and desert heat. That they were overcome must be attributed not only to the indomitable energy and perseverence of men like Dodge and Huntington, but also to the courage and devotion of the thousands of laborers — the ex-soldiers, Irish immigrants, and Chinese coolies, upon whose brawny shoulders the heaviest part of the task rested.

> 'When I think,' wrote Robert Louis Stevenson, 'of how the railroad has been pushed through this unwatered wilderness and haunt of savage tribes; how at each stage of construction, roaring, impromptu cities full of gold and lust and death sprang up and then died away again, and are now but wayside stations in the desert; how in these uncouth places pig-tailed Chinese pirates worked side by side with border ruffians and broken men from Europe, talking together in a mixed dialect mostly oaths, . . . how the plumed hereditary lord of all America heard in this last fastness the scream of the 'bad medicine wagon' charioting his foes; and then when I go on to remember that all this epical turmoil was conducted by gentlemen in frocked coats, and to nothing more extraordinary than a fortune and a subsequent visit to Paris, it seems to me, . . . as if this railway were the one typical achievement of the age in which we live. . . . If it be romance, if it be contrast, if it be heroism that we require, what was Troytown to this.'

Both the Union and the Central Pacific roads were pushed forward in record time, twenty thousand laborers laying as much as eight miles of track in a day in the last stages of the race. The prime motive for this feverish haste was the greed of each group of promoters to obtain the lion's share of federal bounties and land grants. When, amidst universal rejoicing, the two sets of rails were joined with a golden spike at Promontory Point, Utah, 10 May 1869, the Union Pacific was regarded as the winner, but the Central Pacific promoters had made enough to enable them to buy the state government of California.

Meantime there was a wild scramble among other groups of promoters for charters and favors, and within a few years Congress chartered and endowed with enormous land grants three other lines: (1) the Northern Pacific — from Lake Superior across Minnesota, through the Bad Lands of Dakota up the valley of the Yellowstone, across the continental divide at Bozeman, to the headwaters of the Missouri and by an intricate route through the Rockies to the Columbia river and Portland; (2) the Southern Pacific — an outgrowth and development of the Central Pacific and the short-lived Atlantic and Pacific — from New Orleans across Texas to the Rio Grande, across the Llanos Estacados to El Paso, and through the territory of the Gadsden Purchase to Los Angeles, up the San Joaquin valley to San Francisco; (3) the Santa Fé — closely paralleling the old Santa Fé Trail, from Atchison. Kansas, up the Arkansas river to Trinidad, Colorado, across the Raton spur of the Rockies to Santa Fé and Albuquerque, through the country of the Apache and the Navajo, parallel to the Grand Cañon of the Colorado — which thrusts its impassable barrier for three hundred miles athwart the southern railway routes — and across the Mojave desert to San Bernardino and San Diego. By 1884, after numerous bankruptcies and reorganizations, all three reached the Pacific coast.

2. *The Railroads and the West*

These trans-continental lines were promoted largely with a view to profit from construction and from manipulation of securities, but the peopling of the vast region between the Missouri and the Pacific proved to be their most valuable function. In this respect they performed a work comparable with that of the Virginia Company of 1606 and the Ohio Company of 1785.

At the end of the Civil War the Great Plains west of eastern Kansas and Nebraska, the High Plains and the Rocky Mountain region were practically unpeopled, save for mining towns in Colorado and Nevada and the Mormon settlements in Utah. Mail coaches of the Overland Stage Line required at least five days to transport passengers and mails from the Missouri river to Denver, where flour was sold for twenty cents a pound and potatoes for fifteen dollars a bushel. Pre-war pioneers had been confined to subsistence farming until the railway connected them with markets; but the trans-continental railways pushed out into the plains far in advance of settlers, advertised for immigrants in the eastern states and Europe, transported them at wholesale rates to the prairie railhead, and sold them land at from one to ten dollars an acre. Thus James J. Hill settled his great domain in the far northwest, his agents scouring Europe for settlers and meeting new arrivals at the piers in New York City; Henry Villard of the Northern Pacific employed almost a thousand agents in England and Continental Europe; the immigration department of the Santa Fé railroad brought to Kansas in 1874 fifteen thousand German Mennonites whose ancestors had colonized the Crimea and Caucasus. Thousands of section-hands entered a free homestead right, saved their wages to buy farm equipment and a team of horses, built a temporary cabin, and became permanent settlers as soon as the steel road was built. The termini and eastern junction points of these lines: — places like Omaha, opposite the old Council Bluffs of the Indians; Kansas City, hard by the old jumping-off place for the Oregon Trail; Duluth, the 'Zenith City of the Unsalted Seas'; Oakland on San Francisco bay; Portland, Oregon; Seattle and Tacoma, Washington; — places non-existent or villages before the Civil War, became in thirty years metropolitan cities.

Railroading was the biggest business of a big era, and the railway builders were of the metal that makes leaders and conquerors. The new Northwest was the domain of James J. Hill, the 'Empire Builder,' and the Great Northern Railway his individual path of empire. St. Paul was a small town on the edge of the frontier when he migrated thither from eastern Canada just before the Civil War, and Minneapolis a mere village at the St. Anthony falls of the Mississippi. Such importance as they had was due to their position at the end of a trail from the Red river of the North, which connected Winnipeg with the outside world. Long trains of two-wheeled ox-carts transported the peltry and supplies in forty or fifty days' time. In the winter of 1870 Donald Smith, resident governor of the Hudson's Bay Company, started south from Winnipeg, and James J. Hill north from St. Paul, both in dog-sleds. They met on the prairie and made camp in a snowstorm; and from that meeting sprang the Canadian Pacific and the Great Northern railways.

In the panic of 1873 a little Minnesota railway with an ambitious name, the St. Paul and Pacific, went bankrupt. Hill watched it as a prairie wolf watches a weakening buffalo, and in 1878, in association with two Canadian railway men, wrested it from the Dutch bondholders by a mere flotation of new securities.

The day of land-grants and federal subsidies was past, and Hill saw that the Great Northern Railway, as he renamed his purchase, could reach the Pacific only by developing the country as it progressed. He first made connection with Winnipeg by the Red river valley, then, anticipating a diversion of Winnipeg traffic by the Canadian Pacific, struck almost due west across the Dakota plains, sending out branches in order to populate the region and carry its wheat to market. In the summer of 1887 he made a record stride, 643 miles of grading, bridging, and plate-laying from Minot, North Dakota, to the Great Falls of the Missouri, at the rate of 3.25 miles per working day. Two years later the Rockies yielded their last secret, the Marias pass, to a young engineer named John F. Stevens.

In 1893 the trains of the Great Northern reached tidewater at Tacoma, Washington. Ten years more, and Hill had acquired partial control of the Northern Pacific Railroad, had purchased joint control of a railway connecting their eastern termini with Chicago, and was running his own fleets of steamships from Duluth to Buffalo, and from Seattle to Japan and China.

The Great Northern, the Northern Pacific, and the Union Pacific (which sent a tap-root northwesterly) were responsible for the opening of the great 'Inland Empire' between the Cascades and the Rockies, and for an astounding development of the entire Northwest. This once isolated Oregon country, with its rich and varied natural resources, magnificent scenery, and thriving seaports, has become as distinct and self-conscious a section of the Union as New England. The three states of this region — Washington, Oregon, and Idaho — increased their population from 282,000 in 1880 to 763,000 in 1890, and 2,140,000 in 1910, while California, which contained only half a million people when the golden spike was driven in 1869, kept pace with them. The population of Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas, starting at the same level in 1870, increased six-fold in two decades; Utah and Colorado, where there was a great mining boom in the seventies, rose from 125,000 to 370,000 in the same period; Oklahoma and the Indian Territory, where not a white man was enrolled in 1880, had over a million and a half palefaces in 1910; and Texas, with the aid of a network of railways doubled its population of 1,500,000 between 1880 and 1910.

King Cotton's crown passed to King Wheat, whose dominions increased. Railway penetration of the far Northwest, improved agricultural machinery, the handling of grain in carload lots, transshipment to lake or ocean steamers by grain elevators, and a new milling process which ground northern spring wheat into superfine flour — all these factors combined to move the center of wheat production north and west from Illinois and Iowa into Minnesota, the Dakotas, Montana, Oregon, and the Canadian Northwest. In this new wheat-belt the bonanza farms, veritable factories for wheat production, were well established by 1890. The wheat crop increased from 152 to 612 million bushels between 1866 and 1891. With the low prices that prevailed after the panic of 1873 this meant ruin to the wheat farmers of the eastern states. The silo, enabling dairy farmers to turn corn into dairy products, saved eastern farming from ruin; but enormous areas within a few hours of the great industrial centers on the Atlantic coast have reverted to forest since 1870.

3. *Federal and Local Aid*

When railroads began to supplant rivers and canals as highways of commerce, to connect isolated rural regions with markets, and to open up new land to settlement, they were looked upon as unmixed blessings, and their promoters were admired as public benefactors. Since every route decided upon by surveyors and railway promoters brought prosperity to some communities and ruin to others, towns, counties, and states outdid one another in bidding for the iron tracks. The Federal government, too, having definitely abandoned the strict construction theories that bothered an earlier generation, regarded the roads as military and postal necessities, and aided them most liberally. Certainly very few of the early railroads could have been built by private capital alone without generous aid from public taxation; although the time came when that was forgotten, and a noted railroad baron could declare. 'The public be damned!'

Beside charters and rights of way across the territories, federal aid was extended to the roads in a number of ways such as land grants, loans, subsidies, and tariff remission on rails. The land grants were by far the most valuable. The Union Pacific was given some twenty million acres of public lands, in alternate sections along the track; the Santa Fé system got seventeen million acres; the Central and Southern Pacific systems got twenty-four million acres, while the Northern Pacific obtained the enormous total of forty-four million acres, an area equal to the entire state of Missouri. Altogether the Federal government gave to the railroads 158,293,377 acres — almost the area of Texas — of which 26.8 per cent was later declared forfeit because the roads failed to fulfill the conditions of the grants. As this land was worth nothing to the roads until it produced crops to be hauled to market, and because they were in urgent and constant need of money, the railway companies generally disposed of it as rapidly as possible, and at a price averaging about four dollars an acre.[1]

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[1] According to General Land Office the total of Federal land grants to aid in railway construction amounted to 158,293,377 acres, of which 41,780,000 acres were forfeited or otherwise unpatented and 680,885 were cancelled by court decisions. Total

Direct financial aid was given only to the Union and Central Pacific railways and their subsidiaries, and in the form of a loan for every mile of track. These loans, totalling over sixty million dollars, were eventually repaid with interest.

Aid from states, counties, and municipalities, often competing with one another, was equally lavish. The states often granted tax-exemption, protection from competition, and liberal charters. Some states lent the roads their credit, others subscribed outright to the stock of railway companies, and many states, especially Texas, Illinois, and Minnesota, made extensive land grants totalling over fifty million acres. Counties and municipalities likewise subscribed liberally to railway stock and often donated money outright. The states, non-suable sovereigns, could and sometimes did repudiate their obligations, but the courts have consistently held counties and municipalities to a rigid accounting.

4. *Abuses and State Regulation*

This rapid extension of railroads was not followed by the expected wave of prosperity. On the contrary, within a few years the farmers of the West began to feel the effects of post-war deflation, followed by the panic of 1873, and many laid the blame on the railroads. The advantage for which the Westerners had paid so handsomely seemed to bring only hard times. How far the railroads were responsible for the hard times of the early seventies by stimulating production ahead of market needs, is a matter of dispute; but there is no question of the reality of grave abuses connected with railway expansion.

Chief among these abuses were stock-watering and manipulation, resorted to both by unscrupulous speculators like Daniel Drew of the Erie and by constructive builders like Cornelius Vanderbilt of the New York Central; freight rates so exorbitant that the farmers at times burnt their corn for fuel rather than ship it; free passes to state legislators, men of influence, and all actual or probable 'friends' of the railroad; rebates to favored companies; slashing freight rates at competitive points and making up the loss at non-competitive points. For instance, it was cheaper for merchants of Rochester, N. Y., to ship their goods to Chicago via New York City, or for

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Federal land grants therefore which were certified or patented to railroads as of June 30, 1914, amounted to 115,832,492 acres (180,988 sq. miles).

Pittsburgh merchants to ship their goods to Philadelphia via Cincinnati, than by the direct, non-competitive route.

The power of the western railways over their exclusive territory was nearly absolute, for until the age of automobiles, the people of the West had no alternate means of transportation. Such railways could make an industry or ruin a community by a few cents more or less in a rate on wheat or cattle. The funds at their disposal, often created by financial manipulations and stock-watering, were so colossal as to overshadow state governments. Railway builders and promoters had the point of view of feudal chieftains. They regarded the farmers, whom they had placed on the land instead of Indians and buffaloes, as ignorant and ungrateful boors, who must be coerced and bribed into doing right by the railroad, if milder methods would not serve. Railroading in their opinion was a business wholly private in its nature, no more a fit subject for government regulation than a retail store. That there was any public interest distinct from their private interest, they were unable to recognize. In many, possibly in most, instances the despotism was benevolent, and if a few men became multimillionaires, their subjects also prospered; but Collis P. Huntington, Leland Stanford, and their associates who built the Central Pacific and controlled the Southern Pacific, were indifferent to all save considerations of private gain. By distributing free passes to state representatives, by paying their campaign expenses, and by downright bribery, they prevented a just taxation of the railroad properties, and evaded all regulation. By discriminating in freight charges between localities, articles, and individuals, they terrorized merchants, farmers, and communities, 'until matters reached such a pass, that no man dared engage in any business in which transportation largely entered without first . . . obtaining the permission of a railroad manager.'[2] Through the press, the professions, and the pulpit they wielded a power over public opinion comparable to that of the slave-owners over the old South. The same methods were imitated by the eastern and middle western railways so far as they dared. In New Hampshire as in California, the 'railroad lobby,' ensconced in an office near the state capitol, acted as a chamber of initiative and revision; and few could succeed in politics unless by grace of the railway overlord. 'The railroad corporations,' asserted Governor Larrabee of Iowa, 'were in fact rapidly assuming a position which could not be tolerated. Sheltering themselves behind the Dartmouth College decision, they practically undertook to set even public opinion at defiance. . . . They thoroughly got it into their heads that they, as common carriers, were in no way bound to afford equal facilities to all, and indeed, that it was in the last degree absurd and unreasonable to expect them to.'

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[2] *Report of the U. S. Pacific Railway Commission* (1887), i, 141.

These exactions and abuses of power were tolerated by the American people with what Europeans deemed a remarkable patience, so imbued were they with *laissez-faire* doctrine, so proud of progress, improvement and development, and so averse from increasing the power of government. But the deflation of the post-war years and the panic of 1873 brought an inevitable reaction against the roads in the early seventies. This reaction centered in the Mid-Western states of Illinois, Iowa, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Missouri, and Nebraska, but it found expression in Eastern states such as Massachusetts and in Western such as California as well. It took several forms: prohibition of further state aid, as in the constitutions of California, Kansas, and Missouri; recovery of land grants; prohibition of specific abuses; and positive regulation of rates and service. The eastern state governments inclined to supervision by special railway commissions, and that of Massachusetts, under the leadership of the gifted Charles Francis Adams, Jr., attracted widespread attention and was the model for numerous states.

The Mid-Western states were more direct in their methods. The Illinois Constitution of 1870 contained a clause directing the legislature to ' pass laws to correct abuses and to prevent unjust discrimination and extortion in the rates of freight and passenger tariffs on the different railroads of the state.' Pursuant to this clause the legislature of Illinois prohibited discrimination, established a maximum rate, and created a railway and warehouse commission to regulate roads and grain elevators and warehouses. These laws, though bitterly denounced as socialism throughout the East, served as models for similar legislation in other states. At the demand of the farmers, the example of Illinois was followed in 1874 by Iowa, Minnesota, and Wisconsin, with its drastic Potter law.

Thus within a few years the railroads of the Middle West found their independence severely circumscribed by a mass of highly restrictive regulatory legislation. The day of individualism and *laissez-faire* theories was passing away.

The validity of this legislation was soon contested in the courts, but upheld in the ' Granger ' cases. The first and most important of these was Munn *v.* Illinois (1876) involving the constitutionality of a statute regulating the charges of grain elevators. The warehouse owners contended that the act was a deprivation of property without due process of law and thus constituted a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. In one of the most important decisions in the history of American law, Chief Justice Waite upheld the validity of the Illinois statute. Basing his opinion upon the historical right of the state, in the exercise of its police power, to regulate ferries, common carriers, inns, etc., he announced that

> 'When private property is affected with a public interest it ceases to be *juris privati* only. . . . Property does become clothed with a public interest when used in a manner to make it of public consequence, and affect the community at large. When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in which the pubic has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for common good, to the extent of the interest he has created.'

This decision gave *laissez-faire* the air, and welcomed a return of that public regulation of business against the abuse of which *laissez-faire* had been a reaction.

On the same day that the court sustained the validity of the Illinois statute, it handed down decisions in the important cases of Peik *v.* Chicago & Northwestern R. R., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R. R. *v.* Iowa, and Winona & St. Peter R. R. *v.* Blake. These cases involved the validity of laws establishing maximum freight and passenger rates. The laws had been attacked on the ground that they violated not only the Fourteenth Amendment, but also the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution. The Court, however, upheld the state laws as a proper exercise of the police power, and as constituting no violation of the commerce clause of the Constitution since Congress had not yet legislated on the subject. The railroad, said the Supreme Court,

> 'is employed in state as well as interstate commerce, and until Congress acts, the State must be permitted to adopt such rules and regulations as may be necessary for the promotion of the general welfare of the people within its own jurisdiction, even though in so doing those without may be indirectly affected.'

These decisions aroused a storm of protest from conservative and financial circles in the East. They were branded as socialistic class legislation, irreparable blows to private enterprise. Even the liberal

New York *Nation* joined in the hue and cry. Despite important modification in later decisions, these principles have never been repudiated, and the Granger cases remain as landmarks in American constitutional law and in the history of public regulation.

Within a decade the composition of the Supreme Court became more conservative and the Granger decisions were duly modified. In 1886, in the Wabash case, the court held an Illinois statute prohibiting the 'long-and-short-haul' evil invalid, as an infringement upon the exclusive power of Congress over interstate commerce. In the same year, in the case of Stone *v.* Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. the court intimated that the reasonableness of the rate established by commission might be a matter for judicial determination. Three years later, in the case of Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. *v.* Minnesota this *obiter dictum* became the basis for a decision declaring a rate-regulating law invalid. These decisions practically put an end to state regulation of roads and rates, and placed the burden squarely upon the Federal government. Congress responded with the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887.

5. *The Advent of Federal Regulation*

Agitation for Federal rather than state regulation of railroads began with the Senate report of the Windom Committee (1874), which advocated federal construction and operation of railways to compete with the private roads. In the same year the House passed and the Senate rejected a bill providing for federal regulation of the roads. Three years later Congressman Reagan of Texas introduced a bill looking to the elimination of railway abuses, and got it through the House in 1878; but again the Senate, influenced by a powerful railroad lobby, failed to take action. In 1885 the Senate appointed a special committee of investigation, with Senator Collum of Illinois as chairman, and the report of this committee made clear the need of immediate reform. A compromise was found between this report and the Reagan measure, the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. Though the bill was popularly regarded as a victory of the public, railroad stocks rose in the market upon its passage.

The Interstate Commerce Act of 4 February 1887, specifically prohibited pooling, rebates, and higher charges for short than for long hauls. It provided that all charges should be 'reasonable and just,' required the roads to post their tariffs, and established the first modern administrative board of the American government, the Interstate Commerce Commission, to supervise the administration of the law. Although enforcement was left to the courts, a large part of the burden of proof and prosecution was placed upon the Commission.

Administrative regulations, however, were still so foreign to the American conception of government that the federal courts insisted on their right to review orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and took the teeth out of the Act by a series of decisions. In the Maximum Freight Rate case (1896) the Supreme Court held that the Commission did not have the power to fix rates, and in the Alabama Midlands case it practically nullified the long-and-short-haul prohibition. The roads evaded the provisions of the Act so successfully that Justice Harlan declared the Commission to be a 'useless body for all practical purposes,' and the Commission itself, in its annual report for 1898, confessed its failure. Nevertheless the principle of federal regulation of railroads was established, and the machinery for such regulation created. It remained for a later administration to apply the principle, and make the machinery effective.

6. *The Decline of Steamboating*

I saw the boat go round the bend,
Good-by, my lover, good-by!
All loaded down with gentlemen,
Good-by, my lover, good-by!

The generation that flung the iron tracks across the prairies and mountains of western America, witnessed the passing of one of the most characteristic and colorful phases of American life — steamboating. From the eventful day that Henry Shreve launched the *George Washington* on the Ohio (1817), until the Civil War, steamboats were the major means of inland transportation. For fifty years the waters of the Mississippi and her tributaries floated hundreds of steamboats great and small, their main decks laden with cotton and cattle, grain, and furs, and 'fellows who have seen alligators and neither fear whiskey nor gunpowder'; their upper decks, which appeared 'Fairy structures of Oriental gorgeousness and splendor,' to the simple dwellers of the valley, bearing planters, merchants, dandies, and fine ladies. Swift passenger steamers raced each other recklessly on the lazy Father of Waters or the riotous Missouri, lash-ing the waters into foam with their churning paddles. While the North and East followed the fortunes and compared the records of the Yankee clippers, the people of the interior bet their shirts on the *Robert E. Lee* and the *Natchez* in their historic race from New Orleans to St. Louis, won by the *Lee* in the record time of three days, eighteen hours and fourteen minutes. Mark Twain has preserved for us the talk in the pilot's *Texas,* the jabber of the negro roustabouts, the glamour of gilded cabins and the tense excitement of steamboat racing, in his immortal *Life on the Mississippi.*

It was in the decade of the fifties that river traffic reached its zenith. The value of the river trade at New Orleans was over $289,000,000 in 1860. In those piping times before the war hundreds of new steamboats were launched on the inland waters, and on the outbreak of the conflict there were over two thousand of them on the Ohio-Mississippi system alone. Before the coming of the railroads the steamboat almost succeeded in tying the upper part of the great valley to the Cotton Kingdom. At one time eighty per cent of the pork and grain from Cincinnati was floated down the Ohio, and Southern Congressmen so far waived their strict-construction principles as to vote over three million dollars for river improvements.

The greater part of the produce that came down-river was reshipped by sea to Atlantic ports and to Europe. In the eighteen fifties the Eastern trunk lines provided a short cut, right across this roundabout route, and struck at the fancy profits of river steamboating just as on the high seas the steamships got the cream from the clipper ships. As in that rivalry, so in this, the Civil War accelerated the movement tremendously. The steamboat fought gallantly for life, readjusting itself to new circumstances, compromising with new conditions. As Mark Twain tells it:

> 'Boat used to land — captain on hurricane roof — mighty stiff and straight — iron ramrod for a spine — kid gloves, plug hat, hair parted behind — man on shore takes off hat and says:
>
> '"Got twenty-eight tons of wheat, cap'n — be great favor if you can take them."
>
> 'Captain says:
>
> '"I'll take two of them" — and don't even condescend to look at him.
>
> 'But nowadays the captain takes off his old slouch and smiles all the way around to the back of his ears, and gets off a bow which he hasn't got any ramrod to interfere with, and says:

'"Glad to see you Smith, glad to see you — you're looking well — haven't seen you looking so well for years — what you got for us."

'"Nuthin," says Smith; and keeps his hat on, and just turns his back and goes on talking with somebody else.'

But the river captains were not always as unsuccessful as this. Although passenger traffic almost disappeared from the inland waters, there was an absolute, though not a relative, gain in freight traffic. In 1879 no fewer than 3,372 boats and 1,320 barges passed Winona, Minnesota, loaded down with lumber and grain, and 1880 witnessed the high-water mark of transportation for the lower Mississippi with over a million bales of cotton unloaded on the levee at New Orleans. After that the decline of river shipping was precipitous.

Shipping in the Great Lakes was a different story. The enormous iron ore deposits of the Lake Superior region and the products of the marvellously productive soil of the Northwest now brought under cultivation, increased tonnage on the Great Lakes enormously — from 500,000 in 1869 to 2,600,000 in 1920. In 1885 traffic through the Sault Ste. Marie Canals amounted to 3,256,628 tons; by 1920 it had increased to 79,282,000. Both river and Great Lakes transportation of the post-Civil War period exhibited the same tendencies we have observed in the railroads: combination, absorption of the weaker by the stronger lines, local and federal aid.

With the decline of the steamboat passed another phase of American frontier life as unique and as rich as the Cattle Kingdom. Only a few rusty, battered stern-wheelers survive to bring down cotton, hops, and pipestaves from the tributaries, and remoter reaches of the Black, the Arkansas, and the Ouachita rivers. There, as Roark Bradford's stories remind us, we may still see the negro rousta's toting heavy burdens with their peculiar shuffling gait, the 'coonjine,' and hear them sing:

De Coonjine, jine de Coonjine!
De Coonjine, jine de Coonjine!
Roll dat cotton bale down de hill,
De Coonjine, jine de Coonjine.

XXXIX

THE ECONOMIC REVOLUTION

1. *Hamilton Wins*

IT was the dream of Jefferson that his country — ‘ with room enough for our descendants to the hundredth and thousandth generation ’ — was to be a great agrarian democracy. ‘ While we have land to labor,’ he wrote, ‘ let us never wish to see our citizens occupied at a work bench, or twirling a distaff,’ for ‘ those who labor in the earth are the chosen people of God.’ Yet it is one of the ironies of our history that the Sage of Monticello himself, through his own pet embargo, should have given the first stimulus to factory development in America, and that his own party should have passed the first protective tariff. Within two generations of Jefferson’s death the value of American manufactured products was almost treble that of the agricultural, and the advocates of big business were appealing to his *laissez-faire* principles against the regulatory ideals of his rival Hamilton. For a hundred years America has progressed economically in the direction that Alexander Hamilton wished it to do: that of a diversified, self-sufficing nation, ruled by the people who control the nation’s prosperity. When the census of 1920 recorded over nine million wage-earners producing commodities to the value of sixty-two billion dollars, and over fifty per cent of the population crowded into towns and cities, surely Hamilton was able to collect some bets from Jefferson in the Elysian Fields!

By 1910 the United States, hitherto a debtor nation of extractive and predominantly agriculture industry, had become the leading industrial and manufacturing power of the world; and the World War has made it the predominant financial power as well. The power and responsibilities that this achievement has thrust upon the United States are as yet imperfectly apprehended by her people.

First let us glance at some of the outstanding features of this economic revolution. It depended to a large extent upon three factors: a transportation system adequate to the needs of an industrialized


WASH.
MONT.
N. DAK.
MINN.
MAINE
OREGON
IDAHO
S. DAK.
WIS.
VT.
N.H.
MASS.
R.I.
CONN.
N. Y.
MICH.
WYO.
IOWA
NEV.
NEBR.
PA.
N. J.
OHIO
MD.
DEL.
ILL.
IND.
CALIF.
UTAH
COLO.
W.VA.
KANSAS
MO.
VA.
KY.
N. C.
TENN.
ARIZ.
OKLA.
N. MEX.
ARK.
S. C.
MISS.
ALA.
GA.
TEXAS
LA.
FLA.
Less than 750 million dollars
750 million to 1 billion dollars
1 billion to 5 billion dollars
5 billion dollars and over

Value of Manufactured Products in 1919, by States

nation; the application of science, invention, and machine power to new processes and in new regions; and an adequate labor supply, obtained largely by immigration from Europe. The economic revolution was fostered and aided by the Federal government, positively through protective tariffs and other indirect subsidies, negatively through a policy of *laissez-faire*. It led to a concentration of wealth and placed the control of the natural resources and machinery of production and distribution of the country in the hands of a small group of men, so creating, in a nation brought up to Jeffersonian principles, a whole series of antagonisms and difficulties on which the Fathers of the Constitution afforded very little light, to say the least.

It is another, and cruel, irony of our history that the South, which cherished the agrarian Jeffersonian tradition, which had most to fear from the industrialization of America, should have greatly accelerated its coming by her secession and the consequent Civil War.

> 'The Civil War,' says Lewis Mumford, 'cut a white gash through the history of the country; it dramatized in a stroke the changes that had begun to take place during the preceding twenty or thirty years. . . . When the curtain rose on the post-bellum scene the old America was for all practical purposes demolished; industrialism had entered overnight, had transformed the practices of agriculture, had encouraged a mad exploitation of mineral, oil, natural gas and coal, and had made the unscrupulous master of finance, fat with war-profits, the central figure of the situation.'[1]

Indeed it is now so evident what the Civil War accomplished in the long run, that the Beards have gone so far as to assert that industrialization was the conscious purpose of the Republican party in 1861 or of those who supplied the funds and the brains of the Republican party. We can find no evidence of this nigger in the woodpile — or Ford car in the heavy artillery. No one looked toward this end, or foresaw what was coming. It was simply another case of what Euripides said through the chorus in the Medea, twenty-four centuries ago.

And the end men looked for cometh not,
And a path is there where no man thought;
So hath it fallen here.

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[1] *The Golden Day*, pp. 158–9.

America, where society was fluid, and no established Church or feudal aristocracy stood up for the ancient ways; America where success had always been its own justification, was the land first destined for complete conquest by the industrial Moloch. Yet England, France, Germany, where all the forces of resistance were intrenched in governments and society, fell; Jefferson's America must have fallen sooner or later. But the Civil War like every great war, depressed the forces which were declining in the nation's life, and gave ten-fold vigor to those which were active, vigorous, and positive.

The issue of the war, while not absolutely unfavorable to farming and the farmer class, was so highly profitable to manufacturing and finance that small-scale, subsistence farming was doomed. War needs enormously stimulated manufacturing in the North, and a complaisant government prolonged the high profits of the war period with a tariff largely dictated by the interests which it benefited. At the same time the immigration law of 1864 enabled manufacturers to import contract labor and thus keep wages down. The construction of the great transcontinental railroads after the war, opened up new markets for exploitation and furnished employment for additional capital. Within thirty years the ultimate control of a large part of the transportation system of the country was in the hands of a few men in the East.

After all, the Civil War was a mere speeding-up process which eliminated the weak and strengthened the strong. The fundamental factor was the march of science and invention and the exploitation of new resources of iron and of power.

2. *The Age of Invention*

The United States Patent Office was created in 1790 largely through the efforts of one of the greatest American inventors, John Stevens of Hoboken. So numerous were the patents granted to ingenious Americans in the following years that in 1833 the head of the Patent Bureau decided to resign because he felt that everything of importance had been invented. Yet the 36,000 patents granted before 1860 were but a feeble indication of the flood of inventions that was to inundate the Patent Office in the years following the Civil War. In the period from 1860 to 1890 no less than 640,000 patents were issued, and in the first quarter of the twentieth century the number reached the staggering total of 969,428. Nothing more strikingly reveals the extent and implications of the economic revolution than the fact that the average number of inventions patented in any one year since 1900 exceeds the total number patented in the entire history of the country before 1860.

While the beginnings of many important inventions can be traced to the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, their application on a large scale to the processes of industry and agriculture came after the Civil War. Thus James Watt in Glasgow and Oliver Evans in Philadelphia developed the steam engine before the close of the eighteenth century, but it was not until the construction of the great railroad system and the introduction of the de Laval steam turbine in 1882 that steam reached its peak in American development. Already in 1882, the age of electricity was portended. Long ago Franklin, Galvini, and Oersted had experimented with electricity; Michael Faraday of England and Joseph Henry of the Smithsonian Institution had developed the principle of the dynamo as early as 1831, but it was not until after 1880 that the genius of Thomas A. Edison, William Stanley, Charles Brush and a host of others revolutionized American life with the dynamo. Thus Charles Goodyear discovered the secret of vulcanization of rubber in 1839 but it was not until the coming of the automobile that it assumed an important place in the economic order. Elias Howe invented the sewing machine in 1846, but it did not come into general use until popularized by Isaac Singer after 1860, and was first applied to the making of shoes by Gordon McKay in 1862. Eli Whitney of cotton-gin fame adapted for firearms the revolutionary principles of standardization and interchangeability of parts as early as 1798; but the general application of this principle to manufacturing, which has given precedence to American mass production, did not come until after the achievements of Kelly, Holley, and Bessemer ushered in the age of steel; and the full meaning of it did not appear until Henry Ford reorganized the automobile industry, and Herbert Hoover became Secretary of Commerce. Dr. N. A. Otto of Germany invented the internal combustion engine in 1876, but it did not mean much to the average American until Henry Ford in 1908 placed a motor car on the market that was not a rich man's toy but a poor man's instrument and means of recreation.

A mere reference to some of the more important inventions developed since the Civil War will indicate something of the dominant place in modern American life. In the field of railway transportation the Westinghouse air brake of 1866, the Jamey automatic coupler of 1871, the interlocking block signals introduced on American railroads in 1874, and the wide use of all-steel trains after 1900 insured a higher degree of safety to passengers, while the introduction of the Pullman car, in 1864, changed travelling from an ordeal to a pleasure, and the use of refrigerator cars after 1875 revolutionized the slaughtering and meat-packing industry of the country.

At the same time other forms of transportation — the electric railway, the automobile, and the airplane, — were being developed. Between 1870 and 1880 Stephen Field and Thomas A. Edison in America and the Siemens firm in Berlin were perfecting the first electric railway, and inside of ten years there were 769 in operation in the United States. Thus within a short time the street car, elevated and subway train, all based upon the dynamo, accelerated that concentration of population in cities which is one of the characteristics of modern America. It is one of the dramatic things in our history that the steam railway dispersed our population all over the land, and the electric railway and motor car then pulled it, for working-day purposes at least, into a few thousand civic centers, and concentrated one-twentieth of the population of this vast country in a single urban conglomeration, New York.

George Seldes of Rochester, New York, had experimented with gasoline cars as early as 1879, but it was not until the turn of the century that the industry of Henry Ford and the genius of Charles Duryea bore fruit in the modern automobile. By 1920 Ford was making over 6000 cars a day in his Detroit factories, and the automobile industry ranked first in the country in the value of its finished products. 'Darius Green and his flyin' machine' was a favorite comic recitation in the gay nineties. 'God never intended man to fly' was a serious conviction in 1900. Yet the vision of Samuel P. Langley, and the perseverance of the Wright brothers and Glenn Curtiss, lifted the airplane out of the experimental stage into the practical, around 1908. Langley died broken-hearted in 1906 at the failure of his flying machine; in 1919 two Englishmen, John Alcock and Arthur Brown made the first non-stop trans-Atlantic flight from St. Johns, Newfoundland, to Clifden, Ireland; and in 1927 Charles Lindbergh made his non-stop flight from New York to Paris.

Other forms of communication: the telegraph, the cable, the telephone, and wireless telegraphy, helped to revolutionize modern life. It was in 1844 that Samuel Morse, a Yankee painter with a flair for mechanics, flashed over the wires from Washington to Baltimore, the first telegraphic message: 'What hath God wrought!' In 1856 the Western Union Company was organized and soon the whole country was criss-crossed with a network of wires. In 1858 the duplex telegraph was invented and on the modern multiplex telegraph eight messages can be sent simultaneously on one line, and over 100,000 words transmitted within an hour. In 1896 the Italian, Marconi, discovered the secret of wireless telegraphy. Efforts to lay a trans-Atlantic cable had gone on since 1850, but it was not until 1866, and then after repeated failures, that the courage of Cyrus Field and the faith of Peter Cooper were rewarded, and communication between Europe and America became a matter of seconds instead of days.

In the Centennial year of 1876 Emperor Dom Pedro of Brazil, attending the Philadelphia Exposition, sauntered up to the booth of young Alexander Graham Bell: he picked up the cone-shaped instrument on display there, and as he placed one end to his ear Bell spoke through the other. 'My God, it talks!' exclaimed His Majesty; and from that moment the telephone became the central feature of the exposition. Within half a century sixteen million telephones had profoundly affected the economic and social life of the nation. The tempo of business life was enormously quickened, too, by the invention in 1867 of the typewriter by an erratic printer, Christopher Sholes of Milwaukee; of the cash register in 1897 by James Ritty; of the adding machine by Burroughs in 1888; of the dictaphone — an outgrowth of the phonograph — by Edison; and hundreds of other office and business accessories. The linotype composing machine invented by Ottmar Mergenthaler and first used by Whitelaw Reid in 1886 in printing the New York *Tribune;* Hoe's rotary press, the web press, and folding machinery, have made it possible to print as many as 240,000 eight-page newspapers in an hour; and the electrotype has worked a comparable change in the printing of magazines and books. This book costs you somewhat less than a volume of Hildreth's *History of the United States* cost your grandfathers; but the printers, papermakers, binders, and others who produce it get three to five times the wages that their forbears did in 1865; the cost of selling it to you has multiplied in the same degree or more; but the authors get a smaller amount on each copy than Hildreth did on his. Such are the benefits of modern inventions.

Just as science and invention have revolutionized transportation, communication, business, and the conditions of urban living, so they have wrought profound changes in agriculture and in the daily life of the American people. Postponing to another chapter the influence of the new machinery on the development of American agriculture, we will here merely call attention to a few of the inventions that have carried the industrial revolution to the rural regions. In 1868 a Scotch immigrant, James Oliver, perfected the chilled plow; in 1873 John Appelby took out a patent for a twine binder; in 1881 Benjamin Holt turned out the first combined harvester and thresher designed for the great bonanza farms of the Far West; in 1888 A. N. Hadley invented a combined corn cutter and shocker; and after the opening of the twentieth century gasoline power was widely applied to farm machinery. Thus the industrial revolution went beyond the walls of the factory and the streets of the city and transformed the very processes and conditions of farming.

Meantime a host of inventions affected the life of the American people, especially those who flocked to the towns. The 'Wizard of Menlo,' Thomas Edison, gave the world the incandescent lamp in 1880, and within a few years it supplied millions of homes with better, safer, and cheaper light than had ever been known before. It was Edison, too, who perfected the talking machine, and in conjunction with George Eastman, developed the motion picture; two inventions that provide employment to tens of thousands, and entertainment to millions of people everywhere.

3. *Iron and Steel*

The works of man in the United States of 1860 were constructed of wood and stone, with a little brick and iron; by 1920 this had become a nation of iron, steel, and concrete. This transformation, as effective in American life as the strides of science and invention, resulted from the exploitation of new resources of iron, and the discovery of new processes for converting it into steel.

It was in 1844 that the great Mesaba iron range at the head of Lake Superior was first discovered, but it was not until forty years later that the energy and faith of the Merritt family made the ore commercially available. Within a short time this region proved to be the greatest ore producer in the world, and it had the inestimable advantage that the ore was above ground and therefore so much easier and cheaper to mine. In 1860 the tonnage of vessels passing through the 'Soo' canal between Lakes Superior and Huron was 403,000, and in 1870 only 691,000, but in 1901 it was almost 25,000,000 and in 1920 58,000,000. Wheat and iron ore, particularly the latter, formed the bulk of these increasing burdens. These ore fields on Lake Superior are hundreds of miles distant from coal deposits, but cheap lake and railway transportation brought the two together. Ore and coal met in the smelters of Chicago, where the first American steel rails were rolled in 1865, and in Cleveland, Toledo, Ashtabula or Milwaukee. Much of the ore was transported to Pittsburgh, center of the northern Appalachian coal-fields and for long of the American iron industry. In the eighteen-eighties the iron and coal beds of the southern Appalachians were first exploited and Birmingham, Alabama, became a southern rival to Pittsburgh and Chicago. The twentieth century has witnessed a great development of the industry in Colorado with apparently inexhaustible resources of minerals.

The Bessemer and open-hearth processes and the application of chemistry and electricity to the making of steel were as fundamental as the new ore beds. The Bessemer process, which consists merely in blowing air through the molten iron to drive out the impurities, was anticipated in America by William Kelly of Kentucky, a prophet without honor in his own country, and it was not until Henry Bessemer had demonstrated the utility of his process in England that American iron manufacturers adopted it. By 1875 Carnegie had recognized its advantages and adopted it in his great J. Edgar Thompson steel works. Within a few years the open-hearth method of smelting was introduced to this country and despite the increased time and expense it involved, the superiority of the steel it produced was soon apparent. In 1880 ten times as much steel was manufactured by the Bessemer as by the open-hearth process, but by 1910 the latter method accounted for 20,780,000 tons of steel and the Bessemer for only 10,328,000 tons. The Bessemer and open-hearth processes not only made steel of superior quality and in enormous quantities but reduced the price from $300 to $35 a ton. The application of chemistry to steel-making introduced further economies and solved many technical problems. 'Nine-tenths of all the uncertainties were dispelled under the burning sun of chemical knowledge,' affirmed Andrew Carnegie. Finally the introduction of electric furnaces has made it possible to produce hard manganese steel for automobiles and machines, and 'high-speed' steel for tools. Andrew Carnegie could boast with truth:

> 'Two pounds of iron stone mined upon Lake Superior and transported nine hundred miles to Pittsburgh; one pound and one-half of coal mined and manufactured into coke, and transported to Pittsburgh; one-half pound of lime, mined and transported to Pittsburgh; a small amount of manganese ore mined in Virginia and brought to Pittsburgh — and these four pounds of materials manufactured into one pound of steel, for which the consumer pays one cent.'

Well might the great iron-master congratulate himself that the steel age represented a triumph of engineering and technical skill, science and business enterprise, but the social implications of the age of steel largely escaped his optimistic view.

The story of the steel industry cannot be related without reference to those Titans of industry who presided at its birth and nurtured its giant growth. Alexander Holley of Troy, New York, was the first to apply the processes of Kelly and Bessemer in America, and for a decade after the Civil War he was the outstanding figure in iron and steel manufacturing. But the greatest leader in the American steel industry and perhaps the most typical figure of the industrial age, was undoubtedly Andrew Carnegie, who came to this country from Scotland as a boy of twelve. By dint of unflagging industry and unrivalled business acumen and resourcefulness and especially through his extraordinary ability to choose as his associates such men as Charles Schwab, Henry Frick, and Henry Phipps and to command the whole-hearted devotion of his workmen, Carnegie built up the greatest steel business in the world and retired in 1901 to chant the glories of 'Triumphant Democracy' and to give away his enormous fortune of five hundred millions. This was made possible by the sale of his holdings to a rival organization directed by the Chicago lawyer Elbert Gary and the New York banker J. Pierpont Morgan. The result was the United States Steel Corporation, a combination of most of the important steel manufacturers in the country, capitalized at the colossal sum of $1,400,000,000 — a sum greater than the total estimated national wealth of the United States in 1800. $700,000,000 of this was watered, but by 1924 the company had earned aggregate net profits of $2,108,848,640.

4. *The Trusts*

The organization of the United States Steel Corporation in 1901 came as the climax to an economic movement which had been under way for a generation. This was the concentration of industry and transportation in large units — a concentration taking various forms such as pools, trusts, corporations and holding companies. Already as early as 1873 a Congressional Investigating Committee had announced:

> 'The country is fast becoming filled with gigantic corporations wielding and controlling immense aggregations of money and thereby commanding great influence and power.'

Yet by this time the trust movement was only in its infancy.

In 1860, 140,433 manufacturing establishments turned out products to the value of $1,895,861,000. In 1900 the number of establishments had increased slightly to 207,514, while the value of their products had increased eight-fold to $11,406,977,000. Even more illuminating are the statistics of the concentration of manufacturing in large establishments. In 1904 ninety-eight per cent of all the manufacturing establishments in the country had an annual output of less than one million dollars, while but one per cent of the establishments boasted an annual output of over that sum. The former, however, turned out only sixty-two per cent of the manufactured products of the country, while the latter turned out no less than thirty-eight per cent. Yet even this concentration was but a faint indication of the concentration that was to come in the first quarter of the twentieth century.

The trust movement grew out of the period of fierce competition following hard upon the Civil War. Competing railways cut freight rates between important points, in the hope of obtaining the lion's share of business, until dividends ceased and railway securities became a drug on the market. The downward trend of prices from 1865 to 1895, specially marked after 1873, put a premium on labor-saving machinery, on new processes of manufacture, and on greater units of mass production. Pooling — 'gentlemen's agreements' between rival producers or railroad directors to maintain prices and divide business, or even to pro-rata profits — was characteristic of the period after 1872. But on the whole it was found so difficult to maintain these rudimentary monopolies that a 'gentlemen's agreement' came to be defined as one that was certain to be violated. They were forbidden in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and the prohibitions of the Sherman Law were extended to them in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association Case of 1897.

About 1880 pools began to be superseded by 'trusts'—a form of combination in which the affiliated companies hand over their securities and their power to a board of trustees. A trust, according to Eliot Jones, 'may be said to exist when a person, corporation, or combination owns or controls enough of the plants producing a certain article to be able for all practical purposes to fix its price.' The first important trust was the Standard Oil Company, organized by John D. Rockefeller in 1870 and reorganized as a Trust in 1882. A large measure of Rockefeller's success was due to improvements, economies, and original methods of marketing; his monopoly was secured by methods that were condemned even by the tolerant business ethics of the day, and pronounced criminal by the courts. Yet it is only fair to say that his competitors were no less unscrupulous than himself. By playing competing railways one against another, the Standard Oil Trust obtained rebates from their published freight rates, and even forced them to pay over to the Standard rebates from its competitors' freight bills! If competing oil companies managed to stagger along under such handicaps, they were 'frozen out' by cutting prices in their selling territory until the Standard Oil had all the business. The situation was so notorious that the Hepburn Committee of New York reported in 1880 that the Standard

> 'owns and controls the pipe lines of the producing regions that connect with the railroads. It controls both ends of these roads. It ships 95 per cent of all the oil. . . . It dictates terms and rebates to the railroads. It has bought out and frozen out refiners all over the country. By means of the superior facilities for transportation which it thus possessed, it could overbid in the producing regions and undersell in the markets of the world. Thus it has gone on buying out and freezing out all opposition, until it has absorbed and monopolized this great traffic;'

and the Supreme Court of Ohio declared the Trust dissolved in 1892, only to have it reorganize under the more lenient laws of New Jersey a few years later.

The Standard Oil Trust was soon followed by a number of similar business combinations. The movement for consolidation gathered momentum in the eighties and the early nineties, and reached its climax in the piping years of prosperity around the Spanish War. Altogether in this period something over 5000 industrial establishments were consolidated into about 300 trusts or corporations, and of these no less than 198 were formed in the period from 1898 to 1902. The combined capitalization of the consolidations formed in the single year of 1899 was no less than $2,243,995,000 — a sum far exceeding the total national debt at the time. The most important of the combinations besides the Standard Oil Co. and the United States Steel Corporation were the Amalgamated Copper Co., the American Sugar Refining Co., the American Tobacco Co., The International Mercantile Marine, the United States Rubber Co., the United States Leather Co., the International Harvester Co., and the Pullman Co., no one of which had a capitalization under fifty million dollars.

These figures spelled the doom of local industry, of the local self-sufficient community. They bespoke the concentration of manufacturing in large corporation-owned factories where economies could be attained through the elimination of unnecessary duplication and centralized control and through proximity to the source of raw material and of labor. They brought about an ever-increasing specialization in industry, both of the community and of the individual laborer, and they put an ever-increasing burden upon the transportation system of the country, and enormously increased the costs of distribution. The economic implications of this development are writ large in the census reports, but the social implications can best be read in such novels as Louis Bromfield's *Green Bay Tree,* or in Sherwood Anderson's *Poor White:*

> 'In the days before the coming of industry, before the time of the mad awakening, the towns of the Middle West were sleepy places devoted to the practice of the old trades, to agriculture and merchandising. In the morning the men of the towns went forth to work in the fields or to the practice of the trade of carpentry, horse-shoeing, wagon-making, harness repairing, and the making of shoes and clothing. They read books and believed in a God born in the brains of men who came out of a civilization much like their own. On the farms and in the houses in the towns the men and women worked together toward the same ends in life. They lived in small frame houses set on the plains like boxes, but very substantially built. The carpenter who built a farmer's house differentiated it from the barn by putting what he called scroll work up under

the eaves and by building at the front a porch with carved posts. After one of the poor little houses had been lived in for a long time, after children had been born and men had died, after men and women had suffered and had moments of joy together in the tiny rooms under the low roofs, a subtle change took place. The houses became almost beautiful in their old humanness. Each of the houses began vaguely to shadow forth the personality of the people who lived within its walls. . . . A sense of quiet growth awoke in sleeping minds. It was the time for art and beauty to awake in the land.

Instead the giant, Industry, awoke. Boys, who in the schools had read of Lincoln, walking for miles through the forest to borrow his first book . . . began to read in the newspapers and magazines of men who by developing their faculty for getting and keeping money had become suddenly and overwhelmingly rich. Hired writers called these men great, and there was no maturity of mind in the people with which to combat the force of the statement, often repeated. . . .

Out through the coal and iron regions of Pennsylvania, into Ohio and Indiana, and on westward into the States bordering on the Mississippi River, industry crept. . . .

A vast energy seemed to come out of the breast of the earth and infect the people. Thousands of the most energetic men of the Middle States wore themselves out in forming companies, and when the companies failed, immediately formed others. In the fast-growing towns, men who were engaged in organizing companies representing a capital of millions lived in houses thrown hurriedly together by carpenters who, before the time of the great awakening, were engaged in building barns. It was a time of hideous architecture, a time when thought and learning paused. Without music, without poetry, without beauty in their lives or impulses, a whole people, full of the native energy and strength of lives lived in a new land, rushed pell-mell into a new age.'

5. *Trust Regulation*

It was not until the late eighties that the American public began to demand regulation of trusts; and the problem of regulation was greatly complicated by the federal form of government. Corporations are chartered by the states, not the Federal government; and a corporation chartered by one state has the right to do business in every other. Hence it was easy for corporations to escape the restrictions and limitations of strict state laws by incorporating in states such as New Jersey, West Virginia or Delaware, where the laws as to issuing stock, accountability of directors and the like were very lax.

In its ordinary operations the average corporation came into contact only with state and municipal governments. Railway companies, except certain trans-continental lines, obtained all their privileges from the states, and were taxed only by them. Lighting and water companies and street railways depended for their very existence on municipalities. Hence the corrupt alliance that was cemented after the Civil War between politics and business. Plain bribery was often practised with municipal councils, which gave away for nothing franchises worth millions, while their cities remained unpaved, ill-lit, and inadequately policed.

Opposition to trusts and monopolies, however, was not aroused so much by corruption and dishonest practices, which were looked upon with a leniency characteristic of the American people, as by the fear that the natural resources of the country were being brought under the control of a small group of men who used them for the aggrandizement of their own fortunes — a fear inspired in part by a deep-seated antipathy to all forms of monopoly and in part by ruthless exploitation and rapid exhaustion of the natural resources of the nation.

> 'All who recall the conditions of the country in 1890,' said Justice Harlan in the Standard Oil case, 'will remember that there was everywhere among the people generally a deep feeling of unrest. The nation had been rid of human slavery . . . but the conviction was universal that the country was in real danger from another kind of slavery, namely the slavery that would result from aggregations of capital in the hands of a few . . . controlling, for their own . . . advantage exclusively, the entire business of the country, including the production and sale of the necessities of life.'

Opposition to the trust movement, as it was popularly known, was first voiced by intellectual liberals such as Henry George, Edward Bellamy, and Henry Demarest Lloyd, the precursors of the later 'muck-rakers.' Soon the spokesmen of labor, which found itself at an enormous disadvantage in bargaining with gigantic corporations, took up the cry, and these, supported by the independent producers, forced the issue into politics. All through the decade of the eighties the minor parties had denounced the trusts; President Cleveland forced the issue to the front in his tariff message of 1887 and in the next year the platforms of both of the major parties pledged them to oppose trusts and monopolies.

The result of this widespread opposition was the Sherman Anti-

Trust Act of 1890. This famous law, the joint product of Senators Sherman of Ohio, Edmunds of Vermont, Hoar of Massachusetts, Ingalls of Kansas, and George of Mississippi passed Congress by an almost unanimous vote and received the signature of President Harrison July 2, 1890. Its central provisions are expressed in the first two sections:

> 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is . . . hereby declared to be illegal. . . .
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> 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize . . . any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .

The purpose of the bill was to make all combinations or monopolies in restraint of trade, illegal, but what constituted such a combination or monopoly in restraint of trade was nowhere defined. The provisions of the Act were purposely couched in general and indefinite terms, leaving to the courts the task of interpreting and applying it. In thus placing responsibility upon the courts the legislators evaded the problem, and put off its solution indefinitely, for the courts were, for a full decade, singularly ineffective. The Sherman law, as a weapon against trusts, proved indeed a broken reed.

The first important case involving the interpretation and application of the anti-trust law was that instituted by the government against the whiskey trust. This suit, United States *v.* Greenhut, was summarily dismissed by the Court on the ground that no restraint of trade had been proven. Discouraged by this set-back the government abandoned the prosecution of the whiskey trust and allowed an indictment against the cash register trust to lapse. The attempt to dissolve the powerful sugar trust met with a similar fate. In this case, United States *v.* E. C. Knight and Co., 1895, the Supreme Court held that the mere control of 98 per cent of the sugar refining of the country did not in itself constitute an act in restraint of trade, since trade was merely incidental to manufacture. The vigorous dissenting opinion of Justice Harlan was fraught with significance, for he warned that

> 'Interstate traffic . . . may pass under the absolute control of overshadowing combinations having financial resources without limit and audacity in the accomplishment of their objects that recognizes none of the restraints of moral obligations controlling the action of individuals;

combinations governed entirely by the law of greed and selfishness — so powerful that no single State is able to overthrow them and give the required protection to the whole country, and so all-pervading that they threaten the integrity of our institutions.'

While these decisions inspired grave misgivings of the ability of the government to curb the trusts, and moved Theodore Roosevelt to declare that the 'Courts . . . had for a quarter of a century been . . . the agents of reaction and by conflicting decisions which, however, in their sum were hostile to the interests of the people, had left both the Nation and the States well-nigh impotent to deal with the great business combinations,' later decisions in the Trans-Missouri Freight Association Case of 1897 and the Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. case of 1899, gave heart to the friends of government control. Yet despite these adverse decisions, more business combinations were formed in the years from 1898 to 1902 than in any years of our history, and it remained for the administrations of Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson to discover whether the American people would be able to control them.

XL.

LABOR AND IMMIGRATION

1867–1920

1. *The Rise of Organized Labor*

ORGANIZED labor passed through phases of bewildering complexity before it won the power to meet organized capital on equal terms. There was little continuity of personnel with the ante-bellum period: wage-earners of the forties had largely become farmers, shopkeepers, and petty capitalists by the seventies. Their places were taken by farmers' sons, discharged soldiers lured by the attractions of urban life, and a new wave of immigrants, Continental rather than British. Ignorant of what had been tried before, the American labor leaders passed through the same cycle of experiment as in the thirties and forties. There were national trade unions and local trades' unions, efforts to escape from the established order through co-operation, to ameliorate it by devices like the single tax, to break it down with socialism, political labor parties, and attempts to form one big union. Yet in spite of European dilution, the ideas of Marx, Lassalle, and Bakunin exerted less influence than did those of Owen, Cabet, and Fourier in the forties.

The Civil War speeded up industrial development tremendously, and created new opportunities for labor, but the slack was taken up by the return of over a million soldiers to civil life, by the technical and scientific advances which we have already noted, and by a flood of immigration. Rising prices and falling wages created a state of discontent, similar to that which obtained among the farmers; and this led to new labor organizations to take the place of those which had been shattered by the panic of 1857. The first of these were the Knights of St. Crispin, organized at Milwaukee in 1867, along the lines of the medieval craft guild, and the National Labor Union, an outgrowth of the Baltimore Labor Congress of 1866. The National Labor

Union existed only some seven years, but attained a membership of 600,000 which campaigned for an eight-hour day with some effect.

By far the most important of the early labor organizations was the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor, founded in 1869 by a Philadelphia tailor, Uriah S. Stephens. Native-American in leadership and largely in personnel, it was an attempt to unite the workers of America into one big union,[1] under centralized control. Its professed object was 'To secure to the toilers a proper share of the wealth that they created, more of the leisure that rightfully belongs to them; more societary advantages; more of the benefits, privileges, and emoluments of the world; in a word, all those rights and privileges necessary to make them capable of enjoying, appreciating, defending and perpetuating the blessings of good government.' The Order advocated many social and economic reforms that were later incorporated into state and federal laws and accepted even by the most conservative.

The growth of the Knights of Labor was nothing short of phenomenal. When a Pennsylvania machinist named Terence V. Powderly became Grand Master in 1878, the membership was under 50,000. Powderly was an idealist who disliked the tactics of combative unionism, but it was the fate of the Order to become powerful not through co-operation, but by winning a great railroad strike in the Southwest in 1884. Capital then, for the first time, met labor on equal terms, when the great New York financier, Jay Gould, conferred with the Knights' executive board, and conceded their demands. The prestige of this victory was so great that the Order reached a membership of over 700,000 the following year. They helped to push the Chinese Exclusion Act through Congress in 1882, and were largely responsible for the law of 1885 forbidding the importation of contract labor.

Parallel with the rise of the Knights of Labor, non-political trade unions of skilled workers grew and multiplied, as did other unions affiliated with the 'Black' International, an anarchistic organization introduced by John Most. Knights of Labor, trade unions, and socialist unions struck for the eight-hour day in 1886, when the country was prosperous and business was booming. The spectacular event of this great upheaval was the Haymarket bomb explosion in

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[1] Liquor dealers, professional gamblers, lawyers, and bankers were excluded from membership.

Chicago. Two strikers had been killed in a May-day demonstration against the McCormick Harvester Company. On the following day, when the police broke up a mass meeting held to protest against the shooting, someone threw a bomb into their midst: seven persons were killed and sixty injured. Though the actual perpetrator of the outrage could not be found Judge Gary held that those who incited the deed by word or action were equally guilty with those who committed the actual murder, and sentenced seven anarchists to death. Of these four were executed, one committed suicide, and the other two, whose sentences had been commuted to life imprisonment, were later pardoned by Governor Altgeld. Although there was and is no possible doubt of their innocence, Altgeld was denounced from coast to coast as an aider and abetter of anarchy. The Knights of Labor were in no way responsible for the Haymarket affair, but the popular revulsion against radical organizations embraced them uncritically, and their influence began to wane. Indiscriminate strikes, the mismanagement of Powderly, and the difficulty of holding skilled and unskilled labor in the same union, made serious inroads in their ranks. By the close of the decade they had lost their grip, and their place in the van of the labor movement was usurped by an organization of skilled workers on craft lines, the American Federation of Labor.

2. *Gompers and the A. F. of L.*

It is significant that the A. F. of L., distinctively American as it is, issued from the brain of a foreign-born worker in the polyglot section of New York. In the late sixties a bullet-headed young fellow named Sam Gompers, a British subject of mixed Hebrew and Flemish ancestry, was working in a highly unsanitary cigarmaking shop in the lower east side, and speaking at the meetings of a local cigarmakers' union. Cigarmaking was then a sociable handicraft. The men talked or read aloud while they worked, and both shop and union included German and Hungarian immigrants who could discuss socialism or positivism with equal facility. Gompers, as he rose in the councils of his fellow workers, learned to concentrate on the economic struggle, and to fight shy of intellectuals who would ride union labor to some private Utopia. He determined to divorce unionism from politics, which dissipated its energy, and from radicalism, which only served to arouse the fear of the public and the fury of the police. In the hard times of the seventies he experienced cold and hunger, the futility of charity, and the cowardice of politicians. At all times he had reason to bewail the lack of discipline in the labor movement. By 1881 he and other local labor leaders had thought their way through to a national federation of craft unions, economic in purpose, evolutionary in method, and contending for the immediate objects of shorter hours and better wages. Five years later the A. F. of L. was born, and as the Knights of Labor declined it became the fighting spearhead of the American labor movement.

There is a close analogy between the A. F. of L. and the Federal government. Each national union in the Federation has complete power to contract with or strike against employers within its own jurisdiction. The Federation decides matters of jurisdiction, prevents (sometimes by ruthless methods), the establishment of rival unions in the same trade, and endeavors to keep the ranks of the workers solid by salaried organizers and a labor press. The Federation accepts the capitalist system; it is a purely economic organization of wage-earners, for the business of collective bargaining. It is opportunistic rather than idealistic. ' We have no ultimate ends,' testified Adolph Strasser, Gompers' co-worker in the organization of the Federation. ' We are going on from day to day. We are fighting only for immediate objects — objects that can be realized in a few years.' In 1918 the economic platform of the Federation included opposition to the injunction in labor disputes; an eight-hour day and a six-day week; municipal ownership of public utilities; sanitary factory inspection; workmen's compensation laws; abolition of child labor; the initiative, referendum, and recall; free schools, free textbooks and compulsory education; objectives that had already been realized in many states. State federations, cutting traversely the national unions, were created within the A. F. of L. in order to obtain legislation of this nature by bargaining with local political leaders.

Despite the loss of the great Homestead strike against the Carnegie Steel Company in 1892, and of the Pullman strike two years later, the A. F. of L. weathered the hard times of 1893–97 and turned the century with a membership of over half a million. Five years later this membership was trebled, and on the eve of the World

War it reached two million.[2] This rapid growth was in great part due to the intelligent and powerful leadership of Gompers. Except for one year, he was at the helm of the Federation from its organization in 1886 to his death in 1924, and during all these years he held it steadily to the course of aggressive self-interest and steered clear of the shoals of politics, upon which so many earlier labor movements had grounded. 'We must be partisan for a principle,' said Gompers, 'and not for a party.' From time to time the A. F. of L. threw its influence to some candidate who was favorable to the labor program or supported a party which adopted a good labor platform. Thus in 1908 Gompers supported Bryan, and in 1912 Wilson; and the Federation has frequently made its power felt in local or state contests. But it has never listened to radical counsels or yielded to radical leadership. Almost yearly it has had to contend with socialists and other dissentients within its ranks, but the policy of the Federation has remained steadily one of enlightened conservatism.

Only second to Gompers as a labor leader is John Mitchell, for twenty years president of the United Mine Workers of America. When he became head of the miner's union, at the age of twenty-nine, it was a feeble organization numbering some 40,000 members. Within a few years he whipped it into shape, extended its membership to include most of the miners in the United States, and led it successfully through one of the most spectacular labor wars in our history, the anthracite coal strike of 1902. It was this struggle that led President Roosevelt to force arbitration upon the stiff-necked mine operators whose leader, George F. Baer, had announced that 'The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom has given the control of

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[2] Membership of the A. F. of L.:

1897	264,825	1908	1,586,885
1898	278,016	1909	1,482,872
1899	349,422	1910	1,562,112
1900	548,321	1911	1,761,835
1901	787,537	1912	1,770,145
1902	1,024,399	1913	1,996,004
1903	1,465,800	1914	2,020,671
1904	1,676,200	1915	1,946,347
1905	1,494,300	1916	2,072,702
1906	1,454,200	1917	2,371,434
1907	1,538,970		

the property interests of the country.' The universal indignation that greeted this smug avowal did much to smooth the paths of Mitchell and Roosevelt in their struggle for a 'square deal' for labor.

The American Federation of Labor was the acknowledged spokesman of American labor, but at no time did its membership embrace the majority of the laboring class; and certain powerful unions of skilled laborers have steadily refused to join the Federation — most notably the Amalgamated Clothing Workers, and the 'Four Brotherhoods' of railroad workers. The membership of the Federation has been limited on the whole to the skilled crafts. The great mass of unskilled labor in the United States has remained unorganized, its ranks constantly augmented by immigrants from Europe. It is from this class that the International Workers of the World, popularly known as the I. W. W., recruits the greater part of its membership. The I. W. W. is the radical left wing of American labor, a small but aggressive body of fluctuating and uncertain membership, unalterably opposed to the capitalistic system and dedicated to a policy of destructiveness. The attitude of the I. W. W. is well expressed in one of its songs:

We hate their rotten system more than any mortals do.
Our aim is not to patch it, but to build it all anew
And what we'll have for government, when we're finally through
Is One Big Industrial Union!

3. *Industrial Conflicts*

Although the period from the Spanish War to 1907 was one of prosperity and progress for American labor, that progress was accompanied by a series of industrial crises that served to focus the attention of the country upon the new conditions of industry. It was difficult for the American public to adjust itself to the passing of an old order and the advent of a new; difficult for it to realize that the ancient intimate relations between employer and employee had passed away and been replaced by an impersonal relationship between corporation and 'labor union'; difficult for it to understand that the principle of *laissez-faire* was unfair in its operation when applied to labor and capital alike. Roosevelt comprehended this situation clearly and stated it with his customary forcefulness:

> 'The great Anthracite Strike of 1902 left an indelible impress upon the people of the United States. It showed clearly to all wise and far-seeing men that the labor problem in this country had entered upon a new phase. Industry had grown. Great financial corporations, doing a nation-wide and even a world-wide business, had taken the place of the smaller concerns of an earlier time. The old familiar relations between employer and employee were passing. . . .' There was, 'a crass inequality in the bargaining relation between the employer and the individual employee standing alone. The great coal-carrying companies which employed their tens of thousands could easily dispense with the services of any particular miner. The miner, on the other hand, however expert, could not dispense with the companies. He needed a job; his wife and children would starve if he did not get one. What the miner had to sell — his labor — was a perishable commodity; the labor of to-day, if not sold to-day, was lost forever. Moreover his labor was not like most commodities — a mere thing; it was part of a living, breathing human being. The workman, and all citizens who gave earnest thought to the matter saw that the labor problem was not only an economic but also a moral, a human problem.'[3]

But it was not until a series of great nation-wide strikes, accompanied often by violence, shook Americans out of their complacency that they were persuaded to recognize this changed relationship; and the courts have never entirely reconciled themselves to it.

The first serious conflict in the history of American labor came in 1877 when the four Eastern trunk lines jauntily announced a wage-cut of ten per cent, the second since the panic of '73. Without organization the railway employees struck, and with the support of a huge army of unemployed, hungry and desperate, the strike flared up into something like a rebellion. During one week in July traffic was entirely suspended on the trunk lines and demoralized elsewhere in the country, and every large industrial center from the Atlantic to the Pacific was in a turmoil. In Baltimore, Pittsburgh, Martinsburg, Chicago, Buffalo, San Francisco, and elsewhere, there were pitched battles between militia and the mob, and order could only be restored by federal troops. Pittsburgh was terrorized for three days; the fatalities ran into the scores while the damage to property was estimated at as high as ten million dollars. American complacency received a shock which was only partially alleviated by the notion, so precious to Americans then and since, that foreign agitators alone were responsible. Only the most far-sighted realized that the country had reached a stage of industrial evolution which created a labor problem, or that the 'Great Strike' of '77 would be only the first of a long series of battles between labor and capital.

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[3] *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography* (Scribners). Pp. 470–71.

Since that day strikes have been a commonplace in American life. The Leadville, Colorado, coal strike of 1880, the strike on the Gould lines in 1884, the Haymarket riots of 1886, the Homestead strike of 1892, the great Pullman strike of 1894, the anthracite coal strike of 1902, the series of strikes in the Colorado and Idaho mines that amounted to a civil war, and the United States Steel Corporation strike of 1919, have familiarized Americans with violence, class conflicts, and industrial warfare, and brought home to many the distressing truth that this country is no more immune to the consequences of the industrial revolution than England, France or Germany.[4]

4. *Labor Legislation and the Courts*

The difficulties of dealing with the various social and economic aspects of the labor problem, however, are greater in the United States than in England or Continental Europe. This is due largely to three factors: the reluctance of the American public to acquiesce in legislative regulation of business; the limitations of written constitutions embodying out-worn *laissez-faire* ideas and rigidly interpreted by the courts; and the existence of a federal rather than a centralized state. Important, too, has been the indubitable fact that the American working man was more highly paid than any other worker in the world, which led unthinking people to snap at the comfortable theory that all agitation for social reform was inspired by socialistic teachings dangerous to American institutions, and not by any real need or suffering.

The very existence of organized labor has often been threatened; its chief weapons, the strike and the boycott, have frequently been paralyzed by injunction or judicial decision. Early in the nineteenth century labor unions were sometimes held to the illegal in themselves; but by the time of the Civil War the right of workingmen to organize had been everywhere accepted.[5] Yet the strike remained at best an uncertain weapon. Business and government invoked the injunction against it time and again — in the great railroad strike of 1877, in the Pullman strike of 1894, and on scores of other occasions. The Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914 contained a special article forbidding the use of the injunction in labor disputes, except to 'prevent irreparable injury'; but this article has been emasculated by a series of court decisions[6] and eight years after its enactment the United States Attorney-General issued the most sweeping injunction in American history. The boycott of employers who would not accept union terms has been adjudged an unlawful combination in restraint of trade, and thus a violation of the Sherman Law, in two leading cases: Gompers *v.* Bucks' Stove and Range Company (1907) and the Danbury Hatters' Case (Lawlor *v.* Loewe) of the following year. The decisions of the court in these cases effectually crippled the use of the boycott. More recently the Supreme Court has held that labor organizations, even though unincorporated, may be prosecuted for violations of the Sherman Law.[7] Similarly the practice of picketing has been so hedged about with judicial restrictions as to be practically impotent.

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[4] The United States Bureau of Labor has analyzed the statistics of strikes and lockouts in the period from 1881–1906. In this quarter century there were 36,757 strikes and 1,546 lockouts involving 199,954 establishments: 6,728,048 persons were involved in the strikes; 716,231 in the lockouts. Altogether 9,529,434 were thrown out of work directly or indirectly by strikes and lockouts.

[5] Commonwealth *v.* Hunt (1842) is the leading case.

Much more has been accomplished by the labor unions through social legislation, than through strikes and other violent methods. This, in a general way, includes the establishment of an eight-hour day in most industries, limitation of the hours and regulation of the conditions of women's labor, abolition of child labor, factory inspection, safety and sanitation regulation, arbitration of industrial disputes, workmen's compensation laws or insurance provisions, unemployment and old age legislation, minimum wage regulation, restriction of immigration and protection of native labor against foreign competition.

Outside the limited field of interstate commerce, and except for federal employees, the Federal government has no jurisdiction over most of these matters. As early as 1868 Congress established an eight-hour day on public works and in 1892 enacted an eight-hour day for all government employees. The Adamson Law of 1916 extended this boon to all railroad employees. In various other ways, too, the Federal government has indicated its sympathy with the program of labor. In 1884 a Bureau of Labor was created, and this was elevated to cabinet rank in 1913. An act of 1885 prohibited the importation of contract labor, and a whole series of laws since that time have regulated, restricted or excluded immigration. The La Follette Seaman's Act of 1915 regulated the conditions of employment, in the merchant marine, and elevated the seamen for the first time to the full status of a free man. Twice Congress has attempted to prohibit child labor — in 1916 under the guise of a regulation of Congress, and again in 1919 through the medium of taxation. Both attempts, however, were declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court,[8] and the subsequent agitation for a constitutional amendment granting Congress the necessary power has not met with any degree of success.

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[6] Especially Duplex Printing Press Company *v.* Deering et al. (1920). In the case of Truax *v.* Corrigan (1921) the Supreme Court held a law of Arizona forbidding the use of the injunction in labor disputes unconstitutional.

[7] United Mine Workers of America *v.* Coronado Coal Co.

Labor and social legislation lie, however, for the most part in the domain of the states, and here there has been notable progress along certain lines, particularly in the more progressive states such as Massachusetts, New York, Kansas, Oregon, and Wisconsin. The first labor law to be adequately enforced was the Massachusetts Ten-Hour Act of 1874 for women and children in factories. It was not so hard to get such laws passed as to provide proper administrative machinery for their enforcement; and until judges began to lose their *laissez-faire* prepossessions, it was impossible to prevent the courts from declaring such laws unconstitutional. A case in point was the New York Act of 1883 prohibiting the manufacture of cigars in tenement houses, which Gompers persuaded young Theodore Roosevelt to sponsor, and Governor Cleveland to sign. It was intended as an entering wedge to break up the 'sweating' system, a rapidly growing menace. On a test case the constitutionality of the law was brought before the highest state court of New York, which found against it on the ground that it interfered with the profitable use of real estate, without any compensating public advantage. 'It cannot be perceived how the cigarmaker is to be improved in his health or his morals by forcing him from his home and its hallowed associations and beneficent influences to ply his trade elsewhere' declared the court. Roosevelt, who had personally inspected these one-room 'homes' where whole families and their lodgers ate, slept, and made cigars together, then began to revise his conception of justice.

> 'It was this case,' he recorded in his *Autobiography*, 'which first waked me to a dim and partial understanding of the fact that the courts were not necessarily the best judges of what should be done to better

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[8] Hammer *v.* Dagenhart, and Bailey *v.* Drexel Furniture Company.

social and industrial conditions. The judges who rendered this decision were well-meaning men. They knew nothing whatever of tenement house conditions; they knew nothing whatever of the needs, or of the life and labor, of three-fourths of their fellow-citizens in great cities. They knew legalism, but not life. . . . This decision completely blocked tenement-house reform legislation in New York for a score of years, and hampers it to this day. It was one of the most serious setbacks which the cause of industrial and social progress and reform ever received.'[9]

And by what theory did the courts declare such labor laws unconstitutional? It is forbidden in most state constitutions, and in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, to deprive citizens of property without due process of law. As no reform can be effected without depriving some one of something that he may deem to be a property right, the American courts early invented the doctrine of a superior 'police power'—the reserved right of a state to protect the people's health, safety, and welfare. This police power had been held to justify even confiscatory reforms, such as the prohibition of lotteries, or of the manufacture and sale of alcoholic liquors; but when labor and factory laws appeared on the statute books, judges began to draw the line. Corporations, securing the best lawyers, found it easy to convince courts that such laws were not a proper and reasonable exercise of the police power; and to point out conflicts with the Fourteenth Amendment, or other clauses of the Federal Constitution. Where such a conflict could not be discovered, judges in the eighties began to postulate a theoretical liberty of contract, 'the right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper.'[10] Others pored deeply over old English law reports, in the hope of construing conspiracy out of labor unions. A Pennsylvania statute forbidding payment of miners in truck orders was judicially nullified in a decision declaring such a law 'degrading and insulting to the laborer,' and 'subversive of his rights as citizen.' An Illinois court declared unconstitutional a statute limiting the hours of labor for women in sweatshops, on the ground that they had the same liberty of contract as men. In 1905 the Supreme Court of the United States in the case of Lochner *v.* New York took a similar view of a New York statute prescribing the hours of labor in bakeries. If, declared the court in effect, long hours of bakers could be shown to affect the quality of bread, something might be said for the regulation under the police power; but bakers were sufficiently intelligent to make their own labor contracts in their own interest. Mr. Justice Holmes, however, entered a vigorous dissenting opinion in which he said, 'This case is decided upon an economic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. . . . The Fourteeth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's *Social Statics.*'

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[9] *Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography* (Scribners). P. 81.

[10] Justice Harlan, in Adair *v.* U. S. (1907). This theory first appears in American law in 1886, and is first discussed in Herbert Spencer's *Justice* (1891).

Yet these illiberal decisions have been, for the most part, reversed, and the majority of states today have laws carefully regulating conditions and hours of labor for women and children, and in all dangerous occupations. An Oregon law of 1908 limiting the hours of employment for women to ten was upheld by the Supreme Court in the notable case of Muller *v.* Oregon — notable not alone for the apparent change of attitude on the part of the Court, but because the mass of scientific, sociological, economic, and physiological data introduced by the counsel for Oregon, Louis D. Brandeis, was admitted as evidence. Thus the principle was established that the courts can take cognizance of peculiar circumstances which might affect strict legal theory — a two-edged sword, since it practically brings the expediency of a law under judicial review as well as its constitutionality, and thus confirms the tendency of the courts to arrogate to themselves legislative functions. By 1920 forty-two states had limited the hours of labor for women, and most states either strictly regulated or wholly prohibited the labor of children under fourteen years of age. Though the two million children between the ages of ten to fifteen that were engaged in gainful occupations in 1910 had been reduced to approximately one million by 1920, the conditions of child labor in certain parts of the United States are still disgraceful.

Another series of laws safeguard the health and lives of workers through provisions for safety devices, fire prevention, sanitary inspection and standards of sanitation and of cleanliness, light, and ventilation. Yet the hazards of industry remain appallingly great, and there are proportionately more industrial accidents in the United States than in any other civilized country. The question of compensation for the disabled and pensions for the retired veterans of the armies of labor is one of the most urgent in American life today. Fortunately the old common-law theory that the employer was responsible for injuries only when negligence could be definitely proved, has been abandoned in favor of the responsibility of industry and of society as a whole. Wisconsin, Washington, and Kansas led the way in compensation legislation in 1911, since when almost every state has made some provision for accident insurance or compensation. Agitation for unemployment insurance and for old-age pensions such as exist in the more advanced European countries has made little progress, however. But the presence of a more or less constant body of unemployed, and the increasing practice of laying off mass-production workers before middle age, makes it probable that both of these reforms will be universally adopted during our own generation. Indeed, Montana, Nevada, Wisconsin, Kentucky, Colorado, and Maryland have already enacted old-age pension laws, and California, Utah, Minnesota, Wyoming, New York, and Massachusetts have adopted some pension system as we go to press.

5. *Immigration*

While European labor organizations have had to deal only with a native-born body of workers, speaking the same language and inheriting the national tradition, the American labor movement has had to fight for recognition under utterly different conditions: an immense flood of immigration, consisting for the most part, since 1885, of non-English-speaking peoples, and at all times of workers who were accustomed to a much lower standard of living than American laborers, and not only willing but eager to work for wages and under conditions that the native-born would not accept. In the three score years after the firing on Fort Sumter altogether some thirty million emigrants sought the American melting-pot, swarming out onto the rich prairie lands of the West, transforming the cities of the country into enormous cosmopolitan bee-hives, performing the back-breaking labor that made possible the economic expansion of the nation, creating new problems of social assimilation and adaptation, and bringing to this country the richest and most varied social and cultural heritage that was ever vouchsafed any nation — though one all too often dissipated or betrayed. This immigration from the old world to the new represents the greatest folk movement in history, ancient or modern. After a century and a half of colonization and of unprecedented natural increase, the population of the English colonies in America was but slightly over two millions; every decade since 1860 has witnessed an immigration large enough to replace this entire population.

In attempting to analyze and interpret the significance of this immigration, it may be well to dispose of certain misconceptions at the outset. It should be emphasized that neither immigration nor racial heterogeneity are recent developments: immigration was as large, proportionately, in the later colonial period as in the latter part of the nineteenth century; and the population of the colonies on the eve of the Revolution represented six or seven races and three or four languages. Nor does there seem to be any valid ground for believing that the 'native stock' will succumb to the new alien invasion, or that foreign infiltration in any way decreases the quality or the vitality of the American people. More reasonable, perhaps, was the fear that the changing nature of immigration after 1880 would create serious social problems or impede the process of assimilation and Americanization; yet the experience of the World War and of recent years has not largely justified these fears. At one time the notion that the foreign-born element in the population was largely responsible for crime and disease and the perpetual object of charity, was widely prevalent, but a more careful examination of this question over a longer period of time has not substantiated this belief. That the foreign-born figured more largely than native-born in the statistics of crime and of charity appears to have been an index of opportunity rather than of ability. Nor does there seem to be any scientific ground for believing that those of Nordic stock are in any fundamental way superior to those of Mediterranean stock, or any rational ground for supporting the theory of 'Nordic supremacy.' Whether immigration has lowered the American standard of living is not so easy to determine: certainly after half a century of immigration on an unprecedented scale, the American standard of living remained higher than in most countries. The infiltration of new groups into a given industry always makes the older groups more ambitious. And the oft-repeated charge that the immigrant unduly exploited this country loses sight of the extent to which he himself has been exploited, and of his inestimable contribution to the development of the natural resources of the nation.

The facts and figures of immigration can be told briefly;[11] their implications are not so easy to evaluate. In the decade from 1850-60 about two and one-half million aliens came to this country. The

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[11] See appendices for statistics of immigration.

Civil War naturally slowed up this influx, but the cessation of hostilities and the victory of the Union, together with the new opportunities created by the opening up of the West and the industrial revolution, greatly accelerated the movement. In the years after Appomattox immigration increased steadily, checked only by the panics of 1873 and 1893. Altogether in the forty years from 1860 to 1900, some fourteen million emigrants found their way to the United States, and slightly more than that number in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Of these the largest number were from the United Kingdom — a total of some five and one-half million, of which well over two million came from Ireland. Germany accounted for approximately four million, and the three Scandinavian countries for one million seven hundred thousand. The larger part of the emigrants from northern and western Europe came in the generation immediately following the Civil War — there was a notable falling off of the movement from Germany and the United Kingdom, and to a lesser extent from Scandinavia, after 1890. The stream of immigration did not diminish, however, but was swelled to torrential proportions by accessions from new sources — the countries of southern and eastern Europe. Since 1890 Italy, Austria-Hungary, and Russia together have accounted for over half the immigration to the United States. Altogether Italy has sent us some four million one hundred thousand of her sons and daughters, Austria-Hungary slightly less, and Russia something over three million.[12]

This change in the source of immigration is fundamental to any understanding of recent American social history. It is to be accounted for partly by overpopulation in southern and eastern Europe, partly by the persecution of Jews, Poles, Czechs, and others, but more largely by the advertising of steamship companies and the demand of American industry for cheap labor. It is the conclusion of one careful student, J. R. Commons, that the desire to get cheap

[12] Change in source of immigration, 1860–1920:

Period	*Total Admitted*	*Northern & Western Europe*	%	*Southern & Eastern Europe*	%
1861–70	2,314,824	2,031,642	87.8	33,628	1.4
1871–80	2,812,191	2,070,373	73.6	201,889	7.2
1881–90	5,246,613	3,778,633	71.0	958,413	18.3
1891–1900	3,687,564	1,643,492	44.6	1,915,486	51.9
1901–10	8,795,386	1,910,035	21.7	6,225,981	70.8
1911–20	5,795,811	997,438	17.0	1,910,035	33.0


Less than 10 percent
10-25 percent
25-50 percent
50-100 percent

Percentage of Foreign-Born in the Population, by Counties, 1910

labor, to fill the steerages of ocean liners, and to sell land, have probably brought more immigrants than were ever sent by hard conditions in the Old World.

Most important was the characteristic distribution of these new elements in our population. The immigrants from northern Europe, with the exception of the Irish, tended to go west and take up land. Large numbers of Germans, it is true, congregated in the cities of the Middle West, giving a distinctive flavor to such places as Cincinnati, St. Louis, and Milwaukee which has not yet entirely disappeared, but the majority of them became farmers rather than industrial workers. In the Scandinavians this tendency to go out to the land was even more marked: the great agricultural states of Minnesota, Illinois, North and South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Iowa have a considerable Scandinavian population, and the influence of these industrious and intelligent farmers is felt in the neighboring states of Nebraska, Montana, Utah, Washington, and California as well. The Irish on the other hand, showed from the first a tendency to settle in the eastern cities, where they quickly achieved economic independence, and created a definite place for themselves in the political life of the country. The Irish early exhibited a striking talent for politics, and their absolute control of the local governments of New York and Boston is proverbial.

The 'new' immigrants — Italians, Russians, Austrians, Poles, Jews, and others from southern and eastern Europe, showed this same tendency to congregate in the larger cities, a phenomenon somewhat difficult to explain in view of the fact that the majority of them came from countries predominantly rural and that land remained easily available down to recent years. We can only conclude that this was their urban movement. In 1900 two-thirds of the foreign-born population were living in towns or cities, and by 1920 this proportion had increased to three-fourths. The concentration in certain of the larger cities is even more striking: foreign-born constituted in 1920 35% of the population of New York City, 30% of Chicago, 32% of Boston, 30% of Cleveland, 29% of Detroit, and 28% of San Francisco. When Woodrow Wilson was in Paris in 1918 he reminded the Italian delegation that New York was the largest Italian city in the world: it is also the largest Jewish city, and Chicago is the largest Polish, Czech, and Slovak city. Jacob Riis, the social reformer, painted a racial map of New York City in 1890, that is very vivid:

'A map of the city, colored to designate nationalities, would show more stripes than on the skin of a zebra, and more colors than any rainbow. The city on such a map would fall into two great halves, green for the Irish prevailing in the West Side tenement districts, and blue for the Germans on the East Side. But intermingled with these ground colors would be an odd variety of tints that would give the whole the appearance of an extraordinary crazy-quilt. From down in the Sixth Ward . . . the red of the Italian would be seen forcing its way northward along the line of Mulberry Street to the quarter of the French purple on Bleeker Street and South Fifth Avenue, to lose itself, after a lapse of miles, in the 'Little Italy' of Harlem. . . . Dashes of red would be seen strung through the District, northward to the city line. On the West Side the red would be seen overrunning the Old Africa of Thompson Street, pushing the black of the negro rapidly uptown. . . . Hardly less aggressive than the Italian, the Russian and the Polish Jew . . . is filling the tenements of the old Seventh Ward to the river front, and disputing with the Italian every foot of available space in the back alleys of Mulberry Street. . . . Between the dull gray of the Jew, and the Italian red, would be seen squeezed in on the map a sharp streak of yellow marking the narrow boundaries of Chinatown. Dovetailed in with the German population, the poor but thrifty Bohemian might be picked out by the sombre hue of his life as of his philosophy. . . . Down near the Battery the West Side emerald would be soiled by a dirty stain, spreading rapidly like a splash of ink on a sheet of blotting paper, headquarters of the Arab tribe. Dots and dashes of color here and there would show where the Finnish sailors worship their God, the Greek pedlars the ancient name of their race, and the Swiss the goddess of thrift. . . .'[13]

This concentration of the foreign-born in colonies was not peculiar to New York City. The same phenomenon could be observed in Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, and in scores of the larger cities of the country. Problems of housing, of sanitation and health, and of education inevitably resulted. American cities came to have their 'ghetto,' their 'little Italy' or their 'Chinatown,' and 'slum' became a familiar word in the American vocabulary. By the decade of the eighties tenement conditions in American cities were as sordid as in the industrial centers of the Old World: breeding places for vice, crime, and epidemics. In 1890 two-thirds of the population of New York City was crowded into tenements. The situation was so serious that civic authorities, churches, and private philanthropies were aroused to remedy or eradicate it. In New York Jacob Riis, a Danish emigrant who had gained the confidence of Police Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt, told the story of *How The Other Half Lives,* and led a crusade against the worst of the tenements, and the Henry Street Settlement was established under the energetic leadership of Lillian D. Wald. In Chicago Jane Addams established the famous Hull House, a social settlement which served as a clearing house for the social reform movement throughout the Middle West. Considerable progress was made, especially in the realm of sanitation, while 'Americanization' was accomplished largely by the American-born children of the immigrants themselves. The tenement problem, however, touched important property interests, and while hundreds of the worst tenements were condemned, housing conditions among the foreign-born remained disgraceful.

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[13] Jacob Riis. *How the Other Half Lives* (Scribners).

While the northern Europeans became farmers, or entered business or the skilled professions, immigrants from southern and eastern Europe became, for the most part, unskilled laborers in mine, in factory or on the railroad. 'Historically,' according to a government report, 'the American origin of the more recent immigration, so far as such a movement can have a specific origin, seems to have been the desire of certain Pennsylvania anthracite mine owners to replace the employees that they found hard to deal with, and especially the Irish, with cheaper and more docile material. Strikes were a frequent cause of friction . . . and it was natural that employers should be on the lookout for new sources of labor supply. In a number of places these raw recruits of industry seem to have been called in as the result of a strike, and there probably were plenty of instances of sending agents abroad to hire men or of otherwise inducing labor to immigrate either under contract or with an equivalent understanding.'

The Italians, Magyars, Slovaks, Hebrews, Czechs, Croats, Poles and others who came over in the booming years of the eighties and the nineties were generally illiterate, ignorant, and poor, and unable to strike out for themselves in a new country. They naturally took what work was available, in the steel mills of Pennsylvania or the mines of West Virginia, in the stockyards of Chicago or the sweatshops of New York. In 1907 a study of the Carnegie steel works revealed that of 23,337 laborers, 15,858 were foreign born; two years later a survey of the laborers in the bituminous mines of Pennsylvania discovered 76% of foreign birth, and of these 92% from southern and eastern Europe. The 'new' immigration was crowding out the native and Irish laborers in the field of unskilled labor, but though this worked hardship in individual cases, it was in general advantageous, for until recently there was work enough for all in American industry. The ever-ready supply of unskilled and unorganized foreign labor at the beck and call of industry, was a serious obstacle to American labor organizations, and it is not a mere coincidence that the corporation that has been most successful in maintaining the open shop system — the United States Steel Corporation — recruits its labor force largely from immigrants of southern and eastern European extraction. The presence of large numbers of unskilled and for the most part ignorant laborers in such great manufacturing states as Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Massachusetts or mining states as West Virginia and Colorado has tended to accentuate and complicate the grave industrial problems already pressing for solution, and these states have achieved a distressing notoriety in the frequency and the seriousness of their industrial disturbances. The tendency, however, to describe social unrest to the 'foreign agitator' or to the unassimilated laborer is for the most part veriest sophistry. If the professional agitator has found a fertile field among the foreign-born industrial workers, it is equally true that big business has taken advantage of their handicaps to exploit them unmercifully.

The process of assimilation has not been so difficult as was prophesied by most observers, if by assimilation we mean not the supplanting of native culture with an artificial American one, but the cheerful acceptance of American social and political institutions. The opposition of certain patriotic groups to what Roosevelt called 'hyphenated Americanism' led, all too frequently, to an unfortunate and misguided effort to crush out those heritages of foreign culture and customs, language and literature, that give variety and flavor and richness to American life. The extreme and often touching eagerness of newcomers to abandon their Old World loyalties and profess those of the New World is one of the most striking characteristics of the whole immigration movement.

It is customary to interpret immigration as a purely American problem, and from the point of view of the native American. It should be unnecessary to point out that the persons chiefly affected by emigration are the emigrants themselves. The story of immigration cannot be read in the cold statistics of the census bureau, in the reports of labor surveys, of charity organizations, or of educational institutions. For the immigrant who has torn up his roots from Old World soil and transplanted himself to new soil, who has abandoned the familiar ways and fields of his forefathers and is attempting to adapt himself to new and strange conditions of life, this is the great adventure, and one which lasts a lifetime and is often transmitted to the second and the third generation. No historian has yet cut through the statistics of immigration to the psychological realities that underlie them and give them meaning, but the stirring and often splendid story can be read in the moving pages of Rölvaag's *Giants in the Earth,* of Willa Cather's *My Ántonia* and *O Pioneers,* of Jacob Riis' *Making of an American,* of Mary Antin's *The Promised Land,* and Michael Pupin's *From Immigrant to Inventor.*

The story of governmental regulation of immigration, important as it is, can be told briefly. The traditional American policy, and one pursued for well-nigh a century, was that of unrestricted admission of all who sought our shores. To be sure, political opposition to foreigners had flared up in the Know-Nothing movement of the fifties, but this represented a passing phase, and it was the boast of the majority of Americans that their country was a refuge to the poor and oppressed of all nations. This attitude found expression in the popular ballad:

> Of all the mighty nations in the East or in the West
> This glorious Yankee nation is the greatest and the best;
> We have room for all creation and our banner is unfurled,
> Here's a general invitation to the people of the world.
>
> Come along, come along, make no delay,
> Come from every nation, come from every way;
> Our lands are broad enough, don't be alarmed,
> For Uncle Sam is rich enough to give us all a farm.

From the first regulation of immigration was left to the states, but when the burden became oppressive and such states as New York and Massachusetts attempted to levy taxes upon the immigrants, the Supreme Court declared the laws unconstitutional as an interference with congressional regulation of commerce. It was this situation that led to the first Federal immigration law, that of 1882, which placed a head tax of fifty cents upon every immigrant admitted, and excluded convicts, idiots, and persons likely to become public charges. From this time on a long series of Federal acts elaborated the policy of restriction, increased the head tax, prohibited contract labor, considerably extended the classes excluded, and provided for more efficient enforcement of the provisions. In a general way the laws provided for the exclusion of the sick and diseased, paupers or those likely to become public charges, polygamists, prostitutes, anarchists, alcoholics, and — by the Act of 1917 — persons with constitutional inferiority complexes!

An historic battle was waged over the issue of exclusion of illiterates. A literacy test was favored by many because it would act indirectly to exclude immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, where the percentage of illiteracy was very much higher than in northern Europe. A bill incorporating such a test passed one of the two Houses no less than thirty-two times, and on four occasions it was passed by both Houses and went to the President, only to be vetoed each time. Cleveland, in 1897, characterized the measure as 'a radical departure from our national policy.' Taft, in 1913, declared that a literacy test violated a principle which he believed should be maintained. Wilson, in 1915 and again in 1917, denounced it as a test of opportunity rather than of character or of fitness. On the last occasion, however, the bill was passed over the President's veto, and became a law. By its terms no alien over sixteen years who cannot read the English language or some other language or dialect is to be admitted to the United States.

During the World War immigration from Europe fell off sharply, but the fear of a renewal of the influx on an unprecedented scale after the cessation of arms together with the opposition of labor organizations to any competition that might tend to lower their standard of living and the growing conviction, assiduously agitated by patriotic organizations, that unlimited immigration threatened American institutions and the native-American stock, all led Congress, in 1921, to abandon the traditional policy of selection for one of absolute restriction. By the terms of this Immigration Law of 1921, as significant, probably, as the abolition of slavery, the number of aliens admitted from any European, Asiatic or African country was to be limited to three per cent of the total number of persons of that nationality residing in the United States in 1910. This so-called quota system drastically restricted the number of immigrants that could be admitted in any one year to 355,825. The act, however, was severely criticized on two counts: that it admitted too large numbers, and that it failed to discriminate satisfactorily in favor of northern and western Europeans. Consequently a new and more drastic immigration law was passed in 1924[14] which reduced the annual quota from three to two per cent, and which, by taking the census of 1890 as a basis, effectually favored English, German, and Scandinavian and discriminated against Italian, Austrian, Russian, and other southern and eastern European immigration. The total number of aliens to be annually admitted under the terms of this act was reduced to 150,000 — a mere trickle compared to the hundreds of thousands who had sailed proudly past the Statue of Liberty in former years.

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[14] Neither the act of 1921 nor of 1924 applied to immigration from other countries of North or South America.

XLI

AGRICULTURE SINCE THE WAR

1. *From Farm to Factory*

WHILE manufacturing, transportation and business were advancing with giant strides in the half century following the Civil War, agriculture nevertheless remained the basic industry, the one which engaged the labor of the largest number of people, and upon which industrial development largely rested. Agriculture itself, however, was undergoing changes more rapid and more profound than those which brought about the industrial revolution.

Of the major developments in American agriculture from 1865 to 1915, we have already glanced at the break-up of Southern plantations and the building up of Western farms. Simultaneously we note the mechanization of the farm to a point where successful agriculture became an aspect of big business, with increasing efficiency and productiveness and diminishing returns to the landowner; with a consequent rise of tenancy and constant agitation for government relief. The Federal and state governments actively intervened, especially in the fields of scientific experimentation and education.

In the fifty years from 1860 to 1910 the number of farms in the United States trebled; increasing from 2,033,000 to 6,361,000; the acreage more than doubled, from 407,212,000 to 878,798,000, and the acreage of improved farm land trebled; while the production of wheat rose from 173 to 635 million bushels, and of corn from 838 to 2,886 million bushels. More land was brought under cultivation in the thirty years after 1860 than in all the previous history of the United States. The value of farms and of their products increased strikingly, but the increase did not keep pace with that of the value and returns of manufacturing and business; and there were serious decreases in parts of New England and the South.

This enormous extension of agriculture in America was brought about by the opening up of the Far West; and by the development of railroads, which provided access to order markets; and these markets were increasing their demands for meats and cereals. The Homestead Act of 1862 made it possible for any able-bodied man or woman to take up a farm, and between 1860 and 1910 some 120,000,000 acres were thus staked, while other millions of railroad lands were sold to settlers on easy terms. At the same time the application of machinery to the processes of agriculture, and of biology and other sciences to its problems, enabled fewer men to raise ever larger crops. The proportion of people living on farms has steadily declined, while production has outrun the growth in population and the normal needs of wider and more prosperous markets.

Agriculture, naturally the most static of all industries, has thus been forced to adjust itself to rapidly changing conditions. Except in remote nooks and corners like the Southern Highlands and the backwoods of Arkansas and Washington, the average farm ceased to be a self-sufficient economic unit, where a man and his family raised most of what they ate, wore, and used, and provided their own amusement in neighborhood groups. It became, like the sugar plantations of two centuries ago, a cog in the industrial system, devoted to the raising of a staple crop, mechanized, and tied up with banking, railroading, and manufacturing. As the country became increasingly industrialized, agriculture ceased to be the main interest of those in power in business and in government, and no longer held its own in competition with other economic forces. Since 1870 farming has faced an almost continuous crisis, tenancy has increased with appalling rapidity, the number of tenants more than doubling between 1880 and 1910, and the 'farm problem' has become a constant in our politics.

2. *Machinery*

Mechanization of agriculture began in the eighteen-thirties and the forties, when Obed Hussey and Cyrus McCormick were experimenting with the reaper, A. D. Church and George Westinghouse with a thresher, and John Lane and John Deere with the chilled plow. As early as 1847 Cyrus McCormick was turning out five hundred reapers annually from his factory in Chicago. It was in 1841 that Liebig's epoch-making book on agricultural chemistry appeared, and in the same decade commercial fertilizers were first used in this country. Agricultural machinery, however, was little more than a plaything for the wealthy before 1860. The Civil War, robbing the farms of their laborers and increasing the price of grain, induced farmers generally to adopt machines such as the reaper, which enabled a woman or a boy to perform the work of several men. A quarter of a million reapers were in use by 1864. After the war came countless new inventions, and the pressure of competition has made the use of agricultural machinery almost universal. The Oliver chilled plow meant an enormous saving in time and money, the twine binder increased greatly the amount of grain which a farmer could harvest; and the lister, the mowing machine, the corn-planter, corn-binder and husker, the four-plow cultivator, the mechanical hay drier, the combined harvester and thresher which cuts, threshes, cleans, bags, and weighs the grain in one operation, and innumerable other machines, have entirely transformed the ancient practices of agriculture, lightened the drudgery, decreased the amount of labor, and increased the efficiency. If the process continues much longer, only retired capitalists will be able to afford farm equipment.

The most recent development is the application of steam, gasoline, and electric harvester-threshers to the farm. The huge 'combines' on the bonanza farms of the West formerly drawn by as many as thirty horses, are now propelled by gasoline tractors; and in 1920 over 200,000 farm tractors of varying sizes were manufactured in the United States. The substitution of power for horses has released not less than twenty million acres of land formerly devoted to pasture and hay, for other purposes — most of it is growing up to woods, in the East. Electric power is used in all up-to-date dairies. The motor truck has altered to some extent marketing conditions, while the motor car, the telephone and the radio have enlarged the social radius of the farm, and led the farmers to forget their rich heritage of folk lore and song, in favor of canned entertainment of various sorts.

American farmers have been much more receptive than the country people of Europe to machinery and mechanization, perhaps because very few American pioneers were rooted to the soil, or wedded to ancient ways; such folk did not come to America in the first place. While a European peasant, even if able to afford machinery, prefers his ancient ways, an American farmer will use machinery even where hand labor would be more economical. Henry Ford's original impulse to invention was his hatred of caring for farm horses; and in this attitude Henry Ford was typically American. The kindly beasts which have accompanied mankind from the dawn of civilization, and whose care has entered into human discipline and character, have been forsaken in favor of impersonal machinery. There are thousands of farms in the Middle West where no living creature except possibly a dog is kept. As soon as the single crop is harvested and warehoused, the farmer locks up, loads family and dog in the pleasure car, and spends the winter in Florida or California.

Varied farming still exists in many parts of the country, and mechanization has never reached this logical extreme in New England, with its rolling country and little specialties, or in the South with negro labor and cotton. For although the cotton gin was the first important agricultural machine invented, no inventor has since been able to find a machine to supersede the hand-cultivation of cotton — unless indeed the tractor picking machine, invented in 1921, proves a greater success than hitherto. The value of farm implements and machines in the whole country increased between 1900 and 1920 from $761,000,000 to $3,594,000,000. But of this last figure the bulk was in the North and West. In 1910 the value of machinery on Northern farms was $800,000,000 and by 1920 this had increased to over $2,300,000,000, while the corresponding figures for the South are $293,000,000 and $771,000,000. Both sets of figures show that the World War had the same influence as the Civil War in speeding up farm mechanization.

Farming as a way of life is giving way to farming as a business. The farmer has become an industrial worker, as much bound up to the complex industrial and fiscal system of the country, as if he had a boss over him. A stout heart and willing hands are no longer the only necessary equipment for farming. The increase in the value of land and the heavy costs of machinery and fertilizers demand considerable capital. Hence the decrease of diversified farming and the growing specialization on a few staple crops which can be produced with one kind of machinery. Another result is the increase in mortgages and tenancy. In 1890, 27 per cent of farm-owners had mortgaged their farms and 29 per cent of the farms were cultivated by tenants; by 1920 the numbers had increased to 37 per cent and 38 per cent respectively. The application of machinery led, too, to a considerable relative decrease in the number of farm laborers, just as the spinning jenny and the loom led to a decrease in the number of textile workers. It is estimated that the productive efficiency of the average farmer was doubled in this period. The increase in the 'overhead' of farming, the cost of land, machinery, and taxation, led to a growing dependence upon banks, which now became as important to farming as to business.

3. *Scientific Agriculture*

As long as there was an abundance of cheap land and a shortage of labor, a condition which obtained in the United States until after the Civil War, it was more economical for farmers to abandon worn-out soil and move on to virgin land than to cultivate intensively and invest in expensive fertilizers. But the passing of the frontier and the practical exhaustion of good cheap land led inevitably to scientific agriculture, conservation, and reclamation.

There had been considerable interest in scientific agriculture in the closing decades of the eighteenth century, both in Europe and in America. Agricultural societies were founded in Philadelphia and Charleston in 1789; and Virginia planters like Washington adopted the new methods and implements which had been proved in England. The rise of the Cotton Kingdom after the invention of the cotton gin in 1793, however, made it more profitable to take up virgin land in the newer South than to reclaim farms in Virginia and the Carolinas; and interest in scientific agriculture waned, except in New England, where agricultural societies founded in the eighteenth century are still flourishing, and where the Bussey foundation of 1835 anticipated the Morrill Act by twenty-five years. The *American Farmer,* the first agricultural journal in the United States, was established in Baltimore in 1819. By 1840 the prevalence of abandoned plantations and worn-out brush-grown land in the Tidewater regions of the old South had become so depressing as to force a reconsideration of the possibilities of scientific agriculture. A Virginia planter, Edmund Ruffin, devoted his life to disseminating knowledge of scientific agriculture throughout the South. Lord Playfair's translation of Baron von Liebig's great work, *Chemistry in its Application to Agriculture and Physiology* (1840) was read with avidity by the more progressive farmers. By 1860 there were fifty farm papers in the country, many of them in the South; and if the Civil War had not broken out, the teachings of Ruffin and De Bow would undoubtedly have borne fruit in a more diversified and economical agriculture in the South. For their efforts were directed away from specialization, just as those of the last generation have been diverted toward it.

Scientific agriculture in the United States has depended much upon governmental aid. A number of states subsidized agriculture in one way or another before the Civil War and organized their own departments of agriculture. In 1839 Congress made its first appropriation, one thousand dollars, for the study of agriculture. In 1862 Congress created a Department of Agriculture, under the direction of a commissioner not a member of the cabinet; in 1889 this department was raised to the grade of an executive department with a secretary of cabinet rank. Such an establishment would have been unthinkable before the Civil War, since the Constitution nowhere, even by implication, gives Congress jurisdiction over agriculture.

The activities and influence of the Department of Agriculture have grown rapidly, until by 1920 it included a score of subdivisions and bureaus and operated with an appropriation of thirty million dollars. The state and federal departments of agriculture maintain experimental stations, issue valuable crop reports and other bulletins, encourage farmers to introduce new plants, and improve old ones, fight plant and animal diseases, attempt to solve problems of management and marketing, and offer advice on innumerable subjects, from alfalfa and apple-sauce to zygophyllum and zymotic diseases.

In the year 1862, which saw the passage of the Homestead and Pacific Railway Acts, Congress passed the most important piece of agricultural legislation in American history — the Morrill Act. This law provided for the appropriation of public land to each state for the establishment of agricultural and industrial colleges.[1] Under the wise provisions of this law, sixty-nine 'land-grant colleges' have been established, some as agricultural colleges, others as state universities.

Scarcely second to the Morrill Act in importance is the Hatch Act of 1889. Influenced by the valuable work performed by the experiment station of Wesleyan University in Middletown, Connecticut, Congress provided in this act for the creation of Agricultural Experiment Stations in every state in the Union. In 1920 some sixty experiment stations were carrying on scientific research of incalculable benefit to the nation. For the most part the experiment stations concentrate their efforts on local problems: the boll weevil in Alabama, red rust in Minnesota, dry farming in the West.

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[1] The amount appropriated to each state was 30,000 acres multiplied by the number of representatives in Congress, to which that state was entitled.

Scientific farming, the conquest of plant and animal diseases, the surmounting of natural obstacles, and the adaptation of plants to American conditions has its own roll of pioneers and heroes. Mark Alfred Carleton who experienced on the Kansas plains the devastations of wheat rust and rot and the vagaries of Kansas weather, scoured the wilds of Asia for a wheat strong enough to withstand the rust, the droughts, and the frosts of the Middle West. He returned with the famous Kubanka wheat, and later introduced the Kharkov wheat to the American farmer. Within a few years these plants proved their superiority to the domesticated variety, and by 1919 over one-third of the American wheat acreage was of the varieties introduced by Mark Carleton. William Saunders and Angus Mackay of Canada succeeded in crossing Red Fife with Calcutta wheat, and produced the hardy Marquis, thus opening up millions of acres of land in the Canadian north to winter wheat. George Hoffer conquered the insidious rot that destroyed the corn of the Middle West; Marion Dorset found the remedy for hog cholera; and George Mohler stamped out the dread hoof and mouth disease that threatened to wipe out a large part of American live stock. Luther Burbank, working in his experimental garden at Santa Rosa, California, succeeded in creating a host of new plants by skillful crossing. David R. Coker, on his South Carolina experimental farm, improved upland cotton and added incalculably to the wealth of his section. Only the devastating boll weevil has refused thus far to yield to science.

While American farmers have accepted government co-operation to increase the yield of their farms in order to meet rising costs, they have, of necessity, required government aid to reclaim desert wastes by irrigation. Artificial irrigation was practised by the Pueblo Indians even before the coming of the white man, and later by the Spanish missions of the Southwest, but it first came into general use with the Mormon settlements in Utah; and by 1900 these hard-working people had over six million acres under irrigation. A series of Federal laws — the Desert Land Act of 1877, the Cary Act of 1894 and the Reclamation Act of 1902 have opened up additional millions of acres of western lands through government co-operation and financial subsidization.

Since the opening of the twentieth century a movement to reclaim land, particularly in the East, has met with considerable success. The realization that millions of acres of land throughout the East, many of them at the very doors of great cities, lay untilled, moved Secretary of the Interior Work to announce:

> 'We must begin again, in the East, as did our forefathers. Not to conquer the land, wrest a living from it and abandon it, but to restore it. Not to leave it for new farm lands in the West for they are already taken up except where artificially watered. . . .'

Whether the economic and social returns warrant an extensive policy of irrigation and reclamation remains to be seen, but with an official recognition of its necessity, America has definitely passed beyond the happy period when men believed that there was 'land enough for our descendants to the hundredth and thousandth generation' and into a condition approximating the European.

4. *Agrarian Distress and Revolt*

In spite of all that has been 'done for the farmer,' nobody has been able to industrialize the weather, or to regulate supply and demand for agricultural products, which make the farmer's calling the most precarious of all occupations, the most subject to vicissitudes of fortune. Besides those natural conditions, the farmer has had rising capital charges, increased cost of land, machinery, transportation and marketing, competition from new grain fields in Canada and the Argentine, and the disadvantage of buying in a protected market while selling in a competitive world market. Indeed, there is no question that, relatively speaking, the farmer's status has declined, and his last state is worse than his first. Hence a series of crises in American agriculture, and an almost continuous agrarian protest.

The bubble of the Civil War prosperity burst in 1868, as did that of World War prosperity in 1920. While prices on manufactured articles continued high, protected by the Morrill Tariff of 1861, prices of wheat, corn and cotton tumbled. Wheat that netted the farmer $1.45 a bushel in 1866 brought only $.76 in 1869 and $.69 in 1889; so that while the wheat crop in 1878, and again in 1889, was double what it had been in 1867, the farmers received approximately the same amount on the three crops. Corn which brought $.75 at Chicago in 1869 fell to $.38 in 1879 and $.36 in 1889; twenty-three million bushels of rye brought $23,000,000 in 1867 and twenty-eight million bushels brought only $12,000,000 in 1889. Cotton sold at $.31 a pound in 1866, $.09 in 1876 and less than $.08 in the years after 1890.

The average value of the cotton crop per acre fell from almost $15 in 1866 to $7.94 in 1896. This decline in prices, together with the increased cost of farming and of living, meant widespread distress and poverty, foreclosed mortgages and broken homes, and a great increase in tenancy.

The decline in the prices of staples was undoubtedly the principal grievance of the farmer, but it was aggravated by other circumstances, especially the high cost of marketing. Freight rates were so high as to be prohibitive in many instances, and it was frequently cheaper for Western farmers to use their corn as fuel than to ship it to market. The *Prairie Farmer* stated in 1867 that it cost eight or ten times as much to ship Iowa corn to Liverpool as the farmer received for it at the local grain elevator; thus corn that sold for seventy cents a bushel in the East might bring the farmer only half that sum. Other evils were the profiteering of middlemen, the vicious practice of cornering the market at the expense of the farmer, the high cost of credit charges which seldom fell below ten per cent, disproportionately high taxes, the currency, and the tariff.

The farmers came to believe that their grievances were intolerable, and in the years after 1868 a wave of revolt swept the West. This revolt took numerous forms: the election of legislatures, governors, and often congressmen sympathetic to the farmers' demands; the passage of laws regulating freight and elevator charges; the organization of co-operative societies, and eventually of local and even national political parties.

The first and most important of the societies that grew out of agrarian distress was the Patrons of Husbandry, generally known as the Grange. The Grange was organized in 1867 by a group of government clerks in Washington, D. C., the first local grange was founded in Fredonia, New York; by the end of 1870 there were granges in nine states of the Union. By 1873 the Grange had penetrated every state in the Union but four, and two years later it boasted a membership of over 800,000, organized in over 20,000 local granges. One secret of the success of this order over other fraternal organizations was the admission of women to full equality with men. The Grange was formally non-political in character, but most of the state granges exerted their influence in local politics. The decline of the Grange set in after a series of unfortunate ventures into marketing and manufacturing, but not before it had made great contributions to the welfare of the American farmer. So-called Granger legislation

—laws curbing the power of railroads, warehouse owners, and business generally, was passed in a number of Mid-Western states, particularly Illinois and Wisconsin, and alleviated to a certain extent the condition of the farmer. Perhaps the most important aspect of the Grange was the social. The frequent meetings and picnics gave the farmer a certain class consciousness, taught the necessity and power of co-operation, alleviated the dullness and drabness of rural life. The revival of the Patrons of Husbandry in the twentieth century is largely due to the emphasis on its social character.

When the Grange declined in the 1880's its place was taken by the Farmers' Alliance, a confederation of several local farm organizations of which the more important were the Agricultural Wheel, the Northwestern Farmers' Alliance, and the Texas Farmers' Alliance. The conditions that had brought about the rise of the Patrons of Husbandry still existed, and the growth of the new organizations was rapid. While originally economic and fraternal in purpose these orders soon turned to political action. The Southern Farmers' Alliance began as a co-operative movement and gradually took the form of a political faction within the Democratic party for the overthrow of the old planter oligarchy that had resumed power when Federal troops were withdrawn. 'Pitchfork Ben' Tillman, champion of the poor-whites, won the governorship of South Carolina in 1890 from Wade Hampton, pushed a long series of reforms through the state legislature, and created a political machine that endures to this day. The Northwestern Alliance organized a party of its own for the election of 1890, which in abolitionist Kansas became 'a religious revival, a crusade, a pentecost of politics in which a tongue of flame sat upon every man and each spake as the spirit gave him utterance.' Mary Lease, the 'Kansas Pythoness,' went about advising farmers to 'raise less corn and more hell'; Jerry Simpson, the sockless Socrates of the prairie, defeated his silk-stockinged opponent for Congress; William A. Peffer, champion whisker-wearer of the Northwest, was elected to the United States Senate. In no other state was the agrarian uprising so strong as in Kansas; but in Nebraska, South Dakota, and Minnesota, farmers' parties met with some success.

Two years later, in 1892, a convention of some fifteen hundred delegates representing the Farmers' Alliances, the Knights of Labor, and several minor groups, founded the Peoples' or Populist Party. Their platform, drafted by the trenchant pen of Ignatius Donnelly (Minnesota politician, discoverer of the lost Atlantis, and champion of the Baconian theory) opened with a terrific indictment of the existing order. The planks included government ownership of railroads, telegraphs and telephones, a graduated income tax, postal savings banks, restriction of immigration, the eight-hour day for wage-earners, popular election of United States Senators, the Australian ballot, and the initiative and referendum. A cry of horror at such 'socialistic' proposals greeted them in the Eastern press; yet all but the first were adopted within the next generation though the instrumentality of the older parties.

The failure of the farmers to achieve their ends through direct political action in 1892 brought about a disintegration of the Populist party and the decline of the Alliance, and induced an abiding distrust of direct political action on the part of the farmer. The closing years of the nineteenth century brought a temporary prosperity to the farmer, and though the value of agricultural products continued to be disproportionately low, a striking increase in the value of farm lands partly compensated the farmer for his low income. The World War, with its tremendous demand for foodstuffs, brought a wave of prosperity to the American farmer similar to that which he had experienced during the Civil War and the similarity continued to apply to the years of post-war deflation.

While in the last generation the farmers have, as a rule, shunned political action, a notable exception was the Farmers' Non-Partisan League, organized in 1915 and centering in the wheat lands of the Northwest. In 1916 the League was successful in electing a governor and capturing control of the legislature of North Dakota, and in the ensuing years it enacted a farm relief program of a far-reaching nature. This legislation, passed in 1919, provided for state-owned warehouses and elevators, a state bank, exemption of farm improvements from taxation, creation of a hail insurance fund and a Home Building Association to encourage home ownership, and the establishment of an industrial commission to organize state-owned and financed industries. These laws were loudly denounced as class legislation throughout the East, but though in some instances ill-advised, they succeeded in alleviating the condition of the wheat growers of the state to a considerable extent. In the first four years of its existence the League spread to fifteen states, but outside of the Dakotas its political power never became threatening enough to command the attention of the older parties.

The persistent increase in tenancy throughout the country, reaching thirty-eight per cent in 1920, the corresponding increase in mortgages on farms, the rising capital charges carried by agriculture together with the relative decline of farm values and the disproportionately low returns of farming in contrast with those of industry, and the relative, and in some sections even absolute decline of the farm population, makes the agricultural the most serious domestic problem that the United States faces, a century after Andrew Jackson. Most historians will agree with Theodore Roosevelt, that 'If there is one lesson taught by history it is that the permanent greatness of any state must ultimately depend more upon the character of its country population than upon anything else. No growth of cities, no growth of wealth can make up for the loss in either the number or the character of the farming population.'

XLII

ARTS AND LETTERS

1. *The Gilded Age*

THE war and reconstruction, together with the industrial, agricultural, and scientific revolutions, demoralized American society, North and South; immigration changed the character of the American people; transportation and new inventions such as the telephone and the automobile broke down old provincialisms, and, together with a host of other factors, made for standardization and uniformity. Science and industry metamorphosed American society from rural to urban, raising a multitude of problems of housing, sanitation, social and racial adjustments, indirectly affecting the family and decreasing the birth rate. With the industrial revolution went the passing of the self-sufficient community and the growth of cities devoting all their energies and resources to the manufacture of a standardized product — cities such as Akron, Ohio, Gary, Indiana, Fall River, Massachusetts, or Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Much of the old diversity and color of life disappeared, and the passing of provincialism did not result in any notable broadening of horizons or deepening of culture. The growth of wealth raised the standard of living in some quarters and introduced new luxuries, partially compensating for the greater variety and savor of life in an earlier generation. But though the national wealth increased at an unprecedented rate, the distribution of that wealth became correspondingly uneven; the extremes of wealth and poverty more striking. The generation that witnessed the growth of fashionable watering places and resorts such as Saratoga and Newport, witnessed also the extraordinary growth of the slums. New York's 'Four Hundred' was humorously but pointedly contrasted by O. Henry with her 'Four Million.' And for all of its exploitation of natural resources and development of power, the new economic order never achieved that ideal of any well-organized society — a sufficiency of food, shelter, clothing, and health for all of its members.

The pace of life increased; men lived more rapidly if not more fully or richly.

> No space for noonday rest or midnight watches,
> No purest joy of breathing under heaven!
> Wretched themselves, they heap, to make them happy
> Many possessions.

charged George Santayana, whose philosophy of beauty was so alien to the American temper that he finally withdrew to England. That the scientific and mechanical revolution would complicate rather than simplify life, as Stuart Chase has abundantly shown in his *Men and Machines,* was pointed out at the beginning of the process. 'We do not properly live these days,' wrote a disillusioned transcendentalist, J. S. Dwight, 'but everywhere with patent inventions and complex arrangements are getting ready to live. The end is lost in the means, life is smothered in appliances.' As simplicity disappeared in the economic, so in the social organization. Even amusement became complicated and leisure a problem: the sleighing parties and haying picnics of an earlier generation were replaced by organized and professional sport.

Social demoralization, economic disorganization, and moral stagnation were reflected in the cultural life of the nation. The years after the war were years of parvenu society, of new-rich standards, of shoddy architecture and exotic art, of literary sterility. The North, rich, lusty and arrogant, was pushing irresistibly forward to even greater wealth and power, ruthlessly exploiting the natural resources of the nation to private aggrandizement. In the South the flame of life burned but feebly, the institutions and standards of the past had been destroyed, and men were busily engaged in repairing the material damages of the war. The West, raucous and raw, obstreperous and magnificently confident, was repeating the social experience of the frontier from the beginning of our history. Blindly, but with incredible optimism, men were getting and spending and laying waste their powers; creating a new America on the ruins of the old — an America more like contemporary Germany or England than like the America of Jefferson's day; raising problems they could neither understand nor solve; assuming responsibilities for which they were unprepared; lightly abandoning the faiths of their fathers without substituting new gods, unless it were the gods of the mart and of science.

Even Whitman, poet of democracy, was assailed with doubts and misgivings as he surveyed the post-war scene. 'I say that our New World democracy, however great a success in uplifting the masses out of their sloughs, in materialistic development, products, and in a certain highly deceptive superficial popular intellectuality, is so far an almost complete failure in its social aspects, and in really grand religious, moral, literary and esthetic results. In vain do we march with unprecedented strides to empire so colossal, outvying the antique, beyond Alexander's, beyond the proudest sway of Rome. In vain have we annexed Texas, California, Alaska, and reach north for Canada or south for Cuba. It is as if we were somehow being endow'd with a vast and thoroughly appointed body, and then left with little or no soul.'

Yet the post-war period was, withal, a robust, fearless, and not ungenerous age, lawless and picturesque, full of the old-time gusto and joy of living, giving large scope even in corporate form to individual energy and material creation. But of all eras in American history it was the most barren in art, letters, and spiritual forces.

2. *Literary Currents*

The kaleidoscopic changes in the American social scene were faithfully recorded in American letters. Emerson, Lowell, Melville, Bryant, Whitman, Holmes, and Longfellow lived to a ripe old age, but the Civil War seemed to have burnt out all that was original in their genius, or, as with Melville, filled them with frustration and disappointment. Whitman, indeed, wrote some of his finest poems in the post-war years — notably the moving *Thou Mother With Thy Equal Brood,* the philosophical *Passage to India,* the tremendous *Song of the Exposition,* and most of the poem-sequence, *Whispers of Heavenly Death* — but he was chiefly occupied with revising *Leaves of Grass.* Bryant and Longfellow turned their talents to translations; Lowell, devoting himself largely to editorial work, never again reached the splendid heights of the *Harvard Commemoration Ode.* Minor poets such as Richard Watson Gilder, Henry Richard Stoddard, Thomas Bailey Aldrich, and Bayard Taylor, turning away from the stern realities of life and from the contemporary scene, celebrated esoteric themes of love and romance, composed

Triolets, villanelles, rondels, rondeaus
Ballades by the score with the same old thought:
The snows and the roses of yesterday are vanished
And what is love but a rose that fades.[1]

'Do you call these genteel little creatures American poets?' said Whitman savagely in his *Democratic Vistas*. 'Do you term that perpetual, pistareen, paste-pot work, American art, American drama, taste, verse? I think I hear, echoed as from some mountaintop afar in the west, the scornful laugh of the Genius of these States.'

Emily Dickinson, in whom burned the flame of true poetic genius, wrote only for herself and her friends and it remained for a late generation to rediscover and re-evaluate her. Of the great Southern triumvirate, Paul Hamilton Hayne and Henry Timrod were silenced and Sidney Lanier was fighting starvation and painfully penning that handful of poems which was to assure him immortality among American men of letters.

'For ten years,' wrote Stedman of the post-war period, 'the new generation read nothing but newspapers.' Yet the local-color school of fiction which reached high tide in the twenty years after the war, developed real talent and significance. It is not a little remarkable that the local-color school should have had its rise at a time when localism was everywhere giving way to uniformity: it was possibly a consciousness of the evanescent character of American provincialisms that led to their literary description and record. Mark Twain, Bret Harte, and Joaquin Miller celebrated the exciting society of the Far West. Edward Eggleston, forerunner of a host of Middle Western local-colorists, described Hoosier Indiana. The versatile and gifted Constance Fennimore Woolson exploited the Great Lakes country. Grace King and Lafcadio Hearn recorded New Orleans life in loving lines, and George Washington Cable with such caustic realism that he had to find refuge in the North. Thomas Nelson Page, John Esten Cooke, and F. Hopkinson Smith sentimentalized over 'Ole Virginia, and James Lane Allen over Blue Grass Kentucky, while Richard Malcolm Johnston described Georgia villages less romantically but more accurately in the *Dukesborough Tales* and Mary Noailles Murfree discovered and exploited the Kentucky and Tennessee mountaineers. Irwin Russell and Joel Chandler Harris revealed the richness of negro life and character in poetry and in fiction. Meanwhile a group of women writers of extraordinary talent, Mary Wilkins Freeman, Rose Terry Cooke, and Sarah Orne Jewett, recorded in sombre tones the decline of New England. The local-colorists were primarily photographers rather than artists: they recorded, but few of them created. Of the entire school, perhaps only Mark Twain and Sarah Orne Jewett made permanent contributions to American literature: the others contributed to our history.

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[1] From Edgar Lee Masters 'Petit the Poet,' *Spoon River Anthology*. (Macmillan)

Mark Twain is in many respects the most typical American of his generation, the most American of our prose writers, the most national, the most democratic. In himself and in his writing he revealed the America of the Gilded Age more comprehensively than any other literary figure: he typified his country in his strength and his weaknesses, in the greatness of his character and in its tragic limitations. He incarnated in himself all the pulsing energy, the bravado, the crudity, the naïveté, the generosity and great-heartedness, the sentimentality, the frustration and tragedy of his generation.

Born in frontier Missouri, Sam Clemens spent his boyhood on the banks of the great river whose epic he was to write, absorbing the varied and splendid life that passed before him as a moving stage. Missouri was not only a border state, North and South, but a frontier between East and West: the heart of America. Mark Twain spent part of his youth as a Mississippi pilot, learning not only the great river but the infinitely varied country that it traversed and the fabulous cosmopolitan society that it floated. It was from his river experience that Mark Twain took his name, and it was the river and the life on it that inspired his greatest work: *Tom Sawyer, Huck Finn, Life on the Mississippi.*

It was Mark Twain's fortune to picture not only the valley of democracy, but the West and the East as well. He participated in the westward movement, staked out claims in the Nevada mines, turned his apt hand to journalism, and produced eventually the liveliest if not the most accurate literary description of the mining frontier that we have, *Roughing It.* In *Innocents Abroad* Twain made the most typical and inevitably American criticism of European culture that has come out of this country. And in *The Gilded Age,* which he wrote in collaboration with Charles Dudley Warner, he painted the classic picture of American society of the post-war era, and gave to that era its permanent name.

Mark Twain is a symbol for his generation not only for what he was and did, but equally in what he failed to become and to achieve. Though he made America rock with laughter at the conventions and archaisms of Europe, he accepted the conventions and standards of American post-war industrialism without serious misgivings. Magnificently natural himself, he succumbed to the proprieties of a respectable marriage, settled down in the conventional society of Hartford, Connecticut, devoted himself to business and moneymaking, curbed his natural Rabelaisian humor, and aspired to be like the secondary literary figures of New England who were then setting the standards of literary taste. Whether Mark Twain was a potential Swift, inhibited by his wife and by society, it is impossible to say. That his environment stunted his natural artistic development can scarcely be denied. It was typical, too, that Mark Twain's last years should have been years of bitter disillusion, of frustration, of a sentimental and immature but none the less tragic pessimism. 'I have been reading the morning paper,' he wrote to his friend and mentor, Howells, 'I do it every morning, well knowing that I shall find in it the usual depravities and basenesses and hypocrisies and cruelties that make up civilization, and cause me to put in the rest of the day pleading for the damnation of the human race.' It was during these years that he wrote the moving *Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc,* the savage *Man that Corrupted Hadleyburg,* the fantastic and cruel *Mysterious Stranger,* and the naïvely atheistic *What is Man?,* the last two published posthumously. But if Mark Twain was not a great nor an original critic, he was our greatest creative prose artist since Hawthorne.

The very antithesis of Mark Twain, in the tradition of New England gentility rather than of frontier naturalism, of Hawthorne rather than of Baldwin and Longstreet, was Sarah Orne Jewett. She represented an order of things that was passing away, and recorded not a robust nationalism but a decadent provincialism. Born of an old New England merchant family, from her childhood she felt the breeze of the salty air on her cheeks and smelled the faint perfume of bayberry and the pungent juniper. She was the quintessence of New England, of the older New England of Hawthorne and Thoreau, and her pen chronicled a static society that was graceful and lovely and serene. She painted in delicate pastels, in subtle shadings, in greys and twilight colors, the *Country of Pointed Firs.* She was one of the few local-colorists who rose above mere description and achieved a real literary distinction.

If the local-colorists recorded an evanescent provincialism and Mark Twain and Whitman heralded a clamorous nationalism, a new school of writers in prose and poetry used literature as a vehicle of protest against the rising tide of materialism. The literature of social revolt was as varied as the social scene itself, and embraced such diverse figures as Sidney Lanier and Edgar Lee Masters, William Dean Howells and Jack London. It was a natural, an inevitable, reaction from the crudities and shoddiness of industrialism, from the gross inequalities of modern economy. Some of it was broadly philosophical, some was sheer propaganda: only a small part of it had permanent literary value, but all of it is of immense interest to the historian.

The note was struck, significantly enough, by a representative of the order that was passing away, and in a vernacular that ill accorded with the modern tempo. The sheer beauty, the haunting melody, of Sidney Lanier's poetry has obscured for us much of its incisive social purpose. If the *Marshes of Glynn* is the height of his poetic genius, the *Symphony* is of greater historical import.

Yea, what avail the endless tale
Of gain by cunning and plus by sale?
Look up the land, look down the land
The poor, the poor, the poor they stand
Wedged by the pressing of Trade's hand . . .
Does business mean, *Die you — live I?*
Then 'Trade is trade' says but a lie:
'Tis only war grown miserly.

And William Vaughn Moody, indubitably the greatest poet between Lanier and the twentieth century poetic renaissance, sang in a more philosophic vein, in his *Gloucester Moors:*

But thou, vast outbound ship of souls
What harbour town for thee?
What shapes, when thy arriving tolls
Shall crowd the banks to see?
Shall all the happy shipmates then
Stand singing brotherly?
Or shall a haggard ruthless few
Warp her over and bring her to
While the many broken souls of men
Fester down in the slaver's pen
　And nothing to say or do?

These were notes of solemn warning, notes that echoed the deep undertones of American life and flung them out in magnificent challenge. Neither Lanier nor Moody was a spokesman of despair. It was not until fifteen years after *Gloucester Moors* that Edgar Lee Masters, from the home of the Great Emancipator, sounded the note of complete despair, chronicling, in his *Spoon River Anthology,* lives that were blighted and frustrated and a culture that had fallen into dry-rot.

Meantime the prose writers had assailed the intrenchments of industrialism and capitalism all along the line. Stephen Crane, a craftsman of rare promise, turned from vividly realistic stories of the War to even more unconventional themes, and in *Maggie, A Girl of the Streets* revealed a brutal phase of life in a great metropolis that had been comfortably ignored by respectable society. A more significant literary figure was Frank Norris, a disciple of Zola, who, in one of the greatest novels of his generation, *The Octopus,* told the story of the fight of California wheat-growers and shepherds against the overwhelming power of the Southern Pacific Railway, and in *The Pit* traced the fortunes of wheat in the Chicago wheat pit. Far more popular than either of these, but with little literary ability, was Jack London, who wrote crudely realistic novels depicting the war of the classes. An even more severe because more intelligent and philosophical indictment of modern society was drawn by Theodore Dreiser in a series of powerful novels stretching over a generation: *Sister Carrie, Jennie Gerhardt, The Titan, The Financier, An American Tragedy*. Though without literary polish, Dreiser succeeded in arresting and holding attention by sheer power, by ability to create characters such as Frank Cowperwood in *The Titan,* and by a sense of the tragedy and the pity of life that resembled Dostoievsky's.

Nor did this criticism of American life emanate entirely from those upon whom the sun of economic or social success had not shone. Henry Adams, intellectual peer and social superior of any man of his generation, drew so terrific an indictment of American politics in *Democracy* that he was moved to publish it anonymously. John Hay, who likewise moved in the best circles, described labor troubles, unsympathetically to be sure, in the pages of the *Breadwinners*. Robert Herrick, professor in the new University of Chicago, drew a sombre picture of Chicago life upon the background of the Haymarket riot, in the *Memoirs of an American Citizen*. And at last even William Dean Howells, leader of New England literati and recorder of the *Rise of Silas Lapham* was moved to scrutinize more critically the society into which he rose, and found it wanting. In *The Traveller from Altruria* Howells imagined a more rational and kindlier organization of society, one not unlike that pictured by Edward Bellamy in his famous *Looking Backward.*

Meantime long years of agrarian distress, the cruel contrast between the high ideal of the independent, self-sufficient farmer and the tragic reality of farm life on the middle border, resulted in a literary revolt similar to that against the industrial order. Something of this realistic attitude had already been expressed in the stories of Joseph Kirkland, Edward Eggleston, and Francis Grierson, but Edward Howe's grim *Story of a Country Town* fixed the type in our literature. Howe never again produced anything equal to this misanthropic masterpiece: it remains, indeed, the most powerful, as the most dismal, picture of a small country town in our literature.

But it was Hamlin Garland who was destined to be the literary spokesman of the middle border. In his first, and best, book of stories, *Main Travelled Roads,* he presented farm life in Wisconsin and Iowa in all its unprepossessing actuality, 'with a proper proportion of the sweat, flies, heat, dust and drudgery of it all.' *Main Travelled Roads* was succeeded by *Prairie Folks* and *Rose of Dutcher's Coolly*. Eventually Garland achieved eminence and prosperity, settled in the East, and in his old age waved the magic wand of romance over the scenes of his boyhood and enveloped them in a nimbus of romance and of beauty. The result was the *Son of the Middle Border,* a classic narrative of life in the West, portraying in colors of incomparable loveliness the heroic saga of the pioneer. But if Garland himself had abandoned the hot realism of his youth, others had taken it up. Willa Cather in novels which lifted her to a high position in American literature — *My Ántonia,* and *O Pioneers* — painted the Nebraska prairie-land in sombre hues, 'its fierce strength, its peculiar savage kind of beauty, its uninterrupted mournfulness.' And, most recent of the school, O. E. Rölvaag, in *Giants in the Earth,* wrote the epic story of the immigrant farmer in the Dakota country. *Giants in the Earth* chronicles as no other volume has, that combination of physical and spiritual experience which is the warp and the woof of the westward movement; but instead of being the proud story of man's conquest of earth, it is the tragedy of earth's humbling of man.

Yet we would misconceive the American scene if we saw it only through the eyes of its critics. They represented the same dissatisfied elements that found political expression in the program of the Greenbacks and the Populists, that supported Debs and the Progressive movement. But the majority of Americans were not dissatisfied with their life, did not view the American scene with either indignation or despair, and did not applaud those who saw it through a glass darkly. Of all American writers, William Dean Howells perhaps best represents the normal American of this generation. Though his career was not as varied, his character as robust, his sympathies as broad, or his literary product as catholic as that of Mark Twain, he did limn the average American — or in any event the average Easterner — with artistic accuracy. 'He was,' writes Carl Van Doren, 'the intimate historian of his age, who produced the most extended and accurate transcript of American life yet made by one man.' He was chiefly concerned with middle-class Americans — or middle-class New Englanders and Ohioans, and — with less detachment than Henry James — with the international scene. *A Foregone Conclusion, A Fearful Responsibility,* and *The Kentons* are concerned with the conflict between American and European manners, but a comparison of the latter with *Innocents Abroad* measures the advance in sophistication. In the *Rise of Silas Lapham* Howells drew the classic picture of the self-made man, so dear to the American heart, and hung another portrait alongside those of Colonel Sellers and Frank Cowperwood in the gallery of American characters. The *Lady of Aroostook* and the more powerful *Modern Instance* described life in the New England village. *A Hazard of New Fortunes,* which Howells wrote after he had come under the influence of Tolstoy and Turgenev, takes New York and the industrial conflict for its background, but it never penetrates to the more brutal aspects of New York life as does Stephen Crane's *Maggie.* In the *Leatherwood God,* the last and decidedly one of the best of Howell's novels, he returned to frontier Ohio for his setting and material.

The America so elaborately etched by Howells was a placid and on the whole a happy country. With the darker aspects of American life Howells was not concerned. His etchings were like Whistler's rather than Pennell's. His world was one of gentility and correctness. His realism was not hard and brutal but eminently respectable. The emotions that he analyzed were not crude and passionate but delicate and sophisticated. His audience was largely a feminine one;

his vehicle the more dignified periodicals, the *Atlantic* and *Harpers.* His writings reflect the surface of American life but scarcely penetrate to the swift undercurrents.

Edith Wharton did for New York what Howells did for Boston. Though the social milieu which she pictured in her acrid novels was more like that through which Henry James's characters so gracefully moved, she was primarily concerned with the American scene. She is the literary historian, *par excellence,* of fashionable New York in the Age of Innocence. The complex social problems she presents so ironically in *The Custom of the Country,* the *House of Mirth,* and the *Age of Innocence* are reflected upon the background of post-war New York life with its new-rich social climbers, its shattering of old standards of taste, and its disappearing elegance. Her greatest achievement, however, is *Ethan Frome,* a story of rural New England rather than of New York society, and a tragedy of such exquisite and moving beauty that it stands almost alone in American letters.

Yet despite these undercurrents of unrest and protest, the decade of the nineties was a romantic one, and it was in this decade that the historical romance had its greatest triumphs. The local-colorists had already exploited historical material, the influence of Stevenson gave respectability to the movement, and the Spanish-American War gave it a final fillip. In rapid succession were published Harold Frederic's *In the Valley;* S. Weir Mitchell's *Hugh Wynne* and *The Red City;* Mary Johnston's *To Have and to Hold;* Paul Leicester Ford's *Janice Meredith;* Owen Wister's *The Virginian* and *Lady Baltimore;* Ellen Glasgow's *The Battleground;* Edward Bellamy's *Duke of Stockbridge;* and a series of notable novels depicting scenes in American history by Winston Churchill: *The Crisis, The Crossing, Richard Carvel.* All of these dealt with the American scene: of authors who exploited the rich past of European history, Francis Marion Crawford was easily the most successful and popular.

Historically interesting for his reaction from rather than his reflection of the American scene, is Henry James. Like many others, James found himself out of sympathy with the America of the Gilded Age, but his quarrel was not so much with its injustices and inequalities as with what he considered its vulgarity and stupidity. Feeling that America, even Boston, did not afford an encouraging environment to the artist, he deliberately expatriated himself, spiritually as well as physically. His novels are largely concerned with the international scene, though he generally used American characters, and occasionally, as in *Washington Square* and *The Bostonians,* an American setting. Having a private income he was not dependent upon his pen for a living, and had abundant leisure in which to fashion and polish his peculiarly intricate and subtle style, to probe the innermost psychological recesses of his characters, and to construct elaborate if somewhat thin plots and backgrounds. *Daisy Miller, The Portrait of a Lady, The Spoils of Poynton, The Ambassadors, The Golden Bowl,* and *The Wings of the Dove,* are novels of the first water, but they belong to the English rather than to the American tradition.

It is difficult to classify American literature of the twentieth century: eclecticism rather than realism or romanticism or classicism was the dominant note. Most of the authors we have had occasion to mention continued to produce during the first two decades of the new century: Mark Twain lived until 1910, Sarah Orne Jewett until 1909, Henry James until 1916, Howells until 1920. Edith Wharton, Robert Herrick, Ed Howe, Hamlin Garland, Willa Cather, O. E. Rölvaag, Ellen Glasgow, and many of the others are still writing, while a handful of new prose authors of almost equal talent are earning for themselves a place in the history of American letters: Sherwood Anderson, James Branch Cabell, Sinclair Lewis, and, more recently, Thornton Wilder, Elinor Wylie, Louis Bromfield, Stark Young, Elizabeth Roberts, Evelyn Scott, and Ernest Hemingway.

The most notable development was in the field of poetry. 'In 1890,' writes Percy H. Boynton, 'the poetry-reading world was chiefly conscious of the passing of its leading singers for the last half century.' In 1912 the first number of Harriet Monroe's *Poetry: a Magazine of Verse* was published, and the poetic renaissance was under way. Bliss Carman, Richard Hovey, Lizette Woodworth Reese, George Santayana, and William Vaughn Moody bridged the gap. Hovey and Carman are distinguished only by contrast with the feebleness of most of their contemporaries. Miss Reese, despite some verse of haunting loveliness, never achieved more than local fame. The beautiful sonnets of Santayana were over-subtle and philosophical for his American audience. Moody alone of this group, though he died at the height of his creative powers, achieved a distinguished and permanent place on the roll of American poets.

In striking contrast to the comparative barrenness of these transition years, the decade from 1910–20 witnessed the most splendid and varied poetic outburst in our literary history. Vachel Lindsay's *Congo and Other Poems* and Amy Lowell's first imagist poetry were published in 1914. In 1915 appeared Robert Frost's *North of Boston,* Edgar Lee Master's bitter *Spoon River Anthology,* and John Neihardt's *Song of Hugh Glass,* the first volume of an epic of the westward movement. In 1916 came Carl Sandburg's *Chicago Poems,* raucous and defiant, and Edwin Arlington Robinson's philosophic *Man Against the Sky*. Edna St. Vincent Millay's lovely *Renascence* was published in 1917. And in 1921 the appearance of Elinor Wylie's *Nets to Catch the Wind* announced the advent of the most exquisite poetic genius since Emily Dickinson.

3. *Journalism*

If literature reflected the broad lines of national development and delineated the national character, journalism mirrored more faithfully the day by day activities and interests of the American people. The newspapers of the Civil War period were largely personal organs, their four or eight pages given over chiefly to politics, to reprints of foreign dispatches, to editorials, and to personal advertisements. In the evolution of the newspaper of Greeley's or Bennett's day into the modern metropolitan daily such as the New York *Times* or the Chicago *Tribune* we can see not only the material growth of the American people and the expansion of their interests, but other factors which are at the same time characteristic of the development of the American people as a whole. Some of these are: 1. The subordination of politics to 'news,' with a consequent development of highly efficient machinery of reporting and news-gathering. This was made possible by mechanical and administrative improvement in the telephone, telegraph, cable, and printing machinery. 2. The passing of the personal equation in journalism. With a few exceptions newspapers ceased to be largely vehicles for the opinions of their editors, and became great and generally impersonal business organizations. This development, however, is probably less striking in journalism than in business generally. 3. Centralization and standardization of newspapers through the creation of chains, the elimination of competition, and the use of syndicated editorials, features, and news. This is merely the horizontal trust extended to the field of journalism, through such agencies as Hearst and the Scripps-

Howard corporation. More recently we have the beginning of the vertical trust in journalism through the centralized control of all processes of newspaper making from wood-pulp to distribution. 4. A notable enlargement and improvement in the physical appearance of the newsapers, due on the one hand to the perfection of machinery such as the Hoe rotary press, the Mergenthaler linotype, and rotogravure processes, and the organization of news-gathering agencies such as the United Press and the Associated Press, and on the other to the growth of advertising giving newspapers the revenue with which to install such expensive machinery and maintain such service. 5. Co-operation of the Federal government in the form of low postal rates on newspapers and rural free delivery. Thus we see that those processes of consolidation, of standardization, of capitalization, of the scientific revolution, and of governmental co-operation which characterize American life as a whole were profoundly changing the nature of American journalism.

In the sixties, as in the twentieth century, New York City was the newspaper center of the nation. Though such local papers as the Richmond *Enquirer,* the Toledo *Blade,* the Cincinnati *Commercial,* the Chicago *Tribune,* the Louisville *Journal,* and the Springfield *Republican,* to mention only a few, were comparatively more influential than small papers of the present time, it was the great New York dailies — the *Tribune,* the *Sun,* the *Post,* the *Herald,* and the *Times* that held a commanding position.

The dean of American newspapermen was the venerable William Cullen Bryant, for half a century editor of the influential *Evening Post.* The just fame of Bryant has been obscured by over-emphasis on his poetry at the expense of his splendid journalistic talents. It is the fate of the journalist to write in water, and most of Bryant's editorial work is forgotten, but few more vigorous, discriminating, and far-sighted critics have dealt with the American scene. He lifted American journalism to a higher literary and ethical plane than it had heretofore occupied, and gave not only to his editorial column but to his entire paper a refinement and dignity that assured it a leading place in American journalism. 'But,' writes Allan Nevins, historian of the *Evening Post,* 'he lacked the faculty for creating a broad newspaper which would appeal by enterprise in news-gathering and by special features to a great popular audience. He was responsible for few innovations in journalism, and they were not of high importance. His journalistic vein had something of the narrow-ness which marked his poetic genius, and though the *Post's* editorials, political news, literary articles, and foreign correspondence were of the highest merit, they were for the few and not for the many.'

At the farthest remove from Bryant in ability to gauge and to influence popular opinion and to create a broad national paper, was Horace Greeley of the *Tribune,* by common consent the greatest of American editors. Greeley was the spokesman of the plain people, liberal, practical, fearless, of cascading energy and boundless faith in democracy, a social reformer who fashioned a great paper as a flexible instrument to his purposes. He founded the *Tribune* in 1841, drove its circulation up over the hundred thousand mark, and until the close of the Civil War exerted a greater influence over public opinion in the North and the West than any other editor. He made his paper, especially the weekly edition, a family newspaper, and he was read everywhere from Maine to Minnesota, his fierce denunciations of slavery doing more to consolidate Northern opinion than all the work of the abolitionists. Greeley's erratic course during the Civil War cost him some popularity, and his vindictive attacks upon Johnson contrast unpleasantly with the tolerant policies of Bryant, or Raymond of the *Times*. Yet if he ended his career less gallantly than he had begun it, his thirty years as editor of the *Tribune* constitute the greatest achievement of personal journalism in our history.

A very different sort of paper was the *Herald,* edited after 1835 by the James Gordon Bennetts, father and son. It was the elder Bennett's policy to create a paper that would be ' lively, saucy and spicy ' and he succeeded in his ambition. The *Herald* was from the beginning of the sensational, scandal-mongering variety, but Bennett had an ear for news, and his social and financial columns were outstanding. He was never a moulder of public opinion, but he anticipated the modern sensational newspaper in many respects.

The *Sun,* after 1868 under the control of Charles A. Dana, was closer to the *Herald* than to the *Tribune,* despite the fact that Dana was a graduate of Harvard and of Brook Farm, a scholar and a man of discriminating taste, and trained under Greeley himself. By emphasizing the news and feature articles Dana made the *Sun* the most popular paper of his time. He gathered around him a brilliant group of reporters — Arthur Brisbane, Richard Harding Davis, and Jacob Riis, to mention but a few — and made the *Sun* the liveliest and most vivacious and well-rounded paper between Greeley's *Tribune* and Pulitzer's *World*. Dana's incursions into politics were not always fortunate, as when he supported Butler for the Presidency in 1884, but he rendered valiant service in exposing the corruption of the Grant administration and in his terrific fight on Tammany Hall.

Less influential than either Greeley or Dana was Henry J. Raymond of the *Times,* who, from the beginning, held faithfully to his ideal of an independent and decent newspaper. The *Times* under Raymond was, indeed, to its generation what the *Times* of today is to ours, — cautiously liberal, eminently respectable, thorough and accurate. 'It probably came nearer the newspaper of the good time coming than any other existence,' wrote Godkin of the *Nation*.

Undoubtedly the most powerful newspaper in the country outside of New York City was the Springfield (Mass.) *Republican,* controlled and edited by three generations of Samuel Bowleses continuously from 1844 to 1915. Like the *Tribune* the *Republican* was issued in a weekly as well as a daily edition, and the weekly had a much larger and wider circulation, spreading the liberal and independent doctrines of its editors throughout New England, the Ohio and Mississippi valleys. The second, and probably the ablest, Bowles had charge of the paper during the critical years of the Civil War and reconstruction: he supported Lincoln, advocated a magnanimous policy toward the South, fought corruption under Grant, denounced Tammany, and held fast to principles of independence, honesty, and courage that did much to raise the standards of American journalism. The importance of the *Republican* was not only in the influence which it exerted through its editorials nor in the high literary standards which it maintained, but in its demonstration of the nation-wide power that a small provincial journal might wield — an example that was followed by William Allen White with the Emporia *Gazette,* Ed Howe with the Atchison *Globe,* and Thomas R. Nelson with the Kansas City *Star*.

The decades of the seventies and the eighties marked a dividing line in American journalism. Raymond died in 1869, Greeley and Bennett in 1872, Bryant and the second Bowles in 1878. Joseph Pulitzer secured control of the New York *World* in 1883, and William Randolph Hearst of the San Francisco *Call* in 1887. Samuel Bowles himself prophesied the significance of the passing of the older generation of editors:

'The growth of journalism as a business, and the extinction of the old party lines and divisions, have united to make a date, as it were, of its emancipation. With the deaths of James Gordon Bennett and Horace Greeley, personal journalism also comes practically to an end. They did much to create modern American journalism in its two different characters: both sought news as the first and chief element, — the one went farther and added criticism, opinion, reform; the one gathered and organized fact and recorded opinions; the other sought to control and make those opinions. Their personality was the necessity of their creative work; it could not be suppressed by types and ink; but they have no successors, because there is no call for them, — the creators have given place to the conductors; and henceforth American Journalism, in its best illustrations will exhibit its outgrowth both of Partyism and Personalism. It will become a profession, not a stepping-stone; and a great journal will not longer be the victim of caprice and passion, or the instrument of the merely personal ambition, of its chance writer or conductor.'

Joseph Pulitzer perhaps best represents the methods and the objectives of the new journalism. An Hungarian-German Jew, trained under the liberal Carl Schurz, he came to New York from the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch,* and purchased the almost defunct *World* from Jay Gould. By adopting and elaborating on the sensationalism of Bennett, he pushed the circulation of the *World* up to unprecedented figures, passing the million mark during the Spanish-American War. His paper, frankly popular in its appeal, played up crime, scandal, and sensational news in screaming headlines and illustrations, while its bold socialistic program established it definitely as the poor man's paper. Yet the *World* under Pulitzer was never merely a 'yellow sheet.' There was a wide gap between the news sheets and the editorial pages: and the latter was conducted on a high intellectual, moral, and literary plane. Pulitzer's ambition was to reach the masses through sensationalism, and then indoctrinate them with his liberalism — an ideal in which he was not entirely successful. In course of time the *World,* like the *Herald* and the *Sun,* became more respectable and, after the retirement of Pulitzer and the accession of Frank I. Cobb, became the leading Democratic organ in the country, a position which it continued to maintain under the able direction of Walter Lippman.

The success of Pulitzer in tapping substrata of newspaper readers was contagious. William Randolph Hearst, fresh from success on the California coast, came to New York in 1896 and purchased the

Journal. In a short time he was out-sensationalizing Pulitzer, and there ensued one of the fiercest and most dramatic contests in the history of American journalism. Hearst, in the *Journal* and in the nation-wide chain of papers he subsequently acquired, brought 'yellow journalism' to its highest — or lowest — development, and without the editorial compensations of the *World.* Lavish use of enormous black leaders, of colored paper, of blaring full-page editorials, of illustrations, and of colored cartoons and comics, gave the Hearst papers an extraordinary popularity. Sensationalism became a national menace when, in order to boost the circulation of his papers, Hearst exploited the Cuban revolution to whip up a popular demand for war with Spain. Godkin, in one of his last editorials, hotly denounced 'a regime in which a blackguard boy with several millions of dollars at his disposal has more influence on the use a great nation may make of its credit, of its army and navy, of its name and traditions, than all the statesmen and philosophers and professors in the country.'

But alongside of this vulgarization of the press which Godkin deplored, went a significant raising of professional standards and ethics. This was brought about partly through voluntary agreement, partly through the establishment of numerous schools of journalism, the most notable of which was the Pulitzer school at Columbia University, and partly through the example of such eminently respectable papers as the New York *Times,* which grew in circulation and in influence by concentrating on full and accurate reporting and on the editorial page. The vigorous growth of other excellent papers such as the Baltimore *Sun,* the Chicago *Daily News,* and the St. Louis *Post-Dispatch* went far to off-set the strident inroads of the tabloid picture-papers which made their appearance in the years after the World War.

More influential even than many of the great daily papers, were weekly journals of opinion such as the *Nation,* the *Independent,* and *Harper's Weekly.* Of these three, the *Nation* under the incomparable E. L. Godkin was for thirty years (1865–1899) the leader of intelligent opinion in America. A great editor in every sense of the word, fearless, incisive, brilliant, penetrating, of high literary attainments and wide erudition, Godkin made the *Nation,* despite its limited circulation, the most powerful journal of opinion in the country. The *Nation* concerned itself chiefly with politics, the negro, and literature; it was a strident critic of Johnson, attacked corruption national and local, and held aloft at all times the highest ideals of civic duty. Godkin, asserted Charles Eliot Norton, ' was the soundest and best trained writer on social and economical questions ' in the country. His influence percolated down through editors, teachers, clergymen, and professional men until it indirectly affected the great mass of the people. ' To my generation,' wrote the philosopher William James, ' his was certainly the towering influence in all thought concerning public affairs, and indirectly his influence has assuredly been more pervasive than that of any other writer of the generation, for he influenced other writers who never quoted him and determined the whole current of discussion.' Yet Godkin lacked the common touch, lacked broad human sympathies. His liberalism had a doctrinaire tinge that reminds one unpleasantly of Charles Sumner. He had no understanding of either the Southern planter or of the Western farmer, and generally identified good taste with righteousness. His opposition to Granger legislation or the Populist program was as uncomprehending as that of the most hide-bound reactionary. ' He couldn't imagine a different kind of creature from himself in politics,' wrote William James shrewdly. It is noteworthy that the most fervent appreciation of Godkin came from his New England and English friends who, like him, often confused form with substance, elegance with integrity.

More democratic, more in the American tradition, was *Harper's Weekly*, edited by the versatile and scholarly civil service reformer, George William Curtis. A family magazine, designed for entertainment rather than for agitation, it was nevertheless a force for political decency, and Curtis came in time to occupy something of the position formerly held by Horace Greeley. Yet the *Weekly* is chiefly remembered today as the vehicle of Thomas Nast's incomparable political cartoons. Less important than *Harper's Weekly* was the *Independent*, the leading religious paper of the post-war period, ably if somewhat contentiously edited by Henry Ward Beecher and Theodore Tilton.

The weekly journal of opinion went into something of an eclipse after the passing of Godkin and Curtis. The *Commoner*, edited by Bryan, and *La Follette's Magazine* were merely political propaganda for those left-wing leaders. But the second decade of the century witnessed a notable revival. In 1912 Oswald Garrison Villard secured control of the *Nation*, and transformed it once again into a radical weekly similar to, and in many respects equal to, the *Nation* under Godkin. The *New Republic,* launched two years later under the auspices of Herbert Croly and with one of the most brilliant editorial staffs in the history of American journalism, assumed at once a commanding position in directing the political, social, and economic thought of the country along liberal channels.

4. *Art and Architecture*

American artistic development in the post-war period was dominated by two factors: the growth of population and of cities, and the increase in national and individual wealth. The first created new fields for the architect and the artist in the construction of numberless administrative, educational, and commercial structures, and presented new and enormously complex problems of construction, sanitation, transportation, lighting, decoration, and adjustment to real estate values. The second made possible a patronage of the arts as lavish if not as discriminating as ever before in history, led to the establishment of museums and schools of art, and to the wholesale importation of works of art from the Old World. This increase in wealth together with the passing of cultural isolation led to a much wider and more intimate acquaintance with and dependence upon European art. Paradoxically, this led not to an increasing dependence upon European standards or schools, but to a general elevation of American taste and encouragement of native talent. Yet art, in so far as it is an attempt to create beauty out of the stuff of life, is universal rather than national in character, and it is a mistake to attempt to force artistic expression into artificial channels of nationalism. To speak of ' American architecture,' ' American painting,' or ' American sculpture ' is largely an intellectual convenience: neither Richard Morris Hunt, nor John Singer Sargent, nor Frederick Macmonnies were ' American ' except by accident of birth and fortune of patronage.

Even before the Civil War the Greek revival, introduced by Thomas Jefferson and Benjamin Latrobe, had spent itself, and the most promising of American architects, James Renwick and Richard Upjohn, had turned to Gothic. St. Patrick's Cathedral, Grace Church, and Trinity Church, all in New York, gave promise of a Gothic revival. What came instead was a pseudo-Gothic that often goes by the name of Eastlake, after its English popularizer, or of Victorian. This style was used occasionally in larger public buildings such as the Old Grand Central station, New York City, or the Smithsonian Institute, but it was ill-adapted to such structures, and found most extensive application in domestic architecture. It was like much of the oratory of the period, florid, vain, and empty; characterized by over-decoration, over-ornamentation, and ostentation. Jig-saw scroll work, mansard roofs, useless gables, narrow windows, small dark rooms, long halls, ornate prettiness in interior decorations, and stuffy furniture, all reflected the decline in American taste since the simplicity of Jefferson and Bulfinch.

It was Henry Hobson Richardson who ushered in the new day of American architecture. Trained in Paris at the Ecole des Beaux Arts, he brought back not the classic of renaissance styles then so popular in France, but the influence of Viollet le Duc. Richardson's fame is associated with the attempt to transplant Romanesque architecture to the United States — an attempt, it would seem, foredoomed to failure. Yet by contrast to the jerry-work of so much of the Gilded Age Richardson's buildings have a solidity and integrity and completeness that go far to explain the universal admiration they aroused. Such, indeed, was Richardson's power that he enjoyed a personal success greater than any other figure in American architecture. 'To live in a house built by Richardson,' writes T. E. Tallmadge, 'was a cachet of wealth and taste; to have your nest egg in one of his banks gave you a feeling of perfect security; to worship in one of his churches made one think one had a pass key to the Golden Gates.' Even the fastidious Henry Adams records with pride that he employed Richardson to build his house on Lafayette Square, Washington. His greatest monument was undoubtedly Trinity Church, Boston, a magnificent Romanesque structure for which John La Farge did the murals and the stained-glass windows. Though Richardson is best remembered for some of his churches, his influence on domestic architecture was profound, and massive fort-like buildings of gray masonry built by him or one of his disciples are still to be found in many Mid-Western and some Eastern cities. Yet few styles of domestic architecture could be more ill adapted to the American temper than the Romanesque, and it is somewhat difficult now to understand the vogue that Richardson enjoyed.

Contemporary with Richardson and, like him, trained in the Ecole des Beaux Arts, was Richard Morris Hunt, brother of the eminent painter, and most exquisite of American architects. Hunt was, *par excellence,* the architect of the new American aristocracy — an aristocracy of money, but not without taste and standards. He introduced to America the beauty and lavishness of the French renaissance, and built for American millionaires magnificent country houses patterned after French châteaux, or palatial town houses that resembled French palaces. While Richardson's influence was strongest in the Middle-West, especially in Chicago and St. Louis, Hunt's genius found its field in New York City and in the more fashionable Eastern resorts such as Newport. The immense popularity of Hunt is eloquent of the advent of a wealthy leisure class of Americans who could afford to patronize artists after the fashion of Renaissance princes, and who were able to exercise some artistic discrimination. Yet French châteaux were no more suited to the genius of America than Romanesque fortresses, and though Hunt's work commended itself by its loveliness and grace, it was necessarily limited in its influence to a very exclusive group.

Scarcely less important in the development of architecture in America than Richardson and Hunt, was the firm of McKim, Mead, and White, which designed more important public buildings than any other architectural firm in the country: the Pennsylvania station, the Morgan library, the Columbia University buildings, in New York, the public library in Boston, the Union station in Washington, to mention but a few. Though devoted to no one style of architecture, the firm leaned toward the classical, and their influence is evident in scores of libraries, stations, educational institutions, and private homes scattered over the country. McKim, too, rendered signal service to American artists by establishing the American Academy in Rome — a gesture that was peculiarly appropriate coming from one who had done so much to cast American art in the models of imperial Rome.

The advance of architecture in America could be measured by comparing the buildings of the Centennial Exposition of 1876 with those of the World's Fair at Chicago in 1893. 'The Exposition,' wrote Henry Adams wonderingly, 'defied philosophy. As a scenic display Paris had never approached it, but the inconceivable scenic display consisted in its being there at all.' It was eloquent of the waning influence of Richardson and the rising influence of McKim and his associates, that the consulting architects chose the classical style for the Fair buildings. The Exposition enlisted a striking array of American artistic talent. Frederick Law Olmstead, who had laid out Central Park, New York, was the landscape architect. R. M. Hunt, C. F. McKim, Stanford White, Daniel Burnham, Charles B. Atwood, and Louis Sullivan were among the architects. Augustus Saint-Gaudens, Daniel Chester French, Lorado Taft, and Frederick Macmonnies contributed their skill as sculptors, and Kenyon Cox, Gari Melchers, and Edwin Blashfield as painters. Well might Saint-Gaudens exclaim, at a meeting of the architects, 'Look here, old fellows, do you realize that this is the greatest meeting of artists since the fifteenth century?' Daniel Burnham, indeed, remarked that the Fair was 'what the Romans would have wished to create in permanent form.' The remark revealed at once the achievement of American arts and their limitations. If the World's Fair was one of the great artistic exhibitions of modern times, it was not distinctively American nor did it, in any essentials, further the development of native American art. The most promising original artist discovered by the Fair, Louis Sullivan, whose Transportation building aroused the excited admiration of foreign critics, was neglected by his fellow-countrymen. And in so far as the Fair buildings tended to emphasize the façade at the expense of the structure as a whole, and to emphasize monumental buildings at the expense of domestic architecture, its influence must be pronounced unfortunate.

What doomed Richardson's style, and made Hunt's and McKim's impracticable for commercial purposes, was the rising value of real estate which placed a premium upon height and cheapness. Mason work was enormously expensive, and could attain a height of at most seven or eight stories. The low-lying and enormously expensive buildings of a Hunt or a McKim are found chiefly on country estates, or, in cities, on public property. The elevator had been introduced before the Civil War, but it was not until the eighties that the perfection of cheap structural steel set American architecture free, and, together with rising land values and the gregarious habits of the American business man, produced the skyscraper. Chicago was the center of the earliest efforts in this direction, and the Tacoma Building and Masonic Temple the earliest examples of all-steel skeleton buildings. Though Burnham and Sullivan worked capably in this medium, most of the artists who attempted to design curtain walls for these steel skeletons made a poor fist of it. By 1910, however, the skylines of New York and Chicago showed imposing dignity and genuine beauty, and European critics are agreed that the skyscraper is the one genuine American contribution to world architecture. The device of the set-back, required by law in New York City after 1916, revolutionized skyscraper design, and went far to invalidate the charge of such critics as Lewis Mumford that the skyscraper is 'an architecture for angels and aviators.' Yet the chief charge against the skyscraper can scarcely be denied: that it necessarily subordinated artistic considerations to real estate values, and that it added immeasurably to the complexity of modern urban life by concentrating thousands of workers in one spot during the working day, and concentrating business in one small section of a city.

More recently American architecture has been characterized by eclecticism. Its greatest triumphs have been in administrative, religious, and educational buildings, and its most brilliant representatives, Bertram Goodhue and Frank Lloyd Wright, have shown marked originality. Goodhue's Nebraska State Capitol is certainly one of the most notable achievements of modern architecture, while Wright's influence on domestic architecture has been world-wide. But these triumphs have been individual ones: there has as yet emerged from the tremendous activity no characteristic American idiom, and the field of the architect is today more circumscribed by the engineer and the realtor than ever before in our history.

The most striking characteristic of American painting in the period since the Civil War, as in earlier years, is its dependence upon European and particularly French standards and training. The majority of American painters studied in France, at Barbizon or Paris; a smaller number derived their inspiration from Düsseldorf or Munich. A considerable group of the most distinguished American artists — Whistler, Abbey, Sargent, Melchers, Harrison, to name but a few — took up their permanent residence abroad and belong to the history of English or French art as well as of American.

In no branch of the arts have Americans a more distinguished record than in painting, and the advance from the Hudson River School of landscape painters to Innes and Martin, or from portrait painters such as Peale and Trumbull to Whistler and Sargent, is notable. The most distinguished of American landscape painters was George Innes, who in his use of colors and of light anticipated the French luminists, and who combined with extraordinary technical skill a religious mysticism. Scarcely less talented than Innes in the field of landscape painting were Alexander Wyant and Homer

Martin, the first drawing his inspiration from the English Constable, the latter in the Barbizon tradition. Martin was an ardent admirer of Corot, and in *Westchester Hills,* and *View of the Seine* proved himself a worthy disciple to the great French master. The tradition of Innes, Wyant, and Martin was well maintained in the following generation by Dwight Tryon and John Twachtman.

The philosopher of luminism in painting was John La Farge, one of the most versatile and original geniuses of the nineteenth century. Like so many of our artists, of recent foreign extraction, La Farge identified himself completely with American art, and for a quarter of a century exerted a powerful influence in its development. In his youth a student in William Morris Hunt's *atelier,* he did his first important work on the murals and windows of Richardson's Trinity Church; yet he was a disciple of neither of these masters, but developed his own talents along independent lines. His most significant contribution was probably his experimentation in stained glass, and in the Church of the Ascension, New York, he revived something of the lost glory of medieval glass coloring. In his painting, particularly in his interpretation of light and the subtlety of his coloring, he anticipated many of the tenets of the Impressionists. That so exquisite, and by its very nature so exclusive, an art could thrive in America indicated that 'there must have been culture to recognize it, wealth to employ it, and some surrounding beautiful works of art to foster it, and all these to be found in his own country.'

Comparable to La Farge in influence, and bringing Impressionism to a triumphant climax, but utterly different in personality and career, was James McNeill Whistler, probably the most gifted of American painters. Like so many other artists, before and since, Whistler expatriated himself, and established himself in the more profitable, if scarcely more congenial, society of England. His vivid and belligerent personality, his aggressive egotism, his love of notoriety, served for a time to obscure his true gifts. By his portraits of *Carlyle, Sarasaste,* and *The Artist's Mother,* he established himself at once as one of the great interpreters of the nineteenth century. His portraits were distinctly impressionistic — not realistic in the fashion of Sargent or Eakins or Duveneck, the other great portrait painters of his generation. Even more influential than his portraits were the *Nocturnes* and *Symphonies,* strikingly original experiments in the use of colors, such as *Battersea Bridge, Blue and*

Gold, The Falling Rocket, Valpariso Bay, or the delicate *Symphonies in White.*

Though now recognized as one of the greatest of modern painters, Whistler long encountered bitter opposition and misunderstanding, from a public to whom Impressionism was anathema. A very different reception was accorded two other American artists who took up their residence in London: Edwin Abbey and John Singer Sargent. Abbey, who painted the official picture of the coronation of King Edward VII, was primarily an illustrator and mural decorator, famous for his rich and elaborate re-creations of historical scenes, and for the magnificent murals in the Boston Public Library and the Pennsylvania State Capitol. Sargent is, by common consent, the foremost of modern portrait painters, unmatched in the accuracy and intelligence of his character reading, in the great tradition of Velasquez and Reynolds and Gainsborough.

It is a far cry from the academic perfection of Sargent and the elegance of his subjects, to the homely native talent of Winslow Homer. Trained in a lithographer's shop and as illustrator for *Harper's Weekly* during the Civil War, Homer is the most powerful of American painters of independent training. The subjects of his pen and brush were as native as his character: war pictures, scenes from negro life in the South, the Adirondacks, and the fisher folk of the Maine coast. His paintings are marked by originality of conception and boldness of execution, by a primitive power and abounding energy and solemn grandeur that give them a universal rather than a mere local significance.

The richness and variety of the American scene was caught by a group of painters who had little else in common. Horatio Walker drew the homelier aspects of farm life in a manner and style reminiscent of Millet; Jonas Lie was inspired by the singular and primitive beauty of the building of the Panama Canal; George Bellows brought to his paintings and lithographs of life in the crowded streets and the docks of New York a new technique; Joseph Pennell, foremost of modern etchers, was fascinated by the spectacle of modern industry, railroads, and factories; Frederick Remington skillfully sketched life on the great plains; Elihu Vedder and George de Forest Brush painted the vanishing Indian.

In one characteristic field, American painting reached a high level: the ideal representation of girlhood and motherhood. Abbott Thayer, who 'painted like an angel,' created the spiritual type of American womanhood, adored and immaculate, in *The Virgin Enthroned,* and *Caritas.* More tenderly — and more skillfully — George de Forest Brush portrayed the burdens and responsibilities of motherhood in pictures that recall the Flemish masters of the seventeenth century. With masterly brush Thomas Dewing painted the type of woman who might have existed in the novels of Edith Wharton, passionless, subtle, and elegant. Most representations of American women are highly idealized and spiritual, and the critic must subscribe to Henry Adams's charge that 'American art, like the American language and American education,' was, as far as possible, sexless.'

In sculpture, as in painting, American artists struck roots in the classic soil of Greece or Rome or in the rococo soil of modern France. Here too, the advance from the early nineteenth century to the modern period is a notable one. The statues and decorations of Hiram Powers, Thomas Crawford, Erastus Palmer, and Horatio Greenough, had been excellent copies of Canova or Thorwaldsen, but they lacked all originality or power. The first American sculptor to give evidence of either of these traits was John Quincy Adams Ward, whose statues of Henry Ward Beecher and President Garfield were completely divorced from the neo-classical insipidity of so many of his contemporaries.

Modern American sculpture dates from the Centennial Exposition of 1876, when the exhibition of modern French art made a profound impression upon Americans. Two young Americans, both trained at the Ecole des Beaux Arts, exhibited at the Exposition: Augustus Saint-Gaudens, and Olin L. Warner. 'To an intelligent foreigner,' writes Charles R. Morey, 'American sculpture would be summed up in a single name, that of Augustus Saint-Gaudens,' and so impressively does Saint-Gaudens tower above all of his contemporaries, indeed above all American artists, that few critics would quarrel with the generalization. Born in Ireland, of Irish and French parentage, he has nevertheless, more fully and sympathetically than any other sculptor, recorded the American genius. His *Lincoln* in Lincoln Park, Chicago, with its intuitive comprehension of the combination of rugged shrewdness and spirituality, is so convincing that no one, 'having seen it, will conceive him otherwise thereafter.' The *Farragut Monument,* with its base executed by Stanford White, and the *Sherman Monument,* established him as indubitably the foremost monumental sculptor of his day. Perhaps the most profound and the loveliest of all his work is the *Peace of God,* which Saint-Gaudens did for the tomb of Mrs. Henry Adams. 'From Prometheus to Christ; from Michael Angelo to Shelley,' wrote Henry Adams, 'art had wrought on this eternal figure almost as though it had nothing else to say.'

Less powerful and less original than Saint-Gaudens, American trained, and in the American tradition, is Daniel Chester French, who executed the enormous bronze Lincoln for the Lincoln Memorial in Washington. Almost equally known is his figure of the Minute Man, at Concord, Massachusetts, and his lovely *Death Stays the Hand of the Sculptor.*

Though Saint-Gaudens and French are the most distinguished of American sculptors, no account of American sculpture would be complete without mention of Frederick Macmonnies, whose rococo exuberance and grace remind one of Falguiere and Carpeaux, or of George Gray Barnard, a disciple of Rodin who is perhaps best known for his collection of medieval art, or of Karl Bitter, director of sculpture of three major Expositions, or of Lorado Taft, whose work as a teacher and writer has tended to obscure his real talents, and whose *Wave of Life* is one of the most impressive of modern monuments.

Important in the creation of a background for the development of American art, was the accumulation of great private collections, and the establishment of museums and schools of art. Civil War profiteers, bankers, and railway kings invaded Europe and captured 'old masters,' and though some of the early collections were meretricious, collectors such as J. P. Morgan, W. A. Clarke, Martin A. Ryerson, H. C. Frick, C. L. Freer, H. E. Huntington, and J. D. Rockefeller showed extraordinary good taste, and the majority of these collections were eventually made available to the public. The establishment of new museums of art such as the Metropolitan, the Art Institute in Chicago, the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston, and the Corcoran in Washington, and of numerous lesser collections in outlying cities, had a far-reaching educational value. Yet the fabulous wealth of some American museums, and their increasing success in competing for the old masters, cannot conceal the fact that the museums can at best furnish patterns for reproduction. They do not provide fertile soil for the development of native art, nor have they, on the whole, encouraged native art with their patronage.

5. *Education*

The effect of the Civil War and Reconstruction on education varied naturally with the sections. On the South the effect was disastrous. A large part of the school funds of many Southern states had been invested in securities that were now worthless; what was salvaged from the devastations of war was dissipated by the ravages of reconstruction. School houses, never in too good repair, had fallen into ruin; teachers had been killed or scattered; and the South was less able to bear heavy educational taxes than ever before. Yet, impoverished and demoralized as the South was, she faced additional burdens in the form of providing education for the freedmen. Though the Freedmen's Bureau and Northern philanthropic agencies such as the Peabody and the Phelps-Stokes Funds assisted, it was upon the Southern people that the burden ultimately fell. Higher education, too, was paralyzed; many institutions lost part or all of their endowment: the very buildings of others had been swept away. Though students thronged to the colleges, and the faculties served them with unparalleled devotion and self-sacrifice, the story of such colleges as Washington and Lee, Sewanee, and Maryland is one of struggles against tremendous odds. It is the conclusion of a distinguished student, Professor E. W. Knight, that Southern education did not fully recover from the effects of war and reconstruction until the twentieth century. Since 1900 the development in some Southern states, notably North Carolina, has been spectacular.

In the North, on the contrary, after a temporary setback, organized education profited by the peculiar temper and energy of the post-war period. The intimate relationship of a free public school system to democratic society had already been effectively demonstrated by great educational leaders such as Horace Mann of Massachusetts, Henry Barnard of Connecticut, and John D. Pierce of Michigan. 'The common schools,' wrote Pierce, who waged an educational crusade in the West similar to that of Mann in New England — 'the common schools are truly republican. In the public schools all classes are blended together, the rich mingle with the poor, and both are educated in company. Let free schools be established and maintained in perpetuity, and there can be no such thing as a permanent aristocracy in our land: for the monopoly of wealth is powerless when mind is allowed freely to come in contact with mind.' The responsibility of the community to its children, then, had been generally accepted by the middle of the century; but the conditions of education were far from satisfactory. Instruction was mainly confined to the elementary schools: not until as late as 1890 were there as many as 200,000 pupils in the public high schools of the nation. The physical equipment of many schools, especially in the rural districts, was most primitive. Teaching was largely by rote; discipline was severe and corporal punishment everywhere taken for granted. The war had drawn men from teaching into the ranks and to business, and the feminization of teaching was in full swing. By 1870 over 60 per cent of public school teachers were women — a number which was to increase to 70 per cent in 1900 and 85 per cent by 1920. Though Horace Mann had established normal schools in Massachusetts in the thirties, there were only twelve in the country at the outbreak of the Civil War. The great majority of teachers were untrained, and the idea generally obtained that any girl not otherwise occupied was competent to teach school. The responsibility of the community and the state for secondary and higher education was only grudgingly recognized: William H. Ruffner, for example, encountered terrific opposition from the conservatives when he attempted to establish a complete system of education in Virginia.

Yet no large nation was ever so fully committed to the ideal of a system of universal free public education, and the statistics of school enrollment and expenditures are eloquent of her faithfulness to that ideal. A total of 6,871,000 pupils was enrolled in the public schools of the country in 1870; by 1900 this number had increased to 15,503,000; by 1920 to 21,732,000. In the same half century the percentage of children between the ages of five and seventeen enrolled in schools rose from fifty-seven to seventy-eight. But the statistics of expenditures are even more illuminating. In 1870 Americans spent 63 million dollars on their public school system; in 1900, 214 million, and in 1920, $1,039,385,000 — a sum greater than the entire expenses of the national government from its foundation to 1880, with the exception of the Civil War years. In another six years this figure had doubled again. In the half century from 1870 to 1920 the per capita expense for public education rose from $1.64 to $9.80; the expense per pupil from $9.23 to $48.02. Even more striking was the progress in secondary education, indicative of increased prosperity of the American people, and the assumption of responsibility for a complete educational system by the state. In 1890 there were only some 350,000 students in the secondary schools of the entire country, of which over one third attended private schools. Twenty years later there were over a million pupils in the secondary schools, and in 1920 approximately two and one-half million, while the proportion of students in private schools had decreased precipitantly.

Meanwhile teaching was becoming both a profession and a science. In due course of time every state in the Union established a board or commission of education which attempted to impose certain requirements and maintain high standards of teaching. States and cities vied with each other in establishing normal schools, and by 1920 no less than 370 of these were training over 150,000 teachers — a number which doubled in the ensuing decade. In 1867 the office of United States Commissioner of Education was created 'to collect statistics and facts concerning the conditions and progress of education in the several States and Territories and to diffuse information respecting the organization and management of schools and school systems and methods of teaching.' Henry Barnard who had rendered signal service in Connecticut and Rhode Island was appointed first Commissioner of Education. Though this position was subsequently held by William T. Harris, distinguished philosopher and educator, and by Elmer Ellsworth Brown, later Chancellor of New York University, it never became an agency for centralization or standardization. The science of education received a powerful stimulus with the introduction of the doctrines of Pestalozzi, Froebel, and Hebart to America in the post-war decades, most notably by Edward A. Sheldon of the famous Oswego Normal School and William T. Harris, superintendent of schools in St. Louis and editor of the influential *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*. In 1882 was founded the National Hebart Society for the scientific study of education. Schools of education were established at major universities such as Harvard, Columbia, Leland Stanford, and Chicago, in which latter school the nation's most distinguished philosopher, John Dewey, formulated a philosophy based squarely upon a democratic educational system.

It is in the field of higher education that we can best observe the extent to which education has become the national fetish, the depository for that idealism that in an earlier generation was directed toward religion. The objects of American philanthropy of the last half century have been educational institutions or foundations rather than churches; the greatest architectural monuments are likely to be cathedrals of learning rather than of worship; the faith that men once had in religion to move heaven and earth has been largely transferred to organized education. Private philanthropy has combined with the state to create and maintain the most elaborate system of higher education that has ever existed in any nation except Germany, a system which has improved and expanded in every direction in the last generation. Students by the hundreds of thousands throng the college halls; money without stint has been poured into educational coffers; old schools have been expanded beyond recognition and new ones have been created; professional schools of all kinds have come into existence; co-education has advanced with amazing rapidity; the scope and methods of education have been enlarged and standards generally raised.

The beginning of the educational renaissance came in the sixties, and can be traced to a number of causes: the appearance of a remarkable group of educational leaders, most of them trained abroad; the Morrill Act of 1862 with its liberal provisions for mechanical and agricultural training; the demand of business and the professions for specialized knowledge; and the enormous increase in the financial resources of colleges, old and new, which enabled them to carry on their enlarged programs and to maintain their higher standards.

Harvard, the oldest of American universities, led the way when a thirty-five year old chemist, Charles W. Eliot, assumed the presidency in 1869. Eliot summed up in himself many of the new forces abroad in higher education in America: he had been trained in Germany, he was a scientist rather than a theologian, he was peculiarly sensitive to the changes which the Civil War and the industrial revolution had brought about in America, and prepared to adapt Harvard College to those conditions. He signalized his advent to the presidency by radical and far-sighted changes in organization, curriculum, and objectives. Though he was by no means the first to advocate the elective system — Jefferson had inaugurated it half a century before at the University of Virginia — his advocacy of it did more to establish it in American colleges than any other factor. Of greater ultimate significance was Eliot's rehabilitation of the schools of law and medicine which he placed upon a sound professional basis. But more important than any single policy was Eliot's personality. He came, in time, to be a symbol for everything that was finest in American education, and, indeed, in American life — by common consent the first citizen of the land. His trenchant criticism, catholic culture, liberal open-mindedness, ripe wisdom, and gallant faith added incalculably to the American tradition.

If Eliot was the most distinguished of American educators, he was by no means alone. Frederick Barnard was creating the modern Columbia University out of a small college, enriching the curriculum, establishing professional and graduate schools, and laying the foundations for Barnard College and Teachers' college. Andrew D. White, first president of the new Cornell University, was building a great co-educational school under peculiarly happy auspices, waging effective warfare on behalf of science and evolution, and drawing scholars of international repute to the shores of lovely Lake Cayuga. Daniel Coit Gilman was inaugurating the most interesting and fruitful experiment in American higher education at Johns Hopkins University, established for the specific purpose of fostering graduate study, scholarship, and research. G. Stanley Hall, German trained psychologist and philosopher, came to the presidency of Clark University in 1889, and trained a school of psychologists who exerted a deep influence on public school education in the United States. And in 1892 John D. Rockefeller called a young Professor of Semitics at Yale, William Rainey Harper, to take charge of the new University of Chicago. Harper's magnetic personality, towering intellectual ability, splendid organizing capacities, and genius for attracting the ablest scholars in the country, established standards of higher education which were unrivalled west of the Alleghanies, and stamped him as one of the greatest of American educators.

The second important factor in the development of higher education was the passage of the Morrill Land Grant Act of 1862. This Act gave to each state 30,000 acres of land for each Congressman, to be used for the endowment and support of a college of agriculture and mechanical arts. Altogether over thirteen million acres of public domain were thus handed over to the states. The Morrill Act was, undoubtedly, the most important piece of educational legislation ever passed in this country. 'It recognizes the principle,' wrote L. H. Bailey, a prominent agriculturist, 'that every citizen is entitled to receive educational aid from the government, and that the common affairs of life are proper subjects with which to educate or train men. Its provisions are so broad that the educational development of all future may rest upon it.' Under the generous provisions of the Morrill Act sixty-nine land-grant colleges have been established. Many of the Western state universities sprang from the act, and others received a decided impetus from its provisions: such typical and varied institutions as the University of Illinois, Iowa State College, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Cornell University are monuments to the wisdom and far-sightedness of Justin Morrill.

The scientific revolution and the growing complexity of American economic life gave rise to a demand for education more closely articulated to the needs of the day. One result of this was the relative decline of classical and humanistic studies at the expense of the sciences, and the almost universal acceptance of the elective system. Another was the establishment of numerous professional schools, some in connection with older universities, others independently. Schools of law, of medicine, of architecture, of engineering, of education, and of journalism began to turn out men who soon proved the superiority of professional training over experience, and schools such as the Harvard Law School, the Johns Hopkins Medical School, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the Chicago School of Education took their place among the leading institutions of their kind in the world.

All of this expansion, academic and physical, was made possible by the steady flow of money which poured into the coffers of the older colleges or established new ones. The endowment of Harvard University, to take the most striking example, increased from not quite two and one-half million dollars in 1869 to approximately ninety million in 1929. Yale, Columbia, Princeton, Rochester, Northwestern, and a score of other institutions were similarly enriched by private philanthropy. The total endowments of institutions of higher education exceeded one billion one hundred million dollars in 1928. Equally important with the expansion of older schools was the establishment of new. Of these Cornell (1868), Vanderbilt (1875), Johns Hopkins (1876), Tulane (1884), Clark (1889), Leland Stanford (1891), and the University of Chicago (1892) have assumed leading positions in American education.

A significant aspect of the educational renaissance was the development of facilities for graduate study in the United States.

Prior to the Civil War, and indeed for some years thereafter, students desirious of pursuing their studies further than the A.B. degree, were forced to go abroad — generally to German universities. The leaders of American education in the post-Civil War period were for the most part German trained: the universities of Göttingen, Jena, and Berlin were particularly influential. Yale University conferred the first Ph.D. degree in America in 1861; ten years later she organized a graduate school, and Harvard followed in 1872. But the greatest impetus to graduate study came from the new Johns Hopkins University, the gift of a wealthy Baltimore railroad man. Here, under the inspiring leadership of Daniel Coit Gilman, the future leaders of American thought were receiving advanced training in history, philosophy, economics, and the sciences. Future President Woodrow Wilson, Josiah Royce and John Dewey, leaders of two schools of American philosophy, Richard T. Ely and D. R. Dewey, economists, J. F. Jameson and Charles H. Haskins, historians, to mention only a few, gave to the new institution in its early years an intellectual distinction that makes it unique among American universities. By the opening of the twentieth century most of the leading universities had established graduate schools and the number of graduate students totalled well over five thousand.

Higher education for women is comparatively recent in the United States. Emma Willard had established the Troy Female Seminary as early as 1821, and the gallant Mary Lyon had persevered against overwhelming obstacles in founding a school at Mount Holyoke, Massachusetts, which offered advanced work to girls, while Oberlin College, pioneer in co-education as in so many other respects, opened its doors to girls in the thirties. But the first woman's college offering work on a level with the better men's schools was Vassar, the gift of Matthew Vassar, wealthy brewer of Poughkeepsie, New York, who hoped 'to inaugurate a new era in the history and life of woman.' Within twenty years four other colleges for women came into existence: Wellesley, Smith, Bryn Mawr, and Goucher, while Harvard and Columbia so far conceded to the demand for co-education as to establish affiliated colleges for women.

If, as Americans from Jefferson to John Dewey have confidently believed, education alone would provide a sound basis for a 'happy and a prosperous people,' Americans of the twentieth century had reason to be optimistic of the future. By the second decade of the century it could be truthfully affirmed that no child, of whatsoever sex, race, or color, was denied the fullest educational opportunities which he was capable of enjoying. Universal free education from the kindergarten to graduate school had become a fact. And if the results failed to come up to the most sanguine expectations, few but the more jaundiced critics concluded that the premises were erroneous, or questioned that Utopia could ultimately be reached along the broad road of democratic education.

6. *Joining and Other Sport*

Despite his racial heterogeneity the average American was becoming urban in his environment and uniform in his appearance, manners, and thought. There were compensations: human dignity owes much to the Hebrew reorganizers of the garment trades, who wiped out class distinctions in dress. Regional distinctions in cooking began to disappear under a nation-wide distribution of tinned and other prepared foods, which provided the average American with a far more varied and (after the passage of the Pure Food and Drugs Act) more healthful diet than his forbears. Advertising did not exalt mendacity to the status of a profession until the twentieth century, but with psychology as handmaid it helped to build the great department stores of New York, Chicago, and Philadelphia, with such variety of wares and luxury in appointments that travelling Americans were no longer dazzled by the splendors of Bond Street and the Magasins du Louvre.

As the working day was shortened, and the number of indoor occupations increased, the average American began to show an interest in outdoor sport, which the mere business of living had afforded to his rural and frontier forbears. Organized games began in the colleges, and were taken up successively by all classes of the population. Baseball had been introduced in the forties, but the first national professional baseball league was organized in 1871, and the first intercollegiate association for track athletics in 1876. Twenty years later America won the first Olympic Games. Rugby football, introduced into the United States about 1875, diverged from the English game as college strategists invented new formations, and altered the rules to fit. Though baseball became primarily a professional sport, football remained collegiate, and assumed, in some centers, such importance that it threatened to overwhelm the merely academic side of college life. Lawn tennis was taken up as soon as it was invented in England, and became, eventually, the most popular of sports; and after the Davis Cup was established in 1900 it came to be considered something of a national disgrace if it was allowed to go out of the country. Golf, the derision of stalwart citizens when introduced in the nineties, has become more popular even than in Scotland, and the particular hobby of the 'tired business man.' Summer vacations, the privilege of the few in 1870 and not greatly valued by them, had reached the clerks by 1900. Thousands of people whose parents had left the forests, the mountains, and the sea in search of more easy living returned to them for pleasure. State, municipal, and private enterprise vied in establishing recreation parks, public bathing places, and summer resorts. National organizations such as the Boy Scouts and the Girl Scouts celebrated the virtues of the great outdoors.

The American 'joiner' was a creation of this period. A reflex desire for distinction in a country of growing uniformity, a human craving for fellowship among urban masses who missed their old village and neighborhood associations, drew the descendants of stern anti-masons into secret societies and fraternal orders. Freemasons and Oddfellows, both of English origin, proved too exclusive to contain would-be members; the Elks, Red Men, Moose, and so forth were founded between 1868 and 1888. All of these eventually came to exercise philanthropic and charitable as well as purely social functions. The Catholic Church, wisely embracing a movement that it could not exclude, created the Knights of Columbus for its increasing membership. The women, not to be left out in the general joining, established the Order of the Eastern Star. Even the Southern freedmen had their United Order of African Ladies and Gentlemen. The Y.M.C.A. and Y.W.C.A., numbering their members by the hundred thousand, were semi-religious and semi-social, revealing both the tendency to 'join' and the tendency to 'uplift' in American life.

This, the first form of the joining movement, brought people of different classes together; the second, based on race and ancestry, kept them apart. The Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution, Colonial Dames, Mayflower Descendants, Daughters of the Confederacy, and the like, were essentially a drawing together of the older American stock against their polyglot competitors. Much they have done to preserve historical landmarks, records, and traditions; too often have they interpreted these traditions in a narrow and provincial spirit.

XLIII

THE REPUBLICAN DYNASTY

1866–1890

1. *President Grant and the Alabama Claims*

IT would have been well for Grant's reputation had he retired from public life after the great gesture at Appomattox. With less equipment for the Presidency than any predecessor or successor, his temperament was unfitted for high political command. Before the Civil War he had seldom taken the trouble to vote, and the army was not a good school of politics. Although a leader of men, he was not a good judge of men, and the very simplicity which had carried him through the intrigues of the Civil War exposed him to the wiles of politicians whose loyalty to himself he mistook for devotion to the public weal. The death of the faithful Rawlins, in 1869, left him with no intimate adviser; and his choice of Cabinet members fell, with one or two exceptions, on mediocrities. Of the new and complex forces that were shaping the United States anew, he was completely unaware.

Foreign affairs, where Grant's innate sense of justice was enforced by a competent Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, show his administrations (1869 to 1877) in their fairest light. There was much to be done. Seward, by letting Napoleon III withdraw peacefully from Mexico (1865) and by purchasing Alaska from Russia (1867),[1] had eliminated two nations from the American continent; but Russell's peremptory refusal to submit the *Alabama* claims to arbitration prevented any settlement with Great Britain. Postponement of these claims was dangerous. There was a deep feeling of resentment in America that was certain to flare up into war if not satisfied through law. One strong bond, the Canadian reciprocity treaty of 1854, expired in 1866.

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[1] The price $7,200,000 was thought so exorbitant that the negotiation was consummated only by wholesale bribery of congressmen, and Alaska was popularly dubbed 'Seward's folly.'

During the war Canada had furnished an asylum for Confederate plotters, and a base for Confederate raids on Vermont and New York. In time of peace the Fenians, or Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood, took similar liberties in the United States. Two rival Irish Republics were organized in New York City, each with its president, cabinet, and general staff in glittering uniforms of green and gold. Each planned to seize Canada with Irish veterans of the Union army, and hold it as hostage for Irish freedom. Why not pay back England in her own coin, and let the Fenians liquidate the *Alabama* claims?

In 1866 each Irish Republic of New York attempted to execute this plan. In April the first 'invasion' was promptly nipped by federal authorities at Eastport, Maine. But the ensuing howl from the Irish vote, with congressional elections only six months away, frightened President Johnson and his cabinet. Before the Attorney-General and the Secretaries of War and of the Navy could decide who should take the onus of stopping him, General John O'Neil got fifteen hundred armed Irishmen across the Niagara river. The next day, 2 June 1866, the Canadian militia gave battle, and fled; but the Fenians fled farthest — to New York State, where they were promptly arrested, and as promptly released. Ridiculous as they were, these Fenian forays caused Canada much trouble and expense, for which she was never reimbursed by the United States. Yet good came of them in the end; for the fear and distrust that they aroused impelled the Canadian federation movement to its consummation in 1867.

Seward's persistent advocacy of the *Alabama* claims was finally rewarded in the last months of Johnson's administration by the so-called Clarendon Convention for their adjudication. But nothing that Johnson or Seward did could then find favor with the Republican party. In April 1869 the Senate rejected this convention as insufficient, after Sumner had charged Britain with responsibility for half the total cost of the war: a mere $2,125,000,000. Sumner's speech shocked his English friends who so faithfully had sustained the Union cause; nor were they much comforted by his explanation that the cession of Canada would be an acceptable form of payment. Sumner loved England, but with characteristic lack of imagination failed to perceive that the tone as well as the substance of this speech stimulated Anglophobia. Both he and Seward adhered to the old doctrine of Franklin that there could never be peace and friendship between the United States and Britain while Canada was British. Lord Ashburton and Gladstone at one time shared the same idea. Time has proved these fears groundless and Canada has become the principal bond of friendship between the countries.

A Caribbean question eliminated Sumner. President Grant persuaded himself that American annexation of the Dominican Republic, by virtue of a treaty which his private secretary had obtained by dubious methods, would fulfil 'manifest destiny.' Sumner opposed this treaty; Grant accused him of having promised support; Sumner denied it in a bitter, vituperative speech. The treaty failed of ratification, as did another of like tenor, although properly negotiated; and in March 1871 the Senate removed Sumner from its committee on foreign relations.

In the meantime, the Canadian Sir John Rose staged with Hamilton Fish a diplomatic play of wooing and yielding that threw dust in the eyes of extremists on both sides. The covenant thus secretly arrived at was the famous Treaty of Washington (8 May 1871). It provided for submission to arbitration of boundary disputes, the fisheries question, and the *Alabama* claims, it determined rules of neutrality to govern the arbitral tribunal, and contained an expression of regret for the escape of the *Alabama* — a friendly gesture for which Americans had long been waiting.

In presenting their case to the arbitral tribunal at Geneva (December 1871), the United States claimed compensation not only for actual damage inflicted by the Confederate cruisers, but for the numerous transfers of registry occasioned by fear of capture. Hamilton Fish had no intention of pressing these 'indirect claims,' which he was only anxious to be rid of; but English opinion was deeply stirred by their presentation. An ill-tempered press discussion ensued.[2] Gladstone would have withdrawn from the arbitration on that issue had not Charles Francis Adams, the American member, proposed that the Geneva tribunal should rule out the indirect claims in advance. This was done, and the arbitration proceeded smoothly to its conclusion: an award of $15,500,000 for depredations committed by the *Alabama, Florida,* and *Shenandoah* (14 September 1872). Even this sum was in excess of the actual damage, and part of it was never handed out to claimants.

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[2] The question of indirect claims is an interesting one of American and British psychology. The American commissioners who concluded the Treaty of Washington believed the indirect claims were unjustified, but wished to have them disposed of by the Geneva tribunal. Otherwise they would be brought up periodically by Anglophobes. The British commissioners would admit no direct reference to indirect claims, knowing that their inclusion would wreck the treaty in England. Consequently the language of the treaty was so framed that indirect claims were neither expressly admitted nor expressly excluded. The English press denounced their presentation as a 'Yankee trick'; the American press retorted on 'British hypocrisy.'

Although the United States were thereby vindicated, the greater victory was for arbitration and peace. No threat of force affected the issue, for American ironclads had lost their primacy by 1871. Never before had questions involving such touchy matters of national honor been submitted to a mere majority vote of an international tribunal; and the good grace with which England as a whole accepted the verdict smoothed out the ill-tempered dissenting opinion of Sir Alexander Cockburn. Of other persons involved, Charles Francis Adams never forgot that he was judge, not advocate. Ulysses S. Grant, by his unwavering support of peaceful methods, showed a quality not unusual in statesmen who know war at first hand; and in a later message to the Arbitration Union of Birmingham the soldier President confessed his guiding principle: 'Nothing would afford me greater happiness than to know that, as I believe will be the case, at some future day, the nations of the earth will agree upon some sort of congress which will take cognizance of international questions of difficulty, and whose decisions will be as binding as the decisions of our Supreme Court are upon us. It is a dream of mine that some such solution may be.'

2. *Scandal and Stagnation*

Questions of finance were important in the post-war administrations. The desire of debt-ridden farmers for cheap money was the only obstacle to deflating the dollar. Grant set his face sternly against inflation shortly after the panic of 1873, vetoing a popular bill providing eighteen millions more in paper currency. Congress, at his instance, passed an Act in January 1875 requiring the Treasury four years thence to redeem outstanding greenbacks in gold. The dollar then returned to par.

In his dealings with individuals, Grant was not so fortunate. Early in his first administration Jay Gould and 'Jubilee' Jim Fisk, two notorious stock gamblers, organized a corner in gold and implicated the President himself in their nefarious conspiracy. When the crash came, on 'Black Friday,' 24 September 1869, the whole country was aroused and men everywhere blamed Grant for criminal incompetence in permitting himself to be enmeshed in the sordid affair. 'The worst scandals of the 18th century,' wrote Henry Adams, 'were relatively harmless by the side of this which smirched executive, judiciary, banks, corporate systems, professions, and people, all the great active forces of society.' This together with weak cabinet appointments, failure to obtain any substantial reduction in the war tariff, the Dominican episode which involved the resignation of one of the ablest of his official family, Judge Hoar, hostility toward civil service reform which forced Secretary Cox out of the cabinet, and the accumulating evidence of failure in radical reconstruction, created a powerful opposition to Grant's re-election within the Republican party. A Liberal Republican convention dominated by Charles Francis Adams, Carl Schurz, Judge David Davis, and B. Gratz Brown met at Cincinnati in May 1872 and erected a strong platform of reform. But with incredible fatuity the convention nominated the well-meaning but eccentric Horace Greeley for the Presidency. The Democrats endorsed the nomination and faithfully voted for the old abolitionist. Grant was re-elected by a majority of 750,000 and Greeley died broken-hearted.

During his second term, too, Grant's administration was smirched with scandals. The most spectacular of these was the Crédit Mobilier Affair. The Crédit Mobilier was a construction company organized by the promoters of the Union Pacific Railway in order corruptly to divert the profits of construction to themselves. Fearing lest Congress would interpose the directors placed large blocks of stock — some 160 shares — 'where they will do the most good' — in the hands of congressmen. Exposure of the scheme resulted in the disgrace of Representative Oakes Ames of Massachusetts, Vice-President Schuyler Colfax, and others high in public office. At the same time maladministration and corruption were exposed in several executive departments. The Democrats won the congressional elections of 1874 and a new Congress plied the muck-rake in earnest. It was proved that whiskey distillers had been defrauding the government of millions, with the collusion of treasury officials and the President's private secretary, General Babcock. Despite Grant's expressed intention to 'let no guilty man escape' most of them did — Babcock with his connivance. The Post-Office and the Interior and Navy departments were found to be honeycombed with corruption which had stopped just short of the President, and the Secretary of War, Belknap, who had mercilessly raided the public treasury, was allowed to resign the day before he was to have been impeached. Altogether frauds to a total of not less than seventy-five million dollars were uncovered during Grant's second administration.

Republican defeat seemed certain in 1876 when the Democrats nominated for the presidency an able statesman with a reform record, Governor Samuel J. Tilden of New York. The Republicans rode into the fray on a 'dark horse,' Governor Rutherford B. Hayes of Ohio. But the Republicans diverted public attention from live issues by waving 'the bloody shirt' of rebellion,[3] and carried most of the Northern and Western states. After the ballots were counted it was seen that the balance hung on three Southern states, Florida, Louisiana and South Carolina, and Oregon, from which came two sets of conflicting returns. Congress referred the disputed returns to an electoral commission, which by a strict party vote awarded all four states to Hayes; and on 2 March 1877, two days before the end of Grant's term, the Senate declared Hayes elected by a majority of one vote. Public indignation was intense, for Tilden's popular majority over Hayes had been 250,000, and the vote had constituted a stinging rebuke to the Republican administration. Though later investigation revealed frauds on both sides, there seems to be little doubt that the 'will of the people' had been defeated by the decision of the electoral commission. Party passions ran high but there was no resort to violence. Yet Hayes assumed office under a cloud from whose shadow he was never able to escape into the sunlight of popular approval. For four years he was subjected to a campaign of abuse much like that which Jackson had directed against President J. Q. Adams under similar circumstances half a century earlier.

Now that the war issue was dead, American national politics became a mere contest for power between the two parties, like a struggle for traffic between two rival railroads. There was no clearly defined issue between them, and their leaders evinced little understanding of the vital forces that were transforming the country.

Rutherford B. Hayes was an elderly lawyer and ex-Governor of Ohio, who for a steady adherence to pre-war standards of honesty was called 'Granny Hayes' by the party chieftains. The first and most important act of his administration was the recall of the federal troops from the South. In order to complete the reconciliation, Hayes, himself a veteran of the Union Army, appointed an ex-

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[3] *i.e.* appealing to war passions. The phrase came from an incident in a race riot in the South which Blaine used in one of his speeches.

Confederate, David M. Key, to his cabinet. Republicans who had been stirred by 'bloody-shirt' oratory were disgusted, and conservatives were further embittered by the appointment of Carl Schurz, the civil service reformer, to the interior department and W. M. Evarts, one of President Johnson's counsels, to the state department; but they soon found that Hayes was determined to rule as well as govern. He removed some of Grant's most offensive appointees and gave moderate support to the cause of civil service reform. With the aid of John Sherman, his able Secretary of the Treasury, he held the country in the path of financial safety despite bitter opposition. Specie payments were resumed without difficulty on 1 January 1879, though the appreciation of greenbacks to par worked a temporary hardship on many debtors. The Bland-Allison silver bill of 1878, providing for the purchase and coinage of not more than four million or less than two million dollars' worth of bullion a month, was passed over the President's veto by a vote where party lines gave way to sectional alignment of East versus West.

As the election of 1880 approached, the 'stalwart' Republicans who had been supporters of Grant's throne proposed the General for a third term. He was willing but the Republican nominating convention was not; and another 'dark horse' from Ohio, General James A. Garfield, obtained the nomination. Garfield was an educated gentleman with a good military record and long experience in Congress; but his party made a greater virtue of his log-cabin birth, and early exploits as a canal bargee. The Democrats to confirm their loyalty nominated General Winfield Scott Hancock and the Greenback party which had polled over a million votes in 1878, nominated James B. Weaver of Iowa. The campaign was fought largely on personalities and trumped-up issues. Garfield won a sweeping victory in the electoral college but his popular plurality was less than ten thousand in a total of almost nine million votes.[4]

3. *Glimmerings of Reform*

Four months after his inauguration, while still struggling with questions of patronage, Garfield was shot by a disappointed office-seeker. After a gallant struggle for life, he died on 19 September

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Garfield	4,449,053
Hancock	4,442,035
Weaver	307,306

1881. The Vice-President, Chester A. Arthur, was a prominent lawyer and spoilsman of New York. Handsome and affable, liked by businessmen and women of the world, he gave Washington its only 'society' administration between those of Buchanan and Roosevelt. Unexpectedly he became something of a reformer as well. The manner of Garfield's death gave popular sanction to what the Civil Service League had been advocating for years.

Every President since Polk complained of the demands that patronage made on his time, energy, and judgment. Scandal had followed scandal in the civil service; yet the spoils system had been extended even to scrubwomen in the public offices. Rotation in office was never complete, and a large residuum of trained servants was left undisturbed; but in general the federal service had become permeated with a class of men who were strongly tempted to anticipate future removal by present corruption. Federal officials were regularly assessed for campaign contributions, and were expected to spend much of their spare time in political activity. From the President's point of view, the system was no simple matter of turning out the vanquished and putting in the victors. There were usually several applicants for every vacancy, representing different factions of the party. If the congressional delegation from a state could agree upon the federal appointments within that state, the President generally took their advice; but often they disagreed, and by a mis-called 'senatorial courtesy' the Upper House would reject a nomination to which the senators from the nominee's state objected. Minor appointments were generally the gift of congressmen, but the big plums had to be fairly evenly distributed among faithful states. The Tenure of Office Act, passed to limit President Johnson's power of removal, was still in force, and was not repealed until 1887. Congress, since the Civil War, had so largely eaten into the presidential prerogative that the chief executive was by way of becoming a mere *président de la République*. This tendency was exposed by a book entitled *Congressional Government,* published in 1885 by young Dr. Woodrow Wilson, who later did much to correct the tendency.

The spoils system, in state and federal politics, had been subjected to pretty heavy criticism for fully a decade before Arthur's accession to office. The Liberal Republican movement had been largely concerned with civil service reform and in 1877 the New York Civil Service Reform Association whose guiding spirit was the ardent

George William Curtis, was founded. Hayes, as we have seen, had grievously disappointed party regulars by his friendliness toward the movement, and politicians such as Roscoe Conkling whose attitude toward civil service is sufficiently indicated by his observation 'when Dr. Johnson said that patriotism is the last refuge of the scoundrel, he overlooked the enormous possibilities of the word reform,' looked to Arthur to undo the progress of his predecessors. Arthur, however, to the chagrin of the 'stalwarts' allied himself with the reform element, and in his first annual message to Congress came out squarely for the merit system.

The Pendleton Act of 1883 created a Civil Service Commission to administer a new set of rules, which required appointments to be made as a result of open competitive examination. By the law, these rules were applied only to some 14,000 positions, about twelve per cent of the total; but the President was empowered to extend them to other parts of the service, at his discretion. Of Arthur's successors, Presidents Cleveland, Roosevelt, and Wilson made large additions to the merit lists, and by 1915 'the United States civil service was on a merit basis except for 10,690 presidential appointees.'[5] At the same time several states were passing civil service laws of their own. It would be idle to pretend that civil service reform has fulfilled the expectations of its advocates. The emoluments are not sufficiently high, or talent at such a premium as to attract university graduates and other able men from business and the professions. There has, however, been a great improvement in morale and efficiency; and it was fortunate indeed that the merit principle was adopted before the twentieth century, when administrative expansion greatly increased the need of honest and expert service.

James Bryce, at this period, found reformers fighting corruption and boss rule in all the states that he visited; but beyond this civil service reform, and the Australian ballot, they accomplished little until the present century and there is much still left to be done. Organized wealth and professional politicians had too strong an interest in keeping things as they were. Periodicals like the *Nation* and the *Forum* and *McCall's* did much to arouse public opinion, and to prepare it for the glad day when a reformer of the 1880 vintage, Theodore Roosevelt, became President of the United States.

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[5] This exception has been greatly increased since the World War by the prohibition-enforcement service and other expanded governmental activities, which have not come under civil service rules.

4. *The Mugwump Election*

Arthur's placid administration ended in the most exciting presidential campaign since the Civil War, although the only real issue was possession of the government. In 1884 the Republicans nominated James G. Blaine of Maine, a man of fascinating personality, long in public life and a leader in party councils. Of all politicians between Henry Clay and Roosevelt, Blaine had the most devoted personal following. To them he was the 'plumed knight,' but to the most upright and intelligent Republicans, who were sick of the prevailing corruption, he was a simple grafter. The principal charge against him was the prostitution of the Speakership to personal gain; in that connection he had never been able to explain the missive to a certain Mulligan, with the damning postscript, 'Burn this letter.' As Secretary of State for a few months under Garfield and Arthur, he had attempted to mediate peace between Peru, Bolivia, and Chile, but his diplomatic appointees merely antagonized Chile without preventing her occupation of Tacna and Arica. Incidentally, this War of the Pacific awakened the United States to the decrepitude of her navy. Twenty years after the building of the *Monitor* it was inferior to the navy of every principal European country, and to that of Chile. After long discussion, Congress authorized on 5 August 1882 the construction of 'two steam cruising vessels of war . . . to be constructed of steel of domestic manufacture . . . said vessels to be provided with full sail power and full steam power.' These were the *Chicago* and the *Boston,* which entered active service in 1887, and began a new era in American naval history.[6]

Blaine's nomination was more than conscientious Republicans could swallow. Under the leadership of Carl Schurz and George William Curtis the reform wing of the party 'bolted' from the convention, proposed to support any decent nomination the Democrats might make, and proudly assumed the name 'mugwump' which was given them in derision.[7] As 'bolting' is the great offence in American political ethics, few of the Mugwumps managed to resume a public career; younger delegates like Henry Cabot Lodge and

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[6] '"I don't think I should like America," — "I suppose because we have no ruins and no curiosities," said Virginia, satirically. — "No ruins! no curiosities!" answered the Ghost; "You have your navy and your manners."' — Oscar Wilde, *The Canterville Ghost.*

[7] 'Mugwump' is the word for 'great captain' in Eliot's Indian Bible, applied on this occasion by the New York *Sun.*

Theodore Roosevelt, who supported Blaine while admitting the worst about him, had their reward. The Democrats nominated Grover Cleveland, a self-made man who as governor of New York had distinguished himself for firmness and integrity, to the disgust of Tammany Hall. 'We love him for the enemies he has made,' said General Edward S. Bragg, a prominent Mugwumper. Powerful journals such as the New York *Times* and *Harper's Weekly,* with Nast's damning cartoons, shifted over to Cleveland, as did most of the independents and liberal Republicans. No campaign since the Civil War had played such havoc with party regularity.

As the campaign proceeded it became noisy and nasty. Cleveland was charged, among other things, with having an illegitimate child, which he admitted to the consternation of his supporters. But, as one of them concluded philosophically, 'We should elect Mr. Cleveland to the public office which he is so admirably qualified to fill, and remand Mr. Blaine to the private life which he is so eminently fitted to adorn.' Democratic torch-light processions paraded the streets, shouting:

Blaine, Blaine, James G. Blaine,
The continental liar from the State of Maine,
Burn this letter!

To which Republican processions retorted:

Ma! Ma! Where's my pa?
Gone to the White House,
Ha! Ha! Ha!

Blaine had a strong following among Irish-Americans, which he lost at the eleventh hour through the tactless remark of a clerical supporter. As spokesman for a visiting delegation, a hapless parson named Burchard described the Democracy as the party of 'rum, Romanism, and rebellion.' Blaine neglected to rebuke this insult to the faith of his Celtic friends; Cleveland carried New York by a plurality of 1,047 in a vote of over one million; and New York's electoral vote gave him the Presidency.

5. *Cleveland and Harrison*

For a person of such generous bulk, Grover Cleveland was remarkably austere, unbending, and ungenial. He was a man of integrity, courage, and steadfast devotion to duty; but singularly lacking in imagination and never quite at home in the rough and tumble of party politics. Elected at a period when subservience to the popular will was supposed to be the first political virtue, this President remained inflexible in the right as he saw it; and made slight departure from his pre-conceived ideas upon any subject.

Shortly after Cleveland's inauguration (5 March 1885) arose the question of patronage. Deserving Democrats, deprived of the sweets of office for twenty-five years, demanded as clean a sweep as the law would allow — eighty-eight per cent clean; virtuous Mugwumps insisted on no sweep at all. 'I have a hungry party behind me' the President remarked sadly. Congress repealed the Tenure of Office Act, which left the President free again to remove incumbents without permission of the Senate; and by the end of his term Cleveland, despite his intense dislike for the spoils system, had replaced nearly all the postmasters, and about half the other officials. Yet the Democrats were not satisfied, and the Mugwumps were not pleased.

Cleveland stirred up the old soldiers by appointing General Lucius Quintus Cincinnatus Lamar, C.S.A., Secretary of the Interior; by proposing to return to their states the captured Confederate battle-flags; and by vetoing hundreds of private pension bills through which Congressmen were wont to get deserters and others with dubious army records on the pension roll. This particular form of raid on the public treasury disgusted right-thinking men everywhere. Charles Francis Adams wrote scathingly, 'We had seen every dead-beat, and malingerer, every bummer, bounty-jumper, and suspected deserter . . . rush to the front as the greedy claimant of public bounty. If there was any man whose army record had been otherwise than creditable . . . we soon heard of him as the claimant of a back pension . . . or as being in the regular receipt of his monthly stipend.' Cleveland's adamant attitude merely whetted the hunger of the thwarted claimants who deluged the next administration with their demands.

There was a roar of protest, too, from cattle-ranchers when the President nullified their illegal leases of grass lands from the Indians and from the railroads when he ordered an investigation into their adherence to the terms of the federal land grants. Altogether Cleveland forced the restoration of over fifty million acres of public land. He endeavored, without success, to stop the 'free coinage' of silver under the Bland-Allison Act. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and the Dawes Act of 1887, granting citizenship and alloting lands in severalty to the members of such Indian tribes as desired the privilege, were useful points of departure.

More dramatic was Cleveland's effort to force a reconsideration of the tariff problem. In 1887, despite warnings to avoid that explosive subject, he startled the nation by devoting his annual message exclusively to the tariff. 'Our progress toward a wise conclusion,' he wrote, 'will not be improved by dwelling upon theories of protection and free trade. It is a condition which confronts us, not a theory.' He called attention to the inequalities of the existing tariff, and demanded a reasonable reduction. The New York *Nation* characterized the message 'the most courageous document that has been sent from the White House since the Civil War.' But Blaine denounced it as pure 'free trade.' R. Q. Mills immediately introduced a bill to the House looking to a downward revision of the tariff, but the measure was duly deadlocked by Senate Republicans, led by N. W. Aldrich, spokesman of Eastern manufacturing interests. Though nothing specific was accomplished, Cleveland did bring the problem sharply to the attention of the country and forced it to the fore as the major issue of the next campaign.

Cleveland was renominated by the Democrats without enthusiasm, but with little opposition except from some of the disgruntled politicians; while the Republicans pitched on Benjamin Harrison of Indiana as the most available and least offensive candidate. The campaign was an unexciting one; the Republicans bent most of their efforts to discrediting Cleveland with the Irish vote, and succeeded in getting the British minister, Sir Lionel Sackville-West, to pull their chestnuts out of the fire. A naturalized Anglo-American inquired by letter how he should vote in order to serve the mother country. Sir Lionel advised him to vote for the Democrats. Two weeks before the election his letter was published. Though Cleveland's popular vote was almost 100,000 larger than Harrison's, the Republicans carried New York State, and again New York was decisive.

Benjamin Harrison, grandson of the hero of Tippecanoe, was an Indiana lawyer who made a dignified figurehead in the Presidency, from 1889 to 1893 — the 'last of the Brigadier-Generals.' Aloof and aristocratic, able and conscientious, he lacked the insight to comprehend the economic and imperialistic problems of a new day, and despite his character and attainments he made singularly little impression upon his own or later generations. James G. Blaine, who still considered himself the leader of the party, became his Secretary of State. With the autocratic 'Czar' Reed as Speaker of the House, and with a majority in both Houses, the way was clear for constructive legislation. But the Republican party wanted little legislation that was not a raid on the treasury or a hold-up on the consumer. The soldier vote was rewarded by a new pension bill, similar to one that Cleveland had vetoed, and which doubled the pension roll in four years. The platform promise of civil service reform was flouted, though the influence of Theodore Roosevelt on the civil service commission, and of public opinion, made itself felt in the latter half of the administration.

In return for their support of a new tariff bill, the Senators from the Far West, where silver mining interests were strong, obtained the Sherman Silver-purchase Act (1890), increasing the monthly coinage of that metal by 125 per cent. Manufacturers who had contributed liberally to the Republican campaign fund were rewarded by an upward revision of the tariff. This McKinley tariff[8] of 1890 extended the protective principle by higher duties, and more of them. It reached out for the farmers' vote with protective rates upon products of agriculture, duties which proved completely ineffective in the forthcoming agricultural depression. The new tariff on hides was 'a slap in the face of the South Americans,' wrote Secretary Blaine; it rendered abortive the Pan-American Congress that he had summoned to Washington. The new tariff on fruits and vegetables depressed important industries in Canada, whose overtures for renewal of reciprocity were at the same time peremptorily rejected. Canada then adopted the principle of imperial preference. The tariff on manufactures occasioned so sharp a rise in prices as to bring a complete overturn in the congressional elections of 1890. Only 88 Republicans were returned to the new House, as against 235 Democrats; and the Republican majority in the Senate was reduced to eight unstable votes from the Far West. Even rock-ribbed Republican states like Michigan and Massachusetts went Democratic, and McKinley himself failed of re-election. There was more to this verdict, however, than revulsion from the tariff, and disgust at Republican chicanery and corruption. It registered a deep-lying unrest that was presently to break forth into a movement that carried Bryan to prominence, Roosevelt to achievement, and Wilson to apotheosis.

[8] So called from William McKinley, the chairman of the House Committee of Ways and Means, from which all tariff and revenue bills are reported.

XLIV

BOLD CLEVELAND AGAIN

1890–1897

1. *Populism and Panic*

IN 1890 American politics lost their steady beat, and began to dip and flutter in an effort to maintain equilibrium among strange currents of thought that issued from the caverns of discontent.

Almost a generation had passed since the Civil War. The older Republicans had come to revere their 'Grand Old Party' only less than the Union and the flag; to regard their leaders as the beloved generals of a victorious army. It was difficult for the leaders to believe that anything was amiss. The Ohio and Middle Western men, average and representative of the party, had grown up with the country. Their experience of life had been utterly different from that of any European statesman. They had seen the frontier of log-cabins, stumpy clearings, and razor-back hogs replaced by frame houses and great barns, well-tilled farms, and sleek cattle. Towns with banks, libraries, high schools, mansions, and 'opera houses' had sprung up where once as barefooted boys they had hunted the squirrel and the wild cat; and the market towns of their youth had grown into great manufacturing cities. As young men they had taken part in the crusade for the Union, and returned to take their part in progress, development, and expansion. The railroad, the telegraph, the sewing machine, oil and gas lighting, and a hundred new comforts and conveniences had come within reach of all but the poorest and remotest during their lifetime. If discontented workmen and poverty-stricken farmers sometimes intruded into the picture, it must be foreign agitators or the law of supply and demand which were to blame. How could there be anything wrong with a government which had wrought such miraculous changes for the better, or with a Grand Old Party which had saved the nation from disunion?

Yet the quarter-century of exploitation had its suffering victims, who felt that something was radically wrong, and were groping for a remedy. Kansas, in 1888, began to suffer the effects of deflation after a great land boom. Virgin prairie land, and peak prices of wheat and corn in 1881, had induced an excessive construction of railroads, largely financed locally, and an over-settlement of the comparatively arid western part of the state. Small towns and cities indulged in lavish expenditure, and their citizens speculated wildly in building lots. The new farms were largely created on credit; there was one mortgage, on the average, to every other adult in the state. After several years of excessive rainfall there came in 1887 a summer so dry that the crops in western Kansas withered. During the next four years one-half the people who had entered that new El Dorado trekked eastward again; on their wagon covers one could read scrawled, 'In God we trusted, in Kansas we busted.' William Allen White, the 'sage of Emporia' described some of these picturesquely. 'There came through Emporia yesterday two old-fashioned mover wagons, headed east. . . . These movers were from western Kansas. . . . They had come from that wilderness only after a ten years' hard vicious fight, a fight which had left its scars on their faces, had beat their bodies, had taken the elasticity from their steps, and left them crippled to enter the battle anew. For ten years they had been fighting the elements. They had seen it stop raining for months at a time. They had heard the fury of the winter wind as it came whining across the short burned grass and cut the flesh from their children huddling in the corner. These movers have strained their eyes watching through the long summer days for the rain that never came. They had seen that big cloud roll up from the southwest about one in the afternoon, hover over the land, and stumble away with a few thumps of thunder as the sun went down. They have tossed through hot nights wild with worry, and have arisen only to find their worst nightmares grazing in reality on the brown stubble in front of their sun-warped doors. They had such high hopes when they went out there; they are so desolate now — no, not now, for now they are in the land of corn and honey. They have come out of the wilderness, back to the land of promise.' Others, made of sterner stuff, struggled on through the eighties and the nineties to better times. What was true of Kansas was equally true of other agricultural regions. In an Eastern state a survey of seven hundred representative farms discovered an average yield of $167. In the Middle West farmers were glad to exchange places with immigrant factory hands, who had at least a dollar a day. And in the South cotton growers struggled on from year to year against a falling market, overproduction, and the improvidence of negro tenants.

Industrial unrest was acute. The year 1890 witnessed the largest number of strikes recorded in any one year of the nineteenth century, and the Homestead strike of 1892 recalled the scenes of violence and terrorism of the Great Strike of 1877. Discontent with the McKinley tariff was widespread and the Sherman Silver Act of 1890 did not satisfy the advocates of free and unlimited coinage of silver. The stage was set for the entrance of a party of revolt. The Populist Party, composed of the Farmers' Alliances, the Knights of Labor, former Greenbackers, free-silverites, and the socialistic disciples of Edward Bellamy's Nationalist Party, organized in '92, and chose James B. Weaver, a former Greenbacker, for their standard bearer. Their platform raked both the major parties and painted a melancholy picture of the American scene. 'We meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the legislature, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized; most of the states have been compelled to isolate the voters at the polling places to prevent universal intimidation or bribery. The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled; public opinion silenced; business prostrated; our homes covered with mortgages; labor impoverished; and the land concentrating in the hands of the capitalists. . . . The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the possessors of these, in turn, despise the republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two great classes of tramps and millionaires.'

The Republicans renominated Harrison, and the Democrats, as naturally, Cleveland. The campaign itself was less exciting than might have been expected, but the election offered some surprises. Weaver polled over a million votes, and the Populists elected two senators and eleven representatives. Cleveland swept the solid South, and seven Northern states including New York, and for the third successive time received a popular majority. The election of 1892 placed the Democrats in complete control of the government for the first time since the Civil War.

2. *The President and the Panic*

American society appeared to be dissolving, but the same old Grover Cleveland, a little stouter and more set in his ideas, was inaugurated President on 4 March 1893. A large proportion of his vote came from suffering farmers who looked to the Democracy for relief rather than to the inexpert Populists. Cold comfort they obtained from the inaugural address! The situation, as the President saw it, demanded ' prompt and conservative precaution ' to protect a ' sound and stable currency.'

The administration was not three months old when a series of bank failures and industrial collapses inaugurated the panic of 1893. The treasury's gold reserve was depleted by an excess of imports, and by liquidation of American securities in London after the ' Baring panic ' of 1890. It was also subject to a steady drain (*a*) by the monthly purchase of useless silver required by the Silver-purchase Act of 1890, and (*b*) by the specie redemption of greenbacks which by law were promptly reissued, and formed a sort of endless chain for conveying gold to Europe. Cleveland summoned a special session of Congress, to repeal the mischievous law. In so doing he flew in the face of his supporters, who demanded the directly opposite policy of inflating the currency with ' free silver ' at the coinage ratio of 16 to 1.[1] Cleveland's discreet manipulation of the patronage provided enough Democratic votes at this special session to help the Republicans repeal their own Silver-purchase Act at the request of a Democratic President and a bimetallist Secretary of the Treasury! Business and finance breathed more freely, but the farmers cried out betrayal, and when Cleveland later broke the ' endless chain ' by a gold loan from J. P. Morgan and the Rothschilds, they were convinced that their President had sold out to Wall Street.

Cleveland's brusque and dictatorial methods of dealing with Congress did not help the Democratic party to redeem its pledge of tariff reduction, and the panic of 1893 made any tampering with the tariff highly hazardous. A surplus of fifty-seven million dollars in 1890 had become a deficit of sixty-nine millions by 1894. Vested interests had been built up under Republican protection, and Democratic senators from the East were no less averse from free trade than their Republican colleagues. The resulting Wilson tariff of 1894 took off a slice here and a shaving there, but the essentially protective character remained. Cleveland, who had insisted that 'a tariff for any other purpose than public revenue is public robbery' denounced the bill as smacking of 'party perfidy and party dishonor'; but allowed it to become a law without his signature. The best feature of the Act, a two per cent tax on incomes above $4000, was declared unconstitutional by a five-to-four decision of the Supreme Court (Pollock *v.* Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.), which fifteen years earlier had passed favorably and unanimously upon the war income tax. As it happened to be known that the odd judge had changed his mind at the eleventh hour, this decision seemed a further proof to the farmers that they had no voice in their government.

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[1] At that ratio — sixteen ounces of silver to one of gold — the silver dollar would only have contained 57 cents in bullion.

The Wilson tariff went into effect during the worst period of industrial depression since the seventies — worse than any that the United States has since experienced. Prices and wages struck rock-bottom, and there seemed to be no market for anything. It was a period of soup-kitchens, ragged armies of the unemployed, fervid soap-box oratory, desperate strikes. What was wrong with the United States, that it had to suffer these recurrent crises? The Democratic tariff, said the Republicans; gold, said the Populists; capitalism, said the Socialists; the immutable law of supply and demand, said the economists; the wrath of God, said the ministers. But Grover Cleveland, like Br'er Rabbit, 'ain't sayin' nuffin'.'

Chicago was the plague-spot of the depression, for the army of floating labor attracted by the World's Fair of 1893 could not be absorbed. In the spring of 1894 the employees in the Pullman car works struck against a wage cut that left them no margin over their rents in the Pullman 'model village.' The American Railway Union, a craft union outside the A. F. of L., supported the strike by refusing to handle Pullman cars. The General Managers' Association, an extra-legal combination representing the twenty-four railroads entering Chicago, refused to arbitrate, and prepared for a trial of strength. Suggestions reached Cleveland that the fast mail trains, to which Pullman cars were usually attached, were being held up; but the obstruction came about through measures that Cleveland's Attorney-General, Richard Olney, adopted to prevent it. On 1 July he appointed special counsel for the United States a prominent railway attorney named Edwin Walker, at whose suggestion the Federal Circuit Court at Chicago served on the officers of the American Railway Union a 'blanket injunction' against obstructing the railways and holding up the mails (2 July). Hooligans promptly ditched a mail train, and took possession of strategic points in the switching yards. Walker as promptly called for federal troops. Cleveland declared he would use every dollar in the treasury and every soldier in the army if necessary to deliver a single postcard in Chicago. On 4 July he ordered a regiment of regulars to the city. The effect was like that of sending British regulars to Boston in 1770.

Cleveland's real antagonist in this internal conflict was not the union leaders, but John P. Altgeld, Governor of Illinois. This honest and fearless statesman had already been marked for destruction by big business because he had helped Jane Addams to obtain factory regulations in Illinois and because he had pardoned the men imprisoned for presumed participation in the Haymarket bomb outrage of 1886. It is now certain that those men were innocent, but Altgeld was denounced as an aider and abetter of foreign anarchists, even by such men as Theodore Roosevelt and Lyman Abbott. In the Pullman strike case Governor Altgeld was ready and able to protect law and order with state militia. He sent troops to every point in the state where the authorities called for them, and had an ample force ready to use in Chicago, where, as yet, there was no disorder with which police and militia were unable to cope. The real reason why Walker called for a federal injunction and federal troops was to break the strike, not to preserve order; and the most serious disorder came after the federal injunction had been issued. Altgeld lost no time in protesting against this gratuitous interference by the Federal government, and in requesting the immediate withdrawal of the regulars. If, as he wrote Cleveland, the President might at discretion order federal troops to do what he would, the Federal government had ceased to be a government of law. Eugene V. Debs, president of the striking union, defied the injunction, was arrested, and sentenced to six months' imprisonment for contempt of court. Gompers and the executive board of the A. F. of L. advised the American Railway Union that it was beaten, and by early August the strike was completely broken.

The dramatic events of this Pullman strike raised weighty questions of law; and placed the Federal government in direct antagonism to union labor. The President, it is now clear, simply saw the issue of law and order, and had no desire to help the railroads crush a strike; but through appointing a railroad lawyer special counsel of the government, he played into the hands of those who wanted federal troops to break a strike, and not state militia to preserve order. Governor Altgeld had no desire to help the strikers; but his stout protest against a doubtful assumption of federal authority placed him in the position of a rebel. Debs was merely trying to help the Pullman employees by boycotting the company; but the movement got out of his hands, and became something like a labor insurrection. The Supreme Court of the United States, to which Debs appealed against his sentence, upheld the government, declaring that even in the absence of statutory law it had a dormant power to brush away obstacles to interstate commerce — an implied power that would have made Hamilton and Marshall gasp. A new and potent weapon, the injunction, was legalized for use against strikers; Cleveland became a hero and idol of American business men; Debs received the Socialist nomination for the Presidency; Altgeld was hounded from public life.

3. *Foreign Affairs*

Cleveland was a peace-loving President, who believed that the manifest destiny of American expansion had been fulfilled. During Harrison's administration the American settlers in the Hawaiian Islands had upset the native dynasty, and concluded at Washington a treaty of annexation to the United States. Having discovered that the American minister at Honolulu had taken an active part in these proceedings, Cleveland withdrew the treaty from the Senate, and let the new Hawaiian Republic shift for itself. 'I mistake the American people,' he wrote, 'if they favor the odious doctrine that there is no such thing as international morality; that there is one law for a strong nation and another for a weak one.' His attitude toward American occupation of the Samoan Islands was equally unfriendly. In a message to Congress December 1894 he protested vigorously against American imperialism in the Pacific, and urgently requested that the United States withdraw from the joint protectorate over the Samoan Islands.[2] Towards the Cuban insurrection that broke out in 1895 his attitude was neutral and circumspect. Nevertheless it fell to him to make a most vigorous assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, and to risk war with Great Britain.

It was over a long-standing boundary dispute between British

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[2] The joint protectorate was abandoned in 1899 and the United States received the island of Tutuila.

Guiana and Venezuela. Lord Salisbury refused to submit the question to international arbitration, because of the Venezuelan government's absurd pretension to well over half of the British colony, which, as he said, belonged to England 'long before the Republic of Venezuela came into existence.' In a message of 17 December 1895 President Cleveland informed Congress of Lord Salisbury's refusal, proposed to determine the disputed line himself, and declared that in his opinion any attempt of Great Britain to assert jurisdiction beyond that line should be resisted by every means in the nation's power. Panic ensued in Wall Street, dismay in England, and an outburst of jingoism in the United States. Secretary of State Olney's note of 20 July, published with the message, included a definition of the Monroe Doctrine that alarmed Latin America, insulted Canada, and challenged England:

> 'To-day the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.' 'Distance and three thousand miles of intervening ocean make any permanent political union between a European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient.'

No facts of the controversy could justify these extreme claims and provocative language. Why did they use it? Some have said that it was to win the Irish-American vote, alienated by the neglect of some of their leaders in presidential appointments. But Cleveland's character and Olney's were such as to stifle any suspicion of playing to the gallery. Probably Palmerston and the British Honduras were at the back of their minds, as the recent partition of Africa by the European powers was certainly to the fore. They feared that England was procrastinating, and that Venezuela, if further put off, would declare a war in which the United States would be forced to participate. Seventeen years later Olney explained his language on the ground 'that in English eyes the United States was then so completely a negligible quantity that it was believed only words the equivalent of blows would be really effective.'

Actually, it was only a very keen desire for American friendship that induced the Salisbury government to let this challenge lie. Of the British navy's preponderance over the American — at least five to one — there was no doubt. But England was beginning to find 'splendid isolation ' a bit precarious, and the Kaiser's congratulatory telegram to the Boer leader, Kruger, brought her feeling of insecurity into dramatic relief. On 25 January Joseph Chamberlain declared that war between the two nations would be an absurdity as well as a crime, and two weeks later Salisbury made a conciliatory statement in the House of Lords. After much secret diplomacy at London and Washington, a treaty was concluded between Great Britain and Venezuela (12 November 1896) submitting the boundary question to an arbitral tribunal, to be governed by the rule that 'adverse holding or prescription during a period of fifty years shall make a good title.' Thus Cleveland and Olney secured their principle that the whole territory in dispute should be subject to arbitration; and Salisbury secured his, that the British title to *de facto* possessions should not be questioned. The tribunal, which included the Chief Justices of Great Britain and the United States, gave a unanimous decision in 1899, substantially along the line of the British claim. Thus one more dangerous Anglo-American controversy passed under the bridge — but mutual understanding was still far distant.

4. *Bryan, Bryan, Bryan, Bryan*

The party in power is always blamed for hard times. The Congressional elections of 1894 resulted in a complete reversal of the political scene. The Republicans won an overwhelming majority in the House and a plurality in the Senate, and the Populists made heavy inroads upon the Democratic vote in the South. So certain were the Republicans of victory in 1896 as to boast that a Republican rag-doll could be elected President — a boast that Mark Hanna made a prophecy.

Marcus Alonzo Hanna was the last great representative figure of the Ohio dynasty. A big business man satiated with wealth but avid of power, naturally intelligent though contemptuous of learning, personally upright but tolerant of corruption, Mark Hanna believed ardently in the mission of the Republican party to promote business activity, whence prosperity would percolate to farmers and wage-earners. Since 1890 he had been grooming for the Presidency his friend William McKinley, whom he rescued from bankruptcy in the hard times of 1893. Other Republicans like Thomas B. Reed and Levi P. Morton, Governor of New York, were more able, experienced, and popular; but the Ohio tradition and Ohio management prevailed. 'Bill McKinley, author of the McKinley bill, advance agent of prosperity,' was nominated on the first ballot, 18 June

1896. The convention pointed with pride to Republican achievement, viewed with horror the 'calamitous consequences' of Democratic control, and came out somewhat equivocally for solid gold currency.

Three weeks later, when the Democratic convention met at Chicago, it became evident that Populism had permeated that party. Instead of converting the Democracy, Cleveland had alienated it by every act of his administration. While he was striving for sound money the Populist panacea of 'free silver' had become an oriflamme to the discontented. Clever agents of the Western silver miners showed that the depreciation of silver had tallied with that of farm products. *Coin's Financial School* setting forth in simple vigorous language the specious dogmas of free silver and picturing Wall Street bankers as leeches bleeding the farmers white, sold by the hundred thousand, and was to the free-silver crusade what Tom Paine's *Common Sense* was to the cause of Independence. Corn belt economists concluded that gold was the cause of the hard times, and free silver the solution for all their troubles. To argue that bimetallism was a world problem, that unlimited coinage of silver by the United States would avail nothing while the mints of Europe and India were closed to it, merely invited the retort that America must declare her financial independence of London. Some wanted free coinage of silver in order to bring it back to par, others looked for cheap money to pay their mortgages; but all wanted free silver.

William Jennings Bryan, a thirty-six-year-old congressman from Nebraska, carried the Democratic convention off its feet by a speech advocating free silver, famous for its peroration, 'You come to us and tell us that the great cities are in favor of the gold standard; we reply that the great cities rest upon our broad and fertile prairies. Burn down your cities and leave our farms, and your cities will spring up again as if by magic; but destroy our farms and the grass will grow in the streets of every city in the country. . . . Having behind us the producing masses of this nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests, and the toilers everywhere, we will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to them: You shall not press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.' Bryan obtained the presidential nomination, the convention declared emphatically for free silver, and the campaign was fought on that issue. Gold Democrats bolted one way, Silver Republicans the other; Populists came over to Bryan. Apart from the solid

South and the silver mining interests, it was a clean-cut radical-conservative contest, with the first real issue in thirty years. And the new cause had an ideal leader in the 'boy orator of the Platte':

> Prairie avenger, mountain lion,
> Bryan, Bryan, Bryan, Bryan,
> Gigantic troubadour, speaking like a siege gun,
> Smashing Plymouth Rock with its boulders from the West.[3]

Radical only on the coinage issue, strictly orthodox in matters of morality and religion, Bryan was an honest, emotional crusader for humanity, with the forensic fervor, political shrewdness, and intellectual limitations that would have carried him to the Presidency in the age of Clay and Jackson. His object was to reform government and curb privilege, not to reconstruct society; but McKinley stressed the 'danger to our institutions' in the principles of the Democratic platform. Bryan did not 'propose to transfer the rewards of industry to the lap of indolence' but his victory would, in effect, transfer power from the Middle West and Northeast to the Far West and the South. In all the hundreds of speeches delivered during his whirlwind tour of thirteen thousand miles there was no appeal to class hatred; but his followers were full of it, and 'Pitchfork' Tillman of South Carolina called upon the people to throw off their bondage to a money power more insolent than the slave power. It was a campaign such as the country had not witnessed since Jackson and was not to witness again until 1928. 'It was a fanaticism like the Crusades,' wrote William Allen White. 'Indeed, the delusion that was working on the people took the form of religious frenzy. Sacred hymns were torn from their pious tunes to give place to words which deified the cause and made gold — and all its symbols, capital, wealth, plutocracy — diabolical. At night from ten thousand little white schoolhouse windows, lights twinkled back vain hope to the stars. . . . They sang their barbaric songs in unrhythmic jargon, with something of the mad faith that inspired martyrs going to the stake. Far into the night the voices rose — women's and children's voices, the voices of old men, of youths and of maidens, rose on the ebbing prairie breezes, as the crusaders of the revolution rode home, praising the people's will as though it were God's will and cursing wealth for its iniquity.' American business, fearing for its privileges, acted as if the Hun were at the gates. The New York *Tribune* denounced 'the wretched, rattle-pated boy, posing in vapid vanity and mouthing resounding rottenness.' 'Good and high-minded men,' observed Roosevelt, 'in their panic played into the hands of the ultra-reactionaries of business and politics.' Mark Hanna shook down metropolitan banks, insurance companies, and railroad corporations for colossal campaign contributions. The silver mining interests were equally generous subsidizers of the Democrats, according to their ability. Employees were ordered to vote for McKinley on pain of dismissal, and their fears were aroused by the prospect of receiving wages in depreciated dollars. On Wall Street there was even talk of an Eastern secession, if Bryan should win. The results of the election proved their fears somewhat exaggerated. Bryan carried the late Confederacy and most of the Far West; but the heavy electoral votes of the populous East and Middle West gave McKinley an emphatic victory.[4]

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[3] Vachel Lindsay, *Collected Poems* (Macmillan, 1925).

The significance of the campaign was not lost upon contemporaries. The election of McKinley constituted a triumph for big business, for a manufacturing and industrial rather than an agrarian order. 'For a hundred years,' Henry Adams observed, 'the American people had hesitated, vacillated, swayed forward and back, between two forces, one simply industrial, the other capitalistic, centralizing and mechanical. . . . The issue came on the single gold standard, and the majority at last declared itself, once for all, in favor of the capitalistic system with all its necessary machinery. All one's friends, all one's best citizens, reformers, churches, colleges, educated classes, had joined the ranks to force submission to capitalism; a submission long foreseen by the mere law of mass.'

Equilibrium was restored. Nothing had ever been the matter with the Grand Old Party. Now for high protection, plenty, and prosperity. Actually, the election of a Democratic administration could have served no useful purpose. They were not prepared, nor the country ripe, for measures to bring financial giants under control. Free silver, if adopted, would have prolonged uncertainty and placed the United States in a financial isolation. Yet Bryan's campaign had a significance quite independent of any question as to the soundness of its first principle. It was not only the last protest of the old agrarian order against industrialism, it was also the first attempt of the new order to clean house. Bryan was the bridge between Jackson and Roosevelt.

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[4] The popular vote for McKinley was 7,035,638; Bryan, 6,467,946.

XLV

THE SPANISH WAR AND IMPERIALISM

1897–1917

1. *McKinley Yields*

WILLIAM MCKINLEY, a kindly soul in a spineless body, was inaugurated President on 4 March 1897. Mark Hanna refused a cabinet position, lest he should appear to be paid for his trouble; but obtained a seat in the Senate especially vacated for him. The President promptly summoned a special session of Congress to raise the tariff. In a somewhat chastened spirit, the leaders of Congress proposed to set up more moderate schedules than those of 1890; but by the time every member had secured his pet interest, the Dingley tariff of 1897 was the highest protective tariff that had yet been enacted. Already the trough of the long depression had been passed, and business recovered confidence with government in the hands of its friends. Yet so blatant were the monopoly-securing features of the Dingley tariff that the Republican party was badly in need of a new issue to divert popular attention.

Cuba furnished the diversion. The devastating Ten Years' War, 1868–78, against Spanish misrule had ended inconclusively with exhaustion of both sides. In 1895 revolution broke out again, induced partly by continued Spanish oppression and partly by the complete demoralization of the Cuban sugar industry precipitated by the Wilson tariff. The war which ensued was conducted with peculiar savagery on both sides, but American indignation was aroused particularly by General Weyler's policy of herding the natives into garrison towns where they perished by the thousand from disease and starvation. Spanish 'atrocities' were enlarged upon by the yellow journals of William R. Hearst and his sensational competitors, and a well-organized Cuban 'junta' in New York assiduously spread propaganda for American intervention. American sympathies, always susceptible to the spectacle of a struggle for liberty, were deeply stirred. More than once Congress pressed the executive to recognize at least the belligerency of Cuba, but both Cleveland and McKinley refused to act. Cleveland, however, solemnly warned Spain that the time was rapidly approaching when 'our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations.' With public opinion at a high tension, neutrality became increasingly difficult: in the first two years of the rebellion no less than forty-two filibustering expeditions were organized in the United States and a large number of these succeeded in reaching Cuba. When McKinley came to office the situation was critical. In October 1897, however, the new Spanish ministry of Sagasta proposed to abandon the concentration policy, recalled its cruel proconsul, and promised some measure of home rule. It appeared that the crisis had passed; but on 15 February 1898 the United States battleship *Maine* was blown up in Havana harbor. That started a clamor for war; and when a naval court of inquiry reported (28 March) that the cause was an external explosion by a submarine mine, 'Remember the Maine!' went from lip to lip. The next day McKinley sent to Madrid what turned out to be his ultimatum, suggesting an immediate armistice, the break-up of concentration camps, and American mediation between Spain and Cuba. Spain's formal reply was unsatisfactory; but the Sagasta government, anxious to avoid war with the United States, moved towards peace with a celerity unusual at Madrid. Orders were given revoking the concentration policy, and on 9 April the Governor-General of Cuba was instructed to grant an armistice to the insurgents. The next day the American minister cabled from Madrid that if nothing were done to humiliate Spain he hoped to obtain a settlement of the Cuban question on the basis of autonomy, or independence, or cession to the United States.

Any President with a backbone would have seized this opportunity for an honorable solution. McKinley, a veteran of 1861, was averse from war. Mark Hanna, Wall Street, big business, and a majority of the Republican Senators backed him up. With such support McKinley needed less firmness than Grant had shown in the *Alabama* case to preserve peace. But Congress, the press, and the country were clamoring for war. Roosevelt wrote in a private letter, 'The blood of the murdered men of the *Maine* calls not for indemnity but for the full measure of atonement, which can only come by driving the Spaniard from the New World.' McKinley became obsessed with the notion that if he did not give way, the Republican party would be broken. After much prayer and hesitation, he decided to yield. One year later he recorded his conviction that 'if he had been left alone, he could have concluded an arrangement with the Spanish government under which the Spanish troops would have withdrawn from Cuba without a war.'

On 11 April 1898 the President sent Congress a long-winded review of the situation, making only a casual and incomplete reference to the reassuring dispatch just received from Madrid. He concluded: 'The issue is now with the Congress. . . . I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. . . . I await your action.' That action, of course, was war.

2. *Exit Spain*

Light-heartedly the United States entered upon a war that brought quick returns in glory, but new and heavy responsibilities. It was emphatically a popular war. Although imperialistic in result, it was not so in motive. Big business was not interested in the exploitation of Cuba. But American sensibilities had been aroused by the Cuban struggle for independence and outraged by the destruction of the *Maine*. In declaring war Congress also declared that 'the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.'

No one who lived through them will forget those gay days of 1898. With what generous ardor the young men rushed to the colors to free Cuba, while the bands crashed out the chords of Sousa's 'Stars and Stripes Forever'! And what a comfortable feeling of unity the country obtained at last, when Democrats vied in patriotism with Republicans, when the South proved equally ardent for the fight, and Joe Wheeler, the gallant cavalry leader of the Confederacy, became actual commander of the United States Army in Cuba! It was more close and personal to Americans than the World War; it was their own little show for independence, fair play, and hip-hurrah democracy, against all that was tyrannical, treacherous, and fetid in the Old World. How they enjoyed the discomfiture of Germany, France, Italy, and Russia, and how they appreciated the hearty goodwill of England! Every ship of the smart little navy from the powerful *Oregon,* steaming at full speed round the Horn to be in time for the big fight, to the absurd dynamite cruiser *Vesuvius,* was known by picture and reputation to every American boy. And what heroes the war correspondents created — Hobson who sunk the *Merrimac,* Lieutenant Rowan who delivered the message to Garcia, Commodore Dewey ('You may fire when ready, Gridley'), blaspheming Bob Evans of the *Iowa,* Captain Philip of the *Texas* ('Don't cheer, boys, the poor fellows are dying'), and Teddy Roosevelt with his horseless Rough Riders! [1] This was no war of waiting and endurance, of fruitless loss and hope deferred. On the first day of May, one week after the declaration, Dewey steams into Manila Bay with the Pacific squadron, and without losing a man reduces the Spanish fleet to old junk. The Fifth Army Corps safely lands in Cuba, and wins three battles in quick succession. Admiral Cervera's fleet issues from Santiago Bay, and in a few hours' running fight is completely smashed, with the loss of a single American sailor. Ten weeks' fighting, and the United States had wrested an empire from Spain.

Prince Bismarck is said to have remarked, just before his death, that there was a special providence for drunkards, fools, and the United States of America. On paper Spain was a formidable power. If the United States had more battleships, she had more armored cruisers and torpedo craft. Spain already had almost 200,000 troops in Cuba. The American regular army was probably the best in the world, but included less than 28,000 officers and men, scattered in small detachments from the Yukon to Key West. So weak were the harbor defences of the Atlantic coast, and so apprehensive were the people of bombardment, that the North Atlantic fleet was divided: the one half blockading Havana, and the other, reassuringly called the 'Flying Squadron,' stationed at Hampton Roads. Against any other nation such strategy might have been disastrous. But the Spanish navy was inconceivably neglected, ill-armed, and untrained; while the United States navy — a new creation of the last fifteen years — was smart, disciplined, and efficient. Secretary Long of the Navy was honest and intelligent; and when the energetic assistant-secretary Roosevelt left to lead the Rough Riders, his place on the board of naval strategy was taken by Captain Mahan.

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[1] Roosevelt's volume celebrating the deeds of the Rough Riders was the inspiration for one of Mr. Dooley's happiest comments:

"I haven't time f'r to tell ye the wurruk Tiddy did in ar-hmin' an' equippin' himself, how he fed himself, how he steadied himself in battles an' encouraged himself with a few well-chosen worruds whin th' sky was darkest. Ye'll have to take a squint into the book ye'erself to l'arn thim things."

"I won't do it," said Mr. Hennessy. "I think Tiddy Rosenfelt is all r-right an' if he wants to blow his horn lave him do it."

"True f'r ye," said Mr. Dooley. . . . "But if I was him I'd call th' book 'Alone in Cubia.'"

In a military sense the United States was entirely unprepared. An elderly jobbing politician was at the head of the War Department. There were enough Krag rifles for the regulars, but the 150,000 volunteers whom the President insisted on calling to the colors, received Springfields and black powder. There was no khaki cloth in the country, and thousands of troops fought a summer campaign in Cuba, clothed in the heavy blue uniform of winter garrison duty. Volunteers neglected even such principles of camp sanitation as were laid down in Deuteronomy, and for every one of the 289 men killed or mortally wounded in battle, thirteen died of disease. Transporting eighteen thousand men to Cuba caused more confusion than conveying two million men to France twenty years later. Yet the little expeditionary force was allowed to land on the beach without opposition (20–25 June), and the Captain-General of Cuba, with six weeks' warning, almost 200,000 men in the Island, and 13,000 in the city of Santiago, was able to concentrate only 1,700 on the battle-fields of El Caney and San Juan, against 15,000 Americans. These 1,700 Spaniards, well armed and entrenched, gave an excellent account of themselves, and helped to promote Roosevelt from a colonelcy to the Presidency: but on 3 July Cervera's battle fleet steamed forth from Santiago Bay to death and destruction. There never was such a Fourth of July in America as that Monday in 1898 when the news came through. Santiago surrendered on the 15th. Except for a military promenade in Porto Rico, which Mr. Dooley described as 'Gin'ral Miles' Gran' Picnic an' Moonlight Excursion' the war was over.

Spain asked for terms of peace; McKinley dictated them on 30 July — immediate evacuation and definite relinquishment of Cuba, cession of Porto Rico, and an island in the Ladrones, occupation of the city, harbor, and bay of Manila. Spain signed a preliminary peace to that effect on 12 August, sadly protesting: 'This demand [for Porto Rico] strips us of the very last memory of a glorious past, and expels us . . . from the Western Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized through the proud deeds of our ancestors.'

3. *The Little Brown Brother*

In the formal peace negotiations at Paris, which began on 1 October 1898, the only serious question was the disposition of the Philippines. If they had been contented under Spanish rule, there would have been no question of annexing them. An insurrection had just been partially suppressed when the Spanish War broke out. José Rizal, one of the noblest and certainly the most scholarly of nationalist leaders of his day, was executed in 1896. His successor, Emilio Aguinaldo, was more or less encouraged by Commodore Dewey to return from exile after the battle of Manila Bay; and when the Americans had assaulted and captured the city (13 August) the *insurrectos* organized the 'Visayan Republic' in the province of Luzon. The obvious thing to do was to turn the Philippines over to the Filipinos, as Cuba to the Cubans. But Dewey cabled that the 'republic' represented only a faction, and was unable to keep order within its nominal sphere. To restore the islands to Spain would be cowardly; yet few Americans wished to take up the white man's burden. On the other hand, Germany's obvious desire to obtain compensation in that quarter, inclined the Americans to stay. Perhaps it would be well for the United States to obtain a base in the Far East, now that China seemed to be on the point of breaking up; and clearly one must take all the Philippines or none. McKinley hesitated long and prayerfully, but finally concluded to fulfil manifest destiny. 'One night it came to me in this way,' he told his Methodist brethren, '. . . (1) that we could not give them back to Spain — that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany, our commercial rivals in the Orient — that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves — they were unfit for self-government, and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but take them all, and to educate the Filipinos and uplift and civilize and Christianize them.' Spain was induced to part with the archipelago for twenty million dollars, and on 10 December 1898 the Treaty of Paris was signed. Most Americans acquiesced,[2] but a vigorous minority of conscientious objectors led by

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[2] 'I know what I'd do if I was Mack,' said Mr. Hennessy, 'I'd hist a flag over the Ph'lippeens, an' I'd take in th' whole lot iv thim.'

'An' yet,' said Mr. Dooley, ''tis not more thin two months since ye larned whether they were islands or canned goods.' — *Mr. Dooley in War and Peace.*

Senator Hoar believed it a monstrous perversion of American destiny to conquer and rule an oriental country. The necessary two-thirds majority for ratification was obtained only after Bryan had urged the Democratic Senators to assent, and Senator Lodge had pointed out the disgrace involved in repudiating what the President, through his envoys, had concluded in Paris.

This annexation of extra-continental territory already thickly populated by alien peoples, created a new problem in American politics and government. The petty islands and guano rocks that had already been annexed had never raised, as Porto Rico and the Philippines did, the embarrassing question whether the Constitution followed the flag. Opinions of the Supreme Court in the 'Insular Cases' left their status very muddled; but eventually, as in the British Empire, a theory was evolved from practice. Insular possessions are dependencies of, but not part of, the United States, or included in its customs barriers unless by special act of Congress. Thus the Republican party was able to eat its cake and have it: to indulge in territorial expansion, yet maintain the tariff wall against such insular products as sugar and tobacco. Inhabitants of the dependencies are American nationals, not citizens of the United States, unless expressly granted that status by the United States. Organic acts of Congress are the constitutions of the Philippines and Porto Rico; only such parts of the Federal Constitution apply as are included in these organic acts, or found applicable by the Federal judiciary. President and Congress, although limited in power within the United States, are absolute and sovereign over American dependencies.[3] The parallel with the old British Empire is suggestive; and the government at Washington, like that of England, has been reluctant to admit the existence of an empire. No colonial office has been established or colonial secretary appointed. Porto Rico and the Philippines are administered by a bureau of insular affairs of the War Department; the smaller islands by the Navy Department.

The Filipinos, or most of them, had been good Catholics for three centuries, and did not wish to be 'uplifted' and civilized; but when Aguinaldo's troops disregarded the command of an American sentry to halt (4 February 1899) the United States army undertook to

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[3] I.e. in practice. The theory, as stated by Chief Justice Taft in Balzac *v.* Porto Rico (1922), is that the Constitution is in force wherever the sovereign power of the United States is exerted, and fundamental civil rights follow the flag; but certain provisions of the Constitution 'are not always and everywhere applicable.'

'civilize them with a Krag.' Before the Philippine Insurrection was stamped out, it had cost the United States as many lives as the Spanish War, and more scandals: for a war between white soldiers and semi-civilized men of color is something worse than what Sherman said it was. Military government was succeeded in 1901 by a civil Philippine Commission, appointed by the President. William H. Taft was chairman of the Commission and Governor-General of the Islands.

American rule in the Philippines has been compared with that of Great Britain in India, with disparagement to the latter that is unfair; for the Americans had the simpler problem. The insular population in 1900 was about seven million, of which only four per cent were Mohammedans, and five per cent wild pagan tribes. Christian Filipinos, the 'little brown brothers' who comprised eighty-five per cent of the total, were a fairly homogeneous group, law-abiding and intelligent. Their ideas of justice and administration were oriental, but caste distinctions were lacking; their thirst for education was keen, and Tammany Hall could teach them little in the way of politics. Under American rule they made a remarkable advance in education, well-being, and self-government. Through Taft's diplomacy at Rome, the United States acquired title to vast areas of agricultural land from the religious orders, and sold them on easy terms in small holdings to the peasants. 'Uncle Sam' provided the Islands with honest, intelligent, sympathetic administrators such as Taft, W. Cameron Forbes, and Hugh L. Scott; with schools, sanitation, good roads, a well-trained native constabulary, a representative assembly (1907), and baseball. The number of pupils attending school rose from five thousand in 1898 to over one million in 1920, and all but three hundred of the teachers at that date were native. The infantile death-rate in Manila declined from 80 to 20 per cent between 1904 and 1920; and small-pox and cholera were practically stamped out. Although the entire cost of civil administration has been defrayed by the Islanders, their per capita taxation in 1920 was only $2.50, and their per capita debt, $1.81. Civilization has penetrated to parts of the interior where the Spaniards never ventured. Remote forest glades where savage tribes once met in deadly combat are now the scene of baseball games between their respective sons; and the jungle resounds to cries of 'Strike him out!' and 'Attaboy!'

UNITED STATES, ORIGINAL AREA AND AC


OREGON TERRITORY TITLE ESTABLISHED IN 1846
WASHINGTON
OREGON
MONTANA
NORTH DAKOTA
SOUTH DAKOTA
WYOMING
NEBRASKA
NEVADA
UTAH
COLORADO
KANSAS
CALIFORNIA
ARIZONA
NEW MEXICO
OKLA
TEX
CEDED BY MEXICO 1848
LOUISI PURCH 180
GADSDEN PURCHASE 1853
TEXAS ANNEXED 1845
PACIFIC OCEAN
CANADA
ACQUIRED 1898
GUAM
ALASKA
CEDED BY RUSSIA 1867
ACQUIRED 1899
TUTUILA GROUP
HAWAII
ANNEXED IN 1898
Scale

QUISITIONS OF TERRITORY, 1790 TO 1910

PLATE NO. I


TERRITORY OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN STATES
LAKE SUPERIOR
LAKE MICHIGAN
LAKE HURON
LAKE ONTARIO
LAKE ERIE
ST. LAWRENCE RIVER
MISSISSIPPI RIVER
RED RIVER
WISCONSIN
IOWA
ILLINOIS
MISSOURI
INDIANA
OHIO
KENTUCKY
TENNESSEE
ARKANSAS
MISSISSIPPI
ALABAMA
GEORGIA
SOUTH CAROLINA
NORTH CAROLINA
VIRGINIA
WEST VIRGINIA
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW YORK
MASSACHUSETTS
ATLANTIC OCEAN
CEDED 1819 BY SPAIN
PORTO RICO
ACQUIRED 1898
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
ACQUIRED 1898
CANAL ZONE
CEDED BY PANAMA
1904
600 Miles

4. *Minor Pickings*

Because her people have never desired independence, Porto Rico has been less of a political problem than the Philippines; but a more serious social problem. The island was handicapped by a decrepit and unsatisfactory system of law and local government, and is still densely overcrowded with over a million inhabitants of Spanish blood, mostly landless *jibaros* (peasants) enervated by hookworm and discouraged by the fluctuations of the sugar industry. Civil government, first granted by the Foraker Act of 1900, was of the old crown-colony type: an elective assembly, with an executive council appointed by the President acting as upper house. Political parties quickly developed, the American governors were unable to keep neutral, and deadlocks came over the budget. Another organic act (1917) granted American citizenship and a semi-responsible government. There has been the usual advance in education, but the authorities are still wrestling with problems of rural congestion that can only be solved by emigration. It is not impossible that Porto Rico may eventually become a state of the Union.

Training in self-government rather than material progress is the real justification of American rule over dependencies. Every sound colonial administration does things for the people; the United States has encouraged her dependents to do things for themselves, and has taught them to look to the Declaration of Independence as the source of political theory. If the implications of such teaching are ignored by the teacher, the Spanish War will have been fought in vain.

Few persons in Europe expected the United States to relinquish sovereignty over Cuba; and only in a formal and legal sense has she done so. Until 1902 the island was ruled by the United States army, with General Leonard Wood as military governor. The outstanding feature of this military regime was the remarkable clean-up of Havana under the direction of Major William C. Gorgas, which cut the average annual death-rate in half. Then, in 1900, came one of the worst yellow-fever epidemics in years. A commission of four army surgeons under Dr. Walter Reed was appointed to investigate the cause. Working on the theory advanced by a Cuban physician, Dr. Carlos Finlay, they proved that the pest was transmitted by the stegomyia mosquito; and two of them, Dr. James Carroll and Dr. Jesse W. Lazear, proved it with their lives. Major Gorgas then declared war on the mosquitoes; and in 1901 there was not a single case of yellow fever in Havana. One of the greatest scourges of the tropics was at last under control.

A Cuban constitutional convention met in 1900, and after discreet pressure was induced to incorporate into the Cuban Constitution the provisions of the 'Platt Amendment,' granting the United States certain coaling stations, and recognizing her right to intervene 'for the preservation of Cuban independence' or merely to preserve order, and giving to the United States an ultimate veto over the diplomatic and fiscal relations of Cuba with foreign powers. The right of intervention was exercised in 1906, upon demand of the President of Cuba. A provisional government was established under United States authority, a new election was held, and the island was evacuated a second time in 1909. Since then American exhortations, enforced by an occasional battalion of marines, have prevented the pungent politics of Cuba from breaking out into revolution. Owing to the many investments of American capital in sugar plantations, Cuba is an economic dependency of the United States; but it enjoys the international status of a sovereign state, and a somewhat tutored and precarious political independence.

As neither Cuba nor Porto Rico afforded a first-class harbor for a naval base, negotiations were renewed with Denmark in 1898 for the purchase of St. Thomas. In 1867 the United States Senate had rejected a similar treaty, after Christian IX had bidden his West Indian subjects an affectionate farewell. This time, it was the Danish Rigsdag that did the rejecting (1902). During the World War rumors of possible German purchase impelled the State Department to increase its former offer to twenty-five million dollars. That was accepted, and in 1917 the Danish West Indies became the Virgin Islands of the United States. They have since remained a political appanage of the Navy Department. Guam, an island of the Ladrones acquired from Spain in 1898, and Tutuila, the American share of a triple partition of the Samoan group in 1899, have the same status.

Annexation of the Hawaiian Islands, desired by the dominant American group and by the diminishing natives as well, was consummated by joint resolution of House and Senate on 7 July 1898. An organic act of 1900 conferred American citizenship on all subjects of the former kingdom, and the full status of a territory of the United States, eligible for statehood, on the islands. The government is of the usual territorial form, except that, as in the case of Porto Rico and the Philippines, the Governor may make appropriations by his own authority for current expenses of government in case the territorial legislature refuses to do so. A similar provision in the charters of the Thirteen Colonies might have changed the course of history.

5. *The Open Door*

It was feared by many Americans and assumed by most Europeans that these annexations of the year 1898 were only a beginning; that the United States was destined to become a great colonial power. Imperialism in the Roman sense did not, however, make any permanent appeal to the American people, and even the word remains one of reproach. The political control of islands densely populated with inhabitants of foreign tongue and alien race was a very different matter from the traditional expansion into sparsely inhabited regions capable of full fellowship in the Union. During Roosevelt's administration, and largely as a means of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine, the United States began to assume a financial responsibility for Caribbean republics that in several instances has led to intervention; but it has not yet attempted to compete with Europe for colonies, or spheres of exclusive influence in weak and backward countries. On the contrary, it was John Hay, McKinley's Secretary of State, who proclaimed, if he did not originate, the policy of the open door to China.

Trade with China in 1898 was an important item in American foreign commerce, although no longer conducted by American ships. The United States had long since obtained the usual extraterritorial privileges in China, and had even dictated to Korea, at the cannon's mouth, a treaty of amity and commerce (1871); but had taken no part in the game of carving up China into foreign concessions, protectorates, and spheres of influence. In 1899, when this process was fast nearing completion, John Hay, with the support of the British Foreign Office, requested from the European Powers a declaration of the 'open door' policy: that each in her respective sphere would maintain the Chinese customs tariff, and levy equal harbor dues and railway rates on the ships and merchandise of all nations. All the Powers but Russia expressed their approval, but only Great Britain formally agreed. In June 1900 the Boxer rebellion broke out. The United States took part in the joint expeditionary force to relieve the legations at Pekin; but in order to limit the objective, Hay addressed a circular note to the Powers (3 July 1900), declaring it the policy of the United States 'to preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity . . . and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.' The Powers promptly concurred, and it is claimed by Hay's admirers that this second 'open door' note prevented the further partition of China. It is difficult, however, to escape the conclusion of Tyler Dennett, the principal authority on American diplomacy in the Orient, that 'the doctrine of the Open Door after 1899 was an academic phrase to which Europe consented for the sake of placating America. For ten years it existed as a phrase to conjure with but not to be defined. . . . The American Government mistook a phrase and a promise for an event.' Hay's efforts did not prevent China from being saddled with an outrageous indemnity after the rebellion was suppressed; but the United States returned almost half her share ($11,000,000) to the Chinese government, which established therewith a fund for sending Chinese students to American schools and colleges.

Indirectly, then, the Spanish War made the United States a power in the Far East and in world politics. Her new rôle was accentuated by her leading part in the Hague Conference of 1899. The tradition of isolation might continue, and entangling alliances be refused; yet America without knowing it or wanting it had become a world power.

XLVI

THE REIGN OF ROOSEVELT

1901–1909

1. *Theodore Roosevelt*

FOR the presidential contest of 1900 McKinley and Bryan were renominated by their respective parties. The Democrats again demanded free silver, but prosperity had blunted their arguments, and the 'full dinner pail,' emblem of proletarian affluence, was a potent electioneering slogan for the Republicans. 'Imperialism' was the leading issue. Bryan proposed to wind up America's oriental adventure by handing over the Philippines to the Filipinos; McKinley insisted that his country should shoulder the white man's burden for an indefinite period. Mark Hanna managed the campaign with his usual efficiency, and took the stump with Roosevelt, whose reluctant candidacy for the Vice-Presidency strengthened his running-mate. McKinley and Roosevelt were elected by a heavy majority. The Republican party had a clear mandate to preserve the new American Empire.

On 6 September 1901, six months after his second inauguration, McKinley was shot by an anarchist. Eight days later his gentle spirit took flight; and Theodore Roosevelt became President of the United States.

Roosevelt at forty-three was the youngest by several years in the line of Presidents; yet none had been better equipped to administer the office. Building on a broad paternal inheritance of wealth, culture, and public service, he had already become prominent as a naturalist, a man of letters, a soldier, and a statesman. He had served his political apprenticeship as police commissioner of New York City, and had identified himself with the reform element of the party in that capacity and as Civil Service Commissioner under Harrison. Elected Governor of New York in 1898 on his return from war, he had struck corruption in that state with such vigor that in self-defence Senator Platt and the machine politicians had boomed him for Vice-President, Roosevelt accepted the nomination to that high but inconspicuous office for the political oblivion that it usually meant, and was on the point of studying law with the Chief Justice, in preparation for a professional career in 1905, when the fatal shot made him President. No American was more national in his interests or universal in his friendships. University men and the well-to-do in the Eastern states regarded him as one of themselves. He had identified himself with the West by ranching in the Bad Lands of Dakota, and leading the Rough Riders. The South remembered that his uncles had been warriors in the lost cause; and people everywhere loved him as a red-blooded, democratic American whose every action showed good sportsmanship and dynamic vitality. With the heart of a boy, and the instincts of a man of action, Roosevelt had the brain of a statesman. He was the first President since the Civil War who understood what had happened to the country in the last thirty years, and the only American of his time with the temperament and equipment to grapple with problems that were crying for solution.

2. *The Growth of Consolidation*

The trust problem was the first object of Roosevelt's righteous zeal. We have already traced the trust movement through its early stage of unregulated advance to the application of the Sherman Law in the decade of the nineties. The decision of the Supreme Court in the Trans-Missouri Traffic Association case forced business to abandon combination for consolidation.

A group of bankers would organize a trust or super-corporation for the control, let us say, of the match industry. Having persuaded the financiers who had large interests in the leading match companies, the new match trust would buy them out, issuing its own preferred stock in exchange for that of the constituent companies, and assuming their bonded indebtedness. A large quantity of common stock would be issued in anticipation of increased earnings, and perhaps ' unloaded ' by the banker-promoters on the public. The world had never seen such an easy method of making something out of nothing. Tobacco, agricultural machinery, tin cans, salt, sugar, dressed meat, and a score of basic products were consolidated in corporations with power to crush all competition and to mulct the public by increased cost of service and commodities for the wherewithal to pay dividends on a vastly increased capitalization.

The revival of prosperity after the Spanish War inaugurated a frenzy of consolidation that threatened to give the control of the business development of the country to a few powerful interests. A governmental investigation in 1900 revealed the existence of no less than one hundred and eighty-five manufacturing combinations, with a total capitalization of well over three billion dollars. Seventy-three of these trusts had a capitalization in excess of ten million dollars. Four years later John Moody surveying the scene discovered the total of three hundred and eighteen manufacturing combinations with a total capitalization of over seven billion dollars — altogether some two-fifths of the manufacturing capital in the country. Ten trusts were capitalized at one hundred million dollars or more, thirty at fifty million dollars or more, and one hundred and twenty-nine at over ten million dollars. Two hundred and thirty-four of these trusts had been organized since 1898. This process of consolidation was no less marked in the realm of transportation, the control and exploitation of natural resources, and especially of finance. Gradually in the course of the first decade of the century, horizontal consolidations and vertical combinations came under the control of great banking houses located for the most part in New York City. The Houses of Morgan, Rockefeller, Vanderbilt, and Baker came to exercise an influence over the economic life of the nation comparable to that of the Houses of Bardi and of Fugger in the Renaissance. John Moody struck a popular note when he concluded that 'viewed as a whole, we find the dominating influences in the trusts to be made up of an intricate network of large and small capitalists, many allied to another by ties of more or less importance, but all being appendages to or parts of the greater groups which are themselves dependent on and allied with the two mammoth, or Rockefeller and Morgan groups. These two mammoth groups jointly . . . constitute the heart of the business and commercial life of the nation.' Ten years later a Congressional investigating committee confirmed these fears in a survey of the inter-relations of finance, business and transportation. Its findings tended to confirm the popular fear of a financial 'super-trust.' In summary the committee concluded that the firm members or directors of two sets of New York banks, controlled by the Rockefeller and Morgan interests, held:

> 'One hundred and eighteen directorships in thirty-four banks and trust companies having total resources of $2,679,000,000 and total deposits of $1,983,000,000.
>
> Thirty directorships in ten insurance companies having total assets of $2,293,000,000.
>
> One hundred and five directorships in thirty-two transportation systems having a total capitalization of $11,784,000,000 and a total mileage (excluding express companies and steamship lines) of 150,200.
>
> Sixty-three directorships in twenty-four producing and trading corporations having a total capitalization of $3,339,000,000.
>
> Twenty-five directorships in twelve public utility corporations having a total capitalization of $2,150,000,000.
>
> In all, 341 directorships in 112 corporations having aggregate resources of capitalization of $22,245,000,000.
>
> The members of the firm of J. P. Morgan & Co. hold seventy-two directorships in forty-seven of the greater corporations; George F. Baker, chairman of the board, F. L. Hine, president, and George F. Baker, Jr., and C. D. Norton, vice presidents, of the First National Bank of New York hold forty-six directorships in thirty-seven of the greater corporations; and James Stillman, chairman of the board, Frank A. Vanderlip, president, and Samuel McRoberts, J. T. Talbert, W. A. Simonson, vice-presidents, of the National City Bank of New York, hold thirty-two directorships in twenty-six of the greater corporations; making in all for these members of the group 150 directorships in 110 of the greater corporations.'

In most cases the merger of competing or complementary industries marked a technical advance. But trust methods, however suitable for industries such as meat-packing and motor-cars, were also extended to others which were not, such as cotton-spinning and piano-making; and the economies of mass production were not often shared with laborer or consumer. The United States Steel Corporation, formed in 1901, combined the already swollen corporations of Frick, Carnegie, and others in a trust capitalized at $1,400,000,000, of which nearly one-seventh was issued to promoters for their services. Prices were maintained, although ten to twelve per cent was being earned on the real capitalization, and the wages of the steel workers were kept down by importing cheap labor from southern and eastern Europe. The great insurance companies of New York, instead of reducing premiums to their policy holders, paid salaries of $100,000 or more to chief executives who were often mere figureheads, used their profits recklessly to form industrial consolidations, and corruptly to influence legislation. J. Pierpont Morgan endeavored to unite all the steam and electric railways and steamship lines of New England under one management, and succeeded in leaving the transportation system of that region a financial wreck. E. H. Harriman purchased the bankrupt Union Pacific Railway in 1893 with reserve funds of the Illinois Central system that he controlled, and made it one of the best railways in the country; but other lines that he absorbed were sucked dry and cast aside, after their stockholders had been ruined.

As the Sherman Law had not been invoked against these practices, either by the Cleveland or the McKinley administrations, the public suspected corrupt collusion, and labor threatened to leave the guidance of Gompers for some revolutionary dispensation. Much the same thing was going on in England and in Europe, but not to such an extent. The American theatre was so vast, and American resources so boundless, that financial or industrial consolidations found greater materials to work with. American financiers and industrialists were more sanguine and audacious than their transatlantic contemporaries; and the American government was decentralized, constantly changing in personnel, lacking organic strength and administrative traditions. It is hardly too much to say that the future of American democracy was imperilled when Roosevelt took from the bewildered Bryan Democrats the torch of reform.

3. *The Progressive Era*

Not that Roosevelt applied the torch, as Bryan might have done. He had the common sense to see that the problem was complicated and difficult. 'In dealing with the big corporations we call trusts,' he said in 1902, 'we must resolutely purpose to proceed by evolution and not by revolution. . . . We do not wish to destroy corporations; but we do wish to make them subserve the public good. . . . The biggest corporation like the humblest private citizen must be held to strict compliance with the will of the people as expressed in the fundamental law. The rich man who does not see this is indeed short-sighted. When we make him obey the law, we insure for him the absolute protection of the law.' Bryan and the Populist wing of the Democrats proposed to 'bust the trusts' and re-establish an obsolete regime of individual competition. The socialists had an opposite formula. Roosevelt, and after him Taft and Wilson, were liberal conservatives. They accepted the new industrial order, but wished to probe its excrescences, and bring it under a wholesome regulation. The word 'constructive' was constantly on their lips, and reckless agitators shared with complacent corruptionists the weight of their abuse. The violent dissensions between these three men, the sharp contradictions in their characters, and the fact that they used two different parties as an instrument, should not blind us to the fundamental unity of their administrations. Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson were successive leaders of what we call the progressive movement: the adaptation of American government to the changes already wrought in American society. The process was by no means complete when America entered the World War, and twelve years of peace have witnessed a new industrial revolution which demands a new sort of statesmanship. But we shall clarify much political confusion if we regard the period 1901–17 as a unit and call it The Progressive Era.[1]

Roosevelt proceeded with caution and circumspection. He had not come into power as an opposition leader, but was President 'by act of God,' and titular head of the party of big business. Although popular disaffection to the ruling order was widespread, the election of 1900 appeared to most Republican leaders a mandate to let business alone; to 'stand pat,' as Mark Hanna said in poker slang. Roosevelt knew that no one of the four Vice-Presidents who had succeeded to the Presidency had obtained the party nomination at the next election, and that two of them, Tyler and Johnson, had been read out of their party.

Roosevelt was, however, quite right in estimating that the conscience of the people was aroused, and their temper ripe for action. The reform movement had broadened down from university men, social workers, and 'high-brow' periodicals to the popular magazines, and to a new group of publicists, such as Ida Tarbell, Upton Sinclair, and Lincoln Steffens, whom Roosevelt in a moment of irritation termed the 'muck-rakers.' Coincident with his administration came a municipal reform movement that did away with the grosser forms of corruption in most of the smaller cities, and all of the larger ones save Chicago and Philadelphia; a movement that greatly improved the honesty and efficiency of municipal government by developing social activities. Seth Low in New York, Tom Johnson in Cleveland, 'Golden Rule' Brand Whitlock in Toledo, and Fremont Older in San Francisco succeeded in destroying, temporarily at least, the unholy alliance of vice and crime with municipal politics. State governors like Robert M. La Follette, a man of Roosevelt's age and Lincoln's background, who wrested Wisconsin from corporate control between 1900 and 1904, were restoring former standards of virtue, and attempting to consolidate the rule of honest men by new political devices; the popular primary, the Australian ballot, the initiative, referendum, and recall, and the movement for woman's suffrage made considerable progress and by 1910 eleven states had adopted this reform. Social legislation such as Employers' Liability Acts, factory inspection, limitation of hours, and amelioration of labor conditions, with (what was really new) administrative boards competent to enforce them, became the rule rather than the exception in the Northern, Middle, and Western States. Intra-state public service corporations, such as water, lighting, power, and street railway companies, were at last brought under effective supervision, and in some instances socialized. Protest against this extension of governmental power was stout, and has not yet ceased; but in every industrialized state the logic of the situation compelled conservatives to yield their prejudices; and adverse decisions of the courts were very generally overridden by amendments to the state constitutions. The whole fabric of state and municipal government was more radically altered in this progressive era than in the preceding century; and, following the example of Roosevelt, the increasing participation of public-spirited people in state administration brought a wholesome if short-lived change in the tone of standards of public service.

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[1] Perhaps the era should be extended to 1921, in order to include prohibition, woman suffrage, and the new immigration policy; but it is doubtful whether these would have been adopted but for the war.

4. *'My Policies'*

Roosevelt inherited from McKinley, who was a good judge of men, an unusually able cabinet, which with one or two exceptions was willing to follow the new President. According to Roosevelt's conception of the Presidency, 'it was not only his right but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded, unless such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws.' Shortly there came a strike in the anthracite coal-fields of Pennsylvania.

Roosevelt summoned a conference of mine owners and leaders of the miners' union. The latter offered to arbitrate their grievances; the owners refused, and urged the President to break the strike with the army, as Cleveland might have done. Roosevelt merely published the results of the conference, when public indignation compelled the owners to submit to arbitration by a presidential commission. This episode not only strengthened his popularity: it taught him to use public opinion as a whip for recalcitrant congressmen no less than for captains of industry.[2]

So lively and 'strenuous' was Roosevelt in comparison with his predecessors that many wrongly assumed that he was radical, reckless, and impulsive. On the contrary, he was always willing to compromise on a half-measure in the hope of obtaining more later, and to co-operate with Congress. In his first annual message (3 December 1901) he announced a policy with regard to trusts and corporations: enforce the existing laws, obtain full power for the Federal government to inspect and regulate corporations engaged in interstate business. The first rested with him, the second with Congress. Until he could obtain legislation strengthening the Interstate Commerce Commission, the young President found plenty of work to do in cleansing his government of the unsavory garbage that had accumulated since the Civil War.

Frauds in the post office department were uncovered and punished. Upton Sinclair's *Jungle* drew popular as well as presidential attention to disgusting conditions in the Chicago stockyards. A government investigation substantiated his lurid charges, and Dr. H. W. Wiley, a chemist in the Department of Agriculture, proved by experiment the deleterious effect of preservatives and coloring matter in canned foods. The interests affected fought tooth and nail against 'socialistic' interference with the sacred maxim *caveat emptor,* but Congress strengthened the federal meat inspection service and passed the Pure Food and Drugs Act (1906), which gave the consumers of American products better protection than the laws of any other country then afforded.

Roosevelt's love of nature and knowledge of the West gave him a sentimental interest in the preservation of the forests, and 'conservation' became one of his leading policies. In his first message to Congress he announced that 'the forest and water problems are perhaps the most vital internal problems of the United States.' It was, indeed, high time to put some brake on the greedy and wasteful destruction of natural resources that was encouraged by existing laws. Of the original 800,000,000 acres of virgin forest, less than 200,000,000 remained when Roosevelt came to the Presidency. As early as 1873 the American Association for the Advancement of Science had called attention to the rapid and reckless exhaustion of our forest resources, but public opinion remained apathetic, and the majority of Americans continued to hug the comfortable delusion that our natural resources were inexhaustible. It was not until 1891 that Congress was induced to pass a Forest Reserve Act authorizing the President to set aside timber lands. Under this authority Harrison withdrew some thirteen million acres and Cleveland some twenty million acres of forest from public entry. Despite this promising beginning, and the work of faithful public servants such as Major John Powell, Gifford Pinchot, and R. H. Newell, the process of exploitation was going on more rapidly than that of conservation when Roosevelt assumed office. The official attitude, too, was distinctly hostile — 'a narrowly legalistic point of view toward natural resources obtained in the Departments,' Roosevelt wrote later, 'and controlled the Governmental administrative machinery. Through the General Land Office and other Governmental bureaus the public resources were being handled and disposed of in accordance with the small considerations of petty legal formalities, instead of for the large purposes of constructive development, and the habit of deciding, whenever possible, in favor of private interests against the public welfare was firmly fixed.'

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[2] See above. Chapter XL.

Taking advantage of the law of 1891 Roosevelt set aside almost 150 million acres of unsold government timber land as natural forest reserve, and on the suggestion of Senator La Follette withdrew from public entry some 85 millions more in Alaska and the Northwest, pending a study of their mineral resources by the United States geological survey. The discovery of a gigantic system of fraud by which lumber companies and ranchers were looting and devastating the public preserve enabled the President to obtain authority for transferring the national forests to the Department of Agriculture, whose forest bureau, under the far-sighted Gifford Pinchot, administered them on scientific principles.

Realizing the necessity for arousing public opinion to the imperative need for conservation, Roosevelt secured wide publicity for the work of the Forest Service, and enlisted the co-operation of local and state groups throughout the country. In 1907 he invited all the state governors, cabinet members, justices of the Supreme Court, and notables from the fields of politics, science, and education, to a Conservation Conference at the White House. This Conference, one of the most distinguished gatherings in American history, focussed the attention of the nation upon the problem of conservation, and gave to the movement an impetus and an *éclat* that enabled it to survive later setbacks. The Conference issued a Declaration of Principles stressing not only the conservation of forests, but of waters and minerals, and the problems of soil erosion and of irrigation, as well. As a result of its recommendations most of the states established conservation commissions, and, in 1909, a National Conservation Association, with President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard University as chairman, was organized as a center for propaganda and education. Another outgrowth of the Conference was a National Commission, headed by the indefatigable Gifford Pinchot, which undertook an inventory of the natural resources of the nation. Roosevelt realized that the problems of conservation were international in character, and succeeded in securing the co-operation of the other states of North America in the great work which he had at heart.

The hostility of the West to the program of conservation was allayed by a series of irrigation projects. The Carey Act of 1894, giving the states the right to appropriate public lands for irrigation, had proved inadequate, and in 1902 Roosevelt secured the enactment of a Reclamation Act providing that irrigation should be financed out of the proceeds of public land sales and under the supervision of the Federal government. A new reclamation service, of which R. H. Newell was the guiding spirit, added a million and a quarter acres to the arable land of the United States by 1915.[3] Five national parks were created in Roosevelt's administration together with four national game preserves and fifty-one wild-bird refuges.

Much had been accomplished, but much remained to be done. The American people are still prodigal of their magnificent resources. Hundreds of millions of tons of coal are wasted yearly by inefficient methods of mining and of consumption; hundreds of millions of barrels of oil wasted by unscientific and criminally reckless drilling and piping; billions of cubic feet of natural gas escape annually through improvidence and inefficiency. Scarcely fifteen per cent of the water power readily available has been developed. Forest fires lay waste millions of acres yearly, and soil erosion destroys additional millions. Lumber companies continue to devastate the timber areas of the east and the south, while over fifty per cent of the annual cut is wasted by inefficient methods. Unscientific farming makes for soil exhaustion that would not be tolerated in older and more crowded countries, and that keeps down the value of farm property. Alone of our Presidents Roosevelt grasped the problem of conservation as a unit and comprehended its basic relationship to national welfare. None of his successors has had the boldness or the broadness of vision to carry on the work which he so hopefully inaugurated.

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[3] Increased to approximately two million by 1930.

In 1902 President Roosevelt decided to challenge another form of combination, the holding company, which was outside the scope of the decision on the Trans-Missouri Case. 'As far as the Anti-Trust Laws go,' he announced belligerently, 'they will be enforced . . . and when suit is undertaken it will not be compromised except upon the basis that the Government wins.' He now instructed Attorney General Philander C. Knox to enter suit against the Northern Securities Company, a consolidation of the Hill-Morgan and transcontinental railways. By a narrow margin the Supreme Court decided for the government, thereby stopping a process of consolidation that Harriman proposed to continue until every important railway in the country came under his control. This decision aroused consternation in financial circles but it proved to the nation that industrial magnates were not immune from the law.

The trusts, however, needed regulation more than dissolution; and Roosevelt was unable to get any legislation from Congress in the right direction. Bills initiated by his supporters in the House died in the Senate. A large part of the metropolitan press attacked his very moderate program as socialistic and subversive of the common weal, and himself as a reckless demagogue. The President, however, was steadily growing in popularity. Merely by being himself — greeting professors and pugilists with equal warmth, and discussing their hobbies with the same genuine interest, teaching his boys to ride and shoot, leading perspiring major-generals on a point-to-point ride, praising the good, the true, and the beautiful,[4] and denouncing the base, the false, and the ugly, preaching in hundreds of short addresses all over the country, with vigorous gesture and incisive utterance, the gospel of civic virtue and intelligent democracy — Roosevelt became an institution. Even the journals most opposed to his policies were forced to advertise him in their columns. When the election of 1904 came around, the 'Old Guard,' as the more recalcitrant Republicans began to be called, would have preferred to nominate Mark Hanna; but 'Uncle Mark' died, and Roosevelt was nominated for the Presidency by acclamation. The Democrats, hoping to attract the disgruntled reactionaries, put up a conservative New York judge, Alton B. Parker. Roosevelt swept the country by a majority of over two and one half million votes, and on 4 March 1905 began a new term with a clear mandate for his policies.

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[4] Roosevelt's taste was considerably in advance of the average. It was by his personal direction that Saint-Gaudens designed a new gold coinage, and that the

5. *Trust and Railway Regulation* (*1903–20*)

'I see no promise of any immediate and complete solution of all the problems we group together when we speak of the trust question,' confessed Roosevelt at the beginning of his second administration. The authority he asked for giving the Federal government plenary power to regulate all corporations engaged in interstate business was not forthcoming. Big business was further discredited by the panic of 1907, and by the discovery that the sugar trust had swindled the government out of four million dollars in customs duties by false weights. Irritated by the continued attacks upon him as the destroyer of business and author of the panic, Roosevelt retorted in a pungent message attributing the panic 'to the speculative folly and flagrant dishonesty of a few men of great wealth,' describing the current malpractices, and concluding: 'Our laws have failed in enforcing the performance of duty by the man of property toward the man who works for him, by the corporation toward the investor, the wage-earner and the general public.'

Consequently, the President could do little else than direct prosecutions under the Sherman law of 1890. Such prosecutions were frequent, and in notable instances successful; but they simply pun-

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most artistic postage-stamps in the history of American philately were produced by the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. He also appointed a commission of artists to advise the government as to the plans and positions of new public buildings at Washington, which grew visibly in beauty and distinction during his administration.

ished the grosser mischief after it had been committed, and did not always do that. Unscrambling the eggs proved to be a delicate and often impossible operation. Roosevelt was forced to conclude that the mere size and power of a combination did not render it illegal; there were ' good trusts,' such as the International Harvester Company, which traded fairly and passed on their economies to consumers; and there were bad trusts controlled by ' malefactors of great wealth.' That was practically what the Supreme Court decided in the Standard Oil case of 1911: that only those acts or agreements of a monopolistic nature unduly or ' unreasonably ' affecting interstate commerce were to be construed as acts or agreements in restraint of trade, under the Anti-Trust Law. Justice Harlan in a vigorous dissenting opinion denounced this ' rule of reason ' as a complete reversal of earlier decisions and a ' perversion of the plain words of an Act in order to defeat the will of Congress.' But the ' rule of reason ' became the guiding rule of decision, notably in the case of 1920 against the United States Steel Corporation, a consolidation from which the monopoly feature was absent. Subsequent prosecutions had been based not on mere size and power but on unfair and illegal use of power. President Wilson obtained from Congress the sort of legislation that Roosevelt demanded in vain; the Clayton Anti-Trust Act proscribing certain specific trade practices, and the Federal Trade Commission, an administrative agency clothed with police power to enforce the law.

In the realm of railway regulation much was accomplished under Roosevelt. Rebates from published freight rates were forbidden by the Elkins Act of 1903 and the railroad corporations were made liable to prosecutions and penalties. More scandals and disclosures, however, were required before the government could obtain control over the rates themselves. The Hepburn Act of 1906 made rate regulation for the first time possible and extended it from interstate railroads to steamship, express, and sleeping-car companies (further enlarged in 1910 to include telephone and telegraph companies). It authorized the Interstate Commerce Commission, upon complaint, to determine and prescribe maximum rates, and order conformity therewith after thirty days. Owing to respect for the ancient principle of judicial review, appeals had to be admitted to federal courts; but the burden of proof was now on the carrier, not the Commission. Free passes were prohibited for other than railroad employees, and by indirection the roads were forced to disgorge most of the steamship lines and coal mines which they had bought up to stifle competition. Most useful of all provisions in the Hepburn Act was the requirement placed on all common carriers to file annual accounts by a standardized system, and the power given the Commission to settle disputes between railroads and shippers. Yet, as Senator La Follette contended, the Hepburn Act did not go to the heart of the matter, for it gave the Commission no power to discover the value of transport properties and the cost of service, by which alone it could determine rates that were reasonable *per se*.

In 1910, following a sharp rise in railway rates, the Mann-Elkins Act empowered the Commission to suspend any inquiries until and unless the reasonableness thereof were ascertained. A new Commerce Court established to hear appeals from the Commission nullified so much of its work, however, that Congress abolished it in 1914. Finally as a result of governmental experience in operating railroads during the World War Congress passed in 1920 a comprehensive Transportation Act, placing almost the entire initiative and burden of rate-making on the Interstate Commerce Commission, with a view to securing the stockholders a ' fair return ' on their property, and for the public fair rates on freight shipments and passenger traffic. Further, the Commission was given complete jurisdiction over the financial operations of the railways in order to protect the investing public and its stockholders. The full sweep of its powers was strikingly indicated by Chief Justice Taft in an opinion upholding the constitutionality of the so-called ' recapture clause ' of the Transportation Act. 'The new act seeks affirmatively to build up a system of railways prepared to handle promptly all the interstate traffic of the country. It aims to give the owners of the railways an opportunity to earn enough to maintain their properties and equipment in such a state of efficiency that they can carry well this burden. To achieve this great purpose it puts the railroad systems of the country more completely than ever under the fostering guardianship and control of the Commission, which is to supervise their issue of securities, their car supply and distribution, their joint use of terminals, their construction of new lines, their abandonment of old lines . . . and to secure a fair return upon the properties of the carriers engaged.'

In 1917 the Supreme Court went so far as to declare ' It is not far from true — it may be it is entirely true, as said by the Commission — that " there can be nothing private or confidential in the activities and expenditures of a carrier engaged in interstate commerce." ' A Railway Labor Board was established to enforce earlier enactments of the Wilson administration about the wages and hours of railway employees, and to settle disputes. Under plenary government regulation the necessity for artificial competition has ended; and railways are now authorized and encouraged to combine with a view to economical operation, as Roosevelt had recommended in his annual message of 1908. This series of acts and regulations, together with a number of Supreme Court decisions, effectually deprived the states of control over a large part of even intrastate commerce. As the economic and transportation system of the country became a unit, it became increasingly difficult to differentiate between interstate and intrastate commerce. 'Effective control of the one must embrace some control over the other in view of the blending of both in actual operation,' said Chief Justice Taft in a recent decision. 'The same rails and the same cars carry both. The same men conduct them. Commerce is a unit, and does not regard state lines.' [5]

It would be rash to assume that the trust and the railway problems have been solved; but at least they have been removed from the political arena to administrative tribunals. Law and statesmanship cannot claim full credit for this happy consummation. With the immense growth of population and wealth since 1914, some 'trusts' have cracked of their own weight; and unexpected competition has arisen both for them and for the railways. Oil now competes with coal, both as a domestic fuel and for transport; new oil fields have been exploited, and new rivals to the Standard created; and electricity, developed by water-power and harnessed to thousands of new household appliances and machines, has pushed both oil and coal very hard. Henry Ford has become the richest man in the world without employing a penny of Wall Street capital, and has placed his motor-cars within reach of the majority of wage-earners.

Even more significant is the changed mutual attitude of business and public. The old generation of self-made pioneers, frenzied financiers, and feudal chieftains has passed away; with few exceptions the present generation of bankers, managers, and industrialists accepts the ethics of the 'square deal,' and submits with more or less grumbling to a reasonable government regulation. 'Service' has replaced 'efficiency' as the watchword. Big corporations, instead of showing the public where they get off, court public favor by advertising propaganda and common sense. In place of surly underlings, arrogant bosses, and magnates unapproachable as the Dalai Lama, one finds deferential employees, courteous captains, and smooth commanders. And the public, flattered by these attentions, and interested in corporate prosperity by widely distributed stockholding,[6] is inclined to regard unrepentant muck-rakers as agents of Moscow.

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[5] The Wisconsin Passenger Fare Case, 1922.

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[6] The number of stockholders in corporations in the United States increased from 4.4 to 14.4 million, 1900–23.

XLVII

THE BIG STICK

1903–1909

1. *Panama*

THERE is an old adage that says, "Speak softly, and carry a big stick, and you will go far."' This quotation from one of the President's earlier speeches provided cartoonists with another Rooseveltian attribute that proved most appropriate for his foreign policy. Not that the 'big stick' was used to incite war. It was Roosevelt who gave the Hague Tribunal its first case, the Pious Fund dispute with Mexico, who instructed his delegation at the second Hague Conference to work for the restriction of naval armaments, who was responsible for the return of the Boxer indemnity, who smoothed over a dangerous controversy with Japan, participated in the Algeciras Convention, and won the Nobel peace prize for successful mediation between Russia and Japan.

Roosevelt inherited from McKinley a Secretary of State, John Hay, whose experience as ambassador in London made him eager to meet the new British policy of friendship half-way. And that friendship persisted, despite the alarm over the invasion of England by American boots and shoes, steel rails, and cottons, and despite some dissatisfaction with Roosevelt's belligerent attitude in the Alaskan boundary controversy.[1] There is no truth in the oft-repeated story of a secret Anglo-American alliance, but there was in effect, during the entire Progressive Era, an Anglo-American understanding. Downing Street freely conceded to Washington a free hand in the New World; and in return the State Department, under Hay, Root,

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[1] In 1903, after the discovery of gold in the Klondike, Canada challenged the rightfulness of a long-established boundary. Roosevelt at first declined to submit a prescriptive right to arbitration; and in referring the question to a tribunal composed of three United States citizens, two Canadians, and the Lord Chief Justice of England, he warned the British government that he would not respect an award in favor of Canada. The tribunal decided, four to two, in favor of the United States.

Knox, and Bryan, refrained from any act or expression that would unfavorably affect British interests. The entente, if we may so call it, was consummated by the appointment of James Bryce to the Washington embassy in 1907.

A first-fruit of this understanding was the Panama canal. The voyage of the U.S.S. *Oregon* round the Horn in 1898 touched the popular imagination; and new responsibilities in the Caribbean and the Pacific made the construction and operation of an inter-oceanic canal a vital American interest. The Clayton-Bulwer treaty stood in the way, but not the government of Lord Salisbury. John Hay negotiated with Sir Julian Pauncefote in 1899 a treaty that the Senate, much to his chagrin, rejected because it prohibited fortifying the canal, and suggested an international guarantee. With the informal aid of Senator Lodge, chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, a new Hay-Pauncefote treaty was signed on 18 November 1901, and promptly ratified. This treaty gave the United States a free hand to construct and control the canal, subject only to the Suez rules of 1888, which merely forbade discrimination against foreign vessels.

For some years the relative merits of the Panama and Nicaragua routes had been pressed upon Congress by rival interests: the old French company, which wished to sell its concession on the Isthmus, and an American syndicate which had purchased a concession from the Republic of Nicaragua. The syndicate was the more influential; but the Panama group made headway by retaining a prominent New York lawyer who tactfully contributed $60,000 to the Republican campaign fund, and enlisted the powerful support of Senator Hanna. By the Spooner Act of 28 June 1902 Congress authorized the President to acquire the French concession for $40,000,000 if the Colombian Republic would cede a strip of land across the Isthmus of Panama, within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms. On 22 January 1903 Secretary Hay induced the Colombian chargé at Washington to sign a treaty granting the United States a hundred-year lease of a ten-mile-wide canal zone, for the lump sum of $10,000,000 and an annual rent of $100,000.

The Colombian government procrastinated about ratifying this treaty — as other governments have been known to do — in spite of a truculent warning from Hay that something dreadful would happen in case of amendment or rejection. We need not take too seriously the constitutional scruples of the Colombian government, since after the dreadful thing did happen the President of the Republic offered to summon a congress with 'new and friendly members' and rush the treaty through. Nor need we give much weight to Roosevelt's argument that Colombia placed him in a dilemma, of which the other horn was the inferior Nicaragua route.[2] The real obstacle to ratification was the forty millions coming to the French company from the United States. That company had no right to sell its concession without the permission of Colombia, for which permission the Colombian government proposed to charge ten millions, which the French company did not wish to give. There is no good evidence that Colombia attempted to 'hold up' the United States for a higher price than the treaty provided, although its chargé at Washington had not obtained the conditions required by his instructions.

In July 1903 there was held at New York an informal meeting of Panama business men, agents of the French company, and United States army officers, to discuss and plan a way out: the secession of the State of Panama from the Republic of Colombia. Without making any promise, or receiving any of the plotters, Roosevelt and Hay let their intentions become so notorious that Philippe Bunau-Varilla, the French company's agent at New York, advised the revolutionary junta at Panama to proceed in perfect assurance of American assistance. On 19 October three United States war vessels were ordered to the probable scene of hostilities, and on 2 November their commanders were instructed to occupy the Panama railway if a revolution broke out, and to prevent Colombia from landing troops within fifty miles of the Isthmus. The acting Secretary of State cabled the United States consul at Panama, 3 November 1903, 'Uprising on Isthmus reported. Keep Department promptly and fully informed.' The consul replied that afternoon, 'No uprising yet. Reported will be in the night'; and a few hours later, 'Uprising occurred to-night 6; no bloodshed. Government will be organized to-night.' The Colombian admiral on station was bribed to steam away, and the United States warships prevented troops being landed by the Colombian government to restore authority on its own soil. On 4 November a Panama declaration of independence was read in the Plaza; on the 6th Secretary Hay recognized the Republic of Panama, which by cable appointed Mr. Bunau-Varilla its plenipotentiary at Washington. With him, twelve days later, Hay concluded a treaty by which the Canal Zone was leased in perpetuity to the United States.

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[2] The President was required by the Spooner Act to turn to Nicaragua only if unable to obtain a canal zone from Colombia 'within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms.'

As Roosevelt afterwards declared in a speech, 'I took the Canal Zone.' Considering the circumstances, one would wish that he had not defended himself by citing a treaty of 1846 with Colombia, in which she guaranteed to the United States the right of transit, and in return was guaranteed her 'right of sovereignty and property over the said territory.' It would also have been better taste on Mr. Roosevelt's part to have refrained from hurling opprobrious epithets at fellow citizens who questioned the righteousness of his action. After all, the only difference at stake was a few million dollars more or less to the French stockholders; and there was no very pressing hurry for the canal to be built. Colombia was struck by the big stick, but all Latin America trembled. Subsequently, in 1921, the United States paid $25,000,000 to quiet Colombia; it would have been better to have paid a tithe of this sum eighteen years earlier.

Roosevelt was never scrupulous as to methods if a great end was in view, and he was most anxious to secure the Panama canal as a permanent monument to his administration. Over-eager to 'make the dirt fly,' he made some ill-considered appointments to the first Canal Zone Commission. The dirt would have flown to little purpose if Roosevelt had not appointed Colonel Goethals chief engineer and autocrat of the Canal Zone in 1907. Open to commercial traffic in August 1914, and formally completed six years later, the Panama canal was a triumph for American engineering and organization. No less remarkable was the sanitary work of Colonel Gorgas, made possible by the discoveries of Ronald Ross and Walter Reed, which gave one of the world's greatest pest-holes a lower death-rate than any American city; and the policing of Colonel Goethals, which converted the spot described by Froude as a 'hideous dungheap of moral and physical abomination' into a community of happy and healthy workers by hand and brain.

2. *Roosevelt's Caribbean Policy*

The Spanish-American War, the acquisition of Porto Rico, of Panama, and of a practical protectorate over Cuba, necessitated a new interpretation for the Monroe Doctrine with special reference to the Caribbean. Roosevelt's Caribbean policy, dictated primarily by considerations of national defence, may be described as opportunistic, benevolent, and paternalistic. In 1902 a crisis arose over the question of international intervention for the collection of the Venezuelan debt. Great Britain, Germany, and Italy established a blockade to force the recalcitrant dictator, Castro, to come to terms. Castro appealed to Roosevelt to arbitrate the claims, but inasmuch as American rights were involved, he very properly refused. Yet he deprecated the use of force for the collection of debts, and looked askance at the potential threat to the Monroe Doctrine. A crisis was avoided, however, when Germany, breaking away from the lead of Great Britain, agreed to submit her claims to arbitration. The Hague Tribunal settled the dispute satisfactorily, scaling down the demands from some forty million to eight million dollars.[3] Roosevelt expressed the general satisfaction with this solution in a speech at Chicago in which he said, ' Both powers [England and Germany] assured us in explicit terms that there was not the slightest intention on their part to violate the Monroe Doctrine, and this assurance was kept with an honorable good faith which merits full acknowledgement on our part.'[4]

Under the terms of the Platt amendment the United States could intervene in Cuba when necessary to restore order. Such a situation arose in 1906, and Roosevelt sent Secretary of War Taft to take charge of the island. When peace and stability were restored, the United States once more withdrew, leaving the affairs of Cuba in excellent condition. At the same time, however, Roosevelt solemnly warned the islanders that ' if elections become a farce, and if the insurrectionary habit becomes confirmed . . . it is absolutely out of the question that the Island should remain independent; and the United States, which has assumed the sponsorship before the civilized world for Cuba's career as a nation, would again have to intervene and see that the government was managed in such orderly fashion as to secure the safety of life and property.'

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[3] The American claims were reduced from some four million to eighty-one thousand dollars.

[4] Many years later Roosevelt gave an entirely different version of this incident. According to the story in his official biography, Germany was the ring-leader in the intervention, and Roosevelt forced her to submit to arbitration only by threatening to send Dewey's fleet to Venezuelan waters inside of twenty-four hours if the Kaiser did not back down. The evidence to support this version of the story, however, is scant and conflicting.

More important, however, as a precedent, was Roosevelt's intervention in Santo Domingo. In 1905 the financial affairs of the little island were in such desperate condition that she was threatened with foreign intervention and forcible debt-collecting. To forestall this danger Roosevelt placed an American receiver-general in charge of Dominican revenues, arranging to apply fifty-five per cent of customs-receipts to the discharge of the debts, and forty-five per cent to current expenses. The United States Senate refused to ratify this arrangement, but Roosevelt went ahead on his own authority. In a little more than two years Santo Domingo was transformed from a bankrupt island, without credit abroad or stability at home, into a prosperous and peaceful country, with revenues more than sufficient for ordinary expenses, and Roosevelt congratulated himself that he had 'put the affairs of the island on a better basis than they had been for a century.' Under President Wilson American supervision of finances was extended into a military occupation and protectorate which was not concluded until 1924.

American interests in Panama and potential interests in Nicaragua led Roosevelt to seek some means to prevent the chronic disorder in the Central American Republics. In 1907, in co-operation with President Diaz of Mexico, he arranged a conference of the Five Central American States at the White House, which concluded a series of peace treaties and established a Central American Court of Justice which endured until the United States rejected one of its decisions in 1916.

3. *World Politics*

For the first time the United States had a President whom the rulers of Europe looked upon as one of themselves, and who could play their game with their weapons. Roosevelt, more typically American than any President since Lincoln, loved, like Edward VII, to inject his personality into world politics. The most conspicuous instance of this was his mediation in the Russo-Japanese War, undertaken on the suggestion of the Japanese Emperor. Secretary Hay was then in his last illness, and the President negotiated directly with premiers and crowned heads. No one but he could have brought the two belligerents together at that time, or broken the deadlock from which the Treaty of Portsmouth emerged; but not every one will admit the wisdom of that treaty. Roosevelt preserved for the time being the integrity of China; but only by serving notice on

France and Germany that his country would join Japan if either power assisted Russia in the partition of the Celestial Empire. It is difficult to find any difference between this sort of thing and the system of secret treaties and secret diplomacy that Roosevelt, like other Americans, professed to abhor. He played the game with amateur audacity and professional skill, sounding out every step in advance; but if something had gone wrong the American people would have found themselves morally committed by their President to a fighting membership in the Anglo-Japanese alliance. For Roosevelt was not a bluffer. He always acted on the frontier maxim, 'Never draw unless you mean to shoot.' He got the drop on the cattle-thieves, and earned his Nobel peace prize, but the Peace of Portsmouth placed Japan in a position in Manchuria that brought her several times to the verge of war with the United States. If the door held open by John Hay swung to shortly after his death, it was, according to Tyler Dennett, because President Roosevelt's policy 'could not be continued except at the expense of the Constitution of the United States.'

By the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth, Roosevelt established for his country a right that she did not want, to be consulted in world politics. Again, in the Moroccan question of 1905–6, he quietly intervened to preserve peace with justice. The Convention of Algeciras was in part Roosevelt's work.

Roosevelt's growing radicalism had alienated conservatives and moderates even of his own party, and he had failed to satisfy doctrinaire liberals and professional reformers, whom he denounced as 'fanatics' and 'muck-rakers'; his vigorous assertion of executive leadership had antagonized Congress and powerful party leaders; and his sense of what constituted fair play and a 'square deal' brought down upon him at one time or another the wrath of labor and of capital, of the negroes and the Southern whites.[5] Yet no president since Jackson was so popular with the 'plain people.' Only fifty years old in 1908, and at the height of his power and popularity, Roosevelt could have been renominated if he had only said the word. But he had declared in 1904 that 'under no circumstances' would he be a candidate to succeed himself; and in deference to the third-term tradition he contented himself with nominating his successor. Secretary of State Elihu Root, Charles E. Hughes, reform Governor of New York, and William Howard Taft were the most available candidates, but Taft was closer to the President than any other man in high public office. Roosevelt held the Republican convention in the hollow of his hand, and Taft was duly nominated. It is probable that he would have been nominated even without Roosevelt's aid, although hardly so without the pecuniary assistance of the Taft family. Bryan, for the third and last time the Democratic candidate, carried only the solid South, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Nevada: but his popular vote was a million more than that of Parker in 1904, and forty-three per cent of the total.[6]

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[5] Some negro soldiers had terrorized Brownsville, Texas: when investigation failed to reveal the culprits, Roosevelt dismissed the entire detachment of negro soldiers for what he termed a conspiracy of silence. Obversely he antagonized Southerners by inviting Booker Washington to the White House and appointing a negro collector of the port of Charleston.

To Taft, then, on 4 March 1909 Roosevelt handed over a government that had grown rapidly in prestige and power during the last seven years: a government that was by way of becoming once more a servant of the people. The entire civil service had been stimulated by Roosevelt's vitality, no less than by the knowledge that efficiency and intelligence would be recognized and rewarded. The whole tone and temper of public life had changed for the better, and the popular interest in public affairs had never been more keen or intelligent. Yet in one respect Roosevelt had failed as a leader. He inspired loyalty to himself, rather than to his ideals and policies. With the conceit of a strong man he had forced and fascinated men of other beliefs to his and the public service, while neglecting to build up a progressive staff within the Republican party. It would never be quite the same old party again; but the Old Guard drew a sigh of relief when Roosevelt took ship to Africa.

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[6]

Taft	7,679,006
Bryan	6,409,106
Debs	420,820

XLVIII

THE TAFT ADMINISTRATION

1909–1913

1. *Ineptitude and Insurgency*

STRONG-WILLED Presidents of the United States have generally managed to nominate their successors; and if Roosevelt, unlike Jefferson and Jackson, did not bequeath the office to his Secretary of State, it was because the Secretary of War was more 'available.' William Howard Taft had no less experience in public affairs than Elihu Root. He had been an excellent judge, Governor of the Philippines, and diplomatist. The President loved him as a brother, and believed him the ideal person to carry out his policies. Many progressives indeed welcomed the change; for Roosevelt's excessive use of opprobrious adjectives had become tiresome, as his voluminous messages were tedious; and the last year of his administration was consumed in frenzied futility, for as soon as the Republican leaders in Congress learned that Roosevelt would retire in 1909, they ignored alike his recommendations and his threats. 'Big Bill' Taft, it was hoped, would apply the emollient of his humor and good nature to the wheels of legislation.

If Roosevelt appeared to be more progressive than he really was, and Taft less, at heart they both were much the same. Taft wished to clinch the Roosevelt policies, but in his own fashion. Roosevelt was primarily a man of action, Taft essentially a man of deliberation. As a constitutional lawyer he could not share Roosevelt's view that the President could do anything not forbidden by law; rather he could do only those things for which he had legal authority. The difference between the two was much like the difference between Jackson and Buchanan. Roosevelt gave the Presidency an organic connection with Congress; under Taft the relationship became formal, almost diplomatic, and the initiative passed to House and Senate leaders who thought reform had gone far enough, if not too far.

Roosevelt went to Africa in March 1909, as much to avoid embarrassing the new President by his presence as for the pleasure of big game hunting. They parted with warm expressions of trust and affection. Yet Roosevelt returned fifteen months later to find the Republican party divided, the progressive program halted, and liberals everywhere alienated; and in fifteen months more the two old friends were exchanging bitter reproaches before the public.

That this happened was partly Mr. Taft's fault, but mostly his misfortune. The Republican platform of 1908 contained a pledge to revise the tariff: a problem that Roosevelt left alone, fearing lest it should prove a red herring across the trail of the trusts. Yet many believed the high Dingley tariff of 1897 to be the nursing mother of trusts. Revision was popularly understood as reduction. President Taft proposed in his inaugural address that the new tariff should afford merely a protection equal to the difference between the cost of production at home and abroad; and that any consequent deficiency in the revenue be made up by a graduated inheritance tax. In order to shorten the uncertainty of business men, he summoned a special session of Congress for tariff legislation. Instead of attempting to draft a 'scientific' tariff (if there be such a thing), the two ways and means committees held hearings from interested manufacturers, and rushed through with little discussion the Payne-Aldrich bill, which raised duties on more than six hundred articles, and lowered them on a very few.[1] Possibly it was the best tariff that could have been obtained without prolonged and impartial investigation. Certainly it failed to meet the expectations of those who wanted reduction. Mr. Taft was much disturbed. The more progressive Republicans voted against the bill, and urged him to veto it as a violation of party pledges. Instead, he signed the Payne-Aldrich tariff, and shortly after, in a most unfortunate speech at Winona, Minnesota, pronounced it to be 'the best the country ever had.'

Mr. Taft allowed all but two of Roosevelt's cabinet to resign, and appointed men of different metal. James R. Garfield, Roosevelt's lieutenant in the conservation policy, was replaced in the Interior

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[1] 'Th' Republican party,' explained Dr. Dooley to Mr. Hennessy, 'has been thru to its promises. Look at th' free list if ye don't believe it. Practically ivrything nicessary to existence comes in free. Here it is. Curling stones, teeth, sea moss, newspapers, nux vomica, Pulu, canary bird seed, divvy-divvy, spunk, hog bristles, marshmallows, silk worm eggs, stilts, skeletons, an' leeches. Th' new tariff bill puts these familyar commodyties within th' reach iv all.' Mr. Dooley on The Tariff, in *Mr. Dooley Says.* (Scribners') p. 148.

Department by R. A. Ballinger, who was presently charged by Gifford Pinchot, the chief forester, with letting the Guggenheim interests obtain reserved coal lands in Alaska. The President referred this quarrel in his official family to the House of Representatives, which exonerated Ballinger; and thus placed himself in a dilemma of which he chose the horn of dismissing Pinchot. Yet Mr. Taft was a friend to conservation. He was the first President to withdraw oil lands from public sale. He asked for and obtained from Congress the authority to reserve the coal lands which Roosevelt had reserved without specific authority, and set up the Bureau of Mines as guardian of the nation's mineral resources. Pinchot was replaced by the head of the Yale School of Forestry, and his policy was continued by the purchase of great timbered tracts in the Appalachians.

The progressive Republicans in Senate and House, led by La Follette of Wisconsin, Beveridge of Indiana, and Norris of Nebraska, began to suspect Taft of playing traitor to the Roosevelt policies. Their first attack was directed against 'Uncle Joe' Cannon, Speaker of the House since 1903, 'a hard, narrow old Boeotian,' according to Roosevelt, who controlled a well-oiled legislative mill which rejected progressive grist. In March 1910 progressive Republicans of the House joined with the Democratic minority to curb the Speaker's powers. Having effected this revolution in procedure, they became known as 'insurgents' within the Republican ranks. In January 1911 they and the Senate progressives formed the National Progressive Republican League, in the hope of wresting control of the party from the Old Guard. Through his failure to oppose Cannon, Taft's prestige was involved in his defeat. The progressive cause gained, but legislative efficiency lost. Authority was needed to enforce party discipline in a body so unwieldy and fluctuating as the House of Representatives, and the Speaker's whip in due course was transferred to the floor leader.

Yet the ineptitude of Taft's administration and the growing revolt against him must not blind us to his real achievements. During his term much regulatory legislation was enacted. The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 strengthened the Interstate Commerce Commission on one side, while weakening it on another. The Department of Commerce and Labor, established at Roosevelt's instance in 1903, was wisely divided. A postal savings-bank and a parcel-post service — reforms long overdue, much wanted by the people, but opposed by certain interests — were established by law (1910, 1912). A Commission of Economy and Efficiency to examine into the national administration was created, and an act requiring publicity for campaign expenditures passed. Alaska, peevish and discontented since the collapse of the Klondike gold bubble, at last obtained full territorial government (1913). New Mexico and Arizona, last of the continental territories save Alaska, became the forty-seventh and forty-eighth states of the Union, though here again, Taft unnecessarily compromised himself with the Progressives by refusing to certify the admission of Arizona until it expunged from its constitution a provision for the popular recall of judges. Once admitted as a state, Arizona promptly restored the device. Approximately twice as many prosecutions for violation of the Sherman Act were instituted during Taft's four years in office as during Roosevelt's seven. Significant of the rapidly expanding envelope of law was the amendment of the Federal Constitution. As James Bryce pointed out, the difficulties of this process were such that the Constitution had not been amended since 1802, excepting 'in the course of a revolutionary movement which had dislocated the Union itself.' The Sixteenth or income-tax amendment, and the Seventeenth Amendment transferring the election of United States Senators from state legislatures to the people, were adopted by Congress in 1909–10 and ratified by the requisite number of states in 1913. The one was required to override a decision of the Supreme Court; the other made the Senate responsive to the popular will, without impairing its extensive powers.

Taft's mistakes have loomed larger than his accomplishments. Yet his real misfortune was to be President in a period when the cost of living was rising rapidly, to keep pace with the increased world supply of gold. Railway rates were also going up. Hard-pressed wage-earners and small-salaried men blamed the tariff and the trusts. Big corporations had multiplied many-fold; it was natural to conclude that Republican regulation of trusts and railways was mere humbug. In the mid-term election of 1910 the Democrats won a majority in the House, and very much narrowed the Republican majority in the Senate. Democratic governors were elected in several Eastern states such as Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, and New Jersey, where Dr. Woodrow Wilson, late president of Princeton University, made his first step towards a larger presidency. The torch of progress was passing from the Republicans; would the Democrats have the sense to grasp it?

2. *Canadian Reciprocity and Dollar Diplomacy*

With a lawyer in the White House and in the Department of State, American diplomacy returned to its traditional channels. By an exchange of notes in 1908, Japan and the United States agreed to support the independence and integrity of China, and the open door. Japan, nevertheless, supported by the Triple Entente, began to consolidate her position in Manchuria. Secretary Knox attempted to meet this situation by proposing in 1909 to neutralize the Manchurian railways. He had not felt out the Powers, as Roosevelt would have done, and his plan was rejected somewhat contemptuously by Russia and Japan. Unseen hands were closing the phantom open door.

A comparison of Roosevelt's and Taft's policy in Central America recalls the old adage that some persons can make off with a horse, while others cannot look over the stable wall. Secretary Knox signed treaties with Nicaragua and Honduras similar to Roosevelt's with Santo Domingo, underwriting American loans by an American guarantee against revolution and defalcation. The Knox treaties were rejected by the Senate, and his policy both there and in the Far East was called 'dollar diplomacy.' Marines to clip coupons for Wall Street, forsooth! In 1911 President Taft, a warm friend to international peace, concluded treaties with both England and France for the arbitration of all disputes, including those involving 'national honor.' Their ratification would have been a fitting celebration of the centenary of Ghent. The German-American press and the professional Irish-Americans broke out into shrieks of dissent. A presidential election was coming, and the Senate rejected the treaties.

Again it was Mr. Taft's misfortune, not his fault, that tariff reciprocity with Canada failed. In November 1910 three United States Commissioners concluded with two members of the Dominion Parliament a reciprocity agreement to be adopted by identical legislative acts. The agreement provided free trade in primary food products, which would naturally flow from Canada southward, and a large reduction on manufactures, which would obviously go the other way. It was a sincere and statesmanlike effort by Mr. Taft to cement friendly relations, but bad politics. The insurgents, representing for the most part agrarian states, were able to argue that reciprocity was a good bargain for the trusts, which would gain a new market and free raw materials at the farmer's expense. Republican and Democratic votes pushed the bill through Congress. In the debate Champ Clark, the new Democratic Speaker, said, ' I am for it because I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions clear to the North Pole.' Mr. Clark awoke the next day to find himself notorious. His words may have been a joke, as he feebly explained; more likely they were spoken for buncombe; certainly they expressed no current American sentiment. But they roused the fighting spirit of Canadian loyalty, were repeated in Parliament, and awoke to loud entreaty Rudyard Kipling's lyre. Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the Canadian premier, was forced to appeal to the country. Canadian manufacturers, who feared to lose the protected home market they had so carefully built up, financed the Conservative opposition; and in September 1911 reciprocity went down to defeat with Sir Wilfrid.

3. *Roosevelt's Return*

Theodore Roosevelt, after enjoying good hunting in Africa and a triumphal progress through Europe, returned to New York in June 1910. Greeted with an hysterical enthusiasm that somewhat dismayed him, he insisted on settling down at Sagamore Hill to pursue his many non-political interests. The *Outlook* made him associate editor, and afforded him an organ. But the rôle of sage was not congenial to Mr. Roosevelt, and the public would not be denied the delight of seeing and hearing their hero. Before the summer was over, he was making public addresses in the West, which showed unmistakably that shooting lions and dining with crowned heads had not dulled his ' fighting edge ' for progress. His ideas, clarified and systematized as the ' New Nationalism,' included not only the old Roosevelt policies of honesty in government and regulation of big business, but the relatively new conception of social justice — the reconstruction of society by political action. This principle involved some very vigorous and wholly justified criticism of recent Supreme Court decisions, which had nullified social legislation in the states. In his Osawatomie speech of 31 August, he announced, ' I stand for the square deal. . . . I mean not merely that I stand for fair play under the present rules of the game, but that I stand for having those rules changed so as to work for a more substantial equality of opportunity and of reward for equally good service.' That autumn, at the request of Governor Hughes of New York, he actively promoted the adoption of direct primaries in that state.

Conservative Republicans shuddered at the 'New Nationalism,' and feared a breach with President Taft. Roosevelt visited his old friend at the temporary summer capital, continued a friendly correspondence for several months, and refrained from public criticism of his administration. Yet the two men were being pulled apart. Insurgents and displaced Progressives like Pinchot were continually telling Roosevelt that the President had surrendered to the Old Guard, and entreating him to be a candidate in 1912. Mr. Taft, on the other hand, was surrounded by friends and relatives whose advice resembled that of the Princess of Wales to George III: 'George, be a King!'

After the Democratic victories of 1910, and the Republicans' loss of the House, it was clear that Taft could not succeed himself. Senator La Follette of Wisconsin, who had an excellent record as a reforming state governor, put himself forward in 1911 as insurgent candidate for the Republican nomination, on obtaining Roosevelt's assurance that he would not enter the contest. La Follette, however, had few admirers outside the Mississippi valley, and his apparent physical and mental collapse during a speech on 2 February 1912 deflated his boom.

Roosevelt had declared in 1904 that 'under no circumstances' would he again be a candidate for the Presidency. Taft was entitled to his support as his own choice, his friend, and at least a would-be progressive. To oppose Taft would impeach his own judgment. As late as 20 December 1911 he wrote, 'I do not want to be President again, I am not a candidate, I have not the slightest idea of becoming a candidate.' But even then he was weakening. On 2 February La Follette's candidacy went flat, and a week later the Republican governors of seven states signed a letter to Roosevelt, urging him to announce his candidacy. A few days later President Taft publicly denounced persons who had supported the 'New Nationalism' as destructive radicals, 'political emotionalists,' and 'neurotics.' These words touched Roosevelt on the raw, since a rumor that he was losing his reason was being circulated. They were exactly the sort of challenge to dissolve his lingering doubts, and arouse a violent spirit of combat. 'My hat is in the ring,' he announced on 21 February.

Later in the same day he delivered an address advocating the initiative, the referendum, and the popular recall of judicial decisions: doctrines which alienated thousands of Republican voters, revealed a new streak of doctrinaire radicalism in Roosevelt, and made his nomination extremely unlikely.

La Follette stayed in the fight, and the three-cornered contest for the Republican nomination became unseemly and bitter. Taft accused Roosevelt of appealing to class hatred; Roosevelt accused Taft of biting the hand that fed him; and many other things were said that would better have been left unsaid. Thirteen of the states chose their delegates to the party conventions by the new method of popular primaries, and 73 per cent of these delegates were instructed to vote for Roosevelt. But it was doubtful whether he had obtained a majority of the whole Republican convention. The Southern districts, Republican rotten boroughs, returned a solid block of Taft delegates who represented little more than the federal office-holders in their districts. By electing Elihu Root temporary chairman, the conservatives obtained control of the convention machinery, and awarded practically all the contested seats to Taft men.[2] Roosevelt, on the ground that his legitimate majority had been stolen, instructed his delegates to take no further part in the proceedings; and Taft was renominated by a strong majority (June 1912).

Roosevelt and his followers at once took steps to found a new party. Local organizations were rapidly formed, and on 5 August 1912 the first Progressive party convention met at Chicago, amid scenes of febrile enthusiasm that recalled the Populist, and the early days of the Republican party. 'We stand at Armageddon, and we battle for the Lord,' announced Roosevelt to his enraptured followers, who nominated him by acclamation. Another *mot* of the beloved leader, 'I am feeling like a bull moose,' gave the new party an appropriate symbol, beside the Republican elephant and the Democratic donkey.

The formation of the Progressive party was a mistake from every point of view — save that of the Democratic party. Roosevelt's secession with his following lost many good men their political careers, and ended all chance of liberalizing the Republican party in that generation; for although the Progressives eventually returned to the fold, it was with their tails between their legs. The true progressive strategy of the moment was that of La Follette — to remain in the party, let the Old Guard lead it to defeat, and wait for 1916. Roosevelt's mistake was so colossal, irreparable, and so contrary to his long-settled principles of loyalty to friends and party, that one naturally asks whether an appetite for power were not his moving force, for Roosevelt's instinct was Napoleonic — always for action. He simply allowed himself to be persuaded that he and he alone could save the country.

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[2] This question of the contested delegates is so enmeshed in precedent and party technique as to be almost insoluble for the layman. It is asserted on the one hand that the same 'steam-roller' methods were used by Roosevelt in 1904 and 1908; on the other that there was no precedent for the action taken by Mr. Root. It seems on the whole probable that even if all the contests had been fairly decided, Roosevelt would not have had a majority; but that if Roosevelt had allowed his avowed delegates to vote, they would have won enough Taft votes to get the nomination. As one member told the writer, the negro delegates were 'straining on the leash' to vote for Roosevelt.

The Progressives hoped that they would break the solid South; but Roosevelt had invited Booker Washington to dinner at the White House. And the South had a candidate of her own.

XLIX

WOODROW WILSON

1912–1917

1. *The Professor in Politics*

THE young men of the South who lived through the dark days of reconstruction without allowing the bitterness of it to enter their souls came out clean as tempered steel. Such men were Basil Gildersleeve, Walter H. Page, and Thomas Woodrow Wilson. The year after Taft entered Yale, and the year before Roosevelt entered Harvard, Woodrow Wilson, son and grandson of Scots Presbyterian ministers, came up to Princeton.[1] At the Hasty Pudding Club of Harvard, 'Teddy' would become so excited in debate as to lose the power of articulation. 'Tommy' was remembered at Whig Hall, Princeton, for having lost an interclub debating contest rather than defend protection against free trade. Before graduating from Harvard, Roosevelt wrote his first book, *The Naval History of the War of 1812,* which sounded the note of preparedness for war on which his life closed. In his last year at Princeton, Wilson published an article exposing the irresponsibility of congressional government, which he did so much to remedy. Roosevelt entered public life in 1881; Wilson, after a brief and unprofitable practice of law, took his doctorate at Johns Hopkins, and began a quiet career of teaching and scholarship. In 1890, the year after Roosevelt was appointed to the Civil Service Commission, Wilson obtained a chair of political science at Princeton; and in 1902, the year after Roosevelt became President of the United States, Wilson was chosen president of Princeton University.

While Roosevelt fought political privilege in the nation, Wilson contended with social privilege at Princeton. Originally an austere Presbyterian college, Princeton had become a haven of the well-to-do, where young bloods monopolized the amenities of university life. Wilson attempted, too rigidly and arbitrarily, to assort the undergraduates in quadrangular groups. Andrew F. West, a classical scholar of equal determination, spoiled the symmetry of his scheme; and in 1910 Wilson stepped out of the academic cloister.

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[1] Wilson was born in 1856, Taft in 1857, Roosevelt in 1858. They graduated respectively in 1879, 1878, and 1880. Wilson dropped his first name when he became an author.

As a scholar, publicist, and leader in education, Wilson enjoyed a national reputation; but active politics were considered a closed sphere to professors. George Harvey, editor of *Harper's Weekly,* in search of an honest Democratic candidate for the Presidency, mentioned Woodrow Wilson in 1906. The suggestion was greeted with jeers; but the professor took it to heart. In 1910 the Democrats of New Jersey — an amorphous state, half bedroom to New York and half to Philadelphia, controlled by corporations attracted by the laxity of its laws — wished to 'start something' with a new sort of candidate. They had long been out of power, and their none too savory reputation might be sweetened by a scholar. At George Harvey's suggestion the bosses nominated Wilson, and the people elected him governor. Chosen for the job of window-dressing, Wilson proceeded to clean up the shop. Harvey dropped him as an ingrate, but a silent politician from Texas named Colonel House took him up, and Wilson became a leading candidate for the presidential nomination in 1912.

2. *The Election of 1912*

The Democratic party had changed singularly little since Andrew Jackson's time. It was composed of an emotional and somewhat radical Western wing, represented by Bryan, Irish-Americans of the industrial states, who wanted power and office, and the solid South, including almost every white man in the late Confederacy, with its new western colonies of Oklahoma, New Mexico, and Arizona. Only tradition and the hope of victory held these sections together, but the issues of liquor and religion that almost split the party in 1924 and again in 1928 had not yet arisen; and the rural tories of the South had much sympathy with rebels against the Northern industrial bosses. In only one election since the Civil War had the party polled less than forty-three per cent of the total vote cast for President, but it wanted leadership. Cleveland's victories had proved barren, Bryan had thrice failed, and the majority leaders in Congress were elderly and timid. When the Democratic national convention met in Baltimore (June 1912), the majority of delegates were pledged for Champ Clark of Missouri, the candidate of Tammany Hall and of William Randolph Hearst. Mr. Underwood of Alabama represented the 'Bourbons' (as the Old Guard of this party was called); Governor Wilson the progressive wing. Bryan, still a power in his party, required all his art and eloquence to drive the money-changers from the temple, but by a dramatic repudiation of any candidate who had the support of the New York bosses, he withdrew his support from Clark and threw it to Woodrow Wilson, who was nominated on the forty-sixth ballot.

The presidential election, then, became a three-cornered contest between Taft, Roosevelt, and Wilson; but really between the two last, as rival bidders for the popular feeling against privilege. It was a year of social unrest. A new syndicalist movement, the Industrial Workers of the World, had arisen in 1905, had organized the migratory harvest hands of the West, and was contesting the skilled-worker field with the A. F. of L. The I. W. W. took charge of a great strike in the polyglot textile city of Lawrence, Massachusetts, and displayed to the shocked middle classes red banners with lawless and godless mottoes. Thus the campaign was fought with revolution looming as alternative to reform; and in that year the Socialist party, under E. V. Debs, reached high tide. Samuel Gompers, analysing the Progressive platform as mere eye-wash for Caesarism, advised the members of the A. F. of L. to vote for Wilson.

Taft and the Republicans accepted the ultra-conservative rôle now thrust upon them, and preached checks and balances and protection of minorities as the essence of freedom. There was little to choose between the Democratic and Progressive platforms. The latter, as Roosevelt said, 'represented the first effort on a large scale to translate abstract formulas of economic and social justice into concrete American nationalism.' Both denounced the Payne-Aldrich tariff, but the Democratic platform had the cleaner-cut tariff plank. With the Roosevelt doctrine of regulation the Democrats substantially agreed. Wilson's 'New Freedom,' a counterblast to Roosevelt's 'New Nationalism,' was composed of the same ingredients. Their methods of campaigning, however, had no more in common than their personalities. Roosevelt's tone was that of a fighting parson; Wilson already showed some glint of the spiritual quality of Lincoln. Roosevelt, with biblical imagery and voice like a shrilling fife, stirred men to wrath, to combat, and to antique virtue; Wilson, serene and confident, lifted men out of themselves by phrases that sang in their hearts, to a vision of a better world. It was the Old Testament against the New, and the New won.

Wilson polled only forty-two per cent of the vote, but won an overwhelming majority in the electoral college. Roosevelt, with twenty-seven per cent of the vote, carried six states. Taft, with twenty-three per cent, carried only Utah and Vermont.[2] The Democrats swept Congress, carrying the House by 290 to 145 and the Senate by 51 to 45, and they were victorious in 21 of the state gubernatorial contests. It was a complete repudiation of the old order.

Progressives thought of 1856 and were confident of triumph in 1916. The Grand Old Party, as they saw it, had gone the way of the Whigs—killed by a great moral issue that it would not face. Another bland Buchanan was in the White House. But the Old Guard neither died nor surrendered. The Progressives were little more than a candidate and his following, certainly not an organic party. They elected only eighteen members to the House and one to the Senate. And Woodrow Wilson, instead of playing the part of Buchanan, welded his party into a fit instrument of his great purpose 'to square every process of our national life again with the standards we so proudly set up at the beginning and have always carried at our hearts.'

3. *The Inaugural*

Few men have ever come to high office in the United States so unprepared politically as was Woodrow Wilson, but none ever showed a firmer or profounder grasp of the problems of statesmanship with which he had to cope, or a shrewder or livelier understanding of the game of politics which he was to play. Possibly the most remarkable characteristic of Wilson was his capacity for growth, his adaptability to his new position, his ability to orient himself in new problems and circumstances and reinterpret them in the light of the past and of his own convictions. Born an aristocrat, bred a conservative, trained a Hamiltonian, he became the greatest leader of the plain people since Lincoln, and a democrat

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[2] The popular vote was:

Wilson	6,286,214
Roosevelt	4,126,020
Taft	3,483,922
Debs	897,011

who articulated the ideals of Jeffersonian democracy to the conditions of a new day.

Few even of the new President's friends expected more than a respectable Presidency. Wilson lacked the common touch, and loved humanity in the abstract rather than people in particular. Unlike Roosevelt, he could not descend into the market-place or emulate the prize-ring; throughout his eight years of office he was always aloof, and often alone. His humor and warm affections appeared only to a few intimate friends. The obstinacy that had been his undoing in the academic world was not likely to be a useful virtue in the Presidency, if Cleveland's career were a fair test. And no President since Jefferson had been able to turn an intellectual equipment to public service. 'Wilson is clean, strong, high-minded and cold-blooded,' wrote the warm-hearted man who became his Secretary of the Interior; but he was also a Southerner, likely to be ineffective in performance, and to take refuge from facts in generalities. Loving the quiet places of life, his term was placed in an era of fierce contention; without Lincoln's power to express himself in words of one syllable, he was certain to be misunderstood.

Wilson's inaugural address, striking a note of high idealism and couched in words reminiscent of Jefferson's first inaugural, aroused the hopes and enthusiasm of liberals everywhere. 'No one can mistake,' he said boldly, 'the purpose for which the Nation now seeks to use the Democratic Party. It seeks to use it to interpret a change in its plans and point of view. Some old things with which we had grown familiar, and which had begun to creep into the very habit of our thought and of our lives, have altered their aspect as we have latterly looked critically upon them, with fresh, awakened eyes. . . . Some new things . . . have come to assume the aspect of things long believed in and familiar, stuff of our own convictions. We have been refreshed by a new insight into our own life.'

It was by the light of this new vision that Wilson examined the processes by which America had achieved its greatness, revealed the ruthlessness, the waste, and the corruption, and reckoned anew the cost, not by the balance sheet of business but by the ledger of social well-being. 'We have been proud of our industrial achievements, but we have not hitherto stopped thoughtfully enough to count the human cost, the cost of lives snuffed out, of energies overtaxed and broken, the fearful physical and spiritual cost to the men and women and children upon whom the dead weight and burden of it all has fallen pitilessly the years through. The groans and agony of it all had not yet reached our ears, the solemn, moving undertone of our life, coming up out of the mines and factories and out of every home where the struggle had its intimate and familiar seat. . . . The great Government we loved has too often been made use of for private and selfish purposes, and those who used it had forgotten the people.'

The inaugural was not a jeremiad, however, but a program of constructive reform. The Jeffersonian ideal that that government is best that governs least was metamorphosed by this latter-day Jeffersonian into the ideal that 'our duty is to cleanse, to reconsider, to restore, to correct the evil without impairing the good, to purify and humanize every process of our common life.' Nor was this merely the vague and nebulous expression of a cloistered academic. 'We have itemized with some degree of particularity the things that ought to be altered,' he said, and named the tariff, 'which makes the Government a facile instrument in the hands of private interests'; an antiquated and inadequate banking and currency system; a burdensome and wasteful industrial system which 'exploits without renewing or conserving the natural resources of the country'; an inefficient and neglected agricultural system; 'water-courses undeveloped, waste places unreclaimed, forests untended, unregarded waste heaps at every mine.' And not only was it the function of the government to serve and regulate the larger economic interests of the nation, but it must be 'put at the service of humanity, in safeguarding the health of the Nation, the health of its men and its women and its children, as well as their rights in the struggle for existence. . . . There can be no equality or opportunity, if men and women and children be not shielded in their lives, their very vitality, from the consequences of great industrial and social processes which they can not alter, control, or singly cope with. . . . Sanitary laws, pure food laws, and laws determining conditions of labor which individuals are powerless to determine for themselves are intimate parts of the very business of justice and legal efficiency.'

But the reinterpretation of democracy was to be no 'cool process of mere science.' The Scotch Presbyterian in Wilson visualized the contest as one between the forces of good and of evil. 'The Nation has been deeply stirred, stirred by a solemn passion, stirred by the knowledge of wrong, of ideals lost, of government too often debauched and made an instrument of evil. The feelings with which we face this new age of right and opportunity sweep across our heartstrings like some air out of God's own presence, where justice and mercy are reconciled and the judge and the brother are one.' This was no mere political, no partisan task. It was the Armageddon of democracy. 'I summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men, to my side. God helping me, I will not fail them, if they will but counsel and sustain me.'

No administration of modern times has been inaugurated with such a passion for righteousness and justice. Yet it was not in the nature of American politics to move on a high level of idealism, nor to surrender without a struggle the stakes of battle. Nor did Wilson himself forego the advantages of partisanship; on the contrary he considered himself not only the head of the nation, but the head of his party as well, and no more consummate political strategist ever cracked the whip of party regularity. It was Wilson's fortune during his first administration to have behind him a reasonably united party, eager to follow his leadership. It was his misfortune, during his second administration, to conjure up the most bitter political antagonisms, the fiercest partisan opposition, in recent American history, and to have a large part of his reform program imperilled by the accidents of foreign affairs.

4. *Legislative Achievement*

Colonel E. M. House elected himself *l'éminence grise* of the Wilson administration. The cabinet was selected by him, as most cabinets have been by some one, in order to reunite a party considerably torn by the contest for nomination. Bryan for Secretary of State, ensuring the support of his immense following for the administration, appeared to be a master-stroke until there was work for him to do. William G. McAdoo, Wilson's campaign manager and future son-in-law, became a great Secretary of the Treasury. L. M. Garrison, as Secretary of War, proved too warlike for his chief, and was dropped after three years. Franklin K. Lane, Canadian by birth and Californian by residence, proved an ideal Secretary of the Interior to reconcile the Far West with conservation. The others were nonentities. It was not a strong group. The majority were Southerners, as by the rule of seniority were most of the chairmen of House and Senate committees. New England, for perhaps the first time in

American history, was not represented in the cabinet, although Massachusetts, for the first time since 1804,[3] had voted with Virginia.

When Congress met on 7 April 1913, President Wilson revived a practice abandoned by Jefferson, of addressing both Houses in person. A slight thing in itself, this act caught popular approval. It restored the President's initiative in law-making, and established a relation between the 'two ends of Pennsylvania Avenue' in the best sort of way. For Wilson's power over men left him when he stepped off the rostrum; unlike Roosevelt, he could not persuade or browbeat a recalcitrant congressman in private conversation.

Congress had been summoned to special session, as in 1909, to revise the tariff, but in a very different spirit and with very different results than in 1909. 'We must abolish everything that bears even the semblance of privilege or of any kind of artificial advantage and put our business men and producers under the stimulation of a constant necessity to be efficient, economical and enterprising,' Wilson said in his message to Congress, and when the lobbying of powerful business interests became flagrant, he lashed them publicly. The Underwood tariff of 3 October 1913 was the lowest since the Civil War. Judged by British standards it was still a protective tariff, but more than one hundred materials and articles were placed on the free list. Unfortunately it never had a proper test. The European war so deranged American economic life as to bring a business depression in the winter of 1914–15 which was followed by artificial prosperity. A graduated federal tax on incomes, constitutional since the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment (1913), was appended to the Underwood tariff bill.

The greatest measure of Wilson's first year was the Federal Reserve Act of 23 December 1913, which entirely reconstructed the national banking and currency system. The existing system, inelastic and obsolete, had contributed largely to the panic of 1907; but the Republicans had been unable to remedy matters. A great central bank would have been the ideal substitute; but the tradition of Jackson's contest with 'the monster' was still strong in the Democratic party, and a federal investigation had uncovered the existence of a so-called money trust, controlled by a handful of New York financiers. By the Federal Reserve Act the country was divided into twelve districts, each with a Federal Reserve bank: a private corporation empowered to issue banknotes against commercial paper and other liquid assets. A Federal Reserve Board, appointed by the President and connected with the Treasury Department, controls the rate of discount and superintends the Federal Reserve banks, which in turn are articulated with such local banks as wish to become members of the system. That the Democratic party with its rural constituencies could have passed the most important piece of financial legislation since Hamilton was no less remarkable than the persistency with which President Wilson kept Congress to its task, even refusing a Christmas recess until the bill was ready for his signature.

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[3] Excepting 1820, when there was but one presidential candidate.

The Federal Trade Commission and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act of 1914 enacted the repeated recommendations of President Roosevelt — who refused to admit the connection, or to discover any good qualities in the Wilson administration. The Clayton Act included what Mr. Gompers called 'labor's charter of freedom': a section declaring that labor unions could never be considered unlawful combinations *per se;* that strikes, boycotting, and picketing were not, as such, violations of federal law; and that the injunction could no longer be used by federal courts in labor disputes, unless to prevent irreparable injury. Although these provisions were largely declaratory of existing practice, they relieved the mind of labor from fear lest the incidents of the Pullman strike of 1894 should be repeated. They did not, like the British Act of 1906, relieve unions from corporate responsibility for damage caused by their members. The Federal Trade Commission, consisting of five members to be appointed by the President, was given authority to investigate corporations engaged in interstate commerce, and require annual reports, to investigate alleged violations of anti-trust laws, and to prevent unfair competition. This legislation, dealing in a realistic fashion with the trust problem, fulfilled to a large extent the campaign and platform promises of the Democratic party.

This list by no means exhausts the reform and social legislation initiated by Wilson and enacted by the Democratic Congress. A rural credits law, a Workmen's Compensation Act for the federal civil service, and a law excluding from inter-state commerce the products of child labor, were passed in 1916. The La Follette Seamen's Act of 1915 did much for the sailors' well-being, and abolished the crime of desertion in the American merchant marine; but did not, as its advocates predicted, restore American supremacy at sea —

nor, for that matter, did the United States Shipping Board, created in 1916. All in all, the Democratic party made a splendid record of intelligent leadership and harmonious co-operation. They had proved that progress and statesmanship were not the monopoly of the Republicans; that the progressive movement, which the Populists had begun and Roosevelt made popular, transcended party lines.

5. *Neighbors and Dependencies*

Since 1900 it had been an article of Democratic faith that the Philippine Islands should be given their independence at the earliest practicable moment. Congress accordingly passed the Jones Act (1916) giving the Islands dominion status, and promising absolute independence, 'as soon as a stable government can be established.' In his final message to Congress Wilson reverted to this promise, and requested that it be fulfilled, but the Republicans were in control and his demand went unheeded. Francis Burton Harrison, the Governor-General appointed by President Wilson, so construed his own powers that they became merely nominal. The civil service was 'Filipinized' to a point where efficiency suffered and corruption entered. A commission consisting of W. Cameron Forbes (Roosevelt's Governor-General) and General Wood (Roosevelt's favorite officer), appointed by President Harding in 1921, reported that the insular government was demoralized and the people unfit to defend themselves or to govern justly the Moslem minority. General Wood was appointed Governor with enhanced authority, independence was indefinitely postponed, and the nationalist movement became more intense and bitter. Fortunately, the islands have not yet provided a field for corporate exploitation; but if present plans for huge rubber plantations are carried out, independence is not likely to arrive by mutual consent.

President Wilson, in 1913, was not primarily interested in foreign affairs; and Mr. Bryan used the State Department mainly to promote compulsory arbitration treaties. In a speech of 27 October 1913 at Mobile, Alabama, the President declared to the somewhat doubting ears of Latin America that the United States would never add a foot to its territory by conquest; but in practice he continued in the Caribbean the 'dollar diplomacy' of Taft and Knox. Hayti, in the throes of a revolution, was occupied in 1915 by United States marines, and after the lapse of fifteen years remains a colonial appanage of the Navy Department. Nicaragua became a financial protectorate like the Dominican Republic, which, at the same time, was advanced to the status of an occupied republic. On the other hand, Wilson renounced American participation in the three-power loan to China, which Knox had arranged.

Mexico gave the administration a much more serious problem. In 1911 Porfirio Diaz, the dictator of Mexico for thirty-five years, resigned as the result of a revolutionary movement that he could no longer suppress. Unlike most American revolutions, this upheaval in Mexico was not political, but social. Diaz had given his country order at the expense of every sort of liberty. The national domain of 135 million acres was cut up into latifundia (*haciendas*), or used to augment the already swollen estates of less than one thousand great landowners (*haciendados*). At the same time Diaz pursued a policy resembling the enclosures of eighteenth-century England, expropriating and allotting in severalty the communal lands of the Indian villages. The new owners were able to exact forced labor from the landless peons by keeping them in perpetual debt for food and supplies. Education remained in the hands of the Church. The Mexican government was more autocratic than that of Russia, the ruling class more concentrated and powerful, the condition of the people worse. Foreign mining and other interests, to which Diaz gave generous concessions and ensured order, naturally supported his regime.

The revolution of 1910–11 was conducted by a small doctrinaire middle class under Francisco I. Madero, but supported by the peons in the hope of recovering their communal lands. Madero was installed as constitutional President in 1911, but neither kept order nor satisfied the aspirations of the landless. A counter-revolution of the *haciendados* displaced him by assassination in February 1913, and installed Victoriana Huerta as President. Although unable to exert his authority over the greater part of the country, which was fast falling into anarchy, Huerta was promptly recognized by Great Britain and most of the Powers. Strong pressure was exerted on President Wilson by American business interests to do the same. The average American and European could see no other outcome but a restoration of the same autocracy which was responsible for the very conditions repugnant to his sense of property and order. President Wilson refused to be moved. The situation also threatened to becloud Anglo-American relations, for the controversy over

Panama canal tolls was on, and the United States government had reason to believe that the British Ambassador at Mexico, a strong supporter of Huerta, represented British oil interests as well as the Foreign Office. Colonel House first met Sir Edward Grey in July 1913, in order to talk this matter over. At a series of private and informal conferences in Washington between Colonel House, Sir William Tyrrell, and the President, the latter agreed to press Congress to repeal the exemption of American ships from canal tolls, in return for the Foreign Office withdrawing support from Huerta. This agreement — quietly concluded over the heads of the State Department and the British Embassy — was carried out; equality of tolls was restored by Act of Congress, 15 June 1914, and from that date the Foreign Office has followed the American lead in Mexican affairs.

Huerta brought matters to a head early in 1914 by refusing to make proper reparation for an insult to the American flag. In April the President sent a force of marines to Vera Cruz, which they took with slight loss. Almost every one expected that a second war with Mexico was about to begin. It did not begin, because Wilson desired no Mexican territory, and wished to help the Mexican people to find themselves. Argentina, Brazil, and Chile proposed a joint mediation, which the President and Huerta accepted, and a Conference of the American powers met at Niagara Falls in April to compose the differences between the warring Mexican factions. But Huerta stood out stiffly against the terms of the mediation; unable, however, to obtain arms or credit from the United States or from an otherwise occupied Europe, he was practically starved out of office.

During the six years that followed Mexico occasionally broke out into peace. Fundamentally, the trouble was that the underlying force of the revolution — the land hunger of the peasants — was unable to find a leader with the honesty to adopt fundamental reforms and the strength to preserve order. Civil war in Mexico, however, is not so serious a matter as in more civilized countries. President Wilson adopted a policy of 'watchful waiting,' while endeavoring without success to create Pan-American machinery for dealing with the situation. The State Department advised all United States citizens to withdraw from the country, but many who remained to protect their property suffered at the hands of revolutionists and bandits. In 1916 the repeated raids of the bandit Villa across the

Texan border forced the President's hand. The regular army and national guard were mobilized along the Rio Grande, and an expeditionary force under General John J. Pershing was sent in pursuit of Villa, who made good his escape. The practice it afforded to the army was well worth the cost; but failure to bring results discredited the policy of watchful waiting. Armed intervention or even annexation would have been popular in the United States, and with the Mexican upper classes; but President Wilson again refused to take advantage of Mexican weakness and distraction. Probably no other nation but the United States, and no other President but Wilson, would so long and patiently have tolerated such conditions in a neighboring country. Ultimately, favored by the 'hands-off' policy of the United States, Mexico attained a certain degree of political stability. Venustiano Carranza, who controlled the government at Mexico City from the fall of Huerta to May 1920, promulgated agrarian reforms, and, in 1917, a new constitution with stringent decrees in religious matters, and against foreign concessions, that he did not dare to carry out. He was recognized as *de facto* President in 1915, and became constitutional President in 1917. In 1920 Alvaro Obregon captured the government and was elected President. The diplomatic slate was wiped clean by treaties between the United States and Mexico in 1923. Another rebellion was suppressed that year; and in 1924 Plutarco E. Calles peacefully succeeded to the Presidency. The following year the Mexican Congress put into effect the retroactive and confiscatory land provisions of the Constitution of 1917 and thus raised a new dispute with the United States government, as well as anti-clerical legislation that agitated the Roman Catholics of this country. Able diplomacy forestalled an open rupture between the two countries, and the prospects for amicable relations appear better than at any time for a generation.

Wilson's achievements during his first term were indeed remarkable. The professor had become leader of a party refractory to leadership, and converted it from state-rights tradition to enlightened nationalism. In three years he had convinced the average citizen that the Federal government was at last his servant; and had captured the loyalty of 'forward-looking' men and women. The Democratic party, completely under his spell, renominated him by acclamation in 1916; but he had a stout fight to wage against the reunited Republican party. His internal reforms, excepting the Federal

Reserve Act, were unpalatable to big business; and to many citizens his foreign policy appeared feeble, procrastinating, and pusillanimous.

6. *The War and the Election of 1916*

All these problems and embarrassments paled before the issues presented to the United States by the European war. To give these issues the extended treatment that their importance deserves would be ouside the scope of this work. Suffice it to say that the war divided American opinion into three antagonistic groups: pro-Ally, pro-German, and neutral, which traversed political party lines. President Wilson sympathized from the first with the Allied cause, but believed that the interest of the United States and of the world required his country to remain neutral, in order to come forth in due time as peacemaker. However, the form of neutrality that his administration observed was distinctly benevolent to the Allies; and Secretary Bryan resigned after the sinking of the *Lusitania* (7 May 1915) rather than lend himself to protests against the German submarine policy that might have to be made good by war. This policy enraged the pro-Germans, from whose publications we would gather that the President took his orders from Downing Street; while the long literary duel in which the President engaged with the German government, and his reluctance to prepare for war, enraged those who believed the cause of England, France, and Russia to be the cause of liberty and humanity. The Republican party was pro-Ally in leadership, but dared not avow it for fear of losing the German-American vote. Consequently, in 1916, the Republicans attempted to carry water on both shoulders, while the Democrats defended the President's neutrality policy.

By 1916 the Progressive party was moribund. Like the Populists and other minor parties, it helped to convert the American people from *laissez-faire* to social politics, and passed out of existence because a major party appropriated its principles. Roosevelt, uneasy outside the G.O.P., began to endorse Republicans for office in 1914. Those members of the party who were really progressive in domestic matters gradually came over to the support of Wilson, leaving behind the more ardent pro-Allies, the idolizers of 'Teddy,' and what he called the 'lunatic fringe' of extreme radicals. Roosevelt himself became increasingly absorbed in the European war, which he regarded as the one outstanding issue in the election of 1916. A Progressive convention was summoned at the same time and to the same place as the Republican convention. There was hope that the Republican convention would nominate Roosevelt, when the Progressives would come back to the fold; but the Republicans wished to punish Roosevelt for his secession, and feared the effect of his vigorous support of the Allies on German-American voters. Accordingly Charles Evans Hughes, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, was placed in nomination; and Roosevelt dismissed the last Progressive convention with the advice to follow him back into the Grand Old Party.

By adding together the Republican and Progressive vote of 1912, Justice Hughes appeared certain of victory. All the well-known political portents — the September election in Maine, the trend in New York, the betting odds of ten to seven — indicated a Republican victory; and when the returns on 8 November showed that Mr. Hughes had carried New York, Pennsylvania, and Indiana, his election was taken for granted. But the Far West was not yet heard from; and the electoral vote of the Far West had grown with its population. Mr. Hughes had made several errors during an electioneering tour of California. He lost that state by less than 1,300 votes; and its electoral vote was just sufficient to give a majority in the electoral college to Wilson.[4]

'He kept us out of war,' was the popular Democratic slogan of 1916; but since the beginning of the year President and Congress had been quietly preparing for war. The National Defence Act proved insufficient, except in its provision of summer training camps for officers; but the Naval Appropriation Act of 1916 would by 1924 have given the United States the largest navy in the world, if not limited by the Washington conference of 1922.

President Wilson's 'peace without victory' address on 22 January 1917 was his last effort to bring the war to an end by diplomacy. Ten days later the German government withdrew its pledges, and announced unrestricted submarine warfare. On 3 February the German Ambassador at Washington was given his passport. On the 26th the President asked Congress for authority to arm merchant vessels, proposing to adopt a system of armed neutrality similar to that of the Federalists against France in 1798. The bill was held up over the adjournment on 4 March by a Senate filibuster of seven

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[4] The popular vote was:

Wilson	9,129,606
Hughes	8,538,221

Republicans and five Democrats. On 13 March occurred the Russian Revolution, removing, in Mr. Wilson's opinion, the last taint of autocracy from the Allied cause. Addressing the newly elected Congress on 2 April 1917, the President declared:

> 'With a profound sense of the solemn and even tragical character of the step I am taking and of the grave responsibilities which it involves, but in unhesitating obedience to what I deem my constitutional duty, I advise that the Congress declare the recent course of the Imperial German Government to be, in fact, nothing less than war against the Government and people of the United States; that it formally accept the status of belligerent which has thus been thrust upon it; and that it take immediate steps not only to put the country in a more thorough state of defence, but also to exert all its power and employ all its resources to bring the Government of the German Empire to terms and end the war.'

In the small hours of Good Friday morning, 6 April 1917, Congress passed a joint resolution declaring war on the German Empire.

alejandro
Harmodio
Hacker
Hobson
Lochert
[illegible]
Morrison
Ncaim
Pratt.

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General. F. J. Turner, *The Frontier in American History* is a collection of essays that are the best introduction to the most characteristic feature of American life. It may be supplemented by A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History.* F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893,* is a competent synthesis of the enormous monographic material that was stimulated by Turner's first essay. H. U. Faulkner, *American Economic History* and W. W. Jennings, *A History of Economic Progress in the United States* are the best brief surveys. C. S. Callender, *Selections from the Economic History of the U. S., 1765–1860,* is a book of well-chosen source selections with luminous notes by the editor.

Labor. J. R. Commons *et al., History of Labor in the United States* (2 vols.) is the standard authority. Professor Commons's *Documentary History of American Industrial Society* (10 vols.) is a most valuable collection of material on the labor movement to 1880. A. M. Simons, *Social Forces in American History* presents the Marxian point of view.

Special Phases. The 'Contributions to American Economic History' published by the Carnegie Institute of Washington, although disappointingly inadequate, are still best in their respective fields: E. R. Johnson *et al., History of Domestic and Foreign Commerce of the U. S.* (2 vols.), B. H. Meyer *et al., History of Transportation in the U. S. before 1860,* V. S. Clark, *History of Manufactures 1607–1860,* and P. W. Bidwell *et al., History of Agriculture in the Northern U. S. 1620–1860.* F. W. Taussig, *Tariff History of the U. S.* is the best compendium of that subject. Edward Stanwood, *American Tariff Controversies in the 19th Century* (2 vols.) is by a high protectionist. D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the U. S.* is an excellent history of banking and public finance.

Statistics. The volumes of the decennial censuses of the United States are supplied only to libraries, by the Census Bureau, Washington. The current *Statistical Abstract of the U. S., Abstract of the Census of Manufactures,* and the *Abstract of the Fourteenth Census,* are most useful compendia.

Periodicals. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* (1886–) and *American Economic Review* (1911–) are the principal journals of economic history.

3. FOREIGN RELATIONS.

There is no comprehensive history of American Foreign Policy. John H. Latané, *A History of American Foreign Policy* is the best handbook. S. F. Bemis (ed.), *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (10 vols.) is a series of biographies, by different authors. The best collection of treaties is W. M. Malloy (ed.), *Treaties . . . be-*

tween the U. S. and Other Powers, 1778–1909 (2 vols.), with supplements. The documentary history of foreign relations may be found in the following compilations: *Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. S., 1783–1789* (7 vols.); *American State Papers, Foreign Relations* (1789–1828) (6 vols.). From 1828 to 1860 the published papers on foreign relations must be sought in the general series of Congressional documents. From 1861 to 1914, inclusive, the government published an annual volume under various titles, especially (since 1870), *Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the U. S.* Important extracts from these collections, and from Department of State MSS., are published with valuable notes in J. Bassett Moore, *History and Digest of the International Arbitrations to which the U. S. has been a party* (6 vols.), and *Digest of International Law* (8 vols.).

4. TRAVEL.

Contemporary publications of 1763–1846 are listed in the *Cambridge History of American Literature,* i, and iv., and in Channing's *Guide.* J. L. Mesick, *The English Traveller in America,* 1785–1835; A. Nevins, *American Social Life as Seen by British Travellers;* and H. Tuckerman, *America and her Commentators* (3 vols.) have pregnant extracts. Some of the more rare and important works of western travel are reprinted, with valuable notes by R. G. Thwaites, in *Early Western Travels* (32 vols.).

5. GOVERNMENT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY.

Lord Bryce's classic *American Commonwealth,* best in the early unrevised edition of 1888, is an incomparable description of the Federal and state governments during that decade. The following generation brought many changes, which are well described in W. B. Munro, *Government of the U. S.* and *Government of American Cities;* Charles A. Beard, *American Government and Politics;* and A. N. Holcomb, *State Government in the U. S.* A complete constitutional history of the United States is much wanted; Charles Warren, *The Supreme Court in U. S. History* (2 vols.) is a good substitute for the period to 1888. W. W. Willoughby, *The American Constitutional System* and *Constitutional Law in the United States* emphasize the constitutional side at the expense of historical background but are highly valuable studies and by one of the greatest living authorities. R. G. Gettell, *History of American Political Theories,* and C. E. Merriam, *American Political Theories* and *American Political Ideals, 1865–1917,* are the only satisfactory histories of political theory. H. McBain, *The Living Constitution* emphasizes the dynamic nature of constitutional government. H. W. Horwill, *The Usages of the American Constitution* is a valuable study of the unwritten constitution. C. E. Martin, *Introduction to the Study of the*

American Constitution is an excellent brief outline. Woodrow Wilson, *Constitutional Government in the United States* is a brilliant interpretation, though incomplete in many respects. F. J. Goodnow, *Politics and Administration* treats of the relation of party politics to government. Source material may be found in the E. Wambaugh, *Selection of Cases on Constitutional Law,* Allen Johnson, *Readings in American Constitutional History, 1776–1876,* and A. Johnson and W. A. Robinson, *Readings in Recent American Constitutional History, 1876–1926. The American Political Science Review* and the *Political Science Quarterly* are indispensable to the student of American government, as is A. B. Hart and A. C. McLaughlin (eds.), *Cyclopaedia of American Government* (3 vols.).

6. HISTORICAL PERIODICALS AND PUBLICATIONS OF HISTORICAL SOCIETIES.

The American Historical Review (1895–) has the most reliable reviews of new historical literature, and contains important articles and documents. The annual *Reports* of the American Historical Association (1889– overlapped by 5 vols. of *Papers,* 1886–91) include many other articles, monographs, and source material. The best of many regional historical quarterlies are the *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* (1915–), and *The New England Review* (1928–). The *Proceedings* and *Collections* of the *Massachusetts Historical Society,* the *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* the Johns Hopkins University *Studies in historical and political science,* and the Columbia University *Studies in history, economics, and public law* contain monographic material essential to the student.

7. SOURCE COLLECTIONS.

S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents on the American Revolution and Formation of the Federal Constitution* runs parallel to chapters i–viii in this work. William Macdonald, *Documentary Source Book of American History, 1606–1926* is a compendium of the same editor's *Select Charters, 1606–1775, Select Documents, 1776–1861,* and *Select Statutes, 1861–98,* and would be a most useful companion to this work. The *Old South Leaflets* (9 vols.) contain source material in pamphlet form. In A. B. Hart, *American History told by Contemporaries* (5 vols.) the selections are made from an illustrative rather than a documentary purpose.

8. BIBLIOGRAPHY.

Channing, Hart, and Turner, *Guide to the Study and Reading of American History* is the best comprehensive and classified bibliography to 1912. For works that have appeared since, see G. G. Griffin's annual

Writings on American History. These include periodicals as well as books, and are mildly critical. For local history see her 'Bibliography of American Historical Societies' in Amer. Hist. Assn. *Report,* 1905, ii. G. M. Dutcher *et al., A Guide to Historical Literature* has a section on American History. F. J. Turner and F. Merk, *List of References on the History of the West* covers a broad field, and Peter Mode, *Source Book and Bibliographical Guide for American Church History* is admirably full on that neglected subject.

9. GEOGRAPHY AND ETHNOLOGY.

Isaiah Bowman, *Forest Physiography* is the best descriptive geography of the United States; his *The New World,* and N. S. Shaler (ed.), *United States of America* (2 vols.) emphasize the relation of geography to economics and history. A. P. Brigham, *Geographic Influences in American History,* and E. C. Semple, *American History and its Geographic Conditions* are the standard works on that subject. A. B. Hulbert, *Soil* traces its influence on American history. Dr. C. O. Paullin is preparing an *Atlas of American Historical Geography* for the Carnegie Institution of Washington. Until that appears, the best historical maps are those in *The American Nation.* A. B. Hulbert, *Historic Highways of America* (16 vols.) is a collection of monographs on the great rivers and roadways of our history.

C. Wissler, *The American Indian* is the best single work on the aborigines of both Americas, and has a good bibliography. Livingston Farrand's vol. ii of *The American Nation* will satisfy most readers. F. W. Hodge (ed.), *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico* (2 vols.) is an excellent encyclopaedia.

10. LITERATURE.

The Cambridge History of American Literature (4 vols.) is a cooperative work, particularly strong on the Colonial and Early National periods. L. V. Parrington's brilliant interpretation, *Main Currents of American Thought* (2 vols.) goes down only as far as 1860. A third volume is promised. The best study of the post-Civil War period is F. L. Pattee, *A History of American Literature since 1870.* Of the brief general histories those of Barrett Wendell, Percy Boynton, and W. B. Cairns are the most useful. Brief interpretations are Lewis Mumford, *The Golden Day,* brilliant but strongly prejudiced, John Macy, *Spirit of American Literature,* and Lucy Hazard, *The Frontier in American Literature.* R. L. Rusk, *The Literature of the Middle Western Frontier* (2 vols.) is more specialized. Carl Van Doren, *The American Novel* and *Contemporary American Novelists, 1900–1920* are brief but suggestive. On philosophy see Woodbridge Riley, *American Thought from Puritan-*

ism to Pragmatism, and A. K. Rogers, *English and American Philosophy Since 1800.* A. Tassin, *The Magazine in America* is the standard work on that subject, supplemented by F. L. Mott, *History of American Magazines,* 1741–1850. There is no complete history of American historiography. J. F. Jameson, *Historical Writing in America,* and J. S. Bassett, *The Middle Group of American Historians* are the best studies.

BY CHAPTER

I

On the Empire and Imperial Policy, *The Cambridge History of the British Empire,* vol. i, is scholarly and detailed, but lacks synthesis and completeness. The bibliographies are excellent, and some of the chapters on trade, government and law, admirable. Two excellent briefer surveys of the Empire are J. A. Williamson, *History of British Expansion* (2 vols.) and H. E. Egerton, *A Short History of British Colonial Policy.* Three works that furnish an adequate survey of imperial policy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are H. L. Beer's *The Old Colonial System, 1660–1754* (2 vols.) and *British Colonial Policy, 1754–65,* and G. B. Hertz, *British Imperialism in the Eighteenth Century.* The volumes of H. L. Beer are particularly important, as they blazed the way for a more sympathetic understanding of the British imperial policy in this country. J. T. Adams, *The Founding of New England,* ch. xii is a brilliant short interpretation of the theory of empire. On Imperial administration L. W. Labaree, *Royal Government in America* is thorough and scholarly. Two penetrating essays from the hand of one of the most eminent authorities are in Sir W. J. Ashley's *Surveys, Historic and Economic.* A classic interpretation, one of the most brilliant bits of special pleading in English historical literature, is J. Seeley's *Expansion of England.* It should be read by every student of the Empire, but always with caution.

On the Albany Plan and the Seven Year's War, see Franklin's *Works* (Smyth ed. preferred, use index) and R. Frothingham, *Rise of the Republic of the United States.* There are some excellent pages in R. Hildreth's *History of the United States,* vol. ii. See also L. K. Mathews, 'Benjamin Franklin's Plans for a Colonial Union, 1750–75,' *Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev.,* vol. viii. For the Seven Years' War, Francis Parkman is still the standard authority. *A Half Century of Conflict* (2 vols.) and *Montcalm and Wolfe* (2 vols.) are two of the high-water marks of American history and of American literature. His *Conspiracy of Pontiac* is still the classic narrative of that episode. A more recent treatment of the struggle between France and England in America is G. Wrong, *The Rise and Fall of New France* (2 vols.). Two essays of capital importance are W. L. Grant, 'Canada versus Guadeloupe,' *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* vol. xvii, and H. Hall, 'Chatham's American Policy,' *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* vol. v.

On eighteenth-century England the literature is enormous, but there is still wanting a special study of the political and economic background

to the American Revolution. A beginning in this direction has been made by L. B. Namier, *The Structure of British Politics at the Accession of George III* (2 vols.) and there are some excellent chapters in C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (2 vols.). W. E. H. Lecky, *History of England in the Eighteenth Century* (8 vols.), Lord Mahon, *History of England, 1713–1783* (7 vols.), T. E. May, *Constitutional History of England* (2 vols.), and G. O. Trevelyan, *History of the American Revolution* (6 vols.) are larger studies that can be recommended. For brief introductions, the chapters in F. C. Dietz, *Political and Social History of England,* and W. T. Laprade, *British History for American Students* are excellent. Indispensable for an understanding of this period is Sir John W. Fortescue (ed.), *The Correspondence of King George III* (6 vols.). B. Fäy, *Franklin, The Apostle of Modern Times,* and D. D. Wallace, *Henry Laurens* illumine the attitude of typical Americans toward the mother country. Sir Leslie Stephen, *English Thought in the Eighteenth Century* is one of the most penetrating interpretations in English literature.

There are a number of large histories of the American Colonies, but the best is that of H. L. Osgood, *The American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (3 vols.) and *The American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century* (4 vols.). E. Channing's *History,* vols. i and ii, is briefer and more useful for students. Of the brief surveys, those of M. W. Jernegan, *The American Colonies,* C. L. Becker, *The Beginnings of the American People,* and C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Period* can be particularly recommended. C. M. Andrew, *The Colonial Background of the American Revolution* is a series of four essays on imperial problems that will be found most suggestive.

Most of the matters touched on in this chapter are developed more fully in later chapters, and more extensive references will be found in these bibliographies.

II

On the general problem of imperial organization C. M. Andrews, *The Colonial Background of the American Revolution;* C. H. Van Tyne, *Causes of the War of Independence;* and Carl Becker, *The Eve of the Revolution* are useful surveys. G. L. Beer, *British Colonial Policy, 1754–65,* analyzes the reason behind the new English policy. The march of events is ably traced in Channing's *History,* vol. iii. C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (2 vols.) opens up a wealth of material on the western problem, and the views thereon of British politicians. L. B. Namier, *The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George III* (2 vols.) is a fresh research into personalities and groupings and casts a flood of light upon the British background. An illuminating and scholarly study of a particular problem is W. T. Laprade, 'The Stamp Act in British Politics,' *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, vol. xxxv.

An important phase is exhaustively treated by A. M. Schlesinger, in *The Colonial Merchants and the American Revolution, 1763–76,* and more briefly in his *New Viewpoints in American History,* ch. vii. Other monographs of importance are O. M. Dickerson, *American Colonial Government;* H. Baker-Crothers, *Virginia and the French and Indian War;* and R. Coupland, *The Quebec Act.*

The pamphlet warfare of the period is summed up in M. C. Tyler, *Literary History of the American Revolution* (2 vols.); extracts from pamphlets and other documents illustrating the western problem and the political conflict are in S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents Illustrating the American Revolution.* The growth of the constitutional theory of the empire is described in R. G. Adams, *Political Ideas of the American Revolution.* The analysis in V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents in American Thought,* vol. i, part 2, is a masterly summary. A. C. McLaughlin's essay on 'The Background of American Federalism' in *Am. Pol. Sci. Rev.*, vol. xii, is most suggestive.

Some of the better biographies of the period are Bernard Fäy, *Franklin;* J. K. Hosmer, *Samuel Adams;* C. J. Stillé, *The Life and Times of John Dickinson;* Lord Fitzmaurice, *Life of William, Earl of Shelburne* (3 vols.); A. T. Volwiler, *George Croghan and the Westward Movement;* Arthur Pound, *Johnson of the Mohawks;* L. S. Mayo, *John Wentworth;* and Rupert Hughes, *George Washington,* vol. ii.

For further source study, Force's *American Archives,* the collected works of Franklin, Jefferson, and John and Samuel Adams; and *The Correspondence of King George the Third* (6 vols.) ed., Sir John W. Fortescue, are indispensable. Hezekiah Niles, *Principles and Acts of the Revolution* is still a most useful collection of patriotic resolves.

III

The geographic basis of sectionalism is best described in E. C. Semple's brilliant *American History and its Geographic Environment.* The most penetrating treatment of sectionalism during the Colonial period is to be found in the first three chapters of F. J. Turner's *Frontier in American History,* embodying the careful conclusions of the greatest living authority in this field. J. T. Adams, *Provincial Society, 1690–1763,* and H. L. Osgood, *American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century* (4 vols.) are useful general surveys. Special studies of particular importance are H. J. Eckenrode, *Revolution in Virginia;* J. S. Bassett, *Regulators of North Carolina* (Amer. Hist. Assoc. *Reports,* 1894); W. A. Schaper, *Sectionalism in South Carolina* (Amer. Hist. Assoc. *Reports,* 1901); C. H.

Lincoln, *Revolutionary Movement in Pennsylvania;* C. L. Becker, *History of Political Parties in the Province of New York;* N. D. Mereness, *Maryland as a Proprietary Colony;* J. T. Adams, *Revolutionary New England;* and E. A. Bailey, *Influences Toward Radicalism in Connecticut 1754–1775* (Smith College Studies in History).

Valuable monographs on special subjects are: B. Bond, *Quit Rents in the American Colonies;* A. Craven, *Soil Exhaustion as a factor in Virginia History;* (U. of Illinois, *Studies*). I. Harrell, *Loyalism in Virginia,* particularly important for the debt problem; and A. E. McKinley, *Suffrage Franchise in the English Colonies.* C. W. Alvord, *The Mississippi Valley in British Politics* (2 vols.); J. Winsor, *The Westward Movement;* and A. Henderson, *Conquest of the Old Southwest* are useful for the story of western lands. A. L. Cross, *The Anglican Episcopate in the American Colonies* is the standard authority on that subject, and Alice Baldwin, *New England Clergy and the American Revolution* important from another angle. S. E. Morison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts,* and L. K. Mathews, *The Expansion of New England* are indispensable for an understanding of that section.

For the non-English element see A. B. Faust, *German Element in the United States;* C. A. Hanna, *The Scotch-Irish* (2 vols.); and A. J. Ford, *The Scotch-Irish in America.* Something of the social life of the time may be gleaned from Alexander Graydon's *Memoirs of a Life Passed Principally in Philadelphia,* Anne Grant's *Memoirs of an American Lady,* Philip Fithian's *Diary,* and Benjamin Franklin's inimitable *Autobiography.*

Useful biographies for the period are: I. Sharpless, *Political Leaders of Provincial Pennsylvania;* L. S. Mayo, *John Wentworth;* W. E. Dodd, *Thomas Jefferson* (in *Statesmen of the Old South*); M. C. Tyler, *Patrick Henry;* D. D. Wallace, *Henry Laurens;* and W. C. Bruce, *Benjamin Franklin Self-Revealed* (2 vols.).

IV

C. H. Van Tyne, *The War of Independence* and Richard Frothingham, *Rise of the American Republic* cover the history of the period in some detail. S. G. Fisher, *The Struggle for American Independence* (2 vols.) is vivacious and suggestive but somewhat unreliable. M. C. Tyler, *Literary History of the American Revolution* is a masterly survey of the controversial literature of the period. The most important body of source material is E. C. Burnett (ed.), *Letters of Members of the Continental Congress* (4 vols. and others forthcoming).

On Lexington and Concord see especially Allen French, *The Day* *of Concord and Lexington* and Harold Murdock, *The Nineteenth of April.* The first of A. C. McLaughlin *et al., Source Problems in American History* deals with Lexington and is an excellent introduction to the problems of historical criticism. On the beginning of the Revolution in the South see W. E. Dodd, *Virginia Takes the Road to Revolution* in *The Spirit of Seventy-Six and Other Essays.* The best edition of Thomas Paine's Works is that of M. D. Conway, in 4 vols. *The Writings of Thomas Paine,* ed. Carl Van Doren, is a useful one volume edition. The best critical appreciation of Paine is in V. L. Parrington, *Main Currents of American Thought,* vol. i.

On the Declaration of Independence Carl Becker's *Declaration of Independence* is in a class by itself. H. Friedenwald, *Declaration of Independence* discusses the grievances in some detail, and the accounts in Van Tyne's *War of Independence* and Tyler's *Literary History of the American Revolution* are useful from other points of view. T. V. Smith, *American Philosophy of Equality* is a profound and brilliant discussion of this subject. An important study of the constitutional implications of the Declaration is C. H. McIlwain, *The American Revolution: a Constitutional Interpretation.*

The literature on the Loyalists is voluminous, but M. C. Tyler's *Literary History* is still the best introduction. C. H. Van Tyne, *Loyalists of the American Revolution* is a study of the whole subject. Particular monographs such as Isaac Harrell's *Loyalism in Virginia* and A. C. Flick's *Loyalism in New York* are valuable to the special student. One of the most suggestive essays on this subject is Carl Becker's *Spirit of Seventy-Six* in the volume by that title.

Good biographies are C. J. Stillé, *Life and Times of John Dickinson;* Rupert Hughes, *George Washington,* vol. ii; F. W. Hirst, *Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson;* Gilbert Chinard, *Thomas Jefferson;* M. D. Conway, *Life of Thomas Paine;* and L. H. Gipson, *Jared Ingersoll: a Study of American Loyalism.* Adequate biographies of the Revolutionary leaders are sadly lacking.

V

There is no first-class military history of the War of Independence, nor any body of source material, excepting Henri Doniol, *Histoire de la France à l'établissement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique* (5 vols.), and the rare *Stevens Facsimiles.* Carrington, *Battles of the Revolution* and *Washington the General,* Col. F. Vinton Greene, *The Revolutionary War,* and Sir John W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army,* vol. iii, are by military men with strong prejudices. Rupert Hughes's *George Washington,* vol. iii, covers the period 1777–81, and is a great improvement over the earlier volumes, though still somewhat marred by the 'debunking' spirit. G. H. Guttridge has said all that can be said on Lord George Germain in *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* xxxiii: 23–43. Louis C. Hatch, *Administration of the American Revolutionary Army* is the unique study of that important subject; Edward E. Curtis has written *The Organization of the British Army in the American Revolution.* There are several good monographs on individual campaigns: John Codman, *Arnold's Expedition to Quebec;* Hoffman Nickerson, *The Turning Point of the Revolution, or Burgoyne in America* (cf. Jane Clark's article compiled from the Clinton Papers, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* xxxv: 512); W. S. Stryker, *The Battle of Monmouth;* James A. James, *The Life of George Rogers Clark;* and J. B. Perkins, *France in the American Revolution.* William G. Sumner, *The Financial History of the Revolution* (2 vols.) and E. P. Oberholtzer, *Robert Morris* are the standard works on revolutionary finance; see also R. V. Harlow, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* xxxv: 46–68.

NAVAL HISTORY AND YORKTOWN. Admiral A. T. Maham, *The Influence of Sea-Power in History* takes a world-wide view; his *Major Operations of the War of Independence* is more detailed. Gardner W. Allen, *A Naval History of the American Revolution* (2 vols.) is the standard history of the Continental Navy. Ralph D. Paine, *Ships and Sailors of Old Salem* has a good account of the Yankee privateers. William M. James, *The British Navy in Adversity* tells that side. The best account of the naval vessels and conditions of the time, of D'Estaing's fiasco and the Yorktown campaign, is in Admiral F. E. Chadwick's introduction to *The Graves Papers.* Mrs. R. De Koven has written the standard life of *John Paul Jones.* J. L. Howard, *Seth Harding, Mariner* is a vivacious biography of a lesser figure.

DIPLOMACY. We know more of this aspect of the war than any other through the *corpus* of French documents edited by Henri Doniol (under Military History); Wharton's *The Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revolution* (6 vols.); Juan F. Yela Utrilla, *España ante la independencia de los Estados Unidos* (2 vols.); and the documents in Fortescue, *Correspondence of King George III,* vols. iv, v. Of the secondary authorities the chapters in Van Tyne's *War of Independence,* and E. S. Corwin, *French Policy and the American Alliance* are the best for 1778, and Paul C. Phillips, *The West in the Diplomacy of the American Revolution* for the various intrigues about the West, and the peace negotiations. Most of the older accounts of the peace negotiations — Channing, McLaughlin, Winsor, and the biographies of Adams and Jay — are colored by the notion that these two prevented Franklin from being tricked by Vergennes into accepting narrow boundaries. Bernard Fäy, *The Revolutionary Spirit in France and the U. S.* has gone to the other extreme of describing Vergennes and France as moved only by their love of liberty. The British peace proposals of 1778 are printed in Morison, *Sources and Documents,* and analyzed in G. H. Guttridge, *David Hartley.*

VI

The period in general is covered by the volumes in the *American Nation Series* already referred to, by Channing, *History,* vol. iii, and, in meticulous detail, by Allan Nevins, *American States During and After the Revolution.* For the history of the constitutional convention, see especially A. C. McLaughlin, *The Courts, the Constitution and the Parties,* chapters 4, 5. W. F. Dodd, *Revision and Amendment of State Constitutions* is invaluable. Special monographs of value are W. C. Morey, *The First State Constitutions,* in *Annals* of the American Academy, vol. iv; and J. F. Jameson, *Introduction to the Study of the Constitutional and Political History of the States.* The new State Constitutions themselves are most readily available in Ben Perley Poore, *Charters and Constitutions* (2 vols.) and F. N. Thorpe, *American Charters, Constitutions and Organic Laws* (7 vols.). Thorpe's *Constitutional History of the American People* (2 vols.) is still useful. A good brief history of State Constitutions is J. Q. Dealey, *Growth of American State Constitutions.* C. E. Merriam, *American Political Theories* is excellent. Special studies of importance are S. E. Morison, *History of the Constitution of Massachusetts,* and T. F. Moran, *Rise and Development of the Bicameral System in America.* (J. H. U. Studies, series XIII.) H. B. Grigsby, *The Virginia Convention of 1776* is particularly valuable for its biographical data.

The story of political, social, and religious reforms in the several states can best be read in Nevins, *op. cit.,* and in J. F. Jameson's *American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement.* J. T. Adams, *New England in the Republic,* and R. J. Purcell, *Connecticut in Transition* are important for that section. Edward McCrady, *South Carolina in the Revolution* (2 vols.), an excellent detailed study, is primarily concerned with the military story, but has some valuable material on political and social developments. The story of the struggle for religious liberty can best be read in H. J. Eckenrode, *Separation of Church and State in Virginia,* and S. B. Weeks, *Church and State in North Carolina.* Kate Rowland's biography of *George Mason* and any one of the several excellent biographies of Jefferson will give additional data. The attack on slavery and the slave trade is traced, with some prejudice, in Henry Wilson, *Rise and Fall of the Slave Power in America,* and W. E. B. Du Bois, *Suppression of the African Slave Trade.* A careful study of the internal social history of the American Revolution is badly wanted.

The literature on Vermont and Trans-Appalachia is extensive.

The history of Vermont during these years can best be read in two biographies, Wilbur's *Ira Allen,* and John Pell, *Ethan Allen.* Theodore Roosevelt, *The Winning of the West* (4 vols.), written in a high tone of red-blooded morality is weak on economic factors, but is still quite the best and most readable narrative history of the early West. Justin Winsor, *The Westward Movement, 1763–1798,* is erudite and valuable to the scholar, but excessively dull. F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier* is an excellent brief discussion. Archibald Henderson, *Winning of the Old Southwest* is written in a spirited style, but overemphasizes the rôle of Judge Henderson. For the constitutional history of the West H. G. Alden, *New Governments West of the Alleghanies,* and F. J. Turner, 'Western State Making in the Revolutionary Era,' *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* vol. i, are particularly valuable. Alden has an essay on the 'State of Franklin' in the *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* viii. On the Wilderness Road see C. A. Hanna, *The Wilderness Road* and A. B. Hulbert, *Boone's Wilderness Road.* There are few good biographies for this period, but F. M. Turner, *Life of Sevier,* Edna Kenton, *Simon Kenton,* and R. G. Thwaites, *Daniel Boone* can be recommended.

VII

The best scholarly survey of the Confederation period is A. C. McLaughlin, *Confederation and Constitution.* John Fiske, *The Critical Period in American History* is a charmingly written account by one of the great popularizers of American history, but based largely on secondary works and not entirely reliable. J. B. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States,* vol. i, gives a detailed survey of the social and economic life of the time. David Ramsey, *History of the American Revolution* is a contemporary account that contains a wealth of undigested material. Allan Nevins, *The American States During and After the Revolution,* a scholarly and exhaustive work, is the best study of the internal history of the States.

On foreign affairs during the Confederation, J. H. Latané, *History of American Foreign Policy,* and C. R. Fish, *American Diplomacy* are excellent general accounts. S. F. Bemis, *Jay's Treaty* is an exhaustive and impartial examination of Anglo-American relations beginning with this period. E. Channing's *History,* vol. iii, contains excellent chapters on commercial relations. An illuminating study of a special problem is A. C. McLaughlin, 'The Western Posts and the British Debts,' Amer. Hist. Assoc. *Reports,* 1894. A. B. Whitaker, *The Spanish-American Frontier* is a brilliant and indispensable study of the relations of Spain and the United States in the West.

The literature on American land policy and the Ordinance of 1787 is extensive. A. B. Hinsdale, *The Old Northwest;* J. A. Barrett, *Evolution of the Ordinance of 1787;* and J. Winsor, *The Westward Movement, 1763–1789,* are particularly valuable. On special aspects see, P. J. Treat, *National Land System, 1785–1820;* C. W. Alvord, *The Illinois Country;* and H. B. Adams, *Maryland's influence upon land cessions to the United States* (J. H. U. Studies, ser. III).

On the financial history of the Confederacy, C. J. Bullock, *Finances of the United States, 1775–1789* is the most scholarly treatment. W. G. Sumner, *The Financier and Finances of the American Revolution* (2 vols.) contains a mass of ill-digested material. D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the United States* is a standard work. Guy S. Callender, (ed.), *Selections from the Economic History of the United States,* and F. Flüger and H. U. Faulkner, *Readings in the Economic and Social History of the United States* contain important material for further study. The best study of Shays's Rebellion is in J. T. Adams, *New England in the Republic.*

VIII

The literature on the Constitutional Convention and the Constitution is enormous, but a great deal of it has been inspired by patriotic enthusiasm rather than by historical zeal. Fundamental to any study of the Constitution are the *Records of the Federal Convention* (3 vols.) ed. by Max Farrand, or *Documents Illustrative of the Formation of the Union,* ed. by Charles C. Tansill and published by the U. S. Government. Excellent editions of Madison's *Notes* are those of J. B. Scott and of Gaillard Hunt. A day-by-day summary of the work of the Convention is to be found in Charles Warren, *The Making of the Constitution,* a useful work but with a patriotic thesis. The classic analysis of the Constitution is, of course, *The Federalist,* written by Madison, Hamilton, and Jay.

The best general survey of the whole period is still A. C. McLaughlin, *Confederation and Constitution.* P. L. Schuyler, *The Constitution of the United States* is an accurate, well-balanced, and objective account. Max Farrand's two volumes, *The Framing of the Constitution* and *Fathers of the Constitution* are excellent surveys. Still useful, though antiquated, is George Bancroft, *History of the Formation of the Constitution.* Of service to the investigator are Breckinbridge Long, *Genesis of the Constitution,* and William M. Meigs, *Growth of the Constitution in the Federal Convention of 1787.*

A highly important volume on a much-neglected phase is Charles A. Beard, *Economic Interpretation of the Constitution,* a stimulating, suggestive, and scholarly piece of work. A briefer summary is in A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History,* ch. viii. This interpretation is brilliantly supported in J. Allen Smith, *The Spirit of American Government.*

A. J. Beveridge, *Life of John Marshall,* vol. i contains a lively account of the struggle for ratification in the state conventions, whose proceedings are printed in full in Elliot's *Debates* (5 vols.), and selected in S. E. Morison, *Sources and Documents on the American Revolution.* Important monographs on ratification are, O. G. Libby, *The Geographical Distribution of the Vote on the Federal Constitution;* J. B. McMaster and F. D. Stone, *Pennsylvania and the Federal Convention, 1787–88;* and S. B. Harding, *Contest over Ratification in Massachusetts.* Some of the controversial literature of the time is reprinted in J. F. Jameson, *Essays in the Constitutional History of the United States in the Formative Period.*

IX

A Century of Population Growth, 1790–1900, tabulates the results of the Census of 1790, with maps and useful descriptive matter. Among the more useful contemporary works are Jedidiah Morse, *American Geography;* Jefferson's *Notes on Virginia;* W. S. Robertson (ed.), *The Diary of Francisco de Miranda . . . 1783–84;* Thomas Anburey, *Travels through the Interior Parts of America in 1776–81* (2 vols.); Francis Baily, *Journal of a Tour in Unsettled Parts of North America in 1796 and 1797; The Cazenove Journal, 1794;* Marquis de Chastellux, *Travels in North America in 1780–82* (2 vols.); La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, *Travels through the U. S., 1795–97* (2 vols.); C. F. Volney, *View of the Climate and Soil of the U. S. A.* The three last are translated from the French. The reader should be warned against romantic travellers such as Jonathan Carver, Bartram, Chateaubriand, St. John de Crèvecœur, and land-jobbers such as Brissot and Imlay. Henry Adams, *History of the United States,* vol. 1, ch. i–vi is a brilliant analysis and interpretation of America in 1800. There is abundant material, too, in J. B. McMaster, *History of the People of the United States,* vols. i and ii. Allan Nevins, *American Social History as seen by British Travellers* has an extensive bibliography.

X–XI

General. Claude G. Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton* is a vivacious but somewhat inaccurate history of the period. Beveridge's *Marshall* (4 vols.) is also a history of the times. Of the general histories, Channing's vol. iv and McMaster's i and ii may be supplemented by Richard Hildreth, *History of the United States* (3 vols.), dull and detailed, and frankly prejudiced on the Federalist side.

Biographies. We are still awaiting 'definitive' biographies of Washington, Hamilton, and Jefferson. Worthington C. Ford's *Washington* (2 vols.) may be supplemented by P. L. Ford, *The True George Washington,* an excellent character sketch, and P. L. Haworth, *George Washington: Farmer.* John Corbin, The *Unknown Washington* is largely a political study. Rupert Hughes, *Washington* (3 vols.) promises to be the best full-length study. Shelby Little, *George Washington* is the most adequate, one-volume biography. Hamilton and Jefferson have suffered not only from each other's biographers, but from the zeal of their own. Readers of Senator Lodge's artistic *Alexander Hamilton* in the *American Statesmen Series* should remember that the author was a lifelong opponent of almost everything dear to Jefferson. A. McL. Hamilton, *Intimate Life of Alex. Hamilton* is an excellent personal study. W. G. Sumner's *Hamilton* is the most comprehending biography of him, written by an economist who as a dogmatic free-trader could not be quite fair. W. S. Culbertson, *Hamilton: An Essay* is also useful on the economic side. Oliver's and Gertrude Atherton's biographies are highly misleading and inaccurate. The analysis of Hamilton in Parrington's *Main Currents,* vol. i is penetrating and brilliant though strongly partisan. H. S. Randall, *Life of Thomas Jefferson* (3 vols.) is a classic partisan biography. A. J. Nock's is a good brief interpretation. Gilbert Chinard, *Jefferson, Apostle of Americanism* (1929) is the best one-volume biography, but Francis W. Hirst's brilliant *Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson* is somewhat better on the personal and cultural side. Gaillard Hunt, *Life of James Madison* is sound and adequate.

Writings of Statesmen of this period, especially their letters, are in general more useful than the biographies. W. C. Ford, *Writings of Washington* (14 vols.) is the most complete for him. H. C. Lodge, *Works of Hamilton* (12 vols.); P. L. Ford, *Writings of Jefferson* (10 vols.), and Gaillard Hunt, *Writings of Madison* (9 vols.) are to be preferred for these three statesmen. J. T. Adams (ed.), *Jeffersonian Ideals* and *Hamiltonian Ideals* are excellent brief selections. J. G. Hamilton (ed.), *The Best Letters of Jefferson* is revealing. C. F. Adams (ed.), *Works of John Adams with a Life* (9 vols.) is the only edition of Adams's writings. The *Works of Fisher Ames* (2 vols.) is important for Federalist ideas (cf. S. E. Morison, in *N. E. Quarterly,* vol. i), as are those of John Taylor for the Republicans. The last have never been reprinted, but are well summarized by C. A. Beard, with other material that sustains his thesis, in his *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy.*

Organization of the Federal Government. R. V. Harlow, *History of Legislative Methods before 1825;* H. B. Learned, *The President's Cabinet;* and G. Hunt, *The Department of State.* These may be supplemented by the articles of Gaillard Hunt on 'Office-Seeking' in the

Amer. Hist. Rev., vols. i and ii. The *Journal of William Maclay* gives an intimate picture of the process, by an anti-federalist senator. There is a wealth of material in C. A. Beard, *Economic Origins of Jeffersonian Democracy.*

XII–XIII

On the French Revolution and neutrality, see C. D. Hazen, *Contemporary American Opinion of the French Revolution;* Bernard Fäy, *The Revolutionary Spirit in France and the United States* is a spirited and scholarly history of cultural relations which may be supplemented by H. M. Jones, *America and French Culture 1750–1848.* J. F. Turner has published a wealth of material on Genet in Amer. Hist. Assoc. *Reports,* 1896, vol. i, and 1897, and summarized them in the *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* vol. iii. There is an excellent account of the Genet episode in McMaster, *The United States,* vol. ii. M. Minnigerode, *Jefferson, Friend of France* is bitterly prejudiced, but has an extended account of Genet. The impact of the Revolution on the United States is analyzed in Parrington's *Main Currents,* vol. i, and Parrington's lengthy introduction to *The Hartford Wits.* S. E. Forman, *The Political Activities of Philip Freneau* is a capital study of Jefferson's literary lieutenant.

Foreign Relations are so interwoven with the history of this period that most of the works listed in ch. 10–11, may be consulted with profit. W. H. Trescott, *Diplomatic History of the Administrations of Washington and Adams* is old but still useful. The *Correspondence of French Ministers to the U. S., 1791–7;* of *James A. Bayard, 1796–1815,* and *Letters of William Vans Murray to J. Q. Adams, 1797–1803,* are printed in the *Reports* of the American Historical Association for 1903 (vol. ii), 1912, and 1913 (vol. ii) respectively; other correspondence in the *Reports* for 1896 (i), 1897 (ii), and 1898. W. R. Manning, *Nootka Sound Controversy* is in the *Report* for 1904. The dispatches of Rufus King, American Minister to Great Britain, 1796–1803, are in C. R. King, *Life and Correspondence of Rufus King* (6 vols.), A. C. Morris, *Diary and Letters of Gouverneur Morris* (2 vols.), H. P. Johnston, *Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay* (4 vols.), the *Writings of J. Q. Adams,* vols. i, ii, and the *Reports* of the Canadian Archives for 1889–91 and 1894 contain additional material. S. F. Bemis, *Jay's Treaty* is an exhaustive examination of Anglo-American relations, beginning with this period. His bibliography lists all the important monographs and printed sources. Important articles on the Navigation Acts by J. H. Clapham in *Engl. Hist. Rev.,* vol. xxv, and D. O. McGovney in *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* vol. ix, should not be overlooked. Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice, *Life of Shelburne* (2 vols.) and the biographies and works of Adams, Jay, Morris, and Jefferson should be added.

The Northwest and Indian Affairs. A. C. McLaughlin, *The Western Posts and the British Debts* (Amer. Hist. Assoc. *Reports,* 1894) casts new light on the problem. R. G. Thwaites, *Daniel Boone;* C. W. Alvord, *The Illinois Country* (vol. i of *Centennial History of Illinois*); M. M. Quaife, *Chicago and the Old Northwest,* and Justin Winsor, *The Westward Movement 1763–1788* are the best accounts of government and settlement. C. E. Slocum, *The Ohio Country between 1783 and 1815* is ponderous but useful. On military affairs see T. Boyd, *Mad Anthony Wayne.*

A. P. Whitaker, *Spanish-American Frontier, 1783–95,* and S. F. Bemis, *Pinckney's Treaty* are important works on this period in Spanish-Indian-American relations. Articles and documents will be found in *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* vii: 706; viii: 78; ix: 490, 533, 748; xi: 794; *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.,* iii: 462; xii: 155; *Proceedings Miss. Val. Hist. Assoc.,* x: 260.

The Whiskey Rebellion may be studied in H. Adams, *Life of Albert Gallatin.* P. J. Treat, *National Land System 1785–1820,* and B. H. Hibbard, *A History of the Public Land Policies* are satisfactory for the land question.

XIV

For the domestic history of the Adams administration see bibliographies for chapters 10–11; for foreign affairs, chapters 12–13. The *Life of John Adams* by his grandson, Charles Francis Adams, is in vol. i of the *Works,* and is by all odds the best biography of the President. Briefer but not entirely unsatisfactory is the biography by John Morse in the *Statesmen Series.* Claude Bowers, *Jefferson and Hamilton* is a complete and unsympathetic history of the Adams administration. There is a wealth of material in Beveridge's *Marshall.* B. C. Steiner, *Life and Correspondence of James McHenry* throws some light on Adams's relations with his Cabinet. The biographies of Washington, Hamilton, Jefferson, Gallatin, etc., listed above will be found useful. Anson D. Morse, 'The Politics of John Adams,' *Amer. Hist. Rev.* iv, is brief but suggestive. Morse's *Federalist Party in Massachusetts to the Year 1800,* Richard Purcell's *Connecticut in Transition,* and W. A. Robinson, *Jeffersonian Democracy in New England* describe the political background in that section.

On the Alien and Sedition Acts and the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions see F. R. Anderson, *Enforcement of the Alien and Sedition Acts* (Amer. Hist. Assoc. *Reports,* 1912) and 'Contemporary Opinion of the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions' (*Amer. Hist. Rev.* v.), E. D. Warfield, *The Kentucky Resolutions,* and E. P. Powell, *Nullification and Secession in the United States.* There is additional material in J. F. McLaughlin, *Matthew Lyon.*

On the election of 1800 see A. D. Morse, *Causes and Consequences of* *the Party Revolution of 1800* (Amer. Hist. Assoc. *Report,* 1894). This should be checked by the account in Channing's *History,* vol. v. French relations can be traced in G. W. Allen, *Our Naval War with France,* and B. W. Bond, *The Monroe Mission to France.*

XV–XVI

General. Most of the works mentioned in the previous section are useful for this period as well; but the pre-eminent authority is Henry Adams, *History of the United States . . . 1801–17.* (9 vols.) Henry Adams has the best style of any historian who has treated this period, and his work has been superseded on very few points. His attitude towards Jefferson is detached and mildly ironical; his descriptive chapters in the first and the last volumes are incomparable. Henry Adams, *Life of Gallatin* is one of the best Republican biographies, and W. E. Dodd, *Life of Nathaniel Macon* a valuable study of one of Jefferson's most trusted disciples. Captain A. T. Mahan, *Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812* (2 vols.) is indispensable for the diplomacy and naval warfare of the period, but was written to prove a thesis, and to influence naval policy. For the social and political background of Washington, G. Hunt (ed.), *First Forty Years of Washington Society portrayed by the family letters of Mrs. Samuel H. Smith,* and E. S. Brown (ed.), *William Plumer's Memorandum, 1803–7,* are excellent.

Louisiana Purchase, and Conspiracies. Henry Adams's and Channing's histories are adequate; the latter has a good bibliography. J. A. Robertson, *Louisiana under Spain, France and the United States* (2 vols.) contains a mass of source material. E. Brown, *Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase* covers that phase adequately. I. J. Cox, *The West Florida Controversy* is exhaustive. The principal documents for the Federalist plot of 1804, are printed in H. Adams (ed.), *Documents relating to New England Federalism,* and the intrigues analyzed in S. E. Morison's *Harrison Gray Otis* (2 vols.). The Hamilton-Burr duel is best described in Allan McL. Hamilton's biography. There is no adequate life of Aaron Burr, whose conspiracy is adequately dealt with only in W. F. McCaleb, *Burr Conspiracy,* but James Parton, *Life and Times of Aaron Burr* is fascinating reading. Beveridge's *Marshall* is good for the case of Marbury *v.* Madison, and the Chase impeachment. For the general question of judicial review, see C. A. Beard, *Supreme Court and the Constitution,* E. S. Corwin, *Judicial Review,* C. Warren, *Supreme Court* and A. C. McLaughlin, *The Courts, the Constitution and the Parties,* ch. i.

Corsairs and Neutral Rights. The Tripolitan War is described in great detail in G. W. Allen, *Our Navy and the Barbary Corsairs.* There are convenient summaries of the Orders in Council, French Decrees, and American Retaliatory Acts in Channing's *History,* vol. iv. Allan Johnson, *Jefferson and his Colleagues* has an excellent discussion of the Barbary Corsairs. L. M. Sears, *Jefferson and the Embargo* is the best study of that 'noble experiment.' Consult also W. W. Jennings, *The American Embargo 1807–1809.* F. E. Melvin, *Napoleon's Navigation System* is an important monograph (see *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* xix: 257–81). S. E. Morison, *Maritime Hist. of Mass.* describes the actual trading at this period, and is supplemented by an article on the Smyrna trade in *N. E. Quarterly,* i: 208–25.

XVII

J. W. Fortescue, *History of the British Army,* and C. P. Lucas, *Canadian War of 1812* are the principal authorities. Theodore Roosevelt, *The Naval War of 1812* is a popular account. William Wood (ed.), *Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812* (3 vols.) is invaluable, as is L. L. Babcock, *War of 1812 on the Niagara Frontier.* For the West, the Indians, and the origin of the war, see Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812,* a brilliant study of Western and Southern sectionalism, and M. M. Quaife, *Chicago and the Old Northwest.*

For the Peace of Ghent and Hartford Convention C. E. Hill, *Leading American Treaties* and *The Diary of James Gallatin, Peace Maker,* are good introductions. F. A. Updike, *Diplomacy of the War of 1812* is the principal monograph. Important documents are in Wellington's *Supplementary Despatches,* vol. ix; Castlereagh's *Correspondence,* vol. x; J. Q. Adams's *Writings,* vol. v, and *Memoirs,* vols. ii, iii; Gallatin's *Writings* (2 vols.). The Hartford Convention is treated at length in H. Adams, *Documents,* S. E. Morison, *Life of H. G. Otis* (2 vols.): supplementary facts and documents are in *Proceedings Miss. Val. Hist. Assoc.,* vi: 176–88; *Proceedings Mass. Hist. Soc.,* xlviii: 343–51, lx: 24–9; *N. E. Quarterly,* iii: 316–31.

XVIII

General. F. J. Turner, *Rise of the New West* (*American Nation,* xiv) is the best single volume covering this period. Adams's diary, published as the *Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, 1795–1848* (12 vols., or one volume of selections edited by Allan Nevins), W. C. Ford (ed.), *Writings of J. Q. Adams* (7 vols.), and S. M. Hamilton (ed.), *Writings of Monroe* (7 vols.) are important sources. Carl Schurz, *Henry Clay* (2 vols.) is one of the best American biographies. The different editions of Henry Clay's *Works* contain little more than speeches. There is no adequate biography of Monroe; that of D. C. Gilman is useful. Material for an appreciation of J. Q. Adams may be found in John T. Morse's *Life;* in Brooks Adams's introduction to *The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma* by Henry Adams; in D. Bobbé, Mr. & Mrs. J. Q. Adams; and in J. T. Adams, *The Adams Family.* Other biographies containing material on the period are Henry Adams, *John Randolph;* W. M. Meigs, *Life of John C. Calhoun;* and J. S. Bassett, *Life of Andrew Jackson.* The political leaders of the period are brilliantly limned in Claude Bowers, *Party Battles of the Jackson Period.*

On Marshall and the Courts, consult especially the masterly biography by Albert J. Beveridge, though students must beware of his anti-Jefferson bias. Charles Warren, *The Supreme Court in United States History* is especially useful for the background of legal and public opinion. An excellent brief account is E. S. Corwin, *John Marshall and the Constitution.* The biography of A. B. Magruder in the *American Statesmen Series* is disappointing. The leading decisions can be found in John M. Dillon (ed.), *John Marshall; Complete Constitutional Decisions,* and Joseph P. Cotton, *Constitutional Decisions of John Marshall.* J. E. Oster, *Political and Economic Decisions of John Marshall* should be read in connection with Parrington's slashing criticism in vol. ii of his *Main Currents.*

The literature on the Missouri Compromise is voluminous. J. A. Woodburn, *The Historical Significance of the Missouri Compromise* (Amer. Hist. Assoc. *Reports,* 1893) and F. H. Hodder, *Side Lights on the Missouri Compromise* (Amer. Hist. Assoc. *Reports,* 1909) will be found suggestive. The treatment in Von Holst's *Constitutional History* is violently partisan. On economic conditions of the time and the panic of 1819, consult D. R. Dewey's *Financial History of the United States* and F. W. Taussig's *Tariff History of the United States.*

Anglo-American Relations. W. A. Dunning, *The British Empire and the U. S.,* writes from sound knowledge and with good humor. C. K. Webster, *Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815–22* is rather perfunctory in his treatment of Anglo-American policy. H. Temperley, *Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822–7* is more ample and discriminating. J. Fred Rippy, *Rivalry of the U. S. and Great Britain for Latin America* is a capital work. C. H. Levermore, *Disarmament on the Great Lakes,* (World Peace Foundation pamphlets), F. L. Benns, *American Struggle for British West-India Carrying Trade, 1815–30,* and W. E. B. DuBois, *Suppression of African Slave Trade* are important monographs. There is a useful study of the Canadian boundary in the appendix to C. P. Lucas, *History of Canada, 1763–1812.* Richard Rush published two volumes of extracts from his diary, with reminiscences for the years 1817–25, under various titles such as *The Court of London.*

XIX

For the Monroe Doctrine the above-mentioned works of Webster, Temperley, J. Q. Adams, and Rush are indispensable. A. B. Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine, an Interpretation;* D. Y. Thomas, *One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine;* W. F. Reddaway, *The Monroe Doctrine;* and A. Alvarez, *The Monroe Doctrine,* with a valuable documentary appendix including the most important interpretations by American statesmen, are the best general surveys. The authorship of the doctrine is analyzed by W. C. Ford, in the *Proceedings of the Mass. Hist. Society,* 1902, and in the *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* vols. vii and viii. Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823–1826* is a study of the immediate effect. References to important articles in historical periodicals, too numerous to mention here, and to the printed sources, will be found in the foot-notes of Channing's *History,* v: 343–50; F. L. Paxson, *The Independence of the South American Republics;* W. S. Robertson, *Rise of the Spanish-American Republics, as told in the lives of their Liberators,* and *Hispanic-American Relations with the United States,* are the best works in English on those subjects; and their bibliographies list the many important studies in French and Spanish touching the Monroe Doctrine. F. A. Golder, *Russian Expansion on the Pacific 1641–1850,* and the works on Oregon and California listed below deal with the Pacific aspect of the question. For the Anglo-American rivalry in Mexico, the Cuban question, and the Panama Congress, see W. R. Manning, *Early Diplomatic Relations between the U. S. and Mexico;* J. M. Callahan, *Cuba and International Relations.* These works are, however, written largely from American sources, and should be checked by dispatches and letters from British agents in Latin America, some of which are printed in the *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* vii: 304, 500; and by J. Fred Rippy's work.

XX

GENERAL. J. S. Bassett, *Life of Andrew Jackson* is the only biography based on the Jackson MSS., and an excellent political history of the period. Bassett's edition of the *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson* is in course of publication by the Carnegie Institution (6 vols.). James Parton, *Life of Jackson* (3 vols.) is colorful, and well worth reading. C. G. Bowers, *Party Battles of the Jackson Period* is lively but rather inaccurate. A. C. Cole, *Whig Party in the South* and E. Malcolm Carroll, *Origins of the Whig Party* are valuable and suggestive studies. Gaillard Hunt, *John C. Calhoun* is the best life of the South Carolinian; the two-volume one by W. M. Meigs is more detailed, but partisan;

the essay by W. E. Dodd in his *Statesmen of the Old South* is suggestive and stimulating. Calhoun's formal *Works* are in 6 vols.; a selection from his correspondence is printed in the *Report* of the American Historical Association for 1899, ii. Carl Schurz, *Henry Clay* (2 vols.) and H. C. Lodge, *Daniel Webster*, in the *American Statesmen Series*, are still the best biographies of these statesmen. C. H. Van Tyne has edited the *Letters of Webster*, which are not included in his *Writings* (18 vols.). *The Autobiography of Amos Kendall* should be used with caution. *The First Forty Years of Washington Society* and Josiah Quincy, *Figures of the Past*, describe Washington in the Jackson era, and Allan Nevins (ed.), *The Diary of Philip Hone* (2 vols.) describes New York. Charles A. Davis, *The Letters of J. Downing, Major*, are political satire, in Yankee dialect.

Political Conditions and Constitutional Changes. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America* is a classic contemporary account, worthy to rank with Bryce's *American Commonwealth*. J. B. McMaster, *The Acquisition of the Rights of Man in America* assembles a wealth of material in brief compass. M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Party System* is one of the most penetrating analyses that has been written. A brilliant interpretation is A. C. McLaughlin, 'The Significance of Political Parties' in *The Courts, the Constitution and Parties*. Special studies of value are A. B. Darling, *Political Changes in Massachusetts, 1824–1848*, and C. R. Fish, *Civil Service and Patronage*. Fish's *Rise of the Common Man* is a general survey of American society of this generation.

Nullification and Indian Removal. D. F. Houston, *Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina*, C. S. Boucher, *Nullification Controversy in S. C.*, and J. G. Van Deusen, *Economic Bases of Disunion in S. C.* are the three best works; U. B. Phillips, 'Georgia and State Rights,' in *Report* of American Hist. Assoc. for 1901, ii, contains much useful information on nullification and Indian removals in that state. Grant Foreman, *Indians and Pioneers* deals with the Indians before their removal. Dumas Malone, *Public Life of Thomas Cooper* is a notable biography. F. L. Paxson, *History of the Frontier* summarizes Indian removal, with a bibliography. The best account of the Black Hawk War is by T. C. Pease, in *The Centennial History of Illinois*, ii. There are good maps of these Indian wars and cessions in *The American Nation*, vols. xiv, xv.

Bank of the United States and Public Land. R. C. H. Catterall, *Second Bank of the U. S.* is the standard work. R. C. McGrane (ed.), *Correspondence of Nicholas Biddle, 1807–44*, is illuminating, R. G. Wellington, *Political Influence of the Public Lands, 1828–42*, and G. M. Stephenson, *Political History of the Public Lands, 1840–62*, are valuable monographs; and there is some useful source material in A. C. McLaughlin (ed.), *Source Problems in U. S. History.*

XXI

General. A large part of Channing's *History,* vol. v. and of McMaster's *United States,* vols. v–vii is devoted to the subjects treated in this chapter; and the former has excellent bibliographies. Meade Minnigerode, *The Fabulous Forties* is a lively, popular account of that decade. John Macgregor, *Progress of America* (2 vols.) is an excellent conspectus and statistical abstract by an English free-trader who was a skilled observer of foreign countries. Harriet Martineau, *Society in America,* and A. B. Benson (ed.), *America of the Fifties: Letters of Fredrika Bremer,* (a selection from her *Homes of the New World,* 2 vols.) contain penetrating observation on American life by two gifted women. J. Fenimore Cooper, *The American Democrat* contains valuable comments by an American man of letters just returned from Europe. Horace Greeley, *Recollections of a Varied Life* (new ed. by Allan Nevins) is entertaining and illuminating.

The social and economic history of the period is well described by Carl R. Fish, *The Rise of the Common Man.*

The westward movement can be traced in F. J. Turner's *Rise of the New West* and F. L. Paxson's *History of the American Frontier.* A. B. Hulbert, *The Paths of Inland Commerce* describes the canal era, and may be supplemented by Seymour Dunbar, *History of Travel in America* (4 vols.) and A. F. Harlow, *Old Towpaths.* On agriculture and the public lands see P. W. Bidwell and J. I. Falconer, *History of Agriculture in the Northern United States,* and G. M. Stephenson, *The Political History of the Public Lands from 1840 to 1862.* On Immigration, see the general histories of immigration (chapter 40) and A. B. Faust, *The German Element in the United States,* R. B. Anderson, *Norwegian Immigration to 1848,* and J. T. Adams, *New England in the Republic.* Consult also the economic histories listed in the general bibliography.

XXII

The early labor movement is treated exhaustively in Commons, *History of Labour,* vol. i, and *Documentary History,* vols. v–viii. Edith Abbott, *Women in Industry,* and Norman Ware, *The Industrial Worker, 1840–60,* are fresh and interesting studies from a wider range of material. W. R. Waterman, *Frances Wright* is a good biography. A useful compilation of legislation is in Kingsbury (ed.), *Labor Laws and their Enforcement.* G. B. Lockwood, *New Harmony Movement* contains the best account of Robert Owen in America, and Morris Hillquit's *Socialism* includes all the early communistic experiments. Gilbert Seldes, *The Stammering Century* deals with Utopian Experiments, and E. C. Sears, *Days of Delusion,* with the Millerites.

LITERATURE AND TRANSCENDENTALISM. R. W. Emerson's *Journals* (10 vols.) are as important for the intellectual life of America at this period as J. Q. Adams's *Memoirs* for the political, and some of Emerson's addresses and lectures, such as 'Nature,' the 'Divinity School Address,' 'The American Scholar,' 'New England Reformers,' and 'Life and Letters in New England,' may be called original documents of the transcendental movement. A useful selection from the *Journals* is Bliss Perry (ed.), *The Heart of Emerson's Journals.* The *Journals* of Henry D. Thoreau and Nathaniel Hawthorne should also be consulted. The *Dial* (4 vols.) was the literary journal of the movement. O. B. Frothingham, *Transcendentalism in New England* is a general history. Bliss Perry's *Spirit of American Literature* is an excellent introduction. Lewis Mumford, *Herman Melville,* Newton Arvin, *Nathaniel Hawthorne,* and Katherine Anthony, *Margaret Fuller* are perhaps the best transcendental biographies. Lewis Mumford's, *Golden Day* is an original and brilliant celebration of the transcendentalist school. The chapters in Parrington's *Main Currents* combine scholarship, philosophic grasp, and stylistic brilliance. For the Unitarian and Universalist movement see G. W. Cooke, *Unitarianism in America.* The *Works* of W. E. Channing are a source. See J. W. Chadwick, *W. E. Channing,* and R. E. Spiller, "A Case for W. E. Channing" in *New England Quarterly* vol. iii. J. W. Chadwick and O. B. Frothingham have written biographies of Theodore Parker.

For the Humanitarian movement see Channing's *History,* vol. v. There is a suggestive account in J. T. Adams, *New England in the Republic.* L. E. Richards (ed.), *Letters and Journal of S. G. Howe* (2 vols.) is useful. There is a biography of Dorothea Dix by F. Tiffany. On the early temperance movement see J. A. Krout, *The Origins of Prohibition,* and J. B. Gouch's *Sunlight and Shadow.* Woman Suffrage can be traced in *The History of Woman Suffrage* (4 vols.) which has a wealth of documentary material. In this connection the essay in A. M. Schlesinger, *New Viewpoints in American History,* and the chapters on the movement in T. V. Smith, *The American Philosophy of Equality* should be read.

There is a wealth of material on elementary and secondary education during these years, in the *Annual Reports* of the U. S. Commissioner of Education, 1897–98, 1898–99, 1899–1900, and 1900–01. E. P. Cubberly, *Public Education in the United States* is a good general history. B. A. Hinsdale has written the biography of *Horace Mann.*

A. B. Hart, *Slavery and Abolition* is the standard account of abolition, and may be supplemented by Jesse Macy, *The Anti-Slavery Crusade.* Of the many lives of Garrison, the one by his sons (4 vols.) is monumental; J. J. Chapman's is exhilarating, but not quite history; Lindsay Swift's is brief and judicious. Other useful biographies are T. W. Higginson, *Wendell Phillips,* and A. B. Frothingham, *Gerritt Smith.* C. F. Adams, *J. Q. Adams* gives a good account of the fight against the 'gag rule.' E. L. Fox, *The American Colonization Society, 1817–1840,* is a standard account. W. H. Siebert, *The Underground Railroad* is authoritative. The *Reminiscences* of Levi Coffin is a personal narrative of a fugitive.

XXIII

Ulrich B. Phillips, *American Negro Slavery,* and *Life and Labor in the Old South* are very readable works, based on long research and intimate knowledge. They supersede earlier studies of the plantation system with the exception of M. B. Hammond, *The Cotton Industry.* Mr. Phillips has also edited the source material on plantation and frontier in Commons, *Documentary History,* and written the *Life of Robert Toombs,* one of the best biographies of a planter statesman. W. E. Dodd, *The Cotton Kingdom* is a brilliant essay, especially useful for the Southern intellectual movement. F. P. Gaines, *The Southern Plantation, a Study in the Development and Accuracy of a Tradition* fulfils the promise of its title. Parrington's *Main Currents,* vol. ii, has a brilliant section on the 'Mind of the South.' J. D. Wade, *Augustus* B. *Longstreet* is a study of the interesting society of middle Georgia, and should be read in connection with Longstreet's *Georgia Scenes.* Joseph G. Baldwin, *Flush Times in Alabama and Mississippi* is a lively and colorful description of those states, from the authentic school of frontier literature. On the sugar plantations see V. A. Moody, *Slavery on Louisiana Sugar Plantations.* R. Q. Mallard, *Plantation Life before Emancipation,* and Thomas Nelson Page, *Social Life in Old Virginia before the War* are somewhat roseate. Of the many books of travel in the South, F. L. Olmsted, *The Seaboard Slave States* (2 vols.), *Journey in the Back Country,* and *Texas Journey* record the careful observations of a northern farmer who has justly been compared to Arthur Young. (See B. Mitchell, *F. L. Olmsted*) J. D. B. DeBow, *Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States* (4 vols.) is a useful compendium of information and propaganda. Susan D. Smedes, *Memorials of a Southern Planter* gives a picture of the planter at his best. Other contemporary descriptions may be found in Allan Nevins, *American Social History.* Stark Young, *Heaven Trees* is a charming semi-fictitious description of a Louisiana plantation.

XXIV

For the political history of the Van Buren administration, see bibliography for chapter 20. The *Autobiography of Martin Van Buren,* American Historical Association *Reports,* 1918, vol. ii, is really a diffuse and rambling memoir and has little of value on his administration. E. M. Shepard's *Van Buren,* though inadequate, is the best biography. D. B. Goebel, *William Henry Harrison* does justice to the hero of Tippecanoe; Tyler too, gets more than justice in L. G. Tyler, *Letters and Times of the Tylers* (3 vols.). R. C. McGrane, *The Panic of 1837* is a thorough account. There is abundant material on the politics of the Van Buren administration in Benton's *Thirty Years View,* but it must be used with caution.

On Anglo-American relations, see D. A. Mills, 'British Diplomacy in Canada,' *United Empire,* vol. ii, the best account of the Maine boundary controversy. There is an important article by E. D. Adams on Lord Ashburton, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* vol. xvii. R. B. Mowat, *The Diplomatic Relations of Great Britain and the United States* is a general account and H. Keenleyside, *Canada and the United States* is from the Canadian point of view. J. B. McMaster, *The United States,* vol. vi, and W. Kingsford, *History of Canada,* vol. x, contain details of the border incidents. O. E. Tiffany, 'Relations of the United States to the Rebellion of 1837,' *Publications of the Buffalo Historical Society,* vol. viii, is an elaborate discussion of the subject.

XXV

Katherine Coman, *Economic Beginnings of the Far West* (2 vols.), Cardinal Goodwin, *The Trans-Mississippi West, 1803–1853,* and J. C. Bell, *Opening a Highway to the Pacific, 1838–46,* are good general works on the West. H. M. Chittenden, *The American Fur Trade of the Far West* (3 vols.) is the best work on that subject, and includes the best map of the Far West in 1840.

OREGON, THE GREAT PLAINS AND THE ROCKIES. Francis Parkman, *The Oregon Trail* is the classic description of the Great Plains and their Indians, but contains nothing on the actual settlement of Oregon, of which the best compendium is Joseph Schafer, *History of the Pacific Northwest.* W. J. Ghent, *The Road to Oregon* gives the history of the trail. Jesse Applegate, "A Day with the Cow Column," *Oregon Hist. Soc. Quarterly,* 1900, is a classic narrative of the trail. On the Santa Fé Trail, see Henry Inman, *The Old Santa Fé Trail* and R. L. Duffus, *The Santa Fe Trail;* George Catlin, *Letters and Notes on the North American Indians* (2 vols.) was famous in its time and deserves better knowledge now. *Frémont, The West's Greatest Adventurer* (2 vols.), by Allan Nevins, has considerable material in western exploration. Important contemporary narratives of exploration, fur trading, and emigrant trains, by Edwin James, J. B. Wyeth, Edmund Flagg, J. K. Townsend, Fr. P. J. de Smet, Prince Maximilian of Wied, Lord Palmer, and Alexander Ross, are reprinted in Thwaites, *Early Western Travels.* Josiah Gregg, *Commerce of the Prairies* is a classic that is available in several reprints. To these may be added *The Ashley-Smith Explorations . . . 1822–29,* ed. by H. C. Dale, and much valuable material in the *Quarterly of the Oregon Historical Society,* and the *Washington Historical Quarterly.* On the background to the Oregon treaty see H. S. Commager, 'Great Britain and the Oregon Treaty of 1846,' *Oregon Historical Quarterly,* 1927.

The Mormons. M. R. Werner, *Life of Brigham Young* is entertaining and not unduly inaccurate. W. A. Linn, *The Story of the Mormons* is the standard account. F. A. Golder, *The March of the Mormon Battalion* chronicles the participation of the Mormons in the Mexican War. Milo Quaife, (ed.), *The Kingdom of St. James* is the biography of a Mormon leader. H. H. Bancroft, *Utah* is uninspired but useful. C. A. Brough, *Irrigation in Utah,* and G. Thomas, *The Development of Institutions under Irrigation* are valuable accounts of the early social and economic history of Utah.

XXVI

General. N. W. Stephenson, *Texas and the Mexican War* (*Chronicles of America,* xxiv) is a brief, well-written, and judicious summary, based on the latest research. The old-fashioned orthodox 'slave conspiracy' theory is most effectively presented in Hermann von Holst, *Constitutional and Political History of the United States,* vol. ii. G. P. Garrison ploughed new ground in his *Texas* and in his *Westward Extension.* E. I. McCormac, *James K. Polk* is an honest unprejudiced, and comprehensive biography. J. S. Reeves, *American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk* and E. D. Adams, *British Interests and Activities in Texas* are important monographs, the one based largely on the State Department and the other on the Foreign Office Archives. Justin H. Smith, *The Annexation of Texas* and *The War with Mexico* (2 vols.) are the most comprehensive works on either subject, based on the archives of Great Britain, France, Mexico, Texas, and the United States. But they must be used with caution. The author is deductive in his reasoning, and, to quote N. W. Stephenson, 'as artful in his silences as he is effective in his utterances.' G. L. Rives, *The U. S. and Mexico* (2 vols.) is less useful. J. Fred Rippy takes up the story after 1848 in his *United States* *and Mexico.* The Treaty of Guadalupe-Hidalgo is analyzed by Jesse Reeves in *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* vol. x.

Eugene S. Barker who knows more about early Texas than anyone else, and has preserved a judicial temper in the environment of Austin, has not yet written the book that his admirers expect, but has got out an excellent *Life of Stephen F. Austin,* and has scattered important articles during the last twenty-five years throughout the *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.* (esp. xii), the *Reports* of the Amer. Hist. Assoc. (esp. for 1911, i), the *Quarterly of the Texas State Hist. Assoc.,* and its successor, the *Southwestern Hist. Quarterly.* The life of Sam Houston is vividly told in *The Raven,* by Marquis James.

The volumes of Justin H. Smith constitute the best military history of the war. R. S. Ripley, *The War with Mexico* (2 vols.) is useful. These may be supplemented by O. O. Howard, *Life of General Taylor,* and M. J. Wright, *Scott.* Some excellent monographs are in the *Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts,* xiii.

California before 1848. Of two introductory works, I. B. Richman, *California under Spain and Mexico* is the better written, and C. E. Chapman, *History of California, the Spanish Period,* the better documented. C. Goodwin, *Establishment of a State Government in California, 1846–1850,* gives the complete political history. Allan Nevins, *Frémont, the West's Greatest Adventurer,* covers the California period. C. E. Chapman, 'The Literature of California History' in *Southwestern Hist. Quarterly,* xxii, is a good bibliography.

Sources. Madame Calderon de la Barca's *Life in Mexico* (1843, and many later editions) is the classic contemporary description. The indispensable *Diary of James K. Polk* (4 vols.) may most easily be consulted in a one-volume abridgment by Allan Nevins. Good soldiers' views of the war are given in U. S. Grant, *Memoirs,* and E. K. Smith, *To Mexico with Scott. The Diplomatic Correspondence of the Republic of Texas* is printed in the *Reports* of the Amer. Hist. Assoc. for 1907–08; the *Austin Papers* in the *Report* for 1919, ii. The imposing 34 volumes of H. H. Bancroft, *The Pacific States of North America* are largely compilations of source material.

XXVII–XXIX

General. James Ford Rhodes, *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to . . . 1877* (7 vols.) is the best detailed history of that period; but has been shot full of holes by the research of the last forty years. Channing's *History,* vi, is a good corrective to Rhodes, and a guide to the latest writings. For the biographies and works of Calhoun, Clay, Webster, and Polk, see above ch. 20. Frederick Bancroft has written the best *Life of William H. Seward* (2 vols.), whose *Works* consume 5 vols. Carl Sandburg, *Lincoln, the Prairie Years* (2 vols.) is an artistic and inaccurate description; and Albert J. Beveridge, *Lincoln* (2 vols.) a meticulously detailed account of Lincoln's life to 1858. For other biographies of Lincoln see Civil War bibliography. Allen Johnson, *Stephen A. Douglas* is the best book on the 'Little Giant'—there are many bad ones. U. B. Phillips's *Toombs* and L. Pendleton, *A. H. Stephens* are good biographies of Southern Whigs. Allan Nevins, *Frémont* (2 vols.) is a romantic but reliable biography of the Pathfinder. C. B. Going, *David Wilmot, Free-Soiler* is a careful and elaborate piece of work. Indispensable sources are the *Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobb,* and the *Correspondence of R. M. T. Hunter* in the *Reports* of the Amer. Hist. Assoc. for 1911 and 1916. A. C. Cole, *The Whig Party in the South,* and R. F. Nichols, *The Democratic Machine 1850–4* give the political detail and manoeuvreing. C. S. Boucher, '*In re* That Aggressive Slavocracy,' *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.,* viii: 13–79, is a gallant defence of Southern policy; A. C. Cole in the same *Review,* i: 376–99, writes on the Southern Unionists, of which R. H. Shryock, *Georgia and the Union in 1850* is a microscopic study of a single state. R. R. Russel, *Economic Aspects of Southern Sectionalism* is a capital study. E. D. Fite, *The Presidential Campaign of 1860* is comprehensive.

California and the Gold Rush. R. G. Cleland, *History of California, the American Period;* M. F. Williams, *History of the San Francisco Vigilance Committee.* Blaise Cendras, *Sutter's Gold* is a romantic biography. Charles E. Pancoast, *Diary of a Quaker Forty-Niner* is one of the most spirited original narratives in our literature. Others are: O. T. Howe, *Argonauts of '49,* Chauncey Canfield, *Diary of a Forty-Niner,* Louise A. Clapp, *The Shirley Letters from California Mines* and Carolyn Russ, *The Log of a Forty-Niner.* On early attempts to span the continent, see: L. R. Hafen, *The Overland Mail 1849–60,* W. G. Banning, *Six Horses,* G. D. Bradley, *The Pony Express* and F. A. Root and W. E. Connelley, *The Overland Stage.* Josiah Royce, *California* is a philosophical study.

Foreign Relations. M. W. Williams, *Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815–1915* is the capital work, based on British and American archives; Miss Williams has also written on Clayton in the *American Secretaries of State* series, vol. vi. H. B. Learned's study of W. L. Marcy in the same volume is excellent.

There is a fresh study of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in John Bigelow, *Breaches of Anglo-American Treaties.* J. W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient* is a standard and popular work, by an American diplomatist with much experience of the Far East. Tyler Dennett, *Americans in Eastern Asia* is the best account of early trading and treaty relations with China and Japan. P. J. Treat, *Japan and the U. S., 1853–1921* is comprehensive and interesting. Townsend Harris's journal has now been printed in full, *The Complete Journal of Townsend Harris.* Extracts from Commodore Perry's *Narrative* are reprinted in W. E. Griffis, *M. C. Perry.* Inazo Nitobe, *Intercourse between the U. S. and Japan* gives the other side. The Canadian reciprocity negotiations may be studied in C. G. Tansill, *Canadian Reciprocity Treaty of 1854,* and C. D. Allin, *Annexation, Preferential Trade, and Reciprocity.* Laurence Oliphant's genial account of the negotiations is in his *Episodes of a Life of Adventure.* Rhodes, *United States,* i: 516–50, has a full account of Cuban episodes.

Merchant Marine. J. R. Spears, *American Merchant Marine* is the best handbook. Arthur C. Clark, *The Clipper Ship Era,* by an American merchant captain with an historical sense, is classic. S. E. Morison, *Maritime History of Massachusetts* has chapters on the fishermen and whalers as well. F. R. Dulles, *Old China Trade* tells that romantic story. C. L. Lewis, *Matthew Fontaine Maury,* and E. LeRoy Pond, *Junius Smith, the Father of the Atlantic Liner,* are important biographies.

On the Party History during this decade, see L. D. Scisco, *Political Nativism in New York State;* and T. C. Smith, *Liberty and Free Soil Parties in the Northwest.* Jesse Macy, *Political Parties, 1846–1860,* is a general treatment.

The Kansas-Nebraska Act. The Lincoln-Douglas debates are printed in Lincoln's *Complete Works,* and in several separate editions. William Macdonald, *Doc. Source Book,* pp. 397–405, gives a documentary history of the Kansas-Nebraska Act, and Rhodes, *United States,* ii a good summary of the debates; but Mr. Rhodes's view of the genesis of the Act has been traversed by F. H. Hodder in *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.,* ix: 10, xii: 3; by P. O. Ray's *Repeal of the Missouri Compromise* and by H. A. Trexler's *Slavery in Missouri.* Most accounts of the struggle for Kansas are grossly partisan; Channing's *History,* vi, and Beveridge's *Lincoln* are exceptions. F. W. Blakmar, *Charles Robinson* is a biography of one of the Free-State leaders. For the New England Emigrant Aid Society, see S. A. Johnson, in *N. E. Quarterly,* iii: 95–122. On the constitutional aspects, see Milo Quaife, *The Doctrine of Non-Intervention with Slavery in the Territories.*

Dred Scott and John Brown. The opinions in the Dred Scott case are published at length in the *U. S. Reports* (sometimes cited as *Howard's Reports*), xix: 393; extracts are in all collections of constitutional cases, and a lengthy discussion in C. Warren, *Supreme Court* and A. J. Beveridge, *Abraham Lincoln.* The articles by E. D. Corwin and H. T. Cotterall in *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* xvii: 52, and xxx: 56 are indispensable. O. G. Villard, *John Brown* is the best biography; W. E. B. DuBois, *John Brown* is by a noted colored author. H. P. Wilson, *John Brown,* *Soldier of Fortune* is hostile. The New England attitude toward Brown can be read in the *Journals* of Thoreau and Emerson and the biography of Gerritt Smith by O. B. Frothingham.

XXX–XXXIV

The Best Brief Works. Channing's *History,* vol. vi, is the best single volume on the Civil War period, and has excellent bibliographies. His candid account of the civil and economic history of the decade is a valuable antidote for the somewhat heroic view of the Civil War that one naturally gets by reading only the military history. W. E. Dodd, *Lincoln or Lee* is a brief interpretation no student should miss. Lieut.-Col. T. A. Dodge, *Bird's Eye View of our Civil War,* is a brief military history remarkable for clarity and conciseness. J. B. McMaster has brought out a supplementary volume to his *United States,* on Lincoln's Administration, particularly valuable on the social and diplomatic side. John C. Ropes, *The Story of the Civil War* (2 vols.) is probably the best military history so far as it goes, which is only through the campaigns of 1862. Two supplementary volumes by Col. W. R. Livermore cover the campaigns of 1863. J. F. Rhodes, *History of the Civil War* is a detailed military history, scarcely up to the standard of his larger works. Le Comte de Paris, *The Civil War in America* (4 vols.) is particularly useful for the Peninsular Campaign; C. G. Eggleston, *The Confederate War* (2 vols.) is the best military history by a Southerner. *Battles and Leaders of the Civil War* (4 vols.), a well-illustrated symposium by Union and Confederate officers, is highly vivid, but must be read with caution, like all post-war historical work by participants. The *Papers of the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts,* and the *Southern Historical Society Papers* include much material of the same sort, and others of great scientific value. E. C. Smith, *The Borderland in the Civil War* is invaluable. Admiral Mahan's *Farragut* and *The Gulf and Inland Waters;* the *Confidential Correspondence of Gustavus V. Fox* (3 vols.); and M. Robinson, *The Confederate Privateers* are the most important volumes that have yet appeared on the naval history, which is much in need of rewriting. Colyer Meriwether's *Raphael Semmes* is an adequate biography of the most important Confederate naval figure. Of the numerous special works, John Bigelow, *The Campaign of Chancellorsville* is a model of what a military monograph should be. No military history deserves serious consideration unless the author has used the remarkably complete *War of the Rebellion, Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (130 vols.), and *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies* (30 vols.). T. L. Livermore, *Numbers and Losses* *in the Civil War* is an authoritative compilation of vital statistics from the records.

Biographical Literature. *The Crisis Biographies*, ed. by E. P. Oberholtzer (20 vols.) contain some excellent volumes. Gamaliel Bradford, *Union Portraits* and *Confederate Portraits* contain clever character sketches of leading generals and statesmen on both sides. The printed works relating to Lincoln already run to several thousand titles. J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, *Abraham Lincoln* (10 vols.) is largely a history of the Civil War by strong Union partisans. N. W. Stephenson's *Lincoln*, and Lord Charnwood's *Lincoln* are the two best one-volume lives. Alonzo Rothschild's *Lincoln, Master of Men* is a useful study of his relations with generals and cabinet ministers; W. E. Barton's *Life of Lincoln* (2 vols.) is worth reading; C. R. Ballard, *The Military Genius of Lincoln* is by a British general. Nicolay and Hay (eds.), *Abraham Lincoln's Complete Works* (2 vols.) is the handiest edition of Lincoln's writings. New and extensive editions of 'Complete Works' appear almost yearly, but the above contains all the state papers and important letters.

Mrs. V. J. Davis, *Memoirs of Jefferson Davis* (2 vols.) is sentimental, but contains some revealing letters. Of several brief biographies, W. E. Dodd, *Davis* is quite the most valuable. H. J. Eckenrode, *Jefferson Davis* is a brilliant piece of work, somewhat marred by the author's conception of Davis as a conquering Nordic; Allen Tate's *Jefferson Davis, his rise and fall* has the best style; Davis's own *Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government* (2 vols.) and A. H. Stephens, *War between the States* (2 vols.) are typical post-war defences, most valuable if their point of view is understood. Dunbar Rowland (ed.), *Jefferson Davis, Constitutionalist* (10 vols.) is the title of Davis's collected writings; only vols. v and vi are of much value for the Civil War. No one should condemn President Buchanan before reading his *Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion*.

Sentimentalism characterizes most of the lives of Lee. Gamaliel Bradford's *Lee the American* is interesting and suggestive despite this defect. Sir Frederick Maurice, *Lee the Soldier* is an exception, but does not cut deeply. *Recollections and Letters of General R. E. Lee*, by his son and namesake, and the *Reminiscences* by another son, in *South Atlantic Quarterly*, xxvi, are intimate personal studies. D. S. Freeman (ed.), *Lee's Dispatches to Davis* contains a valuable criticism of Lee's campaigns by the editor, as well as letters vital to military history.

Lieut.-Col. G. F. R. Henderson, *Stonewall Jackson* (2 vols.) has literary and artistic qualities of the highest order, and his account of Jackson's Valley campaigns is stirring and accurate; but on later campaigns he is misleading. L. A. Coolidge, *U. S. Grant* is the best biography of that general, whose *Personal Memoirs* (2 vols.) are a classic of military reminiscence. It should be supplemented by J. C. Cramer (ed.), *Letters of U. S. Grant to his Father;* Gen. Horace Porter, *Campaigning with Grant;* James H. Wilson, *Under the Old Flag* and *Life of John A. Rawlins.*

General McClellan stands self-revealed in *McClellan's Own Story;* General Sherman, in the *Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman* (2 vols.) and R. S. Thorndike (ed.), *The Sherman Letters,* 1837 to 1891; Capt. B. H. Liddell Hart, *Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American,* is excellent.

Valuable political biographies are, J. A. Woodburn, *Thaddeus Stevens,* G. H. Haynes, *Charles Sumner,* Pierce Butler, *Judah P. Benjamin,* and L. Pendleton, *Alexander H. Stephens.*

Memoirs and Autobiographies, other than those already listed. Gen. E. P. Alexander, *Military Memoirs of a Confederate* is by a participant, who has corrected battle-field impressions by the official records. Gen. J. E. Johnston, *Narrative of Military Operations* and Gen. James Longstreet, *From Manassas to Appomattox* are defensive and controversial. E. A. Moore, *A Cannoneer under Stonewall Jackson* and Gen. Richard Taylor, *Destruction and Reconstruction,* Gen. G. H. Gordon, *Brook Farm to Cedar Mountain,* Capt. R. G. Carter, *Four Brothers in Blue,* J. K. Hosmer, *The Color-Guard,* and Col. Theodore Lyman, *Meade's Headquarters* give vivid pictures of campaigning. The last has considerable literary merit. The letters of General Pickett to his wife have been collected in a volume *Soldier of the South;* for moving beauty and artistry they are unsurpassed in our literature. Raphael Semmes, *Memoirs of Service Afloat* is by the captain of the *Alabama;* J. M. Morgan, *Recollections of a Rebel Reefer* is more entertaining. The so-called *Diary of Gideon Welles* (3 vols.) is really a post-war memoir giving a vivid though often distorted picture of Lincoln's cabinet. Charles A. Dana, *Recollections of the Civil War* is by the Assistant Secretary of War who accompanied Grant, and gives an intimate view of military events by an intelligent civilian. *The Diary of Senator O. H. Browning* is indispensable for Republican politics.

Foreign Relations. Frederick Bancroft, *W. H. Seward* (2 vols.) is the best life of the American Secretary of State. E. D. Adams, *Great Britain and the American Civil War* (2 vols.) should be supplemented by *The Education of Henry Adams* and *A Cycle of Adams Letters, 1861–5* (2 vols.), and H. D. Jordan and E. J. Pratt, *European Opinion on the American Civil War.* As the French foreign archives for this period are still closed, the views of French relations in John Bigelow's *France and the Confederate Navy,* and *Retrospect of an Active Life* (5 vols.) are necessarily incomplete. J. M. Callahan, *Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy* is a well-rounded monograph. M. L. Bonham, *British Consuls in the Confederacy,* and J. D. Bulloch, *Secret Service of the Confederate States in Europe* (2 vols.) contain much 'inside stuff.' Printed documents of the period will be found in the *British and Foreign State Papers* and the annual *U. S. Diplomatic Correspondence, Papers relating to Foreign Affairs;* Confederate diplomatic correspondence has been published in *Official Records of the Navies,* 2nd series, vol. iii.

NORTH AND SOUTH DURING THE WAR. J. G. Randall, *Constitutional Problems under Lincoln;* E. D. Fite, *Social and Industrial Conditions in the North during the Civil War.* J. C. Schwab, *The Confederate States of America* is an account of Confederate economics and finance. Jefferson Davis's *Rise and Fall* gives the Confederate and U. S. Constitutions in parallel columns. Contemporary reports of debates in the Confederate Congress are in course of publication in the *Southern Hist. Soc. Papers,* beginning with no. 44. Frank Owsley, *States Rights and the Confederacy* is an illuminating study of Confederate constitutional problems. J. D. Richardson (ed.), *Messages and Papers of the Confederacy* (2 vols.). E. C. Kirkland, *The Peace Makers of 1864* is the only study of that aspect, on both sides. A. B. Moore, *Conscription and Conflict in the Confederacy* is a revelation on both those subjects, and one of the first products of the new realistic school of Southern historians. For the Union draft, F. A. Shannon *Organization and Administration of the Union Army* (2 vols.) is indispensable; and A. H. Meneely, *The War Department: 1861* a useful supplement. Ella Lonn, *Desertion during the Civil War* is the only monograph on that neglected subject. The articles by C. W. Ramsdell on the Southern railroads and factories, in *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* xxii, and *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.,* viii, break new ground. Eliza F. Andrews, *A War-Time Diary of a Georgia Girl;* John S. Wise, *The End of an Era* — magnificently written; J. B. Jones, *A Rebel War Clerk's Diary;* G. C. Eggleston, *A Rebel's Recollections;* and Mary B. Chestnut, *A Diary from Dixie;* afford pictures of Southern life in war time.

Of the numerous books of travel, W. H. Russell, *My Diary North and South* is by *The London Times's* best war correspondent. Edward Dicey, *Six Months in the Federal States* (2 vols.), Anthony Trollope, *North America,* Lieut.-Col. A. J. Fremantle, *Three Months in the Southern States,* and [Catherine C. Hopley], *Life in the South by a Blockaded British Subject* (2 vols.) are by accurate English observers.

In conclusion, everyone should read the gorgeous epic poem of Stephen Vincent Benét, *John Brown's Body,* which shows more insight into the Civil War than most of the historians we have mentioned; and Walt Whitman's *Specimen Days,* the finest contemporary literature that the war evoked.

XXXV

For the general history of Reconstruction W. A. Dunning, *Reconstruction, Political and Economic* is particularly good on the political side, and W. L. Fleming, *The Sequel of Appomattox* on the economic and social. E. P. Oberholtzer, *History of the United States since the Civil War* is a social history modelled on McMaster's *History,* with both the virtues and the defects of that monumental work. Rhodes, *History of the United States,* vols. vi and vii, covers the reconstruction period. W. L. Fleming, *Documentary History of Reconstruction* (2 vols.), containing a wide range of source material, is indispensable for the student. Claude Bowers, *The Tragic Era* is a spirited but strongly colored narrative of reconstruction years by an ardent Democrat. Allan Nevins, *The Emergence of Modern America* is the most thoroughly satisfactory one-volume survey of the field, and one of the most brilliant products of the new school of economic historians.

Of the almost countless works of travel and description the following can be recommended: Sidney Andrews, *The South Since the War,* by an able northern newspaper correspondent; J. T. Trowbridge, *The South,* prejudiced but vivid; Whitelaw Reid, *After the War,* by the future editor of the New York *Tribune;* Robert Somers, *The Southern States since the War,* by an English observer; and Charles Nordhoff, *The Cotton States in 1875.* The reminiscences of Southerners are not reliable as to fact but afford an invaluable insight into the psychology of the defeated South. Joseph Le Conte, *Autobiography;* Mary B. Chesnut, *A Diary from Dixie;* Sarah M. Dawson, *A Confederate Girl's Diary;* Frances Butler Leigh, *Ten Years on a Georgia Plantation;* and Mrs. M. L. Avery, *Dixie after the War* are the best.

There is no satisfactory history of the negro in America or of the freedman during reconstruction. The story must be pieced together from monographs and autobiographies. The most important of these are Booker T. Washington's *Up From Slavery,* and W. E. B. Dubois, *The Souls of Black Folk.* There is valuable material in S. Pierce, *The Freedmen's Bureau,* and in A. A. Taylor, *The Negro in South Carolina during Reconstruction.* For a vivid but not entirely reliable picture of negro government, see James Pike, *The Prostrate State: South Carolina under Negro Government.*

The literature on the New South is voluminous and growing. Holland Thompson, *The New South* is a standard survey. Mr. Thompson has also written an important study, *From Cotton Field to Cotton Mill,* and numbers of important articles on the New South. R. P. Brooks, *The Agrarian Revolution in Georgia, 1865–1912,* is an illuminating study of a single state. Two important political studies are H. J. Pearce, *Benjamin H. Hill, Secession and Reconstruction* and F. B. Simkins, *The Tillman Movement in South Carolina.* S. H. Hobbs, *North Carolina, Economic and Social,* is an exhaustive statistical study of the most industrialized of Southern states. On the development of the textile industry see: Broadus Mitchell, *The Rise of the Cotton Mills in the South;* Rupert Vance, *Human Factors in Cotton Culture,* a brilliant study and interpretation; H. L. Herring, *Welfare Work in the Mill Villages;* and M. A. Potwin, *Cotton Mill People of the Piedmont.* W. K. Boyd has written the history of a typical city of the New South, *The Story of Durham.* E. Mims, *The Advancing South* is a cultural study. The *Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. xxxv, is devoted to papers on the New South. There is a wealth of material in the *South Atlantic Quarterly* and *The Sewanee Review.*

XXXVI

For the political and constitutional aspects of Reconstruction see bibliography chapter 35. John W. Burgess, *Reconstruction and the Consituation* is a powerful presentation but is vitiated by the author's preconceptions in favor of the Congressional policy. W. A. Dunning, *Essays on the Civil War and Reconstruction* present the ripe conclusions of the foremost scholar in the field. Lincoln's Reconstruction policy may be studied in E. G. Scott, *Reconstruction During the War* and Charles H. McCarthy, *Lincoln's Plan of Reconstruction.* There are monographs on Reconstruction in every one of the seceded states: the best of these are W. F. Fleming, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Alabama;* J. W. Garner, *Reconstruction in Mississippi;* Ella Lonn, *Reconstruction in Louisiana after 1868;* J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton, *Reconstruction in North Carolina;* John S. Reynolds, *Reconstruction in South Carolina;* William Ramsdell, *Reconstruction in Texas;* C. M. Coulter, *Civil War and Reconstruction in Kentucky;* and H. J. Eckenrode, *A Political History of Virginia during Reconstruction.*

The constitutional phases of Reconstruction may be studied in the general works of Dunning and Burgess already cited, in Warren's *The Supreme Court,* in H. E. Flack, *Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,* and J. M. Mathews, *Legislative and Judicial History of the Fifteenth Amendment.*

For the political history of the period, Edward McPherson, *A Political History of the United States during Reconstruction* is a prime source. Howard Beale, *The Critical Year* is a careful and illuminating study of the election of 1866. B. B. Kendrick has analyzed the *Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction,* and C. E. Chadsey told the story of the *Struggle between President Johnson and Congress* *over Reconstruction.* There is a wealth of material in the *Diary of Gideon Welles* (3 vols.), in Hugh McCullouch, *Men and Measures of Half a Century,* in James G. Blaine, *Twenty Years of Congress* (2 vols.) in George Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years,* and in Carl Schurz *Reminiscences* (3 vols.). Gen. W. T. Sherman reveals one of the most penetrating minds of the time in *The Home Letters of General Sherman,* ed. by M. A. De W. Howe and *The Sherman Letters,* ed. by R. S. Thorndike. *The Education of Henry Adams* views the Reconstruction epoch through the eyes of the most brilliant and profound critic of his generation.

There are biographies of most of the figures prominent in the Reconstruction period, but they are of uneven quality. Robert W. Winston, *Andrew Johnson, Plebian and Patriot* is probably the best biography of that misjudged President. L. P. Stryker, *Andrew Johnson: a Study in Courage* is fuller, but passionately prejudiced in favor of his hero. James A. Woodburn's is the best biography of Thaddeus Stevens, though Samuel McCall's may be used with profit. A. G. Riddle has written the life of Benjamin Wade; A. B. Hart that of S. P. Chase, and Moorfield Storey that of Charles Sumner. H. White's *Life of Lyman Trumbell* is a first-rate piece of work as is G. C. Gorham, *Life and Public Services of E. M. Stanton* (2 vols.). There are remarkably few good biographies of the Southern leaders. H. J. Pearce's *B. H. Hill* is an exception.

The standard work on the impeachment of Johnson is D. M. De Witt, *Impeachment and Trial of Andrew Johnson;* the essay in Dunning's *Essays on Civil War and Reconstruction* should also be consulted.

The files of the *Atlantic Monthly, The Galaxy, The Nation,* the *Independent,* and the *North American Review* during these years contain a wealth of material, most of which must be used with caution. Renewed interest in the South at the end of the century is reflected in numerous articles scattered through these and other periodicals in the nineties and the early years of the twentieth century.

XXXVII

The last phase of the West is dealt with in the concluding chapters of F. L. Paxson, *History of the American Frontier, 1763–1893,* and more fully in his *Last American Frontier.* Emerson Hough, *The Passing of the Frontier* is a vivid popular account. There is excellent material in E. P. Oberholtzer, *History of the United States Since the Civil War,* vols. i–iii *passim,* and Allan Nevins, *The Emergence of Modern America.* On the Indians and Indian fighting see: G. B. Grinnell, *The Story of the Indian;* F. W. Seymour, *The Story of the Redman;* F. E. Luepp, *The*

Indian and his Problem; B. Davis, *The Truth about Geronimo;* and N. A. Miles, *Serving the Republic.* Helen Hunt Jackson, *A Century of Dishonor* is passionate propaganda. The story of the mineral empire has to be pieced together largely from state histories. C. H. Shinn, *The Story of the Mine* is chiefly concerned with the Comstock lode. W. J. Trimble, 'The Mining Advance into the Inland Empire' *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.,* vol. v, is valuable. There is fine illustrative material in N. P. Langford, *Vigilante Days and Ways* and in Mark Twain's *Roughing It.* E. Hough has written *The Story of the Outlaw.*

The literature on the cowboy and the open range is voluminous. Emerson Hough, *The Story of the Cowboy* and P. A. Rollins, *The Cowboy* are the best secondary accounts of the open range. Andy Adams, *The Log of a Cowboy,* and *Reed Anthony, Cowman,* are authentic and realistic. Granville Stuart, *Forty Years on the Frontier* (2 vols.) and J. H. Cook, *Fifty Years on the Old Frontier* are the best of the personal narratives. See also W. Branch, *The Cowboy and his Interpreters.* For the unique balladry of the open range we have the admirable collections of John A. Lomax, *Cowboy Songs and Other Frontier Ballads,* and *Songs of the Cattle Trail and Cow Camp,* together with Badger Clark's own poems, *Sun and Saddle Leather,* which old-timers insist contains more authentic flavor of the cowboy's life than any other prose or poetry. E. D. Branch, *The Hunting of the Buffalo* tells that melancholy story in detail. E. S. Osgood, *The Day of the Cattleman* is a brilliant and scholarly study of the rise and fall of the Cow Kingdom. It may be supplemented by C. C. Rister, *The Southwestern Frontier, 1865–1881.* Stuart Henry, *Conquering Our Great American Plains* is largely a picture of Abilene, Kansas.

For the disappearance of the frontier and political organization, F. J. Turner's classic essay, *The Significance of the Frontier in American History,* is a necessary starting-point. R. P. Porter, *The West from the Census of 1880* consists largely of statistical tables, but is most useful to the student. F. L. Paxson has an illuminating article on the 'Pacific Railroads and the Disappearance of the Frontier' in Amer. Hist. Assoc. *Reports,* 1901, i. Roy Gittinger, *Oklahoma* is one of the best of the state histories; R. E. Twitchell, *Leading Facts of New Mexico History* (2 vols.) has a wealth of material, particularly on the early history of the state. On the state constitutions, see J. D. Hicks, 'Six Constitutions of the New Northwest,' Miss. Val. Hist. Assoc. *Proceedings,* v, ix.

For subjects like the West, a novel, honestly written from authentic materials by a gifted writer having first-hand contact, is about ninety per cent history. Such are Owen Wister, *The Virginians,* on Wyoming cowboy life, Margaret Wilson, *The Able McLaughlins* on a Scots pioneer family, and O. E. Rölvaag, *Giants in the Earth.*

There is a wealth of material on the West in the voluminous publications of the State Historical Societies, most notably those of Minnesota, Kansas, Oregon, Washington, and Texas.

XXXVIII

There is no general history of American railroads, but John Moody, *The Railroad Builders* is a good brief sketch of some of the main roads. The most interesting works for the student are biographies such as J. G. Pyle, *James J. Hill* (2 vols.), George Kennan, *Life of E. H. Harriman* (2 vols.), and C. Hovey, *Life Story of J. P. Morgan* which resembles in tone and reliability the unofficial biographies of crowned heads. H. G. Pearson, *An American Railroad Builder, J. G. Forbes,* is detached and compendious. A. D. Smith has written a spirited popular biography of *Commodore Vanderbilt.* There is a wealth of material in E. P. Oberholtzer's Jay Cooke, *Financier of the Civil War* (2 vols.). J. G. Pyle (ed.), *Memoirs of Henry Villard* somewhat exaggerates Villard's influence on the Northern Pacific. J. B. Hedges, *Henry Villard and the Railways of the Northwest* is an authoritative study of the relation of railways to immigration. W. Z. Ripley, *Railway Problems* is a collection of source extracts that includes such classics as C. F. Adams's *Chapters of Erie* and the *Minnesota Rate Case.* W. Z. Ripley, *Railroads: Rates and Regulations,* and *Railroads; Finance and Organization* are standard treatises including much historical matter. J. W. Starr, *One Hundred Years of American Railroading* is a sketchy popular account. There are histories of most of the important roads, though of uneven merit. A considerable literature has grown up about the Union Pacific. G. M. Dodge, *How We Built the Union Pacific* is by the chief engineer, and should be supplemented by J. R. Perkins, *Trails, Rails and War: the Life of General Grenville Dodge.* On the U. P. see, too, Nelson Trottman, *History of the Union Pacific;* K. White, *History of the Union Pacific Railway;* and E. L. Sabin, *Building the Pacific Railway.* Stuart Daggett, *Chapters on the History of the Southern Pacific;* G. D. Bradley, *Story of the Santa Fé;* and Eugene Smalley, *History of the Northern Pacific Railroad* are competent and impartial histories of individual roads. H. W. Mott, *The Story of Erie* is comprehensive but not entirely reliable. R. E. Riegel, *The Story of the Western Railroads* is a model account, disappointingly brief. C. R. Fish, *The Restoration of the Southern Railroads* is valuable. C. E. Russell, *Stories of the Great Railroads* is a work of the 'muck-raking' type, giving the seamy side of their history, for which the *Report of the U. S. Pacific Railway*

Commission of 1887 (5 vols. 50th Cong., 1st sess., ex. doc. 51) furnishes abundant illustration. There are accounts of the Crédit Mobilier scandal in Rhodes and Oberholtzer; for fuller discussion see J. B. Crawford, *The Crédit Mobilier of America.*

L. H. Haney, *Congressional History of Railways, 1850–87,* is the standard work on land-grants. B. H. Meyer, *Railroad Legislation in the United States;* A. T. Hadley, *Railroad Transportation, its History and its Law;* and W. Thompson, *Federal Centralization,* give the story of the relation of the government to the railroads.

On steamboat transportation, see Norman Beasley, *Freighters of Fortune,* the story of Great Lakes transportation, and H. C. Moulton, *Waterways vs. Canals.* There is a considerable literature of Mississippi Steamboating. Herbert Quick, *Mississippi Steamboating,* Lyle Saxon, *Father Mississippi,* and G. E. Eskew, *Pageant of the Packets* can be recommended.

XXXIX

The 'facts' of American economic history are to be found in the Reports of the Census Bureau and of the numerous state and Federal investigating commissions, but they have not yet been worked into anything like finished form. The best general surveys are those of Faulkner and Jennings (see general bibliography). The volumes in the *Chronicles of America* series are excellent brief accounts, but seldom penetrate beneath the surface: Burton Hendrick, *The Age of Big Business;* Holland Thompson, *The Age of Invention;* and John Moody, *Masters of Capital.* The bibliography in Thompson's volume is particularly valuable. Harry Elmer Barnes, *Living in the Twentieth Century* is an attempt to articulate the scientific and economic changes to the old social and religious patterns of thought.

The most incisive and provocative books on the economic revolution are those by Stuart Chase, *The Tragedy of Waste; Prosperity, Fact or Myth;* and *Men and Machines,* but neither Mr. Chase's statistics nor his conclusions can be accepted without further investigation. The concluding chapters of Lewis Mumford's *Golden Day* will be found most suggestive. There is considerable material on very recent economic developments in Herbert Hoover, *et al., Recent Economic Changes in the United States* (2 vols.).

On science and invention, Waldemar Kaempffert (ed.), *Popular History of American Invention* (2 vols.) is indispensable. Herbert Casson has written three volumes that combine information with interest: *The Romance of Steel, The Romance of the Telephone,* and *The Romance of the Harvester.* George Iles, *Leading American Inventors* is brief and popular, as is also T. C. Martin and S. L. Coles (eds.), *The*

Story of Electricity. On Edison see F. L. Dyer and T. C. Martin, *Edison, His Life and Inventions.* On iron and steel, Andrew Carnegie's *Autobiography* is invaluable. Paul de Kruif's *Seven Iron Men,* the story of the Mesaba Iron Range is breathlessly exciting, and some of its revelations of the methods of big business are most illuminating. Ida Tarbell's *Life of Elbert Gary* is, on the whole, disappointing. John K. Winkler has written on Morgan, *Morgan the Magnificent.*

The literature on Trusts is extensive. John Moody, *The Truth About the Trusts* is old, and of the muck-raking type, but has considerable data not elsewhere available. Of more recent studies the best are: Eliot Jones, *The Trust Problem in the United States;* J. W. Jenks and W. E. Clark, *The Trust Problem;* and H. R. Seager and C. A. Gulick, *Trust and Corporation Problems.* W. Z. Ripley, *Trusts, Pools and Corporations* is an older study by an authority in the field. J. R. Commons, *Legal Foundations of American Capitalism* is useful. A. B. Youngman, *Economic History of Great Fortunes* and G. Myers, *History of Great American Fortunes* are severely critical. A. B. Paine, *Theodore N. Vail* is a readable but not very penetrating biography of a typical 'captain of industry.' The same can be said for G. B. Harvey's *Henry Frick, the Man.* Ida Tarbell, *History of the Standard Oil Company,* though argumentative and scolding in tone, is decidedly one of the best, if not the best, history of a single industry. R. A. Clemens, *American Livestock and Meat Industry* will be found useful.

On trust regulation: Albert Walker, *History of the Sherman Law;* M. W. Watkins, *Industrial Combinations and Public Policy;* Walter Thompson, *Federal Centralization;* and J. W. Jenks, *Economic Aspects of Recent Decisions of the Supreme Court on Trusts* (J. H. U. Studies). Regulation is dealt with fully in the general histories of the trust problem.

XL

LABOR. J. R. Commons, *et al., History of Labour in the United States* (2 vols.) is the standard authority. Professor Commons's *Documentary History of American Industrial Society* (10 vols.) has an enormous amount of source material. He has also edited a volume on *Trade Unionism and Labor Problems.* Mary A. Beard, *Short History of the Labor Movement* is an excellent brief discussion. G. S. Watkins, *Introduction to the Study of Labor Problems* is valuable. The literature on trade unions is extensive. S. Perlman, *History of Trade Unionism in the United States;* George Groat, *Organized Labor in America;* R. F. Hoxie, *Trade Unionism in the United States;* F. T. Carleton, *History and Problem of Organized Labor;* and L. Wolman, *Growth of American Trade Unions, 1880–1923,* are the best references.

The source material for a study of the labor movement is abundant. Samuel Gompers has told the story of his life in *Seventy Years of Life and Labor* (2 vols.) and Powderly written the history of the Knights in *Thirty Years of Labor*. There is illuminating material in Roosevelt's *Autobiography*. E. Gluck, *John Mitchell* is an excellent biography of the great labor leader. W. R. Browne, *Altgeld of Illinois* gives the story of the Haymarket riot and the Pullman strike.

On labor and the courts see G. Groat, *Attitude of American Courts on Labor Cases,* and F. Frankfurter and N. Greene, *The Labor Injunction.* The political aspects of the labor movement can be studied in F. E. Haynes, *Third Party Movements* and *Social Politics in the United States,* and in N. Fine, *Labor and Farmer Parties in the U. S. 1828–1928.* For the more radical aspects of the labor movement see J. G. Brooks, *American Syndicalism* and J. G. Brissenden, *The I. W. W.* D. L. McMurray has written the history of *Coxey's Army. A Story of Industrial Unrest.* Edith Abbott, *Women in Industry* is by one of the foremost students in the country.

Some of the better novels of the period have considerable historical value. Upton Sinclair, *The Jungle* exposes conditions in the Chicago stockyards. Robert Herrick, *Memoirs of an American Citizen* has the Haymarket riot for its background. John Hay, *The Breadwinners* is hostile to labor; Louis Bromfield, *The Green Bay Tree* and *The Good Woman* tell the conflict of capital and labor in a vivid style.

IMMIGRATION. J. R. Commons, *Races and Immigrants in America* is a classic discussion, though now somewhat antiquated. G. M. Stephenson, *History of American Immigration, 1820–1924* is good but somewhat sketchy. J. J. Jenks and W. J. Lauck, *The Immigration Problem* is a sociologist's approach. H. P. Fairchild, *Immigration* is a brief general history. There is a wealth of documentary material in two volumes edited by Edith Abbott, *Historical Aspects of the Immigration Problem* and *Immigration, Select Documents and Case Records.* A useful collection is Mary K. Reely (ed.), *Selected articles on Immigration.* Grace Abbott, *The Immigrant and the Community* is a penetrating study. There are a number of histories of special racial groups. Some of the best are E. G. Balch, *Our Slavic Fellow Citizens;* C. S. Bernheimer, *The Russian Jew in the United States;* A. B. Faust, *The German Element in America;* and K. C. Babcock, *The Scandinavian Element in the United States.* E. A. Hourich, *Immigration and Labor* surveys that subject. The social implications of immigration may be read in Jane Addams, *Twenty Years at Hull House* and *The Second Twenty Years;* and Jacob Riis, *How the Other Half Lives,* and the classic *Making of an American.* Other important personal records are C. C. Jensen, *An*

American Saga; Mary Antin, *The Promised Land,* and M. Pupin, *From Immigrant to Inventor.*

On Oriental immigration see M. E. Coolidge, *Chinese Immigration* and S. L. Gulick, *The American Japanese Problem.* H. S. Garis is satisfactory on *Immigration Exclusion.*

O. E. Rölvaag, *Giants in the Earth* and *Peder Victorious* give the story of the first and second generation and the differing problems of adaptation. A. Cahan, *The Rise of David Levinsky* is a powerful picture of the New York Jew.

XLI

There is crying need for a good history of American agriculture. Brief accounts are A. H. Sanford, *The Story of Agriculture in the United States* and E. L. Bogart, *Economic History of American Agriculture.* There is a wealth of material in L. H. Bailey (ed.), *Cyclopedia of American Agriculture* (4 vols.). L. B. Schmidt and E. E. Ross, *Readings in the Economic History of American Agriculture* is an admirable collection containing articles not easily available elsewhere. W. T. N. Carver, *Select Readings in Rural Economics* is an older collection. There are a number of useful histories of individual crops: E. C. Brooks, *The Story of Corn;* G. Bigwood, *Cotton;* M. A. Carlton, *The Small Grains;* and M. B. Hammond, *The Cotton Industry* (2 vols.) are the most valuable. R. B. Vance, *Human Factors in Cotton Culture* stands in a class by itself.

On agricultural machinery, see the chapters in W. Kaempffert (ed.), *Popular History of American Invention* (2 vols.) and H. W. Quaintance, 'The Influence of Farm Machinery on Production and Labor' in the volume of Schmidt and Ross. H. N. Casson, *The Romance of the Reaper,* and W. Macdonald, *Makers of Modern Agriculture* are popular. There is a 'History of Agricultural Implements' by D. M. Dunham in the 18th *Annual Report* of the Maine Board of Agriculture. E. Wiest, *Agricultural Organization in the United States* is dull but compendious.

S. J. Buck, *The Agrarian Crusade* is a popular history of the farmers in the generation after the War. Professor Buck has also written the standard history of *The Granger Movement.* There is valuable material in A. Nevins, *Emergence of Modern America.* There is an excellent survey of post-war agriculture in the U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, *Yearbook,* 1899. 'Progress of Agriculture in the United States.' On agriculture during the Civil War see E. D. Fite, 'Agricultural development of the West during the Civil War,' *Qt. Journal of Econ.,* xx.

The political history of the agrarian movement may be traced in the volumes of S. J. Buck, in R. McElroy, *Grover Cleveland* (2 vols.), in F. L. McVey, *The Populist Movement,* and in F. E. Haynes, *Third Party Movements.*

Paul de Kruif's *Hunger Fighters* is a gorgeous account of the heroes of scientific agriculture. The literature on Luther Burbank is considerable: D. S. Jordan and V. Kellogg, *The Scientific Aspects of Luther Burbank's Work* and H. S. Williams, *Luther Burbank, His Life and Work*.

There is an extensive literature on the 'farm problem,' much of it of an ephemeral nature. L. F. Carr, *America Challenged* is provocative but not entirely reliable, and the same may be said of W. B. Bizzell, *The Green Rising*. W. E. Dodd, 'Shall Our Farmers Become Peasants,' *Century Magazine,* 1928, is a sombre picture of the farmer's situation. E. R. A. Seligman, *The Economics of Farm Relief: a survey of the Agricultural problem,* is by an eminent economist. O. M. Kile gives the history of *The Farm Bureau Movement*. There are no less than four histories of the Non-Partisan League: Bruce; Gaston; Russell; and Langer.

XLII

Literature. For general works on American literature see general bibliography. There is no full-length interpretative history of post-Civil War literature. V. L. Parrington did not live to complete his study of *American Thought*. Mumford's little collection of essays, *The Golden Day,* is immensely suggestive and written with extraordinary brilliance, and his *Life of Herman Melville* fills in the cultural background of the Civil War period more fully. The richest material is to be found in the autobiographies and letters of literary figures, and in the better biographies. Henry Adams paints a marvellous picture of Boston and Washington in the *Education*. W. D. Howells, *Literary Friends and Acquaintances;* Henry Cabot Lodge, *Early Memories;* and the latter half of Hamlin Garland's *Son of the Middle Border* give the Boston atmosphere. Valuable for Boston and Cambridge, too, is E. W. Emerson, *The Early History of the Saturday Club*. The *Letters of William James* (2 vols.), *Letters of Henry James* (2 vols.), and *Letters* of Henry Adams (W. C. Ford ed.) contain the comments of three of the most acute minds of the generation on the American scene. A. B. Paine's *Life of Mark Twain* (3 vols.) is a classic. Howells, *My Mark Twain* is a tender personal interpretation. Van Wyck Brooks *The Ordeal of Mark Twain* develops the thesis of Twain's frustration by his social environment. Otto Matthiessen has written an exquisite appreciation of *Sarah Orne Jewett*. The most satisfactory life of Whitman is probably that of Bliss Perry. Howells can best be understood from his own critical writings, and in Mildred Howells (ed.) *Life and Letters of William Dean Howells* (2 vols.), and O. W. Firkins, *William Dean Howells*. J. W. Beach, *The Method of Henry James* is a study in literary technique. E. Mims, *Sidney*

Lanier is above the level of literary biographies, and can be supplemented by Lanier's own *Letters,* and by the essay in Gamaliel Bradford's *American Portraits.* John Manly has edited the *Poems and Plays of William Vaughn Moody* (2 vols.) with a lengthy introduction. E. Bisland, *Life and Letters of Lafcadio Hearn* (2 vols.) is fascinating but has aroused considerable controversy. Thomas Beer's *Stephen Crane* is brilliant impressionism. Genevieve Taggard, *Life and Mind of Emily Dickinson* is probably the best of several biographies of the poetess. There is no summarized treatment of the literature of social revolt, but the essay by Parrington in N. Foerster's *Re-interpretation of American Literature* is suggestive, as is also A. M. Schlesinger's essay in the same volume. On the poetic renaissance Amy Lowell, *Tendencies in Modern American Poetry,* Conrad Aiken, *Scepticisms,* Louis Untermeyer, *New Era in American Poetry,* and J. L. Lowes, *Convention and Revolt in Poetry* will be found most useful.

Journalism. There is no satisfactory history of American journalism, as most studies concentrate on a few of the larger metropolitan papers to the exclusion of the Southern and Western ones. The best brief accounts are those of F. Hudson, *Journalism in the United States from 1690 to 1872,* G. H. Payne, *History of Journalism in the United States,* and W. G. Bleyer, *Main Currents in the History of American Journalism.* Algernon Tassin, *The Magazine in America* is distinctly disappointing, but almost alone in the field. The introductions by Allan Nevins in his collection of *American Press Opinion* are suggestive. The most useful material is to be found in the biographies of editors and the histories of some of the papers.

G. S. Merriam, *Life and Times of Samuel Bowles* (2 vols.) is especially valuable. It should be supplemented by R. Hooker, *The Story of an Independent Newspaper.* Rollo Ogden has written the standard *Life and Letters of E. L. Godkin* (2 vols.). For Greeley, his own *Recollections of a Busy Life* (new ed. by Allan Nevins) is indispensable. The old *Life of Horace Greeley* by James Parton is written with that biographer's customary vivacity. Don Seitz has written a journalistic biography of Greeley, and also of *Joseph Pulitzer* and *The James Gordon Bennetts.* Parke Godwin's biography of *William Cullen Bryant* is old-fashioned, and has comparatively little on Bryant's journalistic activities. Royal Cortissoz, *Life of Whitelaw Reid* (2 vols.) is uncritical. E. Cary, *George William Curtis* deals incidentally with the *Harper's Weekly.* Of histories of individual papers the best are: Allan Nevins, *The Evening Post: A Century of Idealism;* F. M. O'Brien, *The Story of the Sun;* and Elmer Davis, *History of the New York Times.*

O. G. Villard, *Some Newspapers and Newspapermen* contains a number of brilliant pen portraits by one of the ablest of contemporary editors.

C. H. Levermore has an excellent article on 'The Rise of Metropolitan Journals,' in *Amer. Hist. Rev.*, vi.

Education. Paul Monroe (ed.), *Cyclopaedia of American Education* (5 vols.) is invaluable. On primary and secondary education there are three satisfactory texts: E. P. Cubberley, *Public Education in the U. S.;* E. G. Dexter, *History of Education in the U. S.;* and R. G. Boone, *Education in the U. S.* Elmer Ellsworth Brown, *The Making of our Middle Schools* is excellent. Edwin Slosson, *American Spirit in Education* is slight and particularly disappointing on recent movements and on higher education. C. F. Thwing's two volumes on higher education are almost alone in the field: *History of Higher education in the U. S.* and *History of Higher Education in the U. S. Since the Civil War.* E. W. Knight, *Public Education in the South* is by the foremost scholar on that subject. S. W. Brown, *The Secularization of American Education* is on a neglected phase. There are some excellent histories of individual universities. The most notable is S. E. Morison (ed.), *The History of Harvard University;* one volume, dealing with the period 1865 to the present, has appeared. On Harvard, too, see W. A. Neilson, *Charles W. Eliot, the Man and His Beliefs.* Fabian Franklin's *Life of Daniel Coit Gilman* tells the story of the origin of Johns Hopkins. T. W. Goodspeed has written *a History of the University of Chicago. The American College and University Series,* ed. by G. P. Krapp, includes volumes on Columbia, Wisconsin, Harvard, Princeton, Illinois, and Vassar. A. D. White, *Autobiography* gives much of the early history of Michigan and Cornell.

Architecture. T. E. Tallmadge, *The Story of American Architecture* and Fiske Kimball, *American Architecture,* are excellent brief histories. By all odds the most provocative and brilliant study is Lewis Mumford, *Sticks and Stones,* an architectural interpretation of certain phases of American history. T. F. Hamlin, *The American Spirit in Architecture,* in the *Pageant of America,* contains invaluable illustrative material. There are a number of excellent biographies: M. G. Van Rensselaer, *Henry Hobson Richardson;* A. H. Granger, *Charles Follen McKim;* and C. H. Moore, *Daniel H. Burnham, Architect and Planner of Cities,* throw a flood of light on American artistic development. Louis Sullivan *Autobiography of an Idea* is the autobiography of one of the most brilliant of American artists.

Painting and Sculpture. Charles H. Caffin has excellent popular histories of both arts: *Story of American Painting,* and *American Masters of Sculpture.* More elaborate are S. Isham and R. Cortissoz, *History of American Painting,* and Lorado Taft, *History of American Sculpture.* Royal Cortissoz has written a number of sketchy but interesting volumes on various phases of American art. *American Artists* is perhaps the most useful. J. C. Van Dyke, *American Painting and Its Traditions* is a study of the leading painters from Inness to Sargent. E. H. Blashfield, *Mural Painting in America* is by one of its ablest practitioners. There are numerous biographies. Among the best are R. Cortissoz, *John La Farge,* and *Augustus Saint-Gaudens;* Kenyon Cox, *Winslow Homer;* F. J. Mather, Jr., *Homer Martin;* E. R. and J. Pennell, *James McNeill Whistler;* F. Schevill, *Karl Bitter;* and Martha Shannon, *Boston Days of William Morris Hunt.*

SPORT. John Allen Krout, *Annals of American Sport* in the *Pageant of America.* F. L. Paxson, 'The Rise of Sport,' *Miss. Val. Hist. Rev.,* iv, gives the historical background.

XLIII

POLITICS OF THE GRANT ADMINISTRATION. For the political history of reconstruction see biobliography for chapter 36. The volumes of Dunning, Rhodes and Schouler cover the Grant administration adequately. Most biographies of Grant neglect his political career for his military; Louis A. Coolidge, *The Life of Ulysses S. Grant* is an exception. For the political history of the period there is a voluminous literature of memoirs and reminiscences. Some of the best of these are: G. H. Hoar, *Autobiography of Seventy Years* (2 vols.); James G. Blaine, *Twenty Years in Congress* (2 vols.); Carl Schurz, *Reminiscences* (3 vols.); Hugh McCulloch, *Men and Measures of Half a Century;* John Sherman, *Recollections of Forty Years* (2 vols.); Andrew D. White, *Autobiography;* and T. C. Platt, *Autobiography.*

On corruption during the Grant administration, Claude Bowers, *The Tragic Era* is the most readable account. The pages in Henry Adams, *The Education of Henry Adams* are brilliant, and his novel, *Democracy,* is a powerful indictment of Washington politics. J. B. Crawford, *The Crédit Mobilier of America* is satisfactory. There is excellent illustrative material in A. B. Paine, *Thomas Nast and his Pictures. Chapters in Erie* by Henry and C. F. Adams brings the trail of corruption very close to the White House. 'Black Friday' can be studied in R. I. Warshaw's *Jay Gould,* and R. H. Fuller, *Jubilee Jim: the Life of Colonel James Fisk.* E. D. Ross has written on *The Liberal Republican Movement,* which can also be studied in C. F. Adams, *Charles Francis Adams* and Don Seitz, *Horace Greeley.*

FOREIGN AFFAIRS. J. F. Rhodes is ample and trustworthy on foreign affairs to 1900. The best history of the *Alabama* claims and the Geneva arbitration is in J. B. Moore, *International Arbitrations,* i, chapter 14; additional material will be found in biographies of the statesmen concerned, and in the *Cambridge Hist. of British Foreign Policy,* vol. iii. The treaty and award are in Malloy's *Treaties,* i: 700–22; the *plaidoyers* and other records are collected in *Papers relating to the Treaty of Wash-*

ington (5 vols.). See also J. V. Fuller's excellent sketch of Hamilton Fish in the *American Secretaries of State* series, vol. vii, and the biography of Charles Francis Adams by his son, C. F. Adams.

The general history of the Hayes and Garfield administrations can be traced in E. E. Sparks, *National Development.* C. L. Haworth, *The Hayes-Tilden Disputed Election* is the standard authority on that subject. The best biography of Hayes is by H. J. Eckenrode, *R. B. Hayes, Statesman of Reunion.* J. W. Burgess, *The Administration of President Hayes* is eulogistic, and far below the standard of his best work. The official life is Charles R. Williams, *The Life of R. B. Hayes* (2 vols.), valuable for inclusion of source material but uncritical. Mr. Williams has also edited the *Diary and Letters of R. B. Hayes* (5 vols.). The official biography of Samuel Tilden is by John Bigelow, in 2 vols., old-fashioned and eulogistic, but valuable.

On civil service reform, C. R. Fish, *Civil Service and the Patronage* is a standard work. There is notable material in Bryce's *American Commonwealth,* vol. ii and in Theodore Roosevelt's *Autobiography.* E. L. Godkin, *Problems of Modern Democracy* contains some essays on spoils in politics by the veteran editor of the *Nation.* There is abundant material in the *Reminiscences* of Carl Schurz. E. Cary, *George William Curtis* is the standard life of the civil service reform leader. The best analyses of the American party system as it developed in the post-war period are C. E. Merriam, *The American Party System* and M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties* (2 vols.).

XLIV

The standard biography of Garfield is T. C. Smith, *James A. Garfield* (2 vols.), above the average of political biographies for this period. There is no biography of Chester A. Arthur. Edward Stanwood, *James Gillespie Blaine* is an excellent though too brief life of the most important Republican party leader; that of Gail Hamilton is personal and less satisfactory. D. R. Dewey, *National Problems* gives a general history of the Cleveland and Harrison administrations, and is exceptionally valuable on the financial and tariff questions. H. C. Thomas, *The Return of the Democratic Party to Power in 1884* is thorough and scholarly. Robert McElroy, *Grover Cleveland, the Man and the Statesman* is the official biography but leaves much to be desired. A new biography of Cleveland by Allan Nevins is in preparation. A sketchy history of the Cleveland administrations is H. J. Ford, *The Cleveland Era.* H. T. Peck, *Twenty Years of the Republic 1885–1905* is a highly readable personal account. There are interesting interpretations of Cleveland and Harrison in W. A. White, *Masks in a Pageant,* and C. E. Merriam has a study of Cleveland in *Four American Party Leaders*. Most of the history of these years must be pieced together from the biographies or autobiographies of the participants. Many of these have been mentioned above. Others are: T. E. Burton, *John Sherman,* dry but useful on financial matters; S. W. McCall, *Life of Thomas B. Reed,* eulogistic; Herbert Croly, *Mark Hanna,* one of the very best of American political biographies.

On foreign affairs, under Cleveland and Harrison, see Dewey and McElroy. Cleveland has an essay on the Venezuela affair in his *Presidential Problems*. See also G. C. Edmundson's article in *Transactions Royal Hist. Society,* 4th ser., vi. Henry James has written on *Richard Olney and His Public Service*. On Hawaii, J. W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient,* and, more exhaustively, E. J. Carpenter, *America in Hawaii* and H. E. Chambers, *Constitutional History of Hawaii*. A. F. Tyler, *The Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine* is a good critical biography of a much overrated secretary.

The Populist Movement can be studied in F. E. Haynes, *Third Party Movements in the United States,* and his biography of *James Baird Weaver*. There is a penetrating account by F. J. Turner in the *Atlantic Monthly,* 1896. W. J. Lauck, *Causes of the Panic of 1893* confines itself to the money question. D. R. Dewey, *Financial History of the U. S.* is the standard work on fiscal matters. D. L. McMurray, *Coxey's Army* is a story of the industrial unrest of the period. Altgeld has received tardy justice in the biography of Waldo R. Browne.

On Bryan and the election of 1896, the student should consult Bryan's own account in *The First Battle*. Three biographies of Bryan have appeared recently: J. C. Long, *Bryan, The Great Commoner;* M. R. Werner, *Bryan;* and, decidedly the best, Paxton Hibben, *The Peerless Leader, William Jennings Bryan*. None of them is entirely satisfactory. The campaign of 1896 is vividly remembered in Peck's *Twenty Years of the Republic,* and in Mark Sullivan's *Our Times,* vol. i. O. S. Olcott, *William McKinley* (2 vols.) is sympathetic, but leaves much to be desired. Mark Hanna has been particularly fortunate in his biographers. Herbert Croly's biography is thorough, scholarly, and profound. Thomas Beer's, *Hanna* is impressionistic and interpretative. James Ford Rhodes deals with the election of 1896 in the first chapter of *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations*.

XLV

SPANISH WAR AND IMPERIALISM. Events leading up to the Spanish War are described in some detail in F. E. Chadwick, *Relations of the United States and Spain: Diplomacy*. The annual *Foreign Relations of the U. S.*

are supplemented by *Spanish Diplomatic Correspondence and Documents, 1896–1900.* E. J. Benton has written on the *International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American War.* B. A. Reuter, *Anglo-American Relations during the Spanish-American War* is largely a study of public opinion.

The War. Col. H. H. Sargent, *The Campaign of Santiago de Cuba* (3 vols.) is the definitive account of the principle military and naval campaigns. F. E. Chadwick, *Relations of the U. S. and Spain: The War* (2 vols.) is more comprehensive and has a bibliography of the published records. H. C. Lodge, *The War with Spain* is wildly inaccurate in spots, but reproduces the flavor and enthusiasm of the time. John D. Long, *The New American Navy* (2 vols.) is by the secretary who saw the rise of the new navy. A. T. Mahan, *Lessons of the War with Spain* is propaganda by our ablest naval historian. R. A. Alger, *The Spanish-American War* is a bit of special pleading. On the attitude of Germany, see L. B. Shippee, 'Germany and the Spanish-American War.' *Amer. Hist. Rev.,* xxx. The most interesting personal accounts are Roosevelt's *Rough Riders* — the book that Mr. Dooley called 'Alone in Cubi,' Joseph Wheeler's *The Santiago Campaign,* John Bigelow, *Reminiscences of the Santiago Campaign,* Frederick Funston, *Memories of Two Wars,* and George Dewey's *Autobiography.*

On the Treaty of Paris consult: *Papers on the Treaty of Paris* (55th Cong. 3d Sess. Sen. Doc. 62), Royal Cortissoz, *Life of Whitelaw Reid* (2 vols.), and the volumes of Chadwick and Benton.

Dependencies. Dean C. Worcester, *The Philippines, Past and Present* is a balanced account of the islands and their administration to 1913, written by a member of the first Philippine Commission. José S. Reyes, *Legislative History of America's Economic Policy toward the Philippines* develops that phase with great detail. Moorfield Storey and M. P. Lichauco, *The Conquest of the Philippines by the U. S., 1898–1925,* presents the Filipino nationalist and anti-imperialist point of view. Katherine Mayo, *Isles of Fear* is an impressionistic attack by the author of *Mother India* on the work of Governor F. B. Harrison, whose apologia is entitled *The Corner-Stone of Philippine Independence, a Narrative of Seven Years.* Nicholas Roosevelt, *The Philippines: a Treasure and a Problem* is a recent survey. Knowlton Mixer, *Porto Rico* is a history and description of American occupation of that island. The only connected accounts of American economic penetration of Cuba, Santo Domingo, etc., are Scott Nearing and Joseph Freeman, *Dollar Diplomacy;* L. H. Jenks, *Our Cuban Colony;* and M. M. Knight, *Americans in Santo Domingo,* all of them highly critical. On the Platt Amendment see L. A. Coolidge, *An Old Fashioned Senator, O. H. Platt.* The anti-imperialistic sentiment is best revealed in G. H. Hoar, *Auto-*

biography of Seventy Years. There are some interesting pages in *The Letters of William James,* ed. by Henry James (2 vols.). W. G. Sumner's essay, 'The Conquest of the United States by Spain' is in his volume *War and Other Essays.*

There is already a large literature on American interests in the Far East. J. W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient* is excellent general survey. Paul S. Reinsch, *An American Diplomat in China* is by a diplomat who was also an historian. Tyler Dennett's *Americans in Eastern Asia* is written with that author's customary thoroughness and scholarship. W. W. Willoughby, *Foreign Rights and Interests in China* is primarily concerned with the relations of China to the great Powers, and by the most learned scholar on Chinese international relations. J. M. Callahan, *American Relations in the Pacific and the Far East* deals with the Philippines, Hawaii and other Pacific interests. P. H. Clements, *The Boxer Rebellion* is scholarly. W. R. Thayer, *John Hay* is a disappointing biography of a secretary whose fame is dimming with each passing year.

The constitutional aspect of imperialism may best be studied in W. W. Willoughby, *Constitutional Law of the U. S.* (2 vols.), and C. F. Randolph, *The Law and Policy of Annexation.* The 'insular cases' can be found in Johnson and Robinson, *Readings.*

General works on American imperialism are C. R. Fish, *The Path of Empire,* brief and superficial but a useful handbook; Archibald Coolidge, *The United States as a World Power,* an interpretation, now somewhat antiquated, and J. H. Latané, *The United States as a World Power,* which combines scholarship, thoroughness and interest.

XLVI

James Ford Rhodes, *The McKinley and Roosevelt Administrations* falls far below the level of his larger *History.* F. A. Ogg, *National Progress* and H. Howland, *Theodore Roosevelt and His Time* are general histories of the Roosevelt and Taft administrations. *Theodore Roosevelt, an Autobiography,* is the best single volume on that President and his administration, and one of the most interesting and illuminating of all American autobiographies. *Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge* (2 vols.) are equally revealing. *The New Nationalism* gives the best summary of his political ideas. Of Roosevelt's biographers Joseph B. Bishop alone has had access to the private papers; his *Roosevelt and His Time* (2 vols.) hardly measures up to the opportunity. C. G. Washburn, *Roosevelt, The Logic of his Career* is the best intimate view that has appeared. C. E. Merriam has an interesting study of Roosevelt as a politician in *Four American*

Party Leaders. There is a penetrating essay on him by John Dewey, in *Characters and Events,* vol. i. W. R. Thayer, *Theodore Roosevelt, an Intimate Biography,* is good on the personal side, but disappointing as history. Albert Shaw, *A Cartoon History of Roosevelt's Career* is both entertaining and informative. No less than four biographies of Roosevelt are in preparation as we go to press.

On the Progressive Era and reform, R. La Follette's *Autobiography* is an indispensable personal source, but like Roosevelt's autobiography must be used with caution. Herbert Croly, *The Promise of American Life* is a profound criticism by the editor of the *New Republic.* His *Progressive Democracy* is a philosophic attempt to adjust the progressive program with the older individualistic ideals of American life. B. P. De Witt, *The Progressive Movement* is a general history. F. C. Howe, *Wisconsin, an Experiment in Democracy* and C. McCarthy, *The Wisconsin Idea* must be used with caution. Brant Whitlock, *Forty Years of It* is the story of municipal reform in a typical city. Lincoln Steffens, *The Shame of the Cities* is an exposé of conditions at the beginning of the century. R. C. Brooks, *Corruption in American Politics and Life* is a more general survey. Samuel P. Orth, *The Boss and the Machine* is a popular history that covers a wide field.

For the trusts and regulation, see bibliography for chapter 39. The report of the Pujo Committee is printed in House Reports no. 1593, 62nd Congress, 3rd Session. B. H. Meyer has written on *The Northern Securities Case,* and his *Railway Legislation in the U. S.* covers the Roosevelt administration. Rogers MacVeagh, *The Transportation Act of 1920* is a thorough analysis. The literature on conservation is large. The best authority is Loomis Havemeyer (ed.), revised edition of C. R. Van Hise, *Conservation of Natural Resources in the U. S.* Roosevelt's *Autobiography* is indispensable. On Irrigation see F. H. Newell, *Irrigation in the U. S.,* R. P. Teele, *Irrigation in the U. S.,* and W. E. Smyth, *Conquest of Arid America.* The *Reports* of the *Public Lands Commission,* the *Inland Waterways Commission,* and the *National Conservation Commission,* are to be found in the Senate Documents, 58th and 60th Congress. Willard G. Van Name, *Our Vanishing Forest Reserves* is a severe arraignment of the U. S. Forest Service.

XLVII

FOREIGN AFFAIRS. On the Panama Canal, J. B. Bishop, *The Panama Gateway* is a general history. J. B. and F. Bishop have collaborated on an excellent biography, *Goethals, Genius of the Panama Canal.* Philippe Bunau-Varilla, *Panama* is by one of the chief participants. H. G. Miller, *The Isthmian Highway* is a general historical, diplomatic and economic analysis. M. C. Gorgas and B. J. Hendrick, *W. C. Gorgas: His Life and Work* tells the story of the miracle of sanitation wrought in Cuba and Panama. Tyler Dennett, *Roosevelt and the Russo-Japanese War* is an exhaustive and fascinating study. The forthcoming biography of Henry White by Allan Nevins will throw much light on American participation in European diplomacy during the Roosevelt administrations. The Algeciras episode is revealed in Bishop's biography. H. C. Hill, *Roosevelt and the Caribbean* punctures the legend of T. R.'s defiance of the Kaiser, and has illuminating chapters on Panama, Cuba and Central America. See also C. L. Jones, *Caribbean Interests of the United States,* and general histories of foreign relations mentioned above and in bibliography chapter 49.

XLVIII

The literature on the Taft administration is very inadequate. There is a biography of the President by Herbert S. Duffy. W. H. Taft, *Presidential Addresses and State Papers* has some important material. B. P. De Witt, *The Progressive Movement* gives the history of the initiative, referendum, recall, state and municipal reform during these years. H. Howland, *Theodore Roosevelt and his Times* and F. A. Ogg, *National Progress* include the Taft administration. There is considerable material in Roosevelt's *Autobiography,* and in Bishop's *Roosevelt. Roosevelt and Taft, the Letters of Archie Butt* (2 vols.) illuminate the break between the two. Canadian relations may be studied in Keenleyside, *Canada and the United States.* H. A. L. Fisher, *James Bryce* treats diplomacy during the Taft administration. M. A. DeW. Howe, *George von L. Meyer, His Life and Public Service* is a biography of Taft's Secretary of the Navy. O. S. Straus, *Under Four Administrations: from Cleveland to Taft* is by Roosevelt's Secretary of Commerce. C. R. Van Hise, *Conservation* continues the story through the Taft administration.

XLIX

We are still too close to the Wilson administration to expect a complete and unbiased history. The best biography of Wilson, though not entirely free from partisanship, is W. E. Dodd, *Woodrow Wilson and his Work,* particularly valuable for the background. The biographies of William A. White and Joseph Tumulty are of a more personal nature. R. S. Baker has published the first two volumes of the authorized biography, *The Life and Letters of Woodrow Wilson* which, while somewhat disappointing in historical treatment, is better than most official biographies. James Kerney, *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson* is a shrewd study of one neglected phase of Wilson's development by a

New Jersey journalist. R. S. Baker and W. E. Dodd (eds.), *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (6 vols.) are, of course, indispensable. The *Letters of Franklin K. Lane* are a delightful running commentary by Wilson's Secretary of the Interior. *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House,* arranged as a narrative by Charles Seymour (4 vols.), leave the President little part in his administration, but are a rich storehouse of material.

On the legislative achievement of the administration the following may be consulted: G. C. Henderson, *The Federal Trade Commission;* E. W. Kemmerer, *The A. B. C. of the Federal Reserve System;* F. W. Taussig, *Tariff History of the U. S.;* A. D. Noyes, *The War Period of American Finance, 1908–1925;* H. P. Willis, *The Federal Reserve;* Roger MacVeagh, *The Transportation Act of 1920;* and J. G. Kerwin, *Federal Water-Power Legislation.*

On Foreign Affairs during the first administration see E. E. Robinson and U. J. West, *The Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson.* J. Fred Rippy, *The United States and Mexico* and C. W. Hackett, *The Mexican Revolution and the United States, 1910–1926,* give our relations with that unhappy Republic. W. S. Robertson, *Hispanic-American Relations with the U. S.* and C. L. Jones, *Caribbean Interests of the United States* are general surveys that may be supplemented by the more critical monographs of L. H. Jenks, *Our Cuban Colony;* M. M. Knight, *The Americans in Santo Domingo;* and D. G. Munro, *The Five Republics of Central America.*

STATISTICAL TABLES

TABLE OF POPULATION OF

ESTIMATES FOR 1770 AND 1780 TAKEN FROM "A CENTURY OF

STATE	1770	1780	1790	1800	1810	1820	1830
New England							
Maine	34,000	55,500	96,540	151,719	228,705	298,335	399,455
New Hampshire	60,000	84,500	141,885	183,858	214,460	244,161	269,328
Vermont	25,000	40,000	85,425	154,465	217,895	235,981	280,652
Massachusetts	265,000	307,000	378,787	422,845	472,040	523,287	610,408
Rhode Island	55,000	52,000	68,825	69,122	76,931	83,059	97,199
Connecticut	175,000	203,000	237,946	251,002	261,942	275,248	297,675
Middle Atlantic							
New York	160,000	200,000	340,120	589,051	959,049	1,372,812	1,918,608
New Jersey	110,000	137,000	184,139	211,149	245,562	277,575	320,823
Pennsylvania	250,000	335,000	434,373	602,365	810,091	1,049,458	1,348,233
South Atlantic							
Delaware	25,000	37,000	59,096	64,273	72,674	72,749	76,748
Maryland	200,000	250,000	319,728	341,548	380,546	407,350	447,040
Dist. of Columbia	....	....	....	14,093	24,023	33,039	39,834
Virginia	450,000	520,000	747,610	880,200	974,600	1,065,366	1,211,405
West Virginia	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
North Carolina	230,000	300,000	393,751	478,103	555,500	638,829	737,987
South Carolina	140,000	160,000	249,073	345,591	415,115	502,741	581,185
Georgia	26,000	55,000	82,548	162,686	252,433	340,989	516,823
Florida	....	....	....	....	....	....	34,730
South Central							
Kentucky	....	45,000	73,677	220,955	406,511	564,317	687,917
Tennessee	....	....	35,691	105,602	261,727	422,823	681,904
Alabama	....	....	....	....	....	127,901	309,527
Mississippi	....	....	....	8,850	40,352	75,448	136,621
Arkansas	....	....	....	....	1,062	14,273	30,388
Louisiana	....	....	....	....	76,556	153,407	215,739
Oklahoma	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Texas	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
North Central							
Ohio	....	....	....	45,365	230,760	581,434	937,903
Indiana	....	....	....	5,641	24,520	147,178	343,031
Illinois	....	....	....	....	12,282	55,211	157,445
Michigan	....	....	....	....	4,762	8,896	31,639
Wisconsin	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Minnesota	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Iowa	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Missouri	....	....	....	....	19,783	66,586	140,455
North Dakota	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
South Dakota	....	....	....	....			
Nebraska	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Kansas	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Mountain							
Montana	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Idaho	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Wyoming	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Colorado	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
New Mexico	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Arizona	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Utah	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Nevada	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Pacific							
Washington	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
Oregon	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
California	....	....	....	....	....	....	....
	2,205,000	2,781,000	3,929,214	5,308,483	7,239,881	9,638,453	12,866,020

THE UNITED STATES
POPULATION GROWTH" (1909) OTHERS FROM THE UNITED STATES CENSUSES

1840	1850	1860	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920
501,793	583,169	628,279	626,915	648,936	661,086	694,466	742,371	768,014
284,574	317,976	326,073	318,300	346,991	376,530	411,588	430,572	443,083
291,948	314,120	315,098	330,551	332,286	332,422	343,641	355,956	352,428
737,699	994,514	1,231,066	1,457,351	1,783,085	2,238,947	2,805,346	3,336,416	3,852,356
108,830	147,545	174,620	217,353	276,531	345,506	428,556	542,610	604,397
309,978	370,792	460,147	537,454	622,700	746,258	908,420	1,114,756	1,380,631
2,428,921	3,097,394	3,880,735	4,382,759	5,082,871	6,003,174	7,268,894	9,113,614	10,385,227
373,306	489,555	672,035	906,096	1,131,116	1,444,933	1,883,669	2,537,167	3,155,900
1,724,033	2,311,786	2,906,215	3,521,951	4,282,891	5,258,113	6,302,115	7,665,111	8,720,017
78,085	91,532	112,216	125,015	146,608	168,493	184,735	202,322	223,003
470,019	583,034	687,049	780,894	934,943	1,042,390	1,188,044	1,295,346	1,449,661
43,712	51,687	75,080	131,700	177,624	230,392	278,718	331,069	437,571
1,239,797	1,421,661	1,596,318	*1,225,163	1,512,565	1,655,980	1,854,184	2,061,612	2,309,187
....	....	....	442,014	618,457	762,794	958,800	1,221,119	1,463,701
753,419	869,039	992,622	1,071,361	1,399,750	1,617,949	1,893,810	2,206,287	2,559,123
594,398	668,507	703,708	705,606	995,577	1,151,149	1,340,316	1,515,400	1,683,724
691,392	906,185	1,057,286	1,184,109	1,542,180	1,837,353	2,216,331	2,609,121	2,895,832
54,477	87,445	140,424	187,748	269,493	391,422	528,542	752,619	968,470
779,828	982,405	1,155,684	1,321,011	1,648,690	1,858,635	2,147,174	2,289,905	2,416,630
829,210	1,002,717	1,109,801	1,258,520	1,542,359	1,767,518	2,020,616	2,184,789	2,337,885
590,756	771,623	964,201	996,992	1,262,505	1,513,401	1,828,697	2,138,093	2,348,174
375,651	606,526	791,305	827,922	1,131,597	1,289,600	1,551,270	1,797,114	1,790,618
97,574	209,897	435,450	484,471	802,525	1,128,211	1,311,564	1,574,449	1,752,204
352,411	517,762	708,002	726,915	939,946	1,118,588	1,381,625	1,656,388	1,798,509
....	....	....	....	....	258,657	790,391	1,657,155	2,028,283
....	212,592	604,215	818,579	1,591,749	2,235,527	3,048,710	3,896,542	4,663,228
1,519,467	1,980,329	2,339,511	2,665,260	3,198,062	3,672,329	4,157,545	4,767,121	5,759,394
685,866	988,416	1,350,428	1,680,637	1,978,301	2,192,404	2,516,462	2,700,876	2,930,390
476,183	851,470	1,711,951	2,539,891	3,077,871	3,826,352	4,821,550	5,638,591	6,485,280
212,267	397,654	749,113	1,184,059	1,636,937	2,093,890	2,420,982	2,810,173	3,668,412
30,945	305,391	775,881	1,054,670	1,315,497	1,693,330	2,069,042	2,333,860	2,632,067
....	6,077	172,023	439,706	780,773	1,310,283	1,751,394	2,075,708	2,387,125
43,112	192,214	674,913	1,194,020	1,624,615	1,912,297	2,231,853	2,224,771	2,404,021
383,702	682,044	1,182,012	1,721,295	2,168,380	2,679,185	3,106,665	3,293,335	3,404,055
....	....	4,837	14,181	135,177	{ 190,983	319,146	577,056	646,872
					{ 348,600	401,570	583,888	636,547
....	....	28,841	122,993	452,402	1,062,656	1,066,300	1,192,214	1,296,372
....	....	107,206	364,399	996,096	1,428,108	1,470,495	1,690,949	1,769,257
....	....	....	20,595	39,159	142,924	243,329	376,053	548,889
....	....	....	14,999	32,610	88,548	161,772	325,594	431,866
....	....	....	9,118	20,789	62,555	92,531	145,965	194,402
....	....	34,277	39,864	194,327	413,249	539,700	799,024	939,629
....	61,547	93,516	91,874	119,565	160,282	195,310	327,301	360,350
....	....	....	9,658	40,440	88,243	122,931	204,354	334,162
....	11,380	40,273	86,786	143,963	210,779	276,749	373,351	449,396
....	....	6,857	42,491	62,266	47,355	42,335	81,875	77,407
....	....	11,594	23,955	75,116	357,232	518,103	1,141,990	1,356,621
....	13,294	52,465	90,923	174,768	317,704	413,536	672,765	783,389
....	92,597	379,994	560,247	864,694	1,213,398	1,485,053	2,377,549	3,426,861
17,069,453	23,191,876	31,443,321	38,558,371	50,155,783	62,947,714	75,994,575	91,972,266	105,710,620

* West Virginia included with Virginia until 1870.

FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION, ALL RACES, BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH: CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

Country of Birth	Number					
	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920
Total foreign born......	5,567,229	6,679,943	9,249,560	10,341,276	13,515,886	13.920,692
Europe.....	4,936,618	5,744,311	8,020,608	8,871,780	11,791,841	11,882,053
Northwestern Europe...	3,124,638	3,494,484	4,380,752	4,202,683	4,239,067	3,830,094
England....	555,046	664,160	909,092	840,513	877,719	813,853
Scotland....	140,835	170,136	242,231	233,524	261,076	254,570
Wales......	74,533	83,302	100,079	93,586	82,488	67,066
Ireland.....	1,855,827	1,854,571	1,871,509	1,615,459	1,352,251	1,037,234
Norway.....	114,246	181,729	322,665	336,388	403,877	363,863
Sweden.....	97,332	194,337	478,041	582,014	665,207	625,585
Denmark...	30,107	64,196	132,543	153,690	181,649	189,154
Netherlands.	46,802	58,090	81,828	94,931	120,063	131,766
Belgium....	12,553	15,535	22,639	29,757	49,400	62,687
Luxemburg .	5,802	12,836	2,882	3,031	3,071	12,585
Switzerland .	75,153	88,621	104,069	115,593	124,848	118,659
France......	116,402	106,971	113,174	104,197	117,418	153,072
Central and Eastern Europe	1,784,449	2,187,776	3,420,629	4,136,646	6,024,041	6,134,845
Germany...	1,690,533	1,966,742	2,784,894	2,663,418	2,311,237	1,686,108
Poland.....	14,436	48,557	147,440	383,407	937,884	1,139,979
Czechoslovakia.......	....	....	....	....	....	362,438
Austria.....	70,797	124,024	241,377	432,798	845,555	575,627
Hungary....	3,737	11,526	62,435	145,714	495,609	397,283
Yugoslavia..	....	....	....	....	....	169,439
Serbia......	....	....	....	....	4,639	....
Montenegro.	....	....	....	....	5,374	....
Russia and Lithuania.	4,644	35,722	182,644	423,726	1,184,412	1,535,563
Finland.....				62,641	129,680	149,824
Rumania....	....	....	....	15,032	65,923	102,823
Bulgaria....	....	....	....	....	11,498	10,477
Turkey in Europe...	302	1,205	1,839	9,910	32,230	5,284
Southern Europe...	25,853	58,265	206,648	530,200	1,525,875	1,911,213
Greece......	390	776	1,887	8,515	101,282	175,976
Albania.....	....	....	....	....	....	5,608
Italy.......	17,157	44,230	182,580	484,027	1,343,125	1,610,113
Spain.......	3,764	5,121	6,185	7,050	22,108	49,535
Portugal....	4,542	8,138	15,996	30,608	59,360	69,981
Other Europe .	1,678	3,786	12,579	2,251	2,858	5,901

IMMIGRATION, BY COUNTRY OF LAST PERMANENT RESIDENCE, 1831–1920

Country	1831–1840	1841–1850	1851–1860	1861–1870	1871–1880	1881–1890	1891–1800	1901–1910	1911–1920
Total Immigrants	599,125	1,713,251	2,598,214	2,314,824	2,812,191	5,246,613	3,687,564	8,795,386	5,735,811
Total Europe	495,688	1,597,502	2,452,657	2,064,407	2,261,904	4,731,607	3,558,793	8,136,016	4,376,564
Austria-Hungary	......	....	....	7,800	72,969	353,722	592,707	2,145,266	896,342
Belgium	22	5,074	4,738	6,734	7,221	20,174	18,167	41,635	33,746
Denmark	1,063	539	3,749	17,094	31,771	88,132	50,231	65,285	41,983
France	45,575	77,262	76,358	35,984	72,201	50,463	30,770	73,379	61,897
Germany	152,454	434,626	951,667	787,468	718,182	1,452,970	505,152	341,498	143,945
Greece	......	....	....	....	....	2,053	15,979	167,519	184,201
Italy	2,253	1,870	9,231	11,728	55,762	307,310	651,893	2,045,877	1,109,524
Netherlands	1,412	8,251	10,789	9,102	16,541	53,701	26,758	48,262	43,718
Norway	1,201	13,903	20,931	109,298	95,323	176,586	95,014	190,505	66,395
Sweden					115,922	391,776	226,266	249,534	95,074
Rumania	......	....	....	....	....	5,938	12,750	53,008	13,311
Russia and Finland	646	656	1,621	4,536	52,254	265,089	602,011	1,597,306	921,957
Spain	2,954	2,759	10,353	8,493	5,266	4,418	8,731	27,935	68,611
Portugal					4,627	11,917	27,323	69,149	89,732
Switzerland	4,821	4,644	25,011	23,286	28,293	81,988	31,179	34,922	23,091
Turkey in Europe	......	....	....	....	....	1,185	3,786	119,256	77,210
United Kingdom	283,191	1,047,763	1,338,093	1,042,674	984,914	1,462,839	659,954	865,015	487,589
England	7,611	32,092	247,125	222,277	437,706	644,680	216,726	388,017	249,944
Ireland	207,381	780,719	914,119	435,778	436,871	655,482	388,416	339,065	146,181
Scotland	2,667	3,712	38,331	38,768	87,564	149,869	44,188	120,469	78,357
Wales	185	1,261	6,319	4,313	6,631	12,640	10,557	17,464	13,107
Not Specified	65,347	229,979	132,199	341,538	16,142	168	67	....	....
Other Europe	96	155	116	210	658	1,346	122	665	18,238
Total Asia	48	82	41,458	64,609	123,803	68,380	71,236	243,567	192,559
China	8	35	41,397	64,301	123,200	61,711	14,799	20,605	21,278
Japan	......	....	....	....	....	....	25,942	129,797	83,837
Turkey in Asia	......	....	....	....	....	....	26,799	77,393	79,389
Other Asia	40	47	61	308	603	6,669	3,696	15,772	8,055

TABLE OF PRODUCTION, MANUFACTURES AND AGRICULTURE

(In Millions of Dollars)

STATE	1880		1900		1920	
	Manufactures	Agriculture	Manufactures	Agriculture	Manufactures	Agriculture
New England						
Maine	79.8	21.9	127.4	37.1	456.8	154.1
New Hampshire	74.0	13.5	118.7	21.9	407.2	51.8
Vermont	31.4	22.1	57.6	33.6	168.1	99.5
Massachusetts	631.1	24.2	1,035.2	42.3	4,011.2	109.2
Rhode Island	104.2	3.7	184.1	6.3	747.3	13.7
Connecticut	185.7	18.0	352.8	28.3	1,392.4	77.2
Middle Atlantic						
New York	1,080.7	178.0	2,175.7	245.3	8,867.0	743.8
New Jersey	254.4	29.7	611.7	43.7	3,672.1	135.0
Pennsylvania	744.8	129.8	1,834.8	207.9	7,315.7	682.3
South Atlantic						
Delaware	20.5	6.3	45.4	9.3	165.0	32.2
Maryland	106.8	28.8	242.6	43.8	873.9	158.2
District of Columbia	11.9	0.5	47.7	0.9	68.8	1.0
Virginia	51.8	45.7	132.2	86.5	643.5	425.2
West Virginia	22.9	19.4	74.8	44.8	472.0	169.1
North Carolina	20.1	51.7	94.9	89.3	943.8	614.1
South Carolina	16.7	41.1	58.7	68.3	381.5	490.0
Georgia	36.4	67.0	106.7	104.3	693.2	338.4
Florida	5.5	7.4	36.8	18.3	213.3	101.2
South Central						
Kentucky	75.5	63.9	154.2	123.3	395.7	512.5
Tennessee	37.1	62.1	108.1	106.2	556.3	492.4
Alabama	13.6	56.9	80.7	91.4	492.7	383.2
Mississippi	7.5	63.7	40.4	102.5	197.7	407.5
Arkansas	6.8	43.8	45.2	79.6	200.3	424.5
Louisiana	24.2	42.9	121.2	72.7	676.2	237.6
Oklahoma	......	......	7.1	45.4	401.4	707.9
Texas	20.7	65.2	119.4	239.8	1,000.0	1,369.5
North Central						
Ohio	348.3	156.8	832.4	257.0	5,100.3	941.7
Indiana	148.0	114.7	378.1	204.5	1,898.8	782.1
Illinois	414.9	204.0	1,259.7	345.6	5,425.2	1,298.9
Michigan	150.7	91.2	356.9	146.5	3,466.2	606.9
Wisconsin	128.3	72.8	360.8	157.4	1,847.0	780.6
Minnesota	76.0	49.5	262.7	161.2	1,218.1	734.5
Iowa	71.0	136.1	164.6	365.4	745.5	1,447.9
Missouri	165.4	95.9	385.5	219.3	1,594.2	952.7
North Dakota	2.4	5.6	9.2	64.3	57.4	368.1
South Dakota			12.2	66.1	62.2	411.1
Nebraska	12.6	31.7	144.0	162.7	596.0	784.7
Kansas	30.8	52.2	172.1	209.9	913.7	882.4
Mountain						
Montana	1.8	2.0	57.1	28.6	166.7	142.6
Idaho	1.3	1.5	4.0	18.1	80.5	181.7
Wyoming	0.9	0.4	4.3	11.9	81.4	68.2
Colorado	14.3	5.0	102.8	33.0	275.6	280.3
New Mexico	1.3	1.9	5.6	10.2	17.9	75.2
Arizona	0.6	0.6	21.3	7.0	120.8	59.8
Utah	4.3	3.3	21.2	16.5	156.9	87.8
Nevada	2.2	2.9	1.6	6.8	22.9	26.4
Pacific						
Washington	3.3	4.2	86.8	34.8	809.6	301.3
Oregon	10.9	13.2	46.0	38.1	366.8	209.5
California	116.2	59.7	302.9	131.7	1,981.2	770.5
Total	5,369.6	2,212.5	13,005.9	4,689.4	62,418.1	21,425.6

THE SIX LEADING AMERICAN INDUSTRIES, 1880–1920

Number of Employees and Value of Products at three census periods

Industry	1880			1900			1920		
	Number of employees	Gross value of production in millions of dollars	Rank based on production	Number of employees	Value	Rank	Number of employees	Value	Rank
Food and kindred products	174,410	1,171.2	1	313,809	2,277.7	1	684,672	12,438.9	1
Textiles	710,493	971.3	2	1,029,910	1,637.5	3	1,611,309	9,216.1	3
Iron and steel and their products	279,491	659.4	3	733,968	1,793.5	2	1,585,712	9,403.6	2
Lumber and its manufactures	319,661	489.4	4	546,953	1,030.9	4	839,008	3,070.1	6
Leather and its finished products	181,772	425.9	5	238,202	583.7	7	349,362	2,610.2	9
Paper and printing	119,388	198.3	6	297,551	606.3	6	509,875	3,012.6	7
Metal and metal products other than iron and steel				190,157	748.8	5	339,469	2,760.3	8
Chemicals and allied products							427,008	5,610.3	4
Vehicles for land transportation							495,939	4,058.9	5

RAILROAD MILEAGE

By Decade

1830	23	1880	93,267
1840	2,818	1890	156,404
1850	9,012	1900	192,556
1860	30,626	1910	240,831
1870	52,922	1920	259,941

SUMMARY OF MANUFACTURES, 1859-1919

	Establishments	Wage-Earners	Capital (In thousands)	Wages (In thousands)	Value of Products (In thousands)
1859	140,433	1,311,246	$ 1,009,856	$ 378,879	$ 1,885,862
1869	252,148	2,053,996	1,694,576	620,467	3,385,860
1879	253,852	2,732,595	2,790,273	947,954	5,369,579
1889	355,405	4,251,535	6,525,051	1,891,220	9,372,379
1899	512,191	5,306,143	9,813,834	2,320,938	13,000,149
1909[1]	246,491	6,615,046	18,428,270	3,427,038	20,672,052
1919[1]	290,105	9,096,372	44,466,594	10,533,400	62,418,079

[1] Figures for 1909 and 1919 do not include hand and neighbourhood industries or establishments with products valued at less than $500.

SUMMARY OF ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY SCHOOLS, CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920
Total population	38,558,371	50,155,783	62,947,714	75,994,575	91,972,266	105,710,620
Population 5–17 years, inclusive	12,055,443	15,065,767	18,543,201	21,538,024	24,239,948	27,728,788
Pupils enrolled in public schools	6,871,522	9,867,505	12,722,581	15,503,110	17,813,852	21,578,316
Per cent of population 5–17, inclusive	57.00	65.50	68.61	71.98	73.49	77.8
Number of teachers	200,515	286,593	363,922	423,062	523,210	679,533
Total expenditure for education	$ 63,396,666	$ 78,094,687	$ 140,506,715	$214,964,618	$426,250,434	$1,036,151,209
Per capita of total population	$1.64	$1.56	$2.24	$2.84	$4.64	$9.80
Per capita of enrollment	$9.23	$7.91	$11.04	$13.87	$23.93	$48.02

PRESIDENTIAL

Yr.	Candidate	Party	Popular vote	Per cent	Electoral vote
1828	Jackson	Democrat	647,231	55.97	178
1828	Adams	Federal	509,097	44.03	83
1832	Jackson	Democrat	687,502	54.96	219
1832	Clay	Whig	530,189	42.39	49
1832	Floyd	Whig	33,108	2.65	11
1832	Wirt	Anti-M.			7
1836	Van Buren	Democrat	761,549	50.83	170
1836	Harrison	Whig	736,656	49.17	73
1836	White	Whig			26
1836	Webster	Whig			14
1836	Mangum	Whig			11
1840	Van Buren	Democrat	1,128,702	46.82	60
1840	Harrison	Whig	1,275,017	52.89	234
1840	Birney	Liberty	7,059	.39	...
1844	Polk	Democrat	1,337,243	49.55	170
1844	Clay	Whig	1,299,068	48.14	105
1844	Birney	Liberty	62,300	2.31	...
1848	Taylor	Whig	1,360,101	47.36	163
1848	Cass	Democrat	1,220,544	42.50	107
1848	Van Buren	Free Soil	291,263	10.14	...
1852	Pierce	Democrat	1,601,474	51.03	254
1852	Scott	Whig	1,380,678	43.99	42
1852	Hale	Free Soil	156,149	4.98	...
1856	Buchanan	Democrat	1,838,169	45.34	174
1856	Fremont	Republican	1,341,264	33.09	114
1856	Fillmore	American	874,534	21.57	8
1860	Douglas	Democrat	1,375,157	29.40	12
1860	Breckinridge	Democrat	845,763	18.08	72
1860	Lincoln	Republican	1,866,352	39.91	180
1860	Bell	Union	589,581	12.61	39
1864	McClellan	Democrat	1,808,725	44.94	21
1864	Lincoln	Republican	2,216,067	55.06	216
1868	Seymour	Democrat	2,709,613	47.23	80
1868	Grant	Republican	3,015,071	52.67	214
1872	Greeley	Democrat	2,834,079	43.83	66
1872	O'Conor	Ind. Democrat	29,408	.45	...
1872	Grant	Republican	3,597,070	55.63	292
1872	Black	Temperance	5,608	.09	...
1876	Tilden	Democrat	4,284,885	50.94	184
1876	Hayes	Republican	4,033,950	47.95	185
1876	Cooper	Greenback	81,740	.97	...
1876	Smith	Prohibition	9,522	.11	...
1876	Walker	American	2,636	.03	...
1880	Hancock	Democrat	4,442.035	48.23	155
1880	Garfield	Republican	4,449,053	48.31	214
1880	Weaver	Greenback	307,306	3.34	...
1880	Dow	Prohibition	10,487	.11	...
1880	Phelps	American	707	.01	...
1884	Cleveland	Democrat	4,911,017	48.89	219
1884	Blaine	Republican	4,848,334	48.27	182
1884	Butler	Greenback	133,825	1.33	...
1884	St. John	Prohibition	151,809	1.51	...
1888	Cleveland	Democrat	5,540,050	48.66	168
1888	Harrison	Republican	5,444,337	47.82	233
1888	Streeter	Union Labor	146,897	1.29	...

VOTE (1828–1920)

Yr.	Candidate	Party	Popular vote	Per cent	Electoral vote
1888	Fisk	Prohibition	250,125	2.20	...
1888	Cowdrey	United Labor	2,808	.03	...
1892	Cleveland	Democrat	5,554,414	46.04	277
1892	Harrison	Republican	5,190,802	43.02	145
1892	Bidwell	Prohibition	271,058	2.24	...
1892	Weaver	People's	1,027,329	8.51	22
1892	Wing	Socialist	21,164	.19	...
1896	McKinley	Republican	7,035,638	50.88	271
1896	Bryan	Democrat	6,467,946	46.77	176
1896	Levering	Prohibition	141,676	1.03	...
1896	Bentley	National	13,969	.10	...
1896	Matchett	Socialist Labor	36,454	.27	...
1896	Palmer	Nat. Democrat	131,529	.95	...
1900	McKinley	Republican	7,219,530	51.69	292
1900	Bryan	Democrat	6,358,071	45.51	155
1900	Woolley	Prohibition	209,166	1.49	...
1900	Barker	People's	50,232	.37	...
1900	Debs	Socialist Democrat	94,768	.67	...
1900	Malloney	Socialist Labor	32,751	.23	...
1900	Leonard	United Christian	518	.00	...
1900	Ellis	Union Reform	5,098	.04	...
1904	Roosevelt	Republican	7,628,834	56.41	336
1904	Parker	Democrat	5,084,401	37.60	140
1904	Swallow	Prohibition	259,257	1.91	...
1904	Debs	Socialist	402,460	2.98	...
1904	Watson	People's	114,753	.85	...
1904	Corregan	Socialist Labor	33,724	.25	...
1904	Holcomb	Continental	830	.00	...
1908	Taft	Republican	7,679,006	51.58	321
1908	Bryan	Democrat	6,409,106	43.05	162
1908	Chafin	Prohibition	252,683	1.69	...
1908	Debs	Socialist	420,820	2.83	...
1908	Watson	People's	28,131	.19	...
1908	Hisgen	Independence	83,562	.56	...
1908	Gillhaus	Socialist Labor	13,825	.10	...
1908	Turney	United Christian	461	.00	...
1912	Wilson	Democrat	6,286,214	41.82	435
1912	Roosevelt	Progressive	4,126,020	27.45	88
1912	Taft	Republican	3,483,922	23.17	8
1912	Debs	Socialist	897,011	5.97	...
1912	Chafin	Prohibition	208,923	1.39	...
1912	Reimer	Socialist Labor	29,079	.20	...
1916	Wilson	Democrat	9,129,606	49.28	277
1916	Hughes	Republican	8,538,221	46.07	254
1916	Hanly	Prohibition	220,506	1.19	...
1916	Benson	Socialist	585,113	3.16	...
1916	Reimer	Socialist Labor	13,403	.07	...
1916	....	Progressive	41,894	.23	...
1920	Harding	Republican	16,152,200	61.02	404
1920	Cox	Democrat	9,147,353	34.55	127
1920	Debs	Socialist	919,799	3.47	...
1920	Christensen	Farmer Labor	26,541	.10	...
1920	Watkins	Prohibition	189,408	.72	...
1920	Cox	Socialist Labor	31,175	.12	...
1920	Macauley	Single Tax	5,837	.02	...

President and Vice-President	Secretary of state	Secretary of treasury	Secretary of war
George Washington-John Adams 1789	T. Jefferson . . . . . 1789 E. Randolph . . . . 1794 T. Pickering 1795	Alex. Hamilton . . . 1789 Oliver Wolcott . . . 1795	Henry Knox . . . 1789 T. Pickering . . . 1795 Jas. McHenry . . 1796
John Adams-Thomas Jefferson 1797	T. Pickering . . . . 1797 John Marshall . . . 1800	Oliver Wolcott . . . 1797 Samuel Dexter . . . 1801	Jas. McHenry . . 1797 John Marshall . . 1800 Sam'l Dexter . . . 1800 R. Griswold 1801
Thomas Jefferson-Aaron Burr . . . . 1801 George Clinton . . . 1805	James Madison . . 1801	Samuel Dexter . . . 1801 Albert Gallatin . . . 1801	H. Dearborn . . . 1801
James Madison-George Clinton . . . . . 1809 Elbridge Gerry 1813	Robert Smith . . . 1809 James Monroe . . . 1811	Albert Gallatin . . . 1809 G. W. Campbell . . 1814 A. J. Dallas . . . . . . 1814 W. H. Crawford . . 1816	Wm. Eustis . . . . 1809 J. Armstrong . . . 1813 James Monroe . 1814 W. H. Crawford 1815
James Monroe-D. D. Tompkins 1817	J. Q. Adams 1817	W. H. Crawford . . 1817	Isaac Shelby . . . 1817 Geo. Graham . . 1817 J. C. Calhoun . . 1817
John Q. Adams-John C. Calhoun 1825	Henry Clay 1825	Richard Rush 1825	Jas. Barbour . . . 1825 Peter B. Porter . 1828
Andrew Jackson-John C. Calhoun . . . 1829 Martin Van Buren . . 1833	M. Van Buren . . . 1829 E. Livingston . . . 1831 Louis McLane . . . 1833 John Forsyth 1834	Sam. D. Ingham . . 1829 Louis McLane . . . . 1831 W. J. Duane . . . . . 1833 Roger B. Taney . . . 1833 Levi Woodbury . . . 1834	John H. Eaton . 1829 Lewis Cass . . . . 1831 B. F. Butler 1837
Martin Van Buren-R. M. Johnson . . . 1837	John Forsyth 1837	Levi Woodbury . . . 1837	Joel R. Poinsett 1837
Wm. H. Harrison-John Tyler 1841	Daniel Webster . . 1841	Thos. Ewing 1841	John Bell 1841
John Tyler 1841	Daniel Webster . . 1841 Hugh S. Legare . . 1843 Abel P. Upshur . . 1843 John C. Calhoun . 1844	Thos. Ewing . . . . . 1841 Walter Forward . . 1841 John C. Spencer . . 1843 Geo. M. Bibb 1844	John Bell . . . . . . 1841 John McLean . . 1841 J. C. Spencer . . . 1841 Jas. M. Porter . . 1843 Wm. Wilkins . . . 1844
James K. Polk-George M. Dallas 1845	James Buchanan 1845	Robt. J. Walker . . . 1845	Wm. L. Marcy . 1845
Zachary Taylor-Millard Fillmore 1849	John M. Clayton 1849	Wm. M. Meredith 1849	G.W.Crawford . 1849
Millard Fillmore 1850	Daniel Webster . . 1850 Edward Everett . 1852	Thomas Corwin . . 1850	C. M. Conrad . . 1850
Franklin Pierce-William R. King 1853	W. L. Marcy . . . 1853	James Guthrie 1853	Jefferson Davis 1853
James Buchanan-J. C. Breckinridge . . 1857	Lewis Cass . . . . . . 1857 J. S. Black 1860	Howell Cobb . . . . . 1857 Philip F. Thomas . 1860 John A. Dix 1861	John B. Floyd . . 1857 Joseph Holt 1861
Abraham Lincoln-Han'b'l Hamlin . . . 1861 Andrew Johnson . 1865	W. H. Seward . . . 1861	Salmon P. Chase . . 1861 W. P. Fessenden . . 1864 Hugh McCulloch . 1865	S. Cameron . . . . 1861 E. M. Stanton . . 1862
Andrew Johnson 1865	W. H. Seward . . . 1865	Hugh McCulloch . 1865	E. M. Stanton . . 1865 U. S. Grant . . . . 1867 L. Thomas . . . . . 1868 J. M. Schofield . 1868
Ulysses S. Grant-Schuyler Colfax . . . . 1869 Henry Wilson 1873	E. B. Washburne 1869 Hamilton Fish . . . 1869	Geo. S. Boutwell . . 1869 W. A. Richardson . 1873 Benj. H. Bristow . . 1874 Lot M. Morrill . . . 1876	J. A. Rawlins . . . 1869 W. T. Sherman . 1869 W. W. Belknap . 1869 Alphonso Taft . . 1876 J. D. Cameron . 1876
Rutherf'd B. Hayes-Wm. A. Wheeler . 1877	W. M. Evarts . . . 1877	John Sherman 1877	G. W. McCrary 1877 Alex. Ramsey . . 1879
Jas. A. Garfield-Chester A. Arthur . . . 1881	James G. Blaine . 1881	Wm. Windom 1881	R. T. Lincoln . . 1881
Chester A. Arthur 1881	F. T. Frelinghuysen 1881	Chas. J. Folger . . . 1881 W. Q. Gresham . . . 1884 Hugh McCulloch . 1884	R. T. Lincoln . . 1881
Grover Cleveland-T. A. Hendricks . . . 1885	Thos. F. Bayard . 1885	Daniel Manning . . 1885 Chas. S. Fairchild . 1887	W. C. Endicott . 1885

THEIR CABINETS

Secretary of navy	Sec'y of interior	Postmaster-gen'l	Attorney-general	Other members
	Established March 3, 1849.	Samuel Osgood 1789 Tim. Pickering.1791 Jos.Habersham 1795	E. Randolph....1789 Wm. Bradford...1794 Charles Lee.....1795	Secretary of agriculture.
Benj. Stoddert....1798		Jos.Habersham 1797	Charles Lee.....1797 Theo. Parsons...1801	Established Feb. 11, 1889.
Benj. Stoddert....1801 Robert Smith.....1801 J. Crowninshield..1805		Jos.Habersham 1801 GideonGranger 1801	Levi Lincoln....1801 Robt. Smith.....1805 J. Breckinridge..1805 C. A. Rodney....1807	N. J. Colman.1889 J. M. Rusk...1889 J. S. Morton..1893
Paul Hamilton....1809 William Jones.....1813 B. W. Crowninshield.'14		GideonGranger 1809 R. J. Meigs, Jr. 1814	C. A. Rodney....1809 Wm. Pinckney...1811 Richard Rush...1814	J. Wilson.....1897 J.Wilson.....1901 J. Wilson.....1909 D.F.Houston.1913
B. W. Crowninshield.'17 Smith Thompson..1818 S. L. Southard....1823		R. J. Meigs, Jr. 1817 John McLean..1823	Richard Rush...1817 William Wirt....1817	E. T. Meredith.......1920 H. C. Wallace 1921 H. M. Gore...1924
S. L. Southard....1825		John McLean..1825	William Wirt....1825	W.M.Jardine.1925
John Branch......1829 Levi Woodbury...1831 Mahlon Dickerson.1834		Wm. T. Barry.1829 Amos Kendall.1835	John M. Berrien.1829 Roger B. Taney..1831 B. F. Butler.....1833	
Mahlon Dickerson.1837 Jas. K. Paulding...1838		Amos Kendall..1837 John M. Niles..1840	B. F. Butler.....1837 Felix Grundy....1838 H. D. Gilpin.....1840	
George E. Badger..1841		FrancisGranger 1841	J. J. Crittenden..1841	
George E. Badger..1841 Abel P. Upshur...1841 David Henshaw...1843 Thomas W. Gilmer.1844 John Y. Mason....1844		FrancisGranger 1841 C. A. Wickliffe.1841	J. J. Crittenden..1841 Hugh S. Legare..1841 John Nelson.....1843	Secretary of commerce and labor.
George Bancroft...1845 John Y. Mason....1846		Cave Johnson..1845	John Y. Mason..1845 Nathan Clifford..1846 Isaac Toucey....1848	Established Feb. 14, 1903.
William B. Preston.1849	Thomas Ewing..1849	Jacob Collamer 1849	Reverdy Johnson 1849	George B. Cortelyou.....1903
William A. Graham.'50 John P. Kennedy..1852	A H. H. Stuart .1850	Nathan K.Hall 1850 SamD.Hubbard1852	J. J. Crittenden..1850	Victor H. Metcalf......1904–6
James C. Dobbin..1853	R'bt.McClelland1853	JamesCampbell1853	Caleb Cushing...1853	O. S. Straus.1907–9 Chas. Nagel..1909
Isaac Toucey.....1857	JacobThompson 1857	AaronV.Brown 1857 Joseph Holt...1859	J. S. Black......1857 Edw. M. Stanton.1860	
Gideon Welles....1861	Caleb B. Smith.1861 John P. Usher...1863	Horatio King..1861 M'tgomeryBlair1861 Wm. Dennison.1864	Edward Bates...1861 Titian J. Coffey..1863 James Speed....1864	
Gideon Welles....1865	John P. Usher...1865 James Harlan...1865 O. H. Browning.1866	Wm. Dennison.1865 A. W. Randall..1866	James Speed....1865 Henry Stanbery..1866 Wm. M. Evarts..1868	(Department divided, 1913.)
Adolph E. Borie...1869 George M.Robeson 1869	Jacob D. Cox...1869 C. Delano......1870 Zach. Chandler .1875	J.A.J. Creswell.1869 Jas.W.Marshall1874 MarshallJewell 1874 James N.Tyner 1876	E. R. Hoar......1869 A. T. Ackerman..1870 Geo. H. Williams 1871 Edw. Pierrepont.1875 Alphonso Taft...1876	Secretary of commerce.
R. W. Thompson..1877 Nathan Goff, Jr...1881	Carl Schurz....1877	David M. Key.1877 Horace Maynard.'80	Chas. Devens....1877	
W. H. Hunt......1881	S. J. Kirkwood..1881	T. L. James....1881	W. MacVeagh...1881	William C.Redfield.......1913
W. E. Chandler....1881	Henry M. Teller.1881	T. O. Howe....1881 W Q. Gresham.1883 Frank Hatton..1884	B. H. Brewster...1881	Joshua W. Alexander..1919 H. C. Hoover.1921
W. C. Whitney....1885	L. Q. C. Lamar..1885 Wm. F. Vilas...1888	Wm. F. Vilas..1885 D.M.Dickinson 1888	A. H. Garland...1885	H. C. Hoover.1925 W.F.Whiting.1928

PRESIDENTS AND

President and Vice-President	Secretary of state	Secretary of treasury	Secretary of war
Benjamin Harrison-Levi P. Morton . . 1889	James G. Blaine. 1889 John W. Foster. . 1892	Wm. Windom. . . . 1889 Charles Foster. . . . 1891	R. Proctor. . . . . 1889 S. B. Elkins. . . . 1891
Grover Cleveland-Adlai E. Stevenson 1893	W. Q. Gresham . . 1893 Richard Olney. . . 1895	John G. Carlisle. . 1893	D. S. Lamont. . 1893
Wm. McKinley-Garret A. Hobart. . . . 1897 Theodore Roosevelt 1901	John Sherman. . . 1897 Wm. R. Day. . . . 1897 John Hay. 1898	Lyman J. Gage. . . 1897	R. A. Alger. . . . 1897 Elihu Root. . . . 1899
Theodore Roosevelt. . . . . 1901 Chas. W. Fairbanks 1905	John Hay. . . . . . . 1901 Elihu Root. . . . . 1905 Robert Bacon. . . 1909	Lyman J. Gage. . . 1901 LeslieM. Shaw. . . 1902 G. B. Cortelyou. . . 1907	Elihu Root. . . . 1901 Wm. H. Taft. . . 1904 Luke E. Wright. 1908
William H. Taft-James S. Sherman . . 1909	P. C. Knox. 1909	F. MacVeagh. . . . 1909	J. M. Dickinson 1909 H. L. Stimson . 1911
Woodrow Wilson-Thos. R. Marshall. . 1913	Wm. J. Bryan. . . 1913 Robert Lansing. . 1915 BainbridgeColby 1920	W. G. McAdoo. . . 1913 Carter Glass. . . . . 1918 D. F. Houston. . . . 1920	L. M. Garrison. 1913 N. D. Baker. . . 1916

THEIR CABINETS — *Continued*

Secretary of navy	Sec'y of interior	Postmaster-gen'l	Attorney-general	Other members
Benj. F. Tracy....1889	John W. Noble..1889	J. Wanamaker. 1889	W. H. H. Miller..1889	
Hilary A. Herbert..1893	Hoke Smith....1893 D. R. Francis...1896	W. S. Bissell...1893 W. L. Wilson...1895	R. Olney........1893 J. Harmon......1895	
John D. Long.....1897	C. N. Bliss.....1897 E. A. Hitchcock. 1899	James A. Gary. 1897 Chas. E. Smith. 1898	J. McKenna.....1897 J. W. Griggs.....1897 P. C. Knox......1901	
John D. Long.....1901 Wm. H. Moody...1902 Paul Morton......1904 C. J. Bonaparte...1905 Victor H. Metcalf. 1907 T. H. Newberry...1908	E. A. Hitchcock. 1901 J. R. Garfield...1907	Chas. E. Smith. 1901 Henry C. Payne 1902 Robt. J. Wynne. 1904 G. B. Cortelyou. 1905 G. von L. Meyer 1907	P. C. Knox.....1901 W. H. Moody....1904 C. J. Bonaparte..1907	Secretary of labor.
G. von L. Meyer...1909	R. A. Ballinger..1909 W. L. Fisher....1911	F. H. Hitchcock 1909	G. W. Wickersh'm 1909	Established March 4, 1913.
Josephus Daniels..1913	F. K. Lane.....1913 J. B. Payne....1920	A. S. Burleson..1913	J. C. McReynolds. 1913 Thos. W. Gregory. 1914 A. M. Palmer....1919	William B. Wilson........1913

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

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
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